


THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CAREER OF GENERAL ANASTASIO BUSTAMENTE (1780-1853)

CATHERINE ANDREWS

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews**



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
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University of St. Andrews

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


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
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For my Mum and Grandma,
who taught me never to give up.

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Abstract

Anastasio Bustamante was born in the modern day state of Michoacán in 1780. He served the Royalist Army during the insurgency (1810-1821). He was one of the first officers to adhere to Agustín de Iturbide's Plan of Iguala in 1821, and a signatory of the Act of Independence (28 September 1821). He was a member of Mexico's first independent government, the *Junta Provisional Gubernativa* (1821-1822) and served as the Captain General of the Eastern and Western Internal Provinces during Iturbide's short-lived reign as Emperor (1822-1823). He served as the Commander General of the Eastern Interior Provinces between 1826 and 1829. In 1829 he became Vice-President of the Republic. In December 1829 he led a successful rebellion against the incumbent President, Vicente Guerrero. He served as acting Head of the Executive between 1830 and 1832. In 1837 he was elected President. He occupied this position until 1841. He commanded the troops of the Western Division during the war with the United States (1846-1848). Between 1848 and 1849, he oversaw the pacification of one of the many rebellions of the Sierra Gorda (now the Sierra de Querétaro). He died in Guanajuato in 1853, aged 73.

This study examines Bustamante's military and political career. It rejects the traditional interpretation of the General, which portrays him as a weak and indecisive man lacking in any real political principles. Instead, it argues that Bustamante was a resolute and pragmatic leader, who supported the cause of moderate federalism for most of his career.

List of Abbreviations

AGN: Archivo General de la Nación

AGGEG: Archivo General del Gobierno del Estado de Guanajuato

AGNCM: Archivo General de Notarías de la Ciudad de México

AHG: Archivo Histórico de Guanajuato

AHSRE: Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores

CMA: Correspondence of Mariano Arista, in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, the University of Texas Library, Austin (henceforth NLB)

CMPA: Correspondence of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga (NLB)

CONDUMEX: Centro de Estudios de la Historia de México, CONDUMEX

FGA: Francisco García Archive (NLB)

FO: Foreign Office Papers of the Public Record Office

INAH: Archivo Histórico del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia

LAA: Lucas Alamán Archive (NLB)

LAF: La Colección Lafragua de la Biblioteca Nacional de México, Fondo Reservado

MRPA: The Mariano Riva Palacio Archive (NLB)

SDN:AH: Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional

SDN: SC: Sección de Cancelados de la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional

VGFA: Valentín Gómez Farías Archive (NLB)

Acknowledgements

Many individuals and institutions have provided invaluable support and assistance in the research and writing of this work. The Arts and Humanities Research Board and the University of St. Andrews have provided financial assistance during my three years as a post-graduate. Travel grants from the Department of Spanish of the University of St. Andrews, the Society for Latin American Studies, and the Russell Trust, enabled me to spend ten months in Mexico (1999-2000) carrying out archival research. I would like to thank all the staff at the various archives and libraries that I have visited in Great Britain and Mexico for their help and patient good humour. Special thanks must of course go to my supervisor, Will Fowler, for his enthusiasm and encouragement over the last three years. Particular gratitude is equally due to Anne Staples, who acted as my supervisor while I was in Mexico, and who has provided helpful commentary upon my written work. I am also grateful for the guidance and advice generously offered by Linda Arnold and Ana Lau Jaiven.

On a personal note, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all those people who made my visit to Mexico so enjoyable. I am grateful to the señora Rodríguez, Con and Ceci Rodríguez, and Victor, Julián and Emilo Valdés, for all their friendly support. Thanks must also go to Amaranta Avedaño for all the *atole* and *tamales* we have shared. At home, I am grateful to all my family and friends, who have been supportive and encouraging over the last three years. However, I would like to specially thank Wendy Anderson and Brendan Fox for their valiant proof-reading; my long-suffering former flat-mates, Helen Haley and Duncan Brannen, for their friendship; and my parents, Eric and Hilda Andrews, and my sister Rachel, for their love and support. Thanks must finally go to Jesús, without whom none of this would have been possible.

Introduction

Anastasio Bustamante¹ was an important political figure in independent Mexico. Born in 1780, in the present day state of Michoacán, he trained originally as a doctor. He served in the Royalist Army between 1810 and 1821. He was one of the original supporters of Agustín de Iturbide's Plan of Iguala in 1821. He was a member of the *Junta Provisional Gubernativa*, the first independent government in Mexico, and was one of the signatories of Act of Independence. He was a close friend and ally of Iturbide throughout his short-lived Empire and unlike many of his military colleagues, remained loyal to the Emperor until his abdication in April 1823. Bustamante was elected as Vice-President of the Republic in January 1829. In the following December he led a successful revolt against the incumbent President, Vicente Guerrero. Between 1830 and 1832 he served as acting Head of the Executive. In 1837 he was elected as President. He occupied this position until October 1841, when he was overthrown by a triumvirate of Generals led by his great rival, Antonio López de Santa Anna. In 1846 he was appointed to the Senate and was elected as President of that body a year later. He commanded the troops of the Western Division during the war with the United States (1846-1848). Between 1848 and 1849, he oversaw the pacification of the one of the many rebellions of the Sierra Gorda (now the Sierra de Querétaro). He died in Guanajuato in 1853, aged 73.

Despite Bustamante's leading role in Mexican politics, he has been, as Michael Costeloe rightly points out, 'one of the forgotten men of early nineteenth century Mexican history.'² With the exception of Brian Hamnett's study of Bustamante's career

¹ Because of Mexican pronunciation, which does not distinguish between the 'c' and the 's', it is possible to see two versions of Bustamante's name in the primary sources: Anastasio and Anastacio. Bustamante himself always used the former, which is the correct modern day spelling. For that reason I have chosen to adopt this spelling throughout my thesis.

² Michael P. Costeloe, "The Triangular Revolt in Mexico and the Fall of Anastasio Bustamante," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 20 (1988), p. 337.

in the Royalist Army,³ he has received little biographical attention. This thesis will try to take the first steps to rectify this neglect. It proposes to examine Bustamante's military and political career, and to assess the contribution he made to the principal events of the early national period in Mexico.

The overall aim of the work will be to investigate and analyse Bustamante's political stance from the beginning of his military career in 1810 until its close after the final campaign against the rebels of the Sierra Gorda in 1849. Most of Bustamante's contemporaries alleged that he had no fixed political opinions, but was easily dominated by those who advised him. Guillermo Prieto, who was adopted into Bustamante's circle of friends in 1840, claimed that he suffered from 'una ausencia completa de convicciones políticas, [...] se desentendía de toda cuestión moral y seguía el dictado de las gentes que le rodeaban.'⁴ When Bustamante's career is looked at superficially it is easy to understand how such an opinion could come about. During his time in government Bustamante seemed to dally between the two major causes of the time: centralism and federalism, and betray one cause for the other on various occasions. He began his career nominally as a centralist in the court of Agustín I, but on the fall of the Empire he became associated with the federalists and the Masonic Lodge of York. He was elected as Vice-President with the help of this Rite in 1829. However, during 1829 he allied himself with many former members of the Scottish Rite of Masons, who were considered to be centralist sympathisers. With their help he led the Plan of Jalapa against the *yorkino* government of Vicente Guerrero in December 1829. His subsequent administration was, and still is, continually accused of trying to impose a centralist system upon the Republic. In 1837 he was chosen as a candidate for the first Presidential elections conducted under the Centralist

³ Brian R. Hamnett, "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de independencia 1810 - 1821," in Virginia Guedea (ed.), *La revolución de independencia* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1995), pp. 99 - 129.

⁴ Guillermo Prieto, *Memorias de mis tiempos* (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1996), p. 180.

Constitution of 1836 by members of the centralist faction. But a year later he became associated once more with the federalists and with their attempts to replace the Constitution of 1836 with the Federal charter of 1824. This alliance came to an abrupt end in December 1838 when he refused to support a revolution in favour of federalism organised by his federalist associate, Manuel Gómez Pedraza.

This study will argue that this version of events is comprehensively disproved by a detailed analysis of Bustamante's political career. It will demonstrate that far from being a turncoat and a moral ignoramus, Bustamante had strong political views that he followed throughout his life. It will contend that, despite appearances to the contrary, once Bustamante allied himself with the federalist cause in the 1820s he remained committed to federalism for the remainder of his career. It will argue that those who condemn Bustamante for his disloyalty fail to take into consideration the circumstances that prompted him to behave in the manner in which he did.

A secondary aim of the investigation will be to assess Bustamante's leadership qualities in both the army and government. Most of his contemporaries had no great opinion of his disposition or capacity to govern. Lorenzo de Zavala commented that Bustamante was not 'un hombre de grandes capacidades ni de genio superior,'⁵ and claimed that he was 'sin talentos para dirigir.'⁶ Carlos María de Bustamante, for his part, came to the same conclusion. He described Anastasio Bustamante as being: 'un hombre de bien, caballero e hidalgo como el que más, compasivo y generoso, bravo en la campaña; pero sin disposición para gobernar en grande.'⁷ Both Prieto and the Scottish wife of the first Spanish Minister in Mexico, Frances Calderón de la Barca, considered Bustamante to be ignorant and quite stupid.⁸ Again, this work will propose

⁵ Lorenzo de Zavala, *Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México desde 1808 hasta 1830* (Mexico City: Oficina Impresora de Hacienda, 1918), vol. 2, p. 294.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

⁷ Carlos María de Bustamante, *Continuación del cuadro histórico de la revolución mexicana: El gabinete mexicano durante el segundo periodo de la administración del Exmo. Señor D. Anastasio Bustamante* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económico/Instituto Helénico, 1985), vol. 1, p. 42.

⁸ Frances Erskine Calderón de la Barca, *Life in Mexico: The Letters of Fanny Calderón de la Barca* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966), p. 106. She writes that Bustamante was

that this judgement upon Bustamante is not altogether correct. It will point out that Bustamante's extended education in Guadalajara and Mexico City demonstrates quite clearly that he was neither ignorant nor stupid. It will show that Bustamante's qualities as a leader and governor are usually assessed with reference to his performance as President between 1837 and 1841, and do not take into account his behaviour as Vice-President or as a military chief. It will also suggest that the weak government over which Bustamante presided as President was brought about, not by his own shortcomings, but by the conventions of the Constitution of 1836, which allowed the executive only limited power.

Finally, this study will try to reconcile Bustamante's reputation amongst his contemporaries as a kind, well-meaning man with the image of Bustamante as a ruthless soldier and politician drawn by the evidence of his behaviour during the wars of independence and as Head of Government. How is it possible that the man described by Calderón de la Barca as looking 'like a little New York merchant or doctor—fat and pursy—a good man with honest, benevolent face, frank and simple in his manners and not at all like a hero;⁹ or who Prieto characterised as 'tratable, sencillo, sin odios ni aspiraciones bastardas sin instintos carniceros y sin deseo de dañar personalmente a nadie;¹⁰ was able to order the executions of countless insurgents during the wars of independence, or sanction the repressive measures which characterised his Vice-Presidency between 1830 and 1832? This study will contend that Bustamante behaved in a manner typical to that of his class. He was after all, an *hombre de bien* imbued with the values and prejudices of the comfortable classes of nineteenth-century Mexico. In this world it was perfectly acceptable to execute insurgents or rebels from the lower classes, in order to dissuade others from following

'remarkably ignorant' and made 'a very stupid President.' Prieto, *Memorias de mis tiempos*, p. 180. Prieto comments that Bustamante's conversation 'realmente no era digno de un muchacho de veinte años.'

⁹ Calderón de la Barca, *Life in Mexico*, p. 107.

¹⁰ Prieto, *Memorias de mis tiempos*, p. 181.

their example. It will argue that the repression during 1830 and 1832, for which Bustamante was later condemned, including the execution of Vicente Guerrero, was not opposed by the vast majority of the *hombres de bien*. Instead, it will demonstrate that the success of Santa Anna's rebellion in 1832 was not wholly dependent upon outrage at the violence practised by Bustamante's government, but rather upon opposition to its strong support of the Church and army.

The examination of Bustamante's military and political career will be undertaken chronologically. This structure has been adopted for two reasons. In the first place, the development and evolution of Bustamante's political opinions can be charted very clearly in this format. Secondly, it permits the biography to enter into a number of discussions upon certain events in which Bustamante played no active part, but by which the progress of his career was profoundly affected. The study will begin by looking at Bustamante's early career as a doctor and an officer in the Royalist Army during the insurgency. In Chapter Two, Bustamante's relationship with Agustín de Iturbide will be explored. Chapter Three will discuss Bustamante's rise to power at the end of 1829. The following two chapters will examine Bustamante's role in government, as Vice-President between 1830 and 1832, and as President between 1837 and 1841. The final chapter will consider Bustamante's post-Presidential career and focus upon his participation in the war with the United States and the pacification of the Sierra Gorda in 1849.

Anastasio Bustamante was not the only 'forgotten man' of early nineteenth-century Mexican history. The careers of other figures, like General Gabriel Valencia, who formed part of the military triumvirate which deposed Bustamante in 1841, and General Luis Quintanar, one of Agustín de Iturbide's most important allies, and friend of Bustamante, still await detailed study. One of the reasons that these men have been ignored is that they belong to the group of traditionalist and conservative politicians and *caudillos*, which have traditionally been vilified and condemned since the time of

the Porfirato. It is hoped that this study will shed some light upon this hitherto neglected group, and that its conclusions will contribute to the better understanding of this period of Mexican history.

Chapter One: The War of Independence

Trinidad Anastasio Francisco Sales Bustamante y Oseguera was baptised on 27 July 1780 in the *parroquia* of San Francisco, Jiquilipan in what is today the state of Michoacán.¹ His parents were José Ruiz Bustamante and Francisca Oseguera; both recorded as being Spaniards² and residents of the village. According to Manuel Rivera Cambas, during his childhood he lived with his parents in Tamazuela and Zapotlán el Grande, in the present day state of Jalisco. His father made a modest living in the transportation of ice from the volcanos of Colima to the city of Guadalajara. In other words, the future President was of relatively humble beginnings, a member of what has been called 'the provincial bourgeoisie.'³ By birth, he belonged to the lower strata of Creole society⁴ and he could only have expected that his future would be contained within these confines. If his parents did not wish him to follow in his father's footsteps, and instead wanted him to make a career for himself, there were only four respectable professions open to a man in his position: that of clergyman, doctor, soldier or lawyer. In fact, he would try his hand at the first three, before the events of September 1810 convinced him to make what would be the crucial decision of his

¹ Archivo General de la Nación (henceforth referred to as AGN): *Genealogía* AGG 469 34-B, contains the archives of the *parroquia* of San Francisco, Jiquilipan.

² According to Doris Ladd, the title of 'español' did not necessarily mean that the titular was actually a Peninsular Spaniard. This title was used by Creoles and Peninsular Spaniards alike to separate themselves from the great mass of indigenous and mixed race population. Doris M. Ladd, *The Mexican Nobility at Independence 1780-1826* (Austin: Institute for Latin American Studies The University of Texas at Austin, 1976), p. 7.

³ Brian R. Hamnett, "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de independencia," in Virginia Guedea (ed.), *La revolución de independencia* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1995), p. 121. Also see, Brian R. Hamnett, *Roots of Insurgency. Mexican Regions, 1750-1824* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 19.

⁴ Secretaría de la Defensa de la Nación (henceforth referred to as SDN), Sección de Cancelados (henceforth referred to as SC) XI/III/1-235/1-31/00002, 00005. Service Records for Anastasio Bustamante, dated December 1817 and December 1820. In these records, Anastasio Bustamante describes himself as a 'noble.' Ladd explains that this term was used much like the title 'español' to separate white inhabitants of New Spain from the mixed race and indigenous population. It very rarely indicated that the person in question was in possession of 'noble' blood in the nineteenth-century European sense of the word. Ladd, *The Mexican Nobility at Independence*, p. 7. *Ibid.*, XI/III/1-235/1-31/00001. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, dated December 1812. In this service record, Bustamante terms himself an American Spaniard. This is probably the most accurate description of his status.

life: to become a full-time soldier. This action proved to be a turning point for Bustamante. The Royalist Army in Mexico during the wars of insurgency was full of opportunities for any ambitious young man. From the very beginning, a chronic lack of troops and healthy officers meant that promotions were not difficult to come by. The conditions of the war allowed all officers considerable autonomy of action and granted them a great deal of local power. In this way, a humble son of the provincial bourgeoisie, who began his military career as a lowly Lieutenant, could reach the rank of Colonel in less than eight years.

However, Anastasio Bustamante's case is hardly unique in the history of the Mexican Royalist Army. Other members of the Creole provincial bourgeoisie also benefited from their decisions to join this Army. The examples of Antonio López de Santa Anna, Agustín de Iturbide, Manuel Gómez Pedraza and Miguel Barragán immediately spring to mind. So, in a way, the experiences of Bustamante during this time are illustrative of a general movement. Through charting his progress we also chart that of countless other Creole officers. We will note how the make-up of the Royalist Army, which before 1810 was predominantly commanded by Peninsular officers, was changed by the sudden influx of Creoles after the events of September 1810. We will assess the effect their experiences as commanding officers, of power and authority, had on their perceptions of themselves and on the army in which they served. Finally, in light of the above, we will consider whether, by arming the Creoles and putting them in positions of authority within the army, the viceregal government freed the Creoles from their centuries' long dependence upon their Peninsular masters, and in so doing, sowed the seeds of its own destruction.

A: Life before 1810

Initially, Anastasio Bustamante seemed destined for an ecclesiastical career. In 1795, at the age of fifteen, he enrolled into the *Colegio Seminario Conciliar de*

San José in Guadalajara on the recommendation of the village priest of Tuxpam, Marcelino Figueroa. This school offered a ten-year course of education and training for the ministry and had gained an excellent reputation in its hundred-year history.⁵ Its entrance requirements demanded that the prospective student be able to read, write and do mental arithmetic. In order to enrol, Bustamante would also have been expected to know the catechism and show a distinct talent and aptitude for learning. We do not know whether the young Anastasio was a boarder at the school or whether he was simply a day pupil. But, given the less than affluent status of his parents, it is more likely that he fell into the latter category, as students who boarded at the Seminary were charged 125 pesos annually.⁶ It is likely that Bustamante studied grammar and rhetoric in his first years at this school. Then, probably at the age of seventeen or eighteen, he would have begun to study the Arts and Philosophy for a further three years. These lessons would have been conducted entirely in Latin and involved the study of Logic, Metaphysics, Physics, Moral Philosophy, Arithmetic, Geometry and Algebra.⁷ It seems that the future General did apply himself in lessons and often achieved some of the best marks in his class. This can have been no small achievement, considering that his contemporaries included Valentín Gómez Farías, Juan Cayetano Portugal, Juan de Dios Cañedo and Diego García Conde.⁸

⁵ The *Colegio Seminario de San José* first opened its doors in 1699. Its former building now houses the Regional Museum of Guadalajara. Rosario Ramírez, "Constitución y reglamentos del Seminario de Guadalajara en los trescientos años de su que hacer," in Jaime Olveda (ed.), *El Seminario Diocesano de Guadalajara. Tercer centenario* (Guadalajara: El Colegio de Jalisco, 1996), pp. 21 and 23.

⁶ Angélica Peregrina "La enseñanza y los alumnos del Seminario, siglo XIX," in Olveda (ed.), *El Seminario Diocesano de Guadalajara*, p. 53.

⁷ As Bustamante and Gómez Farías enjoyed parallel careers up until 1808, I have based my assumptions upon the information provided by Lilian Briseño Senosiáin, Laura Solares Robles and Laura Suárez de la Torre in their work, *Valentín Gómez Farías y su lucha por el federalismo, 1822-1858* (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco, 1991), p. 26.

⁸ Armando Martínez Moya, "El Seminario Conciliar de Guadalajara en el contexto colonial," in Olveda (ed.), *El Seminario Diocesano de Guadalajara*, pp. 47-48. Also see Manuel Rivera Cambas, *Los Gobernantes de México (1822-1843)* (Mexico City: Editorial Citlaltépetl, 1964), volume 4, p. 324 and Briseño Senosiáin, Solares Robles and Suárez de la Torre, *Valentín Gómez Farías y su lucha por el federalismo*, p. 26.

At the end of these three years, Bustamante would have had to pass an examination which would qualify him to continue his studies at the Seminary with a view to eventually becoming a priest, or to leave the school and enrol in a university or college in order to begin studying another profession. The young man chose the second option and moved to Mexico City where he undertook the study of Chemistry and Medicine. He studied Chemistry under Dr. Ligner, at the *Colegio de Minería* and Medicine, probably at the Royal University. It is difficult to know precisely the studies Bustamante undertook as there are few sources available on this subject. However, it was believed later that he followed courses in Mineralogy at the *Colegio*, probably to complement his Chemistry studies.⁹ He most likely undertook his practical medical experience with Dr. José Ignacio García Jove, Professor of Anatomy and Surgery at the Royal University and Director of the Hospital of the Indies, who later recommended him for his first medical position in San Luis Potosí.¹⁰ He seems to have again been a model student, applying himself tirelessly to his work and was well appreciated by his teachers. During his studies, the poverty of Bustamante's family caused him financial worries. However, his tutor, Dr. Ligner, managed to arrange for him to live in the Dominican *Colegio de Porta-Caeli*, and thus alleviate many of his problems. Here in Mexico City, his studies once more brought him into contact with Valentín Gómez Farías who was also a medical student at that time. Such a long acquaintance between the two men, from the Seminary to the capital, suggests the possibility that they may have

⁹ *El Atleta*, 24 February 1830. This newspaper attributed him the qualifications of Bachelor of Philosophy (referring to his qualification from the Seminary in Guadalajara) and Bachelor of Medicine. It also states that Bustamante studied Mineralogy. In order to demonstrate what they described as their respect for the then Vice-President's intellectual merits, they gave him the nickname 'el general bachiller' or 'the student General.' *El Atleta* was fiercely opposed to Bustamante's administration at this time and such a nickname was most likely intended to be ironic, and was almost certainly not designed to flatter.

¹⁰ Gómez Farías did his practical experience with this doctor at more or less the same time. It is likely that he and Bustamante were colleagues. Briseño Senosiáin, Solares Robles and Suárez de la Torre, *Valentín Gómez Farías y su lucha por el federalismo*, p. 27. Rivera Cambas tells us it was Dr. García Jove who recommended Bustamante for his first job. Rivera Cambas, *Los Gobernantes de México*, vol. 4, p. 325.

been friends.¹¹ Certainly in the early years after independence Bustamante wrote personal letters to Fariás,¹² although their opposing political views would soon bring this friendship to an end. His studies at the *Colegio de Minería* may also have brought him into contact, and even friendship, with José Antonio Facio, who attended the *Colegio* in the same years as Bustamante.¹³

Upon attaining his medical qualification in 1808, Bustamante obtained a position as a family doctor in San Luis Potosí, thanks largely to the recommendation of Dr. García Jove. His salary was 500 pesos per annum. In San Luis his merit as a doctor was quickly noticed and in the same year he was appointed as the Director of the local hospital of San Juan de Dios.¹⁴ He was also paid 50 pesos each year by the city's *Ayuntamiento* to tend to the sick amongst the poorer classes of society.¹⁵ According to the biographer of María Francisca de la Gándara, the wife of the future Vice-Roy, Félix Calleja, Bustamante was well-received by the *potosinos* and held them, and their city, in high regard for the rest of his life.¹⁶

The young doctor's stay in San Luis proved to be the turning point of his career. Here he first met Brigadier Félix Calleja and took the decision to join one of the cavalry regiments which made up part of the Tenth Militia Brigade of San Luis Potosí. Bustamante had been used as the family doctor by the Calleja family since his arrival. However, his services did not bring him to the attention of the Brigadier until Calleja's wife fell ill with an eye infection and the ointment

¹¹ Hamnett, "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de independencia," p. 102. He suggests that Fariás and Bustamante became friends in Mexico City.

¹² Valentín Gómez Fariás Archive, in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin (henceforth referred to as VGFA) no. 93. Bustamante to Valentín Gómez Fariás, Guadalajara, 27 February 1824.

¹³ Santiago Ramírez, *Datos para la historia del Colegio de Minería* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1982), p. 203.

¹⁴ Rivera Cambas, *Los Gobernantes de México*, vol. 4, p. 325.

¹⁵ José de J. Núñez y Domínguez, *La virreina mexicana: doña María Francisca de la Gándara de Calleja* (Mexico City: Imprenta Universaria, 1950), p. 101.

¹⁶ In order to back up this assertion, Núñez y Domínguez refers to an event which took place in San Luis Potosí in 1838. In June of that year the image of the Virgin of Guadalupe resident in the city's parish church had accidentally caught fire. The municipal authorities then arranged, directly with the then President Bustamante, for a new image to be commissioned and made. Bustamante undertook the payment of the image himself as a gift to the city. *Ibid.*, p. 102, footnote 5.

prescribed by Bustamante brought about a swift recovery.¹⁷ This medical success transformed him into a friend of the family and of Calleja himself, which in turn brought him into contact with many of the Brigadier's other young acquaintances, including Manuel Gómez Pedraza, Manuel de la Sota Riva and Miguel Barragán. But, most importantly of all, he decided to join Calleja's Militia Brigade. It is clear that Bustamante entered this force as an officer, probably as Lieutenant,¹⁸ more than likely buying his commission, as was the custom in the Bourbon Army.¹⁹ However, it is unclear which regiment he did join, although as the Tenth Brigade was made up almost entirely of cavalry regiments it is probable that his regiment was a mounted one. Lucas Alamán and José de J. Núñez y Domínguez assert that he began his military career as the surgeon for the Dragoons of San Luis.²⁰ Other historians simply record that he joined *el Cuerpo del Comercio*, a company of the above Dragoons.²¹ His service records do not begin until 1811 and state that he enlisted in the Lancers Regiment of Calleja's Army of the Centre, a regiment that was only set up in September 1810.²² They make no mention of any medical duties. What is most likely is this: that Bustamante did join the Militia, probably the Dragoons of San Luis, in the capacity of doctor, but re-enlisted in 1810 in the Lancers Regiment as a regular soldier. The confusion arose from that fact that in 1811 he transferred back into the Dragoons of San Luis.²³

Joining the Militia Brigade, especially as a surgeon, is hardly an indication of Anastasio Bustamante's inclination for a military life. The Militia Brigade in San

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102. Núñez y Domínguez gives the probable recipe, based upon those found in the hospital archives, for this ointment as being (in modern terms): 60 ml of distilled water and 50 ml of tanin. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103, footnote 6. The tanin was extracted from flower buds of a local plant, the mesquite.

¹⁸ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00001. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, dated December 1812. This is the rank he held in this, his first service record.

¹⁹ Christon I. Archer, *El ejército en el México borbónico, 1760-1810* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1983), p. 245.

²⁰ Lucas Alamán, *Historia de México desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon su Independencia en el año de 1808 hasta la época presente* (Mexico City: Instituto Cultural Helénico/ Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1985), vol. 1 p. 454. Núñez y Domínguez, *La virreina mexicana*, p. 101.

²¹ Hamnett "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de independencia," p. 103.

²² Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 1, p. 455.

²³ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00001. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, dated December 1812.

Luis was a part-time force and its major military challenge was in the north of the province where it served to protect villages against Indian raids. His decision to enlist was very likely to be connected with his admiration for Calleja; the fact that many of his friends had done so; and finally, if not most importantly, because of the prestige and social standing a commission in the Militia afforded him. The Militia Brigade in San Luis, unlike those of Veracruz or Guanajuato, was well-regarded and admired. This was mainly due to the fact that this Brigade was made up almost exclusively of cavalry regiments in contrast to the infantry-dominated Brigades in other areas. Being mounted upon a horse immediately commanded more respect. It also gave those with dazzling uniforms countless opportunities to show off. The fact that these regiments actually had work to do also helped immeasurably. Those Brigades in the centre and south, whose existence was merely a long wait for a foreign invasion, could only have difficulty in projecting an image of indispensability. Moreover, being in the San Luis Militia was an extension of a member's social life. The militia assemblies were usually timed to coincide with religious holidays and any reunion, whether for the purposes of training or inspection, were often simply social occasions.²⁴ All in all, Bustamante's decision to join the Militia may have indicated nothing more than a fondness for a uniform and social prestige. He probably did not seriously expect to have to fight any real battles. But then again, neither he nor anyone else, could have foreseen the way events were about to turn.

B. The Early Years of War (1810-1812)

Félix Calleja received word of Father Hidalgo's *Grito de Dolores* at 10.30 in the morning of 19 September in the Hacienda de los Bledos, one of his wife's properties.²⁵ The news caught him and the rest of viceregal establishment

²⁴ Archer, *El ejército en el México borbónico*, p. 299.

²⁵ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 1, p. 452. Christon I. Archer "'La Causa Buena': The Counterinsurgency Army of New Spain and the Ten Years War," in Jaime E. Rodríguez O. (ed.),

unawares. The army created by the Bourbon reforms in New Spain was designed to repel foreign aggression, not to put down internal unrest. Only 8, 257 regular, permanent soldiers existed in the colony. The rest of the 27, 000 strong army was made up of part-time militia brigades, such as the one to which Bustamante belonged.²⁶ Such an army required considerable notice to mobilise effectively. This was all very well when the expected aggressor would be coming by way of the sea. It spelt disaster, however, in the conditions of September 1810. Moreover, the army in existence in New Spain was not a disciplined or trained force. All garrisons suffered an acute lack of arms and the officers in command were for the most part old and infirm Peninsular Spaniards who had not resigned for fear of slipping into destitution.²⁷ In San Luis Potosí, the make-up of the Tenth Militia Brigade was hardly ideal for the job in hand. As we have said, it was almost entirely made up of cavalry regiments and contained no infantry at all.²⁸

Thus, when Calleja was informed of events in Dolores, he had no troops at his immediate disposal. Even his militia cavalry regiments were not based in the capital of San Luis, but scattered throughout the province. In turn, their horses were also not centrally located but grazing on various haciendas.²⁹ The simple assembly of this force was going to take a long time. On the other hand, the numbers of his Brigade were not nearly sufficient to take on the size of the army Hidalgo was reported to have. So he had to begin the painstaking task of raising a new army capable of marching upon Hidalgo's hordes. Weapons and uniforms had to be made; whole new regiments established and manned; and raw recruits had to be trained in the basics of warfare. Local artisans were commissioned to make lances, machetes and sabres and much-needed, but as yet non-existent artillery

The Independence of Mexico and the Creation of the New Nation (Los Angeles: University of California, 1989), p. 87.

²⁶ Juan Ortiz Escamilla, *Guerra y gobierno. Los pueblos y la independencia de México* (Seville: Instituto Mora/El Colegio de México/Universidad Internacional de Andalucía/Universidad de Sevilla, 1997), p. 60.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 60-62 and Archer, *El ejército en el México borbónico*, p. 253-255.

²⁸ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 1, p. 454.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 453.

pieces, such as cannons. Servants, labourers, cowboys and other employees were conscripted from the local haciendas, bringing with them agricultural tools as make-shift weapons.³⁰ New regiments were set up, such as the infantry force which came to be known as the 'tamarindos' because the leather of their uniforms was the same colour as this fruit.³¹ All this preparation was going to take time, and it is little wonder that when Vice-Roy Venegas ordered Calleja to march his Brigade to Querétaro immediately, Calleja had little choice but to ask that this order be delayed.³²

One of the biggest problems facing Calleja in raising this army was finding enough officers to command the new regiments and battalions. The existing Brigadiers and Field-Marsals of the Bourbon Army were for the most part old men, whose physical infirmities prevented them from taking part in active service. Even those who were fit to serve had very little practical experience or talent to speak of. In the case of the Dragoons of San Carlos, a regiment of the Tenth Militia Brigade, the Colonel in charge had been ill for four months and the only commander on active duty was Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Gutiérrez, who according to Calleja was of 'edad avanzada y sin experiencia ni talento militar.' In order to counter this problem, Calleja was forced to give commands to those he described as 'jóvenes inteligentes' who would be able to learn the art of warfare on the battle field.³³ According to Alamán, these young men were recruited from two sources. The first were the owners or managers of the haciendas, mines and ranches of the area. These men commanded the units composed of their ranch-hands and labourers, and therefore filled the positions of authority quite naturally. The second were chosen not because of their military knowledge, but because Calleja was certain of their personal loyalty, which, in Alamán's words 'era lo

³⁰ Archer, "The Counterinsurgency and the Ten Years War," p. 88. Ortiz Escamilla, *Guerra y gobierno*, pp. 66-68.

³¹ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 1, p. 455.

³² Archer, "The Counterinsurgency and the Ten Years War," p. 88.

³³ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 169 ff. 79-81. Calleja to Vice-Roy Venegas, León, 4 December 1810. Quoted by Ortiz Escamilla, *Guerra y gobierno*, p. 61.

esencial.' These men included many members of Calleja's circle of friends and admirers, such as Miguel Barragán, Gabriel Armijo, Manuel Gómez Pedraza, and of course, Anastasio Bustamante.³⁴

On 1 October 1810, therefore, Bustamante enlisted in the newly created Lancer Company. He joined, not as the regiment's surgeon, but as a regular officer, in the position of Lieutenant.³⁵ It is unlikely that he viewed this decision as a permanent change in his career. The Lancer Company was another militia force and it would have been expected to demobilise once Hidalgo had been defeated. He must have thought that he would return to San Luis and his medical practice within a matter of months. Again, he was not to know in 1810 exactly how long the insurgency would last. His reasons for joining Calleja's army were likely to have been mixed. In the first place, the pressure from Calleja, who was trying desperately to organise a force in the quickest possible time to meet the challenge posed by Hidalgo's rebellion, must have been intense. The Brigadier needed intelligent men, above all those whom he felt he could trust, to occupy positions of authority in his new units. Bustamante evidently fell into both categories and so was an obvious target for Calleja's recruiting crusade. Secondly, the fact that friends such as Gómez Pedraza were also rallying to Calleja's cause must have influenced him, even if only slightly. Finally, the news that reached San Luis Potosí on the nature of Hidalgo's rebellion very probably also convinced him to play his part in the fight against the rampaging hordes of the indigenous and mixed race *plebe*. As Hugh Hamill has pointed out, the propaganda issued by the viceregal government in the weeks following the *Grito de Dolores*, firmly emphasised the social implications of Hidalgo's revolt. Stress was placed upon the indigenous origins of Hidalgo's followers, their insatiable appetite for the murder of the white man and the destruction of his property.³⁶ He, like the majority of Creoles not in

³⁴ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 1, p. 454.

³⁵ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00001. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, dated December 1812.

³⁶ Hugh Hamill Jr., *The Hidalgo Revolt. Prelude to Mexican Independence* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1966), p. 156.

contact with Hidalgo or his fellow conspirators, would have been ignorant of the true objectives of Hidalgo's plan to oust the *gachupines* from their position of dominance in New Spain. Instead, like them he most likely took the decision to join Calleja's army, believing the rebellion to be a class struggle or a caste war.³⁷ Even once he became aware of the insurgents' aims, reports of the violence, looting and murder practised by Hidalgo's men would probably have convinced him, as it convinced so many other Creoles, that even if the autonomy of New Spain were desirable, they could not support the use of such means. As so many historians since Alamán have pointed out, the social dimension of the insurgency was a key factor in deciding the Creole population against the insurgents. The Royalist Army, recruited almost entirely from Creoles,³⁸ did not regard the fight against the insurgents as a fight against independence, but rather as Agustín de Iturbide would have us believe, a fight against robbers and bandits.³⁹ In the eyes of the officers, the activities of the Royalist Army constituted the 'restauración del orden social.'⁴⁰ Their role was the defence of civilisation, of order, of property against the onslaught of the barbarous hordes.⁴¹

By mid-October Calleja had raised a force of 1, 500 foot soldiers and 2, 600 cavalymen. He and these troops, including the thirty year-old Lieutenant Bustamante, marched from San Luis Potosí in the direction of Dolores, where he met with Manuel de Flon, the Intendant of Puebla and his 2, 000 strong force. In the three months that followed, the new Army of the Centre would defeat the insurgents in two pitched battles, at Aculco (7 November 1810) and the Puente de

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

³⁸ As Brian Hamnett points out, the first reinforcements to be sent from Peninsular Spain did not arrive until May 1812. They numbered some three thousand men and can hardly be said to have made a significant contribution to the early counterinsurgency effort. Brian R. Hamnett, *Revolución y contrarrevolución en México y el Perú. Liberalismo, realismo y separatismo (1800-1824)* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987), p. 65.

³⁹ Agustín de Iturbide, *A Statement of Some of the Principal Events in the Public Life of Agustín de Iturbide. Written by Himself* (Washington D.C.: Documentary Publications, 1971), pp. 6-7. The terms used by the Royalist Officers to describe the insurgents are illustrative of the point of view. For example, Anastasio Bustamante refers to the captured insurgents as 'ladrones', 'bandidos', 'canalla' and 'pícaros' as well as 'rebeldes' and 'insurgentes'.

⁴⁰ Hamnett, "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de independencia," p. 106.

⁴¹ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 1, p. 454.

Calderón (17 January 1811) and recapture the main towns and cities of the Bajío. We know very little about Bustamante's role in these actions, although it is impossible not to assume that these months would have been extremely important in the terms of his military education. Granted that the engagements with the insurgents were one-sided affairs that usually resolved themselves in the flight of the insurgents after the firing of the heavy artillery,⁴² he cannot have learnt much in the art of warfare. However, he certainly must have learnt much of the art of command in the face of danger. At both Aculco and Calderón, the general body of Calleja's army did not acquit itself with professionalism or commitment. At Aculco, several units appeared to waver in their loyalty upon seeing the size of the insurgent force: both Carlos María de Bustamante and Anastasio Zerecero gleefully record that more than one battalion appeared on the point of changing sides.⁴³ At Calderón, the story was much the same. Calleja gloomily reported in a private letter to Vice-Roy Francisco Javier de Venegas that his troops appeared 'poco o nada imbuida en los principios del honor y entusiasmo militar;' many companies had deserted completely; and that the Royalist victory had been simply down to the fact the insurgents were worse cowards than his own men.⁴⁴ Convincing the remaining troops not to follow the example of their peers must have been a difficult job and can only have taught Bustamante valuable lessons in how to lead a company into action.

In terms of how to treat insurgents and suspected collaborators, and how to impose authority upon rebellious towns, the lessons he received from his commanding officer, Calleja, could not have been clearer. The Brigadier believed

⁴² Christon I. Archer, "La revolución militar de México: Estrategia, tácticas y logísticas durante la guerra de la independencia, 1810-1821," in Josefina Zoraida Vázquez (ed.), *Interpretaciones de la independencia de México* (Mexico City: Nueva Imagen, 1997), p. 134.

⁴³ Carlos María de Bustamante, *Cuadro histórico de la revolución mexicana* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica/Instituto Helénico, 1985), vol. 1, p. 92. Anastasio Zerecero, *Memorias para la historia de las revoluciones en México* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1975), p. 92.

⁴⁴ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 171, f. 90. Calleja to Vice-Roy Venegas, Campo de Zapotlanexo, 18 January 1811. *Reservado*.

that fear was the most important weapon in order to re-establish Royalist government in towns and villages previously controlled by the insurgents.

Al pueblo se le impone de un modo más espantoso y terrible que le haga temer, y perdida toda la esperanza, maldice el delirio de Hidalgo. La experiencia me ha hecho conocer que los pueblos por donde pasa el ejército arreglando sus autoridades, exhortando a los eclesiásticos al cumplimiento de sus obligaciones, publicando el indulto, y castigando con el último súplico uno, dos, tres o los más revoltosos, se han mantenido fieles hasta el día; lisongeándome de que continuarán.⁴⁵

The inducement of fear was crucial to the success of this process. Insurgents and their sympathisers were unlikely to surrender their weapons and identify their leaders (the usual terms for obtaining an amnesty) if they did not fear the consequences of remaining silent. In Irapuato, when one of the notices announcing Calleja's promise of an amnesty was torn down in the night and no one came forward to identify the culprit, all those found near the torn notice were arrested. Calleja ordered that one man in each ten be shot. The victims were chosen by the drawing of lots.⁴⁶ In Guanajuato, Calleja arranged for the hanging of eighteen prisoners, captured in the Alhóndiga, to take place in the city centre in the late evening. According to Alamán, the event was watched by all the inhabitants of the city in complete silence. All that could be heard were the priests muttering the last rites and the pleas for mercy from the condemned. It was an image that haunted Alamán for the rest of his life.⁴⁷ However, perhaps most significantly, Calleja's example promoted a system of class-discrimination. He would show no mercy with captured members of the *plebe*, but was much more inclined to grant another chance to those of higher social standing. This double standard was designed to

⁴⁵ Carlos María de Bustamante, *Campañas del General D. Félix Calleja, Comandante en Jefe del Ejército Real de Operaciones, llamado del Centro* (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila, dirigida por José Ximeno, calle de Medinas, no. 6, 1827), p. 61. The passage quoted is from the plan to counter the insurgency proposed to the Vice-Roy by Calleja, León, 16 December 1810.

⁴⁶ Christon I. Archer, "The Royalist Army in New Spain. Civil-Military Relationships, 1810-1821," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 13:1 (1987), p. 66.

⁴⁷ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 2, pp. 58-59.

convince any Creoles who had participated in the rebellion in the early months to abandon their support for Hidalgo. For example, after the recapture of San Miguel el Grande (now San Miguel de Allende), twelve insurgents were executed and their bodies displayed in the town square. Calleja reportedly ‘aplaudió este suceso, no tanto por su importancia, cuanto por ver con este paso comprometidos contra los insurgentes a los vecinos de San Miguel.’⁴⁸

Despite the Royalist successes in the Bajío, which eventually led to the capture and execution of Father Hidalgo and his main accomplices, the Army of the Centre did not succeed in ending the revolt. Critically, the disturbances had spread far beyond the limits of Guanajuato and there seemed no shortage of those willing to take up arms against the colony. Moreover, the insurgents abandoned their tactics of meeting the Royalists in pitched battles, and transformed themselves into guerrillas under the guidance of another priest, José María Morelos, who rose up to take on Hidalgo's mantle.⁴⁹ During 1811 an insurgent *junta* was set up in Zitácuaro, in the modern state of Michoacán, while in the South, Morelos began to prepare for an offensive on Puebla and its surrounding region. Calleja and his troops marched against the *junta* in late December, arriving at the outskirts of Zitácuaro on 1 January. The next day, after a bloody attack on the town, the insurgent members of the *junta* fled, and Calleja entered in triumph.⁵⁰ He immediately ordered the town to be evacuated and for it then to be razed to the ground.⁵¹ From Zitácuaro, Calleja was ordered to march upon Cuautla, where Morelos had just established his base. He and his troops arrived in Pasulco, about two leagues away from Cuautla, on 17 February 1812. The next day he led an

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 296-7. Also quoted by José Antonio Serrano Ortega, “Votos, contribuciones y milicias en Guanajuato, 1810-1836” (Unpublished PhD. dissertation, El Colegio de México, 1998), p. 93.

⁴⁹ For a description of the fragmentation of the insurgency, see Ortiz Escamilla, *Guerra y gobierno*, pp. 77-8.

⁵⁰ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 2, pp. 453-459.

⁵¹ Calleja issued an edict to this effect on 5 January 1811. It is published in Bustamante, *Campanas de Calleja*, pp. 143-147.

unsuccessful assault upon the fortified town and resolved to besiege it.⁵² For, he reasoned:

Si Cuautla no quedase demolida como Zitácuaro, el enemigo creería haber hallado un medio seguro de sostenerse: multiplicaría sus fortificaciones en parajes convenientes en las que reuniría el inmenso número que de temor se le separa, y desde las que interceptaría los caminos y destruiría los pueblos y haciendas: las pocas tropas con que contamos se aniquiliarían y acaso se intimidarían, y la insurrección que se halla en su último término, cundiría rápidamente y tomaría un nuevo y vigoroso aspecto.⁵³

He calculated that, with sufficient troops and supplies, he could recapture the town in six to eight days.⁵⁴ However, this estimate would prove to be overly optimistic, and the siege of Cuautla dragged on for three months. It ended with Morelos and his followers fleeing the town in the dead of night, effectively robbing Calleja of the resounding victory he so desired.

Bustamante transferred from the Lancer Company to the Provincial Regiment of the San Luis Dragoons on 1 December 1810, just before the action at Zitácuaro. After the capture of the town he was promoted to Captain and took on the command of a squadron of guerrilla soldiers.⁵⁵ This was a mounted unit which specialised in the pursuit of small groups of insurgents who had fled from, or were travelling between, the larger bands of rebels. In this capacity, his guerrilla squadron was kept busy at Cuautla. For, as the situation in the besieged town became worse and worse, with supplies running low and disease spreading, more and more insurgents tried to escape.⁵⁶ In the end, the siege of Cuautla could only

⁵² Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 2, pp. 489-495.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 497.

⁵⁴ Bustamante, *Campañas del General D. Félix María Calleja*, p. 171. Calleja to the Vice-Roy, Cuautla, 20 February 1812.

⁵⁵ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00001. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, dated December 1812. His promotion is dated 6 February 1812.

⁵⁶ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 20 ff. 576-586. Calleja to Vice-Roy Venegas, Cuautla, 18 April 1812. *Ibid.*, ff. 505-506. Agustín de la Viña to Calleja, Reducto de Calvario, 22 April 1812. *Ibid.*, f. 529. Calleja's Diary of Operations 19-24 April 1812. *Ibid.*, f.1. Anastasio Bustamante to the Cavalry Major General (Pedro Menezo), Campo de Santa Inés, 1 May 1812. These communications report the activities of Bustamante and details of his pursuits of the insurgents.

be resolved by the weather. Calleja tried repeatedly to attack the fortifications and gain entry into the town, but the defences and defenders of Cuautla were well-organised and steadfastly resisted the Royalist assaults throughout March and April. Both sides suffered a shortage of supplies and a burgeoning population of invalids caused by illnesses brought on by contaminated water, poor alimentation, and excess alcohol. Even Calleja himself suffered from nasty attacks of dysentery.⁵⁷ It was a race against time to resolve the conflict before the onset of the rainy season and the diseases that would follow in its wake. Things were brought to a head on 2 May, when in the early hours of the morning, Morelos and his remaining men slipped past the enemy lines and made their escape.⁵⁸ Calleja sent Juan Amador, Anastasio Bustamante and his squadron of 25 guerrillas in hot pursuit. Bustamante and Amador chased the insurgents for seven leagues (about 21 miles)⁵⁹ to no avail and eventually returned empty-handed. Even so, their Commanding Officer, Pedro Menezo, recommended them for their 'distinguido mérito' in his report to Calleja on the day's happenings.⁶⁰

The anti-climactic end to the siege of Cuautla must have been a disappointment for Calleja and his army. Morelos had out-manoevred the Royalists and although they tried to declare a victory, it was clear that no battle had been won. Calleja retired to Mexico City where he set up his residence on a fashionable street and surrounded himself with his old friends and admirers: including Manuel Gómez Pedraza, Miguel Barragán, Manuel de la Sota Riva and Anastasio Bustamante. According to Doris Ladd, the erstwhile Royalist hero 'was sulking in his tent,' offended that Venegas had not rewarded him for his services in Cuautla.⁶¹ Rivalry had long existed between Calleja and Vice-Roy Venegas due to

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, ff. 467-474. Calleja to Vice-Roy Venegas, Cuautla, 18 April 1812. Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 2, pp. 515-520. Bustamante, *Cuadro histórico*, vol. 2, p. 67. These contain descriptions of the situation in Cuautla in April 1812.

⁵⁸ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 2, p. 522.

⁵⁹ "Pesos y medidas españoles tradicionales", Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), *Collins Spanish Dictionary* (Glasgow: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 2140. One league is roughly equivalent to three miles or five and a half kilometres.

⁶⁰ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 201 f.4. Cavalry Major General, Pedro Menezo to Calleja, Cuautla, 3 May 1812.

⁶¹ Doris M. Ladd, *The Mexican Nobility at Independence*, pp. 117-118.

the former's military success and obvious ambition. Now, after Cuautla, this rivalry became more acute. According to Alamán, what Calleja established in Mexico City was nothing less than a rival court, 'no menos frecuentada que la del virrey.' It was a focal point for those unhappy with the present government and the subject of much gossip. It was clear that Calleja coveted Venegas' position; the question was how far was he prepared to go to attain it? Rumour had it at the time that he may have been prepared even to join the insurgents.⁶² Later on, in the post-war period, Anastasio Zerecero claimed that, during this time Calleja became involved with the *Guadalupes*, a secret society of the pro-insurgent elites in Mexico City, and plotted with them to over-throw Venegas and set up an independent government.⁶³ However, Virginia Guedea is sceptical. She notes Calleja's tendency to surround himself with Americans, which could have been seen as a sign of his own identification with the Creoles, and accepts that his known association with opponents of Venegas may have convinced some of the *Guadalupes* that they may be able to use their rivalry to their own advantage. But, she argues, there is no evidence to support Zerecero's assertion. Some members of the group may have been involved in indirect negotiation with Calleja, but it is impossible that he knew of the society's existence until later.⁶⁴ Even so, the possibility that pro-insurgents believed that Calleja might be sympathetic to their cause and that they may even have attended Calleja's alternative court is intriguing. What was being discussed in the confines of Calleja's house that gave rise to the rumours of his inclination for independence? If there were talk of independence, did Bustamante, Barragán, Gómez Pedraza and Sota de la Riva take part? After all, it is interesting to note that Gómez Pedraza went on to become one of Iturbide's collaborators in the

⁶² Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 2, p. 548.

⁶³ Virginia Guedea, *En busca de un gobierno alterno: los Guadalupes en México* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1992), pp. 166-167. She quotes from Zerecero, *Memorias para la historia de revoluciones de México* (Mexico City: Imprenta del Gobierno, J.M. Sandoval, 1869), pp. 253-254. He claims that his father, Valentín, was a member of the *Guadalupes*, and that from meetings that had taken place in his house, he had become aware of the plans of the *Guadalupes* and Calleja. The plotting, of course, came to an abrupt end when Calleja was appointed as Venegas' replacement.

⁶⁴ Guedea, *En busca de un gobierno alterno*, pp. 166-171.

organisation of what would eventually become the Plan of Iguala.⁶⁵ Bustamante, Barragán and Sota de la Riva would also work closely with Iturbide after the proclamation of the plan.

C: After Calleja: Coyoacán, Tlalnepantla, and Los Llanos de Apan (1812-1816)

Whatever might have taken place in Mexico City after the siege of Cuautla, Captain Bustamante would only have been able to take a minuscule part, if any at all. For, by July 1812, he was back in active service with his San Luis guerrillas. He was sent to Coyoacán, where, as captain of his detachment, he was the effective commanding officer of the area. Here, he enjoyed considerable independence of action and corresponded directly with the Vice-Roy on the subject of his manoeuvres. Evidently his two years of service in the Army of the Centre had transformed the doctor into a capable soldier, and had earned him a small measure of respect in the Royalist Army. In Coyoacán, Bustamante's orders were to 'proteger todas esas cercanías e imponer respeto a los malhechores.' He was also under the obligation to shoot anyone found in the act of rebellion.⁶⁶ Bustamante and his men formed part of the Viceroyalty's new counterinsurgency programme designed to combat the guerrilla warfare employed by the rebels. They operated as a 'destacamento volante' or flying detachment, patrolling the major roads and protecting the towns in their district. The aim was to prevent the insurgent bands from taking food and other supplies from local villages, and from communicating with each other, or joining forces. This tactic was often combined with that of exemplary terror; a practice employed by Calleja from the very beginning of his

⁶⁵ Manuel Gómez Pedraza, "Manifiesto que Manuel Gómez Pedraza, ciudadano de la república de México, dedica a sus compatriotas, o sea una reseña de su vida pública," in Laura Solares Robles, *La obra política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza 1813-1851* (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Instituto Matías Romero/Acervo Histórico Diplomático de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores), pp. 175-177.

⁶⁶ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 98, f. 6. Vice-Roy Venegas to Bustamante, 5 July 1812. This order was the same in all New Spain. On 25 June 1812, Vice-Roy Venegas issued an edict which obliged all officers to courtmartial and shoot any captured rebels. Hamnett, *Revolución y contrarrevolución*, p. 71.

campaign, which involved the execution of captured rebels and the display of their bodies, or simply their heads, in local towns. These methods had been exported from Spain by the Peninsular officers who had taken part in the guerrilla struggle against the French occupation. The Spaniards had studied their enemies' techniques well, and in Mexico, employed them vigorously. They were first used by José de la Cruz in Huichapan and Tula, in December 1810, and were soon adopted throughout the colony for the remaining period of the war.⁶⁷ Bustamante, for his part, operated his detachment in the environs of Coyoacán. His jurisdiction extended as far west as San Agustín de las Cuevas and Xochimilco, and as far east as the Valley of Tenango and the village of Oculian. In this area their main adversary was the insurgent Father José María Herrera, who, despite various attempts, he failed to capture.⁶⁸

Bustamante left Coyoacán at the beginning of September 1812, and in November was sent, with a section of fifty-five men from the Regiment of San Luis, to Tlalnepantla.⁶⁹ Here, throughout 1813, he operated his flying detachment in the defence of the road to Querétaro. The main settlements in his care were the Villa de Carbón, Palo Hueco, Chapa de Mota and the surrounding haciendas. But his persecution of the rebels, under the control of Epitacio Sánchez and Atiliano García, often took him as far north as Cuautitlán or Tula. His unit was part of the force controlled from Tula by Colonel Cristóbal Ordóñez. In addition to the duties he had performed in Coyoacán, he was also responsible for the protection of the regular convoys of silver, which travelled on the Querétaro road to the capital, when they passed through his jurisdiction.⁷⁰ During his time in this area, Bustamante and his mounted guerrillas took part in the recapture of Huichapan from the insurgent, Chito Villagrán, in May 1813. He was awarded a medal of

⁶⁷ Archer, "The Counterinsurgency and the Ten Years' War," pp. 93-95.

⁶⁸ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 98, ff. 2-71 deals with the time that Bustamante spent in Coyoacán.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 72. Bustamante to Vice-Roy Venegas, Tlalnepantla, 5 November 1812.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. 101, ff. 1-167, contains details of Bustamante's activities in Tlalnepantla. For details of the troops under the control of Cristóbal Ordóñez, see Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 3, pp. 503-504.

honour for his part in the action.⁷¹ The attack on Huichapan led to the capture and execution of Villagrán, a member of one of the most feared insurgent families of the area.⁷²

In April 1814, Bustamante and a detachment of 100 men were transferred to the Llanos de Apan. Here they were to be joined by 60 artillery men under the command of José Joaquín Ponce and 350 foot soldiers sent from Mexico City. These troops were destined to provide reinforcements for the beleaguered Commander General of the area, Major José Barradas. The Llanos de Apan had been more or less completely in the hands of the insurgents since 1810. These rebels were well-organised, numerous and mostly mounted. This was mainly due to the efforts of Carlos María de Bustamante and Father Antonio Lozano, who in 1813 had undertaken its military and political organisation.⁷³ A government had been set up in Zacatlán that co-ordinated the military activities of the insurgents in the Llanos and the Sierra de Puebla and new troops were being trained and weapons made. However, the Royalist campaign had also helped the insurgents, as it had remained entirely on the periphery and had not attacked any of the insurgent bases.⁷⁴ The insurgent stranglehold on this area caused many problems for the viceregal government. The Llanos was usually a major provider of *pulque* for the markets of the capital. Its haciendas also supplied meat, maize and vegetables.⁷⁵ The outbreak of the insurgency meant that these products, especially *pulque*, did not reach Mexico City with any regularity.⁷⁶ It is little wonder that Calleja, who had been Vice-Roy since 1813, wanted things to change.

With his new men, Barradas was ordered to set up his headquarters in Apan from where he was to control the Llanos and surrounding provinces,

⁷¹ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00002. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, dated December 1817.

⁷² Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 3, p. 461, and Bustamante, *Cuadro histórico*, vol. 2, p. 354.

⁷³ Virginia Guedea, *La insurgencia en el Departamento del Norte. Los Llanos de Apan y la Sierra de Puebla, 1810-1816* (Mexico City: UNAM/Instituto Mora, 1996), pp. 61-62.




⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 107 and Bustamante, *Cuadro histórico*, vol. 2, p. 259.

⁷⁵ Guedea, *La insurgencia en el Departamento del Norte*, pp. 9-19.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49 and Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 2, p. 520.

Map One

Position of Anastasio Bustamante (1812-1816)



Border of
Intendancy.

[This map is not to scale.]

(Sources: Guedea, *La insurgencia en el Departamento del Norte*, Ortiz Escamilla, *Guerra y gobierno*.)

stretching from Pachuca and Tulancingo in the north, San Juan Teotihuacán, Otumba and Texcoco in the south, and Zacatlán in the east.⁷⁷ Bustamante's duties were again those of a flying detachment, coupled with the escort of silver convoys. He worked on the roads from the mines in Real del Monte through Pachuca to the capital and occasionally escorted mercantile convoys travelling between Veracruz and Mexico City.⁷⁸ He also took part in the principal attacks mounted by Barradas against the insurgent strongholds in the Llanos. In August 1814, he participated in the Royalist capture of Zacatlán which led to the flight of Carlos María de Bustamante and the insurgent commander, Ignacio Rayón.⁷⁹ In April 1815, he was injured in the thigh during an encounter with the chief insurgent of the Llanos, Osorno, at Nopaltepec. Barradas commended him for bravery in this action. Despite being injured fairly early in the eight-hour confrontation, he refused to leave the front-line until the battle was completed.⁸⁰

The Barradas' campaign in the Llanos did not make any real headway throughout 1814 and 1815. The major achievement in capturing Zacatlán did not last, as Osorno simply returned to the town once the Royalists had left.⁸¹ According to Calleja, the insurgents were 'acaso los más ejercitados del reino;' worse still, they counted on strong public support and possessed a fine cavalry.⁸² As Virginia Guedea has shown, this was not entirely true. With the fall of Zacatlán and the disintegration of Carlos María de Bustamante's administrative organisation, the insurgents slipped into disarray. They were unable to consolidate their supremacy over the Royalists because of a lack of discipline and their marked preference for cavalry over infantry, of which they had next to nothing. By 1815, they owed their strong position more to the weakness of the Royalist forces, who

⁷⁷ Guedea, *La insurgencia en el Departamento del Norte*, pp. 188-119.

⁷⁸ Hamnett, "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de la independencia," pp.108-109. AGN, *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 120, f. 349. Bustamante to Manuel de la Concha, Jalapa, 10 December 1816.

⁷⁹ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4, pp. 184-186.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 253. SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00002. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, dated December 1817.

⁸¹ Guedea, *La insurgencia en el Departamento del Norte.*, p. 197.

⁸² AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 117, f. 298. Vice-Roy Calleja to Manuel de la Concha, 5 December 1815.

lacked sufficient cavalry and men to employ the counterinsurgency techniques used elsewhere. For the most part, they remained fortified within villages and churches and concentrated upon defence rather than attack.⁸³ Things came to a head on 27 November 1815 when the garrison of Apan, defended by a mere 140 men was attacked by Osorno, Inclán, Serrano and Espinosa, the four principal leaders of the insurgents in the Llanos. The garrison could do nothing but fortify itself in the church and let Osorno and his men enter the town. The insurgents burnt all the unprotected buildings and cut off the water supply. Only the persistent firing of the Royalists in the church over the next week prevented them from taking the town. Even so, much of the garrison and townsfolk perished from dehydration during the attack.⁸⁴ On 5 December, Osorno retired to the nearby hacienda of Ocotepec, where troops led by Juan Ráfols and Anastasio Bustamante forced him to retreat into the countryside.⁸⁵

In the light of this new set-back, Calleja replaced Barradas with Manuel de la Concha, who had just returned to Mexico City from his triumphant campaign against Morelos. On 23 December, the day after the insurgent leader's execution, Concha marched for Apan. His instructions from the Vice-Roy were very clear:

Dará V.S. principio sin la menor demora y con la actividad que acostumbra a la persecución de dichos rebeldes, buscándolos en sus madrigueras y siguiéndolos constantemente sin alzar la mano hasta lograr su exterminio o reducción [...] Haga V.S. castigos ejemplares que aterren y escarmienten a los malvados, y quíteles V.S. cuantos armas y caballos tengan, dejando a los que por gracia se les conserve la vida, en estado de no poder continuar en la rebelión [...] Me prometo los más felices resultados en la presente estación; y que desprendido V.S. de toda otra atención dedicado únicamente a perseguir y castigar las gavilla de ese territorio, lograremos su esterminio y restablecimiento de la paz y el buen orden, para lo cual se tomará V.S. el tiempo necesario.⁸⁶

⁸³ Guedea, *La insurgencia en el Departamento del Norte*, p. 213-214.

⁸⁴ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4 p. 375.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 376.

⁸⁶ AGN, *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 117, ff. 298-299. Vice-Roy Calleja to Manuel de la Concha, 5 December 1815.

Concha took these instructions very seriously and implemented a ruthless strategy which saw the Llanos cleared of insurgents within less than twelve months. In this he was helped by the fact that the insurgents' organisation became more and more chaotic now Morelos had been defeated. He also had many more troops at his disposal than Barradas could have ever dreamed of. In April 1816, his new Flying Division counted 1, 255 men, of which 135 were San Luis Dragoons.⁸⁷ These troops were divided into smaller flying detachments under the command of himself, Juan Ráfols, Anastasio Bustamante and Rubín de Celís and dispersed throughout the territory with orders to execute every insurgent captured, regardless of class or condition. Alamán records that in the reports from the above officers, published in the *Gaceta del Gobierno de México*, it was common to read that they had taken 'veinte, treinta o más prisioneros que fueron inmediatamente fusilados.'⁸⁸ This ruthlessness was complemented by the simultaneous offer of the *indulto* to those who would give themselves up, hand over their weapons and divulge any useful information concerning the insurgents' activities to their captors.

The combination of these policies was extremely successful, as fear prompted many insurgents to solicit an amnesty. These included Miguel Serrano, one of the insurgent leaders, Joaquín Espinosa, his second-in-command, Anastasio Torrejón, the second-in-command to another insurgent leader, Inclán, and even José Mariano Vargas who had briefly replaced Serrano in command.⁸⁹ The flood of amnesties had two beneficial effects for the Royalists. In the first place, they demoralised those who chose to remain fighting and severely depleted their numbers, and secondly, they increased their own fighting power, as the amnestied men were forced to join the ranks of their former enemies.⁹⁰ The final blow to the insurgents was Concha's decision to forbid the production and commerce of *pulque* on pain of death. Apart from causing the cities of Mexico and Puebla huge

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. 119, f. 267. "Estado general de la División Volante de los Llanos de Apan", signed by Manuel de la Concha, 6 April 1816.

⁸⁸ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4, p. 397.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 403. Bustamante, *Cuadro histórico*, vol. 3, p. 351.

⁹⁰ Guedea, *La insurgencia en el Departamento del Norte*, p. 221.

problems, this move also effectively deprived the insurgents of the income they had benefited from since 1810, and thus took away much of their power.⁹¹ In the end, those who refused to consider the *indulto* fled from the Llanos and Concha could triumphally inform the new Vice-Roy, Juan Ruiz de Apodaca in December 1816 that 'ninguna gavilla ha quedado en este terreno.'⁹² Concha would be rewarded with the appointment of Colonel. Bustamante, for his part, was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel.⁹³

D: El Bajío (1817-1821)

The newly-promoted Lieutenant-Colonel Bustamante's next posting was to the Bajío. Still commanding a detachment of cavalry from the San Luis Regiment, he made up part of the army, commanded by Field-Marshal Pascual Liñán, which had been organised by the Vice-Roy in response to the news of the arrival of the former Spanish military hero, Francisco Javier Mina in New Spain. Mina had won his reputation in Peninsular Spain during the Napoleonic invasion, but had fallen from grace after the restoration of Ferdinand VII, when he led a failed coup in favour of the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz. He fled first to France and then to England, where he decided to take his fight against what he believed to be Ferdinand's tyrannical government to New Spain. He left London in May 1816 with a group of 32 European officers. He called first at Galveston in the United States, where his numbers were swelled by a number of former U.S. Army officers and a band of 200 adventurers led by a German Colonel, the Count of Ruuth.⁹⁴ This expeditionary force disembarked at the mouth of the river, Soto de la Marina (in the modern state of Tamaulipas) on 15 April, arriving in the nearby town of the

⁹¹ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4, p. 398.

⁹² AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 117, f. 321. Manuel de la Concha to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Tepeapulco, 19 December 1816.

⁹³ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4, p. 411. SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00002. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, December 1817. The promotion is dated 17 February 1817.

⁹⁴ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4, pp. 549-552.

same name seven days later. From there he marched south through the province of San Luis Potosí, in the direction of Guanajuato, with the aim of uniting with the principal insurgents of that area, Father Torres, the Ortiz family and Miguel Borja.⁹⁵ On 29 June, in the hacienda of San Juan de los Llanos, just outside León, his troops engaged in battle with those of Colonel Cristóbal Ordóñez, the Commandant-General of Guanajuato who had recently been appointed to replace the disgraced Agustín de Iturbide. Mina won a resounding victory, capturing 220 prisoners and leaving around 300 of his enemies, including Colonel Ordóñez, dead on the battle field.⁹⁶

In this state of affairs, with Guanajuato and Querétaro under threat, the Vice-Roy, Juan Ruiz Apodaca, wrote to Pascual Liñán on 3 July, ordering him to march forthwith to Querétaro and to take charge of the campaign against Mina.⁹⁷ Anastasio Bustamante and his troops were originally intended to accompany him to Querétaro, but later that month they were ordered to join the troops of Brigadier Pedro Celestino Negrete in Guanajuato.⁹⁸ Here Bustamante, and what Alamán describes as 'una fuerza considerable de caballería' were ordered to keep a close watch on Mina's movements in case he should try to capture the city of Guanajuato.⁹⁹ Meanwhile, Mina had united with the insurgent leaders, Encarnación Ortiz and Miguel Borja, fortifying himself in the Fuerte de Sombrero, positioned on a small hill just outside León. The Royalists began to besiege the Fort on 1 August and fired their cannons constantly at the insurgents' defences for a fortnight. This barrage of artillery had very little effect. Much more successful was the tactic of cutting off the water-supply to the town. Every night Bustamante and his Dragoons, helped by Lieutenant-Colonel José Cristóbal Villaseñor and a unit of Sierra Gorda Dragoons, would surround the local stream, which ran past

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 571.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 584.

⁹⁷ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 487, ff. 46-48. Vice-Roy Apodaca to Pascual de Liñán, 3 July 1817.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 261, f. 261. Pedro Celestino Negrete to Liñán, Silao, 28 July 1817.

⁹⁹ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4, p. 594.

the fort, and thus prevent the insurgents from gathering water.¹⁰⁰ In this they were helped by the weather. For, although the rainy season was still in full swing, the clouds resolutely refused to open over the insurgent fortifications. Very soon there was no water at all, and very few provisions, inside the insurgents' camp.¹⁰¹ In this desperate situation, every day, many rebels, including a number of Mina's foreign troops, tried to make their escape during the hours of darkness. In order to prevent the escape of the foreigners, whom Liñán particularly wished to see captured, on 15 August he launched a new offensive against the town.¹⁰² His soldiers were, however, repelled by the insurgent artillery and the stones thrown from the barricades by the women. Unfortunately, many of the soldiers killed in the assault fell into the ditches constructed as part of the fort's defence. It was too dangerous for the Royalists to remove the corpses and soon the stench surrounding the insurgent camp was intolerable. This merely hastened the inevitable. On the night of 19 August, the insurgents abandoned the fort, only to be immediately attacked by the Royalists:

Apenas la columna había comenzado a bajar la barranca, cuando por la indiscreción de haber dejado que se adelantasen las mujeres y los muchachos, fue descubierto por los realistas, comunicándose la alarma a todo el campo en un instante [...] El fuego se rompió en la oscuridad; los gritos de las mujeres y de los niños; los lamentos de los heridos; la confusión que se introdujo tratando unos de volver al fuerte, otros de pasar al otro lado de la barranca, formaban una escena de horror, difícil de describir.¹⁰³

The Dragoons of Bustamante and Villaseñor were sent to pursue those insurgents who did manage to escape. According to Alamán, of the hundreds of people in the fort, only fifty managed to escape.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 489 ff. 66-68. Liñán to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Mesa de las Tablas, 22 August 1817.

¹⁰¹ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4, p. 602, 604.

¹⁰² AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 489 f. 79. Liñán to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Mesa de las Tablas, 22 August 1817.

¹⁰³ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4, p. 606-607.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 607.

Unfortunately for the Royalists, Mina had left the fort some days before. He headed for Pénjamo and the Fort of Los Remedios, where Father Torres was organising its defence. They were in little doubt that Liñán would soon direct his attention towards this second insurgent stronghold. Therefore, they agreed to split up. Torres would remain in Remedios to lead the defence, while Mina and a 900 strong cavalry, would patrol the surrounding land. In order to prevent a repeat of the siege at Sombrero it was decided that Mina would take responsibility for keeping the hacienda supplied with food, and would also try to prevent the Royalist supply convoys from reaching their camps. As predicted, Liñán arrived at Remedios on 27 August and began besieging the hacienda almost immediately. Initially, Mina and Torres' plan worked well and the besieging army suffered from a lack of food and other supplies. However, the two men quarrelled over how finally to break the siege. Torres wanted Mina to lead an attack on Liñán outside the fort, while Mina believed that it would be better to draw the Royalists off by capturing Guanajuato. This disagreement led to their downfall. Torres instructed his men not to obey Mina unless he led them against Liñán, and so when in October, Mina decided to attack Guanajuato anyway, his depleted troops were unable to capture the town.¹⁰⁵ Liñán sent a force of 200 men from Remedios, including Bustamante, Villaseñor and their Dragoons, under the command of Colonel Francisco Orrantia to pursue Mina, but did not lift the siege. This failure to capture Guanajuato weakened Mina's position further. On 27 October he was apprehended by Orrantia at seven in the evening in the Rancho de Venadito, near Silao.¹⁰⁶ Father Torres, meanwhile, continued to defend his position at Remedios. He held out throughout November and December, despite repeated attacks by the Royalists. Eventually, the insurgents began to run out of munitions and fresh food, and, on 1 January 1818, had no choice but to flee the fort. Bustamante, who was at

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 616, 621-622.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p.624 . AGN: *Operaciones de de Guerra*, vol. 489, f. 336. Francisco Orrantia to Liñán, Silao, 27 October 1817. Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4, p. 625. Vice-Roy Apodaca was named the Count of Venadito in honour of this occurrence.

this time in charge of patrolling the road between the fort, Pénjamo and Casas Blancas, sent his cavalry in pursuit of the fleeing insurgents, and once more, only a few managed to escape.¹⁰⁷

Field-Marshal Liñán returned to Mexico City in January and was awarded with the medal of the *Gran Cruz de la Orden de Isabel la Católica*. Anastasio Bustamante remained in the Bajío and was promoted to Colonel in February.¹⁰⁸ He now operated under the orders of the new Commander-General of Guanajuato, Colonel Antonio Linares. Linares, upon taking up his command in February 1818 set about reorganising the counterinsurgency struggle that had been interrupted by Javier Mina's invasion.¹⁰⁹ He divided his province into three areas: the north, consisting of the territories of San Miguel, Dolores and San Felipe, which he placed under the command of Colonel Orrantia; the south, consisting of the territories surrounding the Valle de Santiago, stretching from Irapuato in the north, through Pénjamo to San Francisco Angamacutiro (now Angamacutiro de la Unión), to the Río Grande and Purándiro in the south, which he placed under the command of Bustamante; and the centre, consisting of the territories surrounding Guanajuato, Salamanca and Celaya, which he was going to control.¹¹⁰ He chose Bustamante as commander of the southern region because its geography demanded a cavalry force that was able to pursue the insurgents over long distances. Bustamante, as he pointed out to the Vice-Roy, was an ideal choice in this respect, as he was an accredited and respected cavalry commander.¹¹¹

Bustamante's strategy in the Valle de Santiago was based on the desire to separate the rural population from the insurgents. He and his fellow officers wanted to deprive the insurgents of local support in the form of food, weapons, and above all, sanctuary. The two main features of this strategy were

¹⁰⁷ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4, p. 633.

¹⁰⁸ SDN: XI/III/1-235/1-31/00005. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, December 1820. His promotion is dated 26 February 1818.

¹⁰⁹ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 477, f. 26. Antonio Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Valle de Santiago, 22 February 1818.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 23. Antonio Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Salamanca, 3 March 1818.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, f. 69. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Salamanca, 7 March 1818.

‘organisation’ and ‘resettlement.’ ‘Organisation’ was the fortification of any settlement, usually including the building of a moat and barricades, in order to protect it from insurgent raids or infiltration.¹¹² Between 1818 and 1820, in the Valle de Santiago, four villages, seven haciendas and three ranches were organised in this way and were assigned a small garrison of troops to supervise the defence. However, in the context of the haciendas, the most successful and widely-used feature of this strategy was the creation of so-called Patriot Militias, or ‘guardacampos’ made up of labourers and other employees to patrol the fields to protect the crops and buildings from insurgent raids. By 1820, 18 haciendas and 29 ranches were protected by this scheme.¹¹³ ‘Resettlement’ involved the creation of demarcation zones between the pacified ‘organised’ areas and the insurgent strongholds. Anyone captured in these zones was presumed to be a rebel and shot. This policy received its name because the zone was usually created by the forcible destruction of small hamlets and ranches found between the pacified and insurgent areas. These populations were then forced to decamp to the pacified towns and villages.¹¹⁴ In the Valle of Santiago, Bustamante went one step further. He decided not simply to destroy settlements which lay in the demarcation zones, but also any which, as he termed it, ‘se oponían a la pacificación y buen orden.’ Or in other words, those he suspected were allied to the insurgents.¹¹⁵

‘Organisation’ and ‘resettlement’ had also been employed by Iturbide during his time as Commander General of Guanajuato. They owed their ideas to Calleja's plan of 1811, which had asserted that the only way to counter the insurgency was by devolving the responsibility for the protection of towns, villages and haciendas to the local population, in order to allow the army to concentrate on

¹¹² Brian R. Hamnett, “Royalist Counterinsurgency and the Continuity of Rebellion: Guanajuato and Michoacán, 1813-1820,” *Hispanic American Review* 62:1 (1982), pp. 37-38.


¹¹³ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 475, f. 193. “Provincia de Guanajuato. Demarcación del Valle de Santiago a cargo del señor coronel graduado D. Anastasio Bustamante.” This document is included in Appendix Two.

¹¹⁴ Hamnett, “Royalist Counterinsurgency, 1813-1820,” pp. 38-39.


¹¹⁵ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 475, f. 193. “Provincia de Guanajuato. Demarcación del Valle de Santiago a cargo del señor coronel graduado D. Anastasio Bustamante.”

Map Two

Position of Anastasio Bustamante (1817-1821)



Bustamante's area
of command
(1818-1821)



Border of
Intendancy

[This map is not to scale.]

(Sources: Guedea, *La insurgencia en el Departamento del Norte*, Ortiz Escamilla, *Guerra y gobierno*.)

the persecution of the rebels in the countryside strongholds.¹¹⁶ In Bustamante's case this meant that he and his troops could be constantly on the move, patrolling the demarcation zones and following up and reported sightings of the insurgents. If we look at the Diaries of Operations sent by Bustamante to Linares during 1818 and 1819 (included in Appendix One) we can see that Bustamante had no real headquarters. He was continually riding between town, village and hacienda on the look-out for signs of the insurgents. As had happened in the Llanos, insurgents who were caught were generally executed at once, and their bodies displayed prominently. For example, in July 1819 Bustamante captured the insurgent leaders Andrés Delgado, alias *el Giro*,¹¹⁷ and Antonio Velasco, alias *el Cuate*, within the space of a week.¹¹⁸ Bustamante ordered that Andrés Delgado's head be cut off and displayed in Salamanca.¹¹⁹ These patrols, or 'correrías,' had a slow, but cumulative effect against the insurgents. As we can see by studying the Diaries of Operations, Bustamante and his men gradually destroyed the power of the rebels by continually raiding their hideouts when they were least expected, usually at night. Surprised by the Royalists, the insurgents would flee, leaving behind their horses and weapons. The troops would then give chase and usually capture half a dozen insurgents, who would then be executed. This relentless persecution had two effects. The first was to induce many rebels, including their leaders, to seek the *indulto*, as they had in the Llanos. These men were then amalgamated into the Royalist Army as Rural or Patriot Companies, and joined the persecution of their former comrades.¹²⁰ Two of Bustamante's most prominent successes here were the capture of leaders Miguel Borja, who was granted the *indulto* in July 1819,¹²¹ and

¹¹⁶ The plan of Calleja is published by Bustamante, *Campanas del General D. Félix María Calleja*, pp. 118-122.

¹¹⁷ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 482, ff. 345-348. Bustamante to Linares, Salamanca, 4 July 1819.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 278. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Celaya, 2 July 1819.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 345-348. Bustamante to Linares, Salamanca, 4 July 1819.

¹²⁰ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4, p. 690.

¹²¹ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 483, f. 198. Certificate of Amnesty for Miguel Borja, dated 29 July 1819.

Antonio García, who was amnestied in January 1820.¹²² The second effect was that it drained the insurgents of their three most important resources: men, weapons and morale. This continual drain made the insurgents weaker and, logically, easier to hunt, until by the summer of 1820 there were no real rebels of any significance left. As Bustamante reported triumphantly to Linares in September, the Valle de Santiago now enjoyed a ‘tranquilidad pública de un modo inalterable.’¹²³

E: Problems for the Future?

Although Bustamante's success in the Valle de Santiago was mirrored by his fellow officers in the Bajío, and by late 1820 the region was officially pacified,¹²⁴ the situation of the Royalist Army in Guanajuato was far from ideal. The main problem, as it would be throughout the forthcoming independence period, was the lack of money, weapons and uniforms. These shortages had been a problem from the very moment of Bustamante's arrival. In October 1817, Pascual de Liñán wrote to Vice-Roy Apodaca that the troops in Guanajuato suffered from ‘la falta de toda clase de auxilios’ and that this shortage threatened the very success of his mission.¹²⁵ In December he reported that his troops were not receiving their salaries, and as a result desertion was becoming very popular amongst the rank and file. The problem, as Liñán went on to observe, was the poor state of the provincial treasury in Guanajuato, which could not provide the necessary money.¹²⁶ Provincial treasuries, such as the one in Guanajuato, had been given the responsibility of financing the troops stationed in its region by Calleja.

¹²² *Ibid.*, vol. 478, f. 240. Bustamante to Linares, Rancho del Cerro Colorado, 27 January 1820.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, vol. 475, f. 193. “Provincia de Guanajuato. Demarcación del Valle de Santiago a cargo del señor coronel graduado D. Anastasio Bustamante.”

¹²⁴ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 4, p. 690.

¹²⁵ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 489, f. 266. Pascual de Liñán to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Campo en el Cerro de Bellaco, 6 October 1817.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, ff. 449-450. Liñán to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Campo de el Cerro de Bellaco, 31 December 1817.

Before his ascension to the vice-royalty the cost of supporting the Royalist Army had been shared between the Royal Hacienda and the local authorities. After 1813, the provincial *ayuntamientos* were expected to raise the necessary money through taxation and special contributions imposed on the local inhabitants, and were given no financial support from the viceregal government.¹²⁷ However, Guanajuato, like other areas of New Spain, had been financially ruined by the insurgency. Mines had been destroyed, haciendas rendered useless by sackings, and their owners bankrupted by the forced loans and increased taxes imposed upon them by a vice-regal government that was itself sagging under huge debts.¹²⁸ As the Intendant and other leading citizens of Guanajuato pointed out to the Vice-Roy in December 1816, the destitution of Guanajuato and its industry made financing the troops garrisoned in the province by means of voluntary loans from the mine owners, the usual source of income, impossible:

Agotados los arbitrios del vecindario y destruida su importante minería que era el patrimonio, el fondo radical de su subsistencia política y natural; ya no encuentra medios para conservar a las tropas en los diversos puntos que necesita. Los generosos mineros, este cuerpo interesantísimo de toda la Monarquía Española, después de haber sufrido radicalmente como se ha manifestado en diversas manifestaciones, todo el peso de la guerra y todo el trastorno de la revolución, han hecho incalculables sacrificios a favor de la causa pública y del Rey [...] Pero agobiados ya con tan crecidas contribuciones, casi aniquilados sus fondos metálicos, y reducida ya estos hombres ricos a lo muy preciso para vivir y sostener sus familias, han llegado por fin al grado de imposibilidad en la continuación de sus servicios.¹²⁹

Even so, the garrisons had to be paid. Therefore, the maintenance of the Royalist army in Guanajuato had to be met by existing methods of raising revenue, such as

¹²⁷ Juan Ortiz Escamilla, "Las élites novohispanos antes la guerra civil de 1810," *Historia Mexicana* 46: 2 (1996), p. 349.

¹²⁸ For a description of the financial problems faced by the vice-regal government, see Hamnett, *Revolución y contrarrevolución*, pp. 79-81.

¹²⁹ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 640 (not paginated). Fernando Pérez Marañón (Intendant of Guanajuato), Mariano de Otero, Pedro Otero, José Antonio Carillo and others, to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Guanajuato, 7 December 1816.

the income from the tobacco monopoly and the *alcabala*. To supplement this, a new system of tax collection and distribution was introduced in late 1814. In each population a group of local dignitaries, including a representative of the *cabildo* and the clergy, called a *junta de arbitrios* was set up. This *junta* had the responsibility for raising the contributions necessary to finance their local garrison and militia companies. These *contribuciones militares*, as they were called, were raised in three main ways: the first by a sale tax applied to basic food items such as maize, beans (*frijoles*), chile and butter; the second by a monthly levy on each inhabitants' private wealth; and thirdly by charging a fee to those who wished to avoid conscription into a patriot company.¹³⁰

However, between 1818 and 1819, the money raised by these taxes almost never provided the funds necessary to meet the army's budget demands (see figure 1). The military treasury often faced a monthly deficit of up to two thousand pesos and as a consequence, troops went without pay and rations. Some men in Anastasio Bustamante's troops were even reduced to selling their swords in order to buy food.¹³¹ Other men became ill or simply deserted.¹³² Financial problems also exaggerated the shortages of arms and uniforms suffered by the army in Guanajuato. In 1818, Bustamante wrote to Linares that urgent measures needed to be taken to remedy 'la desnudez de la tropa y la falta de armas' amongst his men.¹³³ Linares himself also wrote to the Vice-Roy on more than one occasion about this problem, pointing out that arms were scarce throughout the province and complaining that other units, such as those commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Felipe Codallos, also found themselves in a state of near nudity because of a shortage of uniforms.¹³⁴ This picture of misery was repeated across New Spain. As a result, across the colony the counterinsurgency army faced a crisis of morale

¹³⁰ Serrano, "Votos, contribuciones y milicias," pp. 107, 115.

¹³¹ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 478, f. 93. Bustamante to Linares, Irapuato, 8 May 1818.

¹³² *Ibid.*, vol. 480, f. 477 and vol. 480, f. 25. Bustamante to Linares, Salamanca, 6 April 1818 and 5 October 1818.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, vol. 477, f. 73. Bustamante to Linares, Salamanca, 3 March 1818.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 478, f. 124 and vol. 477, f. 211. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Salamanca, 7 April 1818 and Celaya, 6 June 1818.

Figure 1. Table comparing the monthly income and budget of the military treasury in Guanajuato (1818-1819)

MONTH	BUDGET (pesos/reales/ granos)	INCOME (pesos/reales/ granos)	SURPLUS/ DEFICIT (pesos/reales/ granos)
July 1818	53, 602 / 2 / 7	33, 574 / 6 / 9	-20, 027 / 3 / 10
August 1818	46, 374 / 5 / 4	20, 786 / 0 / 0	-25, 588 / 5 / 4
September 1818	40, 957 / 1 / 5	36, 934 / 6 / 0	-4, 002 / 2 / 11
October 1818	43, 128 / 4 / 11	42, 090 / 2 / 11	-1, 038 / 2 / 0
November 1818	41, 099 / 6 / 4	35, 863 / 0 / 5	-5, 236 / 5 / 11
December 1818	42, 016 / 6 / 6	33, 145 / 0 / 1	-8, 871 / 6 / 5
January 1819	42, 016 / 6 / 6	33, 135 / 0 / 1	-8, 871 / 6 / 5
February 1819	42, 184 / 4 / 4	48, 480 / 0 / 7	+6, 295 / 4 / 3
March 1819	33, 661 / 0 / 2	29, 315 / 0 / 3	-10, 345 / 7 / 11
April 1819	42, 703 / 6 / 1	46, 938 / 4 / 3	+4, 224 / 6 / 2
July 1819	57, 415 / 7 / 3	47, 153 / 6 / 2	-10, 262 / 1 / 1

Sources: AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 473, f. 238, vol. 479, f. 357, vol. 480, ff. 65-66, 149, vol. 481, f. 228, vol. 482, ff. 3-5.

amongst its men. Feelings of anger, resentment and hopelessness convinced many to desert. Others published anonymous papers and petitions in which they criticised their officers and demanded better treatment.¹³⁵

The financial crisis became much worse in 1820. Floods in Celaya and Irapuato brought on by violent rainfall in the early summer dealt the shaky

¹³⁵ Archer, "The Counterinsurgency Army and the Ten Years' War," p. 105.

economy in Guanajuato a heavy blow. A thousand properties in Irapuato were invaded by the rising water; live-stock and crops were ruined; and inundations in the mines of the area caused production to fall by 50 per cent in the following months. Not surprisingly, tax returns from the *alcabala* and the tobacco monopoly declined significantly and in August Linares faced the unprecedented deficit of 15,000 pesos in his military budget.¹³⁶ The problem was compounded by the political reforms introduced by the newly re-established Constitution of Cádiz. The *juntas de arbitrios* set up to oversee the payment of *contribuciones militares* for the upkeep of local urban and rural militias were dissolved, and their powers handed over to the *ayuntamientos*. Almost without exception these bodies voted unanimously to discontinue these taxes, and so, the military coffers in Guanajuato, as elsewhere, were shorn of an important source of income.¹³⁷ By October, Linares was moved to write a frank letter to the Vice-Roy, describing the state of military affairs in the province:

La tesorería militar no cuenta con numerario alguno y cada día irá en mayor decadencia, sea porque las Administraciones de Tabacos tengan menores ventas, que hagan más cortos enteros o por otras causas que solo el tesorero D. Pascual Viderique puede asignarlas; pues yo solo veo con dolor el triste resultado de que siempre hay poca o ninguna existencia de reales para las complicadas atenciones que me cercan, de modo que cuanto creía que con la paz de la provincia me veía más aliviado, he sufrido al contrario mayores privaciones, congojas y pesadumbres, según tengo manifestado a la acreditada justificación de V.E.¹³⁸

The financial shortages suffered by the troops in Guanajuato were now threatening the success of the Royalist project. Linares tried to relieve the pressure on the treasury by reducing his army, sending eight battalions away from the province, but to no avail. He still faced a deficit of thirty thousand pesos in December. By 1821,

¹³⁶ Christon I. Archer. "Where did all the Royalists go? New Light on the Military Collapse of New Spain, 1810-1822," in Jaime E. Rodríguez O. *The Mexican and the Mexican American Experience in the Nineteenth Century* (Tempe: Bilingual Press/Editorial Bilingüe, 1989), p. 37.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 474 f. 165. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Celaya, 13 October 1820.

the officers in the Bajío were extremely concerned about the effect the shortage of money was having on their troops. Morale was at rock bottom, and as Bartolomé de la Peña, the commander of the Frontier Company, positioned on the border with San Luis, wrote to Linares on 20 February, four days before Agustín de Iturbide proclaimed the Plan of Iguala: 'las murmuraciones insubordinadas de la tropa por falta de sueldos' were cause for immense concern.¹³⁹

Even so, financial crises were not the only threat to the stability of the Royalist Army. A far more dangerous problem than rank and file unrest was represented by the Creole officers; men like Colonel Bustamante, who had been transformed during the ten years of conflict from green young men, with no knowledge of military matters, to responsible, capable officers to whom successes such as the pacification of Los Llanos de Apan and Guanajuato were entirely due. These men made up, in the words of Lorenzo de Zavala, 'las verdaderas columnas del poder español,'¹⁴⁰ without whom the colony could surely not have survived. And by 1820, it was evident to the vice-regal government that this power could be a very real threat to the future of the colony. Concerned by the opposition manifest against the liberal Constitution of Cádiz, by those members of the government and military elites who found its encouragement of mass participation in government both threatening and alarming, the Vice-Roy sent an appeal to the Peninsula for the dispatch of troops to come to his aid. He obviously had little trust in the Colonial Army and its Creole officers.¹⁴¹ The question is, why?

The answer lies in the very creation and structure of the Royalist Army. It had been created by Calleja and his fellow Peninsular officers in direct response to Hidalgo's revolutionary movement, because in 1810 there was not an adequate army in New Spain to deal with this problem. The colonial government had always

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. 475, f.359. Bartolomé de la Peña to Linares, San Miguel el Grande, 20 February 1821.

¹⁴⁰ Lorenzo de Zavala, *Ensayo Histórico de las Revoluciones de México desde 1808 hasta 1830* (México: Oficina Impresora de Hacienda, 1918), vol. 1, p. 41.

¹⁴¹ Brian R. Hamnett, "Mexico's Royalist Coalition: the Response to Revolution," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 12 (1980), p. 75.

been reluctant to arm large numbers of the Creole population, and more reluctant still to entrust them with positions of authority.¹⁴² The fear, reflected in all areas of colonial government, was that if the Creoles were allowed too much authority and power, they would soon realise how little they needed their colonial masters and act accordingly. However, the insurgency changed all that. It became necessary to do the unthinkable and arm the Creoles. The senility rife within the peninsular officer class resident in New Spain meant it also was necessary to place the elite Creoles, men such as Bustamante, Barragán and Armijo, in positions of authority; although crucially, the highest positions were held by Peninsular Spaniards, such as Calleja, Concha and José de la Cruz. Calleja recognised the threat lying dormant in this new force, writing to the Vice-Roy Venegas on 29 January 1811 that most Creoles were convinced of 'las ventajas que les resultarían de un gobierno independiente.' He assured Venegas that had Hidalgo sought the support of the Creoles, and not the mixed race *plebe*, his revolution would have been unstoppable.¹⁴³ In other words, the motivating factor in enlisting Creole support in the counterinsurgency army was the social dissolution threatened by Hidalgo's rampaging hordes, rather than a desire to defend King and Colony. While social dissolution remained a threat, the loyalty of the Creole troops seemed assured. Most had no wish to see men of the classes and castes which made up the insurgents take over the government of New Spain. As we have seen, for the Creole officers, these men were the riff-raff of society, nothing but 'canalla.' As Bustamante would later recall to Guillermo Prieto, for him, the insurgents fell into two categories: 'impíos y bandidos.'¹⁴⁴ However, once this threat diminished, as it did in 1820, when it appeared that the insurgent activity had been confined to the modern day state of Guerrero, the loyalty of the Creole officers became questionable.

¹⁴² See the chapter "El Dilema del gachupín," in Archer, *El ejército en el México borbónico*, pp. 23-58 for a description of the setting up of militia forces in Bourbon Mexico and the fears of the Peninsular government and officials.

¹⁴³ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 2, p. 210.

¹⁴⁴ Guillermo Prieto, *Memorias de mis tiempos* (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1996), p.180.

What made this all worse for the colonial government was that the Creole army was now considerably more powerful than it had been in 1810. In the ten years of warfare, many of these officers, like Bustamante, had earned considerable promotions, moving from the rank of Lieutenant to that of Colonel. They were occupying positions of considerable authority, no longer commanding a simple unit or squadron, but now commanding various units and co-ordinating their activities over wide areas. They also had attained a sense of identity, the corporate spirit that would manifest itself so clearly in the post-independent period.¹⁴⁵ In contrast, the Spanish content of the Creole army was continually falling. Between 1812 and 1816, 12, 000 to 15, 000 soldiers had arrived in Mexico from Spain to aid the counterinsurgency effort and to prevent the total domination of the army by the Creoles. However, after 1816, no new Peninsular troops were sent,¹⁴⁶ despite repeated appeals by Vice-Roy Apodaca, and the natural wastage of injury, illness, death and reassignment meant that the Spanish presence in the army fell rapidly. By 1820 there were few choices for Vice-Roy Apodaca in the matter of who was to replace Gabriel Armijo as Commander General of Acapulco. He offered the position to the Spanish Brigadier, Melchor Álvarez. But when he refused the commission, the Vice-Roy found himself obliged to appoint a Creole, Agustín de Iturbide.¹⁴⁷

What is more, after ten years of hard work, these men were for the most part exhausted and frustrated. During these years, they had provided tireless service to the crown. According to Linares, Bustamante, for example, was 'infatigable e intrépido',¹⁴⁸ and was deserving of the *Cruz de Isabel* for his valour and service.¹⁴⁹ This had not been without personal cost. The persecution of the insurgents was an extremely stressful activity, involving as it frequently did a real

¹⁴⁵ Archer, "The Royalist Army in New Spain," p. 76. According to Archer it was present from 1812.

¹⁴⁶ Archer, "Where did all the Royalists go?" p. 36.

¹⁴⁷ Hamnett, *Revolución y contrarrevolución*, pp. 308-309.

¹⁴⁸ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 478, ff. 37-38. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Irapuato, 7 May 1818.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. 479, ff. 143-144. Vice-Roy Apodaca to Linares, 21 July 1818.

threat to the soldier's life.¹⁵⁰ Bustamante, who had been injured on two occasions in this time and who had suffered variously from fevers and kidney infections,¹⁵¹ was probably not an atypical case. Moreover, in the climate of poverty, they would often have to dip into their own pockets, or even take out loans, to provide for their troops.¹⁵² They suffered from shortages of weapons, uniforms and horses. Their troop was constantly being depleted through desertion. And all for what reward? If, like Bustamante, these officers had reached the rank of Colonel, there was nowhere else to go. It was unlikely that any Creole would be promoted further. Indeed, they often had to look on as officers transferred from Peninsular Spain, often of lower rank, were given positions of power, such as Commander Generalships and Intendancies, in preference to the Creoles.¹⁵³

Finally, the reintroduction of the Constitution of Cádiz in 1820 sounded the death knell in the hearts of many of the officers. The dissolution of the *juntas de arbitrios* and the loss of the military contributions meant the end of rural and urban militia protection for haciendas, villages and towns. Without them, the Royalist supremacy over the insurgency could not be guaranteed and many feared their regions would slip back into anarchy, as amnestied insurgents seized the chance to return to their old ways of intimidation, robbery and destruction once the militias ceased to function.¹⁵⁴ As Peter Guardino notes, the social and economic problems

¹⁵⁰ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00005. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante dated December 1820. Apart from his injuries, the most dangerous threat to Bustamante's life came in April 1818. An insurgent chief, Vacilio Ramírez came to Bustamante's camp on the pretext of seeking an amnesty. He drew the Colonel away from his troops and, calling upon three companions who had been waiting in hiding, pulled out his knife in an attempt to kill him. According to his service record, Bustamante saw the four of them off singlehandedly, driving his own knife into Ramírez's skull. AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 478, ff. 67-68. Vice-Roy Apodaca to Linares, 26 May 1818. The Vice-Roy came to hear of this attack and wrote to Linares to order Bustamante to take more care in the future when dealing with the insurgents face to face.

¹⁵¹ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 101 f. 128, 137. In February 1813 Bustamante fell from his horse and injured his leg and arm. *Ibid.*, vol. 120, f. 249. In April 1815 he was injured in the thigh during the capture of Zacatlán. *Ibid.*, vol. 480, f. 234. In December 1818 he was struck down with a fever. *Ibid.*, vol. 465, f. 16. In March 1820 he requested a license to remain in Salamanca for an extended period to recover from an infection in his kidney and deteriorating problems with his eyesight.

¹⁵² Archer, "The Counterinsurgency Army and the Ten Years War," p.105.

¹⁵³ Archer, "Where did all the Royalists go?" p. 30 and Jaime E. Rodríguez O. "La transición de colonia a nación: Nueva España, 1820-1821," *Historia Mexicana* 43: 2 (1993), p. 305.

¹⁵⁴ Rodríguez O. "La transición de colonia a nación," p. 279.

that had caused the insurgents to rebel had not been resolved. The Royalist programme of pacification had merely overwhelmed the insurgents with the use of force. So, once this power was reduced, it could only be expected that the insurgents renewed their campaigns.¹⁵⁵ The Constitution also clearly awarded responsibility for provincial government to the provincial deputations, and deprived local military commanders, such as Bustamante, of their customary dominance over affairs. No longer could the local commander rule his area of command as his personal kingdom, overriding all interests but his own in the name of counterinsurgency.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, for many of the Creole elite, amongst whom there was a fair number of officers, the Constitution represented as great a threat to social order as the insurgency had done. The military and ecclesiastical *fueros*, which would be so jealously guarded in early independent Mexico, were threatened. The Jesuits were once more ordered to leave Spanish dominions. The freedom of the press brought with it a wave of pamphlets that ferociously attacked Spain and the Spaniards, and advocated revolution and independence from the Peninsula in the most strident terms.¹⁵⁷ In short, it appeared that the achievements of ten years of counterinsurgency were in danger.

By 1821, the Royalist Army in Mexico was ripe for rebellion. Harsh conditions, the lack of uniforms, salaries, weapons and food had created discontent amongst the ranks. Frustration, resentment and exhaustion had bred similar

¹⁵⁵ Peter F. Guardino, *Peasants, Politics and the Formation of Mexico's National State. Guerrero, 1800-1857*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 75. He goes on to claim that the idea that the insurgents had been defeated by 1820 'was an optimistic assessment that not even Royalist Commanders believed.' While this is undoubtedly true in Guerrero, where in 1820 the rebels were recovering their strength and were still involved in guerrilla warfare against the Royalists, in Guanajuato this was not the case. All the weekly reports for the final months of 1820 sent by Commanders such as Bustamante to Linares, report that the situation in the area of their jurisdiction 'continúa tranquila' and that 'no ha ocurrido novedad.' See for example the reports for December 1820, included in AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 474, ff. 350-387. Linares was infinitely more concerned about the financial crisis he was facing in 1820. He wrote in October 1820 to the Vice-Roy, 'pues yo sólo veo con dolor el triste resultado de que siempre hay poca o ninguna existencia de reales para las complicadas atenciones que me cercan. de modo que cuando creía que con la paz de la Provincia me vería más aliviado, he sufrido al contrario mayores privaciones, congojas y pesadumbres.' *Ibid.*, f. 165. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Celaya, 13 October 1820.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

¹⁵⁷ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, pp. 29-37.

unhappiness within the officer class. The re-establishment of the Constitution of Cádiz would bring this all to a head. For many officers, the reforms demanded by the reintroduction of the Constitution threatened the success of the pacification of New Spain, reopened the door to anarchy, and attacked many of the foundations of traditional colonial society. They saw their ten years of hard work and sacrifices in danger of disappearing quickly, and felt under threat. Their solution would be to hijack the insurgents' call for independence, and to try to impose their authority upon the rebels. In this way, the excuse for the insurgents' violence would be removed, and the control of an independent Mexico would remain in the hands of the Creole oligarchy.

F: The Significance of Bustamante's Military Career (1810-1821)

This study of Anastasio Bustamante's career in the Royalist Army leaves us with two important points which must be carried forward in our examination of his future life and career. The first is that his part in the counterinsurgency struggle completely changed his life. Before 1810 he had dedicated himself to medicine, joining Calleja's militia as a surgeon. In such a position, he would have entertained no hopes of attaining high status or authority beyond the medical world. However, in the ten years of the insurgency his expectations of life must have changed considerably. He abandoned the pursuit of medicine, probably not consciously at first, and became a professional soldier. By 1820, in his position as a highly-regarded and respected Colonel, it is unlikely that he now entertained thoughts of returning to his old career. The second point is that his experiences in the army were probably extremely influential in forming the man he would become in independent Mexico. Here he was taught to despise the insurgents, to regard them as 'canalla' and to believe that it was 'un acto meritorio [...] exterminarlos.'¹⁵⁸ His constant exposure to violence, bloodshed and death would have hardened his

¹⁵⁸ Prieto, *Memorias*, p. 180.

character and most likely left him with very little regard for human life. He was also taught to distinguish between the two classes of insurgent, the elite Creole and the vast majority of the *plebe*. He may have even learnt to regard the insurgency struggle simply as an attempted social revolution of the class of the French Revolution. Finally, he was educated in the exercise of authority. He learnt to command, first a unit of men, his Guerrilla Squadron, and later a whole battalion, in Guanajuato, and was able to co-ordinate the effort of many units in the persecution of the insurgents. He probably also acquired a strong ambition, illustrated in his swift climb through the ranks, and with it, a taste for power and control. All of these things would influence his behaviour in the future. The doctor from San Luis Potosí could never have envisaged becoming a leading military or political figure in New Spain. The Colonel in Guanajuato in 1820, however, most probably could.

Chapter Two: The Shadow of Iturbide

Anastasio Bustamante is perhaps best remembered in Mexican history for being the faithful friend and loyal lieutenant of Agustín de Iturbide. The reasons behind this abiding memory are not entirely clear. It is true that Bustamante was one of the few military officers who remained allied to Iturbide during 1823 and did not adhere to the Plan of Casa Mata. Manuel Gómez Pedraza also remained loyal, but his name is not continually associated with that of the erstwhile emperor in the annals of history. It is correct that during Bustamante's presidency in 1839, the remains of Iturbide were transferred from their tomb in Padilla and reburied in the Cathedral in Mexico City. However, Bustamante did not arrange this move. It was Antonio López de Santa Anna who gave the necessary orders before his departure for Texas.¹ It is also a fact that in his will Bustamante requested that his heart be removed from his body after death and buried beside the remains of the former emperor.² Nonetheless, he was not a unique case. Manuel Mier y Terán also left a similar request in his suicide note of 1832: asking that his body be placed next to Iturbide's in his tomb in Padilla, with the bones touching. He even went to the trouble of falling on his sword in the exact spot where Iturbide was executed in 1824.³ In fact, it is most likely that we inherit our perception of the close friendship between Iturbide and Bustamante from contemporary writing of the period. For example, between 1823 and 1824, as fears heightened that the fallen emperor might be organising a return to Mexico, Bustamante's friendship with Iturbide was regularly discussed in order to prove the accusation that he was an *iturbidista*. We are also influenced by the traditional

¹ Timothy E. Anna, *The Mexican Empire of Iturbide* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), p. 13.

² Archivo General de Notarías de la Ciudad de México (henceforth referred to as AGNCM), Notaría: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2869, f. 8. "Testamento de D. Anastasio Bustamante, 1846," dated: 12 January 1846.

³ Timothy E. Anna, *Forging Mexico* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), p. 251.

interpretation of events which took place in Jalisco during these same years, put forward by writers such as Lucas Alamán and Carlos María de Bustamante, who claim that Bustamante and Luis Quintanar were plotting to overthrow the Supreme Executive Power and the newly-imposed federalist system in order to reimpose the empire of Iturbide. Whether these sources have left us an entirely accurate idea of the relationship between the two men, however, is a subject which needs to be discussed.

A: The Plan of Iguala (1821)

When and where Agustín de Iturbide and Anastasio Bustamante first met remains a mystery. It could be that the two soldiers met in the early years of the counterinsurgency when both served in the Army of Centre in Guanajuato and the Bajío. Another member of this army, Manuel Gómez Pedraza, recounts that he first met Iturbide in 1812, and, although he does not specify where, it makes sense to assume that their acquaintance would have been made in a military context.⁴ Certainly, Carlos María de Bustamante dates the relationship between Bustamante and Iturbide as beginning in Guanajuato at about that time.⁵ If they did not meet at this point they had another opportunity in early 1816, when the Vice-Roy sent Iturbide and a division of his men to the Llanos de Apan for a few weeks to aid Manuel de la Concha's efforts against the insurgents.⁶ Wherever the two men actually met, it is clear that they had the chance to form a firm friendship. The letters Bustamante addressed to Iturbide in

⁴ Manuel Gómez Pedraza, "Manifiesto que Manuel Gómez Pedraza, ciudadano de la república de México, dedica a sus compatriotas, o sea, una reseña de su vida pública," in Laura Solares Robles, *La obra política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza, 1813-1851*. (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Instituto Matías Romero/Acervo histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1999), p. 175.

⁵ Carlos María de Bustamante, *Cuadro histórico de la revolución mexicana*. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica/Instituto Helénico, 1985), vol. 5., p. 144.

⁶ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 119, f. 318. Vice-Roy Félix María Calleja to Manuel de la Concha, 24 April 1816.

1821 are full of effusive expressions of affections and friendship.⁷ Even so, when Iturbide left Mexico City in 1820 for the direction of Acapulco, he carried with him introductory letters provided for him by Gómez Pedraza to various military commanders who might be interested in his plans for the proclamation of independence. These were addressed to Joaquín Parres, José Antonio Echávarri and Anastasio Bustamante, amongst others.⁸ This suggests that the friendship professed by the two men in their later correspondence may have been slightly superficial. For, if Iturbide and Bustamante had been really close friends, there would have been no need for such a letter of introduction from Pedraza.

Iturbide opened communication with Anastasio Bustamante in January 1821. He sent one of his officers, Captain Francisco Quintanilla, to Valladolid and the Bajío to meet with the Royalist officers in those areas (Luis Quintanar, Miguel Barragán and Parres in Valladolid and Bustamante and Luis Cortázar in the Bajío) with letters from Iturbide and copies of the proposed plan in order to sound out the prospects of their support.⁹ It is clear that Iturbide was confident of their support, as he wrote to Pedro Celestino Negrete on the 25 January 1821 that: 'Parres, sargento mayor de Fieles, es

⁷ For example: SDN: Archivo Histórico (henceforth referred to as AH): XI/481.3/1846/00001. Anastasio Bustamante to Agustín de Iturbide, Hacienda de Pantoja, 6 February 1821. This is the first letter sent by Bustamante to Iturbide. He declares his support for the plans for independence begins: 'Mi siempre amado jefe, amigo y dueño de todo mi aprecio'. It concludes, 'su más apasionado súbdito y amigo que le ama de corazón'. Bustamante was in the habit of writing such profuse expressions of affection in his personal letters. Interestingly, those which have survived from this period are addressed to Calleja and Linares, both of whom were Bustamante's senior officers at the time. For example: AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 101, f. 171. Bustamante to Calleja, Texcoco, 1 December 1814. *Ibid.*, vol. 482, f. 329. Bustamante to Linares, Pilas, 2 July 1819. The suspicion that Bustamante was prone to ingratiating himself with his superiors cannot be ignored, especially if we also consider a further letter Bustamante sent to Iturbide in July 1821. In this letter Bustamante describes a meeting he has had with Iturbide's children and father: 'En la tarde de hoy, he tenido la singular complacencia de ver al Sr. Joaquín, padre de V. y parte de su apreciable familia, con inclusión de la amable Pepita, que con su atractivo y extraordinaria viveza, cautiva desde pequeña los corazones. ¿Qué será cuando grande? ¡Dios nos coja confesados! como dicen los rancheros [...] ¡Ojalá pudiera obsequiar a todos desde el más grande hasta el más chico, conforme merecen y como exigen mis deseos!' SDN: AH XI/481.3/1846/00087. Bustamante to Iturbide, Chapa de Mota, 13 July 1821.

⁸ Gómez Pedraza, "Manifiesto," p. 177.

⁹ Lucas Alamán Archive, in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin (henceforth referred to as LAA), no. 316b. Francisco Quintanilla to Lucas Alamán, Celaya, 17 November 1850.

un amigo decidido, y no dudo que Bustamante y Quintanar [...] se decidirán por la razón, justicia y conveniencia.’¹⁰ Iturbide's confidence was not misplaced, for on 6 February Bustamante wrote back to say that he would do ‘cuanto esté de mi parte y permiten las circunstanicas [...] bien seguro de que deseo complacerle.’¹¹ However, Bustamante was cautious enough on the subject of a possible armed rebellion to indicate to Iturbide that the poor state of his eyesight would prevent him from taking an active part in such an endeavour.¹² The Colonel had suffered from a kidney infection in 1820 and had made complaints about his problems with his sight before,¹³ and it is possible that his plea of ill-health was not a convenient opt-out clause. However, as the excuse of illness was rife amongst the officers in the army of independent Mexico, it is difficult not to entertain the suspicion that Bustamante's declaration of ill-health was his way of leaving himself the possibility of withdrawing his support for Iturbide's project, should it suddenly become an obvious failure. On the other hand, Alamán, in his *Historia de México*, attributes Bustamante's hesitation to support Iturbide completely, as more evidence of his indecisiveness.¹⁴ But, as we shall see later, the evidence of his involvement in Iturbide's armed campaign and the manner of his future career in politics suggests that caution, rather than real illness or indecision, is the most satisfactory explanation.

There can be no doubt that Colonel Bustamante would have been in favour of the principle of a rebellion against the viceroyalty and Spanish government. As we have seen in the previous chapter, by 1821, the Royalist army in New Spain was discontented and frustrated. Its soldiers had not been paid for months and lacked uniforms and weapons. Its officers felt that their services and sacrifices for the

¹⁰ Bustamante, *Cuadro histórico*, vol. 5, p. 140.

¹¹ SDN: AH XI/481.3/1846/00001. Bustamante to Iturbide, Hacienda de Pantoja, 6 February 1821.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 465, f. 16. Bustamante to Linares, Salamanca, 4 March 1820.

¹⁴ Lucas Alamán, *Historia de México desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon su independencia en el año de 1808 hasta la época presente* (Mexico City: Libros del Bachiller Sansón Carillo, 1986), p. 95.

counterinsurgency cause had gone unrecognised and unappreciated. With the reintroduction of the Constitution of Cádiz, many officers saw their problems confounded by the abolition of the *junta de arbitrios* and the *contribuciones militares*. They believed that their severe lack of funds threatened the stability of the counterinsurgency programme, and would encourage the huge numbers of amnestied insurgents to return to their old ways of robbery and destruction. It is not unreasonable to suggest that Bustamante shared the frustrations of his peers and was opposed to many of the reforms introduced by the Constitution of Cádiz. Neither is it far-fetched to suppose that Bustamante was in favour of some measure of autonomous government for Mexico, since this sentiment was rife amongst the Creole elites of late New Spanish society. Therefore, he would have most likely welcomed the Plan of Iguala with open arms. This document offered remedies for many of the ills he felt New Spain, and most importantly, he himself had suffered: the *fuero militar* would be preserved and Spanish domination of governmental and military affairs would be ended.¹⁵

The Commander General of Guanajuato, Antonio Linares, remained in complete ignorance of the plans being hatched under his nose. His weekly reports to the Vice-Roy in the first two weeks in March, declared that peace and tranquillity reigned in Guanajuato.¹⁶ Even once Iturbide proclaimed his plan in Iguala, Linares seems not to have considered the rebellion a threat to his region: a stance which earned him a stern rebuke from Apodaca.¹⁷ However, he would quickly learn of his mistake. After Iturbide's declaration of 24 February reached Guanajuato in early

¹⁵ The Plan of Iguala is included in *Ibid.*, pp. 553-556. For an excellent discussion of the implications of the Plan of Iguala, see Brian R. Hamnett, *Revolución y contrarrevolución en México y el Perú. Liberalismo, realeza y separatismo, 1800-1824* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1986), pp. 316-320.

¹⁶ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 460, f. 333, 350. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Guanajuato, 7, 13 March 1821.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 345. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Guanajuato, 11 March 1821. The Vice-Roy's reply is in the margin of this letter, dated 15 March.

March, Bustamante and Luis Cortázar quickly got together and decided upon the actions they would take to ensure their province's swift allegiance to Iturbide's cause. On 16 March, Cortázar proclaimed Mexican independence in the village of Amoles, marching to Salvatierra the next day to make a similar declaration. On 18 March, Cortázar moved to the Valle de Santiago, where his troops met with those of Bustamante, who had previously proclaimed his support for the Plan of Iguala in the hacienda of Pantoja.¹⁸ They intended to march together upon Salamanca, where they hoped to convince Colonel Linares to join their cause. Linares, however, learning of their movements and intentions through a spy, fled in the middle of the night to Celaya. The next day, 19 March, he wrote bitterly to the Vice-Roy that he could not hope to contain the rebellion, as all the troops commanded by Bustamante and Cortázar in the Bajío had remained loyal to their chiefs, while he had barely two hundred men at his disposal. Moreover, it was obvious to him that 'los pueblos generalmente [están] alucinados con que les viene un gran bien, [están] todos a su favor.'¹⁹ Later that day, Bustamante ordered Cortázar to march on Celaya with 150 men to try once more to win Linares over to the idea of independence with the assurance that he would remain in control of the troops in Guanajuato. But Linares, captured in his residence by Cortázar, once more refused to adhere to the plan. Cortázar kept him under guard in his house, until Bustamante arrived on 21 March. Bustamante, apparently annoyed at the harsh treatment Cortázar had given to Linares, whom Alamán says he respected highly, held a private interview with him, and when it became clear that Linares was not willing to consider his proposals, granted him a

¹⁸ Lafragua Collection in the Biblioteca Nacional de México, Fondo Reservado (henceforth referred to as LAF), no. 450. "Oficio del Sr. D. Anastasio Bustamante, Coronel del Regimiento de Dragones de San Luis," in *El Mejicano Independiente*, 21 April 1821. Also see, Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 95.

¹⁹ AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 460, f. 368. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Celaya, 19 March 1821.

passport and escort to Querétaro.²⁰ By now, the cause had virtually been won throughout the province of Guanajuato. Salamanca declared the independence of Mexico on 23 March. On the following day, Bustamante was treated to a rapturous welcome on his arrival in the provincial capital, the city garrisons having adhered to the Plan of Iguala some days before. From this base in the capital he assured the adhesion of the other remaining towns in the province, such as San Miguel el Grande, León, Irapuato and Silao.²¹ So, by 4 April he could declare to Iturbide that: 'se ha proclamado la independencia en la capital y los demás pueblos de esta provincia sin derramar una gota de sangre.'²²

Bustamante's victory in Guanajuato would be crucial for the success of Iturbide's project. For as Alamán reminds us, by late March Iturbide's position in the South was extremely precarious. Desertion had halved his total force; and in the light of the eerie silence that had so far greeted the proclamation of the Plan of Iguala, his new insurgent allies were understandably less than enthusiastic about his leadership. In fact, he had already decided that it would be prudent to leave the South and set up his base in a less hostile environment when the news reached him of the adhesion of José Joaquín de Herrera, Vicente Filisola and Bustamante.²³ Buoyed by this news, he directed his remaining troops towards Guanajuato, where he met with Bustamante, Cortázar and Joaquín Parres in the middle of April in the town of Acámbaro. From this base, Iturbide organised the siege of Valladolid (the present day city of Morelia), which led to the defection of its Commander General, Luis Quintanar, to the Army of the Three Guarantees and the fall of that city to Iturbide. Most of the surrounding

²⁰ "Oficio del Sr. D. Anastasio Bustamante, Coronel del Regimiento de Dragones de San Luis," and Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, pp. 95-96.

²¹ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 96. Bustamante, *Cuadro Histórico*, vol. 5, p. 145.

²² SDN: AH XI/481.3/1846/00003. Bustamante to Iturbide, Silao, 4 April 1821.

²³ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, pp. 92-95.

provinces of Valladolid had already adhered to the Plan of Iguala and the surrender of the capital merely provided the finishing touch.²⁴

From Valladolid, the Army of the Three Guarantees marched upon Querétaro. Bustamante's troops were positioned around San Juan del Río with those of Quintanar, forming a besieging army of over a thousand.²⁵ The town surrendered on 7 June.²⁶ The position in San Juan was strategically very important for Iturbide's army, being as it was on the road from Querétaro to Mexico City. From this base Bustamante and Quintanar prevented Concha from reaching the besieged Querétaro with reinforcements from the capital. Concha advanced as far as Tula and the troops commanded by Bustamante and Quintanar waited for the chance of an open encounter. In the meantime, they concentrated their efforts on trying to intercept the silver convoys travelling from Zimapán to the capital.²⁷ This was a particular concern as the proclamation of independence had meant no real financial advantage for the Army of the Three Guarantees and salaries were still scarce.²⁸ On 10 June Concha retired from Tula and led his forces back to Mexico. Seizing their opportunity, Bustamante and his men consolidated their position. They entered Zimapán on 15 June and appropriated the ten thousand pesos contained in the town's treasury, much to the relief of Bustamante, who was, by his own admission, desperate for money at this point.²⁹ It was now possible to send new troops and money to reinforce the presence of the Army of the Three Guarantees in Huichapan and Ixmiquilpan. Almost

²⁴ Juan Ortiz Escamilla, *Guerra y gobierno. Los pueblos y la independencia de México* (Seville: Instituto Mora/El Colegio de México/Universidad Internacional de Andalucía/Universidad de Sevilla, 1997), p. 158.

²⁵ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 132.

²⁶ SDN: AH XI/481.3/1846/00032. Bustamante to Iturbide, Venta de San Juan del Río, 7 June 1821.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/1846/00032-33. Bustamante to Iturbide, San Juan del Río, 8 June 1821. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/1846/00035-36. Bustamante to Iturbide, Arroyozarco, 9 June 1821. Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 132.

²⁸ Almost without exception, all Bustamante's reports to Iturbide refer to his shortage of money. For example: SDN: AH XI/481.3/1846/00025. Bustamante to Iturbide, Hacienda de Colorado, 28 May 1821: 'No puedo menos que manifestar a V. la necesidad que tenemos de dinero'. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/1846/00035-36. Bustamante to Iturbide, Arroyozarco, 9 June 1821: 'Se hace indispensable nos envíe V. algún dinero a paso largo [...] los pobres [soldados] no tienen que comer'.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/1846/00047. Bustamante to Iturbide, Zimapán, 15 June 1821.

immediately, Bustamante then returned to San Juan del Río to participate in the siege of Querétaro. Once this city had surrendered on 29 June, Bustamante and Quintanar took charge of the troops who were to march south and begin the siege of Mexico City. By 26 July he and his men had advanced as far as Cuautitlán, Tepotzotlán and Tlalnepantla.³⁰ Here they waited in vain for most of August for the Royalist troops to leave their positions in Tacuba and Tacubaya, and engage them in battle. Finally, on 19 August the hoped for encounter took place in the village of Azcapulzalco, and was a bloody yet inconclusive affair. Both sides lost around 100 men, including, on the side of the Three Guarantees, the ex-insurgent Encarnación Ortiz, whose bravery in attempting to rescue a lost cannon was noted by Bustamante in his report to Iturbide.³¹ Although the Royalists did not surrender Azcapulzalco during the battle, they left their positions in the town some days later. Bustamante and Quintanar duly set up their headquarters there, where they were clearly visible to the inhabitants of Mexico City.³² On 5 September they were joined in the village by Iturbide.³³ From here he organised the surrounding of Mexico City by the Army of the Three Guarantees. The Marquis of Vivanco was appointed the chief of the Vanguard section, covering the northern and eastern edges of the capital from Guadalupe to Texcoco and Chalco. The Rearguard section, under the command of Luis Quintanar covered the roads leading out of Mexico City to Michoacán. The centre, which covered the remaining area, was given to Domingo Luaces, the former Commander General of Querétaro. Bustamante was appointed as his second. However, he immediately took on effectively leadership of this section due to Luaces' ongoing ill-health.³⁴

³⁰ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/1846/00106. Bustamante to Iturbide, Cuautitlán, 20 July 1821. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/1846/00108. Bustamante to Iturbide, Tepotzotlán, 25 July 1821.

³¹ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/1846/00143-145. Bustamante to Iturbide, Santa Mónica, 22 August 1821. Bustamante, *Cuadro histórico*, vol. 5, p. 275.

³² Bustamante, *Cuadro histórico*, vol. 5, p. 284.

³³ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 175.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

The battle at Azcapulzalco was the only violent encounter Bustamante would have with the troops of the viceroyalty. From this point on he and his troops merely waited while Iturbide and the newly-arrived Captain General Juan O'Donojú negotiated the Treaties of Córdoba which finalised the details of Mexico's independence from Spain. In fact, violence was conspicuous by its absence in the campaigns of the Army of the Three Guarantees. As was the case in Guanajuato, garrisons and towns for the most part welcomed Iturbide's forces with open arms. It was obvious that the Plan of Iguala had widespread popular support. However, Bustamante was well aware of how easy it would be for this support to fade away if the Army were to misbehave, to indulge in murder, pillage or wanton destruction of property, as the insurgents had done. The Plan of Iguala called for the respect of people and property regardless of race,³⁵ and Bustamante was determined that his army should abide by this ideal at all times. Of course, this had been most important in the early stages of his campaign, when the aims of the Plan of Iguala were not widely known. The day before he entered Guanajuato he wrote to the *ayuntamiento* of that city to assure them that his troops would observe 'el mayor orden y disciplina' at all times and asked them to help him assure the peaceful nature of the proclamation in independence in Guanajuato by 'exhortando al vecindario a la unión con todas las clases y principalmente con nuestros hermanos de Europa, cuyas vidas y propiedades deberían ser para nosotros inviolables'.³⁶ On leaving Guanajuato, he wrote to ask the Indendant if he, the *ayuntamiento* and the mining council would publish a certificate in which they asserted the peaceful, orderly and honourable behaviour of his troops throughout their occupation of the city.³⁷ This these authorities dutifully did, remarking in their statement:

³⁵ "Plan of Iguala," article 13. Included in Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 555.

³⁶ Archivo Histórico de Guanajuato (henceforth referred to as AHG, *Ramo de Guerra*, box 7, document 380. Bustamante to the Very Illustrious *Ayuntamiento* of the City of Guanajuato, Hacienda de Burros, 24 March 1821.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, doc. 387. Bustamante to Fernando Pérez Mañanón, Guanajuato, 1 April 1821.

El sr. colonel D. Anastasio Bustamante [...] observó en su conducta personal y trato con las autoridades que gobiernan la mayor política y moderación [...] Conservó la mayor unión y fraternidad [con los vecinos particulares del pueblo], especialmente con los Europeos, cuyas vidas, honor, quietud y propiedad mantuvo ileso con particular cuidado, no menos que las de todos los habitantes de esta población, a quienes tampoco se advirtió que ofendieron en lo más mínimo los soldados del expresado sr. Bustamante; y si por contrario se les observó el mayor concedimiento en su trato social, sin que hasta ahora haya llegado a saber dicha ilustre Corporación que se excedieron embriagándose, armado quimeras o insultado a alguno, ni con título de alojamiento, bagages ni otros auxiliares.³⁸

It is clear that Bustamante wanted to demonstrate to the rest of Guanajuato and New Spain as a whole, that embracing the cause of independence did not also involve the adoption of the manners and behaviour of the insurgents.

The maintenance of order and discipline cannot have been easy. Bustamante's men were not just made up of Royalist soldiers, used to obeying the orders of their commanding officer. Amnestied and still active insurgents also joined his force. He also had to exercise his authority over these men, many of whom had characterised their own struggles with robbery and destruction, and were probably none too happy about accepting instructions from a former enemy. Moreover, his lack of money, uniforms and weapons only made his life more difficult. He sent repeated pleas for money and supplies to Iturbide, pointing out that if his economic situation did not improve he feared his soldiers would desert, or turn to robbery and violence in order to be able to eat.³⁹ Even so, Bustamante seems to have successfully maintained his authority throughout the campaigns of the Army of the Three Guarantees. This was probably because he showed himself to be unprepared to tolerate ill-disciplined behaviour from his men, and would quickly act upon complaints. In the middle of

³⁸ *Ibid.*, doc. 288. Untitled. Sala Capitular de Guanajuato, 2 April 1821.

³⁹ SDN: AH XI/481/3/1846/00003. Bustamante to Iturbide, Silao, 4 April 1821. *Ibid.*, XI/481/3/1846/00025. Bustamante to Iturbide, Hacienda de Colorado, 28 May 1821. *Ibid.*, XI/481/3/1846/00038. Bustamante to Iturbide, Hacienda de la Cañada, 10 June 1821.

June, after receiving several unfavourable reports about his officers in Huichapan, he made a point of visiting the town personally in order to make his own enquiries. He also wrote to Iturbide to arrange a meeting with him in order to discuss the situation and its solution.⁴⁰ He believed that the success of the Plan of Iguala relied heavily on the general support of the people of Mexico, and quite rightly supposed that: ‘abusos y excesos [...] perjudican a nuestra opinión y al proyecto de la causa.’⁴¹

B: Bustamante and Imperial Mexico (1821-1822)

The Army of the Three Guarantees entered Mexico City on 27 September 1821. Iturbide, whose birthday it was, was at the head of the procession. The Central Division, commanded by Anastasio Bustamante, followed proudly, reinforced by the Vanguard and the Rearguard Divisions, making up a mass of 14, 000 men and 1, 200 officers. The troops marched triumphantly through streets decorated with ‘una multitud de colgaduras, de fámulas, cortinas y gallardetes’ and lined with cheering crowds, from Chapultepec, along the calle de San Francisco towards the National Palace. Here, Iturbide dismounted and entered the Palace, which was also filled with well-wishers, and where Juan O'Donojú greeted him. Both men went out onto the balcony to watch the Army march past the Palace before going to hear a *Te Deum* in the Cathedral. The next day, while the celebrations continued ‘con sus repetidas vivas, salvas e iluminaciones,’ the Act of Independence was signed and the business of governing an independent Mexico was begun.⁴²

Anastasio Bustamante was initially given an important role in the new government of Mexico as he was named as one of the members of the *Junta*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/1846/00052. Bustamante to Iturbide, 17 June 1821.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² LAF no. 395. *Noticioso General*, 1 October 1821. For other details see, Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, pp. 196-200.

Provisional Gubernativa, the body set up by the Treaties of Córdoba to provide an interim government for Mexico until a legislative power could be elected. It was also to designate a regency to provide the executive power in the Empire until a monarch could be found. This group held its first meeting on 22 September, in Tacubaya, in which Bustamante was commissioned, along with Juan Horbegoso and Manuel de la Sota Riva, to make inquiries into what distinctions and rewards should be offered to the army for its services for independence.⁴³ On 25 September they met for the second time to decide upon the powers and attributes that should be given to the *Junta*. It was agreed that the *Junta* would have all the faculties awarded to the Cortes in the Constitution of Cádiz, until a new Mexican Cortes could be convened. On that day, Bustamante, Horbegoso and Sota Riva also presented their recommendations for the rewards that should be given to the Army of the Three Guarantees. They suggested that a new military order should be set up, named *Imperial de la Águila Mexicana*, to which officers could be appointed as recompense for their services. In the meantime, medals should be struck to be handed out immediately to those deserving of recognition.⁴⁴ The military order eventually became the *Orden Imperial de Guadalupe*, and Anastasio Bustamante was amongst those immediately awarded the Great Cross of the Order in July 1822.⁴⁵ On 28 September, the *Junta* met and approved the Act of Independence, which was then signed by its members. Two days later the *Junta* was divided into commissions to take charge of the various aspects of government, such as Interior and Exterior Affairs, the Treasury and Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs. Bustamante was appointed to the War Commission with

⁴³ *Ibid.*, no. 1112. Soberana Junta Provisional Gubernativa, *Diario de las sesiones de la soberana junta provisional gubernativa del Imperio Mexicano, instalada según previenen el Plan de Iguala y Tratados de la Villa de Córdoba* (Mexico City: Imprenta Imperial de D. Alejandro Valdés, 1821), p. 3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁵ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 361

Francisco Manuel Sánchez de Tagle and Sota de la Riva.⁴⁶ However, on 23 October Bustamante was appointed as Captain General of the Eastern and Western Internal Provinces.⁴⁷ This responsibility, although it did not require him to leave the capital, took him away from the *Junta* and made him a continual absentee.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, according to the Diary of Sessions, he did attend the debates in November on the subject of the rules which should be set up in order to organise the election of a Constituent Congress, and is recorded as having supported Iturbide's request to be allowed to address the *Junta* with his own proposals.⁴⁹ Unfortunately we do not know what his opinions were of Iturbide's proposals, which called for the adoption of corporate representation in Congress,⁵⁰ or whether he played any part in the final drafting of the plan of convocation.⁵¹ Also in November, he was present at the discussions undertaken by the *Junta* on the subject of the restoration of the Jesuits and Hospital Orders. According to Alamán, he supported the liberal arguments against the idea of the reintroduction of these orders.⁵² His other interventions in the debates of the *Junta* are few and far between, and it is probably accurate to say he did not play a major part in the work of that body, which eventually was dissolved on 23 February to make way for the new Constituent Congress.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁴⁷ SDN: AH XI/481.3/22. Circular. Dated 23 October 1821.

⁴⁸ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, pp. 268-269.

⁴⁹ Soberana Junta Provisional Gubernativa, *Diario de las sesiones de la soberana junta provisional gubernativa del Imperio Mexicano*, p. 84. (8th November 1821).

⁵⁰ Iturbide wanted Congress to be elected by special groups representing the professions of the Mexican population, such as the ecclesiastics, miners, shopkeepers, merchants, labourers, intellectuals and public employees, rather than by groups of electors designated according to their parishes as required by the Constitution of Cádiz. Torcuato S. Di Tella, *National Popular Politics in Early Independent Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), pp. 102-104. Bustamante was probably aware of these proposals in advance of Iturbide's request to address the *Junta*. His support of Iturbide's right to speak before the assembly could therefore imply his support for the proposals themselves. Even so, there is no evidence in the Diary of Sessions to indicate Bustamante's stance in the debate on the electoral procedure.

⁵¹ For a good discussion of the debates of the *Junta* on the subject of the convocation of the Constituent Congress and the eventual decisions, see Anna, *The Mexican Empire of Iturbide*, pp. 50-54.

⁵² Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 229.

Bustamante's principal role under Iturbide's government was really as a military commander. On 12 October 1821, he was promoted to Field-Marshal, a rank that was later abolished, and has led authors, such as Carlos María de Bustamante and Lucas Alamán, to refer to him as a General during this time. In fact, he remained a Field-Marshal throughout the short period of Empire, refusing the commission of Lieutenant-General offered to him by Iturbide in March 1823.⁵³ He was finally promoted in October 1823, by virtue of a decree which suppressed the rank of Field-Marshal and automatically raised those of that rank to *Generales de División*, the highest rank in the Mexican Army.⁵⁴ As Field-Marshal, he undertook various commissions for the Imperial Government. As we have said, in October 1822, he was appointed as Captain General of the Eastern and Western Internal Provinces. In February 1823, he was awarded the Captain Generalship of the provinces of Mexico, Valladolid, Guanajuato and Querétaro, replacing Manuel de la Sota Riva, who was seriously ill.⁵⁵ Luis Quintanar soon replaced Bustamante as commanding officer in Mexico, Querétaro and Valladolid. But Guanajuato, with the addition of San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas, remained under his control until the fall of the Empire. In his capacity as Captain General of Mexico, Bustamante fought the last battle against the Spaniards of the war of independence at Juchi (which is situated in the mountain range between the Valley of Mexico and Cuautla, in the modern state of Morelos), on 3 April 1822. This encounter was to prevent the application of the plan hatched by José Dávila, the Spanish General who still held the castle of Ulúa in Veracruz, to reunite the remaining Peninsular soldiers in Veracruz and make a last stand for the colony.

⁵³ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00081. Bustamante to the Minister of War, 16 March 1823. Bustamante merely wished the promotion to be delayed until after the rebellion was over. He claimed that the Empire's treasury could not support his promotion. However, once Iturbide had been exiled, Bustamante reiterated his rejection of the promotion to the new regime. In this case, probably in protest against recent events. *Ibid.*, XI/III/1-235/1-31/00092. Bustamante to the Minister of War, 7 April 1823.

⁵⁴ LAF no. 425. "Decreto del 24 de octubre de 1823."

⁵⁵ SDN:AH XI/III/1-235/1-31/00029. Bustamante to Minister of War, 28 February 1822.

The Spanish soldiers, who had been garrisoned in Texcoco and Cuernavaca since the peaceful withdrawal of the Peninsular army from Mexico City, were ordered to meet together in Juchi and begin from there their march for Jalapa. However, the Imperial Government were made aware of the plan and sent Bustamante, with around 300 troops, to prevent this meeting. The two sides met each other outside Juchi, and after a short encounter, the Spanish troops surrendered. Iturbide later described this action to the committee of the regency in glowing terms, crediting Bustamante and his men with the salvation of the Empire. He recommended the decoration of Bustamante with the Great Cross of the newly formed Order of Guadalupe, the promotion of his officers, and medals to be handed out to the soldiers involved.⁵⁶ However, Alamán is sceptical, believing that the Peninsular troops presented no special threat to the safety of the Empire, as they were scattered throughout Mexico in small numbers, and were for the most part suffering from great economic hardships.⁵⁷ Even so, the victory at Juchi would be long remembered as a triumph of the Mexican Army over its Spanish rivals, and Bustamante would be referred to for years to come as the Hero of Juchi.

In general, Anastasio Bustamante's job as Captain General was mainly administrative. The provinces under his jurisdiction were controlled by Commander Generals or Intendants, who submitted monthly reports on the state of their provinces.⁵⁸ Bustamante remained in Mexico City, in attendance at the court of Iturbide, during a large part of the Imperial period. In January 1823 he did make preparations to visit the provinces under his command, but this was all curtailed by the success of the Plan of Casa Mata.⁵⁹ During the revolt of Brigadier Felipe de la Garza, in the late summer of 1822, in Nuevo Santander (now the state of Tamaulipas), which

⁵⁶ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, pp. 312-131.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 315-316.

⁵⁸ For example: SDN: SC XI/III./1-235/1-31/00057. Brigadier Antonio Cordera [Commander General of the Internal Western Provinces] to Bustamante, 19 October 1821.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, XI/III/1-235/1-31/00062-63. Bustamante to the Imperial Government, Mexico City, 1 January 1823.

was one of the provinces he commanded, his role was confined to the issuing of proclamations condemning the uprising, and the organisation of the troops under Brigadiers Gaspar López and José Zenón Fernández, who in effect put down the rebellion.⁶⁰ However, once Garza surrendered and was brought to Mexico City, Bustamante did take a personal interest in the case. He persuaded Iturbide not to execute Garza, but to allow him to continue in his position as Commander General of Nuevo Santander.⁶¹ This perhaps was unfortunate, as it was Felipe de la Garza who captured Iturbide on his return to Mexico in 1824. It might have been expected that the Brigadier might have shown some gratitude for the pardon he received in 1822, and consequently allow him to make an escape. Unfortunately for Iturbide, Garza was not ready to treat the former emperor with the leniency which with he himself had been treated.

Assessing the nature of Bustamante's relationship with Iturbide during this time is difficult. He certainly was involved in the key events of the Imperial period. He is accused by Vicente Rocafuerte of being part of the group of military officers who masterminded Sergeant Pío Marcha's proclamation of Iturbide as Emperor on 18 May 1822.⁶² His signature is present on the document drawn up for Congress by the principal officers and chiefs of the Mexican Army, including Pedro Celestino Negrete, José Antonio Echávarri, Manuel de la Sota Riva, the Marquis de Vivanco and Luis Quintanar, which supported the intentions of Pío Marcha, and which asked the deputies to consider this proposition. In fact, he and Joaquín Parres were selected to

⁶⁰ *Gaceta Extraordinaria del Gobierno Imperial de México*, 20 October 1822.

⁶¹ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00196. Bustamante to Manuel Gómez Pedraza, Matamoros, 27 October 1828. Reservado. Felipe de la Garza to Iturbide, Mexico City, 3 January 1823. INAH: C.A. T. 2. 10, ff. 68-70. Also see, William Spence Robertson, *Iturbide of Mexico* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 209-211.

⁶² The conspirators, according to Rocafuerte were: Antonio Carrasco, Anastasio Bustamante, Epitacio Sánchez, Pedro Otero, and the counts of San Pedro del Alamo and de la Cadena. Un verdadero americano [Vicente Rocafuerte], *Bosquejo ligerísimo de la revolución de México, desde el grito de Iguala hasta la proclamación imperial de Iturbide* (Philadelphia: Imprenta de Teracrouet y Naroajeb, 1822), pp. 205-206.

take the document in person to the Congress on that day.⁶³ Bustamante, alongside his fellow officers, Negrete and Quintanar, also took part in the meetings held on 16 and 17 October 1822, in which the future of the Constituent Congress was discussed.⁶⁴ There is no record, however, of his participation in the dissolution of that body on 31 October, although in his diary Carlos María de Bustamante claims that the Field-Marshal had offered himself for the task.⁶⁵ It was Quintanar who was awarded this dubious honour. In November, he accompanied the Emperor on his visit to Jalapa, which had as its intention the removal of Antonio López de Santa Anna from the Command of Veracruz, and precipitated Santa Anna's rebellion against Iturbide.⁶⁶ Moreover, he was certainly also the recipient of promotion and military decoration from Iturbide. He was entrusted with the military command of huge swathes of the new Empire. All of which goes to show that Iturbide must have trusted and respected Bustamante. But, they do not set him apart from his peers, especially Quintanar, Negrete and Echávarri, who were also participants in these same events and recipients of similar honours. In fact, in comparison to the treatment Iturbide lavished upon Echávarri, Bustamante's own successes fade into insignificance. Echávarri was elevated from Captain to Field-Marshal, and then Brigadier General (compared to Bustamante's modest promotion from Colonel to Field-Marshal); appointed as one of Iturbide's aides-de-camp; and awarded the Great Cross of Guadalupe and the Captain Generalship of Puebla, Veracruz and Oaxaca. Iturbide declared of him: 'lo había tratado siempre como un hermano, lo había elevado de la nada en el orden político, al alto rango que ocupaba, le había hecho confianzas como a un hijo mío.'⁶⁷

⁶³ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 343. Anna, *The Mexican Empire of Iturbide*, p. 64.

⁶⁴ Anna, *The Mexican Empire of Iturbide*, p. 112.

⁶⁵ Carlos María de Bustamante, *Diario Histórico de México* (Mexico City: SEP/INAH, 1980), vol. 1, p. 158. Entry for 23 February 1823.

⁶⁶ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00051. Order of the Secretary of the Admiralty, 8 November 1822.

⁶⁷ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 407.

In the end, what did show the depth of the friendship that existed between Iturbide and Bustamante, and what finally separated Bustamante from the likes of Negrete and Echávarri, was that unlike these men, Bustamante stood resolutely by Iturbide throughout the crises of December 1822 and the early months of 1823. He did not adhere to the Plan of Casa Mata. Instead, he remained with Iturbide in the capital throughout the rebellion. On March 11, as the end drew in sight, he accompanied the Emperor in his withdrawal from Mexico City to Tacubaya, where he prevented anyone entering or leaving the village without a passport issued by himself.⁶⁸ After Iturbide's abdication he returned to the capital and wrote to the new government to resign his commissions.⁶⁹ He would later request an extended license to leave Mexico City for Guanajuato.⁷⁰ Why Bustamante did not adhere to the Plan of Casa Mata is not clear. However, it is most likely that its aims and ambitions did not attract him. If Lucas Alamán is to be believed, the plan was the handiwork of the Scottish Rite of Masons, drawn up by Mariano Michelena and Miguel Ramos Arizpe, both long-term opponents of monarchical government and enemies of Iturbide. These men had seen their opportunity in the discontent with Iturbide present in the army, demonstrated by the uprising of Santa Anna and Guadalupe Victoria in December 1822, and the sister rebellion of Nicolás Bravo and Vicente Guerrero in January. Their plan was put into operation when Echávarri, Iturbide's trusted commander and a recent convert to Free Masonry, was sent to Veracruz to besiege Santa Anna in Veracruz later in January. Echávarri soon found himself in an impossible situation as the siege of Veracruz deteriorated into a stalemate, and was quickly convinced by his masonic allies that the Plan of Casa Mata provided the only honourable escape.⁷¹ The

⁶⁸ Bustamante, *Diario Histórico*, vol. 1 p. 191. Entry for 13 March 1823.

⁶⁹ Bustamante to the Supreme Executive Power, Mexico City, 7 April 1823, in *Gaceta del Gobierno Supremo de México*, 24 April 1823.

⁷⁰ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00107. Bustamante to the Supreme Executive Power, Mexico City, 3 July 1823.

⁷¹ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, pp. 408-413.

Plan, issued by Echávarri on 1 February, called for the election of a fresh Congress but made no attack upon Iturbide's position, although Nettie Lee Benson is convinced that the overthrow of the Emperor was the Plan's unwritten aim.⁷² The Plan won support throughout the army for three reasons. In the first place, masons and others opposed to the idea of a monarchy recognised the plan as the best way of overthrowing Iturbide. Secondly, those officers and men generally disgruntled with Iturbide's performance as Emperor: men such as Nicolás Bravo and Santa Anna, who felt that their careers were not progressing as they should, or those who had not received their salary in months, were also ready to adhere to the plan. Thirdly, those who felt Iturbide had acted unlawfully by closing the Congress in October, felt their concerns were represented by the Plan and supported it accordingly. Bustamante most likely did not share this frustration with Iturbide's government. Even if he did, he chose not to act upon it and unlike Echávarri, decided not to betray his friend.

However, we must remember that Bustamante was not alone in his continuing loyalty. Other important officers, such as Manuel de la Sota Riva, José Joaquín de Herrera and Manuel Gómez Pedraza did not join the rebels either. The interesting thing is that these men, who were also friends of Iturbide, would not be forever remembered as his faithful allies. Herrera and Pedraza would eclipse their former *iturbidismo* with their subsequent achievements, which would prove that friendship with Iturbide did not necessarily mean they sympathised with centralism or monarchy. Bustamante, on the other hand, would be forever linked with Iturbide, not because he had been an outstanding or specially blessed friend, but because he appeared to take his loyalty one step further and to plot for the Emperor's return.

⁷² Nettie Lee Benson, "The Plan of Casa Mata," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 25 (1945), pp. 48-49.

C: Bustamante and the State Congress of Jalisco (1823)

Anastasio Bustamante was elected to the Constituent Congress of the newly-formed state of Jalisco in September 1823.⁷³ In October, after receiving word of his appointment from the Electoral *Junta* of Jalisco, he wrote to the Minister of War to inform him of his election, and of his decision to move to Guadalajara to take up this post. He was currently in Salamanca to where he had retired after the abdication of Iturbide.⁷⁴ Why Bustamante was a candidate for the congressional elections in Jalisco is unknown. He himself declared that he was motivated by ‘el natural amor del patrio suelo donde vi la luz primera y recibí los principios de una educación benéfica.’⁷⁵ However, it is more likely that other considerations were in play as well. One might have been that the *jefe político* of Guadalajara and the soon to be provisional governor of Jalisco, was none other than Luis Quintanar, an old companion of Bustamante from the counterinsurgency and the Army of the Three Guarantees. Both had been close friends and supporters of Iturbide; and in the climate of hostility to the former emperor in the months that followed his abdication, Quintanar may well have felt the need for an ally in Guadalajara. Another reason might have been that Bustamante had many friends in the provincial capital due to the years he had passed at school there. He could have been encouraged to stand by some of these old companions of the Seminary, such as Prisciliano Sánchez and José Justo Corro, who were themselves also elected as members of the new Congress.⁷⁶ Bustamante was also a well-known face in Jalisco at that time. His profile had been high in the public consciousness since

⁷³ “Lista de los diputados que han sido electos para diputados al Congreso Provincial de este Estado [Jalisco],” Guadalajara, 8 September 1823. In José María Muriá (ed.), *El federalismo en Jalisco, 1823* (Mexico City: INAH, 1973), p. 51.

⁷⁴ SDN: SC XI/1-235/1-31/00113. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Salamanca, 11 October 1823.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ “Lista de los diputados que han sido electos para diputados al Congreso Provincial de este Estado [Jalisco].”

his participation in the Plan of Iguala in Guanajuato in 1821. It might be that his status as a military hero made him a desirable choice for deputy.

Above all, Bustamante must have wanted to be involved with the politics and government of Jalisco. But why? One explanation could be that Bustamante wanted to become involved with those who opposed the Supreme Executive Power. From the moment of Iturbide's abdication in March 1823, Jalisco had been a thorn in the side of the Constituent Congress and Supreme Executive Power in Mexico City. It had refused to accept the sovereignty or authority of the restored Congress; had decided not to obey its orders; and had declared itself no longer willing to put up with 'el despotismo del gobierno de la llamada metrópoli de México.'⁷⁷ The leaders of the Supreme Executive Power: Negrete, Bravo and Guadalupe Victoria had also been the leaders of the rebellion of Casa Mata which had engineered Iturbide's downfall. Bravo and Victoria were also both former insurgents. It is not unlikely that Bustamante harboured a deep resentment of these men and their new found power. Moreover, many newspapers and pamphlet writers in Mexico City interpreted Jalisco's defiance as *iturbidismo* and accused Jalisco of plotting for the return of the former emperor. It was even said by some that Iturbide's wife and son were in Guadalajara waiting for his return.⁷⁸ In which case, Bustamante's decision to join the new Congress could then be interpreted as a move to link himself to this *iturbidista* defiance of the government. However, a closer examination of the events leading to the election of the Constituent Congress of Jalisco suggests, these explanations do not tell the whole story. It seems that the political reason for Bustamante's decision to take his place as a state deputy,

⁷⁷ Provincial Diputation of Guadalajara to Lucas Alamán, Minister of Relations, Guadalajara, 30 May 1823, in Provincial Diputation of Guadalajara, *Nuevas contestaciones del gobierno y de la diputación provincial de Guadalajara, sobre convocatoria por el congreso que debe constituir a la nación y sobre el sistema de gobierno representativo federado*. (Puebla: Imprenta Nacional, 1823), p.3.

⁷⁸ See for example, *Que aguarde el nuevo Congreso la venida de Iturbide* (Mexico City: Oficina liberal a cargo del ciudadano Juan Cabrera, 1823). The pamphlet is anonymous and dated, 11 September 1823. It can be found in the Centro de Estudios de la Historia de México, CONDUMEX (henceforth referred to as CONDUMEX).

may well be to do with his opposition to the Supreme Executive Power, and even his personal hatred of the members, but it might not simply be motivated by a desire to join plots to restore Iturbide. Instead, it could be that he wished to associate himself with the struggle for federalism and independent government for the provinces, a fight with which Jalisco was also very much associated.

For the province of Nueva Galicia, the antecedent of the state of Jalisco, their adhesion to the Plan of Casa Mata, on 26 February, had been a defining moment. Article nine of the plan had effectively given each of the adhering Provincial Deputations the administrative control over the government of their province, and in so doing, pronounced them independent of the control of central government in Mexico City.⁷⁹ In supporting this plan the Provincial Deputation of Guadalajara and its *jefe político*, Luis Quintanar, therefore made a definitive break with government in Mexico City. This was clearly illustrated in a declaration made by the Provincial Deputation two weeks later, on 12 March. In this document the members the Deputation refer to Nueva Galicia as ‘el Estado libre de Jalisco’ for the first time. They unequivocally state their rejection of a centrally governed Imperial Mexico, and recommend that it should instead become a ‘confederación de provincias, estableciéndose en cada una un gobierno, popular representativo.’ Within this confederacy, they believed that the former capital of the empire should be reduced to being ‘simplemente [la] capital de la provincia de México.’⁸⁰ Originally, the central government being renounced in Guadalajara was Iturbide and his *Junta Instituyente*. However, once Congress was re-established and Iturbide resigned, the Supreme

⁷⁹ “Plan of Casa Mata”, 1 February 1823. Article 9: ‘En el interim contesta el Supremo Gobierno de lo acordado por el Ejército, la Diputación Provincial de esta provincia será la que delibere en la parte administrativa, si aquella resolución fuese de acuerdo con su opinión.’ In Berta Ulloa and Joel Hernández Santiago (eds.), *Planes en la nación mexicana*. (Mexico City: LIII Senado de la República/El Colegio de México, 1987), vol. 1, p. 228.

⁸⁰ Provincial Deputation of Guadalajara, “La Diputación Provincial de Guadalajara a los pueblos de Nueva Galicia,” (Guadalajara: Imprenta del Urbano Sanromán, 12 March 1823), in Muriá (ed.), *El federalismo en Jalisco*, pp. 34-36.

Executive Power and the restored Constituent Congress took up that mantle. Who constituted the government in Mexico City was not important to the Provincial Deputation in Guadalajara, as far as it was concerned, it could adopt whatever form of government suited it best. But what was crucial was that it did not attempt to uphold 'un derecho de dominación universal sobre las provincias.'⁸¹ As Prisciliano Sánchez, a deputy in Mexico at that time, and later, deputy in Guadalajara and governor of Jalisco, would outline in his own proposal for the federal constitution, what Jalisco was searching for was a nation made up of states which had full internal authority and sovereignty in their own territory. These states would be joined in a pact of unity, and would be administered by a central authority. However, crucially each state would be equal in the pact. No province, even Mexico, would have more authority and influence over the pact or the federal congress, than any other.⁸²

Jalisco was by no means the only province to adopt this point of view as a result of its adherence to the Plan of Casa Mata. Nettie Lee Benson has shown that in the six weeks following the proclamation of this plan, it won universal acceptance throughout the provinces. Each Provincial Deputation took control of the legislative functions of provincial government, while the *jefe político* assumed the reins of the executive power. From this point on, the provinces were run independently of central government, only obeying its orders if they were first approved by their local authorities.⁸³ This did not mean, however, that the provinces wished to become independent nation states any more than Jalisco did. In fact, the adhesion of the provinces to the Plan was quickly followed by their attempts to organise a central

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁸² Prisciliano Sánchez, "Proyecto de contrato de asociación para la república de los Estados Unidos de Anahuac, formulado por un ciudadano del estado de Jalisco en el año de 1823 y sometido a los estados," in Secretaría de Gobernación, *Leyes fundamentales de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y planes revolucenarios que han influido en la organización política de la república*(Mexico City: Imprenta de la Secretaría de Gobernación, 1923), pp. 68-90.

⁸³ Nettie Lee Benson, *La diputación provincial y el federalismo mexicano* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México/UNAM, 1994), pp. 137, 148-149 and 191.

government which would link the separate provinces to each other in some form of federation. In the weeks following the proclamation of the Plan, the deputations of Michoacán, Querétaro, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosí appointed commissioners who were intended to meet with each other to discuss the creation of a national government composed of representatives of all the provinces. The Deputation in Puebla offered its capital as a meeting place, and sent an invitation to all the provincial deputations of the Empire to select commissioners, and to send them to their city.⁸⁴ When this group of commissioners from Guadalajara, Michoacán, Oaxaca, Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí, did meet in the first weeks in April, after the abdication of Iturbide, they quickly decided that the national representation that they wished for was not the restored Congress. Instead they wanted a new Congress, elected upon different criteria, which could proceed to draw up a constitution for the new federated state of Mexico that their provinces now envisaged.⁸⁵

The problem that quickly blew up between provinces and central government was based on this rejection of the authority of the re-established Congress. On 12 April a commission set up by the deputies to decide whether the convocation of a new Congress was necessary, recommended that the old legislature should remain in power until a constitution was written. A debate on the subject of new elections could then take place, it continued, to decide if the ratification of the constitution should be undertaken by a fresh Congress.⁸⁶ Pleas from the provinces were ignored. In Jalisco, this behaviour on the part of the Congress was interpreted as its attempt to derail the federalist plans of the provinces and to set up instead a copy of Iturbide's centralist empire under a different name. In March, after Iturbide had agreed to restore the Congress, the Provincial Deputation of Guadalajara had warned that if it was not

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-8.

⁸⁵ Anna, *Forging Mexico*, p. 113.

⁸⁶ Benson, *La diputación provincial*, p. 157.

replaced by a new Congress, elected specifically to organise a federalist constitution, this body would attempt to dominate the provinces:

al despotismo de uno solo va a suceder el despotismo de muchos, vais a tener tantos tiranos, tantos despotas, tantos absolutos, tantos Iturbides, cuantos son vuestros diputados.⁸⁷

Now it appeared that their darkest fears had been realised. The *jefe político*, Luis Quintanar, wrote to the Secretary of Relations, Lucas Alamán, on 12 May that:

la opinión manifestada vehemente entusiasmo por el común de esta Provincia [Guadalajara] en favor del sistema de República federada [...] está en oposición con los deseos que el actual Congreso ha demostrado hasta hoy.⁸⁸

In a proclamation addressed to the people of Jalisco the next day he was more specific and claimed that Congress was intent on establishing ‘una república central’ in Mexico against the wishes of the provinces.⁸⁹ In response, the Deputation decided to take things into its own hands. After a meeting with Quintanar and the *ayuntamiento* in Guadalajara on 12 May, it issued a joint statement declaring that they would no longer obey Congress or the Supreme Executive Power, nor would it send its taxes to the capital. It appointed the Deputation as the highest authority in the province and resolved to send copies of their declaration to all other provinces in Mexico ‘excitándolas al establecimiento de una federación general.’⁹⁰ On 16 June, the Deputation went one step further and published a new manifesto which declared the

⁸⁷ Provincial Deputation of Guadalajara, “La diputación provincial de Guadalajara a los pueblos de Nueva Galicia,” (12 March 1823), in Muriá (ed.), *El federalismo en Jalisco*, p. 35.

⁸⁸ Luis Quintanar to Lucas Alamán, 12 May 1823, in *ibid.*, p.40.

⁸⁹ Luis Quintanar, “Proclama del Sr. Quintanar a los habitantes de Nueva Galicia sobre la separación del congreso mexicano,” (Mexico City: Oficina Liberal a cargo del ciudadano Juan Cabrera, 1823), in *ibid.*, p. 41.

⁹⁰ “Resolución de la Provincia de Guadalajara y sucesos ocurridos en la misma,” (Guadalajara, 14 May 1823), in *ibid.*, p. 38.

former province of Nueva Galicia to be 'el estado libre de Jalisco.' This new state would be 'libre, independiente y soberano de sí mismo y no reconocerá otras relaciones con los demás estados o provincias que las de fraternidad y confederación.'⁹¹ Jalisco was by no means the only province to take matters into its own hands. On 20 May, a provisional *junta* in Yucatán arranged for elections to be held in the province for a provincial congress. On 1 June, Oaxaca declared its complete separation from the government in Mexico City and set up a provisional *junta* to take control of government. On 9 June, the province of Chiapas declared itself independent from both Guatemala and Mexico. On 18 June, the provincial deputation of Zacatecas announced it would not obey the Constituent Congress in Mexico City any longer and announced a provisional plan of government to rule the province. On 12 July it announced the convocation of elections for the congress of the 'estado libre de Zacatecas.' The provinces of the Eastern Interior, Querétaro, and Veracruz all published manifestos demanding that federalism be adopted as the framework for the government of Mexico.⁹²

In the capital, such moves on the part of the provinces were not well understood. Basically, Congress did not accept that its authority could be bypassed or ignored. It still regarded itself, as it had done from its very inception in 1822, as the sole representative of Mexican national sovereignty, and the only legislative power in the land.⁹³ Therefore, the majority in Congress and the Supreme Executive Power viewed the provinces' actions as separatism and rebellion, and were concerned that Mexico might disintegrate into a large number of smaller nations if the rot was allowed to continue. Moreover, leading members of the government, like Lucas Alamán, Negrete and Bravo were leading proponents of a centralist system, and must

⁹¹ Untitled printed document. (Guadalajara: Imprenta del ciudadano Urbano San Román, 16 June 1823). In the British Library.

⁹² Anna, *Forging Mexico*, pp. 118-119.

⁹³ Sessions of the first day of deliberations at the Constituent Congress, in which the deputies announced these as their attributes, are included in the *Gaceta Imperial de México*, 2 March 1822.

have particularly disliked the dawning realisation that any hope of introducing such a system was impossible. The Plan of Casa Mata had already ensured that federalism was the only option for the new Mexican Republic. Now the actions of the provinces were effectively forcing its hand. On 16 May, a committee of deputies led by Father Servando Teresa de Mier, produced a proposal for a federalist constitution. On 17 June, the Constituent Congress passed an act of convocation for a new Congress, to take up office on 31 October.⁹⁴ Even so, the government in Mexico City was not ready to relinquish its claim on power. The Supreme Executive Power, in a manifesto it drafted in June, but did not publish, made their position clear. The adoption of federalism, it argued, had to first to be agreed centrally by Congress. Only once power had been devolved from the centre to the provinces, could they move to take full control of their regional governments. In the meantime, it warned, the Supreme Executive Power would actively conserve the unity of the provinces.⁹⁵

However, it must be pointed out and constantly borne in mind throughout this discussion, that despite these apparent concessions, it was clear that Congress and the government had little intention of allowing a federal system to be imposed upon Mexico in which the government in the capital would be no more than another provincial authority. As Father Mier later admitted, his proposed constitution was centralist in all but name.⁹⁶ It allowed each province to have its own regional congress, but invested it with no real power. For example, central government was to appoint the army officers and treasury employees who would work in each province, ‘sin consulta o propuesta’ with the provincial government itself.⁹⁷ The Provincial

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁹⁵ “El Supremo Poder Ejecutivo a la Nación,” quoted in Anna, *Forging Mexico*, p.131.

⁹⁶ Speech of Father Mier to Congress on 11 December 1823, in Carlos María de Bustamante, *Continuación del Cuadro Histórico. Historia del emperador Agustín de Iturbide y establecimiento de la república popular federal* (Mexico City: Instituto Cultural Helénico/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1985), p. 202.

⁹⁷ Servando Teresa de Mier, “Plan de la constitución política de la nación mexicana,” in José María Bocanegra, *Memorias para la historia de México independiente, 1822-1846* (Mexico City: Instituto

Deputation of Guadalajara considered it to be 'no [...] más que un plan de gobierno central, mucho más ominoso y opresor para la provincias que el que rige en el día.'⁹⁸

In order to ensure that its version of federalism was imposed upon Mexico, the central government took direct action against the people and provinces who opposed them. On 12 June 1823, Alamán wrote to Luis Quintanar, the *jefe político* of Guadalajara, that he was being replaced by José Joaquín de Herrera and that Herrera had already begun his march upon Jalisco. Herrera was soon forced to return to Mexico City, however, when the provincial deputation refused to accept him as their new governor. In a letter they sent to Alamán, the Deputation explained that they had no confidence in Herrera, as since his arrival he had done nothing but 'sembrar [...] la desunión y desorden' in the army and government. They also added that in the light of their declaration of sovereignty, the matter of appointing internal political figures was a job for themselves rather than central government.⁹⁹ Frustrated in this effort, the government resolved to do better next time, and on 5 July sent an army under the command of Nicolás Bravo to bring the rebellious province to heel. In the face of Bravo's impending arrival, Jalisco entered into swift negotiation with its neighbour, Zacatecas, who was also under threat from Bravo, as it also had resolved not to submit to the authority of the Supreme Executive Power and Congress. The two states organised an army of militia-men and regular soldiers to defend themselves. In the face of this opposition, the government troops did not venture further than Irapuato (in Guanajuato) in their march against Jalisco. Instead, commissioners representing the two states and Bravo met in Lagos to discuss the situation. These negotiations

Cultural Helénico/Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1986), vol. 1, pp. 250-256.

⁹⁸ Pedro Vélez to Alamán, Guadalajara, 24 June 1823, in Provincial Deputation of Guadalajara, *Contestaciones del gobierno de México con él de esta capital de Guadalajara y su diputación provincial sobre la acta de esta corporación del 5 del presente junio, y nombramiento del sr. brigadier D. José de Herrera para jefe político* (Guadalajara: Imprenta de San Román, 1823), p. 11. In the British Library.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 5-12.

dragged on throughout August, gridlocked on the question of state autonomy. The states argued that it was their right to elect a congress, and to veto orders and laws emanating from Mexico City that either were unfriendly to their states, were contrary to the federalism both had adopted, or which concerned the internal functioning of the state (government appointments, etc.). Otherwise, they were happy to recognise the authority of central government. Bravo steadfastly refused to concede any ground to the commissioners, and rejected the states' claims to rights, merely stating that the Deputations in Jalisco and Zacatecas were required to obey all laws emanating from Mexico City as it was the superior power. The states would be able to elect a provincial congress once legislation allowing this devolution of power was authorised by the General Congress. In the end, a proposal was drawn up by the commissioners of both sides which reflected the demands of the states, and although Bravo refused to sign it, it was sent to central government for approval. The Congress appointed a commission to consider the proposal but no decision was ever reached.¹⁰⁰

Despite this second failure, the government in Mexico City did not abandon its efforts to destroy the state government in Jalisco. The troops sent with General Bravo remained in Celaya under the command of his second, General Negrete, as a constant threat to the authorities in Guadalajara, until the summer of 1824 when they would once more be led against Jalisco. From here Negrete embarked upon a secondary scheme, designed to undermine the power and authority of Quintanar and the provincial deputation in Guadalajara, by destroying the territorial unity of Jalisco. Colonel Anastasio Brizuela was sent to the district of Colima, on the Pacific coast, where he organised in conjunction with Negrete the secession of Colima from Jalisco. The district tried originally to join with Michoacán. But, when their application was rejected by the authorities in Michoacán, Colima became a region directly administered by central government. A similar attempt was made by Negrete to

¹⁰⁰ Benson, *La diputación provincial*, pp.187-190.

encourage the neighbouring district of Tepic to follow Colima's lead. However, the military commander of the district, Luis Correa, showed himself to be unfavourable to Negrete's schemes and this project was abandoned. Undeterred, he began negotiations with the *ayuntamiento* of Zapotlán el Grande, a district to the south of Guadalajara in September. However, the military commander of the district, Javier Pacheco, maintained Quintanar informed of all that was occurring. Any hopes Negrete had of convincing the *ayuntamiento* to consent to a separation from Jalisco were quashed when Quintanar sent the newly-arrived Anastasio Bustamante to Zapotlán, in late October, with a small force to preserve the union of that district to Jalisco.¹⁰¹

By September 1823, when the new State Congress of Jalisco convened for the first time, that state's position as one of the leading proponents of federalism was clear. Anastasio Bustamante would have been aware of this when he accepted his nomination as a State Deputy. It seems likely, moreover, that Bustamante's decision indicated his support for the federalist cause. Yet Bustamante had been one of the die-hard supporters of Iturbide's centralist Empire only a few months earlier. What had brought about this change of heart? The usual explanation is that Bustamante cynically joined the federalists in Jalisco in order to exploit their opposition to the government of Mexico City. However, this argument is far from satisfactory. In the first place, Bustamante's conversion to federalism appears to have been a defining moment in his political life. As will be argued in later chapters, he remained a federalist for the rest of his life. Secondly, in the light of the events of the summer of 1823, it is extremely difficult to accept the idea that Bustamante's candidacy for the new State Congress would have been considered by the provincial deputation of Jalisco and its supporters, if they had believed that his true aim was to conspire towards the reintroduction of Iturbide's centralist empire. What appears most likely is that Bustamante was ready to

¹⁰¹ José María Muriá (ed.), *Historia de Jalisco*. (Guadalajara: Gobierno de Jalisco, 1981), vol. 2, pp. 448-449.

support the idea of a centralist government in Mexico while Iturbide was Emperor, and while he himself played an important role in government. However, once Iturbide's enemies took charge and Bustamante found himself isolated from the seat of power, he became attracted to the idea of federalism. He may have even become convinced that federalism was the best form of government for a country the size of Mexico. He could, of course, still have conserved his allegiance to Iturbide. Even a federalist government would require a leader. Why could this not be Emperor Agustín?

Even so, the possibility remains that, after the abdication of Iturbide, Bustamante had lost his monarchist sympathies. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the accusations of 1824, the government in Mexico City did not accuse Quintanar or the provincial deputation of Jalisco of *iturbidismo* to justify its decision to send troops to the state. Pamphlets such as the anonymous *Que aguarde el nuevo congreso la venida de Iturbide*, published in September 1823, or that written by one styling himself, *El Liberal Moderado: Contra el señor Quintanar y la atrevida junta de Guadalajara*, certainly claimed that the real aim of the rebellious government in Jalisco was the return of Iturbide,¹⁰² but it does not appear that they were taken seriously by the central government. Even Lucas Alamán and Negrete, who in 1824 would lead the accusations against Quintanar and Bustamante, did not give the stories of the ex-emperor's return much credence. In a letter to Quintanar himself, Alamán dismissed the rumours of Iturbide's arrival in the United States as complete falsehood, and declared they were:

un medio apropósito para subdividir la opinión en facciones, alarmar a los habitantes para que se despedacen entre sí, o introducir la anarquía

¹⁰² *Que aguarde el nuevo congreso la venida de Iturbide* (Mexico City: Oficina liberal a cargo del ciudadano Juan Cabrera, 1823). In CONDUMEX. *El Liberal Moderado, Contra el señor Quintanar y la atrevida junta de Guadalajara*. (Mexico City: Imprenta de Doña Herculana del Villar y socios, 1823). In the British Library.

más desastroza [sic], recogiendo después el fruto de tan grosera impostura.¹⁰³

Negrete, for his parte, also in a letter to Quintanar, described the rumours of Iturbide and his return as ‘una fábula inventada por los que quieren el desorden y la guerra civil.’¹⁰⁴ Only after events of the following June in Guadalajara, would it become acceptable to claim that the federalists in Jalisco had been hoodwinked by Quintanar and Bustamante to support their dastardly schemes for the restoration of Iturbide. All this leads to the suspicion that the friendship enjoyed between Quintanar and Iturbide was not regarded as a threat by the Supreme Executive Power and the Constituent Congress. The threat was Jalisco's challenge to the authority of Mexico City and its championing of a brand of federalism that central government regarded as dangerous separatism.

D: The Conspiracy of the Calle de Celaya and the Downfall of Quintanar and Bustamante

The State Congress of Jalisco was inaugurated on 14 September. On 2 October, Anastasio Bustamante was appointed to the committees set up by the deputies to discuss matters concerning the departments of war and domestic affairs (‘gobernación’).¹⁰⁵ This would be his official position in Guadalajara until he was appointed as Commander General of the state by Quintanar in March 1824.¹⁰⁶ However, he spent the months of November, December and January in the district of Zapotlán el Grande, protecting the region from any invasion by General Negrete. In

¹⁰³ *Gaceta del Gobierno Supremo de México*, 26 July 1823. Lucás Alamán to Luis Quintanar, 23 July 1823.

¹⁰⁴ *El Sol*, 20 August 1823. Pedro Celestino Negrete to Quintanar, Querétaro, 25 July 1823.

¹⁰⁵ “Comisiones del Congreso Provincial,” in Muriá (ed.), *El federalismo en Jalisco*, p. 54.

¹⁰⁶ Anastasio Bustamante, “El general Bustamante a sus compañeros de armas,” in *El Iris de Jalisco*, 8 March 1824.

his position as Commander General of the military in Jalisco, he became involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the existing government and restore Iturbide to the throne. In June 1824, after the plot had been discovered, troops led by Nicolás Bravo entered Guadalajara and arrested Bustamante. He was later marched to Acapulco, from where it was intended that he would be shipped to exile in Guayaquil, Ecuador. At least, this is the official version of events left to us by contemporary historians, such as Lucas Alamán and Carlos María de Bustamante, both of whom were leading figures in the government in Mexico City during this time. What actually happened in Jalisco between the months of January and June 1824, is not so clear-cut. For, while there is no doubt that conspiracies against the central government existed, and that Bustamante and his colleague, Luis Quintanar, were involved in them, it is by no means certain that their aim was to restore Iturbide to the throne. Instead, it appears that they were merely the product of the continuing battle waged in Jalisco in defence of federalism, against what appeared to be the desire of the Supreme Executive Power to impose centralism upon Mexico.

Jalisco's relationship with the central government in Mexico City had not improved after the confrontation in Lagos, despite the convocation and election of a new Federal Assembly in October. The state legislature of Jalisco continued to make the demands of its predecessor, the Provincial Deputation, for the adoption of a system of confederacy in which each state had complete autonomy of authority within the area of its jurisdiction. In contrast, the government in Mexico City carried on with its project to allow only limited sovereignty for the states, in order to ensure that real power remained centralised. The *Acta Constitutiva*, published in January 1824, as a blueprint for the coming constitution, illustrated this point perfectly. This document began by announcing in its sixth article that the states would be 'independientes, libres y soberanos,' but then went on in the following 30 clauses to set certain limits upon this sovereignty. A commission, appointed by the Congress in Jalisco to examine the

document, declared it to render 'nominal la soberanía de los estados.' The opposition of the commission to the Act was based upon two major points. The first was the prospective representation each state should have in the General Congress of the Union. The Act declared that representation should be based upon the population of each state. The Jalisco commission believed this was unfair, as population was not equally distributed throughout the states, and some, most notably the central states of Puebla and Mexico, would have an undue influence over proceedings in Congress. Instead, it suggested that each state be allowed between three and five deputies in the federal congress, and that in votes, each state should be entitled to one vote each. It also proposed that the federal congress should take up office in Querétaro rather than Mexico City. The second point concerned the granting of certain powers to the General Congress and executive which the commission believed to correspond only to the states. They principally opposed article 13, which in its first clause, granted the General Congress the power 'para conservar la paz y el orden público en el interior de la federación'; in the ninth clause gave congress the right to 'establecer las contribuciones necesarias a cubrir los gastos generales de la república'; in its twelfth, awarded it the power to 'reconocer la deuda pública de la nación y señalar medios de consolidarlo'; and in the sixteenth clause, gave the congress the ability to appoint all military commissions throughout the federation. The commission argued that the conservation of tranquillity within each state, including the appointment of military commanders of local troops, was a purely internal matter that did not concern central government. It also pointed out that state sovereignty also meant that, while it was undeniable that taxation had to be rendered to central government, each state should be allotted a sum of money to contribute, and then allowed to organise the tax system which best suited them.¹⁰⁷ However, despite the objections expressed by its

¹⁰⁷ "Acta Constitutiva de 31 de enero de 1824," in Secretaría de Gobernación (ed.), *Leyes fundamentales de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, pp. 113-116. Also "Dictamen de la comisión de

commission, the state Congress of Jalisco eventually resolved to accept the Act on 4 February. This was not done without protest, and the preamble to the act of recognition pointedly remarked that Congress trusted that the matters raised by its commission would be addressed when the constitution itself was drawn up.¹⁰⁸

The *Acta Constitutiva* was therefore, not the framework for the federal constitution ideally imagined by the Congress in Jalisco.¹⁰⁹ Fears still existed that central government secretly wished to impose centralism on the unwilling states. Much hostility to Mexico City was directed against the members of the Supreme Executive Power, now composed of Mariano Michelena, Miguel Domínguez (who acted as replacements for the absent Guadalupe Victoria and General Negrete) and General Bravo, whom the Congress believed had been instrumental in the attacks made upon the territory of Jalisco in 1823. On 27 February 1824, Anastasio Bustamante wrote to Valentín Gómez Farías, a deputy for Zacatecas in the Federal Congress in the capital, on the matter, declaring that discontent and distrust towards the Power was so widespread in the state that he feared general unrest would break out if the membership was not entirely replaced.¹¹⁰ On 10 March, the Congress addressed its own appeal to the Federal Assembly, calling for the replacement of Mariano Michelena and General Negrete.¹¹¹ Gómez Farías, in combination with his fellow deputies from Zacatecas and Jalisco, proposed to the Assembly that the Power should be completely replaced by men who had given clear and definite proof of their adhesion to the federalist cause. The implication was of course that they did not

Constitución del Congreso del Estado sobre el Acta Constitutiva," (3 December 1823), in Muriá (ed.), *El federalismo de Jalisco*, pp. 61-65.

¹⁰⁸ Congress of Jalisco, "Dictamen aprobado por el Congreso del Estado sobre la admisión y publicación del Acta Constitutiva de la Nación," (4 February 1824), in *ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

¹⁰⁹ It did however grant more autonomy to the states than the Federal Constitution, which was eventually drawn up in 1824. For a discussion of the differences between the Constitution and the *Acta*, see Timothy E. Anna, "Inventing Mexico: Provincehood and Nationhood after Independence," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 15:1 (1996), pp. 13-16.

¹¹⁰ VGFA no. 93. Bustamante to Gómez Farías, Guadalajara, 27 February 1824. *Reservado*.

¹¹¹ Congress of Jalisco, "Representación que dirige el Congreso de Jalisco a la Asamblea General de la Federación," in *El Sol*, 10 March 1824.

believe that the current members had demonstrated such commitment. The outcome of the debate on their proposal was not wholly satisfactory, as the majority of the deputies rejected the demands for a complete renovation of the power, and decided only to accept the resignation previously offered by Michelena, but make no attacks on the other members.¹¹² Moreover, the disappearance of Michelena left General Bravo, who was widely believed to a committed supporter of centralism, as the dominant force in the Supreme Executive Power.

In Jalisco, in the meantime, another issue also began to cause unhappiness with the government in Mexico City. This was the situation of native Spaniards in Mexico. In the months following Iturbide's abdication, a sense of resentment and distrust had built up in the state against the dominance of these Europeans in employment, especially in government and military positions. Perhaps this had something to do with General Negrete's place on the Supreme Executive Power, and his actions in Jalisco in the summer and autumn of 1823. Or more likely, it had been brought about by the achievement of independence. Now the old masters had been dispensed with in government, many felt it was time their old privileges of employment and wealth, previously enjoyed by Peninsular Spaniards, should now only be available to Mexicans. In December 1823 and January 1824, the state legislature approved a measure in which the resignations of Spaniards in all public offices would be encouraged, and arms held by them confiscated.¹¹³ In February, Anastasio Bustamante told Gómez Farías that the general will in Jalisco was that all Spaniards should be removed from their employment nation-wide.¹¹⁴ He himself refused to appoint a Spaniard, José Narvaez, as military commander of Tepic, simply because of his

¹¹² David M. Quinlan, "Issues and Factions in the Constituent Congress, 1823-1824," in Jaime E. Rodríguez O. (ed.), *Mexico in the Age of Democratic Revolutions, 1750-1850* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 192.

¹¹³ *El Sol*, 13 January 1824. State Congress of Jalisco to Luis Quintanar, 19 December 1823, 1 January 1824.

¹¹⁴ VGFA no. 93. Bustamante to Gómez Farías, Guadalajara, 27 February 1824. *Reservado*.

origins.¹¹⁵ Colonel Manuel de la Peña y del Río noted a similar sentiment amongst his friends during a visit to Guadalajara in April, writing to the Marquis of Vivanco, that one had told him that: 'los europeos son mis acervos enemigos' and that he wished that they all would be removed from their offices and their wealth confiscated.¹¹⁶ Both Bustamante and de la Peña warned central government that rebellion and unrest could follow if the problem of the *gachupines* was not dealt with.

Again, Jalisco was not the only state causing problems for central government. Nor were its complaints unique. In December 1823, the deputation of Puebla declared itself to be the state congress and elected a three-man executive. It announced that it would recognise central government, but that it would take measures to defend its sovereignty if this guarantee was not included in the *Acta Constitutiva*. In response, troops were sent under Manuel Gómez Pedraza and Vicente Guerrero. The new authorities were dissolved and Pedraza left as head of government. Once the Act came into force in January, elections were permitted for the convocation of a state congress.¹¹⁷ In Cuautla, Lieutenant-Colonel Hernández and the troops garrisoned in the town began a rebellion in favour of the dismissal of the Spaniards and their eventual expulsion. This was quelled by Vicente Guerrero.¹¹⁸ In the hills of Puebla, the ex-insurgent, Vicente Gómez, also renewed his activities against the Spanish.¹¹⁹ The most threatening occurrence of all happened in Mexico City itself, where on 23 January 1824, the military commander of the troops in the capital, General José Lobato, led his men in a *pronunciamiento*. Lobato's plan, along with that of his

¹¹⁵ Bustamante to Quintanar, Guadalajara, 13 April 1824. In Manuel Mier y Terán and Lucas Alamán, *Discursos pronunciados por los Exmos. sres. ministros de Relaciones y de Guerra, en las sesión del día 8 de junio, del Congreso General de la Federación Mexicana*, (Mexico City: Imprenta del Supremo Gobierno, en Palacio, 1824), p. 16. In CONDUMEX.

¹¹⁶ SDN: AH XI/481.3/305/00102-103. Manuel de la Peña y del Río, "Exposición que el ciudadano colonel Manuel de la Peña y del Río, comandante accidental del batallón de infantería número 11, hace al Exmo sr. gefe del Estado Mayor," Querétaro, 27 April 1824.

¹¹⁷ Anna, *Forging Mexico*, pp. 159-160.

¹¹⁸ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 448.

¹¹⁹ Bocanegra, *Memorias para la historia de México*, vol. 1, p. 291.

second, General José Stávoli, echoed perfectly the opinions rife in Jalisco. Lobato accused the executive of having attempted to suffocate the provinces' attempts to introduce federalism. He and Stávoli called for the immediate renovation of the Supreme Executive Power, the removal of all Spaniards, and all those 'americanos poco adictos al sistema de la libertad' from their offices and employment.'¹²⁰ The unrest in the capital was quickly dealt with and the two leaders removed from their commissions; even so, it surely demonstrated to the executive that opposition to its actions were not confined to the states.

Jalisco's position may not have been unique, but it was by far the most vocal, and without doubt, successful, opponent of the central government. It had already resisted one attempt at military intervention, and showed every sign of continuing its resistance until its demands were met. Part of the reason for this was the presence of Luis Quintanar as provisional governor, who inspired confidence and support throughout the state:

Así por ejemplo, sus comunicados, que siempre incluían expresiones tales como 'federación o muerte' eran recibidos con una fê muy sintomática de la progresiva confianza en el futuro de la entidad. Todavía más, para ganarse la adhesión de las mayorías, que se mostraban confusas e inactivas sin entender con exactitud el trastorno de los sucesos, concedió un sin fin de libertades como las de portar armas y de reunirse sin taxativas. Un testigo presencial posteriormente explicaría como de la noche a la mañana se había convertido en 'amigo de que todo el mundo se divierta, que no haya castigos y que todos sean manejados con la dulzura que se manejan las monjas por su abadesas. (*El Sol*, 18 de julio de 1823). Su figura alcanzó tal vigor que los jaliscienses, seducidos por el optimismo de los potentados, pronunciaban su nombre con respeto y admiración, y repetidamente le ratificaban el apoyo de infinidad de pueblos cuyas autoridades estaban con él.¹²¹

¹²⁰ José M. Lobato, "Pronunciamiento por el plan de Lobato, el 23 de enero de 1824," and, "Documento relativo al pronunciamiento del General Lobato, el 24 de enero de 1824," in Secretaría de Gobernación (ed.), *Leyes fundamentales de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, pp. 112-113.

¹²¹ Muriá (ed.), *Historia de Jalisco*, vol. 2, p. 444.

Another explanation for the continued defiance of the government, was the success that Jalisco had enjoyed in its endeavours since 1823. There can be no doubt that their lead in declaring themselves an independent state, and setting up a state legislature and executive, had forced the hand of central government. Father Mier's plan of centralised government with nominal and restricted powers to the provinces had to be abandoned in favour of the *Acta Constitutiva* which recognised the autonomy of the states. It was now perfectly possible that this Act could also be modified when it was transformed into the constitution to take into account the criticism expressed by the legislature in Jalisco. All in all, the state and its leader represented a constant danger for the centralists in Mexico City, and it was clear that something must be done to address this menace.

The strength of the threat that Jalisco posed to the Executive Power, now dominated by the centralist General Bravo, in the early spring of 1824, is apparent from the actions he then undertook. The first was the proposal presented to the National Congress by a small committee of deputies, apparently aided by Manuel Mier y Terán and Francisco Arrillaga, the ministers of War and the Treasury and members of the Scottish Rite of Masons, of whom Nicolás Bravo was Grand Master.¹²² This scheme suggested the replacement of the three-person Supreme Executive with a single entity, a Supreme Director, who would control the executive until the implementation of the new constitution. This Director would be chosen by the Supreme Executive Power from amongst its current members. Clearly the obvious choice would be Bravo. He would have all the power of the executive as detailed in the *Acta Constitutiva*, plus special authority to take personal command of the army, if necessary; to make all military and governmental appointments; and to veto any legislation passed by the National or State Assemblies. Also ominously for Jalisco, the power of the Director would also include the ability to 'emplear a los oficiales del

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 193.

ejército que hayan sido nombrados gobernadores de los estados o diputados.’ In other words, he would be able to reassign Quintanar and Bustamante away from Jalisco, should he so choose.¹²³ The proposal amounted to the creation of a dictator, and was, as Father Mier admitted in a letter to a friend, designed especially to derail the federalist project.¹²⁴ It was also clearly a direct attack upon Jalisco, where the news of the project was greeted with great dismay and not a small amount of fearful anticipation.¹²⁵ The local newspaper, *El Iris de Jalisco*, described the project as an attempt to transform Mexico into a military dictatorship, which governing by ‘un sistema de terror’ would soon strike ‘el golpe mortal a la federación.’ It was clear that the newspaper feared that once the proposal was implemented, troops might once more be sent against their state.¹²⁶

The concerns of *El Iris* were well justified. For on 17 May 1824, a month after the proposal was approved by the National Congress, Nicolás Bravo marched once more from Mexico City at the head of a substantial force in the direction of Guadalajara.¹²⁷ The state once more rallied to its defences, and troops led by Bustamante and Quintanar forced Bravo into negotiations. In these talks, Bravo agreed to ensure that the central government observed the *Acta Constitutiva*, and promised to enter into no reprisals against those who had opposed his march upon Guadalajara.¹²⁸ However, he did not keep his promise. On 17 June, six days after signing the agreement he entered that city in the early hours of the morning and

¹²³ The proposal is included in *El Iris de Jalisco*, 23 April 1824.

¹²⁴ ‘We are [engaged] in the great question of centralizing the government, because the coach of sovereign federation cannot roll [...] Everything will go to the devil if the remedy proposed by the committee is not adopted.’ Mier to Cantú, Mexico, 17 April 1824. In José Servando Teresa de Mier Noreiga y Guerra, *Antología del pensamiento político americano: Fray Servando Teresa de Mier*, (Mexico City: Imprenta Universitaria, 1945), p. 36. Quoted and translated by Quinlan, “Issues and Factions,” p. 193.

¹²⁵ Carlos María de Bustamante, *Diario Histórico de México* (Mexico City: SEP/INAH, 1981), vol. 2, p. 58. Entry for 30 April 1824.

¹²⁶ *El Iris de Jalisco*, 23 April 1824.

¹²⁷ SDN: AH XI/481.3/305/00141. Agreement and orders of the Supreme Executive Power, dated 17 May 1824.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/306/00032. “Artículos aprobados por el general en jefe del ejército de operaciones,” 11 June 1824. *El Iris de Jalisco*, 16 June 1824.

arrested Bustamante and Quintanar as they slept. The generals were then sent to Colima, en route to Acapulco, from where they were to be transported to Guayaquil, for immediate exile.¹²⁹ A few of their supporters, including the editor of the newspaper, *El Iris de Jalisco*, José María Valdés, escaped to the port of Tepic, where they fortified their position in defence against Bravo. This resistance was short-lived, and Bravo's troops soon put down their rebellion and shot the principal leaders.¹³⁰

Troops would remain in the capital of Jalisco until January 1825, while government of the state was placed in the hands of General Francisco Moctezuma, who had arrived from Mexico City with the invading army.¹³¹ In contrast with the previous year's intervention, Bravo's mission in Guadalajara attracted very little condemnation or protest from other staunchly pro-federalist states, or federalists in the General Congress. The government of Zacatecas wrote to Bravo to demand explanations, but made no attempt to come to the aid of its neighbour as it had done in 1823.¹³² Bravo's mission in 1823 had evidently no other aim but to delay the implementation of federalist government in Jalisco and other states, despite the protestations of the executive to the contrary. However, in 1824, this new mission's aims were not so easy to see, for a new consideration had been brought into the limelight. This was the accusation that the state of Jalisco, under the direction of two old friends of Iturbide, was using the mask of upholding and defending federalism to hide its true aim: the restoration of the ex-emperor to the throne.

The fear that Iturbide, who had left his exile in Italy for London in January 1824, was planning a return to Mexico, had already been shown to be an invaluable propaganda weapon in the debate upon the subject of a single executive. As David M.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/308/00025. Nicolás Bravo to the Minister of War, Guadalajara, 18 June 1824.

¹³⁰ Bustamante *Diario Histórico*, vol. 2 pp. 88-89, 93, 100. Entries for 24 June, and 1, 21 and 27 July 1824. Lorenzo de Zavala, *Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México desde 1808 hasta 1830* (Mexico City: Oficina Impresora de Hacienda, Departamento Editorial, 1918), vol. 1, p. 210.

¹³¹ Muriá (ed.), *Historia de Jalisco*, vol. 2, p. 455.

¹³² SDN: AH XI/481.3/306/00043-44. Government of the Free Federated State of Zacatecas to Bravo, 15 June 1824.

Quinlan has noted in his study of the Constituent Congress of 1823 and 1824, a similar proposal had been twice rejected by the deputies in January 1824. But in the vote on 21 April, the measure was accepted by 46 votes to 39. Certainly, the proposal was slightly amended to change the title to the less dictatorial ‘presidente provisional,’ who would be elected by congress, and to remove the right of veto; but the essence of the idea of a powerful single executive remained. It was clear that the federalist deputies clearly understood that the proposal made a mockery of the *Acta Constitutiva* and jeopardised the future of the federalist system. However, it is also clear that in the debates, which took place in March and April, many deputies were convinced that this was a necessary evil to prevent the loss of the republican project completely. The measures creating a single executive were presented as the best method of defence against the anti-government and pro-Iturbide conspiracies that were said to abound, especially in Jalisco. As Zavala pointed out, the federalist deputies were faced with the difficult question: ‘¿Quienes eran más temibles entre los iturbidistas y los centralistas?’¹³³ In the end, it appeared that a significant number of federalists decided that the former group presented a greater threat, and these deputies voted with the centralists, making them the majority by the small margin of seven votes. Significantly, in that summer, once the perception of the threat of *iturbidismo* had been lifted, the proposal lost its support in Congress, and was never implemented.¹³⁴

Even so, confusion arose because *iturbidismo* was not the only crime of which Bustamante and Quintanar were accused. According to the explanations provided by Manuel Mier y Terán, the Minister of War, and Lucas Alamán, to the General Congress on 8 June 1824, the Supreme Executive Power had agreed to send Nicolás Bravo to Jalisco with orders to depose Quintanar and Bustamante, for three main reasons: 1) the continued disobedience demonstrated by both men towards orders

¹³³ Zavala, *Historia de las revoluciones de México*, vol. 1, p. 206.

¹³⁴ Quinlan, “Issues and Factions,” pp. 193-194.

emanating from the central government; 2) the information that they had gathered which showed the men were plotting to declare Jalisco's independence from the Mexican Union; and 3) because they also had evidence to show that Quintanar and Bustamante were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the current government in favour of restoring Iturbide to the throne. Neither minister lacked evidence to support his claims. It was clear from the correspondence quoted by Terán that Bustamante had repeatedly refused to replace the military commander of Tepic, Eduardo García, who also happened to be the nephew (by marriage) of Iturbide, with the choice of Ministry of War, José Narvaez.¹³⁵ He had resisted sending a cavalry corps, which had deserted in Guadalajara the year before, but had now been amnestied, to rejoin the rest of its regiment in Orizaba.¹³⁶ Moreover, he had given employment to the Baron of Rosenberg, another friend of Iturbide, who had been sentenced to banishment from the Republic. When ordered to arrest him, he delayed relaying the order and in so doing, allowed the Baron to escape.¹³⁷ Letters were quoted from unnamed sources that described the streets in Guadalajara as being covered with signs reading 'Viva Agustín I,' and others that warned that the principal leaders in Guadalajara and the army were plotting a rebellion in favour of Iturbide.¹³⁸ A further communication from the military commander of Colima, Anastasio Brizuela, on 5 May, in which he included the testimony of a fleeing resident of Guadalajara, claimed that a few nights beforehand, Bustamante had attempted to proclaim the independence of Jalisco from Mexico. He had only been prevented by the opposition put forward in the local barracks by Colonel José Antonio Mozo.¹³⁹ Alamán, for his part, read to the Congress

¹³⁵ Alamán and Mier y Terán, *Discursos pronunciados por los Exmos. sres. ministros de Relaciones y de Guerra, en las sesión del día 8 de junio, del Congreso General de la Federación Mexicana*, pp. 15-17.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8. SDN: AH XI/481.3/305/00022, Also Bustamante to the Minister of War, Guadalajara, 24 March 1824. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/305/00024. Anastasio Brizuela to Negrete, 4 April, 1824.

¹³⁸ Alamán and Mier y Terán, *Discursos pronunciados por los Exmos. sres. ministros de Relaciones y de Guerra, en las sesión del día 8 de junio, del Congreso General de la Federación Mexicana*, p. 20.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

a plan discovered in the Calle de Celaya on 12 May. This plan was signed by Quintanar and called for the destitution of all Europeans from their employment, and the restoration of Iturbide to Mexico, ‘con el lugar que la nación quiera darle.’ This, he explained, was to make it appear that the rebellion was not simply in favour of Iturbide.¹⁴⁰ He also referred to a speech given in the state legislature of Jalisco on 7 April, in which a deputy had given voice to rumours that Luis Quintanar and Anastasio Bustamante were plotting a rebellion in favour of Iturbide, and that the troops who were garrisoned in Guadalajara were ready to second their expected *pronunciamiento*.¹⁴¹

None of these accusations against Bustamante and Quintanar would have been new to the deputies. As we have seen, from the very inception of the state of Jalisco, pamphlet writers and rumour-mongers had interpreted the state's defiance of Mexico City as a plot to restore Iturbide to the throne. These rumours had become more widespread after the failure of the plan of Lobato and the introduction of the idea of a single executive. The newspaper of the Scottish Rite of Masons, *El Sol*, began to publish regular editorials accusing the state legislature and governor of conspiracy for the return of Iturbide.¹⁴² Letters purporting to be from concerned residents in Guadalajara detailed the shocking openness of this plotting, were also published by the newspaper.¹⁴³ *El Iris de Jalisco* was condemned for expressing pro-Iturbide sentiments, and its editor was accused of being a leading member of the conspiracy.¹⁴⁴ It was declared by this newspaper that Iturbide had left England, en route to the United States, from where he was planning to head for Guadalajara, via Guatemala or

¹⁴⁰ Lucas Alamán, “Discurso pronunciado por el Exmo. sr. ministro de Relaciones, en la sesión del días 8 de junio del Congreso General de la Federación Mexicana,” in Lucas Alamán, *Obras de Lucas Alamán: Documentos Diversos (Inéditos y muy raros)* (Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1945), vol. 2, pp. 559, 563-564.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 567.

¹⁴² *El Sol*, 19 April 1824

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 19 May 1824.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 17 April 1824.

Panama.¹⁴⁵ On 18 April it published the speech of one of the deputies of the Congress of Jalisco, referred to above, which reported rumours that Bustamante, Quintanar and other officers, were in secret communication with Iturbide in London, and that they were plotting to restore him to the throne.¹⁴⁶ *El Sol* even reported Bustamante's failed attempt at a *pronunciamiento* in favour of complete independence from Mexico, also included in the ministers' evidence.¹⁴⁷ The deputies might have dismissed all these newspaper stories as simple gossip and unsubstantiated rumour. However, the presentations by both Mier y Terán and Alamán brought substance to these reports and most likely quelled any concerns that they may have had over any hidden motives behind yet another armed intervention by the government in Jalisco.

Yet the explanations offered by Terán and Alamán for their decision to send Bravo to Jalisco are far from convincing. In the first place, one cannot escape from the inherent contradiction of their accusations against Bustamante and Quintanar. In one breath they are accused of plotting to declare Jalisco independent from the Mexican Union, while in another, they are said to be also conspiring to restore Iturbide to the throne. Did the ministers mean to imply that the two officers wished to see Iturbide return simply as emperor of Jalisco? Of course, the most logical explanation must be that they feared that if Jalisco became independent, and Iturbide was welcomed back there as leader, a re-conquest of the rest of Mexico might follow. Or, it could be that they believed that Bustamante and Quintanar would prefer to establish an independent Jalisco, should their plans to restore Iturbide fail. Even so, these possibilities are not mentioned, or even hinted at, in either speech. In the second place, the evidence presented as proof of plots of *iturbidismo* or separatism, are highly suspicious. The original correspondence of the unnamed sources quoted by Terán, can be found in the

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 13 March 1824.

¹⁴⁶ "Discurso que dirigió al congreso del estado de Jalisco uno de sus diputados," (7 April 1824), in *El Sol*, 18 April 1824.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 12 May 1824.

archives of the Secretary of Defence in Mexico City. The three letters which are mentioned are written by General Negrete, Colonel Anastasio Brizuela and Colonel Manuel de la Peña y del Río. As we know, General Negrete and Anastasio Brizuela had been sent to Jalisco with Bravo in 1823, and had played important roles in organising the separation of the district of Colima from Jalisco. In his speech, Terán claimed that he did not reveal the names of his correspondents as these were, as he phrased it 'bajo el poder de los facciosos' and he did not want to expose them to danger.¹⁴⁸ Neither Brizuela nor Negrete were in Jalisco, and Colonel de la Peña had addressed his letter to the government from Querétaro.¹⁴⁹ It is more likely that Terán did not want his listeners to know he was presenting evidence gathered from such narrow sources. His listeners may have also suspected the trustworthiness of Negrete and Brizuela, knowing as they did their close relationship with the government. Moreover, Colonel de la Peña's letter does not say that he heard plots in favour of Iturbide, rather that the people he met were discontented with the central government and with the employment enjoyed by the Spanish. He merely surmises from their expressions of discontent that 'se deseaban renovar los estragos del año diez' and that 'se trataba de una revolución la que siendo transcendental a toda la nación mexicana viniese a redundar a favor de su ídolo, Iturbide.'¹⁵⁰

But most intriguing is the idea of Quintanar's plan. According to Alamán, this was discovered in a raid on a house in the Calle de Celaya, on 12 May 1824. Along with this plan, various other documents were also found, one of which also

¹⁴⁸ Alamán and Mier y Terán, *Discursos pronunciados por los Exmos. sres. ministros de Relaciones y de Guerra, en las sesión del día 8 de junio, del Congreso General de la Federación Mexicana*, p. 9.

¹⁴⁹ SDN: AH XI/481.3/305/00102-103. Manuel de la Peña y del Río, *Exposición que el ciudadano coronel, comandante accidental del batallón de infantería número 11, hace al Exmo. sr. jefe del Estado Mayor*. (Querétaro, 27 April 1824).

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* Also, Alamán and Mier y Terán, *Discursos pronunciados por los Exmos. sres. ministros de Relaciones y de Guerra, en las sesión del día 8 de junio, del Congreso General de la Federación Mexicana*, p. 20.

compromised Bustamante in the conspiracy.¹⁵¹ This plan does not call for the restoration of Iturbide to the imperial throne, but to Mexico, albeit in a position agreed upon by the people. It could be interpreted, as Alamán suggests, as a ruse to hide Quintanar's true objectives. It also might be interpreted as a reaction to the declaration by General Congress in April, that Iturbide would be outside the law if he returned to Mexican soil, or in other words, he would be executed. Even so, in the event, they appear to be a plan that only saw the light of day in the investigations of the prosecution. There is no original document, only copies. It is another plan, also found amongst the papers of those arrested in the Calle de Celaya, which is eventually proclaimed by those who fled Guadalajara, to Tepic, on Bravo's entry. This plan, called for three main things: 1) the complete renovation of the Supreme Executive Power; 2) the suspension of the measures to introduce a single executive; and 3) the removal of all Spaniards from their civil, military and political positions.¹⁵² A different version of the same plan, also found in Celaya, declares that once the *pronunciamiento* has been accepted, its leaders will proceed to convene a new Congress which will reform the *Acta Constitutiva* and draw up the constitution.¹⁵³ The states would then elect a president and a senate to oversee operations. Alamán refers to both plans in passing in his speech, but does not mention their contents or include it in his dossier of documents.¹⁵⁴ This is hardly surprising. The sentiments expressed in these documents

¹⁵¹ SDN: AH XI/481.3/302/00037. Francisco Santoya to Antonio García, 1 May 1824. It reads: 'Amado amigo: he dicho a V. en mi anterior que Jalisco ha mandado comisionados para todas las provincias con el objeto de combinar el plan que ya signifiqué a V. en mi antecedente, contraído a la restitución de Iturbide al suelo mexicano, bajo la investidura que la nación estime por conveniente. No dudo que V. estará más empapado en la materia que yo, y que el ciudadano general habría impuesto desde aquel estado todo lo conducente a este fin, como es el más interesado, y que está del todo comprometido para tal empresa.' This is a copy, I was unable to find any original.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/302/00152. "Extracto de la última causa de conspiración descubierta en esta capital en la noche del doce de mayo último." And, *ibid.*, XI/481.3/306/00048-49. "Plan del Sr. Eduardo García en el cuartel de Tepic," Cuartel de Tepic, 18 June 1824.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/302/00151. "Extracto de la última causa de conspiración descubierta en esta capital en la noche del doce de mayo último."

¹⁵⁴ Lucas Alamán, "Discurso pronunciado por el Exmo. sr. ministro de Relaciones, en la sesión del días 8 de junio del Congreso General de la Federación Mexicana," p. 559.

do not support the accusations that the conspirators in the Calle de Celaya, or their associates in Guadalajara were plotting the secession of Jalisco or the restoration of Iturbide. Instead, they demonstrate the frustration with the Supreme Executive Power and its attempts to minimise the autonomy of the states, that had been evident in Jalisco since 1823.

What the papers discovered in the Calle de Celaya do show, however, is that in 1824 there were definite plans afoot in the capital and the states which had designs against the Supreme Government in Mexico City. Correspondence to and from many different states was discovered, although it appears the conspirators were most prominently linked with another cadre of rebels in the city of Guadalajara. After the raid on the Calle de Celaya, those who were not arrested, like the leader Miguel Borja and fellow conspirator, Captain Vicente González, headed for the safety of Jalisco.¹⁵⁵ Evidence given by witnesses after the fall of Jalisco to Bravo's army describes a group of eight or nine officers meeting regularly in each others' houses to plot against the central government. These included Bustamante's secretary, Colonel José María Castañeda, Guadalupe Ballesteros, who was in charge of delivering the post for both Bustamante, Quintanar and the editor of *El Iris*, José Antonio Valdés. Others were leading members of Bustamante's army in Guadalajara, such as Lieutenant-Colonels Eduardo García and Manuel Andrade.¹⁵⁶ Andrade also happened to be the son of José Antonio Andrade, another well-known friend of Iturbide, who had also been implicated in an *iturbidista* plot in October 1823.¹⁵⁷ According to one witness, Antonio Ferrer, the aim of the conspirators was 'atentar contra el gobierno establecido, valiéndose la voz de independencia de este estado de México, y después

¹⁵⁵ AGN: *Archivo de Guerra*, vol. 402, exp. 4280, f. 99. "El Capitán D. Vicente González sobre que se le devuelva su empleo por comprendido en la amnistía."

¹⁵⁶ SDN: AH XI/481.3/306/00112-138. Plaza de Guadalajara, "Información secreta sobre los acontecimientos revolucionarios de este Estado."

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/301/00081. "Copia de la lista que presentó el subteniente de Infantería no. 4 D. Luis Olazabal de los individuos que habían de cooperar a la conspiración de la noche del 2 del presente mes [October]."

proclamar a Agustín I.’¹⁵⁸ Another provided their plan, which proposed the immediate proclamation of Iturbide as emperor and the expatriation of all Spaniards.¹⁵⁹ It was alleged that Bustamante was a close collaborator in these schemes and had worked hard to promote the plan within Jalisco and the neighbouring states.¹⁶⁰

Once Bustamante and Quintanar had been arrested, and Guadalajara found itself under military occupation, the state legislature published a manifesto in which it asserted that the authorities had always been ignorant of any plans held by the two generals in favour of Iturbide. Instead, they had believed that Bravo's mission in Jalisco was:

obra de los enemigos de la federación, que pintando a este estado sumido en una desoladora anarquía, había tendido diestramente los lazos a las autoridades para hacerles coayudar con las más sanas intenciones a sus fines siniestros de centralizar la administración gubernativa de los estados en un solo punto, dejándolos para ignominia el nombre soberanos.¹⁶¹

They claim that they supported the resistance mounted by the two men, and called up the militias to fight Bravo's army, ‘solo para resistir fuerza con fuerza, y para defender la libertad y soberanía del estado que consideraba amenazada.’¹⁶² The legislature was not alone in its suspicions. According to Zavala ‘aun el seno mismo del congreso general’ it was suspected that the real motivation of Bravo's march was to crush the federalist spirit of Jalisco.¹⁶³ He implies that Bustamante and Quintanar successfully

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/306/00126. Testimony of Antonio Ferrer, in “Información secreta sobre los acontecimientos revolucionarios de este Estado.”

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/306/00131. Testimony of Francisco Granderos de Medina, in “Información secreta sobre los acontecimientos revolucionarios de este Estado.”

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/307/00096. Testimony of Francisco Granderos de Medina, in “Información reservada sobre acontecimientos sediciosos, proyectando realizar la proclamación de D. Agustín de Iturbide por emperador de esta América.”

¹⁶¹ Congress of Jalisco, *Manifiesto que el Congreso Constituyente del Estado Libre de Jalisco dirige a sus habitantes* (Guadalajara: Imprenta del ciudadano San Román, 1824), p. 4.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ Zavala, *Historia de las revoluciones de México*, vol. 1, p. 207.

deceived the federalists in Jalisco and elsewhere, presenting themselves as the defenders of federalism, in order to drum up support for their plans to restore Iturbide. Undoubtedly, this is a sensible explanation, for otherwise we would have to accept that the state Congress of Jalisco, the *ayuntamiento*, and its leading members were all also *iturbidistas*. As we have seen in our previous discussions, this would be to fly in the face of all other evidence to the contrary. This would also account for the existence of two separate plans amongst the papers of those arrested in the Calle de Celaya. Quintanar's plan would have had to be top secret, whilst the other provided the necessary camouflage. It would explain why a committed anti-*iturbidista*, like Guadalupe Victoria, was also discovered to have been communicating with the leaders of the conspiracy in Mexico City.¹⁶⁴ Or, why pro-federalists on the run from the conditions in Mexico City, like writer Pablo Villavicencio, should head to Guadalajara for protection.¹⁶⁵

If this is the case, Bustamante, Quintanar and their fellow conspirators must have had to work extremely hard to disguise their true ambitions. Their positions as known friends of the ex-emperor, and the rumours that constantly surrounded their actions can only have made their allies suspicious. Yet they appear to have succeeded in deceiving them all. This must have been most difficult after the undisclosed deputy made his speech in the state Congress on 7 April 1824, in which he brought to the attention of the legislature the stories circulating of Bustamante's and Quintanar's secret communications with Iturbide, and their plots to restore him to the throne. In response, Bustamante published a manifesto denying all the charges and claiming to be

¹⁶⁴ SDN: AH XI/481.3/302/00025-26. Guadalupe Victoria to Miguel Borja, 13 March 1824.

¹⁶⁵ Villavicencio's arrest had been ordered by the Executive, due to the inflammatory pamphlets he had been producing. Bustamante, *Diario Histórico*, vol. 2, p. 47. Entry for 29 March 1824. AGN: *Archivo de Guerra*, vol. 408, Exp. 4280, f. 114. Declaration of Pablo Villavicencio.

‘eternamente acervo enemigo de los monarquistas, sea cual fuese su procedencia.’¹⁶⁶

Luis Quintanar informed the Congress, in response to their enquiries that:

aunque se ha victoriado a dicho sr. Iturbide, he podido averiguar que esto ha sido por alguna corta reunión de gente plebeya y holgazana, mas que sin embargo se ha conservado íleso el orden y tranquilidad pública a beneficio de que el sr. comandante general [Bustamante] proveía noticia de los citados acontecimientos, reunió a los jefes de los cuerpos y les recargó la vigilancia sobre la conducta de sus subordinados, para que en todo cuanto sostuvieran el orden.¹⁶⁷

He also published a manifesto addressed to the inhabitants of Jalisco, in which he denounced all publications in favour of Iturbide as the work of the Spanish government, who wished to cause anarchy in Mexico to facilitate their re-conquest.¹⁶⁸

The legislature in Jalisco appeared to accept these explanations quite easily. On 30 April, it wrote to the Minister of War, Mier y Terán, that any disturbances that had taken place in Guadalajara in favour of Iturbide were not of any significance.¹⁶⁹ On 28 May, after learning that Bravo had begun his march on their capital, they were more specific, dismissing the accusations of *iturbidismo*, as ‘enteramente falsas.’¹⁷⁰

The one thing that undermines this interpretation that the *iturbidistas* in Guadalajara were deceiving their federalist allies is the plan of Tepic. This plan was proclaimed by Eduardo García, Iturbide's nephew-in-law. It was announced after Bravo's entry into Guadalajara and all the accusations of *iturbidismo* had been made by the government. But this, as we have seen, was not Quintanar's plan, for the

¹⁶⁶ LAF no. 257. Anastasio Bustamante, *Noticias de Guadalajara y manifiesto del general Bustamante* (Mexico City: Oficina de Mariano Ontiveros, 1824), pp. 3-4.

¹⁶⁷ SDN: AH XI/481.3/305/00070. Quintanar to the Secretaries of the Congress of the Free State of Jalisco, Guadalajara, 8 April 1824.

¹⁶⁸ Manifiesto of Luis Quintanar, dated 23 April 1824, published in *El Sol*, 6 May 1824.

¹⁶⁹ SDN: AH XI/481.3/305/00063-64. The Secretaries of the Free State of Jalisco (Prisciliano Sánchez and José Esteban Arechiga) to Mier y Terán, Guadalajara, 30 April 1824.

¹⁷⁰ LAF no. 416. Congress of Jalisco, *Ocurrencias interesantes. Sobre reclamaciones del Congreso de Jalisco, hechas por sus diputados en la sesión pública de 28 de mayo de 1824* (Mexico City: Impreso en la liberal de Moreno Hermanos, 1824), p. 2.

restoration of Iturbide to Mexico, nor the plan to restore him to the throne, but rather the federalist plan which called for the renovation of the Supreme Executive Power, and the suspension of the measures to introduce a single executive. This is puzzling, for surely after the arrests of Bustamante and Quintanar, the advantages of concealing the true aims of the rebellion were now non-existent. Could it be that there had been no pretence? Were the charges of Alamán and Terán merely inventions to excuse their direct attack on federalism in Mexico and Jalisco? After all, when charges were eventually brought against Bustamante by the Executive Power, and submitted to the Commander of Acapulco, Juan Álvarez, no specific accusation that Bustamante was plotting to restore Iturbide was made. He is simply charged with disobedience and plotting the secession of Jalisco from the Mexican Union. If the Executive was in possession of incontrovertible evidence that Bustamante was guilty of conspiring in favour of Iturbide, it can only be expected that it would have included this charge.¹⁷¹ The evidence gathered after the entry of Bravo into Guadalajara is not completely reliable. Francisco Grandero and Antonio Ferrer, the main informants, admitted that they had infiltrated the conspiracy in Jalisco as spies for Colonel José Antonio Mozo, the same officer who was appointed as judge and prosecutor in the investigation.¹⁷² Colonel Mozo had been the commander of the garrison in Guadalajara, but had resigned, according to his later testimony, after foiling Bustamante's attempt to implement his revolutionary plan on 3 May.¹⁷³ At the time, he explained to General Manuel Gual, his commanding officer, that he had resigned because of rumours that he himself had been organising a rebellion amongst his men.¹⁷⁴ However, it could also be

¹⁷¹ SDN: AH XI/481.3/306/00158-160. Minister of War to Juan Álvarez, 11 September 1824.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/306/00131. "Información secreta sobre los acontecimientos revolucionarios de este Estado." Testimony of Francisco Granderos de Medina. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/306/00127. Testimony of Antonio Ferrer.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 481.3/307/00088-89. "Información reservada sobre acontecimientos sediciosos, proyectando realizar la proclamación de D. Agustín de Iturbide por emperador de esta América." Testimony of José Antonio Mozo.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/305/000117-122. Mozo to General Manuel Gual, Inspector General of the National Artillery Corps, Guadalajara, 8 May 1824.

that the rebels were determined to oppose Bravo at any cost, and still believed that the only way to ensure any support from the other states was to proclaim the federalist plan and claim that the charges of *iturbidismo* were only invention?

It is unlikely that we will ever know what actually happened in Guadalajara in the first six months of 1824. However, in the light of our present discussions, we can make a number of assertions to aid our comprehension of the situation. The first is that Bravo's march upon Guadalajara in May 1824 was not motivated only by the suspicion that Bustamante and Quintanar were plotting a rebellion in favour of Iturbide. Undoubtedly, the Supreme Executive also wished to neutralise the power Jalisco exercised over the policies of central government. It wanted to ensure that the new constitution would not create a confederated union of sovereign states, but rather a federal union of provinces, whose affairs could be directly controlled from Mexico City. The second point is that the evidence presented by Alamán and Terán to the General Congress on 8 June did not amount to conclusive proof of Quintanar and Bustamante's involvement in any conspiracy to restore Iturbide to the throne. It is unlikely that the executive was ever in possession of such evidence, for otherwise it is inconceivable that they would not have included this accusation in the charges finally brought against Bustamante. Thirdly, the documents discovered at the Calle de Celaya, and the evidence given by witnesses in Jalisco, clearly demonstrate that a rebellion against the Supreme Government was definitely being planned in the spring of 1824. The proclamation of the Plan of Tepic illustrates that these conspirators were in communication with each other. Whether this conspiracy's true aim was the restoration of Iturbide is unclear, since three plans were discovered. The only one of these plans to be proclaimed however, was not the one in favour of Iturbide, but the one which called for the renovation of the Supreme Executive Power and the suspension of the introduction of a single executive, or Supreme Director.

Finally, it must be pointed out that federalism and *iturbidismo* did not have to be mutually incompatible concepts. It is not too much to imagine that some of the *iturbidistas*, like Bustamante and Quintanar, who were heavily involved in the government of a strongly federalist state, may have come to believe that a union of sovereign states was the best solution to solve the difficulties of governing such a large and diverse country such as Mexico. That they may also have believed that Iturbide would have been the ideal choice as the head of this union, whether as emperor or in another position, is also not improbable. In that case, perhaps the most satisfactory way to explain the mystery of 1824 could be to suggest that the rebellion that was plotted in the Calle de Celaya and in Guadalajara, was designed as a compromise. On the one hand, it guaranteed the future of a federal Mexico, and on the other allowed for the exiled Iturbide to return home ‘en el lugar que la nación quiera darle.’ Perhaps as emperor or president, or even in a less exalted position. So, maybe we do not have to decide whether Bustamante was an *iturbidista* or a federalist. It might just be that he was both.

Chapter Three: The Footsteps to Power (1825-1829)

The last six months of 1824 left Anastasio Bustamante at an extremely low ebb. After his arrest in Guadalajara, he was marched via Colima, to the nearby port of Navidad. Here, he boarded the brig 'Morelos' on 13 August, which conducted him to the fortress of Acapulco.¹ He was kept in the fortress for five months, in the custody of the Military Commander, Juan Álvarez. During this time he was charged with conspiring against the government, and of plotting the secession of Jalisco from the Mexican Union.² It appears the case never reached a military tribunal. These were difficult months for the General. The hot and humid climate was extremely unpleasant for one so accustomed to the drier atmosphere of Jalisco and the Bajío, and he feared for his health.³ He had not been paid since his arrest, and in September complained to Álvarez that he found himself 'reducido a la escasez de lo preciso para sobrevivir.'⁴ Had anyone told him during these months of captivity that he would become Vice-President of the Republic within the next five years, it is unlikely that he would have believed them.

Yet things would quickly change. In December 1824, President Guadalupe Victoria introduced an amnesty for all those accused of political crimes. On 5 January 1825, it was judged that Bustamante should be included in this pardon,⁵ and a fortnight later, he was released from Acapulco.⁶ In the following year, Bustamante was appointed as the Commander General of the Eastern Interior Provinces, and in 1828, was named as a candidate for the forthcoming Presidential elections. In January

¹ SDN: AH XI/481.3/308/00101. Anastasio Brizuela to the Minister of War, Colima, 19 August 1824.

² *Ibid.*, XI/306/00158-160. Minister of War to Juan Álvarez, 11 September 1824.

³ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/308/00077. Anastasio Bustamante to the Supreme Executive Power, Colima, 10 July 1824.

⁴ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/308/00175. Bustamante to Álvarez, Acapulco, 20 September 1824.

⁵ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/307/00228-230. Assessor's Report on the Behaviour of Anastasio Bustamante and Luis Quintanar, Mexico City, 5 January 1825.

⁶ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/307/00213. Nicolás de Casío to the Minister of War, Mexico City, 25 January 1825.

1829, he was elected Vice-President by the General Congress, and later that year, after leading a successful *pronunciamiento* against the President, Vicente Guerrero, he became the acting Head of State. One of the explanations for Bustamante's quick rise to power was his involvement in the *yorkino* Masonic lodge. He was chosen and promoted as a Presidential candidate for this faction. He finished the elections in third place, but was elected as Vice-President after a *yorkino* revolt ousted the winning candidate, Manuel Gómez Pedraza in December 1828. His greatest success, however, was achieved precisely by turning against his *yorkino* allies, and by leading a rebellion which toppled Guerrero.

General Bustamante's behaviour between 1825 and 1829 seems puzzling. Why would such a man, who fought against the insurgents and their challenge to social order, join a faction which associated itself with the lower classes and ensured that its candidates assumed the Presidency through a popular revolt which culminated in the riot of the Parián Market? Why, after becoming Vice-President, did he turn away from the *yorkinos*, if he owed to them his success? Why did he ally himself with his former enemies, Lucas Alamán and Nicolás Bravo, in order to overthrow Guerrero? Contemporaries, such as José María Luis Mora, ascribe this contradictory behaviour to pure ambition. This chapter will attempt to show that more complex motives directed the General's actions in the four years in question. It will also demonstrate that, when analysed closely, the behaviour classed above as contradictory, was in fact nothing of the kind. General Bustamante acted just as one would expect of a former Royalist, and a former supporter of Iturbide, to behave in the situations in which he found himself.

A: Commander General of the Eastern Interior Provinces (1826-1829)

Anastasio Bustamante left Acapulco in January 1825 and returned to Mexico City. The ascension of Guadalupe Victoria to the Presidency had brought a new climate to politics in the capital. His long-time friend, Manuel Gómez Pedraza, now occupied Manuel Mier y Terán's position in the Ministry of War. Lucas Alamán would also be soon replaced by Sebastián Camacho. Despite this, Bustamante was not welcomed back to the capital with open arms. Nicolás Bravo occupied the Vice-Presidency, and according to Gómez Pedraza, he hated Bustamante with a passion. Gómez Pedraza sought to find some employment for the General by using his influence with the President.⁷ Even so, the level of Bustamante's unpopularity meant choices were limited. Eventually, it was proposed to Congress in February that he be sent as the Plenipotentiary Minister for Colombia.⁸ It was clear he was not wanted in the capital. Mariano Michelena was sent to England as the Plenipotentiary in 1824, after the Plan of Lobato had made it clear that his position on the Supreme Executive Power was untenable. Juan de Dios Cañedo would be appointed as the minister to the South American Republics by Bustamante's government after it became clear he was a powerful enemy of his regime.⁹ However, the Senate refused to sanction Bustamante's appointment as Plenipotentiary,¹⁰ and he was finally appointed as the Commander General of the distant Eastern Internal Provinces (Texas, Coahuila, Tamaulipas and

⁷ Manuel Gómez Pedraza, "Manifiesto que Manuel Gómez Pedraza, ciudadano de la república de México, dedica a sus compatriotas, o sea, una reseña de su vida pública," in Laura Solares Robles (ed.), *La obra política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza, 1813-1851* (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Instituto Matías Romero/Acervo Histórico Diplomático de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1999), p. 232.

⁸ Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (henceforth referred to as AHSRE), L-E-1798, f. 131. Lucas Alamán to Bustamante, Ministry of Relations, 1 March 1825.

⁹ Jaime E. Rodríguez O., *El nacimiento de Hispanoamérica. Vicente Rocafuerte y el hispanoamericanismo, 1808-1832* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1980), p. 276.

¹⁰ AHSRE: L-E-1798, f.144. Francisco de Dios Rodríguez and Manuel Posado, Secretaries of the Senate, to the Minister of Relations, 23 March 1825.

Nuevo León), in June 1826.¹¹ In the meantime, he presided over the *Junta Patriótica* of 1825. This *Junta* was set up to organise and raise funds for the independence celebrations of 16 September. Carlos María de Bustamante was predictably outraged at such an appointment, although it appears that he found the day itself quite satisfactory.¹²

Bustamante marched north in August or September 1826 and remained in the Eastern Provinces until he was nominated Vice-President in early 1829. During his posting, he suppressed the attempt of John Dunn Hunter to declare Texas' independence from Mexico in late 1826,¹³ and played host to Manuel Mier y Terán's inspection of Texas in 1828. It appears that the General was well-regarded in the area of his command. Mier y Terán commented in a letter to Guadalupe Victoria that Bustamante's presence in Texas was beneficial as he was a man the foreigners there respected.¹⁴ In the Presidential elections of 1828, all the states under his command (Coahuila and Texas, Tamaulipas, and Nuevo León) voted in his favour.¹⁵ The General's time in the Eastern Provinces, most especially in Texas, must have been very instructive. He cannot have failed to see, as Mier y Terán did during his inspection, that Texas was a fertile and important area capable of producing great quantities of maize, beans and sugar for domestic and foreign markets. He must also have been aware of the danger that the United States presented to a Mexican Texas, and it is likely that he concurred with Mier y Terán's opinion that immigration from the US should be discouraged, if not forbidden. Mexican and European settlers should be sent

¹¹ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00138. Manuel Gómez Pedraza to Bustamante, Ministry of War, 21 June 1826.

¹² Carlos María de Bustamante, *Diario Histórico* (Mexico City: INAH, 1982), vol. 3, pp. 118, 124-127. Entries for 30 August and 16 September 1825.

¹³ Henry George Ward, *México en 1827* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995), p. 646.

¹⁴ Manuel Mier y Terán to Guadalupe Victoria, Bexar, 28 March 1828. In Jack Jackson (ed.), *Texas by Terán. The Diary kept by General Manuel Mier y Terán on his 1828 Inspection of Texas* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), p. 38.

¹⁵ José María Bocanegra, *Memorias para la historia de México independiente. 1822-1846* (Mexico City: Instituto Cultural Helénico/Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1986), vol. 1, p. 505-506.

to Texas instead, and the province protected by an increased number of garrisons. Certainly, once Bustamante assumed the role of Head of State in 1830, most of the measures proposed by Mier y Terán in his post-inspection report, as necessary to prevent the loss of Texas to the United States, were adopted and implemented by his government.¹⁶

B: Bustamante and the *yorkinos*

According to Manuel Gómez Pedraza, Anastasio Bustamante joined the Masonic Rite of York during his time in Mexico City between 1825 and 1826. When he marched to Coahuila and Texas, he was invested with the necessary authority to establish and promote new lodges in the territories under his command.¹⁷ He was apparently a dedicated member of the *yorkino* brotherhood. José María Tornel remarks that Bustamante behaved ‘con sorprendente ardor’ in the Eastern Provinces, treating his mission to spread *yorkino* lodges as if it were ‘una especie de deber religioso.’¹⁸ Why Bustamante joined the *yorkinos* is not clear. However, it was undoubtedly a natural step for him to take. The Rite of York had been set up in late 1825 in direct opposition to the dominance of the Scottish Rite in Mexican politics. The *escoceses* represented the elites of the new Republic. Their membership was composed mainly of rich Creoles and Spaniards, and its politics were perceived to be those of centralism and to some extent, Bourbonism (in favour of a Bourbon monarch for Mexico). Nicolás Bravo was the Grand Master, a known centralist and a member of the landed classes. Some of his fellow members had been monarchists and Bourbonists during Iturbide's time in power. Others, like Melchor Múzquiz, Miguel

¹⁶ Jackson (ed.) *Texas by Terán*, pp. 180-181.

¹⁷ Gómez Pedraza, “Manifiesto,” p. 232.

¹⁸ José María Tornel y Mendiola, *Breve reseña de los acontecimientos más notables de la nación mexicana* (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios de la Revolución Mexicana, 1985), p. 312.

Barragán and José Antonio Facio, were high-ranking army officers, and had been closely associated with the former colony. The *escoceses* had played a leading role in the overthrow of Iturbide, and through strong representation on the Supreme Executive Power (through Bravo and Pedro Celestino Negrete) had controlled central government between 1823 and 1824. During this time, as we saw in the previous chapter, their centralist tendencies had clashed violently with the emerging federalism of the states. The Rite of York, in contrast, seemed to emerge as the home of all those opposed to the *escoceses* and their dominance. The federalists, led by such men as Miguel Ramos Arizpe and Lorenzo de Zavala, played an important part in the establishment of the rite; while their erstwhile allies of the previous year, the *iturbidistas*, also became members.¹⁹ The leading lights of the rite were undoubtedly members of the same elite as those of the *escoceses*, but the general composition of the *yorkinos* was more varied. Zavala described the membership as being formed by ‘muchos eclesiásticos seculares y regulares, [...] gobernadores, diputados y senadores, ciudadanos, en fin de todos oficios y condiciones.’²⁰ The British Minister, Henry George Ward, for his part, classed these citizens as mostly ‘halfway subalterns, petty advocates [and] clerks.’ His successor, Richard Packenham, noted that the *yorkinos* were rife in the army. Almost every regiment had a lodge, and the majority of non-commissioned officers were *yorkinos*.²¹ What these members had in common was the desire to use their alliance with the rite to further their career prospects. After all, influential men such as President Victoria's secretary: José María Tornel, Minister of Justice: Ramos Arizpe and Minister of Finance: José Ignacio Esteva, made up the

¹⁹ Lucas Alamán, *Historia de México desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon su independencia en el año de 1808 hasta la época presente* (Mexico City: Libros del Bachiller Sansón Carrasco, 1986), vol. 5, p. 474. Old *iturbidistas* who joined the *yorkinos* were: Anastasio Bustamante, Zenón Fernández, Joaquín Parres and Juan Andrade. See Lorenzo de Zavala, *Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México* (Mexico City: Oficina Impresora de Hacienda, 1918), vol. 1, p. 261.

²⁰ Zavala, *Ensayo histórico*, vol. 1, p. 261.

²¹ Ward to Canning, 22 October 1826. Packenham to Vaughan, 13 January 1829. Both quoted in Stanley C. Green, *The Mexican Republic: The First Decade, 1823-1832* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), p. 90.

leadership of the order.²² As Zavala recalled, in the banquets and other meetings, 'se confundían y mezclaban indistintamente todas clases de ciudadanos,' allowing 'los pretendientes de empleos un fácil acceso a los que los distribuían.'²³ The hunger for power and position prevalent amongst its members made the only discernible policy of the *yorkinos* the drive to replace the *escocés* dominance in government with their own. Various members, such as Zavala and José María Alpuche, may have held radical views, and been in favour of the redistribution of church property and other such policies.²⁴ But, as Michael Costeloe pointed out, the wide-ranging membership of the *yorkinos* made it impossible for the rite to support any constant social or economic policies.²⁵

Therefore, Bustamante would have felt inclined towards the *yorkinos* for a number of reasons. In common with other supporters of Iturbide, he probably wished to be involved in the opposition to the Scottish Rite. Leading members of the *escoceses*, such as Nicolás Bravo and Pedro Celestino Negrete, had led the rebellion against Iturbide in 1823; organised the legislation that led to the ex-emperor's execution; and in 1824 had organised Bustamante's arrest and five-month imprisonment in Acapulco. Secondly, as we saw in the previous chapter, the General's activities in Guadalajara had already brought him into contact, even alliance, with many of the federalist activists who now belonged to the rite. He may even have been a convinced federalist himself. Either way, it is likely he had many friends and contacts in the new lodge. Finally, as we have seen above, in 1825 the General did not appear to be hugely popular in government circles. He may have thought that an alliance with the *yorkinos*, whose Grand Master was José Ignacio Esteva, could help to improve his

²² Michael P. Costeloe, *La primera república federal de México (1824-1835). Un estudio de los partidos políticos en el México independiente* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1975), p. 58.

²³ Zavala, *Ensayo histórico*, vol. 1, p. 261.

²⁴ For a discussion of the opinions of Zavala at this time, see Will Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals, 1821-1853* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1998), pp. 171-189.

²⁵ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 58.

standing in the capital. In no way did his membership of the rite imply that he shared the radical opinions of other masons. The *yorkinos* in 1825 and 1826 were an umbrella organisation for opponents of the *escoceses*. The faction was entirely lacking in political hegemony, a fact obvious later once the *escoceses* were routed. Without a common enemy the *yorkinos* disintegrated into a multitude of various mutually hostile factions.²⁶ Above all, it must be remembered that Bustamante passed the years between 1827 and 1829 outside the capital. He can never have been closely involved in the leadership of the rite in Mexico City, nor with the activities of the *yorkinos* in the main political sphere.

C: The Presidential Elections of 1828

To understand why General Bustamante was chosen as the second *yorkino* candidate in the 1828 Presidential elections, it is first necessary to appreciate the political climate in which they took place. When Bustamante joined the *yorkinos*, the lodge's declared aim was to destroy the dominance of power enjoyed by the *escoceses* in public offices. By 1828, this objective had been achieved. Their candidates had won a sweeping majority in the 1826 congressional elections.²⁷ Remaining *escoceses* had been successfully discredited by a newspaper campaign led by the two *yorkino* newspapers, *El Águila Mexicana* and *El Correo de la Federación Mexicana*, which had been successful in portraying their opposition to the expulsion of the Spaniards, as proof of their wish to impose a despotic Bourbon monarchy upon Mexico.²⁸ Finally, the last bastion of *escocés* power in the executive had been neutralised with the arrest of Nicolás Bravo in January 1828, after his involvement in the Plan of Montaña. This rebellion of leading *escoceses* and *novenarios*, a splinter group of the Scottish Rite,

²⁶ Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals*, p. 49.

²⁷ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 81.

²⁸ Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals*, p. 51.

called for the abolition of secret societies, the renovation of the cabinet and the expulsion of the U.S. minister, Joel R. Poinsett, from Mexico. It was unfortunately timed immediately to follow the passing of the Spanish expulsion laws in Congress. In the eyes of the pro-*yorkino* newspapers and the public at large, it clearly demonstrated the Bourbonism of the *escoceses*. The suppression of this uprising, and the prosecution of Bravo and his fellow conspirators, marked the complete destruction of the Scottish Rite as a political force.²⁹

The Rite of York now enjoyed almost absolute power in politics and public life. Its members held all key positions and controlled power in central government and the states. Yet the price for this success was high. The relentless persecution of individual *escoceses* within the pro-*yorkino* press had alienated a large number of members from the rite. Many felt that the aggressive tactics employed by the *yorkinos* undermined the stability of the government, and had pushed their enemies to resort to armed rebellion to oppose them. They feared that other revolutions could only result if these persecutions continued. Others were unhappy with the populist policies, such as the Spanish expulsion laws, pursued by the *yorkinos* in government. The *yorkinos* began to be associated with the radicalism of leaders such as Zavala and its heterogeneous appeal began to fade. The split developing within the rite became evident in the congressional debates over the punishment that should be meted out upon the rebels of Tulancingo in April. Here, two directly opposing positions emerged. The first, proposed by the radicals, called for the execution of Bravo and his colleagues. The second, championed by Tornel and other more moderate *yorkinos*, proposed an amnesty for all those convicted. The execution of the rebels was a step too far in the persecution of the *escoceses* in Tornel's eyes. It merely stirred up more hatred and animosity and would only invite the remaining *escoceses* to organise

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

another rebellion.³⁰ The debate finally agreed on a compromise: the exile of those involved, but did not reconcile Tornel with the rest of the faction. Bitter in-fighting would develop over the coming months, played out in public in the capital's newspapers and pamphlets. Tornel had Zavala's friend, Lissautte, expelled from Mexico for writing strong attacks on the Church and the Minister of Justice, Ramos Arizpe. He also suspended a *yorkino*, Luis Lozano, from his position on the secretariat of the Federal District. Zavala and his colleagues responded with a summer-long campaign of publications against Tornel, accusing him of betraying the *yorkinos*; of introducing tyrannical and corrupt rule in the Federal District; and of creating his own private army in the shape of a local militia to aid his despotic designs. Finally, by exploiting the potential for criticism inherent in Tornel's decision to allow the theatres to remain open during a religious festival, they succeeded in ensuring Tornel's suspension as governor.³¹

Meanwhile, other *yorkinos* had decided to leave the rite altogether. Many of these men, such as Ramos Arizpe, formed a new group with former members of the *escoceses*, and politicians such as Valentín Gómez Farías and Francisco García, who had not joined either rite. This group called themselves *los imparciales*, and argued for the abolition of secret societies in politics. They argued that political parties were necessarily divisive, and led to violence and governmental instability.³² The *yorkinos* responded by conspiring against Ramos Arizpe and ensuring he was replaced as Minister of Justice. Its newspapers led the attack, launching bitter personal attacks upon Arizpe and claiming that the *imparciales* were merely the new disguise of the *escoceses*, not a separate group as they claimed.³³ In this way, 1828 saw the Rite of York disintegrate into bitter divisions. In one corner existed the radicals who had

³⁰ Will Fowler, *Tornel and Santa Anna. The Writer and the Caudillo, Mexico 1795-1853* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Westport Press, 2000), pp. 82-83.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 84-90.

³² Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, pp. 157-159.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 160-163.

proposed the execution of the rebels of Tulancingo, and who supported Zavala's radical policies of anti-clericalism and land reform. In another was a more moderate group, who appeared to want the rite to abandon its aggressive extremism and opposed the execution of Bravo and his fellow conspirators. Openly opposed to both factions were the *imparciales*, who now proposed the abolition of secret societies and called for the elimination of the influence of Masonic Rites in government.

In this poisonous atmosphere the nominations for the Presidential elections took place. The *yorkinos* originally proposed only the popular hero, Vicente Guerrero, as candidate, confident that their dominant position would ensure a complete victory. However, their campaign soon ran into trouble. Guerrero was a former insurgent and a mixed-race Mexican of poor education, and while undoubtedly extremely popular with the masses, was regarded by many of the elite with distrust. This was partly because many feared that Guerrero, who was generally regarded as being quite naive, would become the puppet of the more intellectual Alpuche and Zavala, and be pushed into forming a radical administration that would be damaging to their power and positions.³⁴ Zavala had already demonstrated his radicalism as Governor of Mexico. In March 1827 he expropriated the Church properties of the missionaries in the Philippines and distributed it among local families. In 1828 he introduced a tax upon absentee landlords, with which he aimed to buy land for immediate distribution to the poor.³⁵ However, the elites' dislike of Guerrero was also partly to do with his colour, lack of education and low social position. As Zavala later observed:

Los generales con las excepciones que veremos; los coroneles, los eclesiásticos más notables, los grandes propietarios, todos los restos del partido vencido en Tulancingo; por último, las personas que con pretensiones de cultura y de civilización abominaban la presidencia de un hombre que ni era blanco, ni podía alternar en los círculos de la bella sociedad con el desembarazo y naturalidad que dan la educación y el

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169.

³⁵ Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals*, pp.181-183.

hábito; las señoras de una cierta clase, que no podían tolerar ni ver, sin despecho y envidia, ocupar un lugar distinguido entre ellos a una familia de color más oscuro, todo en fin, todo el resto de las antiguas preocupaciones y repugnancias por una clases de gentes oprimida y despreciada, junta a que el candidato no podía suplir las faltas que se le notaban con la elevación el genio, la energía de carácter ni alguna de esas cualidades brillantes que cubren los defectos, formó contra la elección de Guerrero un partido formidable entre la nueva aristocracia mexicana.³⁶

In other words, Guerrero's candidacy presented the *yorkinos* as the faction of the masses, or worse still, the disaffected former insurgents. His success threatened to bring attacks upon elite privileges and power, to attack the Church and destroy the political status quo. He was not a candidate that the landed-classes, many members of the upper clergy or the high-ranking officer class, were prepared to support. Consequently, Guerrero was certainly not a candidate who could be trusted to unite the *yorkinos* under one banner once more. He was obviously the choice of the radical faction of the rite, and many members were reluctant to tolerate his selection.

In contrast, the man running in opposition to Guerrero, Manuel Gómez Pedraza, offered all that Guerrero could not. He was a member of the oligarchy: a land-owning Creole, with a wealthy background and privileged education. He had fought on the Royalist side during the insurgency and had been a friend and supporter of Iturbide. He presented no threat to elite privileges or social stability. He had a strong reputation in government after four years as Minister of War, he held a position of authority over the army, and most importantly had never joined either Masonic sect. For those weary with the bitter fighting between *yorkinos* and *escoceses*, he appeared to be a neutral candidate.³⁷ Gómez Pedraza, therefore, could count on wide-ranging support. In the context of the continuing political in-fighting, his candidacy was assured the backing of the *yorkinos*' enemies: the remnants of the defeated *escoceses*

³⁶ Zavala, *Ensayo histórico*, vol. 2, p. 52.

³⁷ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 170.

and the *imparciales*. He also attracted those dissatisfied with the nomination of Guerrero from the *yorkino* faction. Finally, he also offered a palatable alternative to General Guerrero for the rich elites. With this weight of support, he was evidently going to be a dangerous and powerful opponent.

In the light of Gómez Pedraza's nomination, the leaders of the Rite of York embarked upon the search for a candidate for Vice-President. The names of Lorenzo de Zavala and José Ignacio Esteva were brought forward, and both would eventually stand for election. However, the candidate who finally won the support of General Guerrero and other senior members was Anastasio Bustamante. José María Tornel, who first suggested this choice, explained their decision thus:

El gobernador Tornel, quien concurría como orador, deseoso de avenir a los disidentes y de buscar una solución a las dificultades que se amontonaban, propuso que se eligiera a un tercero, y este fue el general de división D. Anastasio Bustamante. Una gran mayoría de los cofrades se decidió por este pensamiento improvisado, y no le faltó razón. Bustamante era en el país una notabilidad, por haber sido del número de los más importantes cooperadores del Sr. Iturbide en la empresa de independencia, por su victoria en Juchitepec, por haber proclamado la federación en Jalisco, y por haberse mantenido leal en la desgracia al caudillo de Iguala. Entre los yorkinos gozaba de privilegiada reputación, porque había propagado su secta en todos los Estados de su mando militar, con sorprendente ardor, que había convertido en una especie de deber religioso. *Unidos al mando Guerrero y Bustamante, se enlazaban los intereses de los hombres de las dos revoluciones, y se evitaba un choque futuro, para el cual no faltaban provocaciones.*³⁸

Tornel's suggestion was partly a response to the alarming divisions that had emerged amongst the Rite of York. It was a clear attempt to win back the support of those *yorkinos* who felt alienated by the radical, populist overtones of Guerrero's campaign. As shown by the above quotation, he believed that General Bustamante represented the Creole oligarchy, the elites who had fought with the Spanish against the threat of

³⁸ Tornel, *Breve reseña*, p. 312. My italics.

social dissolution threatened by the insurgency. His candidacy should therefore have the effect of watering down the threat of radicalism perceived in Guerrero. In a wider context, the choice of Bustamante, must have also been designed to undermine the rest of the coalition supporting Gómez Pedraza's campaign. Obviously, the votes of the former *escoceses* were far beyond reach, but the support of those who had no Masonic sympathies was not. It can be no coincidence that the *yorkinos* chose a character so similar to Gómez Pedraza as a candidate. A man who united almost exactly the same qualities of birth, education and position. A man who had played no part in the political squabbles and machinations of the previous years and was untainted by adverse press campaigns. The aim must surely have been to use Bustamante to attract votes away from Gómez Pedraza, and to hope, rather as modern political parties do, that this vote for a third candidate would undermine the possible majority of their opponent. Finally, as can be ascertained from the final sentence of the above quotation, Tornel could see that a violent confrontation between the radicals and their popular support, and the traditionalists and their Creole elite sympathisers, was clearly on the cards. As we saw above, he believed that the rebellion in Tulancingo was a prelude for things to come if the radicals did not moderate their demands and policies. Thus, he hoped that the presence of Bustamante in the executive would provide the necessary moderating influence and prevent this clash from ever having to take place.

Why Bustamante accepted the nomination is not so easy to pinpoint, as very little evidence exists on the subject. His motivations, and even his candidacy, are of little importance to those contemporaries who write about the period. However, looking at his life to date, we know that the General must have had some political ambition. He had served Iturbide on the *Junta Provisional Gubernativa* in 1821 and 1822, and had been elected to the State Congress of Jalisco in 1823. After his imprisonment in 1824 he had not been prepared to disappear quietly from the scene on his release. Instead he had gone to Mexico City and immediately become involved in

the new political force in the capital, the *yorkinos*. Moreover, our study of his military career has shown us that the General also had personal ambitions. He had been educated in the ways of command and control in the previous eighteen years, and it is not inconceivable that he might have wished to practice this skill at the highest level. From available evidence, we can also speculate that Bustamante shared the view of Tornel and other more moderate *yorkinos* that the rite's political campaign was becoming too extreme. It is likely that he supported the anti-Spanish campaigns, as he had been one of the first to express opposition to the employment of Peninsulars in Guadalajara. He probably had no quarrel with the persecution of the *escoceses* either, as he himself had been attacked by this rite in previous years. But whether he would have supported the execution of Bravo and his fellow conspirators, who included old friends such as Miguel Barragán, is unknown, but unlikely. His experiences of the insurgency had taught him class solidarity, and although his regime would later go on to execute Vicente Guerrero, Bustamante himself, as we shall see, proved to be an opponent of such revenge punishments. He was also an extremely unlikely supporter of Zavala's radical politics. After all, he had spent ten years fighting to preserve the oligarchy of the elites from the onslaught of the insurgents. These years had instead taught him to despise the masses, and he can only have regarded Zavala's call for their participation in politics with a wary eye. All in all, he may have considered himself in the same light as Tornel did: a moderate figure, who could calm the impending storm, and prevent scenes like those in Tulancingo from being repeated. However, all this can never be more than speculation. Bustamante had remained in the Eastern Provinces throughout 1827 and 1828 and it is impossible to tell how well-informed he was on the subject of political intrigue in Mexico City. It is quite possible that personal political ambition was sufficient to motivate him to stand for the Vice-Presidency.

D: The Reluctant Vice-President (1829)

Unfortunately, events did not go according to plan for the *yorkinos*. In the elections of September 1828, Bustamante gained six votes (Sonora, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Chihuahua and San Luis Potosí); his running partner, Vicente Guerrero, received nine; and their rival Gómez Pedraza emerged the victor with eleven.³⁹ This result was unacceptable to many radical *yorkinos*, and they quickly took matters into their own hands. The rebellion against Gómez Pedraza's election began as a *pronunciamiento* declared by Antonio López de Santa Anna in Perote later in September. He did not enjoy immediate success and was forced to retreat to Oaxaca. However, some weeks later, on 30 November, matters came to a head when Zavala and General José María Lobato revolted in the capital barracks of La Acordada in favour of Santa Anna's plan, and began firing on the National Palace. Three days of gunfire followed; until on 3 December, Gómez Pedraza fled Mexico City for Guadalajara. Here, on 27 December, he announced he would make no claims on the Presidency, and in the New Year departed Mexico for voluntary exile in Europe. Upon hearing of Gómez Pedraza's flight, a mob of beggars, escaped prisoners, soldiers and other members of the capital's underclass, sacked the Parián, a market just outside the National Palace and the cathedral, in support of the rebels. In this state of affairs, President Victoria had no choice but to accede to the rebels' demands and accept the inevitable. So, when Congress was reconvened in January 1829, the votes for Gómez Pedraza were declared invalid, and Guerrero named as the new victor. Bustamante's six votes made him the candidate in second place, and he became the choice for Vice-President.

³⁹ Bocanegra, *Memorias para la historia de México*, vol. 1, pp. 505-506.

By his own account, Bustamante was reluctant to take up this nomination. He later claimed that he tried to turn down the offer, but when his refusal was rebuffed, found himself obliged to accept the position in 'una ciega deferencia a la voluntad de los pueblos.'⁴⁰ However, since this claim was made in 1832, in a manifesto that amounts to nothing less than the justification for his rebellion against Guerrero, it must of course be taken with a pinch of salt. After all, this attempt to avoid the Vice-Presidency does not appear to be mentioned by anyone else, and his explanation for his reticence is based upon the doubtful claim that he considered the position to be 'superior a mis luces y merecimientos.' This surely was false modesty. If he really believed this, why would he have consented to run for election in the first place? Yet it is not difficult to believe that Bustamante may not have wished to take up office in 1829. He had not approved of Santa Anna's *pronunciamiento*, and was unlikely to have given his support to the actions of Zavala and Lobato. He wrote a personal letter to Gómez Pedraza at the end of October 1828, expressing his disgust at the behaviour of 'el perverso Santa Anna,' and assuring the Minister of War of his support.⁴¹ Their correspondence continued after Gómez Pedraza left Mexico City, and Bustamante offered the defeated man 'repetidos testimonios de amistad.'⁴² According to Laura Solares Robles, Bustamante also accompanied Gómez Pedraza to Tampico de Tamaulipas from where he departed for his exile in March 1829.⁴³ It is hardly likely that Gómez Pedraza would have consented to this if he felt that Bustamante had conspired against him.

⁴⁰ Anastasio Bustamante, *Manifiesto del vice-presidente en ejercicio del poder ejecutivo a la magnífica nación mexicana* (Mexico City: Imprenta del Águila, dirigida por José Ximeno, calle de Medinas, núm. 6, 1832), p. 4. In CONDUMEX.

⁴¹ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00196. Bustamante to Gómez Pedraza, Matamoros, 27 October 1828. *Reservado*.

⁴² Pedraza, "Manifiesto," p. 229.

⁴³ Laura Solares Robles, *Una revolución pacífica: Biografía política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza, 1789-1851* (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Acervo Histórico Diplomático de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores/Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes del Gobierno del Estado de Querétaro, 1996), p. 85.

Finally, he can only have been shocked and disgusted by news of the Parián riot, an event he would later describe as 'la catástrofe horrorosa y sangrienta' that he would like to wipe 'de los anales del mundo, y hacer que su memoria no llegara a las generaciones que nos suceden.'⁴⁴ Even in Tamaulipas, he was probably aware of the rumours that the *yorkinos* were those who had incited the population to riot, and that Lorenzo de Zavala, General Lobato and Vicente Guerrero had been leading participants, urging the populace on in their destructive frenzy. The sight of the lower classes rampaging through the shops and the stalls of the foreign (mainly Spanish) traders on 4 December would have almost certainly been recounted to him. As would the fact that the events in the Parián signalled the beginning of a period of lawlessness in Mexico City itself in which, according to Francisco Ibar, *hombres de bien* were afraid to walk the streets which were ruled by victorious soldiers and rioters. Carlos María de Bustamante also recounts that in the days after the riot looting and violence continued, and reports that the disorder was so bad that shopkeepers and bakers did not open their shops, making food scarce.⁴⁵ The news could have made him fear, along with much of the capital's élite, that 'estuviese a punto de producirse una revolución a gran escala o de surgir, un ejército de tipo del de Hidalgo.'⁴⁶ The *yorkino* press's interpretation of events as a social revolution, and the demonstration of public opinion in favour of Guerrero, would only have confirmed this impression.⁴⁷ Thus, as an old Royalist, who had fought the insurgents under the banner of protecting social order, the General cannot have relished the prospect of entering the executive on the back of such chaotic circumstances.

⁴⁴ Anastasio Bustamante, *Manifiesto que el vice-presidente dirige a la nación* (Mexico City: Imprenta a cargo del ciudadano Tomás Uribe y Alcalde, calle de Jesús, número 2, 1830), p. 2. In the British Library.

⁴⁵ Silvia Arrom, "Popular Politics in Mexico City: The Parián Riot, 1828," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 68:2 (1988), p. 256. This article provides a detailed description of the riot, contemporary impressions and a discussion of its causes and effects.

⁴⁶ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*. p. 214.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

Despite any misgivings Anastasio Bustamante might have had, he accepted the Vice-Presidency without too much fuss. Perhaps he did feel it was his duty to fill the position Congress allocated to him. Or perhaps he believed, as Tornel had hoped, that his presence could provide a moderating influence on Guerrero's administration. What is clear is that the riot at the Parián Market marked the end of his relationship with the *yorkinos*. Almost from the very moment of his return to Mexico City, Bustamante became involved in a faction which was opposed to Guerrero's regime.⁴⁸ Alamán states that this group came into existence after the events of La Acordada and the Parián.⁴⁹ However, it is clear that its origins were in the coalition of *ex-escoceses*, *imparciales* and the privileged elites that had supported Manuel Gómez Pedraza's candidacy for President. Costeloe describes the membership of the new faction, which became to be known as the *moderados*, or *hombres de bien*, as 'algunos altos clérigos, oficiales del ejército, altos funcionarios del gobierno, antiguos escoceses y otros que habían apoyado a Gómez Pedraza en las elecciones; en general, toda la clase propietaria y muchas familias con parentesco español.'⁵⁰ Their coalition simply became stronger and more numerous in the wake of Guerrero's assumption of the Presidency. As Luis G. Cuevas commented, the horror of the events of December 1828 made the various factions forget their differences, and come together in opposition to Guerrero.⁵¹ For these *hombres de bien*, Guerrero's rise to power upon the strength of the sacking of the Parián market threatened the very bases of civilisation. As the *yorkino* press seemed to confirm, it marked a social revolution in which the wishes of the majority superseded the desires of the elite. Alamán, who was without doubt also part of this moderate group, commented that it appeared that the

⁴⁸ Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 487.

⁴⁹ Lucas Alamán, "Examen imparcial de la administración del general vice-presidente D. Anastasio Bustamante. Con observaciones generales sobre el estado presente de la república y consecuencias que este debe producir," in *Obras de D. Lucas Alamán. Documentos diversos (Inéditos y muy raros)* (Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1946), vol. 3, p. 242.

⁵⁰ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 233.

⁵¹ Luis G. Cuevas, *Porvenir de México* (Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1954), p. 313.

yorkinos were influenced by the French revolution and wished to destroy the power and wealth of the *hombres de bien* in the name of liberty and equality:

Desde esta época [December 1828] empezaron a efectar llamarse [the *yorkinos*] el partido del pueblo, distinguiéndose con este nombre de todos aquellos a quienes dieron el de aristócratas, voz que en nuestra, como en la francesa, significa hombres religiosos, de honor, de propiedad, de educacion y de virtudes, a quienes se trataba de despojar de sus bienes, de privar de todo influjo en los negocios públicos, y por último de desterrar y destruir, que es en lo que consiste según los principios de los jacobinos la libertad y la igualdad.⁵²

The administration of Guerrero would do little to calm the fears of these property-owning elites. Instead, events in 1829 would only convince them that Mexico was on 'la cima de un horroroso precipicio,' staring down at the imminent ruin of the Republic.⁵³ One of the principal causes of this belief was the terrible financial state of the country, under which neither the military nor the civil servants were being paid. The treasury suffered from a deficit of over 3, 000, 000 pesos, and the government's inability to meet foreign debt payments since 1827 meant it could no longer seek financial support abroad.⁵⁴ The Treasury's attempts to resolve these problems and to prepare for the threatened Spanish invasion did not help the situation, as the series of taxes introduced on property and business, the forced loan of \$ 300, 000 imposed on the states and the pay-cuts introduced on the wages of governors and military officers affected the *hombres de bien* the most. What is more, they also seemed to prove the radicalism or *jacobinismo* of the Finance Minister, Lorenzo de Zavala⁵⁵. Another

⁵² Lucas Alamán, "Defensa del ex-ministro de relaciones D. Lucas Alamán, en la causa formada contra él y contra los ex-ministros de guerra y justicia del vicepresidente D. Anastasio Bustamante, con unas noticas preliminares que dan idea del origen de esta. Escrita por el mismo ex-ministro quien la dirige a la nacion," in *Obras de D. Lucas Alamán. Documentos diversos*, vol. 3, p. 45.

⁵³ Francisco Ibar, *Muerte política de la república mexicana o cuadro histórico-crítico de los sucesos políticos acaecidos en la república desde el 4 de diciembre de 1828, hasta el 25 de agosto de 1829* (Mexico City: Imprenta de la calle de Jesús número 2, a cargo del C. Tomás Uribe y Alcalde, 1829), No. 5, p. 5, (14 April 1829).

⁵⁴ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, pp. 231-2.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

preoccupation was Guerrero's adoption of extraordinary powers in August during the Spanish attack on Tampico. This was viewed by many as the final stage of the demagogues' usurpation of power. The restrictions Guerrero placed upon the freedom of the press and the arrest of his virulent critic Francisco Ibar,⁵⁶ allowed his enemies to accuse him of being a dictator, having set himself up as 'un soberano absoluto' and having 'dado rienda suelta a sus deseos.'⁵⁷ Or, as José Antonio Facio would later put it, of using 'el mismo sistema de violencia y corrupción con que se había entronizado.'⁵⁸ For those in the military, the state of the troops was worrying:

La administración de Guerrero había desbaratado el ejército, arruinado la disciplina, perdido todos los cuerpos, o por la incapacidad de los jefes, o por la fuerza de ejemplo, el tesoro estaba exhausto; las rentas empeñadas; los oficiales sin sueldo; los soldados sin camisa, sin zapatos, sin pan.⁵⁹

Such was the state of the army, that when the Reserve Army was set up, its financial needs all had to be met by General Bustamante, its commanding officer.⁶⁰ More generally, concerns could be also found in the disintegrating unity of the Republic. By September 1829, the state of Jalisco, independently of the government, was trying to organise a confederation of states with Michoacán, Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí allegedly in order to protect their independence if the Spanish invasion was successful, although some believed it was to protect their sovereignty in case of the fall of Guerrero's government.⁶¹ The subsequent revolt in Yucatán in favour of centralism appeared to confirm these worries, and as the revolt soon spread to Tabasco, it

⁵⁶ *El Sol*, 4 September 1829.

⁵⁷ Bustamante, *Manifiesto que el vice-presidente de la República Mexicana dirige a la nación*, p. 2.

⁵⁸ José Antonio Facio, *Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio, y sobre la causa intentada contra los cuatro ministros del excelentísimo señor vice-presidente D. Anastasio Bustamante, presenta a los mexicanos el general ex-ministro de la guerra y marina, D. José Antonio Facio* (Paris: Imprenta de Moqueo y Compañía, calle de la Harpe, número 90, 1835), p. 107. In the British Library.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁶¹ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 239.

seemed clear that the Republic was ‘amenzada de una combustión general que la conduzca hasta el punto de perder la unidad nacional.’⁶²

E: The Plan of Jalapa (1829)

Anastasio Bustamante's association with the *moderados* quickly led to the formation of a conspiracy to overthrow Guerrero. The plans for this venture were centred around the Reserve Army. This Army had been officially set up in response to the Spanish invasion of Tampico on 27 July, and was intended to establish its headquarters in Huamantla. From here it was foreseen that the 3, 000 troops allocated to the Army would be able to move quickly to the defence of any point on the coast of Veracruz, should it be attacked. According to Facio, this initiative did not come from the government or the executive, but from a group of army generals. These generals were apparently not overly concerned about the Spanish threat, but wanted to use the opportunity which the invasion provided to establish a nucleus of force that could eventually be deployed against Guerrero:

Esta medida [the formation of the Reserve Army] propuesta entre otras, [...] tenía por objeto el concentrar un número de fuerzas, que más tarde sirviese de apoyo de los estados, pues descontentos con la opresión, y exasperados con el abuso de las facultades extraordinarias que concedió el congreso al presidente, ansiaban el momento de sacudir el yugo, y de que se volviera a la constitución y a la República el vigor que le había arrebatado la administración de Guerrero.⁶³

Facio does not name the Generals who were behind the plans for a Reserve Army, but we can be fairly certain that Bustamante, who was chosen as the leader of this force,

⁶² Lucas Alamán, “Memoria de la secretaría de estado y del despacho de relaciones interiores y exteriores, leída por el secretario del ramo en la Cámara de Diputados el día 12 de febrero de 1830, y en la de Senadores el día 13 del mismo,” in *Obras de D. Lucas Alamán: Documentos diversos*, vol. 2, p. 182.

⁶³ Facio, *Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio*, p. 108.

Melchor Múzquiz, who was the second-in-command, and Facio, who became Bustamante's secretary, were closely involved. Later events also suggest that Luis Quintanar and Santa Anna may also have been aware of the circumstances surrounding the proposal. In terms of the conspiracy that would be organised within the Reserve Army, there is a general consensus amongst contemporary observers that José Antonio Facio, rather than Bustamante was the likely architect. Lucas Alamán remarks that Facio had to have been the real leader, as Bustamante 'no era capaz de nada'.⁶⁴ Zavala interprets the rebellion as a repeat of events at Tulancingo, and concludes that Facio, having played a hidden role in the previous revolt, was now 'el principal director' in Jalapa.⁶⁵ While we shall never know for certain, it seems much more likely that the trio of officers who controlled the Reserve Army collaborated to organise the conspiracy. Facio may have provided the driving force, but the involvement of Múzquiz and above all, Bustamante, would have been essential. It is also likely that these officers had allies outside the Reserve Army. Other leading officers, such as Santa Anna, Miguel Barragán and Nicolás Bravo, were also a visible presence in Jalapa. Even Luis Quintanar, a long-time friend of Bustamante, who led the coup in Mexico City which deposed the Guerrero administration before the arrival of the General in the capital, must have also been involved in some small way in the organisation.

The defeat of the Spaniards in Tampico, and their withdrawal from Mexican waters in September, quickly put an end to the fiction that the Reserve Army was purely a defensive force. Bustamante transferred his headquarters from Huamantla to Jalapa without consulting with Guerrero, and it was rumoured in the press that a revolt was being planned.⁶⁶ Suspicions were directed firstly at Santa Anna, who had

⁶⁴ Lucas Alamán, "Autobiografía de Lucas Alamán," in *Obras de D. Lucas Alamán: Documentos diversos*, vol. 4, p. 251.

⁶⁵ Zavala, *Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México*, vol. 2, p. 173.

⁶⁶ Facio, *Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio*, p. 109.

abruptly left Tampico in September in the wake of his famous victory, and headed to Jalapa for a meeting with Bustamante.⁶⁷ The result of this meeting appears to be a letter written by Santa Anna to Guerrero, in which he demanded that the President entirely replace his cabinet with men of his own choosing. The British *Chargé d'Affaires*, Richard Packenham, was of the opinion that if Guerrero did not heed the demands of Santa Anna, 'the military characters assembled in Jalapa' would impose these reforms by force.⁶⁸ By November, the rumours spread by the pro-Guerrero newspapers and pamphlets suggested that Santa Anna and Bustamante did not simply wish to renew Guerrero's cabinet, but that they were instead plotting to overthrow the President in order to impose a centralist form of government on the Republic.⁶⁹ News of the arrival of the newly pardoned Nicolás Bravo and Miguel Barragán in Jalapa on 1 November only added fuel to these suspicions.⁷⁰ Santa Anna and Bustamante published a joint denial of any intentions to lead a revolt to change the form of government, but it was clear that no one really believed them.⁷¹ This is hardly surprising, for as Facio readily admits, preparations for rebellion were already underway by this time. Contacts had been made in various states and plans laid.⁷² In recognition of the threat the Reserve Army posed to his government, Guerrero tried on more than one occasion to have the force disbanded. Finally, at the end of November, he sent a cavalry force to Jalapa, and later issued its commander with instructions to dissolve the Army and hand over the control of the fortress of Perote to General Vicente Filisola. These instructions were never fulfilled because the

⁶⁷ Richard Packenham to the Earl of Aberdeen, 30 September 1829. Foreign Office Papers in the Public Record Office (henceforth referred to as FO) no. 50/55, p. 203.

⁶⁸ Packenham to Aberdeen, 30 October 1829. FO no. 50/55, p. 287.

⁶⁹ Zavala, *Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México*, vol. 2, p. 166. *El Sol*, 10 November 1829 includes a letter signed by Los Olfatistas, which details and refutes the rumours about Santa Anna and Bustamante.

⁷⁰ *El Sol*, 10 November 1829.

⁷¹ Anastasio Bustamante and Antonio López de Santa Anna, "Los Generales que subscriben a sus conciudadanos," in Lorenzo de Zavala, *Obras de Lorenzo de Zavala* (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1969), pp. 599-600. The manifesto is dated 31 October 1829 in Jalapa.

⁷² Facio, *Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio*, p. 110.

conspirators, having been informed of the plans of the government, decided to initiate their rebellion beforehand. Thus, on 4 December 1829, on the anniversary of the Parián riot, the troops of the Reserve Army proclaimed the Plan of Jalapa and called upon Generals Santa Anna and Bustamante to take control of their revolt.⁷³

According to Luis G. Cuevas, General Bustamante had initially been extremely unwilling to conspire against Guerrero. He feared that the Plan of Jalapa would 'manchar su nombre y dar mal ejemplo a la fuerza armada.'⁷⁴ Facio notes that, on the day, the General 'no quería dar el grito' and instead vacated the garrison, leaving his second, Múzquiz, to proclaim it in his absence.⁷⁵ It is obvious that he had some moral qualms about turning against Guerrero: 'el mismo que lo había honrado con su confianza.'⁷⁶ Yet in the end he was able to set these aside and accept the leadership of the rebellion. José María Luis Mora believed that Bustamante was driven by an overwhelming ambition for power:

Bustamante, se decían, es hombre de honor, y si bien puede cambiar de partido y separarse de sus amigos para aliarse con los que hasta aquí han sido sus contrarios, no elegirá dar este paso que sólo justifica la convicción, una circunstancia, en la que no podría dar ser explicado tal cambio, sino por el deseo de la posesión del poder.⁷⁷

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111. Facio writes that Lorenzo de Zavala, who was on his way to Veracruz and ultimately Yucatán, where he was to negotiate with the rebels in Mérida, was the courier of the secret instructions handed to the commander in Jalapa. The conspirators were made suspicious of his conduct and resolved to investigate. One of their number took Zavala out for a meal, and persuaded him to divulge the purpose of his sojourn in Jalapa. The implication is clearly that Zavala was plied with alcohol to loosen his tongue.

⁷⁴ Cuevas, *Porvenir de México*, p. 336.

⁷⁵ Facio, *Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio*, pp. 110-111, and Enrique Olavarria y Ferrari, "México independiente, 1821-1855," in Vicente Riva Palacio (ed.), *México através de los siglos* (Mexico City: Balleca y Compañía, 1888-1889), vol. 4, p. 219.

⁷⁶ Cuevas, *Porvenir de México*, p. 336.

⁷⁷ José María Luis Mora, "Revista política de las diversas administraciones que la república mexicana ha tenido hasta 1837," in Lilian Briseño Senosiain, Laura Solares Robles and Laura Suárez de la Torre, *Obras Completas: José María Luis Mora* (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y los Artes, 1986), p. 303.

While Mora may be right to some extent, what this chapter aims to show is that Bustamante's decision to lead a revolt against his former Masonic brothers was motivated by much more than this. The call in the Plan of Jalapa for the re-establishment of the rule of constitutional order was made precisely because the conspirators, including Bustamante, felt that Guerrero's administration had been responsible for the loss of this order in the eight months it had been in government. As we saw above, to many of the privileged elite, the *hombres de bien*, the landed classes, the upper clergy and the high-ranking army officers, the rebellion of La Acordada and the assumption of Guerrero to the Presidency, had been nothing less than a social revolution that now threatened to engulf Mexico. Bustamante believed that 'la conservación del orden público y el orden de las autoridades que gobiernan con arreglo a la ley son los más sagrados deberes del ciudadano militar.'⁷⁸ In his eyes, and in the opinion of many who supported him, since the army was the guardian of the Republic's order and stability and it had to act if it felt these were under threat:

Por cuanto la sociedad está próximo a disolverse, expuesta a que la despedece la anarquía, para venir en último resultado a ser presa por un déspota cualquiera, los militares que no pueden permanecer insensibles a la suerte de sus semejantes y de la patria y que ven el origen de los males que han producido, el descontento en la inobservancia de las leyes, en los abusos de la administración y en la desconfianza pública que justamente han merecido algunos agentes del poder, *se creen constituidos en la sagrada obligación* de contribuir por su parte que se ponga en práctica los medios de salvación y proteger y dar impluso a la opinión general que ha manifestado de un modo muy preciso el origen de los males y la naturaleza del remedio.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Anastasio Bustamante to Felipe Andrade, Guadalajara, 6 April 1824., in Congress of Jalisco, *Manifiesto del Congreso Constituyente de Jalisco a sus habitantes* (Guadalajara: Imprenta de: C. Urbano San Román, 1824), p. 6. In the British Library.

⁷⁹ "The Plan of Jalapa." In Berta Ulloa and Joel Hernández Santiago (eds.), *Planes en la Nación Mexicana* (Mexico City: Senado de la República/El Colegio de México, 1987.), vol. 1, p. 227. My italics.

Thus it was his duty to lead the crusade which would 'restaurar el orden y borrar las impresiones siniestras que había causado el 4 de diciembre de 1828.'⁸⁰ As Tornel, who met him in Jalapa after the proclamation of the plan, recorded, it was clear that Bustamante believed himself to have been called 'para dirigir la máquina abandonada del estado.'⁸¹ The General, therefore, most likely concluded that the honour of his mission justified the dishonour of his actions, and resolved to accept the leadership of the rebellion. In contrast, Santa Anna, who found himself in the same dilemma, came to a different conclusion, and resolved to remain loyal to Guerrero.

The quick success of the Plan of Jalapa demonstrated that the conspirators had laid their plans well. Before the end of December the garrisons in Querétaro, Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Guanajuato, Oaxaca and Tlaxcala had adhered to the plan.⁸² On 23 December, after Guerrero had departed to face the rebels, a small coup was quietly effected in Mexico City by Luis Quintanar, Lucas Alamán and the Governor of the Federal District, José Ignacio Esteva. They captured the National Palace and forced the interim President, José María Bocanegra, to step down. A provisional government, headed by Alamán and Quintanar, was set up in his stead. The next day, possible opponents to the new order, such as Lorenzo de Zavala and Manuel Crecencio Rejón, were arrested and imprisoned.⁸³ The revolution was now as good as over, and Guerrero on hearing the news, decided to abandon the struggle. He fled in the company of a select band of supporters for his home in the Tierra Caliente. Meanwhile, Santa Anna, who had marched from Veracruz to confront Bustamante, found himself quickly deserted in Perote. He had no choice but to return home. So, in this way, the march of Bustamante's Reserve Army upon Mexico City met with no

⁸⁰ Cuevas, *Porvenir de México*, p. 336.

⁸¹ José María Tornel, *Manifiesto del C. José María Tornel, 1833* (Mexico City: n.p., 1833), p. 6.

⁸² *El Sol*, 15, 22, 24, 26, 29 December 1829.

⁸³ *El Sol*, 24 December 1829.

resistance. He entered the capital on 31 December and immediately took up the reins of government.

E: Bustamante and the *yorkinos* (1825-1829): An Overview

The *yorkinos* that Anastasio Bustamante joined in 1826 were not the same faction which came to power after the rebellion of La Acordada. In 1826, Bustamante joined a coalition of men opposed to the political hegemony of the Scottish Rite of Masons. The aim of this coalition was to depose the *escoceses* from their positions of power and replace them with their own members. Bustamante's natural opposition to the Scottish Rite, his federalism, and his political ambition made the *yorkinos* an obvious faction to support. However, during the years Bustamante spent in the Eastern Provinces, the demands of the *yorkinos* began to radicalise. The rite became obsessed with the complete destruction of its enemies. This radicalisation alienated many of the *yorkino* membership, including Bustamante, and caused a schism to develop during the Presidential elections of 1828. The radical *yorkinos* now became associated with the candidacy of Vicente Guerrero; with the Governor of the State of Mexico, Lorenzo de Zavala; and with Zavala's anti-clerical and land reform policies. Many of the more moderates left the rite altogether to join the anti-Masonic *imparciales*, or simply to support the alternative Presidential candidate, Manuel Gómez Pedraza. In an attempt to heal the breach that was emerging, José María Tornel persuaded the *yorkino* leadership to accept Anastasio Bustamante as their candidate for Vice-President. Bustamante was perceived to be a more moderate *yorkino*. A former Royalist soldier and supporter of Iturbide, he was considered to be no threat to the privileged classes. What Bustamante thought about his nomination is not clear. He remained in the Eastern Provinces for the duration of the Presidential campaign and elections, and we do not know how well informed he was of news from

the capital. However, we do know that his support of the *yorkino* cause did not extend to adhering to Santa Anna's rebellion, which suggests that he sympathised more with the moderate side of the faction than the radical one.

Yet Bustamante consented to become Vice-President on the strength of this rebellion, and upon its riotous aftermath in the Parián Market. He asserts that he reluctantly undertook the position out of a sense of duty, and although we cannot rule out the possibility that this explanation was concocted later to soothe a guilty conscience, his later actions lend some credibility to his claims. For, almost immediately upon his return to the capital, Bustamante began to distance himself from the *yorkinos*, who were now indelibly connected in his mind and the public imagination with the radicalism of Zavala and the terrible scenes of the sacking of the Parián. He joined a group, later named the *moderados* or *hombres de bien*, made up of *escoceses*, *imparciales*, leading clergymen and army officers and property owners. Consequently he became involved in the establishment of the Reserve Army, in which the Plan of Jalapa was designed, and plans laid for a rebellion against Guerrero. Bustamante's decision to turn against his old allies, the *yorkinos*, and to conspire with those who had been his enemies, most conspicuously Nicolás Bravo, has been interpreted as a demonstration of his overwhelming ambition for power. However, it seems more likely that Bustamante was driven by a desire to rescue the Republic from the chaos which he perceived it to be in. As an old Royalist, he may have seen his situation to be similar to that which it was in 1810. In 1829, as then, the very fabric of social stability was under threat. In 1829, again as in 1810, it was the duty of the military to protect this social order and maintain the status quo. The Plan of Jalapa with its call for the return to the rule of law and the constitution, intended that the Reserve Army would do just that.

Chapter Four: The First Administration (1830-1832)

Before proceeding with any study of the years 1830-1832, it is important that we understand the aims and ambitions of the government brought to office through the Plan of Jalapa. According to the Plan itself there was only one intention: the drive to see the re-establishment in the Republic of 'el orden constitutucional con la exacta observancia de las leyes fundamentales.'¹ The rallying cry of the Reserve Army, 'Constitución y leyes,' neatly reinforced the message. However, it is not clear from the Plan what exactly is meant by constitutional order or exact obedience to the law. For, on the one hand it proclaims 'la más ciega obediencia a los supremos poderes' and pledges its continuing support for the federal pact and respect for the sovereignty of the states.² While on the other, it calls for the removal of 'todos aquellos funcionarios contra quienes se ha explicado la opinión general.'³ Clearly this is not something that could be sanctioned by the provisions of the Constitution of 1824, nor does it demonstrate any respect for the supreme powers in operation at that time. In fact, it could be argued that the very act of revolt expressly contravened the declared purpose of the rebels. The manifesto published by General Anastasio Bustamante upon taking up office as acting Head of State in January 1830, does not help to clear the confusion. In this manifesto he condemns the government of Vicente Guerrero as unconstitutional. He points out that his predecessor came to power through the scandalous events of La Acordada, rather than through the September elections. However, tellingly he declares that 'el ejército de reserva nunca intentará reponer acontecimientos de aquel orden, ni retroceder hasta los sucesos de aquella fecha.'⁴ In

¹ "The Plan of Jalapa", article two in *El Telégrafo Potosiense*, 22 December 1829.

² *Ibid.*, articles one and five.

³ *Ibid.*, article four.

⁴ Anastasio Bustamante, *Manifiesto que el vice-presidente de la república mexicana dirige a la nación* (Mexico City: Imprenta a cargo del ciudadano Tomás Uribe y Alcalde, calle de Jesús, número 2, 1830), p. 2. The pamphlet is dated 4 January 1830 and can be found in the British Library.

other words, although Bustamante's revolt was expressly organised to restore the rule of the constitution, he was not prepared to allow the results of the 1828 election to stand and call for the return of the constitutionally elected president: Manuel Gómez Pedraza.

In fact, the rebels' call for the re-introduction of constitutional order and respect for the law can only be understood if we remember the make-up of the coalition that supported the Plan and ensured that it became a success. As we noted in the previous chapter, opposition to Vicente Guerrero and his government was rife amongst the privileged classes of society: the property owners, the senior clergy and military officers and the more important civil servants. The Plan was devised by a group of military generals, led by Anastasio Bustamante, José Antonio Facio and Melchor Múzquiz, and was brought to power in Mexico City through the combined efforts of Luis Quintanar and Lucas Alamán. These men feared that Guerrero's government was that of the *sancullotes* and *jacobinos*, who wished to usurp the power of the *hombres de bien* and destroy their wealth. They were horrified by the disintegrating state of the Republic: the political infighting, the prevalence of *pronunciamientos* and rebellions, the financial insolvency and the terrible state of the army. In their minds, the principal cause of this chaos was the influence of the secret societies in politics. As the *Registro Oficial*, the official newspaper of the Bustamante regime, declared on 25 March 1830:

El origen de nuestros males es este funesto espíritu de partido, esta obstinación, este deseo de venganza que apoya lo que reprueba el buen juicio, lo que es detestable en todo orden social y lo que no puede conciliarse ni con la moral pública ni con la moral privada. Sostener las facciones directa o indirectamente es declarar la guerra a la nación, es apresurar la época de su aniquilamiento.⁵

⁵ *El Registro Oficial*, 25 March 1830.

They believed that the intrigues and rivalries of the Masonic rites had created an unruly political climate, which had allowed groups of unscrupulous men, like the radical *yorkinos*, to seize power. The coalition that supported the Plan of Jalapa claimed that their movement represented the general will. Their ascension to government seemed to herald, in the words of Alamán, 'el momento de ver extinguir los partidos.'⁶ As far as they were concerned, a return to constitutional order meant the creation of a government which could operate without the pernicious influence of these societies and, in which 'los principios administrativos del ejecutivo, no están a la merced de las pasiones o de caprichos versátiles.'⁷ In order for this to be achieved the administration promised that the destruction of the societies would be 'un objeto primario' of its government.⁸ In practice, of course, this really meant allowing the new order to persecute its *yorkino* opponents merely for their membership of the rite. After all, the Rite of York was the only visible secret society left in Mexico by 1829.

The government brought to power by the Plan of Jalapa aimed not only to solve the cause of Mexico's chaos, but also to bring order to the chaos itself. They believed that if a strong, stable government were to be established, peace and prosperity would naturally follow. Bustamante's administration employed three main strategies to realise this. The first was to protect and strengthen the position of the two main institutional allies of the Plan of Jalapa: the Church and the army. The second was the drive to strengthen the position of the executive in relation to the Federal Congress. The terms of the Federal Constitution, as Lucas Alamán observed,

⁶ Lucas Alamán, "Defensa del ex-ministro de relaciones D. Lucas Alamán en la causa formada contra él y contra los ex ministros de guerra y justicia del vicepresidente D. Anastasio Bustamante, con unas noticias preliminares que dan idea de origen de esta. Escrita por el mismo ex ministro quien la dirige a la nación," in Lucas Alamán, *Obras completas de D. Lucas Alamán: Documentos diversos (inéditos y muy raros)* (Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1945), vol. 3, p. 45.

⁷ *El Registro Oficial*, 23 January 1830.

⁸ Lucas Alamán, "Memoria de la secretaria de estado y del despacho de relaciones interiores y exteriores, leída por el secretario del ramo en la Cámara de Diputados el día 12 de febrero de 1830 y en la de Senadores el día 13 del mismo." in Alamán, *Obras completas: Documentos diversos*, vol. 1, p. 183.

established a weak executive more or less subordinate to the more powerful legislative body.⁹ It gave the President mostly decorative duties, such as ensuring the publication of the laws and statutes, convoking Congress and declaring war. He was also allowed to propose legislation and to choose his own cabinet. However, it was the Federal Congress that decided whether the President's proposals should be accepted, determined taxation and its investment, as well as appointing public employees.¹⁰ This meant that the executive had to rely upon sufficient support in Congress to organise an effective government. To strengthen this position, Bustamante's government would use a mixture of coercion and intimidation to ensure that the representatives in the Federal Congress could not oppose its initiatives.

Finally, the administration also realised that peaceful government could not be achieved if the radical *yorkinos* of the previous government were allowed to remain in control of the federal and state government. In their eyes, this faction did not care for order, but searched only for the self advancement of its members.¹¹ It was abundantly clear that the old supporters of Guerrero were likely to be hostile to all the new regime's policies. For the new government, the re-establishment of constitutional order was dependent upon removing these radicals from positions of power and influence, and replacing them with people who could be relied upon to support the new order.

⁹ Lucas Alamán, "Examen imparcial de la administración del general vicepresidente D. Anastasio Bustamante con observaciones generales sobre el estado presente de la república y consecuencias que este debe producir," in Alamán, *Obras completas: Documentos diversos*, vol. 3, p. 261.

¹⁰ "La Constitución de 4 octubre de 1824," in Secretaría de Gobernación, *Leyes fundamentales de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y planes revolucionarios que han influido en la organización política de la república* (Mexico City: Imprenta de la Secretaría de Gobernación, 1923). See especially "De las prerrogativas del presidente y vicepresidente," and "De las atribuciones y restricciones de sus facultades," pp. 125-126, and "De las facultades del Congreso General," pp. 121-122.

¹¹ Alamán, "Defensa del ex ministro de relaciones," p. 45. He describes the radical *yorkinos* of 1829 thus: 'con lo que ese partido vino a reducirse a solo aquellos que no poseyendo nada aspiran a todo, y siempre están dispuestos a nuevas inquietudes porque miran la autoridad de que por cualquier medio pretenden apoderarse no solo como su único modo de vivir, sino como un arbitrio de enriquecer a costa de la nación, mediante las continuas rapiñas y despilfarros que se han visto siempre que el gobierno ha caído en sus manos.'

These allies were to be the property owning *hombres de bien*, whose very wealth and status guaranteed their support ‘por el orden, por la tranquilidad y por la quietud.’¹²

This chapter aims to examine how successfully Anastasio Bustamante's government implemented this vision of constitutional order. The first part will discuss the manner in which his regime attempted to impose its authority upon the State and Federal legislatures. The focus of the second part will be the regime's political programme and its relationship with the army and the Church. The third part will look at how the administration dealt with its opponents. The final sections will move on to analyse the reasons for the regime's eventual defeat at the hands of Antonio López de Santa Anna.

A: Establishing Order in Government

As soon as General Bustamante entered Mexico City on 31 December he assumed the role of acting Head of State. However, his position was not legally defensible. After all, he had just overthrown the incumbent President by way of an armed rebellion. Therefore, the new government's first action had to be the legitimisation of his authority. This was achieved through the passing of two laws in Congress. The first judged the Plan of Jalapa to have been just, effectively sanctioning the rebellion.¹³ The second declared General Guerrero to be impeded (‘imposibilitado’) from exercising the executive power.¹⁴ According to article 75 of the Federal Constitution, this made his Vice-President his legitimate replacement.¹⁵ It

¹² *El Registro Oficial*, 26 March 1830.

¹³ Manuel Dublán and José María Lozano, *Legislación mexicana o colección completa de las disposiciones expedidas desde la independencia de la República* (Mexico City: Imprenta del Comercio, a cargo de Dublán y Lozano, hijos, calle de Cordobanes, número 8, 1876), vol. 2, p. 215. Law dated 14 January 1830.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 223. Law dated 4 February 1830.

¹⁵ “La Constitución de 1824,” in Secretaría de Gobernación (ed.), *Leyes fundamentales de los Estados Unidos*, p. 123. Perhaps as a result of these laws General Bustamante did not assume the title of

had originally been proposed that the second law declare Guerrero 'imposibilitado moralmente para gobernar la República,' or in other words pronounce him mad in order to conform more clearly with article 75, which specifies that the Vice-President can only take up the functions of his President should he be morally or physically incapacitated. However, the committee appointed by Congress to discuss the issue recommended that the word 'moral' be suppressed in the bill. This was mainly due to the intervention of one of the committee members, Andrés Quintana Roo, a long-term supporter of General Guerrero. He pointed out quite forcibly in his report that the aim of the law was simply to 'adoptar una medida que sirva como título a la legitimidad del actual gobierno' and to prevent the General returning to power. Therefore, he argued, it would be counter-productive to declare him insane, as this would undoubtedly offend the General's honour and make him more likely to take up a hostile position against the new government.¹⁶ This was an important consideration, as Guerrero had recently written to Congress to express his willingness to abide by their decision in the matter of his dispute with Bustamante.¹⁷ If the new regime was to continue unopposed, it would not be wise to upset General Guerrero.

It might seem surprising that a Congress elected for the most part in the elections of 1828, in which the *yorkinos* were the predominant force, would be party to this legal manoeuvring to replace Guerrero with Bustamante. However, it must be remembered that while the Chamber of Deputies was made up with a significant number of opponents to the new order, it was even able defiantly to elect the radical *yorkino*, Father José María Alpuche as its President in January 1830, the majority of senators supported the Plan of Jalapa. This meant that the dictates of the Chamber of

President. In all official documents he is referred to as the Vice-President. Consequently, he will be referred to as the Vice-President for the purposes of this study.

¹⁶ "Dictamen de la comisión de la Cámara de Diputados, sobre el acuerdo del Senado, relativo a declarar al general Guerrero imposibilitado moralmente para gobernar la República," and "Voto particular del señor Quintana Roo," in *El Atleta*, 31 January 1830.

¹⁷ "Exposición del general Guerrero a las Cámaras de la Unión," in *El Atleta*, 18 January 1830.

Deputies could be overridden by a vote in the Senate. As Alamán points out in his *Historia de México*, any bill that was rejected by the deputies could still be presented to the Senate. If the proposal gained a two-thirds majority in its favour here, it could then be returned to the deputies. This bill could only be prevented from becoming law if the deputies voted against it by the same margin of two thirds.¹⁸ Moreover, the regime was not adverse to intimidating the deputies. According to Lorenzo de Zavala, the early deliberations of the Chamber were often marred by the interventions of soldiers and officers who would crowd into the galleries and attempt to influence the deputies to vote in favour of the government with threats and insults. Many of the deputies began to stay away from the Chamber, thus contributing to the disenfranchisement of that body.¹⁹ Other outspoken deputy opponents of the government, such as Alpuche and Anastasio Zerecero, obligingly became involved in plots to overthrow the government. This led to their arrest and exile far away from the Chamber by June 1830.²⁰ Later in the year, in August, the Military Commander of Mexico, Felipe Codallos, and the capital's garrison issued a petition to Congress to unseat the remaining dissident deputies and senators in accordance with the fourth article of the Plan of Jalapa.²¹ This petition was not successful, but it clearly

¹⁸ Lucas Alamán, *Historia de México desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon su independencia en el año de 1808 hasta la época presente* (Mexico City: Libros del Bachiller Sansón Carillo, 1986), vol. 5, p. 489.

¹⁹ Lorenzo de Zavala, *Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México desde 1808 hasta 1830* (Mexico City: Impresora de Hacienda, 1918), vol. 2, p. 211.

²⁰ Father Alpuche made the mistake of writing to General Manuel Mier y Terán in January 1830, inviting him to lead a conspiracy against the government. Mier y Terán found the proposal 'repugnante' and immediately informed the government. He was arrested in March and condemned to five years exile in June. *El Registro Oficial*, 8 March and 9 June 1830. The letters of Alpuche and reply of Mier y Terán are included in *El Sol*, 12 March 1830. Zerecero was accused of plotting with a number of army officers including General Figueroa, Colonels Pinzón and Ordiera and his brother, Lieutenant Manuel Zerecero, to assassinate the Vice-President and issue a *pronunciamiento* in Mexico City in favour of Guerrero. He was also sentenced to five years exile. His brother was sentenced to death. *El Registro Oficial*, 25 March, 22 and 23 June 1830. The execution did not take place, however, mainly due to the intervention of the Vice-President. Its significance will be discussed later in the chapter.

²¹ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 254. The deputies on the list were: José Manuel Herrera, José María Bocanegra, Ignacio Basadre, Fernando del Valle, Juan Pablo Bermúdez, Manuel Palomino, Pedro María Anaya, José Antonio Ulloa, José Matías Quintana, Andrés Quintana Roo, José María Moreno, José María

demonstrated that the new regime wished to ensure that the Congress would not act independently, but would rather follow the wishes of the executive. Those members who were still inclined to express their opposition to the government became few and far between and found themselves in danger of serious reprisals. In February 1831, one such senator, Antonio Pacheco Leal, was attacked in the street by thirty officers after supporting a discussion begun in the Chamber of Deputies by Juan de Dios Cañedo, which questioned Bustamante's legitimacy and suggested that Manuel Gómez Pedraza was the only constitutional President. Cañedo, fearing for his own safety, accepted a position as a minister to South America and conveniently disappeared from the political scene.²² In November of the same year Manuel Crescencio Rejón, who had recently begun publishing a newspaper which opposed the regime was attacked by a group of soldiers as he left the Senate.²³ In such a climate of intimidation it is little wonder that Congress, by and large, did the regime's bidding with little fuss.

Yet it is clear from the behaviour of the new government in the opening months of its rule, that Bustamante and his cabinet did not believe that controlling the federal government would be enough to secure their hold on power. It would also be necessary to ensure that their authority would not encounter opposition in the states either. This was a pressing matter in the first three months of 1830, as it appeared that a coalition of states, led by Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí, were organising themselves in order to defy, if not rebel against Bustamante. In 1829, the two states had proposed the setting up of a league of states to defend federalism from the threat they perceived in Yucatán and from the Reserve Army. In January, they issued a joint declaration proclaiming that should the institutions of federalism be attacked, they

Salvatierra, Manuel García Tato, Antonio Escudero, Manuel López de la Plata, Joaquín Bazo, Pedro Garmendia, Manuel Ordaz and Vicente Güido de Güido. The senators were: Manuel Crescencio Rejón, Juan Nepomuceno Acosta and Agustín Viesca.

²² Timothy E. Anna, *Forging Mexico* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), p. 235.

²³ Carlos María Bustamante, *Diario Histórico*, entry for 3 November 1831.

would unite in their defence. They called on other states to join them. By February it seemed that seven states were ready to join this coalition.²⁴ In order to avoid this perceived threat of rebellion the answer was simple: replace all those legislatures and governors who might conceivably oppose the regime. As these legislatures, rather like the General Congress, had been elected at the height of the *yorkinos'* power, potential allies were the exception rather than the rule. As Michael Costeloe has explained, the manner in which the legislatures were replaced was simple. Using article four of the Plan of Jalapa as his point of reference, the Minister of Relations Alamán, set about persuading the garrison, local *ayuntamiento*, or any other official body of state government to issue a complaint against either the legislature, the governor or both. A petition would then be sent to the National Congress asking that these legislatures be removed and new elections called.²⁵ This petition would be approved by Congress and, in this way, the potential rebel states were tamed. New elections held in September 1830, resulted in the appointment of men who were, in Costeloe's words, 'todos hombres de bien, con los mismos intereses que las clases dirigentes de la capital:'²⁶ even if their political allegiances were not so similar. In this fashion the legislatures and governors were replaced in Jalisco, Michoacán, Querétaro, Durango, Tamaulipas, Tabasco, Oaxaca, Puebla, Veracruz, Chiapas and Mexico.²⁷

This intervention on the part of the federal government in the affairs of the states has long been interpreted as a covert attack on the federal system. Much is made of the fact that Bustamante's cabinet was made up of ministers who were notorious for their centralist views. Espinosa had spoken in Congress in favour of the centralisation of civil authority. Mangino had expressed his reservations on the subject of state

²⁴ Michael P. Costeloe, *La primera república federal de México: 1824-1835. Un estudio de los partidos políticos en el México independiente* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1975), p. 260.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 258-261. Costeloe provides descriptions of how the legislatures were overthrown in Mexico, Puebla, Oaxaca and Michoacán.

sovereignty while a member of the committee commissioned to write the constitution in 1824.²⁸ As we saw in Chapter Two, Alamán had been perceived as an advocate of centralism in 1823. Jesús Reyes Heróles maintains that although Bustamante's administration made no direct attack upon the federalist system, its policies proved it to be a centralist government.²⁹ Timothy Anna observes that Alamán was acutely aware that any direct attack upon federalism would provoke huge opposition within the Republic, as federalism was by now too deeply entrenched in individual interest and loyalty throughout the country. He claims that Alamán chose instead to return to the policy of 1823, suggested (as we noted in Chapter Two) by Servando Teresa de Mier, which allowed limited federalism with a strong and powerful central government.³⁰ However, we must be wary of accepting these opinions uncritically. For, as Josefina Vázquez points out, the charges of centralism against Bustamante's administration originate in the criticisms of its contemporary opponents. In her view, all that Alamán did 'fue aprovechar al máximo las leyes para manipular un cambio de autoridades.'³¹ This was certainly an affront to the sovereignty of the states, and induced many to fear that federalism was in danger, but whether it constituted the erection of a secret centralist republic is questionable.

The key question in the debate appears to be: why did the central government wish to replace so many legislatures? Why did it expect that these state congresses would oppose its authority? The answer to this is provided by Costeloe, who observes that the states attacked by the provisions of the Plan of Jalapa were those 'en que ocupaban cargos representantes de la baja democracia o radicales.'³² If we remember our definition of the meaning of constitutional order, the answers to our questions are clear. The state legislatures represented the continuation of the rule of the radical

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

²⁹ Jesús Reyes Heróles, *El liberalismo mexicano* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1958), vol. 2, p. 156.

³⁰ Anna, *Forging Mexico*, pp. 230-231.

³¹ Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, "Iglesia, ejército y centralismo," *Historia Mexicana* 39:1 (1989), p. 214.

³² Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, pp. 280-281.

yorkinos, and the threat of the power of the lower classes. They were the enemy just as clearly as Guerrero had been. Confirmation of this theory comes when we look at the electoral reform introduced by Alamán to try to ensure that these representatives of low democracy were not re-elected. In his *Memoria* of 1830, Alamán laid out his argument for change. The current system of elections, he claimed, led to chaos and disorder. He condemned the practise employed by the secret societies of distributing lists, printed with the names of their candidates to the voter, for him to use as his ballot paper. This led to a situation, he complained, in which ‘resultan elegidos, no los que han obtenido más sufragios, sino aquellos, en cuyo favor, el artificio y a veces la violencia ha hecho repartir más listas.’ He also lamented that no checks were provided for within the electoral system to identify the voter, which meant it was simple for the same individual to vote on numerous occasions. Such lax procedures, he argued, alienated ‘todos los hombres de juicio’ and excluded them from the electoral process. As a result, he concluded, the elections were hijacked by those least qualified, leading to the election of ‘hombres que no dependen de la sociedad por ningún lazo, y que no poseyendo nada, por este mismo propenden a aspirar a todo.’³³ Or in other words, those he would alternatively describe as *yorkinos* and *jacobinos*, and accuse of seeking power merely to enrich themselves and destroy the *hombres de bien*.³⁴

A new system was clearly needed in order to rectify the situation. Accordingly, new legislation was passed in July 1830 to reduce suffrage and regularise proceedings in the Federal District and territories, the only areas under the direct control of the central government. The electoral system would now work in two stages of primary and secondary elections. The primary elections were conducted in small voting districts of between 400 and 800 inhabitants. In these elections a representative or ‘elector’ was chosen to represent his district in the secondary elections. This elector

³³ Alamán, “Memoria ... 1830,” pp. 184-185.

³⁴ Alamán, “Defensa del ex-ministro de relaciones D. Lucas Alamán,” p. 45.

cast his vote on behalf of his district in this ballot. To be eligible to vote in the primary elections the individual had to be a Mexican citizen who had resided in his district for at least a year. To prevent voters being able to vote on multiple occasions, it was now a requirement for the voter to possess a ballot paper in advance. The practice of accepting lists of candidates from the voter to indicate his preferences was suppressed. In the primary elections, everyone now had to give their votes orally. In the secondary elections, voting was to be secret. All those eligible to vote had to be 21 years old, 18 if married, and had to practice 'algún oficio o industria honorable.' Those wishing to stand as electors would have to meet the same criteria, although the minimum age was raised to 25.³⁵ Of course, the government could not legally oblige the rest of the states to imitate these reforms. Even so, if we consider the political climate now dominant in the states whose legislatures had been dismissed, it is not surprising that many did introduce similar legislation. In Veracruz, a voter was required to possess property to the minimum value of 800 pesos, or earn at least 150 pesos from gainful employment. Those belonging to secret societies were barred from suffrage.³⁶ In Puebla it was proposed that those wishing to stand for election should hold property valued to at least 8, 000 pesos or earn 1, 000 pesos annually.³⁷ These reforms appeared to have the desired effect. For in the elections to replace the dismissed legislatures, those elected were for the most part *hombres de bien* and property-owners. In Puebla, those elected included: two army officers; two clerics; four merchants; a surgeon; two lawyers; a tithe-collector; a civil servant; a pharmacist and one scribe. In the state of Mexico they included: five lawyers, five clerics, a mine owner and a Colonel.³⁸

Looked at in this way, it appears that the motive behind the forced removals of the eleven state legislatures was not the centralisation of power to Mexico City, or the

³⁵ Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, vol. 2, pp. 270-275. Law dated 12 July 1830.

³⁶ *El Registro Oficial*, 24 May 1830.

³⁷ *El Sol*, 23 September 1830.

³⁸ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 284.

further empowerment of the executive. The dismissals were part of the general plan to neutralise potential opposition to the new regime, to destroy the power of the *yorkinos* and to ensure that the privileged classes remained in control country-wide. Their actions show that they did not consider the concept of federalism to be dangerous, as no attempts were made to reform the constitution to reduce state power, it was federalism in the hands of the *plebe* which threatened the stability of the Republic. Replacing the legislatures meant there was no need to attack federalism or practise secret centralism. Federalism could be acceptable provided that the right people were in charge. As long as the disorder created by previous governments could be rectified under the present system, there was simply no point in causing the inevitable political turmoil or civil war by forcing a change. As Alamán argued in 1833:

Ciertamente que la masa general de la población no aspira a una mudanza, cuando el orden actual se halla bien; si él encuentra seguridad para su persona y bienes el ciudadano pacífico; confianza en sus giros el capitalista, y exactitud en sus pagas el empleado y el militar, no puede prestárseles atractivo ninguno hacia una mudanza, el cual no solo no nos adelantarían nada, sino por el contrario aventurarían el bien de que hecho están disfrutando en medio de las vicisitudes consiguientes a un trastorno general. No será menester demostrar que todas estas condiciones se encontraban bajo el gobierno cuyos miembros son hoy objetos de cruel persecución [in the prosecution of Alamán, Mangino and Facio in 1833].³⁹

Even so, if Bustamante's government was not conspiring to rule the nation centrally, why did its opponents consistently accuse him and the cabinet of centralism? The answer perhaps lies in the bitter political rivalry that had developed in Mexico since independence and the language that had begun to be used by each side to define themselves and each other. Centralism and federalism had existed as opposing concepts since the abdication of Iturbide in 1823. Centralists were associated with the

³⁹ Alamán, "Defensa del ex-ministro de relaciones," pp. 155-156.

politicians and elite in Mexico City, the Supreme Executive Power and the Scottish Rite of Masons. Federalists were associated with the states and with the *iturbidistas*, who opposed central government as it was composed of those who had engineered Iturbide's downfall. After the proclamation of the Federal Constitution the two groups remained a feature of political life. The Rite of York became the self-proclaimed home of the federalists, while the Scottish Rite remained the haven for many of those who had been supporters of a centralist system, such as its Grand Master, Nicolás Bravo. In the battle for power which developed between the two rites in the late 1820s, the *yorkinos* were able to exploit this fact to their own advantage. Its press regularly attacked the Scottish Rite with a range of accusations designed to characterise them as unpatriotic and treacherous. It was said that the *escoceses* were opposed to the constitution and still wished to introduce centralism. The Scottish Rite was also accused of plotting to return the country to the Spanish or impose a Bourbon monarch on the nation. The *yorkino* press firmly presented their members as the patriotic defenders of federalism, striving for the Republic's best interests in everything they did.

By 1829, the Scottish Rite had ceased to exist as a political force. The *yorkinos* were now reduced to their radical core and were opposed by a coalition of forces, made up of many groups, including *ex-escoceses* and *ex-yorkinos*. However, crucially for those remaining in the *yorkino* camp, the rhetoric employed against the enemy remained the same. Pamphlets published during December 1829 accuse Bustamante and his fellow rebels of many of the crimes attributed to the *escoceses* in the past; of intending to impose centralism and dictatorship by force and, of plotting the return of Iturbide's son as monarch. They reiterate the claim that the *yorkinos* are the only real defenders of federalism.⁴⁰ These accusations were usually based on the

⁴⁰ See for example: *La culebrina del ejército de reserva* (Mexico City: Imprenta de la testamentaria de Ontiveros, dirigida por el C. José Uribe y Alcade, 1829); and Pablo Villavicencio, *El general Bustamante no quiere a ningún tunante* (Puebla: Reimpreso en la Oficina Nacional a cargo del ciudadano Mariano Palacios, 1829). Both in CONDUMEX.

fact that the Plan of Jalapa was supported by former *escoceses*, such as José Antonio Facio, Nicolás Bravo and Miguel Barragán. This strategy remained the same during Bustamante's administration. In the War of the South in 1830, Guerrero and Juan Álvarez clearly identified their struggle against Bustamante as the defence of federalism, and in their calls to arms, accused his government of conspiring to introduce centralism in order to impose a European tyrant as monarch or hand the country back to the control of Spain.⁴¹ This proved to be an effective tactic, for as Peter Guardino has pointed out, it played on the worst fears of the provincial elites, for whom the memory of the dissolved legislatures was still clear.⁴² It would prove an even more successful strategy in 1832 to rally support for Santa Anna's rebellion in the provinces. Here 'proofs' of the government's commitment to centralism were cited, such as the administration's continual reluctance to send troops to suppress the centralist rebellion in Yucatán, which had begun before the Plan of Jalapa was proclaimed in 1829. It seems that centralism was the big bogeyman with which to characterise the government and win support for the opposition, just as the fear of the *jacobinos* and the French Revolution was used by the architects of the Plan of Jalapa to justify their behaviour and keep the support of their peers. In looking at the accusations of both sides we must assume that both factions employed more or less the same measures of truth, falsehood and exaggeration in their attacks on each other.

C: The Political Programme: Putting an End to Chaos?

The political programme followed by the Bustamante administration was clearly designed to introduce much needed stability to the Mexican Republic. Their policies concentrated upon three main areas of concern: the state of the economy, the

⁴¹ Peter F. Guardino, *Peasants, Politics and the Formation of Mexico's National State. Guerrero, 1800-1857* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 134.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 135.

army, and the Church, and as Fowler has noted, constituted 'the imposition of the first traditionalist proposal of the *hombres de bien*.'⁴³

The national treasury was in a pitiful state. Quite clearly the economy had failed to recover from the damage inflicted by the ten years of insurgency. Neither the mining nor the tobacco industry were operating successfully. In 1824 a Congress finance committee had predicted that revenue from the tobacco monopoly would produce around \$2, 500, 000 annually. The truth was that in the next five years income did not exceed \$1, 212, 462.⁴⁴ The cotton industry still operated at an artisan level and could not compete with cheaper foreign imports. The previous administration's attempt to solve some of this problem by prohibiting the import of cheap foreign cloth had been unsuccessful. Prohibiting imports of cheap cloth did not help to make domestic cotton cheaper; nor did it ensure a protected market, as foreign cloth was easily smuggled into the country.⁴⁵

In order to bring the economy out of the doldrums, the government (or more precisely, the cabinet ministers Alamán and Mangino) tried to stimulate industry and encourage domestic investment and enterprise by creating a public loan company, named the *Banco de Avío*. The ministers introduced this scheme to Congress in the summer of 1830. The bank would provide loans to new companies who wished to become involved in industries such as mining, textile production or ironworks, to aid in the establishment of factories. It would also sell machines to these new industries below market prices. In order to finance the Bank the prohibition on the import of cheap foreign cotton would be lifted and 20 per cent of a new import duty would be channelled into its coffers.⁴⁶ The idea was to encourage the setting up of new factories

⁴³ Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals*, pp. 56-57.

⁴⁴ Barbara Tenenbaum, *México en la época de los agiotistas* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1985), p. 55.

⁴⁵ Robert A. Potash, *El Banco de Avío en México. El fomento de la industria, 1821-1846* (Mexico City/Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1959), pp. 55-56.

⁴⁶ Potash, *El Banco de Avío*, p. 76.

throughout the Republic by private investors, and in this way begin the modernisation of industry. The proposal became law in October and the first loans were allocated in December. On the surface the project appears to have been quite successful at regenerating interest in investing in industry. In its report of 1831, the Bank reported that 14 new companies had been established in the Republic.⁴⁷ However, as Robert Potash points out, this new enthusiasm was not simply due to the promise of aid from the Bank. State governors were encouraged, if not pressured, by Alamán, to find investors in their own states to set up companies. In Guanajuato, three companies were set up by the governor in Celaya, San Miguel and León. In these districts, the local *jefe político* was charged with visiting potential investors to persuade them to buy shares in the companies.⁴⁸ In Mexico City, Alamán himself oversaw the creation of the *Compañía Industrial Mexicana*, which began with capital of more than \$30,000.⁴⁹ The Church also took a significant role in setting up other companies. Groups of clerics bought shares or donated money to new enterprise. Some even sat on boards of management. Others encouraged their parishioners to invest in new companies from the pulpit.⁵⁰ The limit of the Bank's success in simulating private industry can also be measured in the funds it allocated. Both its major loans between 1831 and 1832 were made to companies whose directors had personal connections with the board of the Bank. A silk factory in Guanajuato, run by Domingo Lazo de la Vega, a friend of Alamán, was awarded \$6,450 in 1830 and \$12,940 in 1832.⁵¹ The Director of the Bank acted as guarantor of a loan worth \$12,000, granted to an iron smelting factory in Cuautla, in 1832.⁵² Even so, whether the new companies were the product of rising economic confidence or government pressure, by the end of 1831 it appeared that new

⁴⁷ Mexico City, Tlalnepantla, Tlaxcala, Puebla, San Andrés Tuxtla, Querétaro, Morelia, León, San Miguel de Allende, Celaya, San Luis Potosí, Chihuahua, Parral and Cuencamé. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 105, 107.

⁵² *Ibid.*

industries were at last beginning to establish itself in Mexico. In Puebla and Tlalpan construction had begun on textile factories. In Celaya and Querétaro land had been set aside for construction. Machinery for the cotton factory in Tlalpan and the wool factory in Querétaro had also been unloaded in Veracruz and was ready for transport.⁵³ Yet all would be put in jeopardy the following year by the civil war. The Bank's source of income was cut off when Santa Anna took control of Veracruz and Tampico. The imported machinery was trapped in Veracruz and much was left to go rusty on the docks where it had arrived. Thus, despite its promising beginnings and an overall investment of \$478, 000 by the end of 1832, the Bank could not boast of one business that was in production.⁵⁴

However, in the final report of his administration, written before the financial effects of the civil war could be counted, Mangino was able to offer a rosy picture of the success of the administration's financial strategy. According to the figures he provided, it was possible to see that import revenues had increased from \$4, 815, 418 in 1830, to \$8, 287, 082 in 1831; and that, as a consequence, the overall federal revenue from tax and duties had risen from \$12, 200, 020 in 1830 to \$17, 256, 882 in 1831. He could also speak of having a small surplus in his budget for the following year.⁵⁵ Part of this success may have been due to the increase in domestic tax on foreign goods of five per cent made in 1830, and to the Minister's vow to ensure larger revenues by organising the collection and distribution of tax more efficiently;⁵⁶ but some must indicate a discernible growth in the economy. These claims would be contested once the Bustamante administration had been overthrown. Barbara Tenenbaum observes that despite the financial success claimed by Mangino and later, Alamán, their government was forced to take out loans with the *agiotistas*, private

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

⁵⁵ Costeloe, *La primera república*, p. 304.

⁵⁶ Tenenbaum, *Mexico en la época de los agiotistas*, p. 57.

gentlemen and companies who lent money usually at ruinous rates of interest, amounting to \$2, 356, 997 in 1831 and \$3, 734 566 in 1832. A report commissioned in 1833 for the new government suggested that the outgoing administration had left debt amounting to \$11, 224, 567.⁵⁷ However, we must not forget that the civil war of 1832 proved catastrophic for the government's handling of the economy. Santa Anna seized the port of Veracruz in January 1832 and immediately took control of the custom house, effectively depriving the federal government of its revenue during the coming year. The port and customs house of Tampico also fell into rebel hands that March. With a major portion of its income gone and its costs rising due to the war, the administration had to finance its operations with other means. One solution was to take out the loans mentioned above. Others were to propose the sale of the *Fondo Píadoso de Californias*;⁵⁸ to increase the *alcabala* between three and four per cent;⁵⁹ and to introduce new emergency taxes on a variety of items such as carriages and stagecoaches, shops and cafes, as well as windows and balconies in Mexico City.⁶⁰ Quite clearly, we cannot judge the success or failure of the Bustamante administration's economic policy simply by contrasting the financial situation of 1833 with that of 1832. We must content ourselves instead by observing that before the civil war the *Banco de Avío* had brought new hope to the Mexican economy. That this new hope would have led to enduring financial stability, without the occurrence of the civil war can never be known.

The greatest beneficiary of the increase in government revenue during the Bustamante administration, was, without a doubt, the army. In the financial year of July 1831 to July 1832, a colossal \$10, 450, 251 was allocated from government revenue to be spent on the military. This was the greatest amount ever granted since

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁵⁸ Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, vol. 2, p. 456. Proposal dated 29 November 1832.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 454. Decree dated 15 November 1832.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 454, 469. Decrees dated 23 November 1832 and 11 December 1832.

independence.⁶¹ The size of the military budget reflects the importance attached to the army by the administration. This was a typical concern of governments with a traditionalist leaning. The more radical federalist governments tended to pay much more attention to the civil militias, whom the traditionalists generally regarded with suspicion, as these were usually made up of the lower classes and answered directly to each state government, rather than to the executive.⁶² The army also had an important place in Mexican society and politics. It is obvious from even a cursory glance at the progress of independent Mexico from 1821 to 1830, that elite army officers dominated the political scene. All those occupying the Presidency or Vice-Presidency had been Generals. Their approval or disapproval of political developments was highly significant, as the disaffected were liable to revolt against the sitting government, as had been seen in Veracruz (1822), Otumba (1827) and Jalapa (1829). While Josefina Vázquez has quite rightly pointed out that these *pronunciamientos* were only successful in the context of general discontent within the Republic, especially if they were led by civilian initiatives, it must not be forgotten that the army was the visible power broker.⁶³ It represented the constant threat of revolt, and, for that reason, it was important to keep it happy. This was not an easy thing to do, as the army was far from being a monolithic organisation with any definite ideology.⁶⁴ Its support had to be won not with policies, but with money. As a consequence of this, and because of the political influence wielded by many officers in key positions, the largest percentage of the government's budget always went on the military in the early national period. Even so, the general condition of the army in 1830 was terrible. The failure of previous governments to pay the wages of the soldiers regularly led to a lack of discipline and desertion, through which a great number of uniforms and much

⁶¹ Tenenbaum, *Mexico en la época de los agiostas*, pp. 59, 61.

⁶² Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals*, pp. 57-58.

⁶³ Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, "Political Plans and Collaboration Between Civilians and the Military, 1821-1846," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 15:1 (1996), p. 19

⁶⁴ Vázquez, "Iglesia, ejército y centralismo," pp. 212-213.

equipment was lost. The practice of pressing mostly Indians and criminals into service, and rounding up numbers with beggars and drunkards from the street meant that, in the words of José Antonio Facio, the army was composed of 'unos cuadros de gente armada sin disciplina ni moralidad y carecían muchos de ellos de vestuario, armas y caballos.'⁶⁵

For an administration that wished to install a strong, stable government, the rectification of this situation was of utmost importance. In the first place, it was crucial to have a contented army to prevent more unwanted rebellions and to aid the government with its attempts to maintain public order. As a popular refrain of the time puts it: 'Cuando los sueldos se pagan, las revoluciones se apagan.'⁶⁶ Thus, the administration used its increased investment to ensure wages were paid regularly and that the troops were provided with uniforms and weapons. Great effort was made to increase discipline and morale amongst the ranks.⁶⁷ Promotions, medals and pensions were handed out after the end of the War of the South and the success at Tolome in 1832. In February and March 1831, nine officers were promoted to the rank of *General de Brigada*, the second highest rank in the Mexican Army, and 26 to the rank of Colonel.⁶⁸ After the victory at Tolome, the troops received a weeks' double pay and

⁶⁵ José Antonio Facio, *Memoria del secretario de estado y del despacho de la guerra, presentada a las cámaras el día 24 de enero de 1831* (Mexico City: Imprenta del Águila, dirigida por José Ximeno, calle de Medinas, número 6, 1831), p. 5. For a description of life in the army in early independent Mexico, see Ruth R. Olivera and Liliane Crété, *Life in Mexico under Santa Anna, 1822-1855* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 159-179. Also, Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, pp. 229-230, and Stanley C. Green, *The Mexican Republic: The First Decade, 1823-1832* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), pp. 183-186.

⁶⁶ Donald F. Stevens, *Origins of Instability in Early Republican Mexico* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 10.

⁶⁷ Facio, *Memoria ... 1831*, p. 5.

⁶⁸ Generales de Brigada: Nicolás Catalán, José Antonio Facio, Felipe Codallos, Pedro Valdés, Antonio Mozo, Ignacio Inclán, Juan Amador, Juan José Andrade, Pedro Otero.

Colonels: Manuel Gil Pérez, Antonio Gaona, Rafael Borja, José de las Piedras, Victores Manero, Lino José Alcorta, Juan María de Azcararte, Joaquín Reyes, Tomán Ilanes, José Cayetano Montoya, José Ignacio de Garza Falcón, José María Mangino, Francisco Novoa, Antonio Castro, Joaquín Ramírez y Sesma, José María Malo, Fernando Franco, Josquín Correa, Cirilo Gómez Anaya, José Mariano Guerra Manzanares, Ramón Morales, Gabriel Durán, Mariano Arista, Antonio Villaurrita. *El Sol*, 13, 15 February, 27 March 1831.

a medal, while all sergeants and corporals were immediately promoted one rank.⁶⁹ All their efforts were quite successful, for in the event of the civil war in 1832, very few army units adhered to Santa Anna's plan. In fact, his campaign to overthrow Bustamante was only possible with the help of the state militias.⁷⁰ We assume that the Minister of War, Facio, was responsible for the increase in investment in the army during the Bustamante administration. However, we must not discount the possibility of some participation by the Vice-President. As we have commented in earlier chapters, General Bustamante had always shown great concern for the discipline and well-being of the troops under his command. Neither can we overlook the fact that Bustamante was a widely respected figure within the army by 1830. He had been one of those chosen to lead the Plan of Jalapa precisely because of his standing. It may well have been the officers' respect for him, as well as their gratitude for their improved financial position, that prevented many from joining Santa Anna in 1832.

The loyalty and discipline of the army were not the only concern for Bustamante's administration. For, like many modern authoritarian powers, the government recognised the intrinsic value of appearance, and knew that it was essential that the military looked good. Rather like Mussolini's trains, it would be a show case for the success of its regime. One indication of this is the interest taken by the administration in the appearance of its officers. In June 1830 a circular was issued, which berated the troops and officials for duties dressed in civilian clothes; for wearing a civilian rounded hat on the occasions that uniforms were worn; and for failing to wear their proper emblems of rank on their uniforms. They were ordered forthwith to end these practices, and to dress for duty in a way that reflected 'el brillo de la gloriosa carrera de las armas.' Generals were also told to wear the sashes that denoted their rank at all times, even when not in uniform 'para que se les respete y tengan las

⁶⁹ Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, vol. 2, p. 413. Law dated 15 March 1832.

⁷⁰ Vázquez, "Iglesia, ejército y centralismo," p. 215.

consideraciones que merecen por sus empleos.’⁷¹ In August 1831, completely new uniforms for Generals of all ranks were commissioned in time for the annual celebrations of 16 September.⁷² However, the most obvious indication of the administration's desire to impress is demonstrated by the concentration of their efforts on a small number of regiments. After all, a great change in the general state of the army could not be effected, or be commented on, simply in the space of a year. It was necessary therefore, to create model regiments through which to convince observers that the Mexican army had somehow been turned around. The most noticed regiments were the First and Second Cavalry, commanded by Gabriel Durán and Mariano Arista, both great friends of the Vice-President.⁷³ Carlos María de Bustamante noted, scandalised, in his diary after a military parade in 1831, that the horses' harnesses of the Third Regiment were made of pure silver.⁷⁴ A foreign observer commented that both forces: ‘en hombres, en caballos, en aparato militar, competían con los mejores cuerpos de Europa.’⁷⁵ It is probable that this concern for appearance originated from the Minister of War. Facio had spent his adolescence in Spain in the Royal Spanish Guards⁷⁶ and it was rumoured that, as a result, he was obsessed with the importance of uniforms and military power. The regiments of Durán and Arista were said to be his pride and joy.⁷⁷

⁷¹ Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, vol. 2, pp. 267-268. Circular of the Ministry of War, dated 30 June 1830.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 390. Circular dated 10 August 1831.

⁷³ Correspondence of Mariano Arista in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin (henceforth referred to as CMA) folder 8. Mariano Arista to Miguel Barriero, Mexico City 30 May 1832. ‘Durán y yo somos entusiastas como V. sabe por la persona de nuestro gran amigo el general Bustamante y estoy seguro que moriremos antes que abandonar a este sin igual amigo.’ Bustamante would stand as *padrino* for Arista's wedding in 1838, see SDN: SC XI/III/1-32/101.

⁷⁴ Bustamante, *Diario histórico*, entry for 2 June 1831.

⁷⁵ LAF no. 338. Un español, *Dos años en México, o memorias críticas sobre los principales sucesos de la República de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos desde la invasión de Barradas hasta la declaración del Puerto de Tampico contra el gobierno del general Bustamante. Escrito por un español* (Valencia: Imprenta de Cabrerizo, 1838), p. 41.

⁷⁶ SDN: SC XI/III/ 2-815/00013. Service Record for José Antonio Facio, Facio was born in the city of Veracruz in 1792, he spent between 1809 and 1824 in Spain.

⁷⁷ Un español, *Dos años en México*, p. 41.

At the same time as the Bustamante administration worked to strengthen the regular army, it also made every effort to weaken the states' civil militias and to reduce their numbers significantly. The reasoning for this, provided by Alamán in his ministerial report of 1830, was that large civil militias were damaging to local economies, because a call to arms removed most of the working population from any given village.⁷⁸ This economic argument was also used by Facio, who, in his own ministerial report, noted that a great saving could be made from the public purse if the militias were to stand down.⁷⁹ However, it is obvious that this is not the only reason the administration wished to weaken the militias. Two other concerns are also clear from Alamán's discussion of the subject. The first is that the militias were composed of undesirable members of society.⁸⁰ They represented the arming of the rabble, something which a traditionalist government dedicated to the introduction of constitutional order could not accept. The second is that the militias were open to abuse by those who considered them 'como ejércitos particulares de los Estados.' This might lead the militias to be involved in conflicts with neighbouring states or even the federal government.⁸¹ In other words, unlike the regular army which was directly administrated by the executive, the militias were the domain of the states and could be used to oppose central government. This, as we know from our previous discussions, was not acceptable to Bustamante or his cabinet. Therefore, the government decided to move, not simply to reduce numbers, but to change its composition and duties; and in so doing, remove much of its potential power. Alamán proposed that the militias should be organised, as they had been in Bourbon Mexico, into Urban Battalions and Rural Companies. The former were to keep the peace in towns and villages, and the

⁷⁸ Alamán, "Memoria ... 1830," pp. 191-192.

⁷⁹ José Antonio Facio, *Memoria del secretario de estado y del despacho de la guerra, presentada a las cámaras el 16 de marzo de 1830* (Mexico City: Imprenta del Águila, dirigida por José Ximeno, calle de las Medinas, número 6, 1830), p. 1. In the British Library.

⁸⁰ Alamán, "Memoria ... 1830," p. 192.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 194-195.

latter would patrol roads and haciendas for the same purpose. These militias should be recruited solely from the propertied classes, he asserted, as they were the people most interested in preserving public order. In order to be prepared for any foreign attack he suggested that a small number of men in each of the states be allowed to form reserve companies, which could be called on only in time of need. The current militias were to be suppressed.⁸² Of course, these ideas could only be implemented in the Federal District and Territories. However, the fall in the numbers of civil militia from the 22, 084 men recorded as holding arms in 1830,⁸³ to 5, 509 in 1833⁸⁴ indicates that most of the other states undertook measures to reduce their forces drastically. Even so, we must be careful before assuming that these attacks on the civil militias originated solely in the Plan of Jalapa. As Fowler has pointed out, they represented the continuation of the moderate liberal policies of Guadalupe Victoria's government, whose ministers had also worked to strengthen the regular army and reduce the militia.⁸⁵

The welfare of the Church was as important as that of the army for the Bustamante administration. This was mostly due to the fact that it was undoubtedly the most powerful institution in Mexican society. This power was mainly built on wealth and influence. The Church was one of the most important property owners in the Republic and probably owned half of Mexico's national wealth. It also held great influence over the population in political as well as religious matters.⁸⁶ Thus, it was important to win the support of the church. It could be a useful source of funds in these financially difficult times, and its vocal support could perhaps help maintain the authority of the administration. However, the Church was also an important symbol of

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 192-193.

⁸³ Facio, *Memoria ... 1830*, p. 8.

⁸⁴ José Joaquín Parres, *Memoria del secretario de estado y del despacho de la guerra, presentada a las cámaras el día 26 de abril de 1833*, (Mexico City: Imprenta del Águila, dirigida por José Ximeno, calle de Medinas, número 6, 1833), p. 1. In the British Library.

⁸⁵ Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals*, p. 58.

⁸⁶ Anne Staples, *La iglesia en la primera república federal, 1824-1835* (Mexico City: SepSetentas, 1976), p. 15.

a traditional society and values, a symbol of Hispanic culture. The promotion of its well-being was an important defence against the rise of radicalism and the protection of the *status quo*. Finally, like the army and the economy, the Church seemed threatened by the weakness of its organisation in 1830. Independence from Spain had caused grave problems for the clergy. The King of Spain had exercised the right of patronage, or the appointment of all ecclesiastical positions during the Colony. This practice abruptly ended with the declaration of independence and the problem of who should then properly operate the patronage had to be faced.⁸⁷ This problem was compounded by the Pope's refusal to recognise Mexico as an independent country, which of course meant that, at least in theory, the Spanish crown should still control Mexican appointments.⁸⁸ Nine years after independence the implications of these problems were to become clear. There were now no serving bishops left in Mexico, as all previous incumbents had died or, being against independence, had returned to Spain. The latter were most problematic, as in the eyes of the Pope, the dioceses were not officially vacant.⁸⁹ In the cathedral chapters of 1830, out of a possible 185 prebendaries available, only 74 were filled.⁹⁰ Even at the level of parishes shortages were also keenly felt. In Michoacán, for example, only 27 out of 115 parishes had their own permanent priest. In Mexico, only 30 out of 245 parishes were served by a permanent priest. It was clear that efforts had to be made to fill the vacant positions, even if the thorny problem of the right of patronage could not be resolved.⁹¹

Two attempts were made to strengthen the organisation of the Church through the appointment of senior clerics by Bustamante's administration. The first was a policy inherited from Vicente Guerrero's government. In September, taking advantage

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁹⁰ Michael Costeloe, *Church and State in Independent Mexico. A Study of the Patronage Debate* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), p. 120.

⁹¹ Staples, *La iglesia en la primera república federal*, p. 26.

of his extraordinary powers, President Guerrero had ordered the chapter of each diocese to submit a list of candidates for their vacant bishopric. It was intended that the government would then choose candidates from these lists to submit to the Pope later through the Mexican emissary, Francisco Pablo Vázquez. In this way, his administration bypassed the still ongoing discussions on the subject of patronage, and instead laid out its claim through the use of precedent. When Bustamante came to power in 1830 this process was reaching completion, and his government was able to take advantage of the legislation introduced by Guerrero to choose its approved candidates for presentation by Vázquez. These proposals were submitted in March 1830, and in the following year, after much negotiation, were approved by the Pope, even though the Vatican still refused to recognise Mexico's independence. Even so, the appointments were undoubtedly an achievement for the Mexican Church as they provided its hierarchy with clear leadership. Three days of celebrations were organised in May 1831 when news of the Pope's decision reached Mexico.⁹²

Complementing this move to fill the vacant sees, Bustamante's administration also introduced legislation to allow the appointment of prebendaries and canons in the Cathedral chapters and in this way, tried to restore the second level of Church hierarchy to working order. Again, this policy was designed to side-step the patronage debate. In 1830 it was proposed in Congress that until the patronage issue was resolved, the chapters themselves should be authorised to fill their vacant positions. In May 1831 a law was passed which authorised the bishops, with the support of their chapters, to appoint prebends, canons and other chapter dignitaries. In each state the governor was given power of veto, and in the Metropolitan District, this power was granted to the President. This legislation resulted in the occupation of vacancies in the

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 76-82. Costeloe, *Church and State in Independent Mexico*, pp.118-120. The appointments were: Juan Cayetano Portugal as Bishop of Michoacán, Francisco Vázquez as Bishop of Puebla, José Miguel Gordo y Barrios as Bishop of Guadalajara, Antonio Zubiría y Escalante as Bishop of Durango, Luis García Guillén as Bishop of Chiapas and José María de Jesús Belaunzarán y Ureña as Bishop of Nuevo León.

cathedrals of Mexico, Guadalajara, Michoacán, Puebla, Chiapas and Oaxaca. However, this solution to the pressing problem of empty cathedral chapters was not universally popular. Opponents in Congress believed that the measures effectively abandoned the government's claim to the national right of patronage.⁹³

In fact, the debates surrounding the law concerning the appointment to the cathedral chapters demonstrate the power the Church had in Congress, and the strength of the support it received from Bustamante's government. Various amendments proposed by deputies opposed to the bill, designed to protect the national right of patronage, were blocked in the Chamber by the clerical vote, which constituted around half of the deputies in attendance. A move to prevent the clerics voting in this matter, proposed by Juan de Dios Cañedo, on the grounds that they had a personal interest in the law, was rejected. When some thirteen disillusioned deputies tried to leave the Chamber during a debate, they found the door blocked by soldiers.⁹⁴ The high number of clerics present in Congress in these debates in spring 1831 was a result of the new election laws introduced in the previous year and put into action in the Congressional elections of 1830. The success of the law governing the appointments of canons and prebends indicated that this increased representation had also brought increased power. Even so, we must be wary of assuming that the clergy, anymore than the army, formed a monolithic group and that its increased presence in Congress necessarily meant it presented an unassailable coalition. As Anne Staples has pointed out: 'la iglesia no presentó un frente unido ni una actuación uniforme [...] y sus miembros no obraron todos juntos.' In Congress, as in other walks of life, 'los sacerdotes elegidos como diputados [...] actuaban casi siempre de acuerdo con sus convicciones personales.'⁹⁵

⁹³ Staples, *La iglesia en la primera república federal*, pp. 62-67. Costeloe, *Church and State in Independent Mexico*, pp. 120-124.

⁹⁴ Costeloe, *Church and State in Independent Mexico*, pp. 123-124.

⁹⁵ Staples, *La iglesia en la primera república federal*, p.162. Also see, Anne Staples, "Clerics as Politicians: Church, State and Political Power in Independent Mexico," in Jaime Rodríguez O. (ed.).

We must also be wary of arguing that Bustamante's regime deliberately set out to strengthen the Church's political position. After all, the electoral reform was designed to promote the election of property-holders to Congress, not specifically clergymen. The law on prebendaries and canons was an interim measure, made necessary by the fact that, despite nine years of discussions, the question of who should exercise the right of patronage was still undecided. The Bustamante administration had not abandoned all claim to this right, but had, in fact, made the selection of which clerics should be proposed as bishops before the Pope. It seems more likely that the Bustamante administration was concerned to court favour with the Church, especially with the hierarchy, through both measures. The administration's support of the Church, must have almost certainly come at a price: its political and financial support. The Vice-President was not adverse to writing to the cathedral chapters to ask for a loan or advance payment of the Church's tithe revenue.⁹⁶ The Minister of Justice, Espinosa addressed a circular to all diocesan governors in 1830, asking them to use their influence and resources to promote the government's achievements in introducing peace and order to Mexico. In the same year he wrote to the metropolitan chapter to demand that a priest who had preached against the government be demoted.⁹⁷ Finally, seen in terms of the regime's general policies, it could be argued that, given the almost non-existent state of the Church's organisational framework in 1830, the administration could not perceive it as anything other than another victim of the chaos infecting Mexican society. As the proponents of constitutional order, they would be obliged to rectify the situation.

Mexico in the Age of Democratic Revolutions, 1750-1850 (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), pp. 223-241.

⁹⁶ Staples, *La iglesia en la primera república federal*, p. 124.

⁹⁷ Costeloe, *Church and State in Independent Mexico*, p 42.

D: Dealing with the Opposition

Bustamante's administration faced serious opposition from the many supporters of Vicente Guerrero in Mexico City and the states from its very inception. In January 1830, the Chamber of Deputies was composed of a majority of supporters of the previous government. In defiance of the new order, they elected the radical, José María Alpuche e Infante, as President of their chamber. Two newspapers: *El Atleta* and, Lorenzo de Zavala's journal, *El Correo de la Federación Mexicana*, provided the printed medium for other voices of dissent in the capital. In the states, opposition to the new government was most evident in the south of the states of Mexico and Michoacán (modern day Guerrero). It was originally begun by the deposed governor of Michoacán, José Salgado and the former Commander General of the state, José Codallos. Both men were removed from office by the provisions of article four of the Plan of Jalapa. Mariano Michelena, a supporter of the Plan, had led the garrison of the state capital in rebellion against the governor, and persuaded the city's *ayuntamiento* to press the federal government for Salgado's removal. In response the governor and his Commander General gathered an army in Zamora. The government sent troops under Antonio García and General Armijo to subdue the rebels, and after several weeks of fighting, succeeded in capturing Salgado, who was taken to Mexico City and sentenced to death. Codallos escaped. On 10 March he issued a plan which called for the re-establishment of the deposed legislatures, the end to oppression and for Congress to decide who was the legitimate president.⁹⁸ On 13 March, *El Registro Oficial* reported that Guerrero had left his voluntary retirement in Tixtla accompanied by Francisco Victoria and the escort that had travelled with him from Mexico City. His objective was apparently a reunion with Codallos and his

⁹⁸ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 261-261.

supporters.⁹⁹ He was quickly joined by Juan Álvarez, and soon the revolt spread throughout the South.

For Bustamante's administration, dealing with the uprising in the South and opposition in Mexico City was part of its crusade against the radical *yorkinos* and their *jacobino* sympathies. Facio claimed that 'la rebelión del sur fue la continuación del motín de la Acordada.'¹⁰⁰ Alamán described the War of the South as having 'el carácter de las invasiones que hacían los pueblos bárbaros del Norte sobre la provincia romana.'¹⁰¹ For good measure, both men accused Guerrero of deliberately attempting to incite a caste war in order to further his cause.¹⁰² Their response to the uprising was to send troops, first under the command of José Gabriel Armijo and later, Nicolás Bravo. These engaged in a bloody guerrilla war for approximately a year, without any major success. The *yorkinos* were seen as criminals by the government and their supporters. They had incited the terrible riot of the Parián market, in which, as *El Registro Oficial* reminded its readers in April 1830: 'hizo correr en abundancia la sangre mexicana y se atacó y destruyó la propiedad de un modo inhumana y escandaloso.'¹⁰³ According to this newspaper, and others which supported the government, the *yorkinos* had continued their evil ways in government, but now it was time that they were punished. *El Sol* declared on 13 January 1830:

Dos frutos espera la nación de su acción restauradora de las leyes: el legal castigo de los criminales que se han gozado en sus padecimientos, y verlos reducidos a la dicha imposibilidad de repetir sus atentados.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ *El Registro Oficial*, 13 March 1830.

¹⁰⁰ José Antonio Facio, *Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio y sobre la causa intentada contra los cuatro ministros del excelentísimo señor vice-presidente D. Anastasio Bustamante, presenta a los mexicanos el general ex-ministro de guerra y marina, Don José Antonio Facio* (Paris: Imprenta de Moquet y Compañía, calle de la Harpe, no. 90, 1835), p. 116.

¹⁰¹ Alamán, "Memoria ... 1831," p. 259.

¹⁰² Alamán, *Historia de México*, vol. 5, p. 490. Facio, *Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio*, p. 72.

¹⁰³ *El Registro Oficial*, 12 April 1830.

¹⁰⁴ *El Sol*, 13 January 1830.

In the eyes of those who thought like Francisco Ibar, this wish was not 'una negra venganza' but rather 'el justo castigo [...] que reclama la vindicta pública.'¹⁰⁵

However, it is clear that the Bustamante administration did not feel able to undertake the persecution of the *yorkinos* simply as retribution for the events of 1828. The three main men considered to be the architects of the riot were not immediately arrested. Guerrero was allowed to return to his hacienda in Tixtla without interference, the Chamber of Deputies was allowed to elect Father Alpuche e Infante and Zavala was left to continue the production of *El Correo*. It was necessary for the restorers of 'Constitución y Leyes' that their enemies were proved to be acting in a manner which merited their detention. Of course, as we noted above, Father Alpuche e Infante obliged the government in January by writing to General Terán to urge him to rebel against Bustamante. He was later exiled. Guerrero similarly aided the administration by deciding to join the rebellion in the South. Another rebellion planned in Mexico City by deputy Anastasio Zerecero, which apparently proposed the assassination of the Vice-President, provided the necessary material for his arrest and exile.¹⁰⁶ Even so, not all the government's enemies were so obliging, and alternative methods had to be employed. According to Zavala, the Minister of War, Facio, made two attempts to incriminate him in falsified plots against the government. On one occasion he was invited to join a rebellion by an old acquaintance, who later confessed to be working for the Minister. In the second, a letter apparently signed by Zavala was 'discovered' in a doorway, and presented to the Vice-President. The letter was addressed to the governor of Zacatecas, Francisco García and proposed rebellion. The signature proved to have been produced using a stamp Zavala had employed to sign

¹⁰⁵ Francisco Ibar, *Regeneración política de la república mexicana o cuadro histórico-crítico de los sucesos políticos acaecidos en ella desde el 23 de diciembre de 1829 hasta el 19 de junio de 1830* (Mexico City: Imprenta de la calle cerrado de Jesús, número 1, a cargo del ciudadano Tomás Uribe y Alcalde, 1830), vol. 2, no. 2, 30 December 1829, pp. 5-6.

¹⁰⁶ *El Registro Oficial*, 25 March, 23 June 1830.

lottery tickets when he was Minister of Hacienda. Zavala resolved to leave Mexico as a result.¹⁰⁷

The exile of figures like Alpuche, Zerecero and Zavala was not the retribution that many of the supporters of the Plan of Jalapa had expected. Carlos María de Bustamante considered that the government showed 'inconsiderada clemencia.'¹⁰⁸ Francisco Ibar complained that the Vice President showed 'apatía y lenidad' by not executing these men and, that he risked allowing them to repeat 'sus proyectos de destrucción' in the near future.¹⁰⁹ Most outrage surrounded the case of Lieutenant Mariano Zerecero, who had been arrested, court-martialled and sentenced to death for his involvement in his brother, Anastasio's, plans for rebellion. Zerecero's sentence was suspended in the final hours before the planned execution by the Vice-President. He ordered that a proposal that his sentence be commuted to ten years' exile be put before Congress.¹¹⁰ The newspaper, *El Sol* expressed its opinion that Zerecero should have been shot as sentenced without any interferences from the government.¹¹¹ Ibar launched a series of attacks on Bustamante in his periodical, accusing him of being a traitor to the cause of Jalapa and betraying the trust of those who had supported him.¹¹² Both he and Carlos María Bustamante believed that the Vice-President had been unduly influenced by his *compadre*, Colonel Manuel Barrera, who was opposed to this execution, into taking this action.¹¹³ Bustamante pointed out that the Vice-President had appointed Barrera's son to review Zerecero's sentence, and it had been

¹⁰⁷ Zavala, *Ensayo histórico*, vol. 2, pp. 232-233.

¹⁰⁸ *La Voz de la Patria*, 3 November 1830. Bustamante was the editor of this publication.

¹⁰⁹ Ibar, *Regeneración política*, vol. 3, no. 3, 3 July 1830, p. 6.

¹¹⁰ *El Registro Oficial*, 29 May 1830.

¹¹¹ *El Sol*, 4 June 1830.

¹¹² Ibar, *Regeneración política*, vol. 2, no. 50, 19 June 1830, vol. 3, no.1 and 3, 23 June, 3 July 1830.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p.3. To illustrate this point Ibar writes: 'Bustamante se ha dejado dominar por su compadre Barrera, y según los principios que se notan, con el tiempo será él quien rija los destinos de la república. Él entra en el palacio gritando y usando de su *carácter despótico*, como si estuviera en su casa, y aun se ha dicho que estando en junta de ministros ha tenido el atrevimiento de introducirse en donde está, gritando a su *compadre*, de manera que alguno de los ministros ha tenido que salirse incómodo. [...] El sr. vice-presidente le debe favores y no se le podrá negar, como no pudo evitar el que se infringiera las leyes por un yorkino sedicioso [Zerecero].' His italics.

the result of this review that the sentence had been commuted. He also complained that Barrera and the Minister of Justice, Espinosa, who was ultimately responsible for Zerecero's sentence, were also well known friends; and that it was rumoured that Barrera had convinced the Vice-President to appoint him to that position.¹¹⁴ In his newspaper, *La Voz de la Patria*, Carlos María de Bustamante published an exposition he had addressed to the government, in which he called for Zerecero to be executed as originally sentenced and for Espinosa to be removed as Minister of Justice.¹¹⁵ The problem was, as the British Minister Richard Pakenham observed in August, that the punishment the supporters of the Plan of Jalapa wanted to see meted out in accordance with the promise of the government to enforce strong constitutional order, was only being applied to those men who enjoyed no privileges in society.¹¹⁶ For, as he concludes:

The fate of these obscure and friendless individuals, when contrasted with the impunity enjoyed by culprits of higher rank who have possessed the means of averting the vengeance of the law, must I should think, fail to make that satisfactory impression which is the object of a vigorous and inflexible enforcement of the law.¹¹⁷

Perhaps as a result of criticism of the regime's perceived leniency towards the privileged, in his speech to the opening of the extraordinary sessions of Congress in June 1830, the Vice-President assured the representatives that his government had abandoned 'los medios de la lenidad' and was now employing 'providencias fuertes y el uso de las armas' to ensure that order and tranquillity were restored to the

¹¹⁴ *La Voz de la Patria*, 2 June 1830.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 5 June 1830.

¹¹⁶ On 18 August 1830, three soldiers implicated in a plot to assassinate the Vice-President, Manuel Bello, José Echeverría and Damián Najera were executed. Zavala, *Ensayo histórico*, vol. 2, pp. 255, 258. FO no. 50/61, p.176. Richard Pakenham to the Earl of Aberdeen, Mexico City 30 August 1830. Pakenham describes them as a sargeant and two lieutenants, and states that these executions as the only ones that have been thus far carried out by the government.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Republic.’¹¹⁸ Signs of this new approach began to be seen by the end of the summer. In September, Francisco Victoria, the brother of the former President, and Juan Nepomuceno Rosains, a noted hero of the insurgency, were shot in Puebla after being arrested for plotting a rebellion in favour of Guerrero.¹¹⁹ Neither their own positions nor those of their friends and relations were able to save them. In November, Colonels Joaquín Garate and José Márquez were shot in San Luis Potosí, again accused of plotting rebellion.¹²⁰ It appears that the regime had heeded its critics.

This move towards ‘providencias fuertes’ can also be seen in the Bustamante regime's treatment of the press. In early 1830, new measures were introduced, tightening the law which dealt with material deemed to be libellous. One measure was a decree which allowed judges to impose fines upon those producing such material. In May 1830, this new power was used with success against the opposition newspaper, *El Atleta*. Its editors were fined the sum of 3, 000 pesos and, being unable to make the payment, had their printing presses confiscated.¹²¹ By 1831 however, the government had begun to supplement these fines with violent intimidation. Andrés Quintana Roo began to publish a newspaper, *El Federalista*, in January. This regularly branded the government illegitimate and accused it of employing terror tactics against its opponents. In February, his offices were visited by a group of military officers, who threatened to destroy his presses. Quintana Roo was not present at the time, so the soldiers proceeded to visit his house. It was clear they intended to assault the deputy. He was saved by the quickwittedness of his wife, the insurgent heroine, Leona

¹¹⁸ “Discurso del general Bustamante en la apertura de las sesiones extraordinarias del Congreso General, el 28 de junio de 1830,” in *Los presidentes de México antes de la Nación, 1821-1984* (Mexico City: LII Legislatura de la Cámara de Diputados, 1985), vol. 1, p. 111.

¹¹⁹ Zavala, *Ensayo histórico*, vol. 2, p. 254.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 276.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 233-234. Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 269. Costeloe points out that Zavala originally claimed the fine to be of between 8,000 and 9, 000 pesos in a publication of 1830 entitled: *Juicio imparcial sobre los acontecimientos de México en 1828 y 1829*. This was changed to 3, 000 in the *Ensayo*, written a number of years later. Whether the passing of years had made him forget the true sum, or be less liable to exaggeration, we can never know.

Vicario, who told the soldiers her husband was not in.¹²² Similarly, in November, a group of soldiers attacked the printing presses of the newspaper *El Tribuno del Pueblo Mexicano*. The editor, Manuel Crescencio Rejón, was attacked in the street by the same soldiers.¹²³

The most famous victim of this new policy of ruthlessness was, of course, Vicente Guerrero. Guerrero had been involved in the guerrilla war in the South against the government troops led by Nicolás Bravo and José Gabriel Armijo, with his allies Álvarez, Codallos, Gordiano Guzmán and José Salgado (who escaped from prison in August 1830), since March 1830. By December, it was clear the war had reached an impasse. The rebels were in a strong position on the coast and it seemed unlikely that the government could defeat them but, the rebels had few allies outside the South and were effectively isolated.¹²⁴ This stalemate was famously broken by the intervention of an Italian ship's captain Francisco Picaluga, who tricked Guerrero into boarding his ship in Acapulco in January 1831 and imprisoned him. He then sailed for Oaxaca where he surrendered his prisoner to the government authorities. From here Guerrero was taken to Cuilapa where he was court-martialled and shot on 14 February. Without Guerrero as a figurehead for the rebellion, the War in the South came to an end. Álvarez negotiated peace and amnesties for his followers with Bravo. Only Codallos refused to accept an amnesty. He was later caught and shot.¹²⁵

The capture of Guerrero appears to have been organised by the Minister of War, José Antonio Facio. In 1833, during the prosecution of Bustamante's cabinet by Congress, it was alleged that just before Picaluga kidnapped Guerrero, he had visited Mexico City where, in a meeting with Facio, had promised to deliver up the rebel

¹²² Anna, *Forging Mexico*, pp. 234-235. Jaime E. Rodríguez O., "Oposición a Bustamante," *Historia Mexicana* 20:2 (1970), pp. 208-209.

¹²³ Rejón was chased through the streets by soldiers brandishing unsheathed sabres. He escaped by climbing into a carriage. Bustamante, *Diario histórico*, entries for 26, 29 October, 3 November 1831.

¹²⁴ Guardino, *Peasants, Politics and the Formation of Mexico's National State*, p. 135.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

general for \$50, 000.¹²⁶ In his published defence to the various charges brought against him in the trial, Facio denied this, and claimed instead that Picaluga had merely offered to sell his ship to the government.¹²⁷ However, Carlos María de Bustamante notes in his diary, on 2 February 1831, that Facio boasted to him that such a deal to capture Guerrero had been struck with the Italian in December 1830. He claims that Facio had informed the cabinet of his arrangement with Picaluga shortly afterwards, but that the response of his fellow ministers had been disbelief and laughter.¹²⁸ This story seems credible, for Picaluga did not hand his boat to the Mexican government, yet he was paid the promised \$50, 000. Colonel Gabriel Durán was dispatched to Oaxaca with the money almost as soon as news reached the capital of Guerrero's capture.¹²⁹

The circumstances surrounding the execution of Guerrero are not so straightforward. General José Antonio Mejía, in his statement for the trial of 1833, asserted that the fate of Guerrero was decided in a cabinet meeting. He claimed to have seen letters written by Bustamante to General Santa Anna and Colonel Pedro Landero, in which the Vice-President explained the matter had been resolved by a vote. According to Mejía, three votes had been in favour of execution and only one against. The implication was that Bustamante, in these circumstances, did not need to vote.¹³⁰ José María Lafragua claimed in 1854 that José María Tornel had confided to him the confession made to him by Alamán on his deathbed. Alamán declared that the cabinet had voted thus: Bustamante, Espinosa and Facio for death, and Alamán and

¹²⁶ "Acusación del sr. general D. Juan Álvarez," and "Acusación del sr. diputado D. José Antonio Barragán," in Cámara de Diputados, *Proceso instructivo formado por la sección del Gran Jurado de la Cámara de Diputados del Congreso General, en averiguación de los delitos de que fueron acusados los ex-ministros D. Lucas Alamaán, D. Rafael Mangino, D. José Antonio Facio y D. José Ignacio Espinosa* (Mexico City: Impreso por Ignacio Cumplido, calle de Zuleta, número 14, 1833), pp. 1-5. In CONDUMEX.

¹²⁷ Facio, *Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio*, p. 33.

¹²⁸ Bustamante, *Diario histórico*, entry for 2 February 1831.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, entry for 1 February 1831.

¹³⁰ "Declaración del sr. general José María Mejía," in *ibid.*, p. 29.

Mangino for exile. Lafragua asserts that he searched for evidence of this at the Ministry of War, and found the relevant documents had been destroyed.¹³¹ However, at the time, in their responses to the charges, all four ministers denied that any such cabinet meeting took place. Facio, Alamán and Mangino insist that the Vice-President approached them personally with a scheme to commute any death sentence to exile.¹³² Espinosa denied all knowledge of any matter on the subject.¹³³ The letters written by Bustamante to Santa Anna and Landero do not clear up the matter. In the letter to Landero of 9 February 1831, Bustamante wrote:

Había acordado en una junta de ministros una iniciativa pidiendo que [Guerrero] viviese en país extranjero con una asignación que se consideraba bastante para una cómoda subsistencia, con prohibición de volver a pisar el territorio mexicano, pero habiendo observado que la opinión dentro y fuera de las cámaras se manifestaba en contra de esta medida, se omitió este paso.¹³⁴

Or, in other words, that it was opposition from Congress that dissuaded the cabinet from exiling Guerrero. Yet later in a letter to Santa Anna of 24 February, he changed his mind and blamed the cabinet for persuading him not to introduce his initiative to Congress:

Deseaba con empeño salvarle la vida, y acordé en junta de ministros una iniciativa a las cámaras pidiendo que saliera de la república, pero la opinión contraria que manifestó la mayoría de sus miembros, cuando se les insinuó en lo particular, fue causa de que se suspendiese.¹³⁵

¹³¹ Enrique Olavarria y Ferrari, "Mexico independiente, 1821-1855," in Vicente Riva Palacio (ed.), *México através de los siglos*. (Mexico City: Ballesca y Compañía, 1888-1889), vol. 4, p. 276-278, Anna, *Forging Mexico*, p. 244.

¹³² Facio, *Memoria que sobre los sucesos de sus ministerio*, p. 86, Alamán, "Defensa del ex-ministro de relaciones," pp. 92-93 and "Contestación del sr. Mangino," in Cámara de Diputados, *Proceso instructivo*, p. 57.

¹³³ "Contestación del sr. Espinosa a los cargos," in *ibid.*, p. 60.

¹³⁴ Bustamante to Pedro Landero, Mexico City, 9 February 1831, in Olavarria y Ferrari, "México independiente," p. 278, footnote 1.

¹³⁵ Bustamante to Antonio López de Santa Anna, 24 February 1831, in *ibid.*, p. 279.

Finally, a year later, in a letter to the Grand Jury of Congress during the trial of his cabinet, he claimed that the above letter had been written incorrectly by his secretary:

Aunque en la carta citada se habla de junta de ministros, fue una equivocación de mi secretario privado, porque no la hubo en realidad, y solo les hablé en lo particular separadamente sobre la iniciativa que yo mismo redacté y mandé al secretario de la Guerra para que la presentase; pero que no tuvo efecto por los motivos que se expresan en la misma carta.¹³⁶

What is apparent in these letters, is that Bustamante personally did not want to see Guerrero executed. In fact, he himself was responsible for drawing up an initiative for Congress which proposed his exile. This tallies with the evidence of Alamán, Facio and Mangino, and also with that of Carlos María Bustamante, who in his diary reports on 2 February of rumours that the administration was to present a bill to Congress calling for Guerrero's exile to Liorna with a pension of 2, 000 pesos. On 5 February, he reports that 'el vice-presidente no quiere que se le hable de fusilarlo [Guerrero], y muestra el mayor empeño en libertarlo.'¹³⁷ What is also clear, is that the mood in Mexico City amongst those who generally supported the government was not in favour of this measure. Congress rejected a measure brought forward by deputy Mariano Brasco to suspend all executions (including Guerrero's) until the amnesty law currently under discussion was passed.¹³⁸ Carlos María de Bustamante's own response to the rumour that Guerrero may be sent to Liorna is unequivocal: 'Esto es muy alarmante [...] si se indultase, su regreso sería seguro como el de Iturbide.'¹³⁹ Richard Pakenham noted that Guerrero's eventual execution caused 'little sensation,' which was surprising considering how popular he had been.¹⁴⁰ Obviously, a certain kind of

¹³⁶ Bustamante to the Grand Jury, 1 May 1833, in *ibid.*

¹³⁷ Bustamante, *Diario histórico*, entries for 2 and 5 February 1831.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, entry for 4 February 1831.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, entry for 2 February 1831.

¹⁴⁰ FO no. 50/65, p. 176. Pakenham to Viscount Palmerston, Mexico City, 1 March 1831.

opinion on the subject of the General was dominant at that time. However, whether Bustamante was persuaded not to go ahead with his initiative because of the opposition manifested by his cabinet, or by that present in Congress, or even because he came to the conclusion that the safest way to deal with the threat of Guerrero was execution, will never be known.

E: The *hombres de bien* and the New Opposition.

Anastasio Bustamante's speech to the opening of Congress of 1 January 1832, set forth the achievements of its government:

En ningún periodo de nuestra existencia política habíamos tenido tan justo motivo de felicitarnos mutuamente por los progresos de la república como el presente. [...] Mientras que mucho del antiguo y nuevo mundo se hallan despedazados por guerras sangrientas, amagadas por turbaciones o devastadas por epidemias asoladoras, la Providencia, volviendo sus miradas paternas hacia estos estados, antes afligidos por semejantes calamidades, ha conservado en ellos la paz interior, sin la cual todos los demás bienes son ilusorios, ha calmado las rivalidades y el furor de los partidos, ha dirigido el espíritu de partido hacia empresas útiles y benéficas y ha afianzado sobre estos cimientos la prosperidad futura de la nación.¹⁴¹

In his eyes, or more properly those of Alamán, who no doubt penned the speech, the aims of the Plan of Jalapa had been reached. Constitutional order had been re-established in the Republic and prosperity was growing. However, the Vice-President had spoken too soon. The very next day, a new plan would be issued in Veracruz by Colonel Pedro Landero and adopted soon after by Santa Anna, which would lead to the most sanguinary civil war in the history of Mexico's early national period. As

¹⁴¹ Anastasio Bustamante, "El general Bustamante en la apertura de las sesiones ordinarias del Congreso General, el 1 de enero de 1832," in *Los presidentes de México antes de la nación*, vol. 1, p. 124.

events were about to prove, not everyone shared Alamán's assessment of the success of the Plan of Jalapa.

In fact, by the end of 1831, a great deal of opposition to Bustamante's government was apparent. The radical *yorkinos* and supporters of Guerrero, represented in Congress by Andrés Quintana Roo, were still a force to be reckoned with. The administration's attempts to silence them through violence and intimidation had merely strengthened their resolve. More dangerous to the government was the rise of new opposition amongst its former supporters. It appears that many *hombres de bien* were not happy with the manner in which the government had sought to introduce its version of constitutional order. Some of this dissatisfaction was provoked by the violence employed by the regime against its enemies. For example, in November 1830, the general and former *escocés*, Miguel Barragán, published a pamphlet in which he warned that the War of the South could only degenerate into a terrible civil war. He believed it was important to resolve the conflict as soon as possible. He did not support the military campaign in the South and instead advocated initiating negotiations with the rebels.¹⁴² Carlos María de Bustamante, for his part, did not oppose the war, or even the execution of Guerrero. His quarrel was with the attacks made upon the freedom of the press by the Bustamante regime, and the violence shown to deputies and senators.¹⁴³

However, the majority of the opposition from the *hombres de bien*, derived from their dislike of the administration's political programme. They believed that the government was dominated by military and ecclesiastical interests and feared that this dominance would inevitably lead to the loss of the individuals rights, and the creation of a dictatorship.¹⁴⁴ According to José María Luis Mora, himself a leading dissident by

¹⁴² LAF no. 395. Miguel Barragán, *Exposición del general Barragán al Soberano Congreso* (Guadalajara: Imprenta del ciudadano Ignacio Brambila, 1830).

¹⁴³ Bustamante, *Diario Histórico*, entries for 9 and 10 October, 1 and 11 November 1831.

¹⁴⁴ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, pp. 318-320.

1831, this new opposition was widespread. It included important figures in the Congress, such as Miguel Santa María and José María Cabrera; and others in the states, such as Sebastián Camacho, the governor of Veracruz, Melchor Múzquiz, the governor of the state of Mexico and Anastasio Cañedo, the governor of Jalisco. Mora termed these opponents, 'el partido del progreso' and later, 'la oposición legal,' to distinguish them from that of the former *yorkinos*.¹⁴⁵ As we shall see, this new opposition, which was formed among men who had originally supported Bustamante and the Plan of Jalapa, was destined to play an extremely important role in the eventual collapse of Bustamante's administration.

F: The Civil War of 1832.

The Plan of Veracruz, declared on 2 January 1832, had one proclaimed aim. It called upon the Vice-President to dismiss his cabinet, 'a quien la opinión pública acusa de protector del centralismo y tolerador de los atentados cometidos contra la libertad civil y los derechos individuales.'¹⁴⁶ It was undoubtedly the work of Santa Anna, who lost no time in reinforcing his message in two letters to the Vice-President on 4 January. He suggested that the new cabinet be composed of Sebastián Camacho, the current governor of Veracruz as Minister of Relations; Melchor Múzquiz, governor of the state of Mexico, as Minister of War; Francisco García, the governor of Zacatecas, as Minister of Finance; and Valentín Gómez Farías as Minister of Justice.¹⁴⁷ His plan

¹⁴⁵ José María Luis Mora, "Revista política de las diversas administraciones que la república ha tenido hasta 1837," in Lilian Briseño Senosiain, Laura Solares Robles and Laura Suárez de la Torre (ed.), *Obras completas de José María Luis Mora*, vol. 2, pp. 325-328.

¹⁴⁶ "Acta y Plan de Veracruz sobre remoción del ministerio," in Berta Ulluo and Joel Hernández Santiago (eds.), *Planes en la nación mexicana*. (Mexico City: Senado de la República/El Colegio de México, 1987), vol. 2, p. 73.

¹⁴⁷ Mariano Riva Palacio Archive in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin (henceforth referred to as MRPA) nos. 202,203. Antonio López de Santa Anna to Anastasio Bustamante, Veracruz, 4 January 1832. The first letter enclosed the plan. The second contained his suggestions for the new members of the cabinet.

did not call for armed revolt, but it seemed quite clear that, should his demands not be met, this would be the unavoidable consequence. His accusations against Bustamante's cabinet were nothing new. As we have seen, charges of centralism had been levelled against the supporters of the Plan of Jalapa since 1829. From late 1830, great outrage had also been witnessed at the government's ruthless treatment of its opponents, most especially in the cases of Vicente Guerrero, Juan Nepomuceno Rosains and Francisco Victoria. So, why did Santa Anna choose to stage a rebellion in January 1832? The answer is threefold. In the first place, as Fowler has pointed out, it coincided with the return of José María Tornel from the United States in December 1831 and a visit Tornel made to Santa Anna just two weeks before the plan was announced. Santa Anna might have been considering an uprising for sometime, but he needed the diplomatic skills of someone like Tornel to organise a rebellion successfully. Tornel had been appointed as a Plenipotentiary Minister to the U.S. government by Guerrero in 1829 and the demise of the President left him in an unfortunate position. The Bustamante administration had confirmed his appointment, but had appeared to regard his posting as a neat way of keeping Tornel in political exile. Another minister was sent to the United States and all government business was undertaken through him. Tornel retained his title, but was not rewarded with any salary or responsibility. Not unnaturally he retained a grudge against Bustamante and his ministers, one that was further compounded by the execution of Guerrero, who had been a close friend.¹⁴⁸

Secondly, the timing of the Plan of Veracruz seemed designed to capitalise on one of the worse scandals of the Bustamante administration. On 24 November 1831, the Commander General of Jalisco, Ignacio Inclán arrested a printer, Juan Brambila, for printing a pamphlet which he claimed defamed his character.¹⁴⁹ He ordered

¹⁴⁸ Will Fowler, *Tornel and Santa Anna. The Writer and the Caudillo, 1795-1853* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp. 125-126.

¹⁴⁹ The pamphlet accused the General of having seduced a married woman, Guadalupe Calderón. It was also said that the General behaved in a cowardly way when later challenged to a duel by the woman's husband. He accepted the challenge, but appeared at the chosen place of encounter

Brambila to disclose the author of the pamphlet, and when the printer refused, took the decision to shoot him. The sentence was due to be carried out within three hours, but after intervention by the Bishop of Guadalajara and the State Governor, Anastasio Cañedo, the Commander General, was persuaded not to go ahead with the punishment. This did not mark the end of the problem, however. In his correspondence with the Governor of Jalisco, Inclán had accused him of sedition and treachery and in the light of this attitude, the Governor came to regard his treatment of Brambila as an example of the hostile climate of militarism which existed within his state. He called the state legislature to remove itself from Guadalajara for its own safety and convened an emergency meeting in Lagos. Here the legislature decided that Inclán's behaviour was an attack upon the current federal system of government and elected to send a representative to Mexico City to call for Inclán's dismissal and his punishment. In this they were supported by the legislatures of Zacatecas, Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosí and Guanajuato, who also sent similar petitions to the federal government in December. Zacatecas even offered a safe haven from the threat of Inclán to the legislature of Jalisco. The deputies, however, decided to remain in exile from Guadalajara within the state boundaries, in Lagos. On receiving news of the disturbance in Jalisco, the government took immediate action. On 1 December, Cirilo Gómez Anaya was ordered to march to Jalisco to remove Inclán, investigate the circumstances of the Brambila case and dispatch Inclán to the capital. Meanwhile rumours circulated that Inclán was plotting to resist Anaya. A pamphlet published in Mexico City printed the text of a plan, supposedly drawn up by Inclán, which called for a strengthening of the presence of the army in the states. It was alleged that this plan was the precursor to another, whose intention would be to proclaim

surrounded by armed men. Un español. *Dos años en México*, p. 114. Bustamante, *Diario histórico*, entry for 3 December 1831.

centralism.¹⁵⁰ These accusations were further fuelled by the rumours that had been circulating in Guadalajara and Mexico City since October, which asserted that the garrison of the state capital was involved in a military plot to issue a *pronunciamiento* in favour of centralism.¹⁵¹ These rumours appeared to be unfounded when Gómez Anaya arrived in Guadalajara on 24 December, and assumed the military command with no opposition from Inclán.¹⁵² Even so, the Inclán scandal did not disappear; for it soon became clear that the federal government was not about to prosecute the former Commander General. Facio claimed that this was because no existing legislature provided for the prosecution of a Commander General. The states and others who had called for Inclán's dismissal and punishment, believed the government was simply protecting Inclán and tacitly condoning his actions. For opponents of Bustamante, the episode quickly became symbolic for all that was wrong with the government. As Costeloe rightly points out, the events provided them with 'un material propagandístico ideal para sus acusaciones de tiranía contra el Gobierno y los militares que lo respaldaban.'¹⁵³ What is more important they also provided the ideal background for the proclamation against the government. As the government representatives who held negotiations with the rebels in January 1832 noted, the events in Jalisco made up one of the most important justifications for the *pronunciamiento*.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ José Antonio Facio, *Exposición dirigida a las cámaras del Congreso General por el secretario de estado y del despacho de Guerra y Marina acerca de los acontecimientos del estado de Jalisco en noviembre del año pasado* (Mexico City: Imprenta del Águila, dirigida por José Ximeno, calle de Medinas, número 6, 1832), pp. 1-5, 11-18. In the British Library. Frank N. Samponaro, "The Political Role of the Army, 1821-1848" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1974), pp. 144-147.

¹⁵¹ Bustamante, *Diario histórico*, entries for 22, 28 October, 9 November 1831.

¹⁵² Facio, *Exposición dirigida a las cámaras*, pp. 5-6.

¹⁵³ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 323.

¹⁵⁴ *El Sol*, 30 January 1832. Bernardo Couto and Vicente Segura to the Governor of Veracruz, 25 January 1832. They describe the main themes of the rebels thus: 'Se hizo mérito de la impunidad en que han visto los que en Yucatán destruyeron el gobierno existente: de la tibieza [sic] con que a su juicio se ha procedido en el castigo del atentado del general Inclán en Jalisco: de conatos dirigidos a extinguir la libertad de la prensa; y por último, de las demasías cometidas en las personas de algunos miembros del Congreso General.' Vice-Governor of Veracruz to the Minister of War, 25 January

Thirdly, the timing of the Plan of Veracruz may also have been influenced by the fact that 1832 was the year designated for the new Presidential elections. It has been suggested on more than one occasion that Santa Anna coveted the Presidential position in 1832 and used the Plan of Veracruz as a base from which to win support for his candidacy.¹⁵⁵ The possible nominations for this position were already being discussed at the end of 1831, and it was already clear that the two most important candidates were Santa Anna and Mier y Terán. Santa Anna's support was based in Veracruz and with the old supporters of Vicente Guerrero: the *yorkinos* and radicals.¹⁵⁶ Mier y Terán was the candidate of José María Luis Mora and many of the *hombres de bien*, who formed 'el partido de progreso.' Mier y Terán like Santa Anna was an ideal choice for candidate. Both were popular figures in the army and neither were tarnished by association with the current regime. Mier y Terán had spent the last two years in Texas, while Santa Anna had passed the same time in retirement in his hacienda. Between the two, it seemed like Mier y Terán held the upper hand. Mora had convinced him to enter into dialogue with Valentín Gómez Farías and Francisco García in Zacatecas, both influential figures throughout the states as dogged defenders of federalism and opponents of Church and army privilege. In this correspondence, Mier y Terán gave guarantees that once in office he would favour the gradual abolition of both military and ecclesiastical *fueros* and the removal of federal army garrisons in the state capitals.¹⁵⁷ Santa Anna, however, found his support amongst the states legislatures, which had been elected after the Alamán reforms of 1830, confined to his own state of Veracruz. Thus, it may well be that he wished to capitalise on the unpopularity of the cabinet in the states following the Inclán affair with the Plan of

1832. His view on the arguments presented by the rebels to justify their rebellion was: 'todos se reducen a inculpar al actual ministerio de tendencia hacia el centralismo, para lo cual se citaron como testimonios de convicción los sucesos de Yucatán y Jalisco y algunos de los excesos que se han cometido en la capital.'

¹⁵⁵ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 329.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

¹⁵⁷ Robert F. Florestedt, "Mora contra Bustamante," *Historia Mexicana* 12:1 (1962), p.35.

Veracruz.¹⁵⁸ His suggestions to Bustamante that he replace his cabinet with Camacho, Múzquiz, Gómez Farías and García, all important figures in the opposition from the states, do seem to indicate that he wished to court their support.¹⁵⁹ He might have believed that a success in influencing Bustamante to change his cabinet might ensure this support. Or possibly, that a success in overthrowing the administration completely, in time for the presidential election, would surely guarantee it.

The administration's response to the Plan of Veracruz appeared initially conciliatory. All members of the cabinet offered their resignation on 10 January.¹⁶⁰ At the same time, the Vice-President sent a group of three negotiators from Mexico City to Jalapa to discuss the rebel demands with Santa Anna.¹⁶¹ However, it was soon clear that Bustamante was not prepared to be dictated to by Santa Anna. On 11 January, the Vice-President refused to accept the resignations of his ministers.¹⁶² A few days later, Facio left Mexico City bound for Puebla and Jalapa. According to the *Registro Oficial*, his mission was to oversee military preparations being made for an active suppression of the revolt, under the supervision of General Calderón.¹⁶³ While in Jalapa, according to a letter published in *El Fénix de la Libertad*, Facio also attempted to diffuse the situation by organising a counter strike against Santa Anna from within Veracruz. He wrote to José María Flores, the commander of the Castle of Ulúa, on 25 January, on behalf of the government. In this letter, he offered Flores a promotion and

¹⁵⁸ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 329.

¹⁵⁹ MRPA no. 203. Santa Anna to Bustamante, 4 January 1832. Frank N. Samponaro, "La alianza de Santa Anna y los federalistas, 1832-1834. Su formación y desintegración," *Historia Mexicana* 30:3 (1981), p. 361. Samponaro suggests that Santa Anna proposed García and Gómez Farías in order to win their support for the armed rebellion he was planning. This may well be true, but it is interesting to note that all the men suggested, bar Gómez Farías, were currently state governors. This implies Santa Anna was interested in gaining the support of other states, not just Zacatecas.

¹⁶⁰ *El Sol*, 12 January 1832. Alamán, Espinosa, Facio and Mangino to Bustamante, Mexico City, 10 January 1832.

¹⁶¹ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 330. The men were: Bernardo Couto, Vicente Segura and Manuel María Pérez.

¹⁶² *El Sol*, 12 January 1832. José Cacho to the Ministers of Relations, War, Finance and Justice, 11 January 1832.

¹⁶³ *El Registro Oficial*, 11 January 1832. Also quoted in Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 330.

a payment of \$25, 000, if he would announce a *pronunciamiento* in favour of the government from the castle.¹⁶⁴ Flores refused this offer and, in his response, allied himself firmly with Santa Anna.¹⁶⁵

In the light of the administration's refusal to acquiesce to the demands of Santa Anna, despite having also received separate petitions from Zacatecas and Jalisco which also called for a change in the cabinet,¹⁶⁶ the *pronunciamiento* at Veracruz quickly turned into an armed rebellion. The government troops organised by Calderón marched upon Veracruz in February. On 3 March, Santa Anna's men and those of the government, met in Tolome, just outside Veracruz. Santa Anna was completely defeated. He lost almost 80 dead and at least another 500 as prisoners.¹⁶⁷ He retreated to Veracruz, where his defence now numbered little more than 200. The government was now in a position to end the rebellion for good. However, they failed to take advantage of Santa Anna's crippling weakness. No new assault was made upon Veracruz. Instead, Calderón remained in Tolome until 20 March, caring for his wounded and waiting for supplies and reinforcements from Mexico.¹⁶⁸ In the meantime, Santa Anna was able to recover his strength and enlist new soldiers. By 16 March, he was already able to boast to Francisco García that he could now count on over 2, 000 men.¹⁶⁹ When Calderón did attack Veracruz on 24 March his advantage was non-existent, and his assault quickly descended into an interminable siege. After a month, no progress had been made and the rains, along with the inevitable illnesses

¹⁶⁴ *El Fénix de la Libertad*, 4 February 1832. Facio to José María Flores, Jalapa, 25 January 1832, quoted in Cámara de Diputados, *Proceso instructivo*, pp. 54-55.

¹⁶⁵ Flores to Facio, Ulúa, 31 January 1832., in *Castigo de la traición* (Mexico City: Imprenta de las Escalerillas, a cargo de Agustín Guiol, 1832). In CONDUMEX.

¹⁶⁶ Congreso de Jalisco, *La legislatura de Jalisco pide la remoción del ministerio*, (Mexico City: Imprenta de Escalerillas, a cargo del ciudadano Agustín Guiol 1832). The petition of Zacatecas is contained in *El Fénix de la Libertad*, 1 February 1832, quoted in Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 332.

¹⁶⁷ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 333.

¹⁶⁸ Un español, *Dos años en México*, pp. 150-151. FO no. 50/72, p. 35. Pakenham to Palmerston, 2 April 1832.

¹⁶⁹ Francisco García Archive in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin (henceforth referred to as FGA) folder 36, no.3. Santa Anna to García, Veracruz 16 March 1832.

were fast approaching.¹⁷⁰ By 13 May, Calderón was forced to retire and march his troops, of whom at least half had become ill, back to Jalapa. He was replaced by Facio, who marched from Mexico City in May after his second resignation, with 500 men.¹⁷¹

While Santa Anna was licking his wounds in Veracruz, support was growing for his rebellion. On 10 March in Tampico, the garrison of the port issued a *pronunciamiento* in favour of Santa Anna. This move was supported by their commander, General Esteban Moctezuma. Now, both Atlantic sea ports were in the hands of the rebels. In April, a new twist appeared. In Lerma, a *pronunciamiento* was announced by Ignacio Inclán, who had recently escaped from prison.¹⁷² This declared that Manuel Gómez Pedraza was the only legitimate president of Mexico. The real architects of this plan were Francisco García and Valentín Gómez Farías, with whom Inclán had been in correspondence since escaping from prison. However, their idea was not new. Ever since Bustamante took up the reins of government, there had been those who had upheld Gómez Pedraza's claim on the Presidency, believing that this would solve the constitutional problem created by Bustamante having overthrown Guerrero, who had in turn more or less overthrown Gómez Pedraza in 1828. In March 1830, Vicente Roca fuerte told the Minister of Finance that the return of Gómez Pedraza was the only way to bring peace and order back to Mexico.¹⁷³ Ex-yorkinos and radicals like Andrés Quintana Roo and Juan de Dios Cañedo had also adopted the idea, as it provided the most legitimate, and therefore, most effective way of attacking

¹⁷⁰ FO no. 50/72, p. 74. Pakenham to Palmerston, 26 April 1832.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.* p. 143. Pakenham to Palmerston, 9 June 1832.

¹⁷² On 27 March a law was introduced outlining exactly what the procedure should be to prosecute a Commandant General. Inclán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, vol. 2, p. 416. Law dated March 27th 1832. It seemed that Inclán was about to be prosecuted for his behaviour in Guadalajara. It is difficult not to agree with *El Portalero*, a correspondent to the newspaper *La Verdad Desnuda* in 1833, who believed the publication of the law and most likely resentment against the Bustamante regime were the motives for Inclán's adhesion to the rebels. *La Verdad Desnuda*, 15 May 1833.

¹⁷³ Jaime E. Rodríguez O., *El nacimiento de Hispanoamérica. Vicente Roca fuerte y el hispanoamericanismo, 1808-1832* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1980), p. 216.

the government.¹⁷⁴ In January 1831, Cañedo delivered a speech to the Chamber in which he declared that, in accordance with the election results of 1828, Manuel Gómez Pedraza was the only legitimate President. He was supported in Congress by Quintana Roo and Pacheco Leal.¹⁷⁵

In fact, plans may have been in existence since 1830 to bring Gómez Pedraza back to Mexico.¹⁷⁶ Certainly, the administration did not want the former Minister of War to return to Mexico from France. When Gómez Pedraza wrote to the Vice-President in March 1830, expressing his desire to return, Bustamante replied, asking him to reconsider his decision. He protested that his presence might cause general unrest, in which ‘aun los amigos de usted se pondrían en movimiento, y la guerra civil que hoy está reducida a una parte del sur, se generalizaría en toda la república.’¹⁷⁷ Costeloe suggests that Gómez Pedraza may have known of plots in his favour, and chose to return for that reason.¹⁷⁸ Gómez Pedraza, of course, does not admit to this. His explanation is that he wished to return home to the bosom of his family and lead a quiet life in the country.¹⁷⁹ However, whatever the reason, when he did arrive in Veracruz, he was refused permission to land. The administration offered him the position of Plenipotentiary Minister in France or Colombia to soften the terms of this new exile, but Gómez Pedraza refused these offers and took up residence in New

¹⁷⁴ Andrés Quintana Roo, *Acusación presentada en la Cámara de Diputados el 2 de diciembre de 1830, contra el Ministro de la Guerra* (Mexico City: Oficina del ciudadano Alejandro Valdés a cargo de José María Gallegos, 1830). In the British Library.

¹⁷⁵ Rodríguez O. “Oposición a Bustamante,” p. 206.

¹⁷⁶ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 313.

¹⁷⁷ Anastasio Bustamante to Manuel Gómez Pedraza, Mexico City, 29 August 1830, in “Manifiesto que Manuel Gómez Pedraza, ciudadano de la república de México, dedica a sus compañeros, o sea una reseña de su vida pública,” in Laura Solares Robles (ed.), *La obra política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza, 1813-1851* (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/ Instituto Matías Romero/ Acervo Histórico Diplomático de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1999), p. 243. Gómez Pedraza curiously did not receive this letter until his arrival in New Orleans. It did not leave Veracruz until 13 October, despite having been apparently written in August. It appears that the letter was either held up, or that it was written in October and dated 30 August, perhaps to make it seem to the recipient that the Vice-President had tried to avoid the unpleasant situation in Veracruz.

¹⁷⁸ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, pp. 313-134.

¹⁷⁹ “Manifiesto,” p. 231.

Orleans instead.¹⁸⁰ In the months following this episode, there were more rumours of plans in favour of Gómez Pedraza's presidency. In February 1831, Ignacio Inclán wrote to Alamán from Morelia, stating that a party in favour of Gómez Pedraza existed within the state, and that he had been asked to join.¹⁸¹ In the same month, Carlos María de Bustamante recorded in his diary that José Ramón Malo had informed Facio that such a plot also existed in Toluca.¹⁸² By the end of 1831, a definite cadre of opposition had been assembled against the Bustamante government in favour of Gómez Pedraza, in Mexico City. The leaders of this group were Quintana Roo and Rejón. Other members included Vicente Rocafuerte, Mariano Riva Palacio (Guerrero's son-in-law), Juan Rodríguez Puebla and Antonio Pacheco Leal. According to Mora, once the Plan of Veracruz was declared, this group allied itself to the armed struggle.

Gómez Farías and García were in communication with Quintana Roo's group in Mexico City. However, unlike Quintana Roo and his group, they still had not decided to align themselves with Santa Anna. Their decision to arrange Inclán's *pronunciamiento* suggests that they may have wished to change the direction of the rebellion. Frank Samponaro suggests that neither man trusted Santa Anna and wished to prevent him take up the presidency should Bustamante be defeated.¹⁸³ This plan made it clear that they had different objectives to those of Santa Anna. Even so, it appears that Gómez Farías and García were keeping their options open. They may have begun discussing their possible support for Santa Anna, but at the same time they continued their negotiations with Mier y Terán and Mora. These men and their allies amongst the *hombres de bien* did not wish to see Santa Anna's rebellion overthrow

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 232. For a description of Gómez Pedraza's exile in France, return to Veracruz and new exile in New Orleans, see Laura Solares Robles, *Una revolución pacífica. Biografía política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza, 1789-1851* (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Acervo Histórico Diplomático de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores/Consejo Estatal para la Cultura y las Artes del Gobierno del Estado de Querétaro, 1996), pp. 85-97.

¹⁸¹ Ignacio Inclán to Alamán, 20 February 1831. quoted in Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 315.

¹⁸² Bustamante, *Diario histórico*. Entry for 17 February 1831.

¹⁸³ Samponaro, "Santa Anna y los federalistas," pp. 362-363.

Bustamante, as they knew this would lead to his elevation to the Presidency. Instead, their aim was to have Bustamante replaced democratically in the September elections.¹⁸⁴ Thus, Mier y Terán had taken up arms for the government in April and fought the rebels in Tampico. General Melchor Múzquiz, another member of this group, also fought for the government in Lerma against Inclán.

Therefore, the government's position by May 1832 was difficult. Calderón had been forced to abandon the siege at Veracruz, leaving Santa Anna's rebellion very much in tact. 600 soldiers were left behind under General Rincón to defend the Puente Nacional and prevent Santa Anna advancing, but these men were quickly forced to retreat to Jalapa by the rebels.¹⁸⁵ In Tampico, Mier y Terán had been defeated by Moctezuma. Worryingly for the government, his colours as a potential opponent now were revealed since in the wake of his defeat, he called for the dismissal of the cabinet.¹⁸⁶ Although Inclán's rebellion in Lerma had been quickly extinguished by Múzquiz, the General also demonstrated his membership of the opposition, following up his victory by also asking for the replacement of Bustamante's ministers.¹⁸⁷ Perhaps as a result of the pressure applied from both Generals, whose support was undoubtedly necessary if Santa Anna was to be defeated, Alamán, Facio and Espinosa offered their resignations once more. On 17 May, Bustamante announced to the Chamber of Deputies that he had resolved to accept their requests¹⁸⁸ This move did not bring an end to the administration's problems, however. The Vice-President was unable to find men willing to fill the three cabinet posts and they would remain empty until August. He asked Sebastián Camacho to be the Minister of Relations, José María Calderón, the Minister of War and José María Bocanegra, the Minister of Justice. All

¹⁸⁴ Mora, "Revista política," p. 338, 345-348. Robert F. Florstedt, "Mora contra Bustmante," *Historia Mexicana* 12:1 (1962), pp. 42-44.

¹⁸⁵ Costeloe, *La primera república federal*, p. 334.

¹⁸⁶ Mora, "Revista política," p. 345.

¹⁸⁷ Melchor Múzquiz *Conducta del General Múzquiz en los acontecimientos de Toluca* (Mexico City: Imprenta del Gobierno, a cargo del ciudadano Juan Matute, 1832).

¹⁸⁸ Costeloe, *La primera república*, pp. 335-336.

refused.¹⁸⁹ It was clear that he was in an extremely isolated position, with the survival of his administration reliant on the tacit support of 'la oposición legal.' Bustamante even offered Mora a position in the cabinet. But he declared that nothing in the world would induce him to serve under Bustamante. The dismissal of the cabinet did not imply a change of political direction by the Vice-President, in his opinion. It was merely a tactic 'para endormecer a la oposición.'¹⁹⁰ The weakness of Bustamante's Vice-Presidency became even more apparent in July, when a motion was placed before the Council of Government proposing that he be declared 'morally unfit' to govern.¹⁹¹

Santa Anna, in Veracruz, was also somewhat isolated. He may have succeeded in forcing Calderón and his men to retreat to Jalapa, but his rebellion was still confined to Veracruz and Tampico. Moreover, the reason for his rebellion was now non-existent. Had he only revolted to ensure the terms of the Plan of Veracruz were met, it might be expected that he would return home satisfied. Quite clearly, Santa Anna, had other intentions. It may be, as Costeloe suggests, that he realised he had not won sufficient support to ensure his victory in the upcoming Presidential elections. Or that he did not believe that the elections held under the current regime could be trusted. Or that he was simply determined to see Bustamante removed from power. We cannot be sure. However, Santa Anna now began to change his demands. In negotiations with Sebastián Camacho, who was acting as the government's representative in Veracruz, he now demanded that Gómez Pedraza return to the Presidency; that the ex-cabinet ministers be brought to trial; and he and his troops be granted amnesty. When these demands were refused, he announced a new plan on 5 July which proclaimed Gómez Pedraza as the only legitimate President.¹⁹² This new demand was undoubtedly

¹⁸⁹ Rodríguez O., "Oposición a Bustamante," p. 226.

¹⁹⁰ Mora to Terán, Mexico City, 29 June 1832. Mora, "Revista política," pp. 347-348.

¹⁹¹ Bustamante, *Diario histórico*, entry for 16 July 1832, quoted in Vázquez, "Political Plans and Collaboration," p. 27.

¹⁹² "Acta de la guarnición de Veracruz y la fortaleza de Ulúa reiterando el Plan de Veracruz y desconociendo el gobierno de Bustamante," in Ulluo and Hernández Santiago (eds.), *Planes en la nación mexicana*, vol. 2, p. 129.

designed to appeal to García and Gómez Fariás in Zacatecas and in so doing, end Santa Anna's isolation.

The new plan quickly had the desired effect. On 15 July, Zacatecas published a decree in which Gómez Pedraza was recognised as the legitimate President and Bustamante was condemned as an usurper. García also promised that 6, 000 militia troops were prepared to defend this assertion.¹⁹³ His decision may have been a direct result of Santa Anna's new proposal, but it was also influenced by the suicide of Mier y Terán. His death meant that a peaceful way to remove Bustamante now appeared unlikely.¹⁹⁴ The adhesion of Zacatecas to Santa Anna's cause opened the floodgates. Three days later, the state of Jalisco also issued a decree in favour of Gómez Pedraza.¹⁹⁵ In Durango, Lieutenant Colonel José Urrea, issued a plan supporting Santa Anna.¹⁹⁶ In the South, Guerrero's old allies, Juan Álvarez and Gordiano Guzmán added their voices of rebellion.¹⁹⁷ Esteban Moctezuma advanced from Tampico to San Luis Potosí and on his arrival the ayuntamiento issued an act recognising Gómez Pedraza as President.¹⁹⁸

The escalation of the rebellion saved Bustamante from his isolation in Mexico City. On 3 August he asked for permission to leave the executive and head the army against the rebels himself. This was granted and Melchor Múzquiz was appointed as interim President. Bustamante was appointed as head of the army to march upon Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí, while Facio, who was still in Jalapa at this point, was charged with defeating Santa Anna in Veracruz. As Frank Samponaro points out, their

¹⁹³ "Decreto en que el estado de Zacatecas reconoce como presidente legítimo a don Manuel Gómez Pedraza," in *ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 131.

¹⁹⁴ Mora, "Revista política," p. 351.

¹⁹⁵ José María Bocanegra, *Memorias para la historia de México independiente, 1822-1846* (Mexico City: Instituto Cultural Helénico/Instituto Nacional de Estudios de la Revolución Mexicana/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987), vol. 2, p. 219.

¹⁹⁶ Costeloe, *La primera república*, p. 339.

¹⁹⁷ Anna, *Forging Mexico*, p. 249.

¹⁹⁸ Bocanegra, *Memorias*, vol. 2, pp. 214-125. "Acta de San Luis Potosí," in Ulluo and Santiago (eds.), *Planes en la nación mexicana.*, vol. 2, p. 139.

position in the late summer of 1832 was far from hopeless. The government could still count on the support of Luis Quintanar, Mariano Arista, Gabriel Durán, Juan Amador, and Luis Cortázar, all high-ranking officials and each commanding large armies. The problem as ever, would be economic. The rebel control of the Veracruz and Tampico customs houses made it difficult to finance his campaign and unpaid bills and soldiers could only spell trouble in the long run.¹⁹⁹ Bustamante marched North on 17 August, with 1,580 men. He quickly enjoyed success over Moctezuma in San Luis Potosí on 18 September. The battle of Gallinero, just outside San Miguel de Allende, left the rebels with between 800 and 1000 dead and 600 prisoners.²⁰⁰ The following day he presented his resignation as Vice-President to the Chamber of Deputies. This appears a strange reaction to have in the wake of his military victory. He explains that he had not wished to resign earlier, lest he be considered a coward.²⁰¹ In reality it marked the *fait accompli* of his decision to leave the government in the hands of Múzquiz. The interim President, and the cabinet he subsequently appointed, was associated with the opposition put forward by *hombres de bien* such as Mora to Bustamante's regime. This opposition was now in command, and his return to the executive was now extremely unlikely. At this point he did not really fear military defeat. In fact, his subsequent capture of San Luis Potosí could have marked the beginning of the end of the rebellion. However, Facio had been unable to prevent Santa Anna from advancing from Veracruz. On 29 September, he met the rebels in battle near Puebla, in San Agustín Palmar and was comprehensively defeated. Rumours in the capital even alleged Facio had been killed in the encounter.²⁰² Puebla was now undefended.²⁰³

¹⁹⁹ Samponaro, "The Political Role of the Army," pp. 182-183.

²⁰⁰ Bocanegra, *Memorias*, vol. 2, p. 299. *El Sol*, 28 September 1832.

²⁰¹ *El Sol*, 29 September 1832. Bustamante to the Secretary of the Chamber of Deputies, Dolores de Hidalgo, 19 September 1832.

²⁰² "Detalle de la derrota del ejército ministerial en San Agustín Palmar por el intrépido general Antonio López de Santa Anna," in *Alcance al número 54 de la Columna* (Mexico City: Imprenta de las Escalerillas, a cargos del ciudadano Agustín Guiol, 1832). The article claims that 355 of Facio's men were killed.

²⁰³ Bocanegra, *Memorias*, vol. 2, pp. 303-305.

Santa Anna's troops entered Puebla on 3 October. From here they presented a dangerous threat to Mexico City. President Múzquiz began negotiations with Santa Anna on the subject of surrender. On 7 October, Múzquiz suggested that a solution to the conflict could be achieved if Santa Anna were to recognise Bustamante's and his own resignation from the executive. An interim president could then be elected by the states to serve until April 1833. He also proposed 'un completo olvido de los acontecimientos pasados' for both sides.²⁰⁴ On 10 October, Santa Anna replied to Múzquiz. He refused to accept the Interim President's terms on the grounds that he and his men were being treated as rebels, and that any acceptance of Múzquiz's or Bustamante resignation amounted to a recognition of their government's legitimacy. He reaffirmed his support for Manuel Gómez Pedraza and rejected any call of an amnesty.²⁰⁵ On 17 October, the government declared Mexico to be in a state of siege. The next day, troops marched from Puebla in the direction of Mexico. On hearing the news of Santa Anna's advance, Bustamante marched south from San Luis Potosí. As he approached the capital, Santa Anna withdrew to Puebla to await a confrontation. Their troops finally met just outside Puebla, in the Rancho de Posadas on 6 December, in a battle filled with 'la muerte, el espanto y el horror,' in the words of one pamphletist,²⁰⁶ and, 'tan empeñada y sangrienta como lo fue la del Gallinero' according to José María Bocanegra.²⁰⁷ Both sides withdrew from the battlefield without achieving a definitive victory (although both would claim it)²⁰⁸ and the position seemed to be at a stalemate.

²⁰⁴ Melchor Múzquiz to Santa Anna, Mexico City, 7 October 1832, in *Primera carta dirigida por el exmo. sr. D. Melchor Múzquiz a S.E. el general libertador, sobre las negociaciones de la paz, y contestación presentada por conducto de los comisionados* (Puebla: Imprenta de la calle de Carnicería, bajo la dirección de P.P. Carillo, 1832), pp. 1-2. In CONDUMEX.

²⁰⁵ Santa Anna to Múzquiz, Puebla, 10 October 1832, in *ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

²⁰⁶ *Toma de Puebla y glorias de la patria* (Mexico City: n.p., 1832). In the British Library.

²⁰⁷ Bocanegra, *Memorias*, vol. 2, p. 316.

²⁰⁸ Bocanegra claimed victory for the *santanistas*. Bocanegra, *Memorias*, vol. 2 p. 317, while the author of *Toma de Puebla y glorias de la patria* would claim it for Bustamante.

The next day both sides continued to fire upon each other from their respective positions. Bustamante was camped in the Cerro de San Juan and Santa Anna in Puebla with the newly-arrived Gómez Pedraza.²⁰⁹ However, according to the rumour recorded by Carlos María de Bustamante, this stalemate was broken by a 'una carta amistosa' sent to Gómez Pedraza by Bustamante's second-in-command, Luis Cortázar. He suggested that both sides be allowed to transfer their wounded to a nearby hospital and this opened the channels of communication. A meeting between the representatives of both sides was eventually arranged, in which Gómez Pedraza presented his plan for peace.²¹⁰ In signing this Bustamante agreed to recognise Gómez Pedraza as legitimate president and to support a general amnesty for all political crimes committed since September 1828. This was a significant concession on the part of Santa Anna, who had earlier refused to accept Múzquiz's surrender on such a condition as a general amnesty.²¹¹ This first agreement was rejected by Congress as unconstitutional and unacceptable. Therefore, a new treaty had to be drawn up at the Hacienda of Zavaleta. This treaty altered the unacceptable nature of the first, by providing for new elections to replace the national Congress and the state legislatures and proposed that presidential elections be held on 1 March, with Gómez Pedraza acting as president until this point. It also promised that the army would safeguard the Constitution and the republican system of government. The article dealing with the general amnesty was untouched.²¹²

²⁰⁹ Carlos María Bustamante, *Invasion de México por D. Antonio López de Santa Anna. Segunda Parte* (Mexico City: Imprenta del ciudadano Alejandro Valdés, a cargo de José María Gallegos, 1832), pp. 25-7. In CONDUMEX. Also see: Archivo Histórico del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (henceforth referred to as INAH), Colección Bustamante V. 6 1832, 164. *Diario de las operaciones del E.S.D. Anastasio Bustamante, desde el 22 de noviembre de 1832 hasta el 11 de diciembre de 1832*, dated 19th December 1832.

²¹⁰ Bustamante *Invasion de México por D. Antonio López de Santa Anna. Segunda Parte*, p. 27 and *Diario de operaciones*. LAF 39. *Al publico* (Puebla: Imprenta del C. José María Campos, 1832), contains Manuel Gómez Pedraza's plan.

²¹¹ *Primera carta dirigida por el excmo. sr. D. Melchior Múzquiz á S.E. el general libertador, sobre negociaciones de paz, y contestación presentada por conducta de los comisionados*, p.3.

²¹² Costeloe, *La primera república*, p.346

This concession suggests that the victory of Santa Anna over Bustamante was not as complete as some historians would have us believe. Bustamante had for the most part been entirely successful in his confrontations with the rebels until this point; his decisive action in returning to face Santa Anna from San Luis Potosí was not the action of a man who believed that defeat was either imminent or inevitable. The British Minister, Pakenham, declared that he was surprised that Bustamante had agreed to negotiate a treaty with Santa Anna, as 'since the arrival of Bustamante, Santa Anna has been constantly obliged to give way.'²¹³ Moreover, the attitude of Congress, which refused to sanction the first peace treaty drawn up between Bustamante and Santa Anna, is inconceivable unless we believe that body was not convinced the fight was yet over either. There is also the suggestion that his troops did not think this either, for Carlos María de Bustamante notes that in signing both treaties his namesake disappointed many of his generals (two of whom would play an important part in the peace negotiations) and supporters. According to Carlos María de Bustamante, there was a general feeling of disgust amongst the officers and men 'porque entendían haberse capitulado con el enemigo.'²¹⁴ He darkly hints that 'los agentes y sórdidos maniobradores' are to blame for the whole affair and generously refrains from condemning General Bustamante from succumbing to their blandishments.²¹⁵ Who these agents are is not clear, but it is certainly not too far fetched to suggest that Luis Cortázar, the composer of the 'carta amistosa,' which initiated the peace negotiations, may have been one of their number. There had been rumours that Cortázar had been about to desert Bustamante in November.²¹⁶ More damningly, he himself had written to Gómez Farías in July, declaring that if Zacatecas was successful in spreading the

²¹³ FO no. 50/73, p. 225. Pakenham to Palmerston, 13 December 1832.

²¹⁴ Bustamante, *La invasion de México por D. Antonio López de Santa Anna. Segunda Parte*, p. 27 and *Diario de Operaciones*.

²¹⁵ Bustamante, *La invasion de México por D. Antonio López de Santa Anna. Segunda Parte*, p. 27

²¹⁶ VGFA no. 84. Vicente Romero to Valentín Gómez Farías, 8 November 1832,

rebellion, 'rogaré al cielo que proteja su causa.'²¹⁷ In which case, two possible explanations for Bustamante's surrender are feasible. The first is that in the face of the threat of desertion by Cortázar, his second-in-command, Bustamante decided that the war could not continue and that he should surrender. This is unlikely as Cortázar was appointed as one of Bustamante's commissioners to negotiate with Santa Anna, but not impossible. The second is that Cortázar had been long in sympathy with the rebels and managed to convince Bustamante in the light of the stalemate faced on 7 December that the only way to break it was through negotiation. In his position as commissioner he then adopted an extremely conciliatory attitude to the rebels drawing up a treaty that Congress would find unacceptable.

Although the terms of the peace treaty with Bustamante were more conciliatory than Santa Anna had originally intended, it cannot be said that Bustamante ultimately gained any advantage. The net result of the Treaty of Zavaleta was the election of Santa Anna as President, and Valentín Gómez Farías as Vice-President in 1833. Once in office neither man abided by the terms of the agreement. Almost immediately a process was begun to prosecute Alamán, Facio, Espinosa and Mangino for their 'criminal' actions between 1830 and 1832. Only the latter was later acquitted. In June 1833, the infamous *ley del caso*, which expelled Bustamante, his cabinet colleagues and the majority of his former allies from the country, was approved. Even though it appears that Gómez Farías, rather than Santa Anna, sanctioned this law, it seems that Santa Anna did want Bustamante to be exiled. In June 1833, immediately prior to the publication of the law of expulsion, he attempted to appoint Bustamante to an extraordinary mission to Colombia.²¹⁸ Santa Anna's desire to rid himself of Bustamante may have originated in the hostility of the previous year, but it also might have something to do with the rebellion led by Generals Escalada, Arista and Durán in

²¹⁷ VGFA no. 69. Luis Cortazar to Gómez Farías, Celaya 18 July 1832.

²¹⁸ AHSRE, L-E-1798 (III), f. 150. Ministry of Relations to the Secretary of the Senate, 21 June 1833.

May and June 1833. Santa Anna was taken prisoner by the rebels on 6 June in Tenango, in the state of Mexico. They requested him to lead their rebellion against Gómez Farías' proposals to abolish military and ecclesiastical *fueros*, and proposed to proclaim him Supreme Dictator.²¹⁹ From the capital, Bustamante offered to negotiate with Arista and Durán and, on 10 June marched out in search of Santa Anna.²²⁰ The President escaped of his own accord the same day and made his way to Puebla. It seems likely that Santa Anna should believe that Bustamante had been in league with the rebels and so wish to organise his rapid departure from Mexico. After all, Durán and Arista were well-known friends and supporters of the ex-Vice-President, and their rebellion promoted the privileges of the Church and the military, two institutions closely linked to his former administration.

G: The Failure of the Plan of Jalapa and the Role of Bustamante as Vice-President.

The Bustamante administration came to power in 1830 with clear objectives. Its supporters believed that the instability suffered by the Republic since independence had been the fault of political infighting and the rise of the influence of the radical *yorkinos*, along with their plebeian supporters, to power. It aimed to destroy this influence, and place the property-holding *hombres de bien* in control. Bustamante's government also wished to resolve the chaos they saw around them in the public treasury, army and the Church. It hoped that by building strong institutions and a reliable economy, Mexico could become a peaceful and prosperous country. In so doing, it revealed itself to be traditionalist, but not centralist in its leanings. In the event, the administration established by the Plan of Jalapa was unable to reach its

²¹⁹ LAF 395. Gerónimo Cardona, *Relación de lo ocurrido al exmo. sr. presidente de la república desde su salida de la ciudad federal hasta su entrada en esta, por el teniente coronel Gerónimo Cardona* (Mexico City: Imprenta del Águila: 1833).

²²⁰ José Ramon Malo, *Diario de los sucesos notables, 1832-1853* (Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1948), vol. 1, p. 69.

objectives. The electoral reforms and the dismissal of a number of state legislatures brought many *hombres de bien* to power, but they did not guarantee their support. Many of these men disliked the emphasis the administration placed on strengthening the army and the Church. They believed that Bustamante's administration ultimately wanted to introduce some form of military dictatorship to the Republic. Some were horrified by the executions of Vicente Guerrero, Francisco Victoria and Juan Nepomuceno Rosains, and the brutal way the government tried to suppress opposition newspapers. The Plan of Jalapa had been successful because the coalition supporting it, made up of the senior clergy and military with the *ex-escocés* and *ex-yorkino hombres de bien*, was stronger than the radical *yorkinos*, who opposed it. But once Bustamante lost the support of the *hombres de bien*, his government could not survive. This was amply proved in the summer of 1832. Pressure from men such as Mier y Terán, rather than Santa Anna's rebellion forced the resignation of the cabinet. Hostility from what Mora calls 'la oposición legal,' made up of himself and figures such as Melchor Múzquiz and Francisco Fagoaga, probably ensured that Bustamante himself also left office. Bustamante's departure from Mexico City marked the end of his administration. Even if he had defeated Santa Anna in December it is unlikely that his resignation would have been revoked. He and his cabinet had simply made themselves too unpopular.

What should we make of Bustamante as Vice-President? It has been widely recognised that the intellectual power of Bustamante's regime was Lucas Alamán. Stanley C. Green points out that Alamán was the author of all Bustamante's speeches from June 1830²²¹ and Alamán himself declares that Bustamante often availed upon him to aid him with the composition of official documents.²²² Quite simply,

²²¹ Green, *The Mexican Republic*, p. 191 and 274, footnote 6. He quotes from a printed copy of Bustamante's address to Congress, found in the Salvador Noreiga Archives, and marking the beginning of the extraordinary sessions of the summer of 1830: 'This one and all the following I wrote. Lucas Alamán.'

²²² Lucas Alamán, "Defensa del ex-ministro de relaciones D. Lucas Alamán," pp. 92-93.

Bustamante does not appear to have had a voice during his administration. His participation in his government remains, for the most part, shadowy and unknown. The only occasions in which Bustamante seems to have a discernible role in government are in the trials of Manuel Zerecero and Vicente Guerrero. In each case, Bustamante's decision to interfere or not in the judicial process is crucial to the eventual fate of the two men. Why should he choose to save Zerecero rather than Guerrero? A number of explanations are possible. In the first place, the circumstances surrounding to the prosecution of the two men were extremely different. Bustamante commuted the sentence of death passed on Zerecero in May 1830, in the early months of his rule. Between January and May, his administration had not executed any army officers or other political opponents from amongst the elite. Without exception these political enemies had been exiled. The decision to commute Zerecero's sentence provoked an outcry amongst government supporters and Bustamante subsequently promised to employ stronger measures against those who rebelled against his regime, whatever their class. Guerrero was captured and court-martialled in January 1831. By this point, the government had already executed Guadalupe Victoria's brother, Francisco. So, in some way, it could be argued Guerrero was a victim of this new policy of severe punishment. Secondly, in the case of Zerecero, Bustamante was under pressure from his *compadre*, Manuel Barrera, and his Minister of Justice, Espinosa, to commute his sentence. Both these men held positions of great influence with Bustamante. Guerrero, on the other hand, had very few people to argue his case in Mexico City. In fact, the mood in the capital appeared to favour his execution. Moreover, the Minister of War, Facio had conspired to arrest Guerrero, most likely with the intent of having him executed and can only have been pressuring the Vice-President to abandon his plans to organise his exile. Finally, we cannot discount the fact that Manuel Zerecero was a member of the Mexico City elite (his brother was the deputy Anastasio Zerecero), and that Vicente Guerrero was a *mulatto* and clearly a

member of the lower echelons of society. Throughout his career, Bustamante would show a reluctance to sanction the executions of fellow *hombres de bien*, even if they rebelled against him. He was, however, always willing to execute lower class insurgents and rebels. Therefore, it seems likely that all these factors had a role in Bustamante's decisions on the fate of the two men.

Chapter Five: The Second Administration (1837-1841)

Anastasio Bustamante left Mexico in the summer of 1833 bound for France. He spent the following three years in Paris, where it appears he dedicated himself to the pursuit of various ‘tareas científicas [...] en el Ateneo Real, en el Instituto Histórico y en el de Estadística Universal.’ Unlike many of the politicians and military officers expelled by the *ley del caso*, he did not return to Mexico after the law was repealed in 1835. Instead, he petitioned the government for a year's leave of absence to permit him to complete his studies and to travel in Europe and the United States.¹ Through his legal representative in Mexico, his *compadre* Manuel Barrera, Bustamante ensured that he be paid half his designated wage as a *General de División* for this year. At the same time, he attempted to secure the payment of back-pay he claimed he was entitled to, dating from the application of the *ley del caso* in June 1833 to August 1835, when his leave of absence was granted.² This request was denied.³ As his year's leave drew to a close, Bustamante was summoned back to Mexico by the Ministry of War. In July 1836 he was informed that, due to the difficult situation currently facing the Republic, his presence and military services were immediately required.⁴

The difficult situation in question, was of course, the secessionist rebellion in Texas. The President, Antonio López de Santa Anna, had been captured by the rebels in May 1836 and, without him, the campaign against the colonists was struggling.

¹ SDN: SC XI/III/1-31/1-235/00226-00227. Minister of Relations to the Minister of War, Mexico City, 6 August 1835. This quotes Bustamante's communication to the Mexican representative in France, dated 20 May 1835.

² *Ibid.*, XI/III/1-31/1-235/00238. Manuel Barrera to the Treasury General of the Republic, Mexico City, 18 February 1836.

³ *Ibid.*, XI/III/1-31/1-235/00243-244. José Govantes to Barrera, Treasury General, 12 March 1836.

⁴ *Ibid.*, XI/III/1-31/1-235/00231. Minister of War to Anastasio Bustamante, Mexico City, 30 July 1836.

General Bustamante had spent the years between 1826 and 1829 in Texas and was not an unlikely choice as the new Commander in Chief for the campaign. Yet, although Bustamante was appointed to this position upon his return to Mexico in December 1836, he would never take up the commission.⁵ His name would instead be put forward as a candidate for the Presidential elections of March 1837, where he was elected by a large majority in Congress and the Departments. The timing of these events strongly suggests that Bustamante's re-emergence upon the political scene was not accidental. In fact, it is difficult not to agree with Enrique Olavarría y Ferrari, that the problems in Texas were a mere pretext to bring Bustamante back into the country.⁶ The General's name was being mentioned as a potential candidate long before he arrived in Veracruz. In September, *El Cosmopolita* printed rumours that Bustamante had been summoned home to take up the Presidency.⁷ In November, Bernardo Couto wrote to José María Luis Mora expressing the opinion that General Bustamante would most likely win the Presidential elections the following year, if he were only to return to Mexico in time.⁸ At the same time efforts were visible in the press to rehabilitate his image, which had been considerably tarnished by the memories of the repression employed by his previous administration. *La Lima de Vulcano* printed a spirited defence of the General's term as Vice-President in October, exonerating Bustamante from any part in Vicente Guerrero's execution and praising his administration's ecclesiastical and economic record.⁹

⁵ José María Bocanegra, *Memorias para la historia de México independiente, 1822-1846* (Mexico City: Instituto Cultural Helénico/Instituto Nacional de Estudios de la Revolución Mexicana/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987), vol. 2, p. 654. FO no. 50/100, pp. 230-231. Richard Pakenham to Viscount Palmerston, Mexico City, 21 December 1836.

⁶ Enrique Olavarría y Ferrari, "México independiente, 1821-1855," in Vicente Riva Palacio (ed.), *México através los siglos* (Mexico City: Balleza y Compañía, 1888-1889), vol. 4, p. 380.

⁷ *El Cosmopolita*, 21 September 1836, quoted in Michael P. Costeoe, *The Central Republic in Mexico, 1835-1846. Hombres de bien in the Age of Santa Anna* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 116.

⁸ Bernardo Couto to José María Luis Mora, 17 November 1836, in *ibid.*, pp. 116-117.

⁹ *La Lima de Vulcano*, 27 October 1836, quoted in Olavarría y Ferrari, "México independiente," p. 380.

The proponents of Bustamante's candidacy were his old allies from his Vice-Presidency: the *hombres de bien*, together with the upper representatives of the Church and army. These groups had been profoundly alienated by the radical policies followed by Vice-President Valentín Gómez Farías' administration between 1833 and 1834, which had attacked military and ecclesiastical *fueros* and attempted the expropriation of Church property. United against the common foe, they had used their influence with the President, Antonio López de Santa Anna, to remove Gómez Farías in 1834 and undo his reforms. By this time, a significant number of the *hombres de bien* had become disillusioned with the federal system, which had not brought the peace or prosperity hoped for in 1824. They began to suggest that a new constitution was necessary to introduce order and calm to government, the economy and public life. The mood for change was reflected in the Congressional elections of 1834, in which a majority of representatives in favour of a centralist system of government were elected.¹⁰ In 1835 support for the replacement of the federalist constitution with a centralist alternative seemed to have become widespread. After *pronunciamientos* in Orizaba and Toluca were issued in favour of this change in May, 400 other plans were declared from all corners of the Republic adhering to their cause. 19 were issued opposing centralism.¹¹ As a result, in 1836 a new centralist constitution was unveiled. This was named the *Siete Leyes*, in recognition of the seven parts of its construction.

The architects of this new *magna carta* undoubtedly assumed that the first president elected under the new system would be Santa Anna. As Reynaldo Sordo Cedeño comments, the transformation of the constitution would have been impossible without his support. The *santanistas* had formed part of the coalition of *hombres de*

¹⁰ Reynaldo Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México/Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, 1993), p.121. His calculations show that 60 percent of congressmen were centralists, opposing a representation of 20 per cent for the federalists and five percent for the *santanistas*. For further details of the Congress of 1835-1837, see Sordo Cedeño's exhaustive statistical analysis, pp. 107-137.

¹¹ Will Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1998), p. 68. For a list of these plans and *pronunciamientos*, see pp. 282-283.

bien who had backed the move towards centralism.¹² However, the President's defeat and capture at San Jacinto brought an abrupt end to Santa Anna's popularity and prestige. Faced with the forthcoming Presidential elections of March 1837, the centralists needed a new candidate to represent their interests. Moreover, they needed someone who carried the same weight of influence in the army and general prestige within their ranks and amongst the *hombres de bien*, as Santa Anna had done. To be a success, the new constitution would need a strong and influential president to nurture the fledgling state through its early years. It would need someone prepared to defend and protect it from the attacks it would undoubtedly receive from the federalists.

It was for that reason that many, like José Ramón Malo, the nephew of Agustín de Iturbide, focused their attentions on Anastasio Bustamante. Malo wrote to him in France, urging him to return on various occasions in May and June 1836.¹³ It is highly likely that his letters were supplemented with further appeals from other *hombres de bien*, friends and former allies of the exiled General.¹⁴ As Michael Costeloe has pointed out, General Bustamante 'was in several ways the ideal candidate to represent the interests of the Church, the army and the *hombres de bien*.'¹⁵ His previous administration was remembered as having followed policies entirely favourable to all three groups. During his time in office the power of the radicals and *sanscullores* had been curtailed; the economy had been well looked after; and the abuses of the freedom of the press had been severely dealt with. Bustamante's government was also remembered for its autocratic tendencies; for the uncompromising stand it had appeared to take towards rebels and rebellions; and for its dominance of the federal and state legislatures. Therefore, for the architects of the

¹² Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, pp. 252-253.

¹³ José Ramón Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables, 1832-1853* (Mexico City: Editorial Patria, 1948), vol. 1, p. 144. He writes: 'En fines de mayo y en distintas fechas de junio escribí varias cartas al general Bustamante para que, dejando París, venga al socorro de la patria.'

¹⁴ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 253. Olavarria y Ferrari, "México independiente," p. 380.

¹⁵ Costeloe, *The Central Republic in Mexico*, p. 116.

Siete Leyes, who wished to create a strong centralised government, with a system that tried to exclude the dangerous *sanscullores*, by giving the vote only to the property owners and professionals,¹⁶ the example of Bustamante's Vice-Presidency was, as Carlos María de Bustamante put it, 'inmejorable.'¹⁷ Moreover, his regime had been seen to have a centralist orientation and many assumed Bustamante was a centralist sympathiser.

It seems more than likely that the centralists arranged General Bustamante's return to Mexico and stage managed his election. They, and their supporters, believed he was the right choice to lead their crusade to bring strong, peaceful and prosperous government to the Republic through the medium of the *Siete Leyes*. Great hope and anticipation surrounded his assumption of the Presidency in April. The President of Congress, Juan Manuel de Elizalde, summed up this feeling in his response to Bustamante's inaugural address to Congress on 19 April:

A las reflexiones lúgubres, al porvenir espantoso, ha sucedido una esperanza lisonjera de ver restablecida la paz, precursora de todos los bienes: ella restituirá el orden en los diversos ramos que la fatal agitación política había reducido al estado más deplorable. Desparecerá la miseria, origen fecundo de todos los males. Se asegurarán los derechos del ciudadano con la vigilancia del Gobierno e inflexibilidad de la justicia rectamente administrada; y sofocados generosamente los resentimientos se reunirán en un punto los deseos de los mexicanos, resonando por todas partes la voz uniforme de independencia y ley. [...] Respetable Magistrado, [...] la patria tiene sus ojos fijos en vos:

¹⁶ Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals*, p. 65. Fowler points out that, although the qualification for suffrage set out in article seven of the First Law of the constitution was an income of 100 pesos, which was not a huge sum for the period and allowed almost all males to vote, article 10 imposed severe limits upon this qualification. Servants, the illiterate, the unemployed, and those considered 'idle' or engaged in a dishonest profession were excluded from the right of suffrage. Equally, those who were allowed to stand as candidates were restricted by an economic qualification. To be a local councillor an income of 500 pesos was required, to be a member of a Departmental junta or a deputy, 1,500 pesos was needed, to be a governor, 2,000 pesos, and a senator, 2,500. The full text of the 1836 Constitution can be found in: Secretaría de Gobernación, *Leyes fundamentales de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y planes revolucionarios que han influido en la organización política de la república* (Mexico City: Imprenta de la Secretaría de Gobernación, 1923), pp. 180-201.

¹⁷ Carlos María de Bustamante, *Continuación del cuadro histórico de la revolución mexicana: El gabinete mexicano durante el segundo periodo de la administración del exmo. señor D. Anastasio Bustamante* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica/Instituto Helénico, 1985), vol. 1, p. 1.

realizad pues, sus esperanzas, restituidle su gloria y decoro tan vilmente ultrajados, siempre por las sendas de la justicia y el honor; y haceos digno del justo reconocimiento de los que han puesto en vuestras manos los destinos de esta gran nación.¹⁸

These opinions were also shared by foreign observers in Mexico. Richard Pakenham, the British Plenipotentiary Minister, regarded the election of Bustamante as ‘the last remaining chance for the salvation of this country.’ He recognised that the new President faced ‘an arduous task’ ahead of him, but believed ‘with some confidence’ that his government would bring about an early improvement in public affairs.¹⁹ The newspaper, *El Abeja* of New Orleans, commented that Bustamante was ‘tan propio para la guerra como para la administración’ and was undoubtedly ‘muy propio para mudar el aspecto de los negocios y reponer a México en el puesto de donde lo había hecho descender la criminal ambición de un hombre [Santa Anna] que no ha perdonado medio alguno para sumergir la república mexicana en la anarquía.’²⁰

This hope was short-lived, as Bustamante would ultimately fail to live up to the expectations of those who welcomed his election. His administration did not mark the beginning of a period of stability for Mexico and it certainly did not bring about the desired economic recovery. In fact, the years of his government were peppered with a series of foreign and domestic crises, which served to undermine Bustamante's authority and to convince many of his erst-while supporters that he was far from the ideal candidate for the Presidency. By 1841, the year in which his government was overthrown, it seemed that most observers regarded Bustamante as a weak and indecisive leader, whose inability to impose himself upon his government had served to push Mexico further into chaos. This chapter seeks to explore how this image of

¹⁸ “Contestación del Presidente del Congreso, D. Juan Manuel Elizalde, al discurso del general Bustamante, del 19 de abril de 1837,” in *Los presidentes de México antes de la nación, 1821-1984* (Mexico City: LII Legislatura de la Cámara de Diputados, 1985), vol. 1., p. 171.

¹⁹ FO no. 50/106, pp. 107, 117. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 3 and 25 April 1837.

²⁰ *El Abeja*, 9 May 1837, quoted in *El Imparcial*, 7 July 1837.

Bustamante was created. It will look at the various crises that faced his administration in detail, and study Bustamante's responses to each. In the first section, the events surrounding Manuel Gómez Pedraza's attempt to overthrow the *Siete Leyes* in 1838 will be examined. The discussion will focus upon Bustamante's relationship with Gómez Pedraza and the President's involvement in his plans. The second section will investigate the causes and effect of the French blockade of Mexico's Atlantic ports between 1838 and 1839. It will study Bustamante's role in the resolution of this crisis and consider whether the criticisms directed at him by his contemporaries over his handling of the situation are entirely justified. The third section will discuss the federalist rebellions organised by José Urrea between 1838 and 1840. It will concentrate upon how the suppression of these revolts reflected upon the leadership of Bustamante. The fourth section will analyse the constitutional crises which were provoked by the apparent failure of the *Siete Leyes* to bring stable and orderly government to the Republic. Finally, the fifth section will assess the causes of Bustamante's extreme unpopularity in 1841 and will explain how his government was eventually overthrown.

A: Bustamante and the Federalists (1837-1838)

The centralists soon realised that they had made a grave mistake in choosing Anastasio Bustamante as their President. From his first day in office it was clear that, far from being an ardent supporter of the new constitution, the General regarded the *Siete Leyes* with some distrust. In his speech upon taking office on 19 April 1837, Bustamante qualified his Presidential oath thus:

He ofrecido, señores, el más solemne y delicado voto que mis labios pudieran proferir: voto que será cumplido, *cuanto me lo permitan el honor y la conciencia.*²¹

The implication that he was not prepared to follow the 1836 charter to the letter was plain and not missed by those listening.²² If Olavarría y Ferrari is to be believed, in the weeks that followed, Bustamante made his opposition to the Siete Leyes even clearer. According to the writer, 'no ocultó su disgusto [...] dejando entender que con los principios y sistema proclamados por los constituyentes de 1836 no era fácil mantener sin sumergirse la nave del Estado.'²³ As we shall see later in this chapter, the President's quarrel with the charter lay in the division of power between the executive, legislative and the new intermediary, the Supreme Conservative Power (SPC). For the moment we shall simply note that the new constitution, following the precedent of 1824, had created an executive with extremely limited power. Nothing could be done without the approval of Congress and subsequently, the support of the SPC. Perhaps as a result of Bustamante's widely known disapproval of his weak position, rumours circulated throughout 1837 that the President was planning to establish a dictatorship. Olavarría y Ferrari reports of one such rumour in April.²⁴ In October, the newspaper, *El Imparcial*, reported that 'hacía tiempo que se notaba cierto empeño en propagar la noticia de que se trataba de elegir un dictador.' It claimed that much speculation had surrounded the celebrations of 27 September in which 'se hicieron correr la necia hablilla de que aquel día y en aquellas circunstancias iba a ser proclamado un

²¹ "El general Bustamante al prestar el juramento constitucional, en 19 de abril de 1837," in *Los presidentes de la nación antes la nación*, vol. 1, p. 169. My italics.

²² Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 2. Bustamante reports: 'estas palabras misteriosas dieron no poco que pensar a algunos diputados, pues a nadie exigíamos que jurarse obrar contra su honor y conciencia. Esta es (dijeron algunos) una verdadera restricción mental y el tiempo descubrirá el concepto que encierra.'

²³ Olavarría y Ferrari, "México independiente," p. 405.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

dictador.’²⁵ In November, Carlos María de Bustamante noted that Bustamante was being encouraged by some in his military entourage to set himself up as a dictator.²⁶

Even so, these rumours would come to nought. The most obvious indication of the President's unhappiness with the 1836 Constitution was his close relationship to the moderate federalists and most especially his old friend, Manuel Gómez Pedraza. Quite soon it was clear that Bustamante was plotting with him to overthrow the new constitution and replace it with a modified federal one. We do not know when Bustamante and Gómez Pedraza's involvement began, or whether their relationship was one of friendship or simply business. After all, Gómez Pedraza had felt deeply betrayed by Bustamante after the events of 1830 and had joined Santa Anna's rebellion against the former Vice-President in 1832. But we must assume that at some point in the intervening years they had reached some kind of understanding. It might seem strange that men who were apparently political enemies could be reconciled in this way. However, such an eventuality was not without precedent. While in exile in Paris, Bustamante appears to have been able to strike up a friendship with Lorenzo de Zavala, despite the fact that Zavala had been one the fiercest critics of Bustamante's Vice-Presidency.²⁷ Valentín Gómez Farías would also be able to swallow his distrust of Santa Anna in order to enter into an alliance with the *caudillo* in 1846 to organise the overthrow of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga. The former example seems to demonstrate how friendship was able to overcome political differences. The second shows how personal and political animosities could be laid aside in political alliances, if there were sufficient benefits for both parties. In terms of Bustamante and Gómez

²⁵ *El Imparcial*, 3 October 1837.

²⁶ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 42.

²⁷ Jorge Flores D. (ed.), “Lorenzo de Zavala y su misión diplomática en Francia, 1834-1835,” in Manuel González Ramírez (ed.), *Obras de Lorenzo de Zavala: Viaje a los Estados Unidos del Norte de América; Noticias sobre la vida y escritos de Zavala (por Justo Sierro O'Reilly); La cuestión de Texas; Memorias* (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1976), p. xxxvii. Joaquín Moreno, “Diario de un escribiente de la legación,” in *ibid.*, pp. 418-419.

Pedraza's new alliance, the circumstances would appear to suggest that the latter example of mutual convenience was in play, rather than simple friendship.

The first sign of the new relationship between Bustamante and Gómez Pedraza can be seen in the final three months of 1837. Carlos María de Bustamante reports that in October, the President was seen to 'tener frecuentes sesiones con Gómez Pedraza,' and would meet with him at night in 'cierta casa particular.'²⁸ On 10 October, Juan, one of Valentín Gómez Farías' regular correspondents, wrote to him in New Orleans assuring the exile that Bustamante was poised to appoint Gómez Pedraza as a member of his cabinet. Once he was a member, Juan alleged, 'se destruirá cuanto existe, y será convocada una Asamblea Nacional.' This new Congress would oversee the re-introduction of the federalist system.²⁹ This belief would appear to be widespread. Carlos María de Bustamante, José Ramón Malo and the American envoy in Mexico, William Jones, all note that Bustamante was rumoured to be about to place Gómez Pedraza in his cabinet.³⁰ When, on 13 October, Bustamante's existing cabinet: Manuel de la Peña y Peña, Luis Gonzaga Cuevas, Mariano Michelena and Joaquín Lebrija all submitted their resignations,³¹ many took it as a sign that President Bustamante was about to initiate a change to the constitution. According to Carlos María de Bustamante, 'el hecho de haber hecho la renuncia simultáneamente hizo sospechar que se ocultaba algún misterio de iniquidad, cuyo velo se rasgó: descubrióse que Bustamante protegía a los facciosos y trataba de restablecer la federación.'³²

Bustamante's interest in Gómez Pedraza's federalist proposals, generally referred to as 'la revolución moral' or 'la revolución filosófica,' are not really surprising. In the first place, Bustamante had been an ally of the federalists since his

²⁸ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, pp. 38-39.

²⁹ VGFA no. 419. Juan to Valentín Gómez Farías, Mexico City, 10 October 1837.

³⁰ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 39. Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol. 1, p. 140. Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 290.

³¹ Manuel de la Peña y Peña, Luis Gonzaga Cuevas, Mariano Michelena and Joaquín Lebrija to Bustamante, 13 October 1837, in *El Imparcial*, 17 October 1837.

³² Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 39.

days in Guadalajara between 1823 and 1824. He had later been an enthusiastic *yorkino* and federalist during the time he spent as Commander General of Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas and Texas in the late 1820s. His first administration was often accused of being centralist in orientation. However, there is no real evidence to back up such a charge. While efforts were made to impose the will of the federal government on the states on various occasions, no legislation was actually introduced to reduce the power of the states or subordinate their authorities to those of Mexico City. The main concern of this administration had been to reduce the influence of the *sanscullores* in government. Secondly, Gómez Pedraza advocated a return to a modified version of the Constitution of 1824. He proposed reforms which were entirely in keeping with the position Bustamante had adopted during his first term in office. In order to avoid the clashes between state and federal authorities, which had occurred in the past, Gómez Pedraza wanted to see the position of central government strengthened, and the power of the states to legislate independently to be curtailed. He also called for the electoral system to be reformed in order to prevent those unworthy of participating in elections from taking part.³³ In effect, this was a middle way between the two existing constitutions, without the hindrance on the part of powerful states or the Supreme Conservative Power. As Josefina Vázquez has recently pointed out, the Constitution of 1836 was a modification of the Federalist Constitution rather than a radical shift away from it. It did not remove all power from the departments, but conserved 'un espacio de autonomía administrativa y hasta política en los departamentos.'³⁴ Finally, Gómez Pedraza wanted his revolution to be undertaken

³³ Manuel Gómez Pedraza, "Exposición al buen sentido de la nación para que sin más efusión de sangre se varíe la actual forma de gobierno," in Laura Solares Robles (ed.), *La obra política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza, 1813-1851* (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Instituto Matías Romero/Acervo Histórico Diplomático de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1999), pp. 227-232.

³⁴ Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, "Centralistas, conservadores y monarquistas, 1830-1853," in Humberto Morales and Will Fowler (ed.), *El conservadurismo mexicano en el siglo XIX, 1810-1910* (Puebla: Benémerita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla/University of St. Andrews/Secretaría de Cultura, Gobierno del Estado de Puebla, 1999), p. 117.

peacefully without the descent into chaos that had marked other pro-federalist movements. Bustamante, like many other *hombres de bien*, had been profoundly shocked by the riot of the Parián market in 1828 and probably found the idea of a peaceful, orderly revolution quite attractive.

In the event, Gómez Pedraza was not appointed to the new cabinet. The new members were: José Antonio Romero as Minister of the Interior, José María Bocanegra as Minister of the Exterior and General Ignacio Mora y Villamil as Minister of War.³⁵ No-one could be persuaded to undertake the position as Minister of Finance, and so this brief was also given to Bocanegra.³⁶ Gómez Farías's correspondent, Juan, attributed Bustamante's failure to appoint federalists to the new cabinet as a sign that the President wished to proceed with moderation.³⁷ This might well be the case, as in the following weeks it became clear that the strategy of Gómez Pedraza was to induce peaceful change within the Republic by means of mobilising public support.³⁸ From the end of October a number of representations by Departmental Juntas, garrisons and groups of private citizens were addressed to the President calling for the reintroduction of the federalist system. First to be published was the representation from the Departmental Junta of Durango on 30 October.³⁹ Second was Gómez Pedraza's, published in his newspaper, *El Cosmopolita* on 1 November.⁴⁰ These were soon followed by publications by the Departmental Junta of Zacatecas, the citizens of Puebla, Querétaro, Toluca and Mexico City;⁴¹ and the

³⁵ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol. 1, p. 142. Entry for 25 October 1837.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Entry for 4 November 1837.

³⁷ VGFA no. 420. Juan to Gómez Farías, 19 October 1837.

³⁸ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, pp. 290-291.

³⁹ "Exposición del Departamento de Durango a Anastasio Bustamante," (30 October 1837), in Berta Ulloa and Joel Hernández Santiago (eds.), *Planes en la nación mexicana* (Mexico City: Senado de la República/ El Colegio de México, 1987), vol. 3, pp. 111-118.

⁴⁰ Bocanegra, *Memorias*, vol. 2, pp. 153-155.

⁴¹ "Representación dirigida al presidente de la república," (3 November 1837), in Ulloa and Hernández Santiago (eds.), *Planes en la nación mexicana*, vol. 3, pp. 119-121. "Representación de la ciudad de México," in *ibid.*, pp. 121-122. "Representación de 528 vecinos de Toluca por el restablecimiento del sistema federal, dirigida al presidente," (21 November 1837), in *ibid.*, pp. 123-128. "Representación del municipio de Toluca por el restablecimiento del sistema federal," (22 November 1837), in *ibid.*, pp. 128-129. "Exposición de la capital del Departamento de Puebla," (12

garrisons of Morelia, Puebla, Oaxaca and San Luis Potosí.⁴² The influence of Gómez Pedraza was discernible in all these representations. All followed the same general pattern. They called for the Constitution of 1836 to be set aside and for that of 1824 to take its place. However, they recognised that the first federal constitution had not been perfect and so advocated that an assembly or convention be elected by a popular vote. This body should reform the charter in a period of about six months. While this reformation was being undertaken, Bustamante would remain in power.

Therefore, Bustamante might well have believed in October, that it was wise to placate the centralists and to avoid appointing federalists to his cabinet. He was probably aware that many of his former allies were considering ways of ridding themselves of his Presidency and knew that it would not be wise to precipitate any reaction against his government while Gómez Pedraza was in the middle of implementing his plans. José Antonio Mejía informed Gómez Farías on 28 November that he had heard that ‘los Alamanes, Tagles y compañía estaban muy disgustados con Bustamante.’ He noted that the aristocrats (*hombres de bien*) and clergy were now looking to Santa Anna as a replacement for the President.⁴³ This opinion is also offered by Malo, who records that on 6 November he visited the President to warn him that ‘el temor del Clero y de los buenos, los obligan a entregarse en las manos de Santa Anna como los libró de Farías esperaban [que] los liberase ahora.’⁴⁴ Santa Anna was still very much in disgrace in Veracruz, and unlikely to pose a real threat to the President. Even so, the possibility that the *hombres de bien* might find another military figure prepared to act as the saviour of the new constitution could not be completely discounted.

December 1837), in *ibid.*, pp. 129-131. "Representación de varios vecinos de la ciudad de Querétaro dirigen a Anastasio Bustamante," (28 December 1837), in *ibid.*, pp. 136-138.

⁴² Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 43.

⁴³ VGFA no. 423. José Antonio Mejía to Gómez Farías, La Habana, 28 November 1837.

⁴⁴ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol. 1, p. 142. Entry for 6 November 1837.

The publication of the representations created stir amongst the political groups in Mexico City.⁴⁵ Pakenham's replacement as British minister in Mexico, Charles Ashburnham, reported to London that he feared that a revolution was imminent.⁴⁶ His American counterpart, Jones, made a similar report to Washington. Jones also noted that he had been secretly informed that Bustamante was at the head of this moral revolution.⁴⁷ On 7 November this came to a head after a petition, repeating Gómez Pedraza's plan and signed by 'some of the most wealthy and influential persons of the Republic,'⁴⁸ was presented to the President by a commission headed by Anastasio Zerecero. The same day the Minister of the Interior, Romero, sent the petition to the Council of Government for its consideration. In the note accompanying the petition Romero made it clear that the President considered the content of the petition to be of the most grave importance.⁴⁹ The Council gave an unequivocal and immediate response. It declared the petition to be a simple expression of public opinion, that the President ignore what it recommended. For, if he were to do so, the Council warned, he would be overstepping his constitutional power.⁵⁰

The President was quite obviously faced with a dilemma. Either he could accept the Council's recommendation and take the matter no further, or he could defy their wishes and openly support the proposals of the petition, therefore inciting change through illegal means. He decided to let the matter lie. Sordo Cedeño believes that Bustamante did not dare choose the latter route. He asserts that 'el hombre debatía entre sus convicciones personales y sus principios morales y no se decidía con intensidad ni por unos ni por otros.'⁵¹ Charles Ashburnham was of a similar opinion. He told Lord Palmerston that the President 'had not the courage as yet to undertake

⁴⁵ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 291.

⁴⁶ FO no. 50/108, p. 65. Charles Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 7 November 1837.

⁴⁷ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 292.

⁴⁸ FO no. 50/108, p. 145. Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 30 November 1837.

⁴⁹ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 292.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

so serious a responsibility as to abrogate by his own authority [...] the law of the land.⁵² Bustamante's choice, however, cannot simply be defined in terms of courage or indecision. As we shall see later in this chapter, despite his opposition to the *Siete Leyes*, the President almost always respected its laws and did not overstep his powers. Equally, despite the disclaimer that accompanied his constitutional oath; Bustamante always acted legally, in stark contrast to Santa Anna, who during his brief stint as Interim President in 1839 completely ignored the protocols laid down by the Constitution of 1836 constitution. In this case, we cannot ignore the possibility that his decision was taken mainly on moral grounds, and that he chose not to pursue the petition out of respect for the law.

The failure of the federalists to incite the fall of the *Siete Leyes* in November 1837 did not mark the end of their struggles. If anything the pressure upon the government intensified. Rebellions in favour of federalism had been a feature of the landscape since the introduction of the *Siete Leyes*.⁵³ These had generally been small, local affairs without great influence. However, in the wake of the events in Mexico City, a larger more threatening *pronunciamiento* was launched in Sonora on 26 December by General José Urrea. His plan resembled the moral revolution in that it called for the establishment of an assembly to reform the Federal Constitution of 1824 within a period of six months, and proposed that Bustamante remain in charge of the executive in the meantime.⁵⁴ However, it differed significantly from this movement in its execution. Gómez Pedraza advocated revolution by peaceful means only. He wished to bring about the end of the Constitution of 1836 through political pressure on Congress and the executive.⁵⁵ Urrea, on the other hand, had embarked on what

⁵² FO no. 50/108, p. 145. Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 30 November 1837.

⁵³ For a run down of the rebellions and *pronunciamientos* faced by Bustamante's government between 1837 and 1841, see Appendix Three.

⁵⁴ "Proclama y plan de José Urrea y pronunciamiento de la guarnición de Arizpe," (26 December 1837), in Ulloa y Hernández Santiago (eds.), *Planes en la nación mexicana*, vol. 3, pp. 135-136.

⁵⁵ Laura Solares Robles, *Una revolución pacífica: Biografía política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza, 1789-1851* (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Acervo Histórico Diplomático de la Secretaría de Relaciones

would become a violent rebellion. He sent copies of his plan to most of the Departments: Chihuahua, Querétaro, Baja California, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, Coahuila, Sinaloa and Oaxaca. Only Sinaloa decided to adhere to his plan. Even so, this transformed Urrea's rebellion as it gave him access to the custom house at Mazatlán.⁵⁶ Armed with this important resource and, joined later in October 1838 by the custom house at Tampico, Urrea would provide the strongest military challenge for the centralist regime for the next 18 months.

The return of Valentín Gómez Farías from his exile in New Orleans in February 1838 also increased the strength of the federalist position in Mexico. Gómez Farías was the accepted leader of the radical federalists. He had occupied the Vice-Presidency between 1833 and 1834, and had been seen to be responsible for the radical policies of this period, including the attacks on military and ecclesiastical *fueros*, the abolition of the tithe, and the infamous *ley del caso*.⁵⁷ Therefore he was naturally viewed with suspicion by the *hombres de bien* and the centralists, who had engineered his downfall in 1834 with the aid of Santa Anna. In terms of federalism, Gómez Farías' aims differed little from those of Gómez Pedraza. In essence, Gómez Farías advocated the return to the 1824 constitution, without the need for the reforms proposed by Gómez Pedraza (hence the title of 'pure' federalists given to Gómez Farías' supporters), and was not prepared to accept that Bustamante should continue

Exteriores/Consejo Estatal para la Cultura y las Artes del Gobierno del Estado de Querétaro, 1996), p. 144. Manuel Gómez Pedraza, "Exposición al buen sentido de la nación para que sin más efusión de sangre se varíe la actual forma de gobierno," pp. 330-332.

⁵⁶ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 294.

⁵⁷ Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals*, pp. 196-199. Fowler argues that Gómez Farías was not the fire-brand radical he has often been portrayed to be. He claims: 'While Mora, Zavala, and a radical-dominated Congress pressed for immediate and major reforms that would secularise and demilitarise society, abolishing *fueros* and redistributing Church wealth, Gómez Farías held back and attempted to stall the pace of reform, while at the same time he attempted to disassociate himself from the radical factions, stressing how important it was to go by the book, respecting, wherever possible, the compromises that had come to be represented by the constitution.' However, Gómez Farías in the position of Vice-President not unnaturally was perceived by many of his contemporaries as the author of the radical reforms of 1833 and 1834, and with the death of Zavala and the continuing absence of Mora from Mexico, he became the undisputed leader of the radical faction by 1838.

in power. He also supported the armed rebellions and uprisings for federalism,⁵⁸ while Gómez Pedraza called for his plans to be implemented 'sin más efusión de sangre.'⁵⁹ Aside from for this, the differences between the two men lay in a personal animosity which has, as yet, an undiscovered cause.⁶⁰ It was clear that the federalist star was rising. In February 1838, the month of Gómez Farías' return, petitions calling for the re-establishment of federalism in Mexico were being received by the executive almost daily.⁶¹ In the same month there were even rumours that Bustamante was set to appoint Gómez Farías to his cabinet.⁶²

As this rumour suggests, the President had not abandoned his federalist sympathies after the events of November 1837. However, the return of Gómez Farías presented a new challenge. He recognised that Gómez Pedraza's plans needed the support of the radicals and their leader if they were to be successful. Therefore, when Gómez Pedraza suggested another scheme to bring about the desired re-introduction of federalism in June, he agreed to the proposals on the condition that Gómez Farías' participation could be arranged. Gómez Farías was not interested, and told Pedraza that he would oppose these plans with all his influence.⁶³ In fact, Gómez Farías, perhaps because of his personal dislike of Gómez Pedraza and distrust of Bustamante, regarded both men and their plans in obvious contempt. In July 1838 he wrote:

El señor de quien me habla Ud. [Pedraza] en su apreciable tiene mucho miedo y mucho apetito de mandar, y esta es la razón porque varían

⁵⁸ Lilian Briseño Senosián, Laura Solares Robles and Laura Suárez de la Torre, *Valentín Gómez Farías y su lucha por el federalismo* (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco, 1991), p. 146.

⁵⁹ Gómez Pedraza, "Exposición al buen sentido de la nación para que sin más efusión de sangre se varíe la actual forma de gobierno," pp. 311-335 (Quotation taken from title).

⁶⁰ Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals*, p. 154. Fowler suggests the men had an original disagreement in 1828, basing himself upon a letter which Gómez Pedraza wrote to Gómez Farías in 1832 asking him to take up a position in his cabinet. In this letter, Gómez Pedraza notes that he hoped that their past personal feud could be forgotten.

⁶¹ VGFA no. 431. A. Viesco to Gómez Farías, 18 February 1838.

⁶² VGFA no. 439. José Amata to Gómez Farías, 28 February 1838.

⁶³ U.S. Consulate Dispatches, no. 161, Mexico City 1 October 1838, quoted in Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 297.

tanto sus proyectos, ya ha hecho seis diferentes unos de otros, y si seguimos sus pasos, no nos fijemos en ninguno con perjuicio evidente de la causa pública. ¿Qué se puede esperar de un hombre que habla mal de Bustamante, que se queja de que lo ha engañado varias veces, y que conociendo su tendencia al absolutismo, pretende robustecerlo, depositando en él mayor poder? [...] ¿No es Bustamante el mismo que dijo en una carta que hemos visto yo y otros que podía escribir para que se hiciesen representaciones pacíficas en favor de la federación, y que habiendo recibido un gran número de ellas, no solamente las ha desentendido, sino que ni aun ha querido leerlas, y ha dejado encausar a algunos de los peticionarios? [...] ¿Quién no ve que corrompe, que disimula, que alhaga según le conviene, que es en fin de cuentas el Fernando séptimo mexicano? [...] La revolución está comenzada, y lo que debemos hacer es continuarla. Pedraza y otros señores trabajan para deshacer todo lo hecho. Yo estoy al alcance de sus designios, no obraban de buena fé, y si Ud. se deja engañar, se arrepentirá tarde.⁶⁴

He was more inclined towards the plans of José Urrea, with whom he had maintained a constant correspondence since his return to Mexico.⁶⁵

This opposition from the leader of the radical faction obviously placed the plans of Gómez Pedraza and Bustamante in danger. Moreover, it was also clear that Gómez Farías was drawing up his own plans for the re-establishment of federalism and the immediate deposition of the President. In these, it appeared that the French blockade of Mexico's Atlantic seaports, begun in April 1838 and which shall be studied later in the chapter, played some small part. Ashburnham, the British Plenipotentiary in Mexico, believed that the federalists regarded the French blockade as an ideal moment to seize power. He informed Lord Palmerston in May 1838 that the government's refusal to bow to French intimidation had foiled these plans as it 'deprived the federalists of one weapon by which [...] [they] had expected to effect their downfall: the charge of base submission to France and treason to their country.'⁶⁶ In fact, the truth was somewhat different. On the one hand, Gómez Farías

⁶⁴ VGFA no. 505. Gómez Farías to Manuel González Cosío, 28 July 1838.

⁶⁵ Briseño Senosián, Solares Robles and Suárez de la Torre, *Valentín Gómez Farías*, p. 148.

⁶⁶ FO no. 50/114, p. 1. Ashburnham to Palmerston, 5 May 1838.

and his allies did exploit the blockade as a manner of attacking the government and accusing Bustamante of ineptitude in his dealings with the French.⁶⁷ However, it also appears that Gómez Farías regarded the French as his allies in the struggle against the centralist system. The French always protested that their quarrel was not with the people of Mexico, simply their government. They did not blockade the ports in the hands of the federalist rebels. Gómez Farías' writings of the time show that it was his belief that the French also wished to see a federalist government re-established in Mexico.⁶⁸

On 7 September 1838, Gómez Farías and a number of his supporters, including Father José María Alpuche e Infante, were arrested and imprisoned. They were accused of being in league with the French and of plotting a revolution against the government.⁶⁹ It appears that in light of their failure to win Gómez Farías' support, Bustamante and Gómez Pedraza had taken action to neutralise the threat of the radicals. The order to arrest these men was given by the Minister of the Interior, José Joaquín Pesado, who was also involved in the plans for the moral revolution.⁷⁰ In the *Manifiesto* that Alpuche e Infante published soon after his arrest, he made it clear that Gómez Pedraza, Pesado and Bustamante had planned the arrests to rid themselves of the awkward opposition of the radicals to their own plans for revolution.⁷¹ Charles Ashburnham viewed the arrests in a similar light. He reported that it was generally known in the capital that Bustamante and Gómez Pedraza were organising a revolution and noted that the two men arranged the arrest of Gómez Farías because

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 50/115, p. 78. Ashburnham to Pakenham, 13 September 1838.

⁶⁸ Briseño Senosián, Solares Robles and Suárez de la Torre, *Valentín Gómez Farías*, pp. 146-148.

⁶⁹ José María Alpuche e Infante, *Primera philípica al Exmo. sr. D. Anastasio Bustamante* (Mexico City: Imprenta de Luis Heredia, calle de San Sebastián no. 7, 1838), p. 7. In the British Library. Those also detained were Joaquín Cardoso, Francisco Modesto Olaguibel, Ignacio Basadre, Juan Zalaeta, and D.N. Envides. Costeloe, *The Central Republic*, p. 140.

⁷⁰ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 300.

⁷¹ José María Alpuche e Infante, *Manifiesto que el ciudadano José María Alpuche e Infante cura propio de Cduacán hace a la nación, de su escandalosa prisión* (Mexico City: Imprenta de Luis Heredia, calle de San Sebastián no. 7, 1838), pp. 6-18. In the British Library.

they feared he was about to undertake, 'a revolution in which they would have no share.'⁷²

Even so, the conspirators made no immediate efforts to implement their plans. The expected revolution did not get underway until 13 December 1838 when Bustamante finally appointed Gómez Pedraza and his moderate federalist colleague, Juan Rodríguez Puebla to his cabinet. The reason for the delay is unknown. Perhaps as Sordo Cedeño claims, it was merely another example of Bustamante's indecision.⁷³ Or perhaps Bustamante and Gómez Pedraza were simply biding their time for a suitable moment in which to act. In September 1838, due to the six months of French blockade amongst other things, President Bustamante did not enjoy widespread popularity or support, and any move made then might well have foundered. However, there was every hope of things getting better. The French blockade had suffered terribly during the summer in the waters off Veracruz. Originally composed of six ships, one frigate and five brigs, the fleet had been forced to separate to patrol the Atlantic coastline. Only one ship was visible in Veracruz and this was in a sorry state of disrepair. Also, the sicknesses associated with the rainy season were taking their toll upon its crew. The French minister, Baron Deffaudis, had retired to France complaining of violent headaches and hallucinations in June. By August, a third of all the sailors patrolling the coast had died or were suffering from the *vómito negro*. The commander of the blockade, Post-Captain Bazoche, recognising the futility of his position had requested leave to return to France.⁷⁴ The President can have been forgiven for thinking that the weather might quickly ensure a French retreat. In this case, his own position would almost certainly have been strengthened, and the success of any attempt at moral revolution would have been more likely.

⁷² FO no. 50/115, pp. 77-78. Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 13 September 1838.

⁷³ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 301.

⁷⁴ Nancy Nichols Barker, *The French Experience in Mexico, 1821-1861. A History of Constant Misunderstanding* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 71-73.

Of course this is all mere speculation. After all, the circumstances which surrounded Gómez Pedraza's eventual attempt to lead the President to sanction the re-introduction of the federalist system were less than ideal. The French situation became much worse in October when re-enforcements arrived from France bearing new demands on the government. The failure of the government to resolve these differences in negotiation led to the French opening fire on Veracruz on 27 November. The next day, the Commander of the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, completely outgunned, was forced to surrender the castle. In response, the Mexican government declared war upon France. On 5 December, a raiding party from the French fleet landed in Veracruz with the apparent aim of capturing Mariano Arista and Santa Anna, who had been charged with the port's defence. Arista was taken, but Santa Anna managed to make his escape and led an attack on the party as they returned to their ship. In the ensuing gun-fire, Santa Anna lost his leg and was reported to be near to death.⁷⁵ His attack, however, became instantly translated as a great victory; and Santa Anna reclaimed all his lost popularity in a matter of hours.⁷⁶

In fact, Bustamante's decision to appoint Gómez Pedraza and Rodríguez Puebla to the cabinet on 13 December and thereby set in motion the moral revolution does not appear to have been planned in advance. It merely seems to be a reaction to the events with which he was surrounded. The failure of the negotiations with the French and the subsequent surrender of San Juan de Ulúa, created a volatile political atmosphere in the capital. The American envoy, Jones, reported that on 21 November, the principal chiefs of the army met to arrange a triumvirate which could take over the government during this crisis. Neither Santa Anna, Bustamante, nor Gómez Farías featured in their plans. According to Jones, another junta was convened a week later,

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-80.

⁷⁶ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 143.

and in this it was proposed instead that Bustamante be proclaimed dictator.⁷⁷ However, despite this, it appears that the prevailing mood was not in favour of the President. Carlos María de Bustamante reports that in the days following the capture of Ulúa, 'no pocos generales, diputados y senadores murmuraron altamente del gobierno [...] y trataron en el Pelicano de quitar la presidencia a D. Anastasio Bustamante.' These men even sent a commission to see Bustamante and ask him to resign.⁷⁸ The obvious replacement for the President was, of course, Santa Anna. On 1 December, Malo noted in his diary that in Congress there had been 'más fuertes conatos por algunos jefes para echar de la Presidencia al señor Bustamante y colocar en ella al señor Santa Anna.'⁷⁹ On 4 December, the British Minister, Ashburnham, reported to Lord Palmerston that on the streets voices could be heard shouting 'down with Bustamante!' He noted that all shops were shut and business at a total standstill, concluding that revolution was in the air. He warned London that 'there can be little doubt that in a short time [...] I shall have to announce the election of Santa Anna by the soldiers [...] with the title of dictator.'⁸⁰ When on 8 December, Bustamante asked Congress to approve his request to lead the troops personally against the French, the speed with which the motion passed through both chambers was indicative of his unpopular position. As Sordo Cedeño notes, the members' decision was taken although it was clear that the President's absence would provoke a revolution and their disregard of this fact, 'daba la impresión de que los hombres de bien tenían prisa de deshacerse del general Bustamante.'⁸¹

In the light of this hostility towards his position and the sudden rehabilitation of Santa Anna's image, Bustamante must have known his days as President were

⁷⁷ U.S. Consulate Dispatches, (Mexico City), nos. 176 and 180, Mexico City, 22 and 27 November 1838, quoted in Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 301.

⁷⁸ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 137.

⁷⁹ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol.1, p. 155.

⁸⁰ FO. no. 50/116, pp. 3- 4. Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 4 December 1838.

⁸¹ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 287.

numbered. His request to take personal control of the troops seems a recognition of this fact. As we saw in the previous chapter, such a departure from the capital could provide the only honourable way out of a desperate situation. Therefore, if he really wished to effect a change in the constitution, he would have to act in the next few days. The advantages of leading a successful movement would be huge. In the first place, it would mean the destruction of the Constitution of 1836. Secondly, the assumption of power by the moderate federalists would undoubtedly help Bustamante's personal position. The success of the moral revolution would outmanoeuvre the schemes of the *hombres de bien* to replace him with Santa Anna or any other military figure. In terms of Gómez Pedraza's original plans, his tenure as President would be cut short. However, as the leader of the revolution, his popularity would be sure to grow. It was not inconceivable that he could be re-elected as President in the new federal elections.

The ideal opportunity to initiate the revolution came on 10 December, when his entire cabinet resigned once more. Three days later he appointed Gómez Pedraza as Minister of the Exterior, Rodríguez Puebla as Minister of the Interior, José de la Cortina as Minister of Finance and Benito Quijano as Minister of War.⁸² Both Rodríguez Puebla and Gómez Pedraza state that they accepted their position on the condition that Bustamante would initiate a change in the constitution immediately.⁸³ Consequently, the same day Gómez Pedraza and Rodríguez Puebla held a meeting with Bustamante to discuss their strategy. The ministers presented the President with a proposal for a decree. This paper called for the convocation of a new National Assembly, elected under the same criteria as the Constituent Congress of 1823, to

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 302.

⁸³ Manuel Gómez Pedraza, "Aclaración sobre su conducta en el ministerio de Anastasio Bustamante en diciembre de 1838, y refutación a Carlos María de Bustamante que desvirtúa su actuación en *El gabinete mexicano durante el segundo periodo de la administración del exmo. sr. presidente don Anastasio Bustamante*," in Solares Robles, *La obra política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza*, p. 354. Juan Rodríguez Puebla, "Tres días de ministerio," in *El Restaurador Mexicano*, 19 December 1838.

oversee the reform and implementation of the 1824 constitution over a period of six months. The new Congress would also appoint a new executive. In the meantime Bustamante and his cabinet would remain in power.⁸⁴ Gómez Pedraza wished Bustamante to sign this decree and implement its measures without referring to Congress. However, it appears that the President was not happy with this strategy. In an article published in 1842, Gómez Pedraza claims that Bustamante was opposed to this idea of a new executive. According to his account, the President made it clear to him, ‘aunque no de palabra [...] de modo que esas cosas se indican, el deseo de continuar con el mando.’ He also states that Bustamante insisted that the proposed decree be first presented to Congress, agreeing to sign the decree later even if it were rejected.⁸⁵ So, at five o'clock that afternoon Gómez Pedraza and Rodríguez Puebla presented their proposed decree to the Council of Ministers, who, during a meeting that continued until eleven that evening, rejected the proposals. The next day, the ministers were interviewed by a commission from the two chambers of Congress. This meeting failed to come to any decision but arranged for the Supreme Conservative Power to be consulted the following day. However, neither Congress nor the SPC convened on 15 December. Gómez Pedraza and Rodríguez Puebla tried to convince the President to sign the decree without the approval of Congress, as he had promised.⁸⁶ When Bustamante refused, both men resigned convinced that ‘no se llegaría a publicar el proyecto.’⁸⁷

Anastasio Bustamante's behaviour during what would come to be known as the Three Day Ministry, has been generally described as indecisive and he has been blamed for the failure of the enterprise. He is accused of lacking the strength of character to continue with the fight once it was begun and is condemned for not

⁸⁴ Rodríguez Puebla, “Tres días de ministerio.”

⁸⁵ Gómez Pedraza, “Aclaración sobre su conducta,” p. 355.

⁸⁶ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 304.

⁸⁷ Rodríguez Puebla, “Tres días de ministerio.”

supporting his two ministers in such a way as to guarantee the success of their schemes. Sordo Cedeño claims that Bustamante 'no se atrevió a dar el paso decisivo' to fully support the plans of Pedraza and Puebla.⁸⁸ Costeloe suggests that Bustamante's wavering was an example of his characteristic 'vacillation and a chronic inability to act decisively.'⁸⁹ Certainly at first glance this interpretation does not seem too short of the mark. After all, it was Bustamante who invited Pedraza and Puebla to take up positions in his cabinet and who promised them his support for their plans. It was Bustamante who insisted that they first present their decree to Congress. He must have known that the predominantly centralist members would have opposed these plans.

However, this explanation fails to take into account the reaction of the capital's population to the news of the proposals in Congress.⁹⁰ On 14 December, during the commission's interview with the ministers, a crowd of around 2000 people gathered outside the National Palace. According to the newspaper, *El Restaurador Mexicano*:

Un fuego eléctrico se apoderó de todos y comenzaron a dar las voces: ¡viva la federación sin cola! ¡viva la libertad! ¡viva el pueblo soberano y muera el centralismo! [...] Las calles y plazas se veían inundadas de gente que corría y gritaba muy llena de entusiasmo. El número que se reunió bajo de la habitación del presidente Bustamante era considerable y terrible, y fueron tan repetidas las insistencias por la federación que tuvo que presentarse al balcón y decir también, ¡viva la federación!⁹¹

Later that afternoon the mob headed for the Convent of Santo Domingo, where Gómez Farías and Padre Alpuche were being held prisoner. They poured into the square outside the convent and demanded their release. When Gómez Farías appeared he was feted as a hero and the saviour of the federation, and in the face of a

⁸⁸ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 307.

⁸⁹ Costeloe, *The Central Republic in Mexico* p. 144.

⁹⁰ Gómez Pedraza, "Aclaración sobre su conducta," p. 356.

⁹¹ *El Restaurador Mexicano*, 15 December 1838.

clamouring crowd was obliged to climb into a carriage for his own protection.⁹² The mob then proceeded to lead the carriage back to the centre, passing by the National Palace, where according to *El Restaurador*, the procession made another stop to ‘dar las voces de ¡viva la federación sin cola! ¡viva la libertad! ¡viva el ilustre y gran Farías! ¡muera el centralismo!’ before taking Gómez Farías back to his home.⁹³ Father Alpuche found himself abandoned, and having no where else to go, returned to the convent.⁹⁴

Without a doubt, the street demonstrations spoiled the plans of Bustamante and Gómez Pedraza. The actions of the mob, as Gómez Pedraza noted, aroused ‘la alarma de la gente pacífica de la capital’ and undermined their support for his plans.⁹⁵ The street demonstrations also meant that Congress and the Supreme Conservative Power did not convene to decide upon Gómez Pedraza's proposals on 15 December. This meant that any hopes Bustamante had cherished of persuading Congress to support the moral revolution disappeared. It seems likely that the President had insisted that Gómez Pedraza and Rodríguez Puebla present their proposals to Congress because he wanted to bring them to the attention of the public at the same time. He probably hoped that professions of support from the Departmental Juntas and other bodies, who had supported the first attempt at the moral revolution the year before, might have forced Congress' hand and induced them to acquiesce to the moral revolution. The scenes of chaos in the street meant that this plan could not take effect. The crisis had now to be resolved immediately, so as to avoid any repetition of these scenes. Congress' refusal to convene on 15 December placed the onus for resolution of

⁹² Not before the more enterprising amongst the crowd had stolen his watch and cape. *El Mexicano*, 8 January 1838.

⁹³ *El Restaurador Mexicano*, 15 December 1838. The newspaper also claims the crowd shouted ‘¡muera comehuevos! ¡qué se ponga a dieta que es muy glotón y se vaya a su casa! Ya entregó a Ulúa, no queremos que entregue toda la república.’ Egg-eater was one of the nicknames given to Bustamante as he had the reputation for frequently enjoying the consumption of soft-boiled eggs.

⁹⁴ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 148.

⁹⁵ Gómez Pedraza, “Aclaración sobre su conducta,” p. 256.

the problem solely in Bustamante's hands. If the moral revolution were to be successful, he would have to implement the reform by decree. It is not surprising that he would shrink from such a step. Throughout his time as President, he respected the conventions of the Constitution of 1836. He never attempted to introduce any decree or other legislation without the approval of Congress and the Supreme Conservative Power. Moreover, he had always shown a marked dislike for the interference of the lower classes in the business of government. He had led the Plan of Jalapa in 1829 against Vicente Guerrero, who had been brought to power partly by the riot of the Parián market. The demonstrations of 14 December were unlikely to encourage him to continue to work for the triumph of the revolution. Moreover, it was obvious that the popular leader of the federalist movement was Gómez Farías, not Gómez Pedraza. It was clear that Bustamante and Gómez Pedraza's attempt to neutralise his influence had been utterly unsuccessful and that in his new found liberty, he could easily hijack their plans and turn them to his own advantage. It is not improbable that, as José Ramón Malo reported in his diary, this eventuality was only avoided on 14 December by the fact that the city's garrison remained loyal to the government and did not join the mob.⁹⁶ This of course meant, that any decision to introduce a change in government would be unlikely to benefit Gómez Pedraza, but rather Gómez Farías. Moreover, on 14 December the Supreme Conservative Power had decided, in the face of Bustamante's obvious betrayal of centralism, to call upon Santa Anna to come and restore order in the capital if this should become necessary.⁹⁷ This could be no idle threat, for if Santa Anna were to be able to come he would probably be able to count on the loyalty of the troops in Mexico City and the departments, thanks to his recent victory over the French. In this case, Bustamante's presidential career would be well and truly over.

⁹⁶ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol. 1, p. 159. Entry for 14 December 1838.

⁹⁷ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1 p.149.

Therefore, for Bustamante, there was no real choice but to abandon Gómez Pedraza and his plan. Continuing his support meant laying aside his moral convictions and quite clearly represented political suicide. Even if he had agreed to decree the acceptance of the plan, he would have survived a very short time in office before being deposed by Santa Anna, or another General. The explanation for General Bustamante's change of heart during the events of the Three Day Ministry is as a consequence, probably less to do with his lack of courage or hesitation and rather more to do with pragmatism. He chose the only sensible course open to him, which was not to press for change at this juncture. In this way he conserved his position for at least a few more weeks, and could try, as we shall see in later in the chapter, to bring about change by reforming the Constitution of 1836. However, it is evident that both centralists and federalists believed he betrayed their cause during December 1838. This placed him in a very delicate position as head of the executive. He had lost the confidence of two of the most important factions in government and would have to face the following three years in power in a very hostile atmosphere. Furthermore, this feeling of betrayal would undoubtedly colour any judgements given upon Bustamante's government by centralist observers such as Carlos María de Bustamante, or federalists like Gómez Pedraza. It is little wonder that both sides would later be so critical of his administration.

B: The French Blockade (1837-1839)

The French crisis, which was one of the major causes of dissatisfaction with Bustamante's government during its first two years, had its origins in the Parián riot of 1828. Many French traders claimed that they had suffered great losses in the events of 4 December. With the help of their government they attempted to extract

compensation of 163, 378 pesos from the government.⁹⁸ One of these traders was a baker, which explains why the short-lived military conflict of 1838 would be dubbed 'la guerra de los pasteles.' This diplomatic process began in 1829 and dragged on for the next decade. Tensions between the French and the Mexicans were also increased by a number of complaints made by the French minister in Mexico concerning the discriminatory treatment and violence he alleged had been suffered by his countrymen. The main complaint concerned the execution of two French subjects in Tampico in December 1835. These men had been part of an expedition against the government of Santa Anna led by General José Antonio Mejía which had landed in Tampico in December. When Mejía's party was captured, all his men, including the Frenchmen were executed. The French government wanted the officials who had ordered these executions to be removed from their positions. Another complaint concerned the murder of five Frenchmen in Atencingo in 1833. The inhabitants of that village accused these Frenchmen of poisoning their water supply with *cholera morbus*. As a result of this accusation the men were murdered by the residents of Atencingo. Those who carried out the murders later confessed, but were never prosecuted. Again, the French government demanded that the officials who oversaw both cases be removed from their positions.⁹⁹ Eventually, to ensure payment and satisfaction on the matter of their complaints, the French resorted to blockading Mexico's Atlantic seaports until the compensation, then assessed at 300, 000 pesos, almost three times the original sum was paid and the officials in question were replaced.

However, the French agenda was not limited to securing compensation, nor even justice for its subjects. Instead, its government also wished to secure an

⁹⁸ *Suplemento al número 1077 del Diario del Gobierno del miércoles 11 de abril. Continuación de los documentos relativos al Ultimatum* (Mexico City: Imprenta de Galván, 1838), pp. 104-108, carries details of the claims made by the traders of the Parián. The document can be found in the British Library.

⁹⁹ FO no. 50/98 pp. 14-16. This is a copy of the letter from Deffaudis to the Minister of the Exterior, 26 December 1836, included by Pakenham in his dispatch to London of 6 January 1836. Also see, *Suplemento al número 1077 del Diario del Gobierno*, pp. 52-54.

advantageous trade treaty with Mexico. By 1836 Great Britain, Prussia, Holland, Denmark, Saxony and the United States had all signed trade treaties with Mexico. France, on the other hand, whose citizens were more numerous in Mexico than any of the above nations, had so far been unable to negotiate a successful treaty with the Mexican government.¹⁰⁰ The difficulties lay in the French demands for certain guarantees upon the government. The French population in Mexico was almost entirely devoted to retail trade, mostly of luxury and fancy goods such as silk.¹⁰¹ For this reason, the French government wished to ensure that its traders would be protected in Mexico. It wanted its subjects to be given the same rights as Mexicans to practise retail trade (currently foreigners were allowed to practise trade, but could be individually deprived of this right by the government), but also wished that they should be exempted from military service and all forced loans and contributions levied by the government. In 1827, when Mexico was still struggling to achieve international recognition of its independence, Sebastián Camacho had signed an agreement with France acceding to these requests. This had not been a treaty, however, as France at this stage was unwilling to recognise Mexico's status, and two years later Vicente Guerrero's government took the decision to declare it invalid on the grounds that neither the French king, nor the Mexican Congress had validated the agreement.¹⁰² In 1831 and 1832 two further attempts had been made to draw up a full treaty but, on both occasions, they had come to nothing.¹⁰³ It was clear to the French government that a new approach had to be found.

In April 1837 the first step of a such a new strategy was taken by the French Plenipotentiary Minister, Baron Deffaudis. He sent a letter to the Mexican Ministry of the Interior which demanded that compensation be paid to those French traders who

¹⁰⁰ Barker, *The French Experience in Mexico*, p. 52.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 12-14, 28.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41, 46-52.

had suffered losses during the Parián riot; that the French residing in Mexico be reimbursed for all taxes and forced loans that they had been obliged to pay; that those officials who had overseen the execution of the Frenchmen in Tampico and had refused to prosecute the murderers in Atencingo be immediately punished and what was most important, that the informal trade treaty signed between France and Mexico in 1827 be fully recognised by the Mexican government until a new one could be drawn up. This new treaty should be written 'lo más pronto posible.' If these demands were not met, the Baron threatened the government, France was prepared to take matters into their own hands.¹⁰⁴ In the words of Pakenham, to whom Deffaudis showed the orders he had received from this government, they were 'prepared to resort to the mode of obtaining satisfaction as was triumphantly put into practice at Lisbon and Algiers' (i.e. force).¹⁰⁵ The Bustamante government attempted to settle the issue peacefully with the Baron and Luis G. Cuevas was ordered to begin negotiations with the French representative. In June of that year the two men met and discussed the situation, but were unable to come to any agreement. From a letter Cuevas wrote to the Baron just after this meeting it is clear that the Mexican government was not keen to set a precedent whereby foreign governments could demand compensation for losses suffered by their nationals during Mexican unrest, and it certainly was not prepared to exempt the French from taxes or forced loans, nor reimburse those who had already paid.¹⁰⁶

Cuevas' position is easily understood if we consider that France was not the only country making complaints against Mexican treatment of their nationals and

¹⁰⁴ Baron Deffaudis to the Minister of the Exterior, 13 April 1837, in *Suplemento al número 1077 del Diario del Gobierno*, pp. 43-45.

¹⁰⁵ FO no. 50/106, p. 24. Pakenham to Palmerston, 4 March 1837.

¹⁰⁶ Luis G. Cuevas to Baron Deffaudis. Palace of the National Government, Mexico City, 27 June 1837, in *Suplemento al Diario del Gobierno de México núm. 1066, del Sábado 31 de Marzo de 1838. Contiene el ultimatum remitido por S.E. el sr. baron Deffaudis, ministro plenipotenciario de Francia al gobierno mexicano* (Mexico City: Imprenta de Galvan a cargo de Mariano Arévalo, calle de Cadena núm. 2, 1838), pp. 20-26.

claiming for compensation for the damage suffered. In September 1836 the United States had also presented the government with a series of grievances concerning the treatment of its citizens in Mexico. Their minister, Powhatan Ellis, had likewise demanded that proper redress be given to those who had complained. When these demands had not been met, Ellis requested to be furnished with a passport and left Mexico. Richard Pakenham is probably correct in his assessment that these grievances were exploited deliberately by Ellis to manufacture a rupture with the Mexican government in order to add pressure upon them 'in favour of the cause of the separation of Texas.'¹⁰⁷ Even so, the government must have been acutely aware that if it were to concede France's right to demand the dismissal of its employees and extract compensation for its subjects, this could only open the floodgates for other disgruntled nations to demand similar rights.

If we consider that the Mexican government had been fielding such demands from the French for nearly ten years, it is quite possible that neither Bustamante nor Congress was prepared for the way events would develop after this failed meeting. After all, Deffaudis' demands in 1837 had included the threat of military interference. In the event, this had not materialised. A small French fleet had appeared in Veracruz in March 1837, but had made no attempt to support Deffaudis in his demands against the government. This led many to believe that Deffaudis' letter had no special significance. Deffaudis found himself the object of ridicule in the press of the capital and, in the face of the government's refusal to accede to his demands, resigned and made plans to return to France.¹⁰⁸ However, in January 1838 as Deffaudis sailed out of Veracruz his progress was halted by a small fleet of French ships, consisting of a frigate and five brigs, speeding towards the port. He was ordered to turn around and accompany the fleet back to Mexico, where in February it anchored off the coast of

¹⁰⁷ FO no. 50/105, pp. 1-2. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 14 February 1837.

¹⁰⁸ Barker, *The French Experience in Mexico*, p.65.

the island Sacrificios.¹⁰⁹ On March 21 Deffaudis published an ultimatum to the Mexican government. This demanded 600, 000 pesos from the Mexican government as compensation for the losses its nationals had suffered during the Parián riot and other disturbances; the replacement of named officials who had been instrumental in the ill-treatment or false imprisonment or illegal execution of its citizens; the exemptions of its nationals from forced loans; the treatment of France as the most favoured nation as far as diplomatic agents, consulates, navigation and trade were concerned; and the privilege that its own traders should be treated as Mexicans in the execution of their business. The ultimatum gave the Mexican government until the 14 April to comply with these demands. It threatened that, should the demands not be met, the French fleet would take steps to deprive the national authorities of the income of their marine customs houses, or in other words, to blockade their ports.¹¹⁰ The response of the Bustamante government was uncompromising. The Minister of the Interior, Cuevas, wrote to Eduoard de Lisle, who had replaced Deffaudis as the French representative in the capital that 'nada puede tratarse sobre el contenido del ultimátum mientras [que] no se retiren de nuestras costas las fuerzas navales francesas.'¹¹¹ Consequently, on the 16 April, the French blockade of Mexico's Atlantic ports began.

In the light of the prolonged nature of the blockade which would cost the government over five million pesos in lost revenues,¹¹² Bustamante's the decision to adopt such a position seems quite ill-advised. It was also quite unexpected. The French had clearly expected the Mexicans to capitulate immediately to their ultimatum. A significant number of French passenger ships arrived in Veracruz in April and May.

¹⁰⁹ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 276.

¹¹⁰ *Suplemento al Diario del Gobierno de México* núm 1066, pp. 3-20. The quotation is taken from page 18.

¹¹¹ Cuevas to Eduoard de Lisle, 30 March 1838., in *ibid.*, p. 39

¹¹² Luis Gonzaga Cuevas, *Exposición del ex ministro que la suscribe sobre las diferencias con Francia* (Mexico City: Impreso por Ignacio Cumplido, calle de los Rebeldes, no. 2, 1839), p. 51. In the British Library.

Their captains had obviously not been informed of a proposed blockade, for it is unlikely that they would have made the crossing in such circumstances.¹¹³ Nancy Nichols Barker, in her study of the conflict, attributes this to the superiority the French believed they enjoyed over Mexico, and 'never doubted the ease with which this country could be subdued.' Baron Deffaudis himself had claimed that a single war-ship could demolish the fortress of Ulúa in less than an hour.¹¹⁴ However, the administration, already considerably unpopular, could ill afford to be seen to placate the French. As Minister of the Exterior, Cuevas, explained to the British and Prussian ministers, he did not doubt that the government's enemies would seek to exploit the crisis in an attempt to overthrow it. In his opinion, the government's only option was to take the lead in the resistance against the French, and exploit the excitement and passions of the population in their support.¹¹⁵ In this vein, the President published a manifesto on 31 March, in which he called for national unity in the face of this foreign aggression and concluded:

Tan dispuesto a una paz con honor como decidido a una guerra sin término, vuestro presidente nada omitirá para prevenir por su parte nuevas dificultades que prolonguen un estado tan perjudicial a los intereses de ambos países.¹¹⁶

These were not idle sentiments. On 2 April, a law granting amnesty for all those who had been engaged in political crimes since 1835 was passed.¹¹⁷ Two days later, a second law announcing an amnesty for all army deserters was also introduced.¹¹⁸ In

¹¹³ FO no. 50/114, p. 120. Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 24 May 1838.

¹¹⁴ Barker, *The French Experience in Mexico*, pp. 67-68.

¹¹⁵ FO no. 50/113, pp. 199-200. Ashburnham to Palmerson, Mexico City, 4 April 1838.

¹¹⁶ Anastasio Bustamante, *El presidente de la república mexicana a sus habitantes* (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila, dirigida por José Ximeno, 1838), p. 7. In the British Library.

¹¹⁷ Manuel Dublán and José María Lozano, *Legislación mexicana ó colección completa de las disposiciones legislativas expedidas desde la independencia de la República* (Mexico City: Imprenta del Comercio, a cargo de Dublán y Lozano, hijos, calle de Cordobanes, no. 8, 1876), vol. 3, p. 468. Law dated 2 April 1838.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* Law dated 4 April 1838.

May and June two laws were passed that allowed the government to increase the size of the army to 60, 000 men and to undertake all the necessary expenditure to prepare for the defence of the Republic.¹¹⁹ The government had originally proposed to Congress in April that 'las atribuciones del presidente de la república se extiendan a tomar cuantas medidas juzgue convenientes para poner la república en estado de defensa, mantener la integridad del territorio cuidar la paz y tranquilidad interior.'¹²⁰ But this and a subsequent request made in May, was rejected by the Senate. Therefore, all measures had to be approved individually by Congress. Sordo Cedeño explains that the *hombres de bien* in the Senate were suspicious of Bustamante's motives. They were fearful that Bustamante was organising a *coup d'état* with the aim of bringing back the Constitution of 1824. He sees the fact that Congress approved measures to strengthen Mexico's defence individually as proof that Bustamante did not need the extraordinary powers he solicited, and suggests that the *hombres de bien* were correct in thinking that he was driven by motives 'más allá de la sola defensa del país.'¹²¹ However, we must also consider that the delays necessarily imposed by having to submit each proposal to Congress to be debated separately might also have motivated Bustamante's request. At the time he was faced with much criticism over his slow response to the French threat.¹²²

From a French point of view, the blockade of Mexico's ports was entirely unsuccessful. Even as the weeks turned into months, the Mexican government showed little sign of backing down. Moreover, by August the French fleet was in serious trouble. A third of its crew was either ill or had died from the *vómito negro*. Baron Deffaudis had fled back to France, defeated by the climate and the commander of the

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 512, 533-534. Laws dating 25 May and 13 June 1838.

¹²⁰ The text from the bill presented to Congress is quoted from Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 279.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 280-281.

¹²² Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, pp. 112-113.

fleet was petitioning to be allowed to retreat.¹²³ In order to avoid this humiliation, the French decided to step up their presence in Veracruz. Three frigates and nine brigs arrived in Sacrificios on 26 October, under the command of Rear-Admiral Charles Baudin, a veteran of the Napoleonic wars. He was ordered to repeat the French demands, and add a further 200, 000 pesos to the claim for compensation for the losses incurred thus far by the French fleet. He was also under instructions to insist that the French should be in future exempted from forced loans and allowed to engage in retail trade. Ideally these aims were to be achieved through negotiation, but he was authorised to resort to the use of arms if necessary. The increased military presence at Sacrificios, and the rapidly escalating losses from the closed customs houses, induced Bustamante to enter into negotiation with Baudin in November. However, despite concessions made by both sides, the two parties were unable to reach agreement in negotiations which took place from 17 to 21 November in Jalapa. The Minister of the Exterior, Luis Gonzaga Cuevas, head of the Mexican delegation, agreed to pay the 600, 000 peso compensation by instalments and promised that in future the French would be exempt from forced loans. Baudin agreed to drop the demand for the extra 200, 000 pesos and granted the Mexican authorities huge leeway in the way in which they were to punish their offending officials, practically assuring their immunity.¹²⁴ The negotiations broke down on the subject of the French demand that the provisional treaty of 1827 be enforced while a new trade treaty was negotiated.¹²⁵ The main sticking point was that of retail trade. Baudin was willing to waive this demand, if the Mexican government would agree to indemnify those French subjects who were deprived of this right. Cuevas refused to give such assurances and the negotiations broke down on 21 November. Baudin returned to Veracruz and addressed his final

¹²³ Barker, *The French Experience in Mexico*, pp. 72-73.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

¹²⁵ FO no. 50/116 p. 38. Ashburnham to Palmerston, 10 December 1838.

warning to Cuevas; either they agreed to his terms by noon on 27 November or he would commence hostilities.¹²⁶

Their demands remained unmet and the French began firing upon Veracruz on 27 November.¹²⁷ General Rincón, the commander of the fort of Ulúa, surrendered almost immediately; and the government, indignant at the treachery of this officer appointed General Santa Anna to take his place. The General arrived in Veracruz in the morning of the 4 December and reinforcements under General Mariano Arista followed later that evening. On the morning of 5 December the French disembarked into the town of Veracruz and with the aim of capturing Santa Anna and Arista. Arista was taken prisoner, but Santa Anna managed to escape and rally enough troops to attack the enemy as they returned to their ships. In this action Santa Anna's horse was shot from under him and he was seriously wounded in his leg, which was later amputated.¹²⁸ The French were not really expelled by this action and remained in their ships blockading the port of Veracruz. The Mexican pride was however somewhat mollified. Santa Anna quickly became a national hero overnight, his disgrace at San Jacinto quite forgotten.

Despite the capture of the Ulúa fortress, the French still did not have the upper hand in the conflict. Baudin did not possess sufficient force to capture Veracruz and could make no advance from his new position.¹²⁹ Baudin recognised that unless his government sent an expeditionary force to launch an invasion, he had exhausted his military options. He could only continue the blockade, for which he had no great hopes. 'Mexico is adapting itself to poverty' he wrote, 'and, ruined though it may be,

¹²⁶ Barker, *The French Experience in Mexico*, p. 74. Baudin to Cuevas, 21 November 1838, in *Documentos relativos a las conferencias en Jalapa entre el ministro de relaciones exteriores y el contra-almirante plenipotenciario de Francia, sobre el arreglo de las diferencias entre ambas naciones* (Mexico City: Impreso por José M. Lara, calle de la Palma no. 4, 1838), p.49. In the British Library.

¹²⁷ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol 1, p. 154 and Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano* vol. 1, p. 122.

¹²⁸ Costeloe, *The Central Republic in Mexico* p. 146.

¹²⁹ Barker, *The French Experience in Mexico*, p.76.

it can long sustain the struggle against us relying simply on the force of inertia.¹³⁰ It seemed that negotiation was the only answer. In January 1839 a British fleet of 13 ships, carrying the returning minister Richard Pakenham, also appeared in the water off Veracruz. Pakenham was authorised by his government to act as an arbitrator in any negotiations and to work to bring both sides to an agreement.¹³¹ This was a blow to the Mexican government, who had thought that the British might have been persuaded to aid their cause against the French Navy.¹³² Initially, the Mexican government opposed his arbitration, using the accusation that Baudin had supplied the federalist rebels in Tampico with weapons as an excuse to stall negotiations.¹³³ Barker suggests that the administration preferred to rely on the climate of Veracruz eventually to defeat the French.¹³⁴ Even so, Pakenham was able to brush aside this question relatively easily¹³⁵ and new negotiations were begun in March.¹³⁶ On 14 March, the chief government negotiator, Manuel Eduardo Gorostiza presented the agreed treaty and convention to Congress for its approval.¹³⁷ In ratifying this, Congress committed itself to paying the original sum of 600, 000 pesos to the French government and to arrange for a lasting peace between the two nations. It also agreed to begin negotiations for a treaty to be drawn up. It did not however include any clauses upon the exemption of French citizens from forced loans or guarantee their right to retail

¹³⁰ Baudin to Molé, La Néréide, 15 December 1838, in *ibid.*, p. 81.

¹³¹ FO no. 50/117, p. 110-112. Report to Lord Palmerston, Port Royal, 11 December 1838.

¹³² Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano* vol. 1 pp. 163-165. *El Restaurador Mexicano*, 19 January 1839.

¹³³ FO no. 50/123, pp. 100-104. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 26 January 1839.

¹³⁴ Barker, *The French Experience in Mexico*, p. 81.

¹³⁵ Carlos María de Bustamante reports that the British minister in Mexico, Richard Pakenham, threatened that unless Congress agreed to begin negotiations he would demand his passport. This, claims Bustamante, was akin to threatening war, as the minister was in command of a fleet in Mexican waters. Congress had little choice but to agree to the new attempt to end the conflict through negotiation. Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1 p165-166. However, I have been able to find no evidence of this in Pakenham's dispatches to Palmerston.

¹³⁶ FO no. 50/123, p. 163. Pakenham to Palmerston, 23 February 1839.

¹³⁷ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol. 1 p. 165.

trade. Nor did it promise the removal of Mexican officials who had taken what the French viewed as illegal action against its citizens.¹³⁸

On the whole, it cannot be said that the Mexican government was humiliated by the terms of the treaty. It was the French who were forced to moderate their demands and to abandon many of their complaints. Carlos María de Bustamante and other critics of the government would later make unfavourable comparisons of Mexico's treaty with that extracted from Juan Manuel de Rosas in Argentina, after a three year blockade of Buenos Aires by the French Navy between 1838 and 1840. Carlos María de Bustamante in particular would see this as evidence of Bustamante's weakness and ineptitude for government.¹³⁹ This would seem to be somewhat unfair. Rosas, like Bustamante, was obliged to concede the payment of the indemnities demanded by the French. He did not succeed in defeating his French enemies, although it must be noted that he resisted for a much longer period than Bustamante.¹⁴⁰ Bustamante's enemies chose to see the treaty as a humiliating failure, partly because they opposed his government and therefore, we must be careful before we accept their opinions uncritically. It is difficult to see how Mexico, or the President, could have escaped any better from the French crisis. It is true that the blockade was extremely expensive for the Mexican government, and can hardly be described as a famous victory. It is also clear that if Bustamante had ceded to French demands at the start, the treasury would have been saved over five million pesos in lost revenues. However, this would have been a real humiliation for Mexico, and would no doubt have allowed

¹³⁸ Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, vol. 3, pp. 617-619. Treaty dated 29 April 1838.

¹³⁹ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 175. He writes: 'Buenos Aires ha conservado su honor en la lid con Francia; ¿y por qué? Por la enorme diferencia que hay entre *Rosas y Bustamante*. Aquel pueblo estaba regido por una águila y el nuestro por un tortuga.' His italics. *El Sonorense* of 13 February 1841 writes after publishing the treaty: 'nos provoca una comparación triste y desagradable, humillante y fea cual resulta entre Buenos Aires y México, entre el poseer de una y otra, los sufrimientos y resultados que han tenido, y la gloria de los directores y nacionales de aquella y la infamia y vergüenza de ésta y sus mandatarios.'

¹⁴⁰ "Convención entre la Francia y el gobierno de Buenos Aires, encargado de las relaciones exteriores de la Confederación Argentina," (29 October 1840), in *El Sonorense*, 13 February 1841. The French blockaded Buenos Aires between 1838 and 1840.

other nations to bully the Republic into acquiescing to other more outrageous demands. Moreover, it would almost certainly have spelt the end of Bustamante's career. His enemies would have surely capitalised upon the general outrage which would have been provoked by an early surrender and they would have almost certainly have tried to depose him.

C: The Struggle for Survival (1839-1840)

Throughout the French Crisis and Bustamante's dealings with Manuel Gómez Pedraza, the armed rebellion in favour of federalism continued in many of the provinces. This had begun long before Bustamante took office on 19 April 1837 and involved various areas of the country. In January 1837 a federalist *pronunciamiento* was issued in Alta California. On 14 April, another was announced in San Luis Potosí. In May, General Esteban Moctezuma issued a federalist plan in Río Verde, Querétaro. In November, *pronunciamientos* for federalism were announced in Papantla and Michoacán.¹⁴¹ In Michoacán the rebellion was led by the veteran rebel, Gordiano Guzmán, and soon spread to parts of Jalisco and Guanajuato.¹⁴² The most significant of these rebellions was that of José Urrea, which as we noted previously began in Sonora in December 1837. This rebellion became stronger throughout 1838, as his forces were joined by those of José Antonio Mejía in Tampico. Soon the rebellion spread from Sonora and Sinaloa into Tamaulipas. During the French crisis these rebels were pursued by government troops with varying degrees of success. However, in January 1839, following the failure of the Three Day Ministry, Bustamante requested

¹⁴¹ Appendix Three carries a list of the rebellions and *pronunciamientos* during Bustamante's administration.

¹⁴² For a detailed description of Guzmán's activities see: Juan Ortiz Escamilla, "El pronunciamiento federalista de Gordiano Guzmán, 1837-1842," *Historia Mexicana* 38:2 (1988), pp. 241-282.

Congress to allow him to lead a new offensive against the federalist rebels.¹⁴³ Why Bustamante should want to do this is clear if we consider the circumstances in which he now found himself. As we have already commented, support for Bustamante amongst the centralists in Congress by December 1838 was non-existent. They had long suspected he was a closet federalist, and his behaviour during the Three Day Ministry had appeared to confirm this. Moreover, in failing to insist that the moral revolution be enforced, Bustamante had burnt his boats with the moderate federalists, who regarded him as little better than a traitor. Therefore, he occupied an extremely solitary position at the head of the executive and, shorn of practically all support, could not have expected to continue long in the Presidency. Leaving the capital to fight the rebels was certainly a better departure than being forced to leave by a rebellion. He may have even hoped that he could restore his popularity amongst the centralists with a successful campaign against the rebels, from which could then organise a victorious return to Mexico City.

That Bustamante wanted to avoid being toppled by rebellion is obvious from the manner in which he organised his departure. He proposed that his interim president should be none other than Santa Anna¹⁴⁴ and appointed the well-known *santanista*, José María Tornel, as Minister of War. Santa Anna represented the greatest threat to Bustamante's position by January 1839. His popularity had undergone a meteoric rise after his display of heroics against the French and there had been many rumours alleging plans in favour of the General's return to power. During the crisis of the moral revolution, the Supreme Conservative Power had gone as far as deciding that, should law and order break down, Santa Anna should be sent for to restore peace. It seems clear that Bustamante wished to try to prevent a rebellion against himself by making

¹⁴³ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol., p. 162. The motion was proposed to Congress on 21 January.

¹⁴⁴ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, pp. 311-312. Sordo Cedeño rejects the idea, popular at the time, that the centralists forced Bustamante to accept Santa Anna as his replacement. He shows that the request for Santa Anna came from the executive itself.

any movement in favour of Santa Anna unnecessary. This strategy appears to have been successful. In February Carlos María de Bustamante introduced a bill to Congress which proposed that the legislature declare Anastasio Bustamante morally unfit to continue as President, or even to lead the army against Urrea. He presented his proposal on 28 February, eleven days after Santa Anna's arrival in the capital. He argued that President Bustamante had disappointed all those who had supported his election. He blamed the President for all the problems now facing the Republic, including the internal unrest and aggression from the French. He described the negotiations with the French as shameful and criticised the President for not immediately leaving the capital to march against the rebels upon the arrival of Santa Anna.¹⁴⁵ According to Sordo Cedeño, this feeling was not confined to Carlos María de Bustamante, but was shared by many centralists.¹⁴⁶ However, Congress rejected Carlos María de Bustamante's petition and the writer's colleagues in the Supreme Conservative Power quickly made it clear that they had played no part in the drawing up of the proposal.¹⁴⁷

General Bustamante did not leave Mexico City until 18 March, more than a month after Santa Anna's arrival. He rode as far as Guadalupe, where he remained until 20 March. Although Carlos María de Bustamante claims this is because he did not wish to hand over command,¹⁴⁸ this is unlikely considering it was Bustamante who suggested Santa Anna as a replacement in the first place. Instead, it seems that in the weeks after Santa Anna's arrival, the two Generals worked together to agree upon the best way to tackle Mexico's mounting problems. General Cortázar was summoned from Guadalajara to take part in these discussions. On 7 March, the three Generals in the company of various ministers, deputies and senators held an important meeting, in

¹⁴⁵ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, pp. 169-170.

¹⁴⁶ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 313.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

¹⁴⁸ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 176.

which it was decided that both the Constitution of 1824 and its successor of 1836 were not suitable for government. It was agreed that the latter should be reformed and that this should be undertaken by Congress. The meeting also discussed military strategy and a plan to suppress the two major rebellions of Urrea and Guzmán was formed. According to this plan, Cortázar would return to the Bajío and lead the fight against Guzmán; Bustamante would head North to recapture the ports of Tampico and Tuxpan; and Santa Anna would remain in Mexico City, where he should prevent the federalists from reaching the capital, should they evade Bustamante's troops.¹⁴⁹ Sordo Cedeño also suggests that Bustamante wished to see the French crisis resolved before he left the capital. Senate approved the articles of the French treaty on 20 March, the day that Bustamante finally left his camp at Guadalupe and headed for Querétaro.¹⁵⁰

General Bustamante's campaign against Urrea was generally regarded as a failure. The slow progress of his army, which was interpreted by the official *Diario de Gobierno* as being motivated by a desire not to spill Mexican blood,¹⁵¹ allowed Urrea and Mejía to leave Tampico and head south. This was seen by many, including Carlos María de Bustamante, as the fault of Bustamante's incompetence and as proof of his unwillingness to fight against federalism.¹⁵² Urrea and Mejía headed for Puebla and Santa Anna, hearing of their arrival, immediately set out to confront them, accompanied by Tornel and Gabriel Valencia. Government troops met the rebels in Acajete on the border between Puebla and Veracruz and won a decisive victory. Mejía was caught and shot within three hours, but Urrea managed to make his escape and return to Tampico. Although Valencia led the attack, while Tornel apparently directed military operations, it was Santa Anna who took the credit for this achievement.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, pp. 313, 317.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

¹⁵¹ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 192.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 192, 196-197. Costeloe, *The Central Republic*, p.154.

¹⁵³ Will Fowler, *Tornel and Santa Anna. The Writer and the Caudillo, 1795-1853* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp. 169-170.

This of course reflected badly upon Bustamante, who was now seen to be a much less effective soldier than a one-legged man. To add further embarrassment to the General, the eventual defeat of the rebels in Tampico on 4 June was achieved without his presence. According to Carlos María de Bustamante, Bustamante was in Padilla at the time, paying his respects to the memory of Iturbide, a fact which hardly endeared him to the diarist.¹⁵⁴ Finally, Bustamante also failed to play any part in the eventual capture of Urrea, who gave himself up to General Paredes y Arrillaga in Tuxpan a few days later.¹⁵⁵

In the manifesto that Bustamante later published to defend his role in Tamaulipas, he attributed his slowness in attacking Tampico to two main reasons. The first was the distance between the major focuses of revolt in the North. Rebellion was not confined to the two ports of Tampico and Tuxpan; and federalist rebels also threatened other towns, such as Matamoros, Monterrey, Soto la Marina and Saltillo. This meant Bustamante was obliged to divide his forces and resources; and quite obviously was unable to be in all places at all times.¹⁵⁶ This problem was aggravated by the second cause Bustamante attributes to his slow progress: the general lack of money and supplies.¹⁵⁷ Bustamante sent repeated appeals to Mexico for more money and supplies; but by May, the problem had become acute. Bustamante directed this warning to Tornel in Mexico City:

Los escasos fondos que han quedado en la comisaría del ejército de mi mando, no son suficientes ni aun para cubrir las precisas atenciones de la segunda quincena de las fuerzas que operan en este Departamento [...] Se aproxima el 1 de junio, día en que mis angustias han de ser inauditas, porque en él me voy a ver privado de auxiliar a los cuerpos

¹⁵⁴ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 196.

¹⁵⁵ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol. 1, p. 170. Entry for 18 June 1839.

¹⁵⁶ Anastasio Bustamante, *Manifiesto que el ciudadano Anastasio Bustamante dirige a sus compatriotas como General en Jefe de Operaciones sobre Tamaulipas y demás departamentos de Oriente* (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila, dirigida por José Ximeno, calle de Medinas, no. 6, 1839), p. 22. In CONDUMEX.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

aun para que por ellos se ministre el rancho del soldado en un país en que no se encuentran recursos.¹⁵⁸

He went on to plead that 'se apresure a disponer la pronta remisión del numerario suficiente' adding that 'ni yo deberé ser responsable de las resultas,' which would surely be the desertion of large numbers of his men.¹⁵⁹ Even so, whatever Bustamante's explanations may have been, his image as a soldier suffered greatly from the campaign in Tamaulipas, and can have done little to reawaken confidence of centralists or others in his Presidency.

Despite this, Bustamante found himself summoned back to the capital on 23 June 1839. According to the letter sent to him by the Minister of War, Tornel, Santa Anna's health no longer permitted him to act as interim and he wished to return to Veracruz.¹⁶⁰ The truth, however, was a little more complex. Santa Anna had governed since April more or less by decree, showing a marked disregard for Congress and the Supreme Conservative Power. On 8 April he issued a decree which denounced those who abused the freedom of the press, naming specifically three guilty newspapers: *El Cosmopolita*, *El Restaurador* and *El Voto Nacional*, and announced new measures for dealing with this crime. Henceforth those editors deemed to be guilty of such a crime would lose their constitutional rights and be imprisoned in the fortresses of San Juan de Ulúa or Acapulco.¹⁶¹ The three newspapers closed down almost immediately and their editors were subject to persecution.¹⁶² On 30 April, without asking for Congress' permission, he left the capital to fight Urrea.¹⁶³ On 1 July he agreed to seek a loan in London to the value of £130, 000 sterling.¹⁶⁴ Once more he failed to seek approval

¹⁵⁸ Bustamante to Tornel, Santander, 16 May 1839, in *ibid.*, p. 71.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ Tornel to Bustamante, Mexico City, 23 June 1839, in *ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁶¹ Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, vol. 3, pp. 616-617.

¹⁶² Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 318.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 322-323.

from Congress in this matter. All this had given the centralists and *hombres de bien* in Congress a lot to think about. On Santa Anna's triumphant return to Mexico in May, after the action of Acajete, he was met by a welcoming committee from the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of Government. The senators refused to participate in protest at his infringement of the constitution.¹⁶⁵ But most worrying of all were Santa Anna's plans for the reformation of the constitution, which when they were sent to the Council of Government on 15 June, included this article: 'para que durante el tiempo que éstas [reformas] se efectuen designe [el Consejo] la persona que se encargue del ejecutivo, atendida aun la situación en que se encuentra la república.'¹⁶⁶ Given that the reforms were about to be undertaken by Congress, this article appeared to suggest that Bustamante should be prevented from returning to the Presidency. It is little wonder that Bustamante's friends in the capital wrote to the General begging his prompt return. They saw this article as proof that Santa Anna wanted to remove Bustamante permanently and suspected that he really wanted to usurp his position.¹⁶⁷

Santa Anna's behaviour during his three months in power convinced the centralists that it was better to support the submissive Bustamante, who observed the constitution and respected Congress, than the more dynamic Santa Anna, who rode roughshod over the law.¹⁶⁸ Santa Anna, recognising that his popularity was on the wane in Congress, abruptly announced his intention to retire from the executive on 24 June. He left on 10 July, nine days before Bustamante arrived, thus avoiding a meeting with the President. He retired to his hacienda to await a better opportunity to arrange his rival's fall. As a parting shot he published a manifesto, in which he claimed responsibility for the peace with France, the suppression of the federalist rebellion and the prospective reforms of the constitution.¹⁶⁹ In this way, he would be remembered

¹⁶⁵ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol. 1, p. 168. Entry for 8 May 1839.

¹⁶⁶ Proposal quoted in Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 325.

¹⁶⁷ Olavarria y Ferrari, "México independiente," p. 443.

¹⁶⁸ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 327.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 326-327.

as the one who had saved 'la patria en una de las crisis más terribles en que se viera,'¹⁷⁰ and Bustamante, who had overseen the peace negotiations, participated in drawing up the plans for constitutional reform and played a more active part in the fight against the rebels,¹⁷¹ would be forever seen as ineffective.

The federalist revolt was far from over, however. In the North, Antonio Canales and Pedro Lemus continued to lead the fight, while in Michoacán, Guzmán's rebellion continued unabated. General Urrea also did not abandon his plans for re-introducing federalism into Mexico. In April 1840 he wrote to Valentín Gómez Farías from his prison in the fortress of Perote describing what he believed to be the universal rejection of the centralist system in Mexico and proposed an alliance between Farías and Gómez Pedraza in order to save the country from total ruin.¹⁷² Later that year he was transferred from Perote to the prison of the ex-Inquisition in Mexico City from where he organised one of the most daring *pronunciamientos* of the early decades of independence. In the early morning of the 15 July 1840, Urrea escaped from his prison with the help of the 5th Infantry Regiment and quickly moved to enter the National Palace, surprising the guards and capturing Bustamante in his bedchamber. According to various accounts, Bustamante faced the intruders calmly, but with a sword in his hand ready to defend himself. Apparently, the soldiers were ordered to fire upon the President, but refused. Carlos María de Bustamante later recounted that their reticence was due to their memory of his friendship with Iturbide.¹⁷³ Another writer claimed that they were instead affected by respect for Bustamante himself. He says: 'en este momento tan crítico el Presidente dominó a los sublevados por su extremada calma e inalterable firmeza, presentándoles su pecho y desafiándolos a que tiraran.'¹⁷⁴ The

¹⁷⁰ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 202.

¹⁷¹ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 327.

¹⁷² VGFA no. 625. José Urrea to Valentín Gómez Farías, 16 April 1840.

¹⁷³ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 2, p. 63.

¹⁷⁴ *Relación de los principales sucesos que tuvieron lugar el día 15 de julio próximo pasado y pormenores acaecidos en las 24 horas de prisión del exmo. sr. presidente de la república*, p. 2. Quoted in Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 367.

President was held hostage for the rest of the day while the rebels attempted to convince him to accept their demands. In return for his freedom, Urrea suggested, Bustamante should commit himself to the re-establishment of the federalist constitution; that a new congress be convened to reform this Constitution of 1824; and in the meantime he should remain in power, appointing a new cabinet to support him.¹⁷⁵ While Bustamante remained a prisoner, Generals Valencia and Almonte organised the troops loyal to the government in the Ciudadela, and began firing on the National Palace. According to Urrea, Bustamante expressed a mixture of approval and repugnance to the various details of the plan but agreed to negotiate with Valencia and Almonte in order to re-establish peace.¹⁷⁶ According to another witness, the interview between the President and the federalists went like this:

Pasado un rato llegó otra comisión, y el presidente les dijo :

—Jamás firmaré las proposiciones que me han mandado, y creo que bastante me conocen uds. para no dudar ni un momento que antes preferiría perder la vida que el honor.

A lo que contestaron:

—Que sabían de un modo positivo que era incapaz de cometer una bajeza.

—Entonces son uds. unos viles, pues se han atrevido a proponer una infamia. Les repuso el S.E. con una dignidad que siempre le es característica.

—En manos de V.E. está el bien del país, le decían estos señores.

—Sí, les contestaba el Presidente, pero no con semejante gente, agregando, tan mexicano como uds. soy y aun creo algo más; de modo que con mucho dolor veo el derramamiento de sangre entre hermanos; por lo que si quieren que salga, haré mis esfuerzos para que el General en Jefe de las tropas fieles al gobierno escuche sus proposiciones, si estas son razonables. Yo no me comprometo a otra cosa.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ VGFA no. 639. This document is the plan which Urrea showed to Bustamante.

¹⁷⁶ VGFA no. 642. José Urrea to Juan Alvarez, 18 July 1840.

¹⁷⁷ *Relación de los principales sucesos que tuvieron lugar el día 15 de julio próximo pasado y pormenores acaecidos en las 24 horas de prisión del exmo. sr. presidente de la república*, pp. 6-7. Quoted in Sordo Cedeño, *El Congreso en la primera república centralista*, pp. 369-370.

Accordingly, he was released the next day. Once outside the Palace, Bustamante soon joined up with the troops that had remained loyal to him in the Ciudadela. It was quickly decided to reject Urrea's proposals and the firing of cannons from their position in the Ciudadela upon the National Palace continued unabated. In fact, both sides would fire indiscriminately from their positions upon the buildings surrounding their enemy for the next twelve days. This brought chaos to the streets as businesses shut down and the well-to-do classes fled the city. Food and water were in short supply.¹⁷⁸ Many civilians who ventured on the streets were caught in the crossfire and their bodies left to rot on the streets or be eaten by packs of marauding dogs.¹⁷⁹ Carlos María Bustamante estimates that 986 people died in the twelve days of fighting; the US ambassador reckoned the figure was between five and seven hundred;¹⁸⁰ and Richard Pakenham put the figure at 400.¹⁸¹ It was clear that the government had the upper hand. The rebels had lost all their advantages of surprise and confusion; and their trump card of being in possession of the president, by the second day and from that point on were effectively isolated in the National Palace. They received no support from outside the capital and were faced with the prospect of reinforcements being sent for the government under General Santa Anna. Moreover, their supplies were quickly running out and in their position they faced considerable difficulties in finding more.¹⁸² All this considered, it is not surprising the rebels surrendered after only twelve days of hostilities.

The July Revolt failed because the federalists could not count upon support amongst the *hombres de bien* and the military. These groups instead remained on the side of the government. However, this support was essentially based upon their

¹⁷⁸ Frances Erskine Calderón de la Barca, *Life in Mexico: The Letters of Fanny Calderón de la Barca* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966), pp. 296-306.

¹⁷⁹ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 2, p. 74.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 80. Costeloe, *The Central Republic in Mexico*, p. 162.

¹⁸¹ FO no. 50/136, p. 172. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 29 July 1840.

¹⁸² Michael P. Costeloe, "A Pronunciamiento in Nineteenth Century Mexico: '15 de julio de 1840,'" *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 4:2 (1988), pp. 255-256, 263.

opposition to Urrea and Gómez Farías, but above all to the army of *léperos* who had been seen to join their cause. President Bustamante's performance in the events of July 1840 did not boost his popularity. Federalists came to believe that the President had betrayed them once more, agreeing to their demands while a prisoner and then abandoning them as soon as he was released.¹⁸³ Centralists saw the whole sorry affair as proof of his government's weakness. They were disgusted that despite twelve days of fighting, the troops had been unable to gain any real advantage.¹⁸⁴ The peace treaty signed with the rebels which granted a general amnesty for the rebels and guaranteed their jobs,¹⁸⁵ was not that of a strong government. Perhaps they compared the fate of Urrea, who was returned to prison, only later to be appointed Commander General of Sonora once more,¹⁸⁶ with that of his former comrade-in-arms, José Antonio Mejía, who was shot after his defeat at the hands of Valencia, Tornel and Santa Anna. Finally, the events of July 1840 convinced many *hombres de bien* that the *Siete Leyes* and the President were a failure. As Costeloe points out, 'the sight of rotting corpses on the streets being torn apart by packs of dogs was deeply offensive to them and it seemed that the long-feared social dissolution had finally happened.'¹⁸⁷ Neither the new constitution, nor its leader could be seen to be living up to their promise to protect the interests of the *hombres de bien* and ensure peace, if rebellions of this nature could take place.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸³ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 369.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.372.

¹⁸⁵ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 2, pp.74-75.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

¹⁸⁷ Costeloe, *The Central Republic*, p. 163.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

D: Constitutional Arguments, 1839-1841

Opposition to the constitution of 1836 had existed from the moment of its conception. In the first three years of its jurisdiction the most vocal objections appeared to come from the federalists. However, as the threat that the federalists might succeed in provoking the overthrow of the *Siete Leyes* diminished with the failure of the moral revolution and the rebellions of José Urrea, a different type of opposition began to be heard. This opposition was generally found amongst the *hombres de bien* and other parts of the oligarchy, who had originally supported the centralist project but had become disillusioned in the face of the failure of the constitution to restore peace and stability to the Republic. In general terms, they objected to how government was organised by the Constitution of 1836, especially in terms of the division of power, which was regarded as creating a dangerously weak executive. Two broad solutions were put forward by these opponents. The first was that the constitutional law should be reformed in order to create a more balanced system of government. The second was that the project should be abandoned and a new form of government be set in its place. As can be imagined, neither idea was very popular with the architects of the *Siete Leyes*: the centralists, creating a dangerous divide in the ruling coalition of *hombres de bien*.

In order to understand the opposition to the *Siete Leyes*, we must first examine the manner in which this constitution envisaged government should be organised. It divided power into a judicial, legislative and executive section just as the previous Constitution had done. It also created a Council of Government rather like that of the Federal Constitution. The Council was made up of thirteen individuals, whose task it was to examine and express its opinion on all proposals or initiatives presented to

it.¹⁸⁹ Its role, as was illustrated during the crisis of the federalist petitions of 1837, could be extremely important as its approval often decided whether the government would present a bill before Congress. The major innovation of the *Siete Leyes* was the creation of a new government body: the Supreme Conservative Power. The Supreme Executive Power was a five man council, made up of individuals who had served either as a member of Congress, a cabinet minister, a Supreme Court Judge, President or Vice-President of the Republic. It was designed to be a neutral power which oversaw all branches of government. It could not present initiatives of its own accord to Congress, as could members of the legislative and executive. But all initiatives had to be presented to the SPC for final approval once they had been passed by Congress. It could veto any law, decree or executive action if this was called for by one of the three other powers. It was also the only body authorised to sanction reforms upon the constitution.¹⁹⁰ In other words, the SPC was allowed the final word on any subject. The executive on the other hand, had very little power. The President, as *El Investigador Mexicano* described him in 1837, was: ‘reducido a nulidad, lleno de responsabilidades, sujeto a corporaciones a más de la legislativa, que tiene superioridad de poder, rodeado de cuerpos consultivos, cuyos dictámenes son obligatorios.’¹⁹¹ His proposals had to pass first from the Council before being presented to the Chamber of Deputies, from there if its project were approved it would be sent to the Senate. Finally, if the senators voted in favour of the motion, it would finally pass to the SPC for judgement. As can well be imagined, all legislation or action proposed by the executive could take weeks, even months to be approved.

Above all, opponents of the *Siete Leyes* objected to the Supreme Conservative Power. Those who advocated the reform of the constitution, generally called for the

¹⁸⁹ “Leyes constitucionales: December 29 de 1836,” in Secretaría de Gobernación, *Leyes fundamentales de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, p. 193.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 182-184.

¹⁹¹ *El Investigador Mexicano*, 2 August 1837.

abolition of this body. President Bustamante was without a doubt one of the leading figures in this campaign. After the failure of the moderates' moral revolution in 1838, he appeared to have finally abandoned his attempts to replace the Constitution of 1836 with the federalist charter, and instead he concentrated upon reforming the *Siete Leyes*. This was not such a change of direction as might be thought. Bustamante had supported Gómez Pedraza's plans for the re-establishment of a reformed version of Federal Constitution of 1824. As we noted earlier, this called for the power of the states to be curtailed, especially in terms of their ability to introduce legislation, so that their power and that of the federal government would not clash, and for a new election system to be arranged, which prevented those 'indignos' of election from taking part.¹⁹² The *Siete Leyes*, shorn of the cumbersome SPC, could be said to realise this project quite well.

Before he left for Tampico, Bustamante agreed with Santa Anna that Congress should be charged with this reformation. When he returned in July 1839, the Chamber of Deputies began to discuss the proposal that the constitution be reformed. It is clear that the centralists blamed Bustamante for this turn of events, even if it had been Santa Anna as interim President, who had presented the motion for discussion. During the debate on reform, José María Jiménez made a speech in which he traced the movement for reform back to Bustamante's first speech in April 1837, when he had sworn to obey the Constitution, 'en cuanto me permite el honor y la conciencia' and added:

Todos sabemos también cual ha sido entre tanta murmuración que se ha hecho de las leyes constitucionales en este mismo palacio, el empeño que se ha tomado para que nada se organice bajo su influencia, a fin de presentar a aquellas como fuente de las calamidades públicas.¹⁹³

¹⁹² Gómez Pedraza, "Exposición al buen sentido de la nación," pp. 227-232.

¹⁹³ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 335.

The proposal was eventually passed by both chambers of Congress in September and presented to the Supreme Conservative Power, who gave its approval on 11 November 1839, albeit with certain conditions. It stated that reform should only be undertaken following the guidelines of the constitutional law, and that the division of power envisaged by these laws should not be changed.¹⁹⁴ In February 1840 a commission of deputies was set up to draw up proposals for reform. This group would deliberate for the next five months.¹⁹⁵

Meanwhile, Bustamante's opposition to the constitution, and above all to the Supreme Conservative Power became more marked. On 12 March, Congress passed a law submitted by the executive which called for all thieves to be henceforth tried in a military tribunal, under military law. The Supreme Court considered this law to be unconstitutional, and for that reason, petitioned the SPC for its annulment. The SPC, which had already annulled this proposal twice when it had been submitted as an executive decree in the previous six months, annulled the law on 13 May. Bustamante refused to accept this and asked instead that Congress annul the SPC's decision. What is more, he also issued an order instructing the army to ignore the SPC's resolution. A public argument then ensued between the executive and the SPC on this subject. The government argued that the SPC had waited too long before announcing its decision; it was authorised to annul laws only during the two months following its issue (13 March to 12 May), further maintaining that the annulment had only been signed by four members of the SPC, when it should be signed by all five. The SPC argued that the full five members were only required to be present at the time of the debate and only three out of five votes were necessary to carry a motion. All five members had been present during the discussion of the disputed law and the motion had been carried by a majority. It also claimed that the two months allowed for a law to be annulled

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 336. Resolution of the Supreme Conservative Power, included in Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, vol. 3, pp. 664-665.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 342.

should be counted from the day after its issue (14 March to 13 May), which thereby made its decision lawful. In order to resolve the issue, the government introduced a new law in Congress in July which resolved that while the SPC only needed three votes to carry a motion, the two month period for annulment should be counted from the day of issue.¹⁹⁶

On 30 June, just before the close of the spring session, the commission on reform presented its proposals. This advocated what was described as ‘un proyecto intermedio [...] entre las dos constituciones del 24 y del 36.’ Most importantly it proposed that the suppression of the Supreme Conservative Power be considered; that the power of the Council of Government be reduced; that the executive's powers be amplified; and that departmental governors and other officials be granted more autonomy.¹⁹⁷ Comment and proposals from the departments were now sought before any action should be taken. While this was going on, the President entered into yet another conflict with the Supreme Conservative Power. On 3 August, in the wake of the July revolt, he sent an initiative to Congress which asked the body to submit a proposal to the SPC for consideration. The proposition read: ‘Se declara voluntad de la nación, que mientras reforma la cuarta ley constitucional, puede el gobierno adoptar cuantas medidas juzgue necesarias para restablecer el orden turbado y conservar la tranquilidad pública, respetando en lo esencial el actual sistema de gobierno.’¹⁹⁸ This was passed by Congress, but rejected by the Senate. The government then returned the matter to Congress, qualifying its original request quite significantly. It now proposed that it should have the power to suspend members of the judiciary should it deem this necessary and make temporary replacements; to increase the number of days

¹⁹⁶ Anne Worthington Surget MacNeil, “The Supreme Harmonising Power (El Supremo Poder Conservador), 1837-1841,” (University of Texas: Unpublished Masters' Thesis, 1969), pp. 134-143. Linda Arnold, *Política y justicia: la Suprema Corte Mexicana (1824-1855)* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1996), pp. 90-93.

¹⁹⁷ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, pp. 343-344.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 376.

a suspect could be held without being brought before a tribunal, from three to 30 days; and to be allowed to employ whosoever it wished in government, without having to obey constitutional restrictions.¹⁹⁹ It also included the concession that Congress would be allowed to suspend these powers whenever it considered it necessary. This reformed proposal was passed by both chambers in Congress and presented before the Supreme Conservative Power on 30 September. In the discussions, Carlos María de Bustamante, one of the authors of the Constitution of 1836, presented his recommendations. He unsurprisingly resented the President's attempt to modify his charter. He argued that the President's request was unconstitutional. The control over judicial appointments and the ability to lengthen the period of permitted custody, would put him in effective charge of the judicial power, he claimed. He also pointed out that the government's insistence that it needed extraordinary powers was at odds with the daily reports it published in the official newspaper, *El Diario de Gobierno*. Perhaps these reports were false, he commented, adding, if that were the case, why were they being published? On 19 October, the SPC announced it would not grant all the powers requested. It only consented to the final request: the power for the executive to appoint those it saw fit to government positions. However, the government refused to publish this ruling. The SPC was incensed and on 18 November, published Carlos María de Bustamante's speech in *El Cosmopolita*. The ruling was finally published on 4 December.²⁰⁰

The result of this conflict was that in his address to the opening of Congress on 1 January 1841, President Bustamante launched into an extraordinary attack upon the SPC:

Si el Ejecutivo, señores, no ha de estar suficientemente autorizado, si sus actos y los del Congreso General se han de anular por otro cuerpo desconocido en las instituciones modernas, no tengáis la menor

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 377.

²⁰⁰ MacNeil, "The Supreme Harmonizing Power," pp. 88-92.

esperanza de la felicidad pública. Lejos de que se conserve el equilibrio entre los Supremos Poderes, como se intentó con la mejor buena fé al dictarse la actual Constitución, se suscitarán a cada paso cuestiones que dividan los ánimos, den pretexto para el desorden y privar a la Administración Suprema de los respetos que se la deben. Sea en buena hora el Gobierno responsable por todos sus actos; administren los jueces y tribunales justicia con toda la independencia y libertad consignadas en los códigos de las naciones civilizadas; límitese el Congreso a sus funciones legislativas; *pero no se confundan las ideas ni se usurpen los Poderes sus facultades peculiares bajo el pretexto vano y contradictorio de evitar con esta usurpación que traspasen sus límites constitucionales.*²⁰¹

In the same speech, he also made clear his support for the reformation to the Council of Government suggested by the committee of constitutional reform the previous year.²⁰² It appeared, therefore, that constitutional reform, agreed in principal in Congress and possessing the full support of the President, was now inevitable.

This was not to be, however, as Bustamante and the *Siete Leyes* would be overthrown in September 1841. As we will go on to examine in the following section, the government was overthrown by a coalition of the military, merchants and dissatisfied *hombres de bien*. This group proposed a second solution to the defects of the Constitution of 1836. It advocated the abolition of the *Siete Leyes* and the election of a new constituent Congress to draft a new constitution. In the meantime, Santa Anna, who was one of the powers behind the movement against Bustamante, would be appointed as a temporary dictator. Signs of support for such a proposition as an alternative to the *Siete Leyes* had been long visible in Mexico. As we commented previously, rumours announcing an imminent *pronunciamiento* in favour of proclaiming Santa Anna, or at times, Bustamante, as dictator were frequent from the very moment of Bustamante's inauguration. Santa Anna's brief sojourn in power

²⁰¹ Anastasio Bustamante, "El general Bustamante al abrir las sesiones del primer período en 1 de enero de 1841," in *Los presidentes de México ante la nación*, vol. 1, pp. 214-215. My italics.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 214.

during 1839 gave an indication of his support of such an option. Opinions in favour of other variations on the theme of a dictatorship could also be heard in Mexico during the tenure of Bustamante's Presidency. Plans for establishing a European as Mexico's monarch were in evidence, the most famous of course being contained in José María Gutiérrez Estrada's public letter to Anastasio Bustamante published in September 1840.²⁰³ However, the monarchists would still have to wait a long time before their proposals were adopted by the nation. In 1841, it would be the *santanistas*, with their plans for a new republican constitution and a period of dictatorship, who would prevent Bustamante and Congress from realising the reformation of the *Siete Leyes*.

E: The Triangular Revolt: The Final Fall (1841)

After the experiences of Santa Anna's brief period as Interim President in 1839, many people believed that he harboured ambitions to overthrow Bustamante's government. This ambition did not appear to recede even when he resigned his interim position and returned to Veracruz. Just before his departure from the capital in July 1839 he named himself Commander General of Veracruz and, on his arrival to his native department gathered a large military force stationed in both Jalapa and Veracruz. It seemed clear to observers that he was spoiling for a confrontation with the newly restored President Bustamante.²⁰⁴ However, over the last six months of 1839, it would seem that Bustamante held the upper hand in his government. In October 1839 he felt confident enough of his position to order that Santa Anna be replaced as Commander General of Veracruz by Guadalupe Victoria.²⁰⁵ During these months Bustamante had worked hard to restore the credibility and strength of his

²⁰³ José María Gutiérrez Estrada, *Carta dirigida al exmo. sr. presidente de la república sobre la necesidad de buscar en un convenio el posible remedio de los males que aquejan la república y opiniones del autor acerca del mismo asunto* (Mexico City: Imprenta de Ignacio Cumplido, 1840).

²⁰⁴ FO no. 50/26, pp 45-46. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 1 August 1839.

²⁰⁵ Bocanegra, *Memorias*, vol. 2, p. 792.

government, appointing a new cabinet which was said to contain an 'absoluta conformidad de ideas y de opiniones'²⁰⁶ and, as we saw, embarked upon a drive to increase the power of the executive in government. Unfortunately for Bustamante, the July Revolt swung the pendulum back in Santa Anna's favour, as once more the President's regime was seen as being weak and ineffective. From that point on, Bustamante retired to conduct his government from the convent of San Agustín, surrounded by 'cañones y centinelas,' guarded always by a regiment of soldiers from Guanajuato and protected by a bodyguard.²⁰⁷ This was perfectly comprehensible at first, as the President had only recently been captured in his own bedchamber by soldiers who appeared with orders to shoot him, and the National Palace needed to undergo repairs after twelve days of bombardment. However, as the months passed, this state of affairs only served to emphasise the weakness of his government and exposed the President to ridicule. *El Sonorense* on 13 February 1841 wrote:

El gobierno de México no sabiendo defender y guardar su palacio, apenas sostiene y guarda el convento de San Agustín que sus religiosos han conservado cerca de 200 años sin soldados ni cañones. ¿Se atreverá alguien a llamar gobierno al que hoy tiene la república mexicana? Su presidente está reducido a una celda y no puede recibir al cuerpo diplomático extranjero sino es en el refectorio. Quizá para demostrar que la iglesia no se mete en el gobierno, el gobierno se mete en la iglesia con infracción de la regla del santo obispo de Hipona. ¡Qué vergüenza, cuando los hombres y las cosas de las épocas desaparezcan, caerán en el dominio del ridículo y ni aun puede prometerse el desprecio y las excusas de compasión!²⁰⁸

Worse still for Bustamante, it was becoming clear to many people that it was not simply the constitution which had failed to live up to its promises. President Bustamante had been elected on the strength of many peoples' memories of his Vice-

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 790.

²⁰⁷ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 2, p. 85.

²⁰⁸ *El Sonorense*, 13 February 1841.

Presidency in which a strong government had controlled Congress and the states; had dealt harshly and swiftly with its enemies; had strengthened the army; had protected the Church; and had brought new hope of economic prosperity to the Republic. It had been hoped that he could deliver a repeat performance as President. However, this had manifestly failed to materialise. The public quarrels between Bustamante and the Supreme Conservative Power had demonstrated that the President was far from being in control of government. His poor showing in his campaign against Urrea and the leniency with which he dealt with the rebels after the July revolt, showed that he could not be relied upon to vanquish his enemies or enforce his authority upon the nation. Moreover, Bustamante had not convinced many of his strength or influence as President. Many observers believed that he was being controlled by his senior ministers and members of the clergy. In 1837, Charles Ashburnham wrote that Bustamante 'was greatly under the domination of the priesthood.'²⁰⁹ Another commentator claimed that the President showed '[una] deferencia [...] casi ciega hacia los hombres sacro-profanos de esa porción acomodada y feliz de los ministros del altar.'²¹⁰ Following his return from Tamaulipas, it was widely thought that his new cabinet was the true power in the executive.²¹¹ In the course of his Presidency he had been seen to waver between supporting centralism, federalism and dictatorship; and it appeared that he lacked any true political or moral principles. As one observer put it: 'hombres de todas creencias y colores, de todas capacidades y partidos, de todos indoles y afectos tuvieron lugar en el gabinete.'²¹² In short, Anastasio Bustamante was regarded as a weak man, with no political beliefs of his own and let himself be

²⁰⁹ FO no. 50/108, p. 145. Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 30 November 1837.

²¹⁰ *Causas y efectos de la última revolución en México* (Mexico City: Imprenta de la Lima, dirigida por José Uribe y Alcalde, calle de San Miguel, no. 5, 1841), p. 5. In the British Library.

²¹¹ *El Sonorense*, 15 December 1840 and 1 January 1841.

²¹² *Causas y efectos de la última revolución en México*, p. 5.

dominated by his advisors. In the words of Pakenham, he appeared to be afflicted by 'a state of mental disability quite unfitting for the arduous duties of his office.'²¹³

In terms of his treatment of the army, the comparison between his Vice-Presidency and his Presidency could not be starker. In his new administration, spending on the army never reached the colossal sums seen during his Vice-Presidency.²¹⁴ Various laws were introduced with the aim of reducing desertion and improving discipline within the ranks.²¹⁵ The *Plana Mayor del Ejército*, which provided an organisational and judicial backbone for the military, was also set up.²¹⁶ Even so, these failed to have the obvious effect that the reforms made by Facio had done. As Bustamante himself commented during his campaign in Tamaulipas, the army suffered from an overwhelming lack of food, weapons and money. Many believed that this general lack of resources made the military quite ineffective. They pointed to the ignominious capture of the fortress of Ulúa by the French and the loss of Yucatán and Tabasco.²¹⁷ (Garrisons in Mérida and Valladolid announced the separation of their province from Mexico in 1840; but during Bustamante's government, no force was able to quell them successfully.)

However, it was the government's economic policies which caused most unhappiness. A considerable number of *hombres de bien* who had supported Bustamante were disgusted by its use of Church property as security for loans. This was begun in 1837 when the government contracted a \$750, 000 loan in 1837 in this

²¹³ FO no. 50/145, p. 180. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 10 June 1841.

²¹⁴ Spending was at \$8, 790, 662 in 1837-1838, \$7, 088, 140 in 1839, \$5, 998, 908 in 1840 and \$6, 720, 383 in 1841. Barbara Tenenbaum, *México en la época de los agiotistas* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1985), p. 74.

²¹⁵ For example, in two circulars in June and October 1837 new rules were introduced for the prosecution of those men who deserted, and the practise of officers who remained absent from their units for a longer period than allowed by their leave, was now included in the offence of desertion. Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, vol. 3, pp. 410, 431. Circulars dated 12 June and 19 October 1837. In 1839, the practise of recruiting by levy was replaced by a lottery system. *Ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 582-589. Circular dated 30 September 1839.

²¹⁶ "Establecimiento de la plana mayor del ejército mexicano," in *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 558-561. Dated 30 October 1838.

²¹⁷ *Causas y efectos de la última revolución en México*, pp. 13-14.

fashion and continued throughout the administration.²¹⁸ The government's reliance on these loans probably explains Bustamante's close relationship with the Church. It was necessary for him to have the support of the senior clergy for these loans to continue. It was also the case that Bustamante used the threat of radicalism to convince the Church of the importance of their aid. His negotiators reminded the clergy that, should Bustamante's government fall, there was always the danger that it would be replaced by a regime that might attempt to expropriate Church assets, as Gómez Farías administration's had tried to do in 1833.²¹⁹ Even so, the *hombres de bien*, who had led the overthrow of Gómez Farías at least in part because of his ecclesiastical policies, were liable to see Bustamante's use of Church property as collateral as the thin end of the wedge. Many must have asked themselves in unison with *El Investigador Mexicano*: 'el modo de reformar el clero, ¿es por ventura, comenzando por apropiarse los bienes?'²²⁰

These *hombres de bien* were also badly hit by the government's introduction of a huge range of direct taxes on their wealth and property. In June 1838 in an effort to raise funds for the expected war against the French, an emergency tax which authorised the government to raise up to four million pesos from urban and rural property, commerce, professions and trades, wages and salaries and luxury items was introduced. This levied a one-off charge of between one and three pesos per thousand of the value of property and introduced payments for the holders of business, ranging from 300 pesos for large businesses and ten pesos for small ones. Those in professions and trades were expected to pay a fixed contribution: 300 pesos for lawyers, business agents 50 pesos and teachers between eight and 25 pesos. Salaries and regular incomes were taxed at a rate from two and half to twelve and a half pesos depending on their values. Finally luxury goods such as carriages and even horses, were also

²¹⁸ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, pp.17-18. Costeloe, *The Central Republic*, pp. 130-131.

²¹⁹ Costeloe, *The Central Republic*, pp. 127-128.

²²⁰ *El Investigador Mexicano*, 21 June 1837.

subject to a one-off charge.²²¹ Later that year a poll tax was also introduced on the incomes of the heads of families; they were to be taxed between one and 100 pesos depending on the size of their earnings. The minimum income needed to be liable for this tax was twelve reales a day and this meant that the poorer elements of society were excluded from the tax; and the burden of taxation fell upon the richer classes.²²² In March 1841 another tax upon urban and rural property was announced, of three pesos per thousandth of the value of the property to be paid every four months.²²³ In April a personal contribution tax was introduced. Anyone earning over 500 pesos a year was liable for this tax, which demanded a contribution of between one real and two pesos each month, depending upon the income of the contributor.²²⁴

This concerted attack on their wealth and property was not the kind of policy that the *hombres de bien* expected from a government which had been set up to protect their interests and they generally refused to contribute to these taxes. In 1841, Manuel María Canseco complained that of the 200, 000 pesos that the government had hoped to receive from the first payment of March's tax upon urban and rural property, only \$100, 000 had been collected. This was the only income the treasury could count on in April and the loss of one half of the expected money meant that it had an even larger deficit than usual.²²⁵ In fact, during the years of Bustamante's Presidency, only between three and ten per cent of the government's income was derived from direct taxation, such was the elites' hostility towards it.²²⁶ This reluctance to pay taxes amongst the elites was nothing new. As Barbara Tenenbaum notes, the habit was acquired during Iturbide's Empire, when in efforts to win

²²¹ Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, vol. 3 pp. 512-529. Law dated 8 June 1838.

²²² Costeloe, *The Central Republic in Mexico* p. 133.

²²³ Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, vol. 4 pp. 6-9. Law dated 11 March 1841.

²²⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 11-21. Law dated 26 April 1841.

²²⁵ Manuel María Canseco, *Memoria de la hacienda nacional de la República Mexicana presentada a las cámaras por el ministro del ramo en julio de 1841. Primera parte* (Mexico City: Imprenta de J. M. Lara, calle de la Palma, no. 4, 1841), p. 4.

²²⁶ Tenenbaum, *México en la época de los agiotistas*, p. 69.

popularity, he had abolished or abandoned most of the old colonial system of collecting revenues.²²⁷ There had been various attempts subsequently to introduce new systems, but all were met with similar hostility. It seemed that once the habit of paying tax had been lost, as Canseco commented dispiritedly in his annual report, it was difficult to persuade people of the importance of such contributions.²²⁸

The failure of the government to introduce a successful system of taxation made it reliant upon custom duties and loans, usually acquired from moneylenders, or *agiotistas*, who charged extortionate levels of interest. It also meant that the treasury regularly suffered from a worrying deficit in its budget. For example, it stood at \$9, 773, 573 in 1837.²²⁹ In turn this meant that the government was unable to meet its financial obligations. Government salaries (including that of the President) and pensions were regularly unpaid, and a Finance Minister was often 'obliged to furnish sums from his own private fund for the mere payment of the Troops from day to day.'²³⁰ This of course, increased the President's unpopularity and laid him open to charges that he was incapable of creating a stable economy. His image was not helped by those who protested at the increased taxes levied against them, and painted a vivid picture of continued economic decline to illustrate their inability to pay. At least in some areas, such as agriculture, this picture was not entirely correct. As Margaret Chowning comments, as clear signs of a recovery were underway in the late 1830s and early 1840s. She believes that many *hacendados* felt threatened by increased taxation and 'they used all the rhetorical tools available - including painting a vivid picture of economic disaster - to ensure that the fragile recovery [...] was protected.'²³¹

²²⁷ Barbara A. Tenenbaum, "El poder de las finanzas y las finanzas del poder en México durante el siglo XIX," *Siglo XIX* 3:5 (1988), p. 208.

²²⁸ Canseco, *Memoria de la Hacienda ... 1841. Primera parte*, p. 6.

²²⁹ Tenenbaum, *México en la época de los agiotistas*, p. 73.

²³⁰ FO no. 50/116 p. 30. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 10 December 1838.

²³¹ Margaret Chowning, *Wealth and Power in Provincial Mexico. Michoacán from the Late Colony to the Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 196.

Without a doubt, therefore, Bustamante was in the weakest position he had ever been after the July revolt. He had no allies left. The centralists blamed him for the attacks on their constitution and the federalists believed he was a traitor who had betrayed their cause time and again. He was hated by large sections of the *hombres de bien* for his financial policies and what they regarded as his general mismanagement of the economy. In contrast, Santa Anna's position strengthened, as many groups began to regard him, and the rebellion he wished to lead, as the best way to rid themselves of Bustamante. One of the first groups to be associated with Santa Anna was domestic and foreign merchants and traders who felt badly used by the economic policies of the Bustamante administration. In November 1839 the levy on foreign goods sold in Mexico was increased from five to 15 per cent, which caused much anger in their community.²³² The merchants of Mexico City, Guadalajara and Morelia issued immediate protests to the government. The departmental juntas of Zacatecas, Durango, San Luis Potosí and Veracruz also sent representations to Congress criticising the measure. The Plenipotentiary Ministers of Great Britain, Prussia and France, also protested to Congress against the injustice of the scheme, which it was argued would damage overseas trade and increase smuggling.²³³ In December 1839 Congress passed a law postponing the introduction of the increase for a month, but did not overturn the legislation.²³⁴ As a consequence some merchants began to believe that only a change of government could ensure that the law be repealed; they therefore became involved with Santa Anna in Veracruz and Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga in Guadalajara. The community in Guadalajara addressed a petition to Santa Anna in April 1841, asking for his support for the reduction in the levy. Foreign merchants sent a representative to Santa Anna in the summer of 1841, with the same declared aim. This representative made two trips in total to Veracruz and, on his return from the

²³² Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, vol. 3, pp. 667-668. Law dated 26 December 1839.

²³³ Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, p. 349.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

second, also visited Guadalajara. It seems, in the light of the events of the rebellion, which began only three weeks after his departure from Guadalajara, his purpose was to co-ordinate the events of both cities.²³⁵

The second group which became identified with Santa Anna in 1841 were the cotton growers and manufacturers. In September 1840, The Minister of War, Juan Nepomuceno Almonte, gave General Arista permission to import foreign cotton yarn to the value of 500, 000 pesos into Matamoros, in order to make uniforms for the troops who were destined to form part of the campaign in Texas.²³⁶ The import of foreign yarn had been illegal in Mexico since 1837 in an attempt to protect domestic industry from cheap foreign competition,²³⁷ and the cotton industry was furious at this breach in the law, which they saw as a threat to their struggling industry. Vocal protests were made in Congress and to the Supreme Conservative Power. As a result the SPC annulled the permission given to Arista. Almonte waited a considerable amount of time before relaying the decision to Arista, which meant he had time to make the necessary arrangements with the importers before the nullification of the permission reached him. As a consequence the yarn arrived in Mexico in January 1841 much to the disgust of the cotton manufacturers and merchants.²³⁸ This body turned to Santa Anna for help, who wrote to Bustamante in February to protest against these illegal imports and to demand that they be stopped.²³⁹ General Valencia, an ally of Bustamante, also added his voice to the protest. The recently formed *Junta de Fomento de la Industria Nacional*, led by Lucas Alamán issued a statement in which it forecast disaster for the cotton industry if such imports continued. In the face of this overwhelming protest, especially by two important figures as Valencia and Santa

²³⁵ FO no. 50/147, pp. 58-60. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 9 October 1841.

²³⁶ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 2, p. 93.

²³⁷ Sordo Cedeño "El pensamiento conservador del partido centralista en los años treinta del siglo XIX," in Morales and Fowler, *El conservadurismo mexicano en el siglo XIX*, p. 161.

²³⁸ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 2, pp. 93, 100-101. Also see, Sordo Cedeño *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, pp. 383-4

²³⁹ Santa Anna to Bustamante, 6 February 1841, in *El Sonorense*, 13 February 1841.

Anna, it was clear that something had to be done. An agreement was reached with the merchants and manufacturers and compensation was promised to make up for any losses they would suffer.²⁴⁰

The political damage had already been done, however. Almonte and Arista, it was claimed, had arranged the deal with the notorious *agiotista* Cayetano Rubio and were callously intent on making a profit out of the suffering of the cotton growers and manufacturers.²⁴¹ Once more, Bustamante was seen as a weak leader, who in this case was being controlled by his ‘aborrecibles favoritos:’ Almonte and Arista.²⁴² Carlos María de Bustamante, not to be outdone, reminds us that the President recently ‘había encompadrado con Almonte’ in the wedding of Manuel Barrera's eldest daughter.²⁴³ But, most significantly, the cotton growers and the manufacturers had been pushed into the arms of Santa Anna, who by championing their cause, had made himself a more palatable alternative to Bustamante. During the summer of 1841, Santa Anna received several delegations from the cotton growers, who begged for his support in their struggle against the government.²⁴⁴

The financial masters of the capital, the money lending *agiotistas*, were the last group to become identified with Santa Anna. The *agiotistas* had enjoyed a close relationship with the Bustamante administration from the start. This was due in some part to their readiness to provide loans to the cash-strapped treasury. Even so, the bedrock of their relationship was their control of the tobacco monopoly, which was sold to a consortium of *agiotistas*, including Benito Maqua, Cayetano and Francisco Rubio, Felipe Néri del Barrio, Miguel Bringas and Manuel Escandón in November

²⁴⁰ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 2, pp. 103-104. Also see, Sordo Cedeño *El congreso en la primera república centralista* p. 387 and Costeloe, *The Central Republic in Mexico* p. 165.

²⁴¹ *El Sonorense*, 6 February 1841.

²⁴² *El Sonorense*, 13 February 1841.

²⁴³ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 2, p. 102.

²⁴⁴ Michael P. Costeloe, “The Triangular Revolt in Mexico and the Fall of Anastasio Bustamante. August-October 1841,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 20 (1988), p. 343.

1837 by the *Banco de Amortización*.²⁴⁵ This bank had been established in January 1837 with the aim of amortising the huge amounts of devalued copper money in the market place by using income from the monopoly. The consortium which became known as the *Empresa del Tabaco*, soon found out that the administration of the tobacco monopoly was not a lucrative investment. Mexican tobacco was not of first-class quality and could not compete with foreign leaves smuggled into the country. The *Empresa* was forced to employ a private police force to try and maintain its monopoly by capturing this illegal tobacco. This necessarily pushed costs up. At the same time, the consortium as part of the deal with the *Banco de Amortización*, was paid for the tobacco it produced in copper money. The failure of the bank between 1837 and 1840 to complete the successful amortisation of the money made this a further liability for the *Empresa*. The value of copper currency continued to fall consistently even after it was devalued by 50 per cent in 1837; and the result was that the *Empresa* was unable to administer the monopoly at a profit. It was forced to take out loans with the financial houses in Mexico City; but even with these loans, by December 1840 it suffered from a deficit of \$1.7 million.²⁴⁶

In the light of this situation, the *Empresa's* shareholders tried to re-negotiate their contract with the government. They proposed that this should be abandoned and replaced with a new company, which would be a joint enterprise between the former *Empresa* and the government. This new company would have three aims: to provide a loan of half a million pesos to the government to finance its campaign in Texas; to amortise the copper money; and to administer the tobacco monopoly. Working in partnership with the government had three main advantages for the shareholders of the *Empresa*. First, it meant that they would no longer have to pay rent to maintain the monopoly; second, it shifted the expense of maintaining the monopoly on to the

²⁴⁵ David W. Walker, "Business as Usual: The Empresa del Tabaco in Mexico, 1837-1844," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 64:4 (1984), p. 680.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 693-695.

shoulders of the government; and thirdly, it meant that the government would pay the shareholders for the tobacco it currently had in store, to the value of \$2 million. President Bustamante initially approved the plan and a law was passed to set up the new company in April 1841. However, the law met with fierce opposition from the *Banco de Amortización*, which feared the new enterprise would usurp its position, and the law was abandoned. Subsequently the shareholders began to look for new ways to rescue the *Empresa*. In July, the shareholders entered into negotiation with Santa Anna in Veracruz, and arranged to aid the *caudillo* financially with his rebellion. In gratitude for this support, once Santa Anna was in power he agreed to the shareholders' plan. The *Empresa's* contract was cancelled in November 1841, its existing stock purchased and a new government company to administer the tobacco monopoly created.²⁴⁷

All in all, by August 1841, Santa Anna could count on an impressive coalition of support for his plans for rebellion and it appears that he felt it was now the right time to begin to implement his schemes. The first signs of this were visible in Guadalajara in the early days of August 1841. The city was awash with soldiers, 1,100 arriving in one week alone. The merchant community supplied them with uniforms and arrangements were made with the local treasury to cover their pay. The Commander General of Guadalajara, Paredes y Arrillaga, informed the department's governor that the garrison of the city was ready to rebel against the increased levy on foreign goods, due to pressure from the merchants. On 8 August, the definitive move was taken and at 11 a.m. Paredes y Arrillaga announced his plan to the assembled troops outside the city's garrison. It demanded that Bustamante be declared unfit to remain in power, a replacement to be named and that a congress be assembled to reform the constitution.²⁴⁸ If the Bustamante government first hoped to confine the revolt in

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 696-699.

²⁴⁸ Costeloe, "The Triangular Revolt," pp. 343-345. Also a detailed account of events can be found in Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 2, pp.131-133.

Guadalajara and deal with it as yet another localised rebellion, events soon made this impossible. On 31 August, General Valencia, the hero of July 1840, abandoned the government's cause and issued his own plan which called for the replacement of the tyrant Bustamante and the convention of a new congress to draft a new constitution.²⁴⁹ He took up position in the Ciudadela, occupying the prison of La Acordada with around 1, 000 men.²⁵⁰ Then, while the government was recovering from this shock, Santa Anna also issued a plan for revolution, which seconded that proclaimed by Valencia and called for Bustamante's resignation. The situation, that had been far from hopeless in the early weeks of August, was now looking very grim. Both Paredes y Arrillaga and Santa Anna were marching towards the capital, half of which was already under the control of Valencia. Almost daily, troops were deserting Bustamante to join Valencia. To make matters worse the revolt was gaining support in the provinces. Luis Cortázar in Guanajuato and Juan Álvarez in Acapulco publicly supported the rebellion. Nicolás Bravo in Chilpancingo refused to condemn it and moreover, refused to march upon the capital to aid the struggling government. The garrisons in San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas and Oaxaca also declared their backing for the plan.²⁵¹ It appeared that the government could not win.

However, far from giving up, General Bustamante adopted measures that indicated his desire to fight on. The Supreme Conservative Power was convened and declared that it was the will of the people not to be governed by any form of despotism and Bustamante was authorised to take whatever steps necessary to restore order in the country.²⁵² It seems that faced by a revolution led by Santa Anna, who had already proved himself to be no friend of the SPC, that body had decided it was safer to support Bustamante. The capital was declared in a state of siege, limits on

²⁴⁹ Bocanegra, *Memorias* vol. 2 pp. 805-6.

²⁵⁰ Costeloe, "The Triangular Revolt," p. 348.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.* pp.351-2.

²⁵² Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 2, p. 173. Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana* ,vol. 4, pp. 29-30. Law dated 2 September 1841.

press freedom were introduced and significantly the increase on the levy on foreign goods returned to its original level and the personal contribution tax was reformed to exempt the lowest earners.²⁵³ Once more the capital echoed to the sound of cannon fire as troops of both sides fired at each other from behind their fortified positions. Buildings were destroyed and the innocent were again caught between the crossfire. Shops shut, church bells were silenced and the rich fled the city. According to Fanny Calderón de la Barca, it was impossible to find a house, much less a room in any of the villages surrounding the capital.²⁵⁴ Bustamante was granted leave to lead the army against the rebels himself,²⁵⁵ and organised his sadly dwindling troops to prepare for an assault upon the arriving Paredes and Santa Anna. In the event, he marched to Guadalupe just outside the city and began by attempting to negotiate with the two rebel leaders. Almonte was sent to talk to Paredes and Santa Anna and eventually agreed to what would be called the *Bases de Tacubaya* on the 28 September, which effectively suspended the Constitution of 1836 and provided for a new congress to be set up. This was to be composed of deputies of Santa Anna's choosing and would dedicate itself to draft a new constitution.²⁵⁶ This apparent surrender on the part of Bustamante however was little more than a ruse to win a little more time. The next day he and his men marched back into the city. He resigned his Presidency and on the following morning issued a plan in favour of re-introducing the federalist Constitution of 1824.²⁵⁷ This was obviously an attempt to win over extra support to boost his falling numbers. But despite receiving some popular support, he failed to gather the numbers necessary to have a chance of defeating Santa Anna. In one skirmish with Santa Anna in the outskirts of the city, he did score a small victory, but in the long run

²⁵³ Costeloe, "The Triangular Revolt," p. 349. Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, pp. 30-31. Law dated 2 September 1841.

²⁵⁴ Calderón de la Barca, *Life in Mexico*, p. 502.

²⁵⁵ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol. 1 p. 196.

²⁵⁶ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 2 pp. 177-8.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 180 and Costeloe 'The Triangular Revolt,' p. 354.

it was clear his position was untenable. Once the National Palace fell into the hands of Valencia on 5 October, he agreed to negotiate once more with the rebels. The next day his delegates agreed once more to the terms of the *Bases de Tacubaya*²⁵⁸ and Bustamante's regime officially came to an end.

Bustamante's failure to survive this final challenge against his Presidency can be explained in three ways. The first is that unlike during the July Revolt he could not count on the loyalty of the majority of the army, and more specifically, he had lost the support of General Valencia. We should not be surprised that Valencia joined the rebellion. Throughout 1837 and 1838 this general's name was linked with Santa Anna and it was rumoured that he wished to proclaim Santa Anna as dictator.²⁵⁹ At this time, Valencia existed very much in Santa Anna's shadow. However, his leadership at the battle of Acajete marked the beginning of his increase in stature. His leadership of the loyal troops in 1840 only increased this further. Valencia now showed clear signs of ambition. According to Gómez Fariás' correspondent, Juan, now writing to Francisco García, Valencia was now at the head of a group of military officers 'quienes solo esperaban una oportunidad favorable para asegurarse del poder, y establecer un gobierno dictatorial.' Valencia, says Juan, had broken his relationship with Santa Anna, and 'tiene la impresión de haber ganado gran popularidad con el ejército como para ponerse a la cabeza de los acontecimientos.'²⁶⁰ We can deduce therefore, that once the rebellion had broken out in Guadalajara in August, Valencia decided to seize his chance to join the bandwagon and extract whatever advantage possible from his contribution to the overthrow of Bustamante. However, without Valencia, Bustamante lost the support of a significant section of the capital's garrison. The second explanatory factor also stems from Valencia's desertion. In 1841,

²⁵⁸ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 2 pp. 211-212 and Costeloe "The Triangular Revolt," p. 355.

²⁵⁹ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1, p. 152.

²⁶⁰ AFG folder 6 no. 45. Juan to Francisco García, 26 August 1846.

Bustamante found himself attacked from both inside and outside the capital, which naturally made his position extremely weak, and meant he could not concentrate his attack at any one front individually. Finally, the third factor is that the President was almost completely without support in the capital itself. As we have seen, he had very few friends left by 1841. This undoubtedly led him to take the desperate measure to pronounce in favour of federalism in an attempt to strengthen his position by increasing his following. The failure of this attempt to mobilise more support for his rapidly decreasing army meant that his defence was inevitably doomed.

E: Bustamante, a Weak Leader?

The traditional interpretation of Bustamante's Presidency portrays the General as a weak and ineffectual leader, beset by indecision and controlled by stronger personalities around him. This is certainly the impression left by his contemporaries. However, as Michael Costeloe has already pointed out, the decision and energy he demonstrated in defending his position in 1841, sits uncomfortably with this view of Bustamante.²⁶¹ It is probably fair to say Bustamante showed the same qualities in 1840. There are perhaps two possible explanations for this apparent contradiction. The first is that Bustamante was simply a brave soldier who was at his best in a crisis. This coupled with the obstinate nature and ambition also attributed to him by his contemporaries meant that he was not prepared to give up the Presidency without a fight. However, despite his talents as a soldier and leader of men, he could not transfer these skills into the realm of politics.²⁶² Here he was indecisive and weak as accepted wisdom would have us believe.

²⁶¹ Costeloe "The Triangular Revolt," pp. 356-357.

²⁶² Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1 p. 42 says: '¡pobre república en qué manos te vimos! En las de un hombre de bien, caballero e hidalgo como él que más, compasivo y generoso, bravo en la campaña; pero sin disposición para gobernar en grande.'

The second, more convincing explanation is that Bustamante demonstrated the same character as both soldier and politician. This character is shown off at its best during his Vice-Presidency when surrounded by allies, he was able to impose himself upon the government of the day. During his Presidency, however, circumstances conspired against him, preventing him from truly exercising command. In the first place the Constitution of 1836 was expressly designed to prevent strong leadership from the President,²⁶³ lumbered as it was with an unwieldy system of four powers: the Chamber of Deputies, Senate, the Council of Government and the Supreme Conservative Power, which deprived the President of all real power in decision-making.²⁶⁴ Bustamante almost always respected the *Siete Leyes* and its protocols throughout his Presidency. For this reason he appeared slow and indecisive in his actions and Santa Anna, during his brief stay as interim president, so active and decisive. Santa Anna ruled by decree and paid little heed to the posturing of the Supreme Conservative Power or Congress. Bustamante also opposed this constitution consistently throughout his years in power. In the first two years he conspired with the moderate federalists to replace the *Siete Leyes* with a reformed version of the Federal Constitution of 1824. Between 1839 and 1841 he supported reforms on the Constitution of 1836, which if they had been implemented would have introduced a constitution not dissimilar to a reformed version of the federal charter. He did not

²⁶³ Sordo Cedeño suggests that the SPC was based upon Benjamin Constant's ideal of a neutral power, which would police the branches of the legislative, executive and judicial powers. It was to prevent the arbitrary or despotic use of power. Sordo Cedeño, "El pensamiento conservador del partido centralista en los años treinta del siglo XIX mexicano," pp.148-151. Edmundo O'Gorman, for his part, sees the SPC's role as being akin to that of a monarch. He writes that the *Siete Leyes* created 'una monarquía disfrazada con máscara republicana, de una república monárquica, valga la expresión, o si se prefiere, de una monarquía sin príncipe, pero con soberano colegiado.' Edmundo O'Gorman, *La supervivencia política Novo-Hispana. Monarquía o república* (Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana, 1986), p. 27. Whatever the ideological basis of the Supreme Conservative Power, it seems clear that it was designed precisely to be the highest power in the land, and therefore prevent the President from occupying this position.

²⁶⁴ Josefina Z. Vázquez, *Don Antonio López de Santa Anna: Mito y enigma* (Chimalistac: Centro de Estudios de la Historia de México, 1987), p. 26: 'A Bustamante se le acusaba de ineficiente, sin contar que las *Siete Leyes* le negaban al Ejecutivo casi toda autoridad pues el Congreso y el Poder Conservador monopolizaban el poder de decisión.'

waver between federalism and centralism as his contemporaries believed. Rather, he supported the moderate federalist plans for a change in the constitution until these became untenable. He then turned his attention to changing the *Siete Leyes* through reform.

Perhaps the bad reputation he earned during his time in the Presidency simply reflects the mood of those writing the character descriptions. Carlos María de Bustamante, for example, had been one of the architects of the Constitution of 1836. He was not ready to accept that there may have been problems with its make-up. Instead he preferred to blame the incompetence of his namesake to explain its failure.²⁶⁵ Both centralists and federalists believed by 1841 that Bustamante had betrayed their cause. Other commentators were simply disillusioned with the constitution's failure to live up to its promise. They had placed their hopes in the fact that the *Siete Leyes* would immediately solve all the problems they attributed to the federalist system: political chaos, financial crises and general instability within the nation. When this failed to happen they blamed both Bustamante and the constitution.

²⁶⁵ Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol.1, p. 212. He refuses to accept that extraordinary powers were the answer to the problems of Bustamante's government. Instead he argues that giving such power to the General would be 'lo mismo que dar una espalda de dos filos a un niño o un loco furioso.'

Chapter Six: The Final Campaigns (1845-1853)

After the fall of his government in October 1841, General Bustamante once more undertook exile in Europe. He left Mexico City in November,¹ and embarked upon the Spanish war-ship the *Jason*, on 9 January 1842.² After a brief sojourn in Cuba, where he socialised with fellow exile José María Gutiérrez de Estrada, the former Spanish Ambassador to Mexico, Ángel Calderón de la Barca and his Scottish wife, Frances, he boarded another ship bound for England.³ He arrived in Falmouth in May and immediately set out for London.⁴ I have been unable to find evidence of his stay in the British capital, but it seems that he soon moved and fixed his residence once more in Paris. During Antonio López de Santa Anna's time in power, General Bustamante made no attempt to return home. However, once his enemy was overthrown in December 1844, he immediately began to plan his departure from Paris.⁵ In March 1845 he wrote to the government, announcing his decision to return, and offering his services in the light of the threat of war with the United States.⁶ His

¹ José Ramón Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables, 1832-1853* (Mexico City: Editorial Patria, S.A., 1948), vol. 1, p. 204.

² SDN:AH XI/III/1-235/1-31/00304. Gregorio Gómez to the Minister of War, Commandacy General of Veracruz, 10 January 1842.

³ Frances Erskine Calderón de la Barca, *Life in Mexico: The Letters of Fanny Calderón de la Barca*, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966), pp. 613, 625-626. It is curious to note that Gutiérrez Estrada had in fact been exiled by Bustamante himself in September 1840 for the publication of his pro-monarchist proposals. It seems that yet again, personal friendships could survive political animosity.

⁴ SDN:AH XI/III/1-235/1-31/00302. Bocanegra to the Minister of War, Ministry of Exterior Relations, 14 July 1842.

⁵ MRPA no. 1521. Francisco Modesto de Olaguíbel to Mariano Riva Palacio, 19 December 1844. Olaguíbel wrote to Riva Palacio, then Minister of Justice, on behalf of Bustamante and other exiles, including Valentín Gómez Farias and José María Luis Mora, asking that they might be allowed to return to Mexico.

⁶ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00309. Anastasio Bustamante to the Minister of War, Paris, 26 March 1845.

offer was welcomed with open arms and when he arrived in Veracruz in 16 June,⁷ an armed escort was provided to accompany him on the journey to Mexico.⁸

General Bustamante was now in his sixty-fifth year. He would never again attain the political power he had enjoyed as Vice-President and President in the 1830s and 1840s. However, he remained an important figure within the army for the rest of his life and for that reason, still enjoyed a relatively influential position within the political sphere. This chapter will examine Bustamante's activities in the last eight years of his life. It will concentrate upon four main areas: Bustamante's association with President José Joaquín de Herrera in 1845; the drawing up of his final will in 1846; the war with the United States, 1846-1848; and the rebellions in the Sierra Gorda, 1847-1849. The discussion will focus on how these events relate to the picture of Bustamante that has been drawn thus far by his study.

A: Bustamante and Herrera (1845-1846)

The diarist José Ramón Malo tells us that Bustamante arrived in Mexico City on 26 June 1845. That evening he hosted a dinner for his friends, including the ministers and Generals who had supported his previous administration. Following the meal he visited President José Joaquín de Herrera in the National Palace.⁹ From the evidence of their association over the coming months, Bustamante and Herrera seem to have been allies, if not friends. On his arrival to the capital, Bustamante was immediately appointed as a senator.¹⁰ In July the General was designated as the General in Chief in charge of a proposed expedition to protect Upper California from

⁷ *Ibid.*, XI/III/ 1-235/1-31/00315. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Jalapa, 16 June 1845.

⁸ *Ibid.*, XI/III/ 1-235/1-31/00308. Ministry of War to the General in Chief of the 2nd Division, 27 May 1845.

⁹ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol. 1 p. 280.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

the United States.¹¹ However, this expedition was never undertaken. Instead, Bustamante remained in Mexico City. In November of 1845, his name was suggested as one of the two top choices for the short list drawn up by Herrera to replace him if he were to take a six-month leave of absence to recover his health.¹² During the rebellion instigated by Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga in December 1845, Herrera appointed him Chief of the Armed Forces in the Capital¹³ and asked him to remain in the National Palace with him during the rebellion.¹⁴ Bustamante stayed by Herrera's side in the National Palace until he resigned on 30 December.¹⁵ Subsequently, the victorious Paredes invited him to take part in a general meeting of generals to discuss appointments to a new *Junta Legislativa* to replace Congress. Bustamante declined to attend on the grounds of ill health, the usual excuse of all politicians at the time to avoid participating in unpalatable events.¹⁶

Any association between Bustamante and Herrera may seem strange at first glance. Herrera had not supported or collaborated in any obvious way with Bustamante since the days of Iturbide. In fact, in 1841 he was suspected of plotting against Bustamante's government. In February Herrera wrote to the Minister of War, Juan Nepomuceno Almonte, to complain that he was being watched and followed by government agents. In this letter he denied he was involved in any rebellious activity.¹⁷ However, if we take a closer look at the events of 1845, any relationship between the two men becomes easier to understand. Herrera had come to power in December 1844

¹¹ Carlos María de Bustamante, *El Nuevo Bernal de Castillo o sea, historia de la invasión de los angloamericanos en México* (Mexico City: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 1990), p. 82.

¹² José María Tornel to Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, Mexico City, 15 October 1845, in Gaston García Cantú, *El pensamiento de la reacción mexicana. Historia documental* (Mexico City: Empresas Editoriales, 1965), p. 247.

¹³ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol. 1, p. 289.

¹⁴ Bustamante, *El Nuevo Bernal Díaz*, vol. 1 p. 133.

¹⁵ Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol. 1, p. 291.

¹⁶ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00330. J. Mariano de Salas to the Minister of War, Mexico City, 5 January 1846.

¹⁷ T. Ewing Cotner, *The Military and Political Career of José Joaquín de Herrera* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1949), p. 99.

in the wake of a revolution against Santa Anna. Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga had begun the movement by issuing a *pronunciamiento* in November from Jalisco, but Herrera had assumed its leadership by taking control of the rebel troops in the capital in December and orchestrating the fall of Santa Anna.¹⁸ Herrera was part of the moderate faction that had been linked to Bustamante between 1837 and 1838. In 1845 he refused to placate the radical ('pure') federalists, led as ever by the indomitable Valentín Gómez Farías, by sanctioning the replacement of the centralist *Bases Orgánicas* of 1843 by the Constitution of 1824. He believed that the threat posed by the United States' expansionist policies and their desire to annex Texas made the political situation too dangerous for another abrupt constitutional upheaval to take place.¹⁹ He wanted to undertake reform at a slow pace and insisted that the *Bases Orgánicas* should remain in force while the departments were fully consulted on the issue of constitutional reform.²⁰

In the light of this policy, Anastasio Bustamante does not seem an unlikely ally for Herrera. After all, General Bustamante had unsuccessfully supported two sets of proposals for peaceful constitutional reform during his presidency: the first to re-establish a reformed version of the Constitution of 1824, organised by the moderates; and the second to reform the *Siete Leyes*, debated in Congress. Moreover, he and Herrera appeared to share some of the same friends and advisors. Luis Gonzaga Cuevas, who served twice as Bustamante's Minister of Relations and was named as one of the executors of the General's will of 1846,²¹ occupied the same position under Herrera. Manuel Gómez Pedraza, who had a long history of association with Bustamante, was also frequently linked to President Herrera. He was named as one of

¹⁸ Michale P. Costeloe, *The Central Republic in Mexico, 1835-1846*. *Hombres de bien in the Age of Santa Anna* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 250-257.

¹⁹ Will Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals, 1821-1853* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1998), p. 155.

²⁰ Costeloe, *The Central Republic*, p. 263, 266-267.

²¹ AGNCM. Notaria: Francisco de Madariaga, vol. 2869, f. 9. Last Will and Testament of Anastasio Bustamante, dated 12 January 1846.

the favourites to be appointed as Herrera's interim replacement in November 1845²² and was regarded to be 'el alma del gabinete' by some observers.²³

What is interesting, however, is that Bustamante should have remained loyal to Herrera until the bitter end. In the rebellion of 1845, most of Herrera's military allies deserted him, including Juan Nepomuceno Almonte and Gabriel Valencia. There were even rumours that Gómez Pedraza was associated with the rebels.²⁴ A significant part of the *hombres de bien* had become disillusioned with Herrera's government. The military elite opposed the President's resurrection of the civil militias; the radical federalists disliked his unwillingness to restore the Constitution of 1824; and a great number of the elites opposed his readiness to accept an indemnity from the United States in return for Mexico's acquiescence for their annexation of Texas (the Texans had voted to join the Union in July). Bustamante's stubborn loyalty in this case seems to hark back to the position he took in 1823, when he supported Agustín de Iturbide until his abdication. It is probably true that Bustamante did not support the plans of Paredes y Arrillaga, which appeared aimed to introduce a centralist dictatorship in Mexico, based on the traditionalist stance of reducing suffrage to the point at which only the wealthy property-owning professional would be allowed to vote.²⁵ Even so, his decision to stay in the National Palace with Herrera and to rebuff Paredes y Arrillaga's offers to join the rebels, certainly indicates a significant level of friendship or commitment to the President.

In keeping with this position, General Bustamante played little part in public events during Paredes y Arrillaga's tenure in power. He spent the first two months of

²² José María Tornel to Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, Mexico City, 15 October 1845, in García Cantú, *El pensamiento de la reacción mexicana*, p. 247.

²³ Laura Solares Robles, *Una revolución pacífica: Biografía política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza, 1789-1851* (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Acervo Histórico Diplomático de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores/Consejo Estatal para la Cultura y las Artes del Gobierno del Estado de Querétaro, 1996), p. 208.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

²⁵ For a discussion of the proposals of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, see Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals*, pp. 71-75.

1846 in Querétaro visiting his sister, María Anastasia, who had become extremely ill in November.²⁶ On his return to the capital, he was granted a leave of absence to cure the rheumatism brought about by the inclement weather he had experienced during his journey back from Querétaro.²⁷ Bustamante's return to public affairs was not to be until June when he was appointed President of Congress. However, he did not take up this appointment, pleading ill health once more. It is likely that illness was again simply an excuse, as the General simultaneously asked to be employed within the army.²⁸ Perhaps he still did not want to be associated with Paredes y Arrillaga's government. Or he might have considered himself more useful in military affairs than political ones. Or he simply felt uncomfortable in the political role of a senator and was unwilling to shoulder the responsibility of the Presidency. In any event, he had to wait until September before he was given a military command and he appears to have played no part in Santa Anna's triumphal return to the presidency during the summer of 1846.

B: The Last Will and Testament

Immediately following the fall of José Joaquín de Herrera's government, General Bustamante drew up his final will. He was now a rich man. In his first will, written in 1838, he declared his assets to be 52, 002 pesos, deposited in various financial houses in Mexico City, Bordeaux, Paris and London.²⁹ In his second will, drawn up in 1846, he also mentioned 'cantidades de alguna consideración en el Banco Real de Escocia.'³⁰ However, he did not specify the sums that were deposited with

²⁶ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00317. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Mexico City, 18 December 1845.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, XI/III/1-235/1-31/00325. Record of the granting of the license, dated February 1846.

²⁸ Bustamante, *El Nuevo Bernal Díaz*, vol. 1 p. 256.

²⁹ AGNCM.. Notaría: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2855, ff. 1078-1081. Last Will and Testament of Anastasio Bustamante, dated, 1 October 1838.

³⁰ Unfortunately the archives of the Royal Bank of Scotland do not retain any documents involving Bustamante.

each house, and the will suggests that much of the money placed in Bordeaux, Paris and London before 1838 had been spent during his second exile in Europe. The three beneficiaries of Bustamante's final will were his sister, María Anastasia Bustamante, her son Francisco Figueroa and his illegitimate sons: Anastasio Bustamante y Treviño and Leandro Anastasio Bustamante y Manzano.³¹

It seems that Bustamante acquired such a fortune from his involvement in mining and agriculture. In his will of 1846 he asserts that the national treasury still owed him his salary for the years he spent as President. He also claims that he did not receive the payments he was due during his second exile. He appears to have owned no property outright at the time of drawing up his second will, although he does claim as his possessions: 'las decoraciones, los libros, armas y demás objetos de mi equipaje y algunas otras alhajadas [...], caballos, monturas etcetera.' Instead, he records that he holds shares in the estate of his nephew, Francisco Figueroa (the hacienda del Fresno, in Querétaro) and in the mining company, Minas de la Canal, in Zacualpan.³² From other documents we also know, that he had a further interest in the ranch and the livestock of La Ventana (part of the Hacienda de San Agustín de Amoles in San Luis Potosí).³³ Due to a lack of any other evidence we must conclude that these three investments provided the bulk of Bustamante's income. The fact that he never married, nor seems to have purchased any houses or estates that might have placed a drain on his purse, might explain why such small scale involvement proved extremely profitable for him. Even so, in the light of the amount of money Bustamante possessed at his

³¹ AGNCM. Notaría: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2869, ff. 7-10. Last Will and Testament of Anastasio Bustamante, dated, 12 January 1846. In fact, Bustamante recognised three illegitimate children. The third, Jesús Rivera, died in the period between the drawing up of Bustamante's first will in 1838 and the writing of his second in 1846. He was born in the Valle of Santiago in 1821. Leandro Anastasio Bustamante y Manzano was born while Bustamante occupied the Presidency in 1840. He died in 1850. Anastasio Bustamante y Treviño, who was born in Saltillo in 1829, was the only son to survive his father. According to the provisions laid out by Bustamante in a codicil to his will, it appears that he paid for this young man to be sent to Paris in the early 1850s.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ AGNCM. Notaría: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2866, ff. 428-430. Dated, 19 April 1844.

death, we cannot discount the possibility that the General also acquired money from other sources, legal or illegal, at various times during his life. Most Presidents abused their position to their own financial advantage during this time (and after), and it is not far-fetched to suppose that Bustamante also benefited from his two periods in office.

C: The War with the United States (1846-1848)

On 11 September 1846 General Bustamante was appointed as the General in Chief of the Western Division, in charge of the defence of the states of the two Californias, Sinaloa and Sonora.³⁴ However, he made no move to leave the capital until December. This may seem to be extremely negligent considering the desperate position of Upper California during the autumn of 1846. During the summer months, the troops of Captain Fremont and Commodore Robert F. Stockton had effectively captured Monterey and Los Angeles. Since then, the salvation of the Mexican cause depended on the resistance of the Mexican Californians to the imposition of U.S. authority. In late September, a rebellion led by José María Flores brought Los Angeles back under the control of the Mexican population.³⁵ Even so, the prospects for retaining this authority were not good, since the volunteer troops commanded by Flores had few weapons or munitions.³⁶ Despite this, it appears that the policy of the Mexican government was to consolidate the rebellion in Los Angeles, by sending munitions and ammunition, before sending Bustamante. It was probably hoped that from a secure base in Los Angeles a strong army could be organised to drive the U.S. invaders out of California. Accordingly, a deal was struck with José Limantour, the

³⁴ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2242/00017. The Minister of War to Bustamante, Mexico City, 11 September 1846.

³⁵ John S.D. Eisenhower, *Tan lejos de Dios. La guerra de los Estados Unidos contra México, 1846-1848* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2000), p.279.

³⁶ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2479/00019. José María Flores to the Minister of War, Hermosillo, 31 March 1847. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/23/68/00002-00004. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Tepic, 30 January 1847.

father of the Porfirian Finance Minister of the same name, to provide weapons, munitions, uniforms and food by sea from Acapulco.³⁷ Unfortunately these supplies would never reach the beleaguered Californians. Negotiations for the deal dragged on for nearly 4 months between September and December. Consequently, the ship sent by Limantour from Acapulco did not arrive until 29 January 1847. By that point the United States had managed to recapture Los Angeles.³⁸

Bustamante left Mexico City in December 1846. He passed through Querétaro and Guadalajara before arriving in Tepic, near the port of San Blas, at the end of January 1847. He appears to have made preparations to march to the Sinaloa port of Mazatlán³⁹ and was probably planning to sail for California within the next month. However, things would not go according to plan. A rebellion in Mazatlán against the Santa Anna government ruled out this port as a base for Bustamante.⁴⁰ The expedition also suffered from a severe lack of supplies and men. From the very moment of his arrival in Tepic, Bustamante refused to continue his march upon Mazatlán until reinforcements were sent, pointing out that the men he commanded were not nearly enough to mount a proper defence against the U.S. troops, or to bring the rebels in the port under his command.⁴¹ Although orders were issued from central government requiring these troops and arms be sent from the surrounding states of Jalisco and Guanajuato, the supplies never arrived as neither the Commander Generals of Jalisco nor Guanajuato were prepared to weaken their own states' defence in favour sending an army to defend Sonora and Sinaloa.⁴² Worse still, it appeared that the central

³⁷ AGNCM. Notaría: Manuel Orihuela, vol. 18, ff. 72-77. The contract is dated, 2 December 1846.

³⁸ Jan Bazant, "El general Anastasio Bustamante y Joseph Yves Limantour. Crónica de un negocio, 1846-1847," *Historia Mexicana* 30: 4 (1980), pp.649-650.

³⁹ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2199/00161. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Mexico City, 13 December 1846. Bustamante asked that the General Commanders of Querétaro, Jalisco and Guanajuato be ordered to facilitate supplies to his Division to aid his march from the capital 'hasta Mazatlán.'

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2368/00013-00014. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Mexico City, 27 January 1847.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2368/0053, 0092, 0029 and 0023. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Tepic, February 2, 6, 13 and 14 February. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2478/00067. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Tepic, 20 April 1847.

⁴² *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2478/54. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Tepic, 15 April 1847.

government had decided to abandon the West to its fate. In March a circular was sent to all Commander Generals informing them that the National Guard of their states should be ready to assist the Generals in Chief of the Eastern and Northern Divisions, should these men be required. No mention was made of the Western Division.⁴³ In April the government informed Bustamante that they would not be able to send any troops to man any new expedition to California in the near future as all their resources were currently engaged in Veracruz.⁴⁴ It is little wonder that by this time Bustamante was disillusioned with his position and despaired of the possible influence he could have on the outcome of the war. On 15 April he resigned his command. He warned the Minister of War that if no new General were sent with the necessary supplies, all the Western states, including Jalisco, were under severe danger of occupation by the United States.⁴⁵ Bustamante's resignation was not accepted and he continued in this largely useless role throughout the summer months, unable to pacify Mazatlán or defend Sinaloa or Sonora from his base in Tepic.⁴⁶

Once Mexico City had been captured by the United States and the Supreme Government had transferred to Querétaro, Bustamante was ordered to march to that city to receive new orders.⁴⁷ Here he was appointed as head of the Reserve Army and later Commander General of Guanajuato. He was also charged with the protection of Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí and Michoacán from the invaders. It is unclear what exactly he did in the first few months of this appointment, although a year later the *santanista* newspaper *La Palanca* would claim his aim was to bring together an army

⁴³ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2478/0069-0070. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Tepic, 10 April 1847.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2478/0046. Supreme Government to Bustamante, Mexico City, 8 April 1847.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2478/00054-00055. Anastasio Bustamante to the Minister of War, Tepic, 15 April 1847.

⁴⁶ This is not to say that he did not try. He continued to make appeals for reinforcements and supplies throughout the summer and sent his second in command, Teófilo Romero, to Mazatlán to try and bring the port back under government control. He had no success. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2654/00006-00007. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Silao, 15 August 1847, and *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2654/00009-00010. Teófilo Romero to Bustamante, Cuilacan, 28 July 1847.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2697/00001. The Supreme Government to Bustamante, Toluca, 28 September 1847.

of anti-*santanistas* for unspecified purposes.⁴⁸ In terms of concrete evidence we only have two definite records of his actions. The first is that in December he submitted a plan to central government outlining the measures he thought most effective to prevent an advance by U.S. troops upon Querétaro from Mexico City. This plan proposed that groups of soldiers should be organised around key positions between the capital and Querétaro, such as Huichapan, Tula and San Juan del Río. These units should operate like guerrilla bands, launching surprise attacks upon the marching columns of the enemy before disappearing into the countryside to regroup.⁴⁹ This was the strategy the Spanish had employed against the Napoleonic invaders in the early part of the century. The insurgents had used the same tactics successfully against Bustamante's comrades in the Royalist Army. However, Bustamante's plan would never be necessary. The U.S. army did not attempt to over-stretch itself by pushing North from the capital. Instead, peace negotiations were begun between the Mexican government and the U.S. commanders in January 1848. The treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed on 2 February. In response to the government's negotiation with the enemy, the Vice-Governor of San Luis Potosí, Mariano Ávila, launched a *pronunciamiento* against the Querétaro government. This plan was in favour of declaring San Luis Potosí an independent state. It called upon the other states to join with it in confederation in order to continue the war with the United States.⁵⁰ Ávila wrote to General Bustamante, who was currently in charge of military operations in the state, to invite him to lead the rebellion.⁵¹ However, Bustamante declined to support him. He explained to the Vice-Governor that his plan could only help the U.S. cause, as it would lead the Republic into more chaos.⁵² It seems that, even though the

⁴⁸ *La Palanca*, 19 October 1848.

⁴⁹ SDN:AH XI/481.3/2687/00009-00013. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Guanajuato, 24 December 1847.

⁵⁰ *El Monitor Republicano*, 23 January 1848, includes the plan.

⁵¹ Mariano Ávila to Bustamante, San Luis Potosí, 16 January 1848, in *ibid.*

⁵² Bustamante to Ávila, Guanajuato, 18 January 1848, in *ibid.*

General elaborated military strategies with the aim of continuing the war, he also generally supported the peace negotiations undertaken by the moderate government in Querétaro.

D: The Rebellion of the Sierra Gorda (1847-1849): Origins and Aims

The year 1848 would mark the beginning of General Bustamante's last military campaign: the persecution of the rebels of the Sierra Gorda. This campaign would be interrupted by various other crises, such as the *pronunciamiento* of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga in June 1848, but would undoubtedly occupy the majority of the General's time between 1848 and 1849. It is highly ironic that the persecution of the rebels of the Sierra, whose revolt was characterised by the sacking of ranches and haciendas, the plunder of villages and the murder of local landowners and the wealthy, should be Bustamante's final campaign. In this way his military career can be seen to have turned in a full circle, as he ended his days in much the same way as he began them: pursuing small bands of what he described as *canalla*, in order to restore the rule of law and the authority of what he believed to be the legitimate government. This section will examine the origins and aims of the revolt, while the following section will investigate Bustamante's role in pacifying the region.

The Sierra Gorda forms part of the Sierra Madre Oriental in the centre of Mexico. It is a mountainous region of about 200 square kilometres, situated between the modern day states of Guanajuato, Querétaro and Hidalgo at about 2,000 metres above sea-level.⁵³ It was originally populated by three nomadic tribes, called *pames*, *ximpeces* and *jonaces* by the Spanish. Colonists first arrived in the Sierra in the

⁵³ Map 3 shows the extension of the Sierra Gorda, now called the Sierra de Querétaro. For an in depth description of the geography of the Sierra Gorda, see María Elena Galaviz de Capdevielle, "Descripción y pacificación de la Sierra Gorda," *Estudios de Historia Novohispana* 4 (1971), pp. 115-117.


sixteenth-century, and tensions arose almost immediately between the indigenous people and the settlers. Sporadic rebellions by the *serrano* people against the colonists flared up throughout the Colonial period. The disputes mainly concentrated upon land, which the *serranos* believed was being stolen from them by the colonists.⁵⁴ Immediately after the insurgency, the region enjoyed a period of relative calm. This was rudely shattered in 1847, when a new revolt broke out in the small village of San Juan de Xichú in the heart of the Sierra. It appears to have been sparked off by a personal feud between the *Alcalde Mayor* of Xichú, José María Ramírez and a local family, the Chaires. The Chaires were members of the local elite. One of their senior figures, Miguel Chaire, was the commander of the local voluntary force of *auxiliares*, and he was in competition with the *Alcalde* for political control in Xichú. In August of 1847 the *Alcalde* arrested one of Miguel Chaire's sons, Francisco, who had deserted from the army. On 1 September, when Francisco was being escorted to the nearby town of San Luis de la Paz, a group of 30 armed men led by his brother, Guadalupe, managed to rescue him. However, in the following chase, Guadalupe and a few other men were captured and imprisoned in Xichú. Later that evening the same band of men stormed the village jail, rescued Guadalupe and his accomplices and destroyed the mayor's office. The *Alcalde* himself fled to San Miguel de Allende. These then returned to the hacienda of Palmillas (probably the property of the Chaires), where in a very short period of time they managed to bring together a group of 300 armed men. The situation was soon diffused by Manuel Ignacio Caballero, the Chief of the Department of San Miguel Allende. With the help of Miguel Chaire, he persuaded the men at Palmillas to return to their homes. According to Caballero, this might have been the end of it, but for the petty behaviour of the *Alcalde* of Xichú. The *Alcalde*

⁵⁴ For more information concerning the Sierra Gorda during the Colony see, Galaviz de Capdevielle, "Descripción y pacificación de la Sierra Gorda," pp. 118-137; Carmen Vázquez Mantecón, "Espacio social y crisis política: La Sierra Gorda, 1850-1855," *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 9:1 (1993), p. 51; and John Tutino, *From Insurrection to Revolution in Mexico. Social Bases of Agrarian Violence, 1750-1940* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 199-201.

Map Three: The Sierra Gorda



Approximate area
of the Sierra Gorda



State
boundaries

[This map is not to scale.]

(Sources: www.nationalgeographic.com and Galaviz de Capdevielle, "Descripción y pacificación de la Sierra Gorda.")

began to try and exact revenge on those who had humiliated him, making scores of unnecessary and unjustifiable arrests amongst the residents of Xichú. This increased the mayor's unpopularity and created a volatile atmosphere in the village and its surroundings.⁵⁵

Following the events of September 1847 small groups of armed men began to appear in the hills around Xichú. There was no shortage of men ready to take up arms against the authorities in the Sierra, as had already been aptly proven by the ease with which the Chaire family had organised a group of 300 men after the arrest of Guadalupe. The leadership of the rebels in the Sierra Gorda had been taken up in October by another army deserter, Eleutorio Quiroz. The Chaires continued to support the rebels for a further year until they were captured by Bustamante's troops in February 1849.⁵⁶ The rebels soon began to terrorise the settlements around and about Xichú with their robberies and violence. According to Muñoz Ledo, it should have been possible to defeat these forces quite easily with the right number of soldiers. Unfortunately the soldiers sent by the state of Guanajuato were certainly not enough and during November and December the size and power of the rebels grew enormously until:

Hacia fines de diciembre de 1847, la revolución había tomado un carácter alarmante: masas numerosas de hombres bien montados y armados, dirigidos por individuos de la más baja extracción, pero famosos por sus crímenes se entregaban en distintos puntos de la Sierra, a toda especie de excesos: robaban haciendas, asaltaban las poblaciones, ejerciendo sobre sus moradores actos de personal venganza, saqueaban e incendiaban las habitaciones, vivían verdaderamente sobre el país.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ These details are taken from the Archivo General del Gobierno del Estado de Guanajuato (henceforth referred to as AGGEG) Fondo del Gobierno, Serie de Tranquilidad Pública: CI-208-E2; Octaviano Muñoz Ledo, *Memoria del Gobierno del Estado de Guanajuato presentada a su Honorable Legislatura en 1ro de Enero de 1852* (Mexico City: Imprenta de Lara, 1852); LAF 796, O.L.A, *Sublevación en la Sierra*, (San Luis Potosí: n.p., 1849); and *El Siglo XIX*, 7 May 1849.

⁵⁶ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2916/00170. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Querétaro, 10 February 1849.

⁵⁷ Muñoz Ledo, *Memoria del Gobierno del Estado de Guanajuato*, p. 68.

By January the residents of Xichú and surrounding settlements had fled to the nearby town of Casas Viejas⁵⁸, and it was feared that the rebels were now so strong as to be a real threat to the town of San Luis de la Paz, which was situated on the outskirts of the mountains of the Sierra⁵⁹.

The governor of Guanajuato, Octaviano Muñoz Ledo, believed that the main reason for this was the poverty and discontent that existed amongst the indigenous population, although he also pointed out that these local men were quickly joined by a steady stream of deserters from the army, who in their already lawless condition were attracted to a way of life that would provide for their daily needs and would prevent them from being arrested. The anonymous chronicler, O.L.A., specifies that the residents in and around Xichú were generally disgusted with 'las contribuciones, alcabalas, derechos parroquiales, estanco de tabaco y la formación de las levas.'⁶⁰ For this reason they were ready to ally themselves with a rebellion. This discontent was not new. In 1844 a group of men had attacked the *ayuntamiento* in Xichú in protest over the new taxes introduced to finance a war with Texas.⁶¹ Even so, the ideas that motivated the men in the Sierra Gorda to take up arms can never really be known, as no document appears to exist in which Quiroz or anyone else amongst his band sets forth a reasoned argument or explanation. The plan of Rioverde, held by many to outline the wishes of the rebels, was not written by Quiroz. It was penned by a government official of Rioverde, Manuel Verástegui, and only signed by the rebel leader. This plan called for the expropriation and redistribution of untitled hacienda land among the people of the Sierra; the suppression of free labour ('feina') upon estate

⁵⁸ AGGEG, Fondo del Gobierno, Serie de Tranquilidad Pública CI-216-E26. Manuel Ignacio Caballero to the Secretary of the Governor of the State of Guanajuato, Allende, 2 January 1848.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Caballero to the Secretary of the Governor of the State of Guanajuato, Allende, 1 January 1848.

⁶⁰ O.L.A., *Sublevación en la Sierra*, p. 4.

⁶¹ *El Siglo XIX*, 12 May 1849.

lands; and demanded that hacienda tenants only be charged moderate rent by their landlords. It also insisted that the *serranos* in Quiroz's band be henceforth exempted from all taxes and parish duties. Quiroz was to receive a 100 peso monthly pension and his fellow leaders smaller pensions.⁶²

Quiroz and Verástegui were old acquaintances. The Verástegui family owned most of the haciendas in Rioverde. Quiroz had worked as a tenant farmer in that area before the war with the United States. Coincidentally or not, one of the first properties that the *serranos* had attacked in September 1847, the hacienda Albercas in Rioverde, was administered by the Verástegui family. While in the hacienda, Quiroz also recruited many of the tenant farmers to join his band. These facts had led some to accuse Manuel Verástegui, now the Prefect of Rioverde, of being in league with Quiroz. Whether this was true or not, it appears that the Verástegui clan did wish to exploit the rebellion to their own advantage. Manuel's uncle, Paulo Verástegui, was elected as the President of the State Congress in 1847 and was involved a rebellion against the Governor, Ramón Aldame in January 1848. He gained support for his revolt amongst the elites by pointing to the rebel unrest in the Sierra as an example of the social dissolution that was being provoked by Aldame's Governorship.⁶³

However, by 1849 the Verásteguis were regretting their part in the dismissal of Aldame. The new Governor, Julian de los Reyes, did not prove to be helpful for their interests. He introduced a fiscal policy that seemed to favour the merchants in Mexico City and Monterrey rather than those in San Luis Potosí. He did not reward the family for their support against Aldame, and instead, showered favours upon the Verásteguis' rival in San Luis, the Barragán family. Manuel Verástegui was dismissed as Prefect of

⁶² "El plan político y eminente social: proclamado en Rioverde por el Ejército Regenerador de Sierra Gorda," (14 March 1849), in Berta Ulloa and Joel Hernández Santiago (eds.), *Planes en la nación mexicana* (Mexico City: Senado de la República/El Colegio de México, 1987), vol. 4, p. 380.

⁶³ Barbara Corbett, 'La política potosina y la guerra con Estados Unidos,' in Josefina Zoraida Vázquez (ed.), *México al tiempo de su guerra con Estados Unidos*, (Mexico: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores/Colegio de México/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997), p. 473.

Rioverde and José María Barragán was named as Military Commander and General Treasurer of the state. Therefore it appears that when the *serranos* occupied Rioverde in March 1849, Manuel Verástegui saw his chance to undermine the Governor and strengthen his family's position. Not only did he write the 'Plan político' on behalf of Quiroz, but he also took up nominal leadership of the rebellion and offered to act as negotiator between the rebel forces and the federal government. The influence of Verástegui on the plan is clear; for, aside from calling for agrarian reform, the plan also demands that de los Reyes be replaced.⁶⁴

Quiroz claimed during his later trial that he was illiterate and had merely signed unquestioning the documents with which Verástegui had often presented him.⁶⁵ This assertion is questionable, considering the circumstances in which it was made. Even so, it does appear that within the ranks of the *serranos* there was much disquiet on the subject of Verástegui's involvement in the revolt and the peace negotiations he initiated. In fact, while negotiations were being undertaken the *serranos* continued to attack ranches and haciendas. The treaty drawn up in May 1849, promised Quiroz the military command of Xichú and a monthly pension of 100 pesos; it committed the government to introducing legislation which would better the condition of the hacienda labourer; and promised that the Church would be encouraged to reduce the parish duties demanded in the Sierra.⁶⁶ Quiroz continually refused to verify this agreement, probably because of opposition amongst his men. In June, Verástegui informed Bustamante that Quiroz was preparing to fight his fellow *serrano* leader, Juan Ramírez, because 'lo ha tratado de traidor entre la gente que forma su gavilla,

⁶⁴ 'El plan político y eminente social: proclamado en Rioverde por el Ejército Regenerador de Sierra Gorda,' p. 380. Article three.

⁶⁵ SDN: AH XI/481.3/3069/00033. *Testimonio de la declaracion tomada al cabecilla de los sublevados de la Sierra, Eleutorio Quiroz, por el fiscal capitan de la Guardia Nacional de Querétaro D. Luis G. Arranachera, en Peñamiller a tres de octubre pasado*. Dated, 3 October 1849. Quiroz was about to be executed.

⁶⁶ *El Monitor Republicano*, 20 May 1849.

por haber iniciado [...] las mencionadas negociaciones de la paz.”⁶⁷ The result of this confrontation was that the *serranos* abandoned their relationship with Verástegui. They made no more effort to communicate with Bustamante or the government. In order to underline this definite break, on leaving Rioverde in June, Quiroz ordered that the San Diego hacienda, property of Paulo Verástegui, be burnt.⁶⁸

Such behaviour by Quiroz and his fellow rebels certainly gives weight to the belief, widely held at the time by many observers, that their uprising had no political or social motivations whatsoever. They seemed ready to join any uprising against the government. During Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga’s revolt in Guanajuato during June and July 1848, the rebels of the Sierra Gorda appeared to back his *pronunciamiento*. There were very strong rumours at the time that the *serranos* had entered Guanajuato on the request of Paredes and Manuel Doblado, who had been appointed Governor of the state at Paredes’ instigation.⁶⁹ All in all, Quiroz’s men had all the appearance of thugs for hire. According to *El Monitor Republicano*, Quiroz and his accomplices were nothing but groups of bandits and robbers, whose movement lacked a political end, and whose only objective was robbery and murder.⁷⁰ Ledo, in his *Memoria* of 1852, expresses a similar point of view. He points out that although many of the rebels were members of the discontented indigenous population, a large part of them was made up army deserters, who used robbery, violence and intimidation to provide for their needs and to escape arrest.⁷¹

Even so, it does seem that the agrarian reform demanded by the ‘Plan político’ did reflect the aims of the *serranos*. In the first place, the agrarian reform it proposed echoed the conflict for land that had raged between the indigenous population of the Sierra and the immigrant settlers since colonial times. Secondly, it reflects the opinion

⁶⁷ Bustamante to the Minister of War, Casas Viejas, 11 June 1849, in *ibid.*, 7 July 1849.

⁶⁸ Corbett, ‘La política potosina y la guerra con Estados Unidos,’ p. 478.

⁶⁹ *El Siglo XIX*, 19 June 1848. *El Monitor Republicano*, 25, 29 June, 8 and 11 July 1848.

⁷⁰ *El Monitor Republicano*, 22 April 1849.

⁷¹ Muñoz Ledo, *Memoria del Gobierno del Estado de Guanajuato...1852*, p.67.

of the revolt held by those had close contact with the rebels. Colonel Valentín Cruz, who fought throughout the conflict, defined the *serranos'* rebellion as 'una revolución que proclama independencia absoluta de toda autoridad y todo orden, abolición de toda clase de contribuciones y repartición de tierras.'⁷² Manuel Verástegui described it as 'una guerra [...] del pobre contra el rico,' a fight against the misery inflicted upon them by the hacienda system.⁷³ Finally, the plan also fits into the later development of rebellion in the Sierra during the following forty years. The most obvious point of comparison here is the 'Plan Socialista,' issued in 1879. This proposed the same expropriation and distribution of hacienda land and demanded the abolition of debt peonage, amongst other things.⁷⁴ The problem for Quiroz and his followers was simply that their lack of education and literacy denied them the opportunity to express their ideas independently. They were therefore reliant upon the mediation of others, who sought to exploit their protest for their own ends.

E: The Rebellion in the Sierra Gorda and the Revolt of Paredes y Arrillaga: The Military Response (1848-1849)

General Bustamante was charged with the suppression of the rebels in the Sierra Gorda in March 1848. On 24 March he issued a proclamation from Silao to the forces of the Reserve Army that were to accompany him, exhorting their loyalty and support in the re-establishment of law and order in the territory of the Sierra.⁷⁵ The situation was now quite serious, as the rebels had begun to menace towns and villages

⁷² Valentín Cruz to the Minister of War, Hacienda de Tapanco, 30 July 1848, in *El Siglo XIX*, 1 April 1849.

⁷³ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2936/00012. Verástegui to General Romulo Díaz de la Vega, Alaquines, 1 April 1849.

⁷⁴ Gastón García Cantú, *El socialismo en México. Siglo XIX*, (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1980), pp. 66-68.

⁷⁵ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2768/00003-00004. *El General en Jefe del Ejército de Reserva a sus subordinados*, Silao, 24 March 1848.

outside the Sierra. In February 1848 the town of San Luis de la Paz, which had felt exposed to the rebels since January, began now to fearfully construct defences against an expected attack.⁷⁶ This came on 12 March.⁷⁷ Two days earlier, one of the few officers sent into the Sierra, General Manuel Romero was killed in a skirmish with the *serranos* near Peñamiller and Tolimán.⁷⁸ However, Bustamante did not seem in any rush to enter the Sierra. Instead he marched as far as Dolores Hidalgo, where he set up his headquarters. One observer commented 'los expropiadores de la Sierra siguen cometiendo depredaciones [...]; entretanto Dn. A. come huevos tranquilo en Dolores.'⁷⁹ Meanwhile, another attack was made on San Luis de la Paz⁸⁰ and many ranches in the surrounding of Casas Viejas were pillaged.⁸¹

Bustamante's reticence to march into the Sierra, or at least to one of the towns on its outskirts, such as San Luis de la Paz or San José de Iturbide, seems to be extremely negligent. However, it may be that the General's sights were not fixed simply upon the suppression of the *serranos*. He probably also wished to contain the threat posed to the government by Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, who had recently returned from exile and was living in San Luis Potosí. It was generally believed that he had returned to instigate a *pronunciamiento* and that his motive for staying in San Luis Potosí was to make the necessary arrangements to bring about this rebellion.⁸² According to a government official sent to San Luis assess the situation, things were perilous. He reported in March that those involved in the *pronunciamiento* begun in

⁷⁶ AGGEG Fondo de Gobierno, Serie de Tranquilidad Pública CI-216-E26. Caballero to the Secretary of the Governor of Guanajuato, San Miguel de Allende, 27 February 1848.

⁷⁷ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2901/00007. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Guanajuato, 19 March 1848.

⁷⁸ SDN: AH XI/481.2/2901/00023. Francisco de Viellesca to the Minister of War, Querétaro, 13 March 1848.

⁷⁹ Correspondence of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin (henceforth referred to as CMPA), wallet 148, no. 54. J. Anno Portillo to Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, San Luis, 26 April 1848. .

⁸⁰ AGGEG Fondo de Gobierno, Serie de Tranquilidad Pública CI-216-E26. Caballero to the Secretary of the Governor of Guanajuato, San Miguel de Allende, 4 April 1848.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Caballero to the Secretary of the Governor of Guanajuato, San Miguel de Allende, 20 April 1848.

⁸² *El Monitor Republicano*, 10, 18, 20 and 31 March 1848.

January by the Vice-Governor of San Luis, Mariano Ávila, had still not been punished. He wrote that the state was still without a congress and that, in the east of the territory, there were 'numerosas partidas de bandidos [...] recorren los campos y las pequeñas poblaciones, cometiendo robos y desórdenes, sin que haya bastante fuerza para reprimirlos.'⁸³ He believed that a rebellion begun on the behalf of Paredes or Santa Anna in San Luis would be very likely to flourish in such conditions.⁸⁴ It is likely, therefore, that the government was a good deal more concerned with Paredes y Arrillaga's plans, than it was with a localised indigenous rebellion in the Sierra. A further *pronunciamiento* could only weaken the Republic further and leave her completely defenceless against any U.S. attempt to invade the entire nation. It seems that Bustamante had dual instructions to try and repress both these threats. He was expected in San Luis Potosí anytime from the end of March by both general observers and Paredes y Arrillaga's spies.⁸⁵ Yet, he made no move until June. Instead, he remained in Dolores Hidalgo, a point between both the capital of San Luis Potosí and Sierra. It appears he was hedging his bets, maintaining a close eye on the two trouble spots without committing himself to either.

In the event, he was unable to deal with either problem adequately. He directed a very small operation against the rebels in the Sierra between March and June without any discernible success. On 1 June, the government's worst fears were realised. Father Jarauta (an ally of Paredes y Arrillaga) issued a revolutionary plan in Lagos. He called for the overthrow of the government, a return to state autonomy and the continuation of the fight against the United States.⁸⁶ The government immediately appointed

⁸³ As the east of the State of San Luis Potosí is partly taken up by the mountains of the Sierra Gorda, it is probable that these groups of outlaws were in fact the rebellious *serranos*.

⁸⁴ Francisco Estrada to the Minister of Interior and Exterior Relations, Querétaro, 15 March 1848, in *El Monitor Republicano*, 31 March 1848.

⁸⁵ *El Monitor Republicano*, 31 March 1848. CMLA wallet 148 no. 47. Eusebio Anaya to Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, Guanajuato, 27 March 1848.

⁸⁶ Plan of Padre Jarauta, Lagos, 1 June 1848, in Daniel Molina Álvarez, *La pasión del padre Jarauta* (Mexico City: Gobierno de la Ciudad de México, 1999), pp. 144-145.

Bustamante as Chief of Operations against Jarauta. He was given the authority to co-ordinate a response to the rebellion across the states of Guanajuato, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Jalisco and Zacatecas.⁸⁷ He was removed from the command of the Reserve Army and given control of a new division: the eponymously named *División Bustamante*. He immediately sent a section of his soldiers and men from the St. Patrick Brigade to Lagos to aid General Miñón who had already begun to besiege Jarauta's position.⁸⁸ Jarauta escaped Lagos on 10 June and headed for Guanajuato, where he met with Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga. The two men captured the state capital on 15 June and issued a new plan.⁸⁹ The newly formed *División Bustamante* was now ordered to march upon Guanajuato. Before heading for the capital, Bustamante organised his force first in Silao. By 29 June he could count on a force of three thousand, under the command of himself and Generals Cortázar and Miñón.⁹⁰ On 7 July he moved his headquarters to Márfil, on the outskirts of Guanajuato to begin his operations against the rebels.⁹¹

By all accounts, Bustamante's troops far outnumbered those at Paredes y Arrillaga's disposal. He and Jarauta had taken Guanajuato on 15 June with 400 men and since then, had managed to recruit another 200.⁹² The greater part of these recruits, however, was rumoured to be local *léperos*, who had been given weapons by Paredes y Arrillaga's ally, the state deputy and future Governor: Manuel Doblado.⁹³ It was also widely believed that the rebels from the Sierra Gorda had also entered Guanajuato at the request of the *pronunciados*.⁹⁴ As a result of this, many army

⁸⁷ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2803/00011. The Minister of War to Bustamante, Mexico City, 15 June 1848.

⁸⁸ *El Monitor Republicano*, 16 June 1848.

⁸⁹ *El Siglo XIX*, 19 June 1848. This plan contained the same demands as the Plan of Lagos.

⁹⁰ *El Monitor Republicano*, 3 July 1848.

⁹¹ Bustamante to the Minister of War, General Barracks at Márfil, 7 July 1848, in *El Monitor Republicano*, supplement to the edition of 10 July 1848.

⁹² *El Siglo XIX*, 19 June 1848.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 19 June 1848, *El Monitor Republicano*, 27 June 1848 and SDN: AH XI/481.3/2803/00512. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Silao, 20 June 1848. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/280300686. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Silao, 1 July 1848. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2803/00791. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Márfil, 11 July 1848.

⁹⁴ *El Monitor Republicano*, 25, 29 June, 11 and 18 July 1848.

officers who had originally supported Paredes y Arrillaga began to change their mind and made attempts to bargain with Bustamante for their impunity.⁹⁵

However, despite this obvious numeric superiority, Bustamante's troops did not put down the rebellion quickly. In fact, it took his Division eleven days from arriving in Márfil to capture Guanajuato, much to the disgust of the newspapers in Mexico City and the trapped residents of Guanajuato. One such resident, the future Governor of Guanajuato, Octaviano Muñoz Ledo, told Mariano Riva Palacio that each time Bustamante delayed his attack the rebels became more powerful. He feared that Bustamante would eventually be defeated.⁹⁶ An anonymous correspondent of *El Siglo XIX* described Bustamante's plan as appearing to be 'aburrir a la tropa trayéndoles de cerro en cerro sin emprender un ataque formal.'⁹⁷ However, it would be quite wrong to say that Bustamante and his men did nothing during these eleven days. Many skirmishes took place between the two sets of forces and Bustamante's men captured a number of strategic positions, such as the village of Valenciana.⁹⁸ The long awaited final attack eventually came on 18 July and Guanajuato was quickly captured. Father Jarauta, who had been fighting on the front-line, was caught and shot the next day.⁹⁹ Paredes y Arrillaga however, managed to make an escape and was rumoured to have headed for the Sierra, seeking the protection of Quiroz and his men.¹⁰⁰

The support that Paredes y Arrillaga had received from the *léperos* and *serranos* convinced the government that a firm hand was needed to deal with the captured rebels. Bustamante was ordered to court martial each suspected rebel within twenty-four hours of their capture and to immediately impose the court's sentence (which would be execution in this case). There was to be no use of the customary

⁹⁵ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2803/00655. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Silao, 27 June 1848.

⁹⁶ MRPA no. 2779. Octaviano Muñoz Ledo to Mariano Riva Palacio, Guanajuato, 8 July 1848.

⁹⁷ *El Siglo XIX*, 17 July 1848.

⁹⁸ *El Monitor Republicano*, 18 July 1848.

⁹⁹ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2803/00517. A certification of the arrest and execution of Jarauta signed by General José López Uruga and dated 19 July 1848.

¹⁰⁰ *El Monitor Republicano*, 9 August 1848.

amnesty for the captured officers and men.¹⁰¹ The scenes of Guanajuato in 1848 forcibly reminded Bustamante of similar events that had engulfed the state capital thirty-eight years previously (the taking of the Alhóndiga in Guanajuato by the insurgents in 1810) and he was determined to prevent a repeat of the terrible destruction that had then occurred.¹⁰² In his opinion:

La absoluta impunidad [...] de diversas maneras que han obtenido por un largo tiempo los revolucionarios, si bien ha dado margen a la escandalosa repetición de las asonadas militares, también ha sido para que muchos por insensatos más que por malicia se adhieran, a ciegas, por decirlo así, a cualquier plan que le propone el primer audaz que por fines innobles tiene la hostilidad propia para alucinar a los incautos.¹⁰³

However, it must be pointed out that Bustamante's support for the execution of the Guanajuato rebels, both officers and soldiers, was not completely all-inclusive. He had Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga's ally, Father Jarauta, summarily shot, but he did not call for Paredes y Arrillaga's execution. In fact, he would later support moves to grant the fugitive General an amnesty.¹⁰⁴ It seems that Bustamante's attitude towards execution had changed little since 1831. He believed that executing rebels was the only way to prevent future revolts, unless the rebel was personally known to him. Then, as in the cases of Vicente Guerrero and Paredes y Arrillaga, he was unwilling to advocate the death penalty.

The generally merciless approach to punishing the rebels in Guanajuato would have unpleasant consequences for Bustamante. One rebel who was executed for his part in Paredes y Arrillaga's rebellion, Captain Ramón Carrera, obviously had powerful

¹⁰¹ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2803/00017. *Boletín de Noticias*. Guanajuato, 3 July 1848. The Minister of War to the Commander General of Guanajuato, 17 June 1848. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2803/00795. Minister of War to Bustamante, Mexico City 21 July 1848.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2803/00003-00004. *El Correo Nacional*, 7 September 1848. Bustamante to the Minister of War, 4 August 1848.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2803/00023. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Guanajuato, 24 July 1848.

¹⁰⁴ AHG: *Archivo Particular del sr. licenciado D. Manuel Doblado*, no. 48. Bustamante to Nicolás Moral, Querétaro, 9 February 1849.

friends in Guanajuato. When his sentence was learnt, various delegations composed of the most important residents of the city, dignitaries from the town council, members of the clergy and a number of women visited Bustamante to ask that his sentence be delayed until the government decided to offer amnesty to those captured. Bustamante was disgusted by these efforts and he ordered that the execution of Carrera go ahead as planned.¹⁰⁵ However, this was not the end of the matter. The supporters of Carrera now accused Bustamante of not giving him the appropriate form of court martial, which his rank of officer required.¹⁰⁶ They tried to prosecute him for the unlawful execution of Carrera. An inquiry into the circumstances of Carrera's death was conducted by the Supreme Tribunal of War. This case dragged on throughout the rest of Bustamante's natural life and was only closed at his death, as the documents surrounding the case were never found.¹⁰⁷

As can be imagined, during the Paredes' uprising the rebellion in the Sierra Gorda had gone from strength to strength. If before the uprising their activities had mostly been confined, with a few notable exceptions, to the centre of the Sierra, now these were being felt 'por mucha parte de Guanajuato, Querétaro, y principalmente en el de San Luis.'¹⁰⁸ According to Colonel Cruz, during this time, the towns of Nuevo Gamotes, Lagunillas, Rioverde and La Palma had been sacked along with others in the neighbouring part of the Huasteca (in the state of Hidalgo). Countless haciendas and ranches in the area had been destroyed and their owners made bankrupt. Whole villages had adhered to the *serranos*, and it was impossible to calculate their exact

¹⁰⁵ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2803/00023. Bustamante to the Minister of War, 24 July 1848.

¹⁰⁶ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00337. Díaz Torres to the Supreme Tribunal of War and Marine, Mexico City, 29 September 1848.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, XI/III/1-235/1-31/00404-00405. Escudero to the Supreme Tribunal of War, 24 February 1853.

¹⁰⁸ Cruz to the Minister of War, Hacienda de Tapanaco, 30 July 1848, in *El Siglo XIX*, 14 August 1848.

number. His was the only force in the Sierra itself, and its number was sadly incapable of making any impression upon the rebels.¹⁰⁹

It did not appear that the situation could soon be remedied. In Guanajuato, Bustamante complained that his troops had been reduced to uselessness by widespread desertion, a lack of food and clothing, and above all an extreme want of arms. He believed it hopeless to send his men out on any campaign when no money existed even to pay their salaries. He refused to send troops into the Sierra until he received some money with which to finance such an expedition.¹¹⁰ Therefore, Cruz was left to his own devices in the Sierra throughout the months of August and September. In late September, the Commander General of Querétaro informed the Minister of War that he had devised a plan for the pacification of the Sierra Gorda. He explained that he had begun negotiations with Tomás Mejía, a rebel leader, who had formerly been an ally of Paredes y Arrillaga. He told the Minister that he had every confidence that he could persuade Mejía to accept a government amnesty and to join his own troops. Jarero proposed to set up a meeting with Mejía in the heart of the Sierra, preferably in Peñamiller or Tolimán. He hoped that once Mejía had decided to leave the *serranos*, he and Jarero could lead a new expedition against the rebels from this central position. To facilitate this scheme he asked the government for extra munitions and arms to be sent for his troops in Querétaro. The government refused, telling him that he must arm the expedition with those arms that he already had.¹¹¹ Jarero's plan was initially successful. Mejía accepted a government amnesty almost immediately after meeting with Jarero in Tolimán and quickly decided to join his troops.¹¹² However Jarero was

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2803/00220-00221. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Guanajuato, 25 August 1848.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2874/00047-00049. José María Jarero to the Minister of War, Querétaro, 29 September 1848.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2874/00027. Jarero to the Minister of War, San Pedro de Toliman, 9 October 1848.

unable to launch his planned expedition from his base in Toluca. As usual, he was crippled by a lack of supplies and money.

Meanwhile, the government had new plans for Bustamante. It wanted him to leave Guanajuato and lead his division to Tampico, which it believed was under threat of a U.S. invasion.¹¹³ Bustamante, suffering from acute rheumatic pains, asked to be excused from this commission. He pleaded that he be allowed a temporary leave of absence instead; stating he would like to ease his condition with a visit to the thermal baths in Guanajuato or Querétaro.¹¹⁴ In response, the government proceeded to reappoint him as the Commander General of Guanajuato. It extended his authority to cover the states of Jalisco, San Luis Potosí, Querétaro and Zacatecas and charged him with the pacification of the Sierra Gorda. He was told that, if he completed this mission, his leave of absence would be approved.¹¹⁵ Bustamante declared that he would only undertake the commission, provided that new troops were immediately sent to aid him. He warned the government that if these men were not sent, he would not make himself responsible for maintaining order in the state and its surroundings, and much less for carrying out any orders relative to the pacification of the Sierra.¹¹⁶

Bustamante launched a new offensive against the *serranos* in October 1848. He sent a strong force into the Sierra under the command of General José López Uruga and submitted a plan of action to the government. Bustamante's idea was to follow similar tactics to those used during the war of insurgency. He proposed to arm the *hacendados* and their *peons*, and to encourage the different haciendas to work together in mutual defence against the *serranos*. Small sections of cavalry should be sent to the various groups of haciendas to form 'secciones volantes' that would ride out in the principal roads of the Sierra keeping watch and providing an early warning

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2841/00001-00003. The Minister of War to the Governor of Tamaulipas, Mexico City, 30 September 1848.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2890/000128. Bustamante to the Minister for War, Silao, 16 October 1848.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2890/000129. The Minister of War to Bustamante, Mexico City, 21 October 1848

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2879/00074. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Silao, 19 October 1848.

system against attacks. These would be made up of both regular troops and volunteers from amongst the hacienda workers. The involvement of the *hacendados* and their workers in the defence of the Sierra was essential for two reasons. In the first place, it discouraged the tenant farmers and *peons* from joining the *serranos*. Secondly, it meant that fewer troops needed to be deployed in defence of property. As a result, more troops could be sent on missions to seek the rebels in the mountains.¹¹⁷

Bustamante had used these tactics to great effect in both the Llanos de Apan and the Bajío during the wars of insurgency. From experience he would have known that progress would be slow. He probably did not expect to complete the pacification in less than six months. After all, he and his colleagues had taken more than two years to pacify the Bajío. In the event, his campaign would not end until October 1849, when the rebel ringleaders were caught and shot. However, it is extremely likely that the pacification of the Sierra would have been completed much sooner, if certain internal military problems had not diverted attention away from the rebels in the first six months of operations. The first of these problems was caused by the fact that Bustamante initially avoided entering the Sierra to take personal control of the military operation against the rebels. This meant that there were two senior officers in the area: José María Jarero, the Commander General of Querétaro and José López Uruga, who led the forces of the *División Bustamante* in the Sierra. Bustamante had appointed General Uruga as his representative in the military operation and had given him full authority over all the troops in the Sierra. This arrangement irked Jarero, who believed that he should have been given this authority, because he was a higher ranking officer than Uruga.¹¹⁸ He declared that he would not take orders from Uruga. In response, Bustamante asked the Minister of War to order Jarero to return to Querétaro and to

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2890/00034-00035. Bustamante to the Governor of Querétaro, San Miguel de Allende, 21 November 1848. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2890/00037-00039. Bustamante to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 22 November 1848.

¹¹⁸ Jarero was a *General de Brigada*, while Uruga, the other commanding officer in the Sierra, was a rank below him as *Colonel graduado de General*.

appoint another officer to take his place. He did not want his operation to be handicapped by internal squabbling.¹¹⁹ The government did not approve of this measure. Instead, it advised Bustamante to avoid any possible trouble by sending a separate brigade into the very heart of the Sierra under the command of General Ángel Guzmán. This brigade would be made up of half the men currently under Jarero's command, half those under Uruga's control and the remaining soldiers of Colonel Cruz. Jarero and Uruga would stay in the outskirts of the territory, each working independently to provide a defensive line around the Sierra.¹²⁰ The government also wrote to Jarero clearly informing him that General Bustamante was his superior officer in these operations,¹²¹ and that his orders must be obeyed.¹²²

Unfortunately it appears that this effort on the part of the government to avoid confrontation arrived too late. Uruga and Jarero were already in position in the Sierra by the second week of November. By the time Bustamante received the above orders the situation had already become dangerous. Jarero was now refusing to obey orders that were sent to him from Generals Uruga and Bustamante. In turn, Uruga refused to obey orders emanating from General Jarero. The general result of this lack of mutual co-operation was that no progress was made against the *serranos*. In fact, on 14 November, the rebels descended en masse from the Sierra into the plains of Querétaro and Guanajuato. The village of Casa Viejas, and the neighbouring haciendas of Chichimequillas and Buenavista were sacked first, followed by the haciendas and ranches in the surroundings of San Miguel de Allende.¹²³ This was an impressive show of strength by the *serranos*, who had not before ventured so far into the plains. It was

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2890/00104-00107. Bustamante to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 6 November 1848.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2890/ 00108-00111. The Minister of War to Bustamante, Mexico City, 14 November 1848.

¹²¹ Bustamante was a *General de División*, the highest rank in the Mexican Army.

¹²² SDN: AH XI/481.3/2889/00020-00021. The Minister of War to Jarero, Mexico City, 19 November 1848.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2889/00029-00031. Cayetano Muñoz to the Minister of War, Querétaro, 16 November 1848.

generally feared that it would not be long before they would attack the city of Querétaro itself.¹²⁴ Quite unsurprisingly Uraga and Bustamante blamed this disaster on Jarero's failure to send reinforcements to Casa Viejas as ordered. Jarero claimed that Bustamante's refusal to implement a plan of attack he had submitted was the true cause of the disgrace.¹²⁵ Probably nearer the truth was the view expressed by the exasperated Francisco de Paula Mesa, an official in the state government of Querétaro. He informed Bustamante that the refusal of Uraga and Jarero to work together meant that the state troops defending the area around Casa Viejas had no idea who was in charge of their operations and were thus rendered useless.¹²⁶ All in all, it was obvious that while Jarero and Uraga refused to co-operate with each other, no progress could be made in the pacification of the Sierra. In the wake of these events, Bustamante summoned Jarero to San Miguel Allende.¹²⁷ Here he held a private interview with the Commander General, and must have managed to smooth matters sufficiently to prevent any further squabbles between Uraga and Jarero.¹²⁸

Jarero did not abandon his pretensions of power, however. Things came to a head in December when another of Bustamante's officers in the Sierra, General Rafael Vázquez, failed to obey one of Jarero's direct orders. Vázquez had been posted to command a defensive line in the plains of Querétaro by Bustamante and believed himself to be answerable to this General. Jarero did not share this view, and when Vázquez repeatedly refused to obey his order to move his barracks from the hacienda

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2890/00064. Bustamante to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 17 November 1848.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2890/00070. Uraga to Bustamante, Hacienda de Charcas, 15 November 1848. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2890/00075-00076. Bustamante to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 15 November 1848. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2889/00018-00019. Jarero to the Minister of War, Cadereyta, 17 November 1848.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2890/00029. Francisco de Paula Mesa to Bustamante, Querétaro, 20 November 1848.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2890/00012-00015. Bustamante to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 24 November 1848.

¹²⁸ Unfortunately as this was a personal meeting, no record appears to exist of how exactly Bustamante managed to calm the situation.

of Esperanza to Ajuchitlán, he accused him of insubordination.¹²⁹ He also issued a circular to all the officers in the Sierra to this effect, warning them not to follow Vázquez's orders. This was too much for Bustamante and he immediately demanded that Jarero recall this circular. He also wanted orders to be given to counter its content. When Jarero did not respond, he appealed to the government for support.¹³⁰ The government immediately wrote to Jarero, ordering him to obey Bustamante's orders.¹³¹ Still, Jarero refused to retract his orders. Finally, Bustamante accused Jarero of insubordination and ordered him to march to Mexico City to face a court martial.¹³² Jarero obeyed this order and marched for the capital. He refused, however, to drop the charge of insubordination against Vázquez. Jarero was eventually acquitted in December 1849.¹³³ However, he spent the intervening months conducting a hate campaign against General Bustamante. He wrote to the Minister of War, alleging that Bustamante was inept and unable to organise the campaign in the Sierra. He also accused Bustamante of abusing his authority by interfering in the trial of Rafael Vázquez.¹³⁴ Vázquez was not prosecuted until the Sierra was pacified. He was eventually found innocent by a military court in August 1851.¹³⁵

The fortune of the government troops in the Sierra improved considerably after the departure of Jarero. The troops of General Uraga marched to the heart of the

¹²⁹ SDN: AH XI/481.3/3059/ 00017-00018. Jarero to Bustamante, Querétaro, 15 December 1848.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, XI/ 481.3/3059/00020-00023, 00032-0034. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Querétaro, 23 and 26 December 1848.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/3059/00030. The Minister of War to Jarero, Mexico City, 30 December 1848.

¹³² *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/3059/00041-00042. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Querétaro, 4 January 1849.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/3059/00001. Quijano to the Minister of War, Mexico City, 9 January 1850.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/3059/00094-0099. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Querétaro, 20 January 1849. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/3059/ 00075. Jarero to the Minister of War, Mexico City 3 February 1849. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/3059/00107-0108. Jarero to the Minister of War, Mexico City 22 March 1849. AGN: *Archivo de Guerra*, vol. 1428. Jarero to the President of the Supreme Tribunal of War and Marine, Mexico City, 22 January 1849. Also see, José María Jarero, "Esposición del general Jarero al consejo de guerra de oficiales y generales," (Mexico City, 5 December 1849), in *El Siglo XIX*, 12 December 1849. This is his speech in his defence at the close of the trial. He neatly turns this defence into an attack on Bustamante, Vázquez and Uraga in which he implies that Bustamante and Uraga should have been brought to trial rather than himself.

¹³⁵ AGN: *Archivo de Guerra*, vol. 1428. Miramón and Zapata to the Supreme Tribunal of War and Marine, Mexico City, 23 August 1851.

rebellion, defeating the rebels in a series of encounters, before finally entered the village of Xichú on 5 January 1849.¹³⁶ They only passed one night in the village, but the symbolic achievement of capturing this settlement served to strengthen the position of the government troops. Two important victories were also won over the leaders of the revolt: Eleutorio Quiroz, Juan Ramírez and the Chaire family.¹³⁷ In the second of these, Miguel Chaire and his son were captured. This was also a landmark achievement for Bustamante. For, as he reported to the Minister of War on 10 February, the Chaires had been the first instigators of the revolt. He was sure that this event would have a profound influence on the situation in the Sierra. Moreover, in the face of the army's growing supremacy, many of the *serranos* accepted the amnesty that the government had recently introduced. At last, it seemed that at last the pacification of the territory was within the grasp of Bustamante's men.¹³⁸

However, all did not continue in that positive vein. In fact, on the very day that Bustamante composed the above letter to the Minister of War, one of his officers in the Sierra, Leonardo Márquez, issued a *pronunciamiento* in favour of the return of Santa Anna. With a group of 25 of his soldiers, he proceeded to capture and imprison his commanding officer, General Guzmán. The rebellion was short-lived. Guzmán managed to make his escape the next day.¹³⁹ Márquez's men quickly began to desert him and his position soon became untenable. He fled the Sierra just over a week later.¹⁴⁰ Even so, the rebellion had a very adverse effect upon Bustamante's campaign. The *serranos* were quick to take advantage of the confusion caused by the *pronunciamiento*. During February and March they made fresh attacks against

¹³⁶ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2916/00034-00036. Uraga to Bustamante, Hacienda de la Noria, 6 January 1849.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2916/00138. Uraga to Bustamante, Campo en el Palote, 6 February 1849. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2916/00170. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Querétaro, 10 February 1849.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2916/00170. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Querétaro, 10 February 1849.

¹³⁹ Ángel Guzmán to Bustamante, Casas Viejas, 12 February 1849, in *El Siglo XIX*, 17 February 1849.

¹⁴⁰ Manuel Gutiérrez to Mariano Arista, Querétaro, 16 February 1849, in *ibid.*, 21 February 1849.

haciendas in the plains of Querétaro and San Luis Potosí.¹⁴¹ This new frenzy culminated in the capture of the town of Rioverde and the defeat of Colonel Cruz in the nearby hacienda of Javalí, on 12 March.¹⁴² The *serranos* seemed now to have a clear path towards the city of San Luis Potosí and were more confident than ever. In Rioverde, the Prefect Manuel Verástegui, had joined their forces. His presence and apparent leadership gave the rebels new prestige, while the capture of the town furnished them with new bargaining power.¹⁴³ It appeared as if the military pacification of the Sierra was now once more an impossible object.

In the face of this situation, the government authorised Bustamante to begin negotiations with Verástegui. A cease-fire was agreed and peace talks began in April. Bustamante was then ordered to use the opportunity provided by the cease-fire to regroup and reinforce his forces.¹⁴⁴ These negotiations lingered on for two months. A peace treaty was finally agreed on 14 May and sent to Mexico City for ratification. The terms of the treaty show that Bustamante and the government were desperate to end the rebellion. Quiroz was given the military command of Xichú and a personal army of one hundred men and the government further undertook to introduce laws to improve the lives of the *serranos*.¹⁴⁵ These terms were highly criticised by the papers of the capital.¹⁴⁶ In the end, the government's concessions failed to bring the rebellion in the Sierra to a close. It soon clear that the various groups of rebels did not agree with the call for peace. Despite the cease-fire many bands continued to attack villages and

¹⁴¹ SDN: AH XI/481.3/2916/00178. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Querétaro, 27 February 1849.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2958/00012-00015. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Querétaro, 12 March 1849.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2938/00052-00052. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Querétaro, 10 April 1849.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/2936/00001-00002. The Minister of War to General in Chief of the Bustamante Division, Mexico City, 14 April 1849.

¹⁴⁵ The agreement is printed in *El Monitor Republicano*, 20 May 1849.

¹⁴⁶ See for example the editorial of *El Siglo XIX*, 30 May 1849.

pillage haciendas throughout April and May.¹⁴⁷ Neither were these groups ready to accept the treaty brokered for them by Verástegui. It seems that Quiroz abandoned the peace process to regain their favour. He continually refused to ratify the treaty and finally broke from Verástegui in June.¹⁴⁸

By this point though, the impetus that had carried the *serranos* into the plains of San Luis Potosí had run out. Bustamante's troops had now recovered from the chaos caused by Márquez's rebellion. During the peace negotiations they had regrouped and rearmed. When hostilities officially recommenced in June, Quiroz and the other *serrano* leaders were quickly driven back to the safety of the mountains.¹⁴⁹ At the end of August a new offensive was launched into the heart of the Sierra led by Generals Uruga and Vázquez.¹⁵⁰ On 3 September, Quiroz and his band were comprehensively defeated by the troops of their former ally, Captain Mejía. Quiroz fled the scene on foot, leaving his horse for the victors. Fifty-three of his men were killed on the field, including his second-in-command: Lázaro Cuillen.¹⁵¹ This defeat encouraged many rebels to seek a government amnesty and to return to their homes.¹⁵² By 9 September, Bustamante could tell the Minister of War that he was confident that the rebellion was reaching its end.¹⁵³ A fortnight later, Quiroz and Juan Ramírez were the only rebels left in the Sierra. They were captured in the first week of October.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁷ *El Siglo XIX*, 17 and 22 May 1849. AGGEG, Fondo del Gobierno, Serie de Tranquilidad pública, CE-223-E7, and E10. J. Isidrio Chávez to the Governor of Guanajuato, Silao, 11 April 1849, and J. Urbano Rodríguez to Secretary of the Governor of Guanajuato, San Miguel de Allende, 3 May 1849.

¹⁴⁸ Bustamante to the Minister of War, Casas Viejas, 11 June 1849, in *El Monitor Republicano*, 7 July 1849.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.* Also see: SDN: AH XI/481.3/3010/00078-00081, 00075-00076. Bustamante to the Minister of War, 16 and 21 July 1849.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/3028/00013. Rafael Vázquez, *El General en Jefe de la Brigada Vázquez a los habitantes de Rioverde*, (unpublished), Hacienda de San Diego, 29 August 1849.

¹⁵¹ *El Monitor Republicano*, 12 September 1849.

¹⁵² SDN: AH XI/481.3/3028/00060-00061. Uruga to Bustamante, Macuala, 5 September 1849.

¹⁵³ Bustamante to the Minister of War, San Luis de la Paz, 9 September 1849, in *El Monitor Republicano*, 18 September 1849.

¹⁵⁴ SDN: AH XI/481.3/3020/00002. Pedro Cortazar to the Minister of War, Celaya, 4 October 1849. *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/3020/00004. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Casa Viejas, 4 October 1849.

The rebellion in the Sierra was finally over.¹⁵⁵ The *División Bustamante* was dissolved in December and General Bustamante was granted his promised leave of absence.¹⁵⁶

Bustamante retired to San Miguel de Allende after the events of the Sierra Gorda. He held the title of Commander General of Guanajuato for the rest of his natural days, but illness prevented him taking an active role in any military operation. In June 1850, cousins Evaristo and Feliciano Liceaga, old allies of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, began a rebellion in Pénjamo, which called for the return of Santa Anna to the Presidency.¹⁵⁷ There were fears that the revolt would spread to the capital of the state.¹⁵⁸ Bustamante sent General Vázquez to confront the rebels, and the revolt was quickly quashed.¹⁵⁹ In January 1851, the cousins tried once more to achieve their objective. This time they managed to effect the capture of Guanajuato. Bustamante sent General Uruga to take control of the situation. Uruga marched on the city with a force of a hundred men, accompanied by a company of infantrymen and artillery men. He soon defeated the Liceagas, who fled in the direction of Pénjamo.¹⁶⁰ In December 1852 the General suffered what appears to have been a stroke and became unable to speak.¹⁶¹ He died at five past nine on 6 February 1853.¹⁶² In accordance with his wishes his heart was removed and placed in a flask, which was later transported to Mexico City. With the gracious permission of Iturbide's widow, it was laid to rest

¹⁵⁵ It would quickly flare up again in 1854, but for Bustamante the campaign was certainly over.

¹⁵⁶ SDN: AH XI/481.3/3053/00029-00030. Bustamante to the Minister of War, San José de Iturbide, 6 December 1849.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/3298/00007. The Minister of War to the Commander General of Michoacán, Mexico City, 12 June 1850.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/3298/00032-00033. Mariano Leal y Araujo to Bustamante, Guanajuato, 6 June 1850.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/3298/00009. Bustamante to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 28 June 1850.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, XI/481.3/3293/00102-00108 and 00146. Bustamante to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 17 January 1851. Uruga to the Minister of War, Guanajuato, 21 January 1851.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, XI/III/1-235/1-31/00402. Anaya to the President of the Supreme Tribunal of War and Marine, Mexico City, 30 December 1852.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, XI/III/1-235/1-31/00410. Luis Quintanar to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 6 February 1853.

beside the remains of the former Emperor in the capital's cathedral.¹⁶³ He was buried in the church at San Miguel de Allende the next day. The government pronounced nine days of mourning be observed by the Mexican Army¹⁶⁴ and it was generally expressed by the capital's newspapers that Mexico had lost 'uno de sus hijos más ilustres.'¹⁶⁵

F: The Final Campaigns: Concluding Remarks.

The final events of Anastasio Bustamante's career give his life an appearance of neat symmetry. His final military expedition against the rebels in the Sierra Gorda mirrored his first campaign against the insurgents and employed many of the same tactics. He even died in Guanajuato, the state in which he had been most successful during the insurgency; from where he also began his political career in 1821, seconding Agustín de Iturbide's Plan of Iguala. Moreover, our study of these years has shown a number of interesting parallels between Bustamante's actions during this time and his behaviour in previous years. In keeping with the stance he adopted during his Presidency, Bustamante supported the moderate government of President José Joaquín de Herrera in 1845. In an echo of his loyalty to Iturbide in 1823, he refused to betray Herrera in December 1845, even when it became obvious that the President would be deposed. He also rejected the opportunity to take part in Paredes y Arrillaga's government in 1846. Finally, as is shown by his behaviour in Guanajuato in 1848, the long years of opposing rebellions had left Bustamante convinced of the merits of execution as the best deterrent against future unrest. This strategy had been introduced to him during the insurgency, and was employed during his Vice-Presidency to varying degrees of success. Despite this, he remained unwilling to

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, XI/III/1-235/1-31/00410. Quintanar to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 6 February 1853. *Ibid.*, XI/III/1-235/1-3/ 00417. Manuel Gutiérrez to the Minister of War, 14 February 1853. *El Monitor Republicano*, 10 February 1853.

¹⁶⁴ SDN: SC XI/III/1-235/1-31/00413. Decree, 8 February 1853. Signed Manuel María Lombardini.

¹⁶⁵ *El Universal*, 10 February 1853.

advocate the execution or punishment of Paredes y Arrillaga, the leader of the 1848 rebellion. This reluctance appears to be rooted in the fact that Bustamante knew Paredes y Arrillaga personally, just as he knew Vicente Guerrero. However, it could reflect Bustamante's usual practice of approving the execution the lower class rebels, but pardoning the elites, who often had powerful friends to protect their interests.

Conclusion: Anastasio Bustamante's Position in Society, Politics and Government

A: Bustamante's Place in Society

General Anastasio Bustamante, by the virtue of his birth and education, belonged to the ranks of the middle classes or *hombres de bien*. More or less like the imaginary *hombre de bien* described by Michael Costeloe,¹ Bustamante was born into the Creole bourgeoisie in the final years of the Colony. He was educated by the Church in the Seminary in Guadalajara, before moving to Mexico City to study Chemistry and Medicine. As a doctor before the outbreak of the insurgency and afterwards, as a military officer, he occupied a respectable position in society. At various points in his career he acquired rural property and mining interests that, linked with his military salary, provided him with an income of well over a thousand pesos a year.² He probably lived in rented houses during his time in Mexico City, but he owned his own horses, various weapons and items of jewellery.³ He was a religious man, probably a regular church-goer, who made provisions in his will that thirty masses be said for his soul as soon as possible after his death.⁴ He amassed a personal library during his life-time,⁵ most likely containing books upon the study of medicine and science, subjects which he appears to have continued to study throughout his life, most obviously during his first exile in Paris, even though he never returned to the medical profession after 1810. Bustamante never married, although he did father three

¹ Michael P. Costeloe, "Hombres de bien in the Age of Santa Anna," in Jaime E. Rodríguez O. (ed.), *Mexico in the Age of Democratic Revolutions, 1750-1850* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), pp. 249-257.

² To be eligible for the Presidency in 1837, he was required to have an income of at least 4,000 pesos.

³ AGNCM. Notaría: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2869, f.9. Last Will and Testament of Anastasio Bustamante, dated, 12 January 1846.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, Notaría: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2855, f. 1078. Last Will and Testament of Anastasio Bustamante, dated, 1 October 1838.

illegitimate children. He outlived two of his sons, while the third became his legitimate heir.

In many ways Bustamante's life and career reflect these origins as an *hombre de bien*. In the first place, it seems to illustrate Costeloe's observations that 'despite all the potential conflict among *hombres de bien* [...] there was loyalty to their class, a social solidarity, that allowed bitter rivals to retain respect for one another.'⁶ This study has noted on various occasions that political animosity was not sufficient to disrupt all of Bustamante's personal relationships. For example, Manuel Gómez Pedraza allied himself with Bustamante in 1838, despite their hostility during his Vice-Presidency. Bustamante was able to strike up a friendship with Lorenzo de Zavala in Paris in 1833, even though his administration had persecuted Zavala and ordered the execution of his friend and ally, Guerrero, only a few years earlier. Similarly, he was able to socialise with José María Gutiérrez Estrada in Cuba in 1842, although he had personally ordered the latter's exile in 1840.

However, where Bustamante's life seems to demonstrate the most shocking example of this class solidarity is his approach to the execution of his enemies. During his first administration there was a strong contrast between his treatment of Mariano Zerecero and Vicente Guerrero. He interfered in the judicial process to save Zerecero, pardoning him on the eve of his execution; but he refused to extend a similar amnesty to Vicente Guerrero. The different social origins of Zerecero and Guerrero must have had some bearing upon the way Bustamante treated them. Mariano Zerecero was the brother of Anastasio, who was a lawyer. Although Anastasio Zerecero had been an insurgent during the wars of independence, was still an *hombre de bien* by virtue of his profession and status as a deputy. Guerrero on the other hand, was a poorly educated *mulatto*, who was resented in Mexico City society for his colour and lack of social

⁶Costeloe, "*Hombres de bien* in the Age of Santa Anna," p. 256.

graces.⁷ Throughout this period it was usual, as we noted in Chapter One, to execute lower class rebels, but to spare the wealthy middle-class elites; and it seems that Bustamante's treatment of Guerrero was influenced by this practice. It does not seem far-fetched to believe that Bustamante also supported the execution of the wandering priest, Father Jarauta, but opposed the punishment of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga's for similar reasons.

Amongst the *hombres de bien*, the perception that any organisation or movement of the lower classes presented a direct threat to orderly society and government was common. Bustamante does not seem to be any exception. He enlisted in Félix María Calleja's army in 1810 in order to defend the social order threatened by the marauding mobs of the insurgent under-class. He adhered to Agustín de Iturbide's Plan of Iguala in contrast, because this plan offered the prospect of an orderly rebellion and was championed by a fellow member of the Creole elite. In 1829 he led the Plan of Jalapa against the government of Vicente Guerrero, which had been brought to power as a result of the riot of soldiers and *léperos* in the Parián Market in 1828. His administration dedicated itself to removing the influence of the radicals, whom it termed *sanculottes* and *jacobinos* in memory of the mobs of the French Revolution. In 1838 he conspired with Manuel Gómez Pedraza to re-introduce the Federal Constitution. However, following an afternoon in which a mob of lower class supporters of Valentín Gómez Fariás demonstrated upon the streets and stormed their leader's prison to rescue him, Bustamante abandoned Gómez Pedraza and his plans.

⁷ Lorenzo de Zavala, *Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México* (Mexico City: Oficina Impresora de Hacienda, 1918), vol. 2, p.52.

B: Bustamante and Politics

Bustamante's position in the world of politics was defined by two important features. The first was his membership of the army. The army had a strong position in Mexican society and politics. By and large, its generals dominated the executive in independent Mexico. Between 1824 and 1855, 15 out of 22 Presidents were military men.⁸ Bustamante counted as one of the most elite officers in the army. From 1823 he held the highest rank possible, *General de División*, a distinction he shared with only eleven others.⁹ This position, probably as much as any ambition he held, was key to his own success in occupying the executive on two occasions. Other military contemporaries in the Presidential chair, such as Guadalupe Victoria, Vicente Guerrero and Antonio López de Santa Anna, all shared the same rank. It seems that the Generals provided high-profile, respected leadership around which political coalitions could form. They also could be relied upon to have a sufficient following in the army to ensure its support could be organised at important moments.

There is little doubt that Bustamante was proud of his position in the army. In his will he specified that he wished to be buried in his uniform.¹⁰ In 1848 he fought fiercely with José María Jarero, whom he believed was trying to usurp his authority in the Sierra Gorda. He eventually sent Jarero to be court-martialled in Mexico City on the charge of insubordination. He also appeared to wish that the army should make itself worthy of respect. As a commander in the Army of the Three Guarantees, he worked hard to ensure discipline amongst his ranks. During his first administration

⁸ Michael P. Costeloe, "Mariano Arista y la élite de la Ciudad de México, 1851-1852," in Humberto Morales and Will Fowler (eds.) *El conservadurismo mexicano en el siglo XIX*, (Puebla: Benemérita Universidad de Puebla/ University of St. Andrews/ Secretaría de Cultura, Gobierno del Estado de Puebla, 1999), p. 188.

⁹ LAF no. 425. Decree of 24 October 1823.

¹⁰ AGNCM. Notaría: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2869, f.8. Last Will and Testament of Anastasio Bustamante, dated, 12 January 1846.

new uniforms were designed for the class of general, and many attempts were made to ensure that officers always presented a dignified spectacle when wearing their uniforms. As President he oversaw the setting up of the *Plana Mayor del Ejército*, a body that would co-ordinate the regulation of the army in the matter of rules and discipline.

The second feature that defined Bustamante's place within the political sphere was the ideas he supported and followed as a politician. As was noted in the introduction, many of his contemporaries believed that the General had few consistent political opinions of his own, but was entirely dominated by his advisors. This idea seems to stem from the fact that Bustamante seemed to dally between the factions of centralism and federalism in the 1820s and 1830s, appearing to betray one side for another on more than one occasion. Bustamante's ideas, like those of all politicians, evolved over time. In common with the majority of his contemporaries, he began his political career as an *iturbidista*, a supporter of a centralised constitutional monarchy. However, his support for centralism did not survive long past Agustín de Iturbide's abdication in April 1823. By the autumn of that year he had become associated with the federalists in the state of Jalisco. It is possible, therefore, that his initial support for a central system had been more based upon loyalty to Iturbide than to anything else. Once he had disappeared, Bustamante seems to have become convinced that a federalised system was more suitable for governing the vast territory of Mexico. This is probably because Iturbide's abdication removed Bustamante from the capital and the seat of power: thus introducing him to the frustrations of provincial government. Whatever the case, Bustamante remained a federalist of sorts for the rest of his career. It is true that while he was in Guadalajara he became involved in a plot to restore Iturbide. However, as we noted in Chapter Two, this did not necessarily mean he wished to restore a centralist system. Iturbide could have also functioned as head of a federalised state.

Bustamante joined the *yorkinos*, the Masonic lodge most associated with federalism, in the late 1820s. He was never associated with its radical wing, but rather emerged in the 1828 Presidential Elections as the moderate candidate to complement the more radical Guerrero, and to oppose Manuel Gómez Pedraza. His first administration did not, despite all the assertions of the radical *yorkinos*, try to impose a centralist system upon the Republic. It merely sought to strengthen the position of the executive within the framework of the Federal Constitution. He spent two years of his second administration conspiring to bring a modified form of federalism back to Mexico with the leader of the moderate federalists, Gómez Pedraza. This programme was abandoned not because of Bustamante's lack of resolve, but rather as it was clear it could not be successful. In 1846 he became one of moderate President, José Joaquín de Herrera's trusted generals and remained loyal to his government in the face of a rebellion organised by Paredes y Arrillaga.

It seems clear that by the late 1830s, Bustamante had become a moderate federalist. He supported the Constitution of 1824, but wanted, like Gómez Pedraza, to see it modified in certain key areas. The example of both his first administration and his involvement with Gómez Pedraza in 1838, indicates that Bustamante preferred a system of more limited autonomy for the states than that envisaged in the charter of 1824. In his Vice-Presidency, his regime had sought to prevent the states from opposing the federal government by dissolving potentially rebellious state legislatures. As President, he supported Gómez Pedraza's plans to reduce the legislative power of the states. The same example also demonstrates that Bustamante wished to reduce the participation of the lower classes in politics. His first administration introduced legislation to reduce suffrage and to ensure that candidates in elections could only be *hombres de bien*. During his second administration, he endorsed Gómez Pedraza's plans to introduce a federal system that prevented those he deemed unworthy ('indignos'), from taking part in elections. Finally, the evidence collected in this study

shows Bustamante had a preference for a strong executive government. He disliked the constraints placed upon the President by the Federal Constitution of 1824, which invested more power in the legislative bodies than in the executive. During his first administration Bustamante's regime sought to strengthen the power and influence of the executive by intimidating the Federal Congress and by exploiting its conventions to force through legislation. As President he made his opposition to the Supreme Conservative Power widely known. He repeatedly requested the Congress grant him emergency powers, which would have allowed the executive to legislate and act without the approval of Congress or the Supreme Conservative Power. Even so, it appears that Bustamante did not support the idea of dictatorship. Between 1837 and 1838, many people appeared to want Bustamante to make himself into a dictator, yet he did not associate himself with these schemes. He refused to introduce Gómez Pedraza's moral revolution by decree and, throughout his Presidency respected (however grudging at times), the authority of the institutions established by the constitution of the *Siete Leyes*.

C: Bustamante's Role in Government

Anastasio Bustamante's contemporaries considered that he was a weak, indecisive figure in government. Carlos María de Bustamante wrote that Bustamante was 'bravo en la campaña pero sin disposición de gobernar en grande.'¹¹ Guillermo Prieto described the former President's worst faults as those of ignorance and indecision.¹² It was generally accepted that Bustamante was an ineffectual leader. It was said that his flaws were disguised during his first administration by the work of his

¹¹ Carlos María de Bustamante, *Continuación del cuadro histórico de la revolución mexicana: El gabinete mexicano durante el segundo periodo de la administración del exmo. señor D. Anastasio Bustamante* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica/Instituto Helénico, 1985), vol. 1, p. 42.

¹² Guillermo Prieto, *Memorias de mis tiempos* (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1996), pp. 180-181.

cabinet, and that his weakness was only revealed during his Presidency. This study has cast doubt upon these assertions. As we noted in Chapter Four, Bustamante became Vice-President and acting Head of State in 1830 under the Federal Constitution of 1824. He came to power as a result of a successful rebellion, organised by a wide-ranging coalition of the Church, the army and the *hombres de bien*. During the first year of his administration, every effort was made to strengthen his position in government. Potential enemies in the Federal Congress were nearly all exiled. Other deputies and senators were intimidated by the army, whose officers often attended Congressional sessions. All state legislatures which appeared to pose a threat to his government were dissolved and replaced. Terror tactics, such as the execution of enemies, and violent attacks upon critics, were also employed to subdue opposition to his government. Therefore, in this administration the executive power enjoyed a strong position of influence within government and was rarely thwarted in their actions by Congress.

In 1837, the situation was entirely different. On this occasion, Bustamante came to power through an election. He served under the Centralist Constitution of 1836. This constitution established a system of government whereby the President's initiatives needed to be approved by four separate government bodies (the Council of Government, the Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and finally the Supreme Conservative Power), before they could be enacted. In other words, Bustamante's position was weak by its very nature. Moreover, in 1837, he did not enjoy the broad based support of a coalition within government circles. He had been proposed as President by some members of the centralist faction. However, he could not count upon the support of the other main factions: the federalists and the *santanistas*. Later, he lost the endorsement of the centralists when it became clear that he did not support the Constitution of 1836. He became associated with the federalists in 1837 and 1838, but this alliance disintegrated in the wake of the failure of the moral revolution. This meant

he could not use the same tactics of coercion upon Congress, or any of the other institutions, that he had employed in his first administration. Coercion had only been successful in 1830 because the number of dissidents was inferior to the coalition of supporters of the Bustamante regime. When the balance shifted, Bustamante found he had to leave his position. Finally, unlike Antonio López de Santa Anna, Bustamante proved to respect the institutions and laws of the Constitution of 1836. He did not attempt to rule by decree, as Santa Anna did during his brief period as interim President. This meant he was confined to the weak position established by the constitution, and effectively barred from imposing himself upon his government.

It is worth noting at this point that neither the Federal Constitution nor the *Siete Leyes* allowed for a strong executive. Both constitutions fixed power firmly with Congress and required the President to seek its approval for all its initiatives. However, almost paradoxically, it seems that most members of the political elite actually expected the President to have the dominant position. Those like Bustamante in his second administration, and Guadalupe Victoria (1824-1828), who obeyed the dictates of the constitution and consequently failed to impose their authority upon their administrations, were generally characterised by contemporary observers as weak and ineffective Presidents. This is not to say that the President was expected to ignore the constitution entirely and behave in an authoritarian manner. When Bustamante tried to control Congress during his Vice-Presidency, and when Santa Anna ignored both Congress and the Supreme Conservative Power during his interim Presidency in 1839, both men were condemned by the same observers for acting dictatorially. It seems that politicians and the political elite were unable to define adequately the role that a President should have in the Republic.

Despite the constitutional problems faced by Bustamante, this study has shown him to be a pragmatic figure in government and a resolute leader during times of crisis. He acted realistically rather than idealistically during the Three Day Ministry of

December 1838. It became clear that imposing Gómez Pedraza's moral revolution would inevitably lead to his own downfall and the ultimate failure of the scheme; so, he abandoned the plans. He weathered the subsequent political storm by diffusing the mounting threat of a rebellion in favour of Santa Anna by suggesting that this *caudillo* replace him temporarily, while he attempted to re-coup his lost popularity in the battlefield. In July 1840, while he was being held prisoner by General Urrea, he refused to agree to his demands. He remained calm throughout his capture and was not intimidated by threats to his life, or swayed by the promises of the rebels. In September 1841 he fought Santa Anna, Paredes y Arrillaga and Gabriel Valencia with stubborn determination. He only surrendered once all hope of victory was lost.

In summary, the conclusions that can be drawn from this study are the following: Bustamante was a man of his time; an *hombre de bien*, whose attitudes were shaped in no small measure by the society in which he lived. Despite beginning his political career as an *iturbidista*, he evolved into a moderate federalist, who wanted to see a strong executive power control the federation. His own weak position during his Presidency was probably due to the organisation of the Constitution of 1836 and the fact that, for most of his period in government, he could not rely upon a great deal of support in or outside Congress. He was able to remain in the Presidency for such a long period despite his unpopular position, because he was a pragmatist who could keep his head in a crisis. Even in the most desperate situations he was not prepared to capitulate, but always tried to defend his government with courage and determination.

Appendix One

A Selection of Bustamante's Diaries of Operations (1818-1819)

March 1818

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 477 f. 187]

4. Salió la sección de Salamanca a Pueblo Nuevo.
5. Marchó a Santa Catalina.
6. A Cerro Prieto.
7. A Irapuato a buscar auxilio.
8. Permaneció en el mismo lugar.
9. Se dirigió a Piedras Negras.
10. El Rincón de Cora.
11. Contramarchó al Valle de Santiago en solicitud de una reunión que amenazaba a los destacamentos de Salvatierra.
12. Por las inmediateces de Iuriria a Juan Luaces con cuyo movimiento se dispersó la reunión que habían hecho Olivares y Miguel Torres en Jumilla a dos leguas de dicho rancho de Juan Lucas.
13. Se avistó en la hacienda de la Calvera la partida de Miguel Torres que fue perseguido por distancia de tres leguas y por la grande ventaja que llevaba sólo se le pudieron quitar algunos caballos. La sección hizo noche en el rancho de San Andrés y se le ofició por triplicado al Sr. Aguirre para que si fuese posible obrase en combinación con nosotros las tropas de Valladolid que un día antes había estado en Puruándiro distante legua y media de dicho rancho de San Andrés sin haber tenido contestación hasta ahora.
14. Se dirigió la sección al rancho de los Frijoles y continuando su marcha por la noche puso cerca al cerro de Huanímaro en donde al amanecer del día siguiente se

aprehendieron cuatro rebeldes con nueve pistolas, cuatro espadas, una carabina, veintiuna monturas, treinta y cinco caballos útiles y treinta y nueve mulas de cargas sin aparejo pertenciendo todo a la gavilla de Vicente García, sin contar con los rebeldes que murieron a balazos entre las malezas, ni con varias prendas de vestuario y otros frioleras que aprovechó la tropa.

15. Descansó la sección en Huanímaro.

16. Marchó a Cerritos.

17. A Santiago Cunguripo. En este día fue herido de bala un cabo de San Luis. Se mató un rebelde y se recogió un machete.

18. Después de haber buscado al enemigo por San Francisco Angamacutivo y Villachuato le avistamos en el rancho de los Tres Mesquites y habiendo hecho frente en Zurumuato donde tenía varios enboscados, rebatimos y dipersamos completamente siguiendo el alcance más de tres leguas en que tuvo varios muertos y heridos con más cuatro prisioneros que cogimos los que declaran que el padre Torres tenía allí sobre quinientos o seiscientos bandidos con los cabecillas Borja, Magaña, Vargas, Huerta, Calisto, Aguirre y otros varios, habiendo perecido a nuestras manos el cabecilla Sixtor Martínez, comandante de Penjamillo, quedando igualmente en nuestro poder varias armas de fuego y blanca, habiendo tenido la desgracia de haber muerto un cabo y dos Dragones de S. Carlos, con un sargento y tres Dragones del mismo cuerpo heridos, como igualmente un Dragon de San Luis también herido. Después de concluido el alcance pasó la noche la sección en el rancho del Rincón de los Martínez.

19. Después de haber libertado seis arrieros que tenían presos los rebeldes en una de las cárceles subterráneas a las inmediaciones del expresado rancho, destruido enteramente los zipos y prisiones regresamos a descansar a Huanímaro.

20. Al rancho de la Estrella.

21. A Salamanca.

22. En idem.

23. En idem.

24. Marchó la sección a la hacienda de la Tinaja.

25. Al rancho del Jinaja. En la noche de este día salió la sección a hacer una correría por Pantoja y sus ranchos, logrando aprehender cincuenta individuos de los que huyen de la tropa de Rey bien sea por delincuencia o por una orden que tienen para hacer lo del infame padre Torres, de los cuales solo queda prisionero Rafael Silva por haberle encontrado armas y caballos en su casa, habiendo puesto en libertad a los demás después de haberlos exhortado a la obediencia que deben al rey, ya que detesten la insumisión, todo a la vista de un ejemplar que hizo con tres insurgentes que se pasaron por las armas en dicha hacienda.

26. El rancho de Piedras Negras.

27. Al Rincón del Cora.

28. Descansó la sección en el mismo Cora y en la noche hizo una correría por la hacienda de Zurumucito y los ranchos del Roda, la Yácata, el Zapote y la Calle en los cuales se reunieron sesenta individuos entre ellos un cabo Esquadra y tres insurgentes con dos fusiles y una lanza y habiendo pasado por las armas estos últimos se pusieron en libertad los demás después de haber hecho conocer sus obligaciones hacia el rey y los daños que recibir del tirano, padre Torres, a excepción de Francisco Hernández alias *el Fuerte* que se hizo prisionero en el nominado rancho de la Yácata nombrado administrador general por Lucas Flores de las haciendas de la demarcación del Valle.

29. Al rancho del Ointo.

30. A San Francisco Xavier.

31. A Pueblo Nuevo.

May 1818 [AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 488, f. 127, vol. 478, f. 249]

1. En Tamasulco desde donde salió el resto de la sección por el rumbo de Pénjamo de perseguir a los dispersos de la acción del 28 próximo pasado de abril, y con el fin de

proteger un partido que había salido la noche anterior a Barajas para adquirir noticias del paradero del padre Torres, no habiendo podido lograr en ambas correrías noticia alguna de dicho Torres, y solo sirvió de cerciorarnos de que su pérdida había excedido de trescientos hombres entre muertos, heridos y prisioneros (según confesión de ellos mismos y de todos los rancheros) por lo que careciendo enteramente de noticias de aquel malvado y sabiendo de positivo que los Ortices a gran prisa dispersión se habían retirado ya a sus madrigueras, marché el 2 a Irapuato en donde permanecí hasta el 8 con el objeto de recoger los haberes de la sección, darle algún descanso, pasar revista de comisario y esperar al sr. comandante general de la provincia. Porque aunque estábamos habilitados de todo para marchar el 8 al tiempo de salir se avistaron los rebeldes a Irapuato dando muerte a un realista, y fue necesario perseguirlo, por lo que volvimos a quedarnos en el expresado punto.

9. A la hacienda de la Tinaja.

10. Al Valle de Santiago con el objeto de llevar dinero y retraer las varias partidas de insurgentes que hostilizaron aquella guarnición y su destacamentos, por lo que permanecimos allí el 11 y 12.

13. Al pueblo de Amoles con el fin de auxiliar el convoy que según noticias debía ser atacado por las gavillas de Jalpa y del giro en el intermedio de Celaya a Salamanca, mas no habiendo habido novedad en el convoy sólo tuvimos un fuerte tiroteo en la retaguardia por una partida que nos salió en las inmediaciones de Pitallo, la que escarmentamos persiguiéndola por más de dos leguas, dando muerte a dos rebeldes, quedando en nuestro poder un prisionero, tres caballos, tres machetes y una carabina.

14. A la Hacienda de la Zanja que se hallaba amenazada por una partida de más de doscientos bandidos que venían por el rumbo de Yuriria, mas estos retrocedieron luego que supieron nuestra aproximación.

15, 16, 17, 18, 19. En el Valle de Santiago protegiendo las cosechas de los frutos de las haciendas, habiendo salido la noche del 17 a recoger gente tanto para los trabajos

de la fortificación como para la cosecha, en cuya correría que se hizo por diferentes rumbos cayó en nuestro poder un insurgente con una carabina y siete caballos, además de doscientos trabajadores que reunimos.

El 20. A esta villa con el objeto de recoger la segunda data.

21. Permaneció la Sección en Salamanca para percibir la segunda data y acordar con el señor Comandante General varios asuntos del servicio.

22. Al Valle de Santiago conduciendo tabacos para el socorro de aquella guarnición.

23. Al rancho de los Frijoles.

24. Al Rodeo de Villachuato.

25. A la hacienda del mismo nombre. En esta noche se ha hecho una correría por los Ranchos de Janamuato, Herruruta y el Cacalote con el fruto de haber aprehendido a un capitán de rebeldes con dos pistolas guarnecidas de plata, una carabina, dos sables, una mula y seis caballos.

26 y 27. Permanecimos en Puruándiro en unión de la segunda sección, con el objeto de dar algún descanso a la tropa y de inspirar confianza a aquel numeroso pueblo, que por haber permanecido en él algunos días antes una gran reunión de rebeldes habría tal vez formado una opinión favorable así del injusto partido.

28. Al rancho de los Cerritos.

29. Al Rodeo. En este día se han reunido a Ceniza una porción de barrancas que el padre Torres tenía en el cerro de Zurumuato, habiendo recogido allí más de ochocientas artas para lanzas, que por no haber mulas en que conducir las se entregaron tan bien al fuego la mayor parte y igualmente se recogieron veintiséis mulas flacas, quedando allí una porción de maíz por no haber tampoco en que cargarlo.

30. Al rancho de San Francisco Javier habiéndose aprehendido en el camino un rebelde de la gavilla del padre Torres uniformado y montado pero sin armas.

31. Al Valle de Santiago después de haber recorrido los ranchos de Cerro Colorado, Loma Tendida y Copales, donde según noticias se creía encontrar la gavilla del Giro,

la que en efecto ayer tarde ha pasado por aquí y se ignora el rumbo que tomó en la noche.

June 1818 [AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 478, f. 287, vol. 279, f. 42.]

1. Descansó la Sección en el Valle de Santiago.
2. Marchó a Pueblo Nuevo.
3. Hizo una correría por el Rancho de Curadero y Hacienda de Peralta sin haber encontrado enemigos.
4. A Irapuato con el objeto de pasar revista de Comisario y recibir la primera data de los Cuerpos.
5. A Salamanca.
6. Permaneció la Sección en esta Villa habiendo dado una partida fuerte para conducir el convoy a Irapuato.
7. Después de haberse incorporado la partida que salió el día anterior a Irapuato, se dirigió la Sección al Valle de Santiago.
8. Al Pueblo de Amoles, habiendo aprehendido en el camino a un insurgente montado y armado con sólo carabina.
- 9 y 10. Al pueblo de Apacio.
11. A la hacienda de los Potreros, sin haber logrado ventaja alguna apesar de haber destacado una partida fuerte la noche anterior, con el objeto de sorprender una gavilla, que acostumbra guarnecerse en el Rancho de las Pulgas, y de haber recorrido en este día otras varias madrigueras en las pertenencias de la hacienda del Pichacho, Jalpilla y la referida de los Potreros, porque aunque se avistaron algunos rebeldes tiroteando a grande distancia desde las alturas huyen con la mayor velocidad en el momento que se trataba de perseguirlos.

12. Al pueblo de Ixtla después de haber incendiado todas las barrancas que tenían los rebeldes en un cerro inmediato a Jalpa, en donde parecía trataban de sostenerse desafiándonos con sus acostumbrados aprobios, tiros y toques de cornetas, pero bien pronto fueron desalojados por los piquetes de Infantería de Zaragoza y Celaya que con los esquadrones de San Luis y Fieles del Potosí me acompañaron a subir aquella escarpada eminencia, sin haber habido desgracia alguna por nuestra parte ni por la de los enemigos que huyeron vergonzosamente, dispersándose y escogiéndose a otras varias alturas. También al anochecer de este día han tiroteado unos pocos rebeldes en el referido pueblo de Ixtla al abrigo de los cerros que le dominan sin sufrir nosotros daño alguno, a causa de haber destacado algunas partidas de Infantería para alejarlos ya que se dificultaba su aprehensión por la naturaleza del terreno y fugas de la canalla tan cobarde, como insolente en palabras.

13. Al pueblo de Apaco: habiendo contramarchado en la mañana por el camino de Jalpa con el objeto de ver si encontrábamos alguna partida, mas no habiendo logrado nuestro deseo registramos las cañadas del las Haciendas del San Peñón y Rancho de las Pulgas en donde igualmente hemos condenado a las llamas todas las chozas de las insurgentes, sin encontrar más interesante que ocho bueyes de su pertenencia los que recogimos.

14. A Celaya en donde permaneció este día y el siguiente para dar descanso a la tropa y caballada, que justamente lo necesitaba por el estropeo que sufrió los días anteriores en las correrías de la venta.

16. A Salamanca prosiguiendo al paso la marcha del convoy, que salió este día de Celaya.

17. A Irapuato para recoger la segunda data de la tropa que compone la sección.

18 y 19. Permaneció la sección en Irapuato esperando al señor comandante general para percibir la segunda data.

20. Marchó a Cuernavaca conduciendo dinero para aquel destacamento, habiendo tenido la desgracia de que se inutilizase una carga de municiones en el paso del río Turbio, quedando igualmente enterrados en el fango del camino de Tupargu veinte caballos que fue imposible sacar de aquellos profundos pantanos.

21y 22. Fue indispensable permanecernos en el referido destacamento, sacando el parque y limpiando las armas mojadas el día anterior.

23. Nos dirigimos al rancho de la Sabor con el doble objeto de una entrevista con el señor coronel D. José Antonio Andrade, comandante de la primera División de N. Galicia (que se suponía en Pénjamo) y con el de recoger algún maíz para la guarnición de Cuernavaca, que se hallaba muy escasa de este artículo, mas no habiendo logrado aquella entrevista, que tanto interesa el mejor servicio, por las crecidas ventajas que deben esperarse de la combinación de nuestros movimientos para el total exterminio de los pequeños restos que han quedado en la jurisdicción de Pénjamo de la extinguida gavilla del apostata Torres (quien ha desaparecido enteramente de su antigua demarcación) dispuse regresase a su destacamento el 24 con el maíz que se pudo cargar en las pocas mulas que teníamos el capitán D. Vicente Endorica, a quien acompañé hasta San Gregorio, marchando después a la hacienda de San Isidro, en cuyas inmediaciones tuvo la desgracia de que fuere gravemente herido el bizarro alférez de Dragones de San Luis D. Esteban Pérez, comandante de mi descubierta en la carga que dio a la partida del cabecilla José Negrete, haciendo prisioneros en el alcance a Felipe Chagoya comandante que fue de la hacienda de Burras y a otros rebeldes, quedando en nuestro poder dos sables y un fusil.

25. Permaneció la sección en la referida hacienda con el fin de que se repusieron algunos de los caballos y en la noche de este día se hizo una correría por los ranchos de Tamasula, Ojos de Agua y Copales con el fruto de haber recogido quince caballos, habiendo aprehendido igualmente un rebelde con un machete.

26 y 27. Se mantuvo la sección en el rancho de San Juan, con el objeto de ver si llegaba a Pénjamo la mencionada División para los fines ya indicados.

28. A la hacienda de Santa Catalina cuyo día se empleó en pasar la sección el río Grande, habiendo sorprendido en la madrugada a los rebeldes que guardaban el paso llanado de las Estacas, mas estos liberaron la vida arrojándose a la agua y abandonando la causa con cuatro fusiles que quedaron en nuestro poder.

29. Al Valle de Santiago con el objeto de reponer la caballada, no encontrándose ya forrajes para este importante fin en todo el resto de la demarcación de mi cargo.

July 1818

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 479, f. 124]

1, 2, y 3. Permaneció la expresada sección en el Valle de Santiago, habiendo pasado revista de comisario el 2.

4. Ocurrió a la villa de Salamanca por la primera data.

5. Regresó al Valle.

6. Continuó en dicho pueblo.

7. Por la noche salió a hacer una correría por varias madrigueras de la gavilla del Giro en que se logró la aprehensión de cuatro insurgentes con doce fusiles, una espada y una lanza.

9, 10, y 11. En el Valle de Santiago.

12. A la hacienda de San Nicolás con el objeto de hacer alguna correría por aquel rumbo y de introducir maíz al Valle de Santiago que se había escaseado y hacía falta, tanto para el consumo de la tropa y caballada como para los habitantes del pueblo.

13. Permaneció la sección en dicha hacienda esperando una partida que había marchado a Salvatierra para escoltar dicho grano.

14. Regresó al Valle donde se mantuvo el 15 y 16.

17. Vino a Salamanca por la segunda data y volvió al Valle donde mantuvo hasta la noche del 25 en que se hizo una correría por la hacienda de Uruétaro con el fruto de haber aprehendido a dos rebeldes, cuatro fusiles, dos pares de pistolas, una espada y doce caballos, con más una hermosa canoa que nos facilita con seguridad y prontitud el paso de río Grande a varios puntos de la demarcación que antes no podíamos recorrer por el obstáculo de dicho río.

26. A esta villa donde hemos permanecido hasta la noche del 29 en que dividida la sección en varias partidas fue recorriendo las madrigueras del Giro a derecho e izquierda del río Grande hasta el Pueblo Nuevo, cuyos movimientos se ejecutaron con la mayor prontitud y acierto pero los rebeldes alarmados ya por las anteriores correrías han abandonado sus antiguas madrigueras eligiendo nuevas en puntos más distantes por lo que solo hemos logrado esta vez a pesar de nuestra actividad y diligencia dar muerte a un insurgente y tomar cuatro prisioneros con un fusil.

30. Descansó la sección en Pueblo Nuevo y el 31 regresó a Salamanca.

August 1818

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 479, f. 309]

1. En Salamanca, donde permaneció la Sección hasta el 5 y en la noche de este día hizo una correría por el Ancón y Alarigomez. Habiendo logrado tomar al enemigo treinta chaquetas.

5, 6, 7 y 8. Continuó en Salamanca.

9. Marchó a Irapuato por el convoy y regresó a dicha villa el 10 habiendo hecho también en la noche de este día una correría por el rumbo de Santa Cruz, con el objeto de sorprender al Giro que se hallaba en el rancho de la Guitarrera, mas esta empresa se frustró a causa de la fuerte abarida de un arroyo que no se pudo pasar.

11. Regresó a Salamanca.

12. A Irapuato conduciendo el convoy.

13. Volvió a Salamanca donde permaneció hasta el 14.
15. Marchó al Valle de Santiago donde se mantuvo hasta el 18.
19. Regresó a Salamanca por la segunda data, donde permaneció hasta el 23.
24. Habiendo hecho en la noche de este día una correría por Valtierra, y no se logró sorprender a los rebeldes, porque poco antes se fugaron de allí.
25. Al Valle de Santiago donde permaneció hasta el 28 que salió una partida a Iurira con el objeto de escoltar los bagajes que llevaban las compañías de Tres Villas y Cazadores de San Luis, cuya partida aprehendió en el camino dos rebeldes que dejó en dicho pueblo para ser pasados por las armas.
29. Regresó logrando la aprehensión de otro insurgente.
- 30 y 31. Permaneció en el Valle la sección y en la noche de este día salió una partida con el objeto de sorprender una reunión que se hallaba en las haciendas de Pantoja y Santa Catalina, pero esta importante empresa se frustró a causa de haberse dirigido la referida reunión en la misma noche a estas inmediaciones, por otro camino diverso del que llevaba la partida, habiendo logrado solamente recoger doce caballos, y cincuenta cabezas de ganado vacuno que tenían los insurgentes, de las que se han devuelto varias a sus legítimos dueños, y también se han cobrado en esta expedición algunas contribuciones para gastos de la fortificación de este punto.

October 1818

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 480, f. 198]

7. Trasladados ya del Valle de Santiago a Salamanca los enfermos de la sección, y establecido el hospital provisional para su asistencia por disposición del señor comandante general de esta provincia, marchó la corta fuerza que quedaba disponible a dicho Valle con el objeto de conducir las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnición y sus destacamentos.

8. Se dirigió a la hacienda de Santa Catalina en solicitud de los enemigos, en donde permaneció el nueve y diez.

11. Marchó al Rodeo de Villachuato.

12. Se dirigió a la hacienda de Zurumuato para una entrevista con el señor coronel D. José Joaquín Márquez y Donallo.

13. Regresó a la hacienda de Santa Catalina.

14. Al rancho de la Estrella, y en la noche de este día habiendo tenido noticia que los rebeldes se aproximaban a los destacamentos del Valle, nos dirigimos inmediatamente hacia aquel punto, en donde amanecimos el quince, y no habiendo encontrado a los enemigos que buscábamos por haber variado de intento a causa de nuestros movimientos se retiró la sección a la hacienda de Guentes en donde descansó dicho día.

16. Recorrió las haciendas del Pirallo y Uruétaro donde se decía estaban las gavillas de rebeldes que intentaban hostilizar a los destacamentos del Valle, mas solo se encontró una partida del Giro, a la vista de Uruétaro, pero de la otra parte del Río Grande, la que no se persiguió por no poderse pasar dicho río, y aunque hubo un corto tiroteo no tuvimos novedad por nuestra parte, y los enemigos tuvieron algunos heridos, según las noticias que se han adquirido posteriormente. En la noche de este día permanecemos en dicha hacienda con el objeto de ver si se reunían las gavillas para batirlas, mas no habiéndose verificado, nos retiramos el 17 a esta villa.

18. Se dirigió a Celaya con el objeto de recibir un convoy que venía para el interior, y en este día habiéndome separado con una partida corta para el pueblo de Amoles logré dar muerte a cuatro insurgentes hacer dos prisioneros, recogiendo igualmente dos carabinas, seis lanzas y ocho caballos asillados, con la desgracia de haber perdido el guía de la sección y un Dragón de San Carlos que fueron mortalmente heridos por la gavilla que encontramos a la entrada de dicho pueblo.

19. Regresamos de Celaya a esta villa con el convoy.

20. Marchó el convoy a cargo del teniente coronel D. Francisco Romero y la sección descansó aquí.

21. Se dirigió al pueblo de Santa Rosa.

22. Al rancho del Tecolote, y en la noche de este día hizo una correría la sección por la hacienda de Aguilares, rancho de la Guitarra y otras madrigueras del Giro, hacia el rumbo de Santa Cruz, con el fruto de haber aprehendido tres rebeldes, tomándoles tres carabinas, dos lanzas y ocho caballos, mas no habiendo logrado más ventajas porque alarmados por los movimientos que hizo la primera sección a las inmediaciones ordenes del sr. comandante general el día anterior, en el pueblo de Santa Cruz, se habían retirado, abandonando las citadas madrigueras.

23. Regresó a Salamanca en donde permaneció hasta la noche del 28 en que hizo una correría con el objeto de sorprender al comandante de aquella gavilla y su partida, mas no habiéndose encontrado volvió el 29 a esta villa .

30 y 31. Permaneció en Salamanca.

November 1818

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 480. f. 236]

1. Se practicó una correría por la Hacienda de la Tinaja y no habiendo encontrado enemigos regresó dicha sección a Salamanca.

2. Permaneció en ella y pasó revista de comisario.

3. Marchó a la hacienda de Buena Vista a proteger el paso del convoy de lo interior.

4. Se hizo una correría por la hacienda de Uruétaro y regresó sin novedad a este punto.

5. Se dirigió al Molino de Saravia con el objeto de auxiliar al convoy que salió de Celaya, creyéndose fuese atacado según las noticas que corrían.

6. Pasó la sección al Valle con dinero y municiones para aquella guarnición.

7. Condujo dicha sección el citado convoy a Irapuato y en la noche regresó a esta villa para auxiliar al Valle de Santiago que se hallaba atacado por todas las partidas del Giro, y habiéndole dado un corto descanso continuó su marcha hacia aquel punto, de donde ya se habían retirado los enemigos con alguna perdida y sin desgracia por nuestra parte.

8. Descansó allí.

9. Se hizo una correría por Santa Rosa y varios ranchos, con el objeto de buscar al enemigo, mas no habiéndole encontrado regresó a este lugar en donde permaneció hasta el 18 practicando siempre diariamente sus correrías en todas estas inmediaciones y hostilizando las partidas de rebeldes que impedían el ingreso de sus víveres.

19. Habiéndose dirigido la sección por rancho Nuevo y el de la Peña, perseguió a escape una partida de rebeldes, quitándoles nueve caballos.

20. Condujo a Irapuato el convoy que salió de Celaya, acompañado el 21 hasta la hacienda de San Antonio a la sección del teniente coronel D. Franciso Romero para mayor seguridad de dicho convoy, y regresando en el mismo día a Irapuato.

22. Volvió a Salamanca.

23. Hizo un movimiento sobre el Valle.

24. Habiendo hecho una correría por Valtierra, puerto de Valle y el Piralto logró aprehender a dos rebeldes que se fusilaron, previos los auxilios cristianos, sin haber tenido más novedad en esta vez que un cabo y un Dragon de San Luis levemente heridos.

25. Volvió hacia el mismo rumbo porque había noticias de que esperaban los enemigos reunirse en mayor número, pero ni habiéndolos encontrado se regresó a este punto.

26. Reunida a la del teniente coronel D. Ramón Galinsoga, marchó a la hacienda de Burras en solicitud de la gavilla del cabecilla Borja, de donde regresó el 27, sin novedad.

28. Marcharon ambas secciones al Valle de Santiago, en cuyas inmediaciones se estaba haciendo una gran reunión de los cabecillas Huerta, el Giro y Antonio García para atacarle de nuevo, pero se disolvió esta en la noche anterior a causa de nuestros movimientos y los de las fuerzas del Sr. Márquez Donallo que se hallaba en Pantoja.
29. Descansó en Salamanca.
30. Salió a auxiliar el paso del convoy de lo interior a esta villa en el de Buenavista.

December 1818

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 481, f. 67]

1. Marchó de Salamanca a Celaya escoltando el convoy.
2. Descansó en Celaya.
3. Regresó a Salamanca con el convoy del interior.
4. Escoltó dicho convoy hasta la hacienda de Buenavista y regresó a Salamanca.
- 5, 6 y 7. Hizo una dilatada correría por el rumbo de Santa Cruz en unión de la primera sección a las ordenes del teniente coronel don Ramón Galinsoga.
8. Descansó en Celaya.
9. En la noche volvió a practicar una correría por el mismo rumbo de Santa Cruz.
10. Regresó a Salamanca.
11. Marchó al Valle de Santiago conduciendo las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnición y su destacamentos.
12. Regresó a Salamanca después de haber recorrido las madrigueras del Pirallo, Puerto de Valle y Valtierra.
- 13 y 14. Se hicieron varios movimientos por las haciendas de Cruces, Mendoza y el Ancón.
15. A la hacienda de Urúetaro de donde salió la sección a practicar una correría esta noche sobre las madrigueras del Giro hacia el rumbo de Santa Cruz, habiendo logrado

las ventajas indicadas ya en el parte que se dio al señor comandante general de la provincia coronel D. Antonio Linares, con fecha del 16 en el rancho de los Damianes donde descansó este día.

17. Se dirigió al pueblo de Huaje y en el transito fue aprehendido un rebelde con una lanza y una espada.

18. Regresó a Salamanca.

19. Habiendo salido a buscar a los rebeldes hacia el rumbo de Pantoja, se nos presentaron antes don fuerzas superiores en las inmediaciones del rancho del Tecolote, en donde fueron batidos y escarmentados conforme expresa el parte dado al señor comandante general de la provincia coronel Dn. Antonio Linares con fecha de 20 en Valtierra donde descansó la sección.

21. Se dirigió a Salamanca.

22. Marchó a la hacienda de San Nicolás continuando sus movimientos con los de la primera sección.

23. Al pueblo de Santa Cruz en donde se reunieron las dos secciones.

24. A Celaya donde permaneció el 25.

26. Marchó al pueblo de Amoles.

27. Al rancho de los Comaleros.

28. Al del Cerro Colorado.

29. Al rancho de Borija después de haber hecho una correría por Pantoja.

30. Al rancho de las Tetillas.

31. A Salamanca.

March 1819

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 481, f. 301]

1, y 2. Permaneció la sección en Irapuato con el doble objeto de pasar revista de comisario, limpiar las armas y reponerse en algo la tropa y caballada estropeada en las expediciones anteriores.

3. Se dirigió a Salamanca para sacar la primera data de los cuerpos.
4. Escoltó un convoy de dicha villa a Irapuato.
5. Permaneció en el expresado pueblo, mas en la noche de este día se practicó una correría por la estancia de Cruces en donde logró aprehender tres rebeldes con una espada, dos lanzas y dos caballos ensillados.
6. Volvió a Salamanca a recoger las buenas cuentas de la guarnición y destacamentos del Valle de Santiago, las que condujo el 7.
8. Permaneció en dicho Valle, pero en la noche de este día se han registrado la mayor parte de las madrigueras que tienen los rebeldes al suroeste del Valle extendiendo nuestros movimientos hasta el puerto del Aguila y rancho de las Jicamas con el fruto de haber aprehendido a tres rebeldes, dos lanzas, seis monturas, cuarenta caballos, el equipaje, correspondencia y ganado del Apostata Fray Benigno Barrón, con algunos paramentos y varos sagrados que escandalosamente tenía mezclados con su ropa.
9. Al rancho de Botija.
10. Se dirigió al de la Estrella.
11. A Pueblo Nuevo.
12. Hizo una correría por Perata y regresó a dicho pueblo.
13. Se dirigió a Cerro Prieto y habiéndose avistado en la tarde los enemigos fueron perseguidos por Cerro Blanco y bosques de Santaguillo, sin haber logrado ventaja alguna porque se concluyó el día y apesar de haberse hecho este movimiento marchó a las doce de la noche una fuerte partida de caballería al bosque de la Ratonera inmediato a Pueblo Nuevo con el objeto de sorprender a los rebeldes que frecuentemente ocurren los domingos al citado pueblo, pero se frustró el fin a causa de no haber concurrido los malvados seguramente recelosos de una sorpresa.
14. Se reunieron las partidas en el mismo pueblo.
15. Se dirigió al rancho de la Noria.
16. Marchó a Salamanca con el objeto de sacar la segunda data.

17. Hizo una correría la caballería por el Aucón y regresó sin novedad a dicha villa.
18. A Irapuato escoltando el convoy del Interior.
19. Permaneció en dicho pueblo.
20. Por la noche marchó la sección a ocupar las madrigueras que tienen los rebeldes en Peralta y Molinos de Quirisco, en que logró dar muerte a tres rebeldes y aprehender a nueve con seis armas de fuego, dos lanzas, siete monturas y veinte caballos.
21. A Pueblo Nuevo donde permaneció el 22, 23, y 24, haciendo algunas correrías por sus inmediaciones.
25. Marchó a Cerro Prieto y en esta noche se dirigió a registrar las madrigueras que tienen los rebeldes en las inmediaciones de la hacienda de Parangueo.
26. Al la estancia de Quiricco.
27. A Irapuato, después de haber escarmentado en las inmediaciones de Santiaguilla la partida de Simón Pantoja, perteneciente a Antonio García (una de las gavillas perniciosas por sus robos y asesinatos) dando muerte a tres rebeldes y quedando en nuestro poder cinco prisioneros, una carabina, cuatro espadas, tres lanzas y diez caballos.
- 28, 29, y 30. Descansó la sección en Irapuato.
31. Se dirigió a esta villa escoltando un convoy.

April 1819

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 481, f. 301]

- 1 y 2. Permaneció la expresada sección en el Valle de Santiago a donde marchó para relevar con la Infantería de Celaya a la de la Corona que se hallaba en aquella guarnición.
3. Regresó a Salamanca y al pasado por Uruétaro persiguimos a una pequeña partida de rebeldes que abandonaron dos caballos ensillados.
4. Condujo el convoy de dicha villa a Irapuato.

5. Se dirigió a Pueblo Nuevo.
6. Al rancho de Toconostle.
8. Se dirigió al Valle de Santiago donde permaneció el 9,10, y 11 sin omitir alguna correría por sus inmediaciones de que resultó alejar algunas partidas de enemigos que hostilizaron a los destacamentos.
12. Al rancho de la Barquilla, en este día se dio muerte a un rebelde y quedó en nuestro poder un prisionero con catorce caballos.
13. Habiendo tomado la dirección a Salamanca y dejando emboscados unas partidas de caballería en las inmediaciones de Pantoja con el objeto de sorprender a los rebeldes que frecuentemente concurren en dicha hacienda, después de practicada la operación contramarchó hasta el espresado rancho de la Barquilla, no habiendo logrado aprehender más que un rebelde con tres caballos, a causa de haberse descubierto antes de tiempo las referidas emboscadas.
14. Al rancho de Alonso Sánchez.
15. Al Valle de Santiago, y habiéndose hecho en este día una correría por Valtierra el Grande y Cerro del Rincón de Parangueo, se dio muerte a un rebelde, quedando en nuestro poder un prisionero, dos fusiles, un machete y dos caballos ensillados.
16. Marchó a Salamanca por la segunda data de los cuerpos.
17. Se dirigió a Celaya por el convoy para el interior.
18. Lo condujo a Salamanca.
19. A Irapuato.
20. Permaneció en el mismo pueblo.
21. Regresó a Salamanca.
22. Se dirigió a la hacienda de la Tinaja, y habiendo mandado desde allí los tabacos que iban para el Valle de Santiago con una partida fuerte, contramarchó en la noche el resto de la sección hasta más allá de tres leguas del pueblo de Santa Cruz, en solicitud

de las partidas del Giro, y de algunos heridos de su gavilla, pero apesar de la más escrupulosa diligencia nada se logró.

23. Descansó la partida en el rancho de las Pilas.

24. Marchó a Salamanca.

25. Al Valle de Santiago después de haber publicado en el pueblo de Valtierra al bando que prohíbe los mercados o tianguis.

26. Subsistió en el Valle de Santiago.

27. Marchó a Cerro Blanco en solicitud de una gavilla que había pasado el día anterior por las inmediaciones de Salamanca.

28 y 29. Se mantuvo haciendo varios movimientos entre Pantoja y Pueblo nuevo atacando la misma gavilla, pero no habiendo encontrado se dirigió el 30 a este pueblo habiendo registrado de paso el cerro de Panales donde perseguidos los rebeldes abandonaron una caja de guerra y dos caballos.

May 1819

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 482, f. 204]

1. Habiendo tenido noticia de que los rebeldes se reunieron para atacar a Pénjamo o al destacamento de la hacienda de Cuernamaro, marchó la sección hasta dicha hacienda, en donde se supo que los enemigos habían tomado otra dirección por cuyo motivo regresó el 2 a Irapuato.

3. Dirigió a Salamanca.

4. Al pueblo de Huaje en donde recibió el convoy del interior y regresó a dicha villa.

5. Escoltó dicho convoy hasta Irapuato donde se mantuvo el 6 y 7 haciendo algunas correrías por sus inmediaciones.

8. Marchó al Valle de Santiago a llevar las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnición y sus destacamentos, persiguiendo al paso una partida de Antonio García por más de tres leguas logrando dar muerte en el alcance a un rebelde y tomar un caballo ensillado.

9. Permaneció en dicho punto.

10. Se dirigió al rancho de la Barquilla en solicitud de las partidas de Antonio García.

11. Después de haber recorrido las madrigueras de los ranchos de Salitre, Cerro Colorado y las Jicamas, hizo noche en el de Borja sin haber encontrado a los bandidos.

12. Regresó al Valle de Santiago y en el camino se logró aprehender al rebelde Mariano Casares, colector de alcabalas y contribuciones por los insurgentes y a su asistente con dos caballos ensillados y dos espadas.

13. Permaneció en el expresado punto.

14. Se dirigió a Salamanca, y en el camino se aprehendió un rebelde con dos carabinas y un fusil.

15. Permaneció en la expresada villa.

16. Marchó a Celaya por el convoy del interior a las órdenes del capitán Dn Vicente Sobrevilla, a causa de hallarse enfermo el que subscribió, cuyo convoy escoltó hasta Irapuato en los días 17 y 18.

19, 20, y 21. Permaneció en aquel punto, esperando se desembarasen de las atenciones del convoy la sección del teniente coronel D. Pedro Ruiz de Otaño para emprender un combinación sobre la hacienda de Burras, lo que en efecto se verificó saliendo de Irapuato la noche del 22 a las órdenes del capitán D. José Martínez de Chavero y habiendo amanecido el 23 sobre el rancho del Coyote avistó una partida con o de cincuenta rebeldes, acaudillados según noticias por los facciosos Aragón y Erdozosa, la que persiguió al escape a distancia de cuatro leguas hasta el rancho del Potretillo, según expresa el parte del enunciado Capitán Chavero y contramarchó sobre Burrera hizo noche en Taripitio.

24. Hizo un movimiento sobre la hacienda del Chapia en donde se unió con la sección del teniente coronel Otaño, marchando ambas a la del Rodeo.

25. Recorrió las cañadas del padre y capilla Colorada, habiendo encontrado en la primera treinta casacas, con igual número de cartucheras y zapatos, todo nuevo, y pasó la noche en Taripitio.

26. Regresó a Irapuato donde permaneció el 27.

28. Se dirigió a Salamanca después de haber recorrido los ranchos de Satiaguillo y el de Yaravato.

29. Marchó al Valle de Santiago a las órdenes del capitán D. Vicente Sobrevillar haciendo al paso una correría por los ranchos de la Palma y Valtierra donde se logró aprehender un rebelde con cinco caballos.

30. Permaneció en dicho punto.

31. Regresó a Salamanca sin novedad.

July 1819

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 483, f. 35]

1. Marchó dicha sección al pueblo de Santa Cruz, sin más novedad que la de haber resultado herido por los rebeldes, un dragón de San Luis.

2. Se dirigió al rancho de las Pilas, y habiendo dejado emboscado una partida en dicho pueblo con el objeto de sorprender al Giro y a los demás rebeldes que acostumbraban concurrir allí, solo se logró aprehender a un desertor de la tropa del rey, mas en la noche se dirigió esta infatigable sección a la intrincada cañada de la Saborsilla donde logró en la mañana del 3 la interesante presa del rebelde Giro, con las demás ventajas que expresa el parte dado al señor comandante general de esta provincia con fecha del 4 relativo a tan feliz acontecimiento. En el mismo día 3 no habiéndose podido encontrar víveres y forajes, fue indispensable a pesar de la crecida distancia marchar hasta Salamanca donde permaneció el 4.

5. Se dirigió a Irapuato, en donde se mantuvo hasta el 11 reponiendo la caballada que se había estropeado remanado por las correrías anteriores y la escasez de forajes.

12. En la noche se dirigió la sección dividida en varias partidas sobre las madrigueras de Pueblo Nuevo, haciendas de San Cristóbal, Guadalupe y Peralta, de cuyas inmediaciones resultó la muerte de dos rebeldes, sin contar los varios que se ahogaron en el río Grande por escaparse, quedando en nuestro poder un prisionero, una carabina, dos machetes, una lanza y doce caballos.

14. Regresó a Irapuato.

15. Se dirigió a Salamanca con el objeto de sacar la segunda data.

16. Habiendo hecho una correría por las madrigueras de Santiaguilla, Cerro Blanco, Valtierra y Santa Rosa, se logró dar muerte a dos rebeldes, quedando en nuestro poder un prisionero y 4 caballos, no habiendo podido recoger las armas de los malvados porque prefirieron arrojarlas al río antes que rendirlas.

17. y 18. Permaneció en el Valle de Santiago.

19. Habiendo quedado parte de la sección en la hacienda de la Tinaja, pasó el resto al otro lado del río Grande en Salamanca para recorrer a un mismo tiempo las madrigueras de Cerro Blanco, Santiaguillo, Valderrama, Dinantes, Pueblo Nuevo, Munguia, como en efecto se verificó en la mañana del 20 logrando dar muerte a un rebelde, quedando en nuestro poder dos prisioneros, una carabina, cuatro caballos, regresando al Valle de Santiago la partida que había quedado en la Tinaja y marchando a Irapuato la que pasó dicho río, en cuyo pueblo, permaneció el 21.

22. Habiendo unido los insurgentes a dicho punto con el objeto de llevarse los ganados fueron perseguidos por nuestra caballería a distancia de cinco leguas, logrando rescatar la mayor parte de los que se llevaban, y quedando en nuestro poder un prisionero con una carabina y un caballo ensillado.

23. Regresó a Irapuato donde permaneció el 24 y 25.

26. En la noche se hizo una correría sobre las madrigueras de las haciendas de Peralta, Guadalupe, rancho del Curadero y bosque de la Ratonera, habiendo logrado dar muerte en la mañana del 27 a dos rebeldes y hacer tres prisioneros, quedando en

nuestro poder un par de pistolas, una espada, un machete, dos lanzas y cinco caballos ensillados.

En el mismo día 27 se reunieron las partidas de en Pueblo Nuevo a excepción del que quedó operando por las inmediaciones del Valle de Santiago que también logró la aprehensión de dos insurgentes con seis caballos, el día anterior en el rancho de Cerro Prieto.

28. Regresó a Irapuato, haciendo de paso una nueva correría por las haciendas de Guadalupe, Cuehuenato y San Cristóbal donde se logró la aprehensión de un rebelde con un fusil y un caballo ensillado.

29, 30, y 31. Permaneció en este pueblo reponiendo y herrando la caballería para poder continuar la persecución de los insurgentes que contramarchó por los cerros y bosques.

August 1819

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 483, ff. 175-176]

1. Marchó al Valle de Santiago conduciendo las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnición, la mayor parte de la caballería que había permanecido en Irapuato el 29, 30 y 31 del anterior herrando y reponiendo la caballada, habiendo practicado en dichos tres días la infantería y el resto de la caballería de la expresada sección a las órdenes del capitán de Dragones de San Carlos D. José Martínez de Chavero, varios movimientos por las inmediaciones de dicho punto, en persecución de los rebeldes.

2. Reunida toda la fuerza en el indicado lugar, pasó revista de comisario y en la noche de este día se dirigió a la hacienda de Pantoja con el objeto de escarmentar a la perversa gavilla de García, mas a pesar de haber destacado varias partidas al amanecer de 3 nada se pudo lograr en este día, porque los malvados dos días antes se habían dispersado ya por la otra parte de Río Grande ocultándonos las canoas y barqueros para impedirnos el paso.

4. Se hicieron varios movimientos por las madrigueras de la hacienda de Santa Catalina, la barquilla y Rancho de Borja, registrando al mismo tiempo el escarpado cerro de la Torre, no habiendo encontrado enemigos.
5. Sin esperar ya de lograr ventaja alguna por aquel rumbo, regresó la sección al Valle de Santiago, recogiendo algunas familias de los individuos que expresa la adjunta lista presentados en el día anterior en Pantoja implorando la real gracia del indulto.
6. Marchó a Salamanca con el objeto de pasar el río Grande, dejando en el Valle de Santiago la Infantería y parte de la caballería para operar a derecha e izquierda de dicho río, quitando este refugio al enemigo como en efecto se verificó el 7 y 8 recorriendo la partida de la derecha las madrigueras de Santiaguilla, Cerro de Pemales y Pueblo Nuevo, habiendo registrado la de la izquierda a las órdenes del capitán del regimiento de la Corona D. Vicente Sobrevilla los ranchos de Valtierra, Cerro Prieto y Duranes y saliendo igualmente en la noche del mismo día 8 una guerrilla del regimiento de San Luis a las órdenes del teniente graduado D. José María Castillo y otra del de San Carlos a las del de la misma graduación D. Aranacio Rojas lograron recoger al amanecer del 9 cuarenta y cinco caballos incluso algunos ensillados que abandonaron los rebeldes arrojándose al río perseguidos por Castillo y Rojas, y habiendo continuado en este día el resto de la partida de la derecha sobre las madrigueras de la hacienda de Peralta al mismo tiempo que la de la izquierda recorría los ranchos de la Calara, Alonso Sánchez y San Antonio, concurrieron ambas en Pantoja, siendo el fruto de toda esta correría la entera dispersión de los enemigos y la presa de los cuarenta y cinco caballos expresados con las demás ventajas que manifiesta el parte dado al sr. comandante general de esta provincia coronel D. Antonio Linares, con fecha de este mismo día en el rancho de Piedras Negras, en donde se hizo noche la partida de la derecha quedando la de la izquierda en Pantoja.

10. Se dirigió a Irapuato la partida de la derecha quedando la de la izquierda al Valle de Santiago recorriendo la primera los ranchos del Curadero, Guanimitiro y hacienda de San Rique.
11. Permaneció en Irapuato.
12. Volvió a Pueblo Nuevo, en donde concurrió con la partida a la izquierda sin novedad.
13. Reunida toda la sección marchó a Irapuato.
14. Condujo el convoy del interior a Salamanca.
15. Escoltó dicho convoy hasta Celaya en donde permaneció el 16, 17 y 18 esperando el procedente de México.
19. Regresó a Salamanca con el expresado convoy, donde permaneció el 20, dando algún descanso a la mulada que apenas pudo llegar a dicho punto el día anterior.
21. Pasó a Irapuato en donde permaneció el 22.
23. Se dirigió a Pueblo Nuevo con el objeto de pasar el río para perseguir a los insurgentes en combinación con las secciones de Puruándiro y Pénjamo, mas como los rebeldes habían hecho ya desaparecer las canoas y barqueras, fue preciso continuar la marcha el 24 al paso de Salamanca en donde habiendo tenido contestación del sargento mayor D. Juan Torres, comandante de la sección de Pénjamo, en que dicho jefe manifestaba la necesidad de regresar a aquel pueblo en solicitud de las raciones y habiendo al mismo tiempo adquirido noticias de que los bandidos de Jalpa se habían reunido con los de Santa Cruz se dirigió la sección a este último punto el 25 en que logró las ventajas que expresa el parte dado al señor comandante general con fecha del 27 del presente.
26. Se practicaron varias correrías por las cañadas y cerros de las haciendas de Suaz y Valencia, sin novedad.
27. Regresó a Salamanca.
28. Permaneció en el mismo punto.

29. Se practicó una correría por el pueblo de Valtierra y habiendo perseguido a una partida de rebeldes hasta la hacienda de Sorelo y Capilla Pintada no se pudo alcanzar a aquello por el retardo en pasar el río de la Lafa y solo se logró aprehender a dos individuos que servían de espías al finado Giro, siendo al mismo tiempo ladrones y asesinos.

30. Permaneció la sección en Salamanca.

September 1819

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 483, f. 361]

1. Marchó la expresada sección al valle de Santiago.
2. Se dirigió a la Hacienda de Pantoja en persecución de la gavilla del rebelde García pero habiéndose sabido nuestro movimiento pasó a la otra parte del río Grande con anticipación y no se pudieron lograr las ventajas que se esperaban.
3. Después de haber recorrido las madrigueras de los ranchos de Copales y San Pedro, se dirigió a Santa Rosa sin novedad.
4. A la hacienda de Tinaja.
5. Al Valle de Santiago a conducir las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnición y sus destacamentos.
7. A Pantoja sin novedad.
8. A Santa Rosa en donde se decía había de concurrir la gavilla de García con el motivo de la función de Corpus que allí celebraba.
9. Volvió a Pantoja con el objeto de fortificarse aquel interesante punto, madriguera favorita y principal en donde tiempo ha solía haber sus reuniones aquel obstinado y perverso cabecilla y desde aquella fecha ha permanecido allí la sección hasta el 29, trabajando incesantemente sin dejar de hacer frecuentes salidas, y con el fin de proporcionar víveres y brazos para aquella fortificación, ya persiguiendo a los rebeldes hasta la distancia de seis o ocho leguas, de cuyos movimientos han resultado las

ventajas de haber aprehendido a tres insurgentes con otros tantos caballos ensillados y un fusil y la de haberse dispersado las partidas de dicho cabecilla presentándose a gozar de la real gracia del indulto los individuos que expresa la adjunta lista a demás de los varios que han ocurrido a Pueblo Nuevo, Salamanca y otros puntos organizados.

30. Se dirigió a los ranchos de Salitre en donde nuevamente contaba a reunir García las partidas dispersas con el objeto de hostilizar a Pantoja luego que se alejase de aquel punto la sección y habiéndome avistado en efecto aunque a larga distancia una partida como de sesenta rebeldes, fue perseguida hasta los cerros de Huipana y ranchos de la Sangijuela pertenecientes al partido de Puruándiro en donde desapareciera sin perderles dar alcance por la espesura de los bosques y ventaja con que emprendieron su vergonzosa y precipitada fuga.

October 1819

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 484, ff. 66-67]

1. Al rancho de los Copales.
2. Al Valle de Santiago con el objeto de pasar revista de comisario y en el camino se hizo prisionero a un asistente de Antonio García con tres caballos y una carabina.
3. Se dirigió al rancho de Baltierra después de haber practicado una correría por todas las inmediaciones donde suelen guarnecerse los rebeldes.
4. Marchó a Salamanca por la primera data.
5. Continuó su marcha a Irapuato a recoger víveres para el destacamento de Pantoja.
6. Salió por las inmediaciones en solicitud de mulas para conducir dichos víveres.
7. A Pueblo Nuevo y en el camino se aprendió a un rebelde montado y armado con una lanza.
8. A la Labor de Peralta y habiéndose practicado una correría por los cerros de Guanímaro se logró la aprehensión de un insurgente con siete caballos.

9. Se practicó otra correría por los ranchos del Curadero y Hacienda de Quiteco en que se aprehendió a un bandido con tres caballos, una carabina y una lanza.
10. Marchó al Valle de Santiago a conducir las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnición y su destacamento.
11. Regresó a Pantoja.
12. Descansó en idem.
13. En la noche hizo una dilatada correría destacándose partidas por los ranchos del Rodeo, de Villachuato, Huipana y hacienda de Zurumnalo del partido de Puruándiro en que se logró dar muerte a cinco insurgentes, quedando en nuestro poder dos prisioneros con tres pistolas, una carabina, un sable, una lanza y diez y seis caballos no todos útiles, juntamente con el vestido, divisas, despachos y sello del titulado capitán Ignacio Garrido que escapó arrojándose en el río Grande.
14. Se reunieron las partidas en Huipana.
15. Marchó la sección al rancho de las Raíces.
16. Al rancho del cerro, colorando y habiéndose mandado en la noche de este día varias partidas por sobre las madrigueras de Cerro Blanco, Baltierra y Uruétaro, se logró dar muerte a un rebelde, quedando en nuestro poder en la mañana del día siguiente un prisionero y la mujer de Antonio García, con más un caballo y una espada.
17. Se reunieron las partidas en el rancho de la Aguililla.
18. Permaneció en dicho rancho reponiendo la caballada estropeada por las correrías anteriores.
19. Pasó a Salamanca una corta partida con el objeto de conducir el convoy de Irapuato y el resto de la sección marchó al Valle de Santiago conduciendo la segunda data de los piquetes de Caballería que se hallaban en aquel destino.
20. Se condujo el convoy a Irapuato.

21. Marchó la partida que se había dirigido al Valle, al Pantoja, y a Pueblo Nuevo la que condujo el convoy a Irapuato.
22. Se reunieron ambas en Pantoja después de haber practicado una correría por las madrigueras de Bravo.
23. Se dirigió al rancho de Borija.
24. A Santa Rosa Parangueo.
25. Al rancho de la Estrella después de haber hecho varios movimientos por las inmediaciones de que resultó la aprehensión del rebelde Ramón Muñoz que tanto ha perjudicado.
26. Marchó a Pantoja.
27. Permaneció en idem.
28. Al Rancho del Rincón de Parangueo de donde salieron en la noche varias partidas por las madrigueras de los ranchos de Cerro Colorado, de Pegueros, Huipana, Puerto de Aguila y Caña, en que se logró hacer a un rebelde prisionero, varios utiles de maestranza y seis caballos.
29. Se reunieron las partidas en el rancho de las Jicamas.
30. Al rancho de Borja.
31. Habiéndose practicado una dilatada correría por los ranchos de Valtierra, Cerro Prieto y Uruétaro, se logró dar muerte al cabecilla Miguel Cervantes y a su compañero José María González, que dando en el campo muerte tres rebeldes sin contar los que se ahogaron en el río Grande, habiendo escapado heridos los pocos que sobraron de la gavilla de aquel pernicioso cabecilla y se han recogido su sello, dos carabinas, dos pistolas, una espada, cuatro lanzas y once caballos.

November 1819

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 484, f. 339]

1. Se dirigió la expresada sección al pueblo de Santa Rosa Parangueo con el objeto de sorprender a los rebeldes que suelen concurrir allí.
2. Al Valle de Santiago con el objeto de pasar revista de comisario.
3. Se practicó una correría por el pueblo de la Magdalena, sin novedad.
4. Marchó a la hacienda de Tinaja.
5. A Salamanca por la primera data.
6. Regresó al Valle de Santiago conduciendo las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnición y sus destacamentos.
7. Marchó a la hacienda de Pantoja con el mismo objeto y el de llevar operarios para su fortificación.
8. Al rancho de San Francisco Javier.
9. Al de Alonso Sánchez, protegiendo la conducción de materiales y operarios para la fortificación de dicha hacienda.
10. Al rancho de la plaza Vieja.
11. Al de Copales.
12. Al de la Noria.
13. Al de la Estrella y en esta noche salieron las partidas de caballería, sobre los ranchos del Salitre, Barquilla y Rodeo de Villachuato, habiendo logrado dar muerte a tres rebeldes, quedando en nuestro poder otros tantos prisioneros, con dos lanzas y cinco caballos ensillados y después de haber perseguido al escapar en todas direcciones a la canalla, se reunieron dichas partidas el 14 en el rancho del Rodeo.
15. Se dirigió la sección a la hacienda de Zurumuato con el objeto de combinar sus movimientos con las tropas de Puruándiro que concurrieron allí.
16. A la Barquilla.

17. A la hacienda de la Calera y habiéndose hecho al paso una correría por los ranchos de la Sangijuela, Tres Reyes y San Andrés, se logró la ventaja de recoger solamente tres caballos, a pesar de haber perseguido a todo escape a los rebeldes que se avistaron en dicho día.
18. Al de San Andrés.
19. Regresó a la Calera.
20. Al rancho de Boriija, y habiéndome avistado varios pelotones de la gavilla del rebelde García, se perseguieron a todo escape, mas por la gran distancia en que se devisaron, solo se logró el fruto de haberles dispersado, quitándoles cuatro caballos.
21. Se hizo una correría por el pueblo de Santa Rosa con el objeto de sorprender a los rebeldes que suelen concurrir en dicho pueblo los días festivos, pero por desgracia no se logró ventaja alguna.
22. Al rancho de las Terillas.
23. Marchó la sección a Salamanca por la segunda data.
24. Se dirigió al rancho de Cerro Prieto.
25. Al de San Francisco Javier.
26. Al de las Raíces.
27. Se dirigió al rancho de Salitre con el objeto de combinar sus movimientos con las tropas de Puruándiro que concurren allí.
28. Recorrió esta sección las madrigueras de la Loma Tendida, Copales y pueblo de Santa Rosa sin novedad, y según lo acordado, el teniente coronel D. Manuel Rodríguez de Cella, debió registrar con las tropas de Puruándiro las madrigueras de Puerto de Águila, Cerro Colorado y rancho del Pozo en el mismo día, lográndose las ventajas que halla logrado dicho jefe.
29. A Salamanca, donde permaneció el 30 esperándose al señor comandante general de la provincia para pasar al nuevo destino de Juan de la Vega.

December 1819

[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 476, f. 188]

1. Marchó al pueblo de Santa Cruz escoltando el convoy del interior.
2. Se dirigió al rancho de los Vascos y en la mañana de este día habiendo seguido de un corto número de bandidos que se avistaron a dicho pueblo se les tomó un fusil y cuatro caballos, mas destacando en la noche una partida a la hacienda de Santo Domingo y otro al rancho de las Tortugas lograron entre ambos la aprehensión del cabecilla Simón Pantoja con otros dos rebeldes, una carabina y cinco caballos.
3. Se reunieron las partidas en el rancho de Santiaguillo.
4. Marchó dicha sección a Salamanca por la primera data.
5. Hizo noche en le rancho de Copales después de haber dispersado y perseguido por más de cinco leguas al rebelde García, que con una fuerza de ciento cincuenta bandidos se hallaba en el pueblo de Santa Rosa, habiendo obtenido las ventajas y resultados que pormenor expresa el parte al Sr. coronel D. Antonio Linares, comandante general de esta provincia en el mismo día.
6. Se dirigió al rancho de Cerro Colorado.
7. Al de Tetilla.
8. Marchó a la hacienda de Pantoja.
9. Habiendo reunido a dicha sección el teniente coronel D. Eusebio Moreno con ochenta caballos se distribuyó toda la fuerza en varias partidas que recorrieron simultanea e incesantemente todas las madrigueras que ocupa la gavilla del rebelde García desde los ranchos de Huipana hasta Guerrero en las escarpadas montañas de Villachuato y Parangueo, ocupádonos en dicha fatiga desde este día hasta el 12, con las ventajas que expresa el parte dado a dicho señor comandante general con fecha de este último día, habiéndose presentado en pantija el dragón de San Carlos que se extravió en el alcance de SS.
13. Se dirigió a Salamanca.

14. Al rancho de Santiaguillo.
15. Al de San Francisco Javier.
16. Al Pueblo Nuevo con el objeto de una combinación que se practicó en unión del teniente coronel D. Eusebio Moreno destacando en la noche varias partidas sobre la hacienda de Cuchimato, la Caja y Rancho Nuevo en solicitud de las partidas de Montejano y el cabecilla Toro, dependientes de los Ortices, y aunque se continuaron los movimientos el 17 hasta las inmediaciones de la hacienda de Rubí, no se pudo lograr una ventaja que la de dispersarlos y dejarlos de aquellas madrigueras.
18. Se dirigió a Salamanca por la segunda data.
19. Permaneció en dicho punto, y en la noche se practicó una correría por los ranchos de Valtierra Cerro Blanco, Uruétaro y Puerto de Valle con el fruto de haber aprehendido a dos rebeldes con una carabina y tres caballos.
20. Se reunieron las partidas en el pueblo de Santa Rosa Parangueo.
21. Marchó al Valle de Santiago.
22. Permaneció en dicho punto.
23. Se hizo una correría por los ranchos de la Loma Tendida, Copales y Borija, con el útil resultado de haber quedado en nuestro poder un capitán de rebeldes con otros cuatro de la escolta de García, tres carabinas, cuatro lanzas y ocho caballos.
24. Se dirigió al Valle de Santiago y en esta noche habiéndose puesto en movimiento la sección buscando a García por diferentes rumbos se logró sólo la aprehensión del cabecilla Candelario Flores con dos pistolas y tres caballos.
25. Se reunieron las partidas en el rancho de San Felipe.
26. Se emprendió un movimiento general por todas las madrigueras que ocupan las partidas del rebelde García en combinación con las tropas de Puruándiro y Salvatierra, y habiendo durado esta fatiga hasta el 31 se lograron las ventajas que pormenor expresa el parte dado al señor comandante general de la provincia con fecha de este mismo día.

Appendix Two[AGN: *Operaciones de Guerra*, vol. 475, f. 193]

Provincia de Guanajuato. Demarcación del Valle de Santiago a cargo del señor graduado de colonel D. Anastasio Bustamante. Estado que manifiesta el número de los pueblos que se han reorganizado, y reducciones que se han formado con los habitantes dispersos en dicha demarcación, desde el año de 1818, hasta el presente, con distinción de los puntos guarnecidos con tropa y de que se hallan con patriotas guardacampos encargados de su seguridad y buen orden.

Pueblos reorganizados y guarnecidos con tropa:

Valle de Santiago

Magdalena

San Jerónimo

Santa Rosa

Reducciones que se han formado en los puntos siguientes y se hallan cubiertos igualmente con tropa:

Haciendas: San Javier

Villadiego

Carmelita

La Grande

Tintoja

Pantoja

Raíces

Rancherías: Charco

Copales

San Felipe

Reducciones que se han formado en los puntos siguientes y subsisten solamente al cargo de patriotas guardacampos:

Haciendas:	San José de Propios	Rancherías:	Ojo de Agua de la Batea
	Santa Rosa		Surumitaro
	Huéfnas		Puerto de Zempoala
	Pitayo		Olla de Sintora
	Brazo		Rancho Nuevo de Cal
	Casas Blancas		Aguiliya
	Uruétaro		Tecolote
	Lobos		Valtierra
	San Vicente		La Labor
	Mal País		Capilla Blanca
	Guantes		La Noria
	Compañía		Rincón de Parangueo
	Aróstegui		San Andrés
	La Boba		Loma Tendida
	La Cal		Cerro Colorado
	Santo Domingo		Tinaja de Pantoja
	Parangueo		Salitre
	Santa Catalina		San Cristóbal
			San Antonio
			San Francisco Javier
			Alonso Sánchez
			Paso Blanco
			Duranes
			Santa Bárbara

Tetillas
 Cerro Prieto
 Santiaguillo
 Xononostle
 Cerro Blanco

Resumen general:

Pueblos reorganizados y defendidos por tropa	4
Reducciones guarnecidas por tropa	10
Reducciones guarnecidas por patriotas guardacampos	48
TOTAL	62

Nota 1:

Que además de los vecinos emigrados que se hallaban dispersos en la mencionada demarcación, ha venido a establecerse en los referidos pueblos y reducciones, una considerable porción de habitantes de otras partes en solicitud de los auspicios y ventajas que les proporciona un sistema en que al mismo tiempo que se respetan las propiedades y todos los derechos del hombre en sociedad, se afianza la tranquilidad pública de un modo inalterable con la vigilante observación de los destacamentos y partidos y tropa que recorren el territorio no menos que con el cuidado de los caudillos guardacampos, estando todo muy a la mira de evitar una nueva facción de los indultos descontentos a su reincidencia en el latrocinio y demás desórdenes a que por tanto tiempo estuvieron acostumbrados.

Nota 2:

Que la elevación de guardacampos y principalmente de sus caudillos, se ha hecho de aquellos labradores que aun en el tiempo de la rebelión han observado mejor conducta y tienen más ascendiente sobre el resto de los vecinos.

Nota 3:

Que no sólo se han destruido los ranchos y demás establecimientos que habían formado los emigrados y dispersos en los cerros y bosques durante el tiempo de la revolución, sino también todos aquellos que se oponían a la pacificación y buen orden.

[signed] Anastasio Bustamante.

Salamanca, 4 de septiembre de 1820.

Appendix Three

Rebellions and *Pronunciamientos*, 1837-1841.

1837:

26 January: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Alta California.

14 April : Federalist *pronunciamiento* in San Luis Potosí.

6 May: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Río Verde, led by Esteban Moctezuma.

2 June: Revolt in Chilapa under Colonel Domingo Esquivel.

9 August: Federalist rebellion in New Mexico.

16 August: Secessionist *pronunciamiento* in Sonora.

9 October: *Pronunciamiento* of González and Fiz.

23 November: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Papantla.

30 November: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in La Aquililla (Michoacán), led by
Gordiano Guzmán.

26 December: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Arizpe led by General José Urrea.

1838:

11 January: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Culliacán.

16 January: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Sinaloa.

19 May: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Aguascalientes.

3 June: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Monte Alto.

23 August: Revolts in Morelia and Oaxaca.

3 September: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Arizpe.

7 October: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Tampico by Captain Longinos Montenegro, joined by José Antonio Mejía.

5 November: Federalist revolt in Villa de Guerrero, Tamaulipas, led by Antonio Canales.

9 November: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Camargo.

12 December: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Ciudad Victoria.

14: December: Uprising in Oaxaa.

16 December: Federalist revolt in Tampico. begins under Urrea and Mejía.

1839

15 January : Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Moncloa.

28 January: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Toluca by Colonel Vicente González.

27 February: *Pronunciamiento* of Montemorelos.

1 June: *Pronunciamiento* in Misantla.

11 June: *Pronunciamiento* in Rancho San Francisco.

1840:

14 January: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Valladolid, Yucatán.

18 February: Garrison at Mérida seconds the *pronunciamiento* in Valladolid. Its plan declares the secession of Yucatán from the Republic until federalism is re-introduced.

25 February: This plan is seconded in Campeche by Juan Pablo Anaya.

30 March: Federalist *pronunciamientos* in San Andrés de Nava, Santa Rita de Morelos and San Pedro de Gigedo.

1 April: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Valle de Santa Rosa.

- 16 July: Federalist revolt in Mexico City.
- 9 August: *Pronunciamiento* in Turicato (Michoacán).
- 1 October: *Pronunciamiento* in Valle de Aguililla.
- 7 December: *Pronunciamiento* in Pichuacalco.
- 28 December: *Pronunciamiento* in San Pedro Michoacán.

1841:

- 1 February: Yaqui secessionist plan of independence led by Manuel María Gándara in Sonora.
- 8 May: *Pronunciamiento* in Landa (Querétaro).
- 30 July: *Pronunciamiento* in Capula.
- 8 August: Plan of Guadalajara by Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga.
- 23 August: *Pronunciamiento* of Northern Army seconding the Plan of Guadalajara, led by Mariano Arista.
- 31 August: *Pronunciamiento* in La Ciudadela (Mexico City) led by Gabriel Valencia.
- 5 September: *Pronunciamiento* in Santa Anna de Tamaulipas.
- 9 September: *Pronunciamiento* in Perote led by Santa Anna and in Santiago de Querétaro.
- 11 September: *Pronunciamientos* in Veracruz and Durango.
- 14 September: *Pronunciamientos* in Saltillo and Monterrey.
- 15 September: *Pronunciamientos* in Tlaxcala and Santa Anna Chautepam.
- 17 September: *Pronunciamiento* in Orizaba.
- 1 October: Federalist *pronunciamiento* in Mexico City.
- 2 October: *Pronunciamiento* of General Valentín Canalizo.
- 3 October: Centralist *Pronunciamiento* in Morelia.
- 4 October: *Pronunciamiento* in Patzcuáro.

5 October: *Pronunciamiento* in Acuitzio.

6 October: *Pronunciamiento* in Apatzingán, and a federalist *pronunciamiento* in Morelia.

(Sources: Bustamante, *El gabinete mexicano*, vol. 1 pp. 33, 79, 159. Fowler, *Mexico in the Age of Proposals*, pp. 283-285. Malo, *Diario de sucesos notables*, vol. 1 pp. 134-193. Sordo Cedeño, *El congreso en la primera república centralista*, pp. 289, 365.)

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