PREVENTING TERRORISM? CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND NATIONALIST VIOLENCE IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY

Ioannis Tellidis

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St. Andrews



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Abstract

This study examines the debates on nationalism, terrorism and conflict resolution, and intends to identify, on the one hand, the reasons why and the instances in which nationalist discourses usurp the notions of political violence and present it as a legitimate option for opposing a State, and on the other, whether there exist circumstances where conflict resolution techniques and approaches can be useful in isolating terrorist discourses from the nationalist ones, without necessarily criminalising the latter. The study employs a critical and discourse analysis approach to explaining ethno-nationalist and terrorist phenomena, arguing that a contextualisation of the nationalist and terrorist objects of study is necessary in order to comprehensively analyse the relationship between the two, and the instances where the former gives rise to the latter. The purpose of the study is to develop a theoretical framework for the understanding of nationalism and terrorism as interconnected practices, and looks into ways in which conflict resolution can intervene and prevent the infusion of the two.

In order to test this framework, the thesis examines the Basque conflict and discusses how the discriminatory practices of the Francoist dictatorship towards the Basques played a catalytic role in their acceptance of violence as a legitimate vehicle of pursuit of the nationalist aim of independence, and how the radicalisation of counter-terrorist practices after the democratic transition further distanced the civil society from both the State and the militant group. The study analyses the role of the Basque civil society, and how it became the primary actor in the transformation of the conflict by rejecting violent practices from both the State and ETA, while at the same time promoting a more civic aspect of the Basque nationalist discourse. This attitude allows the thesis to conclude that, contrary to theories of conflict resolution, the State can combat terrorism most effectively when it allies with civil society in the alteration of perceptions that perpetuate violence, but instead favour a strictly political approach to the pursuit of political objectives, like self-determination.

Declarations

I, Ioannis Tellidis, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 80,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

date……..signature of candidate……..

I was admitted as a research student in September 2002 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in September 2002; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2002 and 2007.

date…….signature of candidate……

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution of Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

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Contents

Acknowledgements

The first time I found myself interested in the Basque conflict was during my first stay in Spain during which the most significant unilateral ceasefire was declared in 1998. The end of the ceasefire in 1999 and, more concretely, the first explosion (after the ceasefire) that killed Colonel Pedro Antonio Blanco in January 2000 was only blocks away from my house, and it had a significant effect in my desire to study the Basques and the reasons behind their violent attitudes in a liberal democratic state like Spain. I am very grateful to all in the University of St Andrews for their help and support in my study. In particular, I am immensely grateful to my supervisor, Professor Oliver P. Richmond, for his guidance, persistence, strong interest and patience, which at some points must have superseded that of Job. I am also grateful to the School of International Relations in the University of St Andrews who provided the necessary funding for the completion of my fieldwork. I am also grateful to Dr Norman Reid and the staff of the Special Collections Department of the University of St Andrews Library who proved to be more than just colleagues and showed their practical support when the going got tough with my thesis. I owe immense gratitude also to Professor Jesús Martín Ramirez and Dr Tina Lindhart-Ramirez who virtually adopted me as their son, providing for my material and intellectual needs during my stay in Spain. Of course, I cannot forget the many people in Madrid and the Basque Country, who spent some of their time answering my questions and engaging in very fruitful and insightful conversations without which this study would have been incomplete. In particular, I would like to thank Gorka Espiau and Professor Ludger Mees for the time they devoted and the insights they offered for my study of the Basque conflict. Finally, the support of my family and my friends was invaluable and the main motivation for the completion of my thesis. My gratitude for their patience, help and support for this study will be eternal. Any errors, of course, are solely my responsibility.

Terms and Abbreviations

EE	Euskadiko Ezkerra (*Basque Left*)
EGI	Euzko Gaztedi Indarra (*Basque Youth Force*)
Elkarri	Association for Peace, Dialogue and Agreement
Ertzaintza	Basque Police
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (*Basque Homeland and Freedom*)
EU	European Union
Euskadi	The Basque Country
GAL	Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (*Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups*)
GAR	Grupos Antiterroristas Rurales (*Rural Anti-terrorist Groups*)
Gesto	Co-ordinadora Gesto Por la Paz en Euskal Herria (*Co-ordination of a Gesture for Peace in the Basque Country*)
HB	Herri Batasuna (*Popular Unity*)
LAB	Langile Abertzaleen Batzordeak (*Nationalist Workers' Committees*)
MLVN	Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco (*Basque National Liberation Movement*)
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PNV	Partido Nacionalista Vasco (*Basque Nationalist Party*)
PP	Partido Popular (Popular Party)
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (*Spanish Workers' Socialist Party*)
UN	United Nations

INTRODUCTION

When I first set the point of departure of this thesis, violence was the only dimension of the Basque conflict that interested me. I wanted to understand how is it possible for a liberal democratic state, as well as a minority extremist group to be violent, especially towards innocent people, in a country, a setting, that provides them all the necessary institutions to raise their grievance(s). There were many case studies which could have been selected, especially European, where liberal democracy is the norm, but the Basque case was the more provocative because, while researching, I realised there are so many instances where it deviates from existing theories of orthodox terrorism theories, as well as theories of conflict resolution. First and foremost, I realised that the liberal democratic state of Spain did not reflect the liberal qualities it claimed to endorse, when it found refuge in illegal activities that were branded 'counter-terrorist' in order to eliminate what it perceived to be a threat to its own survival. What is more, it seemed to follow the prescriptions of orthodox theories of terrorism according to which a liberal democratic setting must combat such minority groups because any grievances they might have may be communicated through the existing institutionalised channels that every liberal democratic state puts at the disposal of its citizens.[1] This, as I saw in the examination of the Basque case, did not take into consideration 'permanent' minorities that were engaged in a futile battle against the wishes and the agendas of a 'permanent' majority. Second, my understanding of theories of conflict resolution according to which, any attempts to resolve the conflict reside mostly in the political will of official and semi-official actors, ran contrary to the phenomenon of Basque civil society taking control of the conflict resolution process, through the participation of social initiatives and with the aid of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that were set up precisely for the

[1] Paul Wilkinson, 1990. "Some observations on the relationship between terrorism and freedom" in Martin Warner and Roger Crisp (eds.), *Terrorism, Protest and Power*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 44-53; Conor Cruise O'Brien, 1983. "Terrorism under democratic conditions: the case of the IRA" in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), *Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence*, Scranton: Wesleyan University Press, p. 93.

purpose to educate and inform both the minority and the majority that the violence exhibited from both conflictive sides is detrimental not only to them as conflictive parties, but also to the very society they both claim to represent and/or work for.

The Basques have their own language and customs that differ from other Indo-european clans and the conflict with the central authorities goes as far back as the late 19th Century, when the Basque region formed part of the Spanish state for the first time, albeit with some degree of autonomy.[2] The Basques' cultural signs of difference were used in the manifestations of violence both in the early days of Basque nationalism (late 19th-early 20th century), as well as in its revival during Franco's dictatorship. Therefore in order to understand the perpetuation of violence and the devotion of some segments of the Basque society to it, one has to first understand who the Basques are and what makes them different from the Spanish. In other words, it is necessary to understand Basque identity in order to be able to explain the dynamics and development of Basque nationalism – its history, its aspirations, its perceptions. This type of analysis is greatly aided by post-modernist approaches on issues of nationalism that view nations and ethnies as 'imagined communities',[3] and recognise the fact that conceptions of 'otherness' are very much rooted in the conceptions that we have about ourselves.[4] In that sense, therefore, and contrary to theories that maintain that nations and cultural ties between individuals are based on cultural givens (for instance, blood, race, language, locality),[5] the nation is deconstructed to reveal an artificial image which, in turn, makes evident the elasticity, not only of the notions, but also of the boundaries that set the ingroup apart from the outgroup.[6]

This, in turn, contributes to an understanding of the Basque extremists' selection of violence per se, as well as the reasons behind that. Only when that understanding is achieved can one look for ways in which ethno-nationalist violence will become too

[2] Javier Corcuera, 1979. *Orígenes, Ideología y Organización del Nacionalismo Vasco, 1876-1904*, Madrid: Siglo XXI; Marianne Heiberg, 1989. *The Making of Basque Nation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 20-38; Daniele Conversi, 1997.*The Basques, the Catalans and Spain*, London: Hurst & Co., pp. 45-46

[3] Benedict Anderson, 1991. *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso, p. 15.

[4] Homi Bhabha, 1990. "Dissemination: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation" in Homi Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration*, London; New York: Routledge

[5] Clifford Geertz, 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*, London: Fontana, p. 259.

[6] Andrew Linklater and John MacMillan, 1995. *Boundaries in Question*, London: Pinter.

costly to favour and utilise. On the other hand, an analysis into the workings of the State as well as its perceptions about its foundations, conceptions and, ultimately, survival must be examined under the prism of the Westphalian standards of statehood, prominent until nowadays, that brought forward an understanding that the State's borders are inviolable, except in a war with another State, and within these borders the legitimacy of violence rested with the State structures. As Richmond claims, the Westphalian system is incapable of addressing conflicts that fall under intra-state (rather than inter-state) categories.[7]

The influence of the Westphalian system, however, is not limited to the understanding and analysis of terrorist activity, but extends to the understanding of conflict in general, and, as such, it respects the ontology of the State even where that is clearly at fault, not only when its nature is oppressive and undemocratic, but also – if not, *particularly* – when the State structure is seemingly liberal democratic and as such any violence directed against it is condemned. Orthodox theories of terrorism view terrorist attacks against liberal democracies as "a perversion of pluralism and democratic freedoms",[8] an attack to the human rights principle.[9] As such, they believe that domestic and international law and counter-terrorist policies should focus principally on the infringement of human rights by it, if the battle against terrorism is to be won.[10] Conflict resolution approaches, on the other hand, rely on the structures of the state for the transformation or elimination of conflicts, primarily because of the theorema of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders as understood under the Westphalian system, but also because the state is seen as the only actor with the necessary resources that need to be mobilized for the desired end. As such, until the 1960s and the conception that the system is also to blame for the intractability of conflicts,[11] the State was virtually a holy entity which decided both the beginning as well as the cessation of conflict. As a result, the very roots of conflict, when this concerned hostilities that took place within the borders of a State, were left unaccounted for and unidentified.

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[7] Oliver Richmond, 2002. *Maintaining Order, Making Peace*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 4.
[8] Wilkinson, 1990, op.cit., p. 47.
[9] Irwin Cotler, 1998. "Towards a counter-terrorist law and policy", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 3-23.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Johan Galtung, 1964. Editorial, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 1-4.

From the 1960s onwards, however, approaches to conflict resolution became more and more critical, disputing the role of the State in, and its contribution to, the cessation of conflict and the establishment of sustainable peace.[12] The end of the Cold War brought forward an understanding of intra-state conflicts that until then was left to be dealt with almost exclusively by the prescriptions offered within the Westphalian framework. The idea that there exist universal human needs,[13] even though it was conceived before the end of the bi-polar world, was catalytic to the study of conflict resolution. This gave rise to studies of 'protracted conflicts'[14], that is, social conflicts, in which the marginalisation of one of the parties took place along the lines of the communal and/or regional spheres. In turn, the role of culture[15] and identity also began to be examined to identify reasons and circumstances that, until then, were claimed to be of little or no importance, since conflict was only identified in materialistic terms as an incompatibility of goals and wishes between the conflictive parties.[16] It is these critical approaches that have formed the base of my critical understanding of the Basque conflict, in which the two main protagonists, the State and the terrorist organization ETA, seemed to be engaged in a war of attrition,[17] each for their own reasons, that marginalized any resolution attempts for the conflict and, at times, radicalized both the terrorists and their circle of support as well as the counter-terrorist initiatives and strategies the State was deploying.

Methodology

This study engages in a critical understanding of the three schools it sets out to explain (nationalism, terrorism and conflict resolution studies) in the light of the Basque

[12] John Paul Lederach, 1997. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington D. C.: United States Institute for Peace.
[13] John Burton, 1979. *Deviance, Terrorism and War*, Oxford: Martin Robertson
[14] Edward Azar, 1986. "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions", in Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Brighton: Whitesheaf
[15] Kevin Avruch and Peter Black, 1991. "The Culture Question and Intercultural Conflict Resolution", *Peace and Change*, Vol. 16, pp. 22-45. See also Kevin Avruch, 1998. *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.
[16] Jacob Berkovitch, 1984. *Social Conflict and Third Parties*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press
[17] Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, 2001. *ETA Contra el Estado: Las Estrategias del Terrorismo*, Barcelona: Tusquets

case. Critical theories are a valuable tool that allow researchers to deconstruct all theories that have been brought forward and question their assumptions in order to show that the truth which they claim to present is but the result of a specific manner of analysis elaborated under a specific framework. According to Cox, "critical theory asks how the order came about and calls into question the nature of the existing structures".[18] Essentially, it does away with the rigidity of normative theories by focusing its analysis, not on facts, but on particular social and historical frameworks.[19] Crucially, according to Bleiker, critical theory questions the power relationships under examination and intends to offer an understanding as to their emergence,[20] the reasons behind the specific interpretation of the 'facts',[21] and seeks to determine which elements are universal and which are "historically contingent".[22]

According to "orthodox terrorism" approaches,[23] as I have claimed, a liberal democratic state carries greater legitimacy, than the terrorists who are but a minority. The reason for that is that in a democracy there are sufficient manners and opportunities to communicate your grievances through a non-violent process.[24] But such approaches fail to question the power relationship between the State and the terrorists, and thus account for the views of the latter who themselves have rejected the State's legitimacy. Approaching terrorist phenomena critically allows researchers to comprehend how terrorism is understood by the very actors that use it, and why and how it comes to be justified. On the other hand, it deconstructs the idea that the State, especially a liberal democratic State, is always and invariably fair and just towards the minorities encountered within its borders by taking into account and remedying their grievances. Far from taking the terrorist's side, this approach allows researchers to identify the root

[18] Robert W Cox, 1996. *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.88.
[19] Steve Smith, 1999 (5th ed.). "New Approaches to International Theory", in Baylis and Smith, *The Globalisation of World Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 176.
[20] Roland Bleiker, 2000. *Popular Dissent, Human Agent and Global Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 17.
[21] Cox, 1996, op.cit., p. 88. See also James Clifford, 1986. "Introduction: Partial Truths" in James Clifford and George Marcus (eds.), *Writing Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
[22] Stanley Hoffmann, 1987. *Janus and Minerva: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations, Boulder*, CO: Westview Press, p. 237.
[23] Jason Franks 2006. *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. See also Jenny Hocking, 1984. "Orthodox theories of terrorism: The power of politicised terminology", *Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 103-110.
[24] Conor Cruise O'Brien, 1983 op.cit., p. 93

causes of terrorism's emergence by questioning the very legitimacy that the State claims automatically, and therefore to apply conflict resolution techniques that instead of concentrating unilaterally towards the elimination of terrorist violence, can instead shed light on the violent aspects of the State, particularly when that treats the entire minority group as potential terrorists and refusing to satisfy their grievance with the excuse that they undermine the State's security and survival.

While critical theory is the methodological pillar of my research, my thesis is also influenced by discourse analysis. According to Kitschelt,[25] discourse analysis is a useful tool that helps identify a) the actors and their perception(s) of the conflict; b) the institutional structures (state or movement) of which they are members; and c) the greater social context, critical theory is often coupled with discourse analysis in this thesis. Bleiker, on the other hand, purports that it "facilitates an exploration of the close linkages that exist between theory and practice".[26] In other words, theory and practice are mutually constituted and do co-exist,[27] or, as Walker puts it, appeals for objectivity should not obscure the fact that discourse and practice are very much linked and, therefore, any examination of policy analysis should take that link into consideration.[28] It is at this point that critical theory and discourse analysis are most useful because they allow researchers to break down and study separately each of the actors' truth(s). In the Basque case, for instance, the terrorist's truth is that he is fighting an oppressive regime that denies him his full rights to self-determination; for a state official, on the other hand, the truth is that he is protecting the state and its citizens, a state that cannot be oppressive at the moment when it has granted the Basques extensive autonomy. In a similar way, of course, this very study could be subjected to an equally critical analysis, of which it might emerge that it is but one more truth in the total prism of truths surrounding this conflict. Nonetheless, even in those instances, it is more useful in providing insights and accounting for factors that all three schools consider irrelevant or indeed inconceivable as to their relationship with the conflict's dynamics and development.

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[25] Herbert Kitschelt, 1991. "Critique of the resource mobilisation approach", in Dieter Rucht (ed.), *Research on Social Moviements: The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA*, Western Press, p. 338

[26] Bleiker, 2000, op.cit., p. 17.

[27] Jenny Edkins, 1999. *Poststructuralism and International Relations*, London: Lynne Rienner, p.48

[28] Rob Walker, 1993. *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 29.

Based on the aforementioned insights offered by critical theory and influenced by discourse analysis, this thesis aims to question the understanding that positivist approaches offer in the analysis of nationalism, terrorism and conflict resolution. With the exception of Smith's ethno-symbolic paradigm[29] in the study of nationalism, which is itself a critical approach to modernist theories examining the formation of nations and the emergence and spread of nationalism, this thesis intends to question the understandings of reality in the Basque case and critically examine: a) the defence by the nationalist minority of its historic truth that brings forward its violent demands for self-determination as a protection from the usurpation of the State; b) the defence by the State that the nationalist grievances have been solved with the Statue of Autonomy and therefore the only problem in question is that of violence, and; c) the efforts for an end to the problem of violence that, until recently, have only centred around the two principal actors, that is, the State and ETA, without taking into consideration the role that the Basque civil society can play in the resolution of the conflict and the elimination of violence.

During my fieldwork, I engaged in informal conversations not only with individuals that, in terms of the conflict, identified either with the Spanish State or with the militant nationalist circles, but also with citizens who distanced themselves from either actors, yet, at the same time, were affected by it either as victims of such violence (a direct and personal experience), or because they could not distance themselves from it as citizens of the country within whose borders said violence took place. Such an approach was advantageous because it allowed me to, first, identify the perceptions of truth(s) as well as the different spectra of truths that corresponded to said perceptions and, second, analyse them in a way that took into consideration the change of attitude of the civil society, local and national, with respect to the behaviour of the two main actors – the State and the terrorists. My status as a researcher, which was known to my interlocutors, certainly contributed to the establishment and conduct of unhindered communication. Nevertheless, merely noting perceptions and attitudes, as well as the ambit in which they originated from, is not very useful in providing insights that can be used for an in-depth analysis. It is by critically analysing said notes that an extraction of

[29] Anthony D. Smith, 1986. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell.

findings and their correct interpretation from a researcher's point of view can become possible. The nationalist fervour of the State, for example, in the implementation – and the reasons for such implementation – of anti-terrorist policies becomes visible only after engaging in conversations with members of the minority who described how they perceived of the violence of the State towards them. On the other hand, using the same means in places outside the Basque Country revealed that many citizens have began taking into account the recent differentiation of the Basque civil society from the significance of violence and, as such, do not always side with or approve of the adoption of radicalised policies of the State against the Basques. In other words, these informal interviews manifested to me the lack of importance that should have been ascribed by both the State and the terrorists towards the local and national civil society, which, as I argue, is one of the reasons why the State and the terrorists were locked into a discourse and strategy stalemate.

Thesis Outline

The first chapter offers an analysis of the historical background of Basque nationalism, its emergence and development that came to incorporate violence as its constitutive part in the 20th Century. Such analysis is necessary in order to highlight the 'truths' of the Basque nation and clarify their role in the promotion of violence. The second chapter offers an analysis of the major theories that contributed to the explanation and understanding of nationalism. As a phenomenon, it has been approached by many different schools and fields. Their conclusions are often disparate, but this thesis will divide them in five categories: the primordialists,[30] the instrumentalists,[31] the perennialists,[32] the modernists[33] and the post-modernists. As the chapter will explain, all these theories have offered significant insight to the study of nationalism, yet they all seem inadequate to explain why nationalism can adopt so many different forms and be as diverse in terms of strategies. As is explained in the chapter, the ethno-symbolic model of nationalism has utilised the contributions of the aforementioned approaches and is the

[30] Anthony D. Smith, 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*, London; New York: Routledge, pp. 145-160.
[31] Ibid., pp. 153-159.
[32] Ibid., pp. 160-169.
[33] Ibid., pp. 18-24.

most appropriate guide in the Basque case because it takes into account and explains all those cultural elements that, for example, the primordialists or the perennialists accept as ineffable.[34]

The third chapter reviews the literature that concerns the manifestation of political violence and concentrates on the sub-category of terrorism – political violence can be expressed in a variety of ways, some quite violent, like mass terrorism, others no more violent than civil disobedience. What the chapter highlights is the great variety of subjects that have studied and analysed 'terrorism'. As such, and taking into consideration the fact that there is no commonly agreed definition of 'terrorism' there is no common base from which to start and conduct organised research. As a result, some studies are ahistorical and fail to see the broader environment in which terrorist actions take place.[35] Furthermore, one feels that some studies are not in fact studies but prescriptions that concentrate solely on the alleviation of 'terrorist' symptoms[36] without engaging in an examination of the root causes of terrorism itself. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that we have not enhanced our understanding of terrorism. There are many studies that have provided valuable insights but Crenshaw's[37] incitement to contextualise our studies of terrorism is the one that is more valuable. As my thesis supports, terrorism cannot be fully understood when isolated from its very environment that generated it. The analysis of a terrorist's behaviour, patterns or psyche tells us more about the terrorist rather than the reasons that made him choose this particular method. In other words, it is an analysis that focuses more on how the individual chose to oppose the state rather than why. Besides, terrorism itself is so variedly used – by Islamic fundamentalists, militant nationalists, state structures, animal right supporters, Marxist groups –[38] that cannot be separated into one independent school. The reason why the Basque case becomes relevant to the theory is because, even when the latter dictate

[34] Geertz, 1973, op.cit
[35] Michel Wieviorka, 1993. *The Making of Terrorism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 3-8.
[36] Andrew Silke, 2001. "Continuing problems with research on terrorism", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.13, No.4, pp. 1-14. Quote at p. 12. See also David Brannan, Philip Esler and Anders Strindberg, 2001. "Talking to "terrorists": towards an independent analytical framework for the study of violent substate activism", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol.24, No.1, pp. 3-24 . Quote at p.4.
[37] Martha Crenshaw, 1995. *Terrorism in Context*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
[38] Brynjar Lia and Katja Skjolberg, 2004. *Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature*, Norway: Kjeller (FFI/Rapport-2004/04307), p. 8. Available at http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2004/04307.pdf

alleviation of grievances[39] and careful counter-terrorist measures so as not to incite spiral violence,[40] the Basque conflict is still very much alive. Theoretically, that is, the Basque country should now be a region that negotiates its possible independence in every political level available to them since the transition to democracy, and in the absence of violence. Yet, the existence of ETA to our days and the continuation of its terrorist practices despite the efficacy of French[41] and Spanish[42] police forces and intelligence, show that there are still nationalist circles for whom violence is still considered a way to conduct politics. If anything has changed, that is the public perception of the significance of violence and its justifications, which, since the Transition have been falling steadily amid the Spanish population and for the last decade have also been massively rejected by the greatest majority of Basque society itself.[43]

The fourth chapter offers the necessary analysis of the major theories of conflict resolution and transformation. It will assess them critically vis-à-vis the Basque case and will highlight those that have shifted our understanding of conflict beyond the boundaries of the state. In a post-Cold war world, asymmetric conflicts have become the standard and the dynamics of the conflicts have changed. As the Basque case shows, the grassroots level is not as passive as the literature presents them to be.[44] This thesis takes into consideration Burton's theory of human needs and *pro*vention,[45] and claims that the transformation of the Basque society was brought about not only by the manifestation of ethno-nationalist violence, which, by the year 2000 expanded its selection of targets to include Basque entrepreneurs, local and national politicians,[46] but also by the mistrust and the arrogance of the governments in Madrid that denied any nationalist links to the nature of the violence and even undermined the non-violent political demands and

[39] John Burton, 1979. *Deviance, Terrorism and War*, Oxford: Martin Robertson, p. 60.
[40] Grant Wardlaw, 1990 (2nd ed.). *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-measures*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 68-70.
[41] Florencio Domínguez Irribarren, 1998, De *la Negociación a la Tregua ¿El final de ETA?*, Madrid: Taurus, pp. 258-300.
[42] Daniele Conversi, 2006. "Why do peace processes collapse? The Basque conflict and the three-spoilers perspective" in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds.), *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*, New York; Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp.173-199
[43] Ibid., p. 183.
[44] Lederach, 1997, op.cit., p. 52.
[45] John Burton, 1990. *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
[46] Conversi, 2006, op.cit., pp. 182-183.

initiatives brought forward by local political parties and platforms.[47] In essence then, the Basque civil society's stand concerns a set of demands for the respect of human rights and the development of self-determination in non-violent ways that is directed to both ETA and the Spanish State.

Chapter Five develops the theoretical framework on which this thesis is based. Using the ethno-symbolic model, I argue that nationalism is neither good nor bad.[48] On the contrary, as the Basque case shows, any nationalism can adopt any facet depending on its moment of history, the economic and socio-political circumstances that surround it, and the cultural strength of the symbols it utilises. I argue that the Basque case is primarily a nationalist conflict, in which violence only constitutes a method for the achievement of the nationalist goals and without this necessary contextualisation, every fight against the manifestation of violence will be almost futile. What is necessary for a comprehensive analysis of the Basque conflict is the isolation of violence from the nationalist discourse. The very symbolism that is utilised by nationalist ideology in the Basque conflict is again used in ETA's discourse. This is not a coincidental usurpation, as I argue, but one that is in tandem with the broader orientation of the Basque nationalist movement. The violence that the Francoist regime has exercised on the Basques, their cultural persecutions and physical humiliations, along with a cultural heritage of fighters and warriors, have made easy the justification of violence against the Spanish state. The critical position of this argument is that the exaltation of ETA's fighting image, which started in the Francoist era, has not been shaken off. On the contrary, it is still a powerful concept,[49] whose spirit of struggle[50] seems to generate a culture of violence in its immediate social surroundings.[51]

Yet, after forty years of violence, the conflict has been costly for both sides. Citizens outside the Basque country began rejecting ETA almost immediately after

[47] Ludger Mees, 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave, pp. 114-115.
[48] David Brown, 1990. "Are there good and bad Nationalisms?", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 5, No.2, pp. 281-302.
[49] William Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, 1990, "On the interpretation of terrorist violence: ETA and the Basque political process", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.32, No.2, p.254;
[50] Juan José Echave, in Daniele Conversi, 1997. *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation*, London: Hurst & Co, p. 226.
[51] Conversi, 2006, op.cit., p. 187.

Franco's fall. In the Basque country, that did not happen as quickly, primarily because the transition was not reflected in the re-formation of state agencies like the security forces and the police stationed in the Basque country.[52] How are things different if the torturers of the dictatorship are now the police officers of the democracy? However, when the relationship between the central state and the majority of the Basque society was restored, particularly through the incremental delegation of autonomy and its safeguard, there began a change of attitude towards violence, one which rejected it not only because of its social consequences but also because of the strategic costs. Violence was hampering the same thing that moderate and extremist nationalists wanted: Basque independence. This change is the key moment in the development of my theoretical framework, which claims that in a violent nationalist conflict, any conflict resolution attempts must focus on the dynamics of nationalism behind the manifestation of violence. Police efficiency – not only the numbers of arrests, but also the way these are made, without violation of human rights – is obviously useful in combating terrorism. But transforming this culture of violence into a culture that has developed the necessary reflexes to reject it is a more efficient strategy, particularly when a liberal democracy is at the receiving end of the terrorist violence. Such transformation, as I argue, is only possible through the increased provision of guarantees by the liberal democratic state that self-determination claims can be satisfied through political dialogue and bargaining, void of radicalised and excessive measures that increase the perception that what is targeted is not the violence used by some circles of the minority, but rather, the minority in its totality, simply because by advocating their right to self-determination pose a great threat to the stability and survival of the State.

The last three chapters follow the aforementioned pattern of nationalism, terrorism and conflict resolution, but this time they are focused on the analysis of the case study and how it affects theories already brought forward. Thus, chapter Six looks at the critical moments in the formation and development of Basque nationalism where violence is advocated as the most strategic option, as well as the cultural elements that

[52] Conversi, 1997, op.cit., pp. 148-149. See also Robert Clark, 1979. *The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond*, Reno: University of Nevada Press, pp. 269-271; Paul Preston, 1986. *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain*, London: Methuen, pp. 82-83; Ludger Mees, 2003, op.cit., p.35.

allowed it to become the established form of political communication. It highlights those instances where the Spanish state has had a catalytic role in fomenting violence's image in the Basque population as a means of defence and it assesses the political culture of both the regional as well as the state-wide parties vis-à-vis the resolution of the conflict. Finally, chapter Seven will describe the transformation of attitudes in both the political and social level in the Basque country that facilitated the erosion of support for terrorist organisations and activities. Unavoidably, the role of the political parties in both the region and the centre will be examined to highlight their inactivity, a direct result of which is the popular indignation not only against violence but against the constant lack of initiatives and progress.

My examination of the literatures of all three schools of study (nationalism, terrorism and conflict resolution) aims to highlight, on the one hand, the contributions of the theories towards the improvement of the understanding of nationalism, terrorism and conflict resolution but, on the other hand, underline the inefficiencies of all three schools when it comes to their application in the Basque case. My thesis develops this argument by employing a critical approach that manifests those instances in the conflict that contradict the theories. What is more, by employing the Basque conflict as a case study, my thesis aims for an explanation of ethno-nationalist violence that brings together, and is bound by, the critical formulations of all three fields under consideration. While I recognise that joining three seemingly different and separate fields of study is a very optimistic undertaking, nevertheless I maintain that in the Basque case any advancement in the resolution of the conflict must necessarily involve an examination of the links between the nationalist discourse and the violent activity of both the local militant fractions as well as the central policies of the State that are directed against them. As such, my thesis contributes to the explanation and understanding of ethno-nationalist movements by highlighting the circumstances in which violence is justified by both actors and the way in which they both become locked in a discourse that regards 'freedom', albeit with a different understanding by either actors. Finally, even though it recognises the fact that liberal democratic states rely on their existing political institutions for the *examination* of ethno-nationalist conflicts, and as such they tend to ignore the catalytic role that civil society can play in its *resolution*, my thesis establishes the idea

that if similar circumstances are experienced in similar conflicts, the Basque case points to the fact that there is plenty of scope for the civil society to become involved in the transformation of the perceptions of the conflict, and as such, side-stepping or ignoring it will prove detrimental not only to the society in question, but also to the actors who, ultimately, seek the same end as the society itself: that is, the resolution of the conflict.

CHAPTER 1

Basque Tales of Nationalism

This chapter offers a historical account of the emergence and development of Basque nationalism, and the crucial stages in which it transformed in order to incorporate violence as a legitimate means of self-defence, as perceived by the Basques, against the central state. It describes the political and social behaviour of the principal actors that were involved in promoting, on the one hand, and fighting, on the other, Basque nationalism and its association with, and consecration of, violence. Such a historical analysis is necessary in order to understand the reasons why Basque nationalism developed as an exclusionary movement, and how it was led to a transformation that involved the de-legitimisation of violence and its dissociation by the local civil society with regards to the nationalist ideology. It is necessary because it is a manifestation that the very same means used for the emancipation or defence of an aggrieved minority can, under altered circumstances, hamper and undermine not only the basic objective of self-determination but also the nationalist ideology itself.

The foundations of Basque nationalism were laid out by Sabino de Arana y Goiri (1865-1903). He was the first to make systematic use of cultural characteristics of Basque life, in order to demonstrate the Basque identity, and the first who fiercely opposed the centralising policies of the Spanish capital, Madrid. His work is of major importance to the comprehension of Basque nationalism, not because of its scope and depth but because of its influence on the establishment and development of Basque claims. Broadly speaking, there are three very important historical moments for Basque nationalism: the medieval, pre-Aranist apparition of nationalist claims; the end of the 19th and beginning of 20th centuries, when Arana and his ideas came to the fore, and; finally, from the 1950s onwards, when ETA made its first appearance.

The Basque country consists of seven regions, four of which (Gipuzkoa/Guipúzcoa, Bizkaia/Vizcaya, Araba/Álava and Nafaroa/Navarra) are in Spain and the remaining three (Lapurdi/Labourd, Benafaroa/Basse Navarre and

Zuberoa/Soule) are on the French side of the Pyrenees. It must be explained here that Navarre is not currently part of the Basque Country but rather an autonomous community in its own context. This administrative separation was not a vice of the bureaucrats but rather it reflects the distance between the Navarrese and the rest of the Basques. Only a small percentage of the Navarrese define themselves as Basques (15-20%), whereas Navarra was and is always included in the Basque plans for independence. This essay will focus on those regions in Spanish soil because they represent 85% of the Basque country and, more importantly, because they developed a stronger national feeling. "In total contrast to the prominent role of Basques in Spanish affairs, their northern kinsmen were inconspicuous in the national affairs of France", as Payne describes.[1] Other commentators also suggest that the centralising machine of the French government was more efficient in carrying out its task than the Spanish one.[2] Although not exhibiting a passive nationalistic posture, it is not until after the appearance of ETA in the 1960s that French Basques actively contributed to, and became involved in the Basque cause.

Once upon a time…

Two things the Basques are proud of are the belief that they are an ancient people and the fact that they have never been conquered. Strabo, the Greek geographer, was the first to record the existence of 'Vasconians'[3] in what is nowadays identified as the Basque Country. After the Romans came the Visigoths, the Muslims, the Franks and the Normans but none succeeded in subduing them. Historically the four regions were never united under a form of state or kingdom. By 1200, they were all associated to the kingdom of Castile, except Navarra, which was an independent kingdom.[4] The regions' legal system was based on foralism and the so-called *fueros* were a substantial characteristic of Basque life. As Clark explains, under the *fueros* "each province (and indeed, each township) was granted substantial powers of self government by the reigning monarch".[5] The *fueros* were customary or traditional

[1] Stanley Payne, 1975. *Basque Nationalism*, Reno: University of Nevada Press, p. 28.
[2] James Jacob, 1994. *Hills of Conflict: Basque Nationalism in France*, Reno: University of Nevada Press, p. 388.
[3] Roman geographers and historians later termed them 'Vascones'. See Roger Collins, 1986. *The Basques*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 30-31.
[4] Marianne Heiberg, 1989. *The Making of Basque Nation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 20.
[5] Robert Clark, 1984. *The Basque Insurgents: ETA 1952-1980*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, p. 12; author's parenthesis.

laws that governed the private as well as the public sphere, and were codified in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as agreements between Madrid and the Basque provinces.[6] But the most important aspect of the *fueros* was that it exempted the local population from state military conscription and state taxation. The former meant that any military threat would be dealt with by the Basques themselves, which in turn implied the formation and organisation of some kind of Basque military machine – albeit for defence purposes. The right, known as *hidalguía de sangre* (nobility by blood) or *hidalguía colectiva* (collective nobility), was granted to the Basques by the Spanish Crown Kings, who saw in it the alternative of an efficient border-defence system. The role of the Basque 'army' was to strengthen the controls in the Franco-Spanish borders and limit the intrusions of the French.[7] On the other hand, the exemption from the state taxation system hinted to a secured economic development of the provinces, especially when these are compared to the rest of the Spanish regions.

The Basque country is quite rich in resources, with abundant iron reserves, lumber and natural harbours located north, at the Bay of Biscay. The discovery of the Americas and the intensification of trade attracted people from the traditional rural life to the more hispanicised urban centres. The influx of people from the country meant that the existing rural aristocracy was about to be confronted by a new bourgeoisie developed in the cities. The two élites coexisted until the abolition of foralism in 1876. As Heiberg explains, the two had achieved to push aside the peasantry from the decision-making process.[8] For that reason, property qualifications and literacy in Spanish were introduced as a method of exclusion. The first meant that a candidate for a public place should possess a certain amount of wealth – which, of course, was analogous to the prestige of the position – before being nominated; and the second, "became an instrument wielded by the hispanicised Basque notables to exclude and control the Basque-speaking [tumultuous peasantry]".[9]

The emergence of nobility in the towns and, more concretely, their objective of further social ascendance and broader concentration of wealth and privileges, provoked the reaction of intellectuals who re-introduced the concept of *hidalguía de*

[6] Daniele Conversi, 1997.*The Basques, the Catalans and Spain*, London: Hurst & Co., p. 45.
[7] Davydd Greenwood, 1977. "Continuity in Change: Spanish Basque Ethnicity as an Historical Process" in Milton Esman (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*, New York: Cornell University Press, pp. 81-102. Quote at p. 92.
[8] Heiberg, 1989, op.cit, pp. 31-32.
[9] Ibid., p. 31.

sangre (nobility by blood), only this time with a somewhat twisted meaning. Heiberg refers to two early Basque essayists, Zaldibia who "equated Basque nobility with the purity of Basque blood 'unmixed with that of foreign peoples'"[10] and Lope de Isasti, who claimed that "since all Basques are [noble by blood] they could never lose their nobility by manual work or poverty".[11] A Jesuit priest called Manuel de Larramendi was among the first who highlighted the difference between the old and the new meaning of the concept.

In his writings, Larramendi attacked those members of the peasant aristocracy and the urban bourgeoisie because they were rich and powerful, which for him was synonymous to moral tarnishing.[12] Larramendi became thus "the ideologue of small landholder and the tenant farmer", while the traditional, rural, Basque life, "governed by the values of austerity, social harmony and egalitarianism in social relations was, for Larramendi, the original Basque in a state of grace".[13] Evidently, the élites' social behaviour was all but respectful to the Basque customs: modern clothes and modern ways of life that substituted austerity, and the pursuit and possession of wealth and social ascendance slowly erasing social harmony and egalitarianism.

This type of social behaviour did not change, as the country was heading towards industrialisation. The aristocracy were becoming fervent supporters of liberalism and, in order to protect their privileges, they had established an ever-closer relationship with Madrid. The increasing social antithesis in the Basque society was the most fundamental manifestation of the first Carlist war (1833-1839), which was a result of the persistent centralising attempts of Madrid to abolish the foral regime[14]. The Carlist wars were described as Basque civil wars because they were fought almost exclusively in the territory of the four provinces.[15] Corcuera explains that Carlism's supporters had their stronghold in the Basque country, for it offered higher levels of mass mobilisation against modernisation and industrialisation than other

[10] Ibid., p. 33.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., p. 34.
[13] Ibid., p. 33.
[14] The war was named 'Carlist' due to a controversy that broke out in the Spanish crown. King Ferdinand VII wanted to be succeeded by his daughter Isabel, even though succession in Spain could only take place by a male heir to the throne. Don Carlos, Isabel's brother, counted with the support of the traditionalists whereas his sister had attracted the attention of the liberals as well as that of France and Britain.
[15] Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p. 37.

Spanish regions.[16] The members of both nobilities aligned with the forces of liberalism. According to Heiberg, the Carlists' losses in this first war included the transference of executive and legislative powers from the local authorities to the Spanish Parliament and a situation under which the *fueros* were upheld only in so far as they did not threaten "the constitutional unity of the monarchy".[17]

This first war saw the peasantry, Carlism's core supporter, financially decimated, while the bourgeoisies were struggling to maintain their privileged social status. The end of the second Carlist War (1872-1876) brought with it the abolition of the statute of *fueros* – except in the Kingdom of Navarra. The economic and social impact of the second war was poignant for the *basses-classes*. As Shafir points out, the integration of the regions into the Spanish market, with the abolition of customs between the two, carried with it an increase on the price of imported food and privatisation, which entailed loss of effective control of the resources of the region exercised by the rural nobility.[18] The abolition of the fueros is a key event in the development of Basque nationalism for two reasons: (a) although it was a necessary step for the creation of the modern Spanish state, it was also rough because it deprived the Basques from a centuries-old tradition, if not basic way of life; and (b) it signalled the first Basque sentiments of frustration and anger against Madrid which, from this moment onwards, was to be eternally accused of attempting to conquer the Basque country.

The pro-capitalist urban aristocracy lined up with the central liberal bureaucracy, and showed their quick reflexes in attempting to secure their privileges. In 1878 a new fiscal and economic arrangement took place, known as *concierto económico* that allowed the Basque Provinces to negotiate their tax contribution to Madrid. The direct beneficiaries of this agreement:

> "were the big industrialists who bore a very low share of the tax burden. The rural areas and small towns were penalized, as local merchants, professional sectors and the peasants suffered most of the hardships brought by new industries and taxes".[19]

[16] Javier Corcuera, 1979. *Orígenes, Ideología y Organización del Nacionalismo Vasco*, 1876-1904, Madrid: Siglo XXI, p. 31.
[17] Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p.38.
[18] Gershon Shafir, 1995. *Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia and Estonia*, Albany: State University of New York Press, p. 91.
[19] Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 47.

If the first Carlist war manifested, for the first time, the economic and social contrasts of the Basque population, the second Carlist war made evident that the division had grown bigger, with still more antithesis to come. For, the second Carlist war also marked the beginning of the industrialisation in the Basque region, which, along with Catalonia, became the principal motor of the Spanish economy.[20]

The Basques had taken great advantage of their geographical position and their natural resources, by trading with Spain, France and the new markets in America. But the end of the second Carlist war, and with it the apogee of industrialisation, hinted at more development and further changes, economic as well as social. For example, the export of iron ore to the British and the Flemish, the establishment of one of Europe's most renowned shipbuilding industries and the intensification of trade in general, contributed to the increase of development and, ultimately, wealth in the region. The growth of the population, as a social indicator, also highlighted that affluence. The towns were transforming into cities. The fastest growing region was the birthplace itself of the Basque capitalists – and later nationalists – Vizcaya, and its capital Bilbao. In 1877, Bilbao had 35,505 inhabitants and twenty-three years later, in 1900, that number reached 83,306, more than half of which were immigrants from other Spanish regions.[21]

The pace of industrialisation and modernisation attracted immigrants who contributed to the booming of the population. Notably, it attracted more immigrants from outside the Basque region than Basque members of traditional rural families. "Less than 20% of Bilbao's population had actually been born in the city and close to half were non-Basques by origin", while "around one-third of Bilbao's immigrants were recruited from the rural parts of the Basque country".[22] Immigrants from outside the Basque country worked in mines and steelworks, whereas the Basque workers were occupied in the smaller factories. The conditions of life of the former were tragic and pitiful. The long hours in the mines, the living conditions and the debasing wages were the beginning of the workers' movement.[23] The megalomaniac aristocracy, on the other hand, secured the foundations of such a movement, for it presented an ever-expanding image of itself, at the same time that it oppressed the wage earners. Their

[20] Stanley Payne, 1971. "Catalan and Basque nationalism", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 15-51. Quote at p. 49.
[21] Corcuera, 1979, op.cit, pp. 73-75.
[22] Heiberg 1989, op.cit., p. 42.
[23] Shafir, 1995, op.cit., p. 95.

capital was crucial in developing related industry sectors (railways, chemicals, hydroelectric power, paper), while at the beginning of the twentieth century they had also entered the banking and insurance sectors.[24]

The picture, for a local Basque of the time, is understandably one of discontent and frustration. The formation of a proletariat– which included those Basques occupied in the small factories and the craft industries – in the industrial cities and the transfer of local powers to the State's capital signalled the end of egalitarianism, in the cities as well as in the country. The traditional Basque *modus vivendi* was fading away as people moved to the cities in a search for better life.[25] Furthermore, the cities had to face large numbers of non-Basque immigrants whose living conditions (filthy, anti-hygienic, and extremely poor) were aggravating the life of the whole of Bilbao. Finally, the abolition of the fueros was perceived as a move against the Basque customs and traditions, as well as privileges. This is possibly how Sabino Arana viewed Bilbao and the situation in the Basque country. The above elements, along with his religious education, were the pillars of his nationalistic effusions.

Sabino Arana, the founder

Sabino Arana was born in 1865 in an outskirt of Bilbao from a Spanish-speaking Carlist family, while his education took place in a Jesuit college. According to Heiberg this was an explosive combination because he "inherited […] an adherence to religious fundamentalism and a total aversion to modern, liberal Spain".[26] In 1882 he moved to Barcelona where he completed his studies. Despite his contact with Catalan nationalism – whose claims were the projection of Catalonia's contribution to the rest of Spain and the autonomy that Catalonia should enjoy within the Spanish State –, Arana built a more rigid and exclusivist nationalism. His philosophy, as it is synthesised through his writings, resembles strikingly the ideas of German nationalism and Romanticism. That, according to Smith, meant "an interest in ethnic customs, an attachment to vernaculars, nostalgia for tribal and medieval pageantry and society, [and] religious yearnings".[27] More concretely, Arana's nationalist discourse depicted a cultural, rather than political, approach by adopting racial

[24] Ibid., p. 93.
[25] Interestingly, according to Shafir (1995: 95), "a process of land concentration [by the nobles] sent an unwilling wave of Basque peasants to the industrial cities".
[26] Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p. 49.
[27] Anthony Smith, 1979. *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Martin Robertson & Co., p. 7.

elements of the Fichtean philosophy and promoting ideas about language, similar to those found in Herder's writings.

It must be stressed at this point that Arana's discourse, no matter how vile or poignant or even symbolic it was, it would have never reaped if it were not for the weakness and feebleness of the central State of Madrid. For, the nineteenth century was catastrophic for the Crown in terms of wealth, prestige and influence. By 1824 most of the Latin American colonies were lost and, even though the Carlist wars had an unusually Basque flavour, they were nothing but civil wars, pointing to the inability of the crown to promote national integration and cohesion. Instead, corruption was omnipresent and omnipotent, from the local mayor to the higher Ministers. As Mees points out, "[u]ntil 1898 there was no external enemy and there was no national symbols to create and represent the imaginary community of the Spanish nation".[28] In other words, when other countries of similar size to that of Spain had begun transforming their states into nation-states, Spain carried a medieval mentality of royal division of rule: not only did it not attempt to assimilate these local particularisms but it relied upon their own systems of governance in order to guarantee policy continuity. The eighteenth century marked the "degeneration" of Spain, with the Castilian intelligentsia criticising the Crown and lamenting the losses that resulted from its rule. It would not be too inaccurate to claim that it is this phase of broad disenchantment that permitted representatives of local particularisms, like Arana, to use such sharp and over toned discourses.

Arana focused on Basque racial characteristics and a fierce anti-Spanish discourse in order to accentuate and promote his nationalist cause. He referred to the immigrants as *maketos* (a derogatory word for 'immigrants') and, more often than not, he pointed to their terrible and pitiful conditions of life to juxtapose it with Basque purity and nobility. For him, as for Larramendi and other intellectuals, *hidalguía de sangre* symbolised Basque racial superiority when compared to Spanish. Everything that was part of or linked to Spain was a demoralising factor for the Basque identity. As Sullivan describes "Arana's belief that the *maketos* constituted a danger to the moral health and social purity of the Basques led him to call for measures which

[28] Ludger Mees, 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 7.

would make life uncomfortable for the *maketos*".[29] Although his racist crones might recall Hitler, commentators argue that there were no biological strings attached to his racism.[30] His intention was to separate the Basques from the newcomers by preserving their traditional values and, at the same time, point indirectly at the traditional egalitarianism.

Language was another characteristic that would help distinguish the Basque identity, even though its importance was always second to that of race. While in Barcelona, Arana commenced working on the Basque language, *euskera*, which he intended to use as an instrument of political mobilisation.[31] The fact that *euskera* was not spoken at home, even though his parents did command it, made Sabino Arana obsessed with learning it and 'purifying' it from hispanicisms.[32] During the process of standardisation, he manipulated the language by inventing several words.[33] Nevertheless, Arana was conscious of the fact that *euskera* was scarcely spoken not only in urban but even in rural areas. It is for this reason that race was placed above language when it came to assert Basque distinctiveness.[34] Furthermore, even though he wished for the language to take the place it deserved in Basque culture, Arana could only target the Basque middle classes for its transfusion. The upper classes had not only imbibed Spanish, but they also regarded anything Basque as backward and un-modern; an attitude that was incrementally adopted by the middle classes too. As for the immigrants, Arana considered that if they were to learn the language, then moral contamination would spread even faster in Euskadi. Along these lines, Conversi explains that Arana failed to see how a different language might have resulted in a different state of mind, as well as a different value scale.[35] That is why Arana concentrated on what he used to call "God and the Old Law". The latter was synonymous with the values, traditions and customs of the Basques, in other words the *fueros*. The former reflected his Jesuit education and the high-levels of religiousness of Basque society.

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[29] John Sullivan, 1988. *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890-1986*, London; New York: Routledge, p. 5.
[30] Payne, 1975, op.cit., p. 74; Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 60.
[31] Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 174.
[32] Ortzi, 1975. *Historia de Esukadi: El Nacionalismo Vasco y ETA*, Paris: Ruedo Iberico, p. 124.
[33] *Euzkadi* (Basque Country) and *ikurriña* (flag) are two of his most famous linguistic inventions, still in use today (although in the modern standardization Euskadi replaces the 'z' with 's')
[34] Corcuera, 1979, op.cit., p. 395.
[35] Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 65.

Arana's nationalist discourse promoted social harmony and economic equality – always within an independent Basque country – and espoused Catholicism. "For Arana, the supremacy of Roman Catholicism was essential for sacred and, hence, moral order upon which all social order ultimately rested".[36] Arana believed that independence could only be achieved through faith. And faith, as Arana understood it in its traditionalist sense, was only manifested among the lower strata of the Basque society, the farmers and small-factory workers. The elites, having been usurped by the more secularised and morally relaxed Spanish culture, had no place in an independent Euskadi, since they not only lost every sense of equality by amassing wealth, but also lost a sense of moral order by not assisting their compatriots in need, and instead accept the services of a filthy and impure nation like the Spanish. In 1892, shortly after the publication of his *Bizkaya por su Independencia*, Arana and his brother Luis held a meeting in Larazabal with admirers and friends, the majority of which were liberal fuerists, where he announced that independence would be much better happening sooner rather than later. The members of the audience in that meeting later figured in the lists of Arana's party.

While some commentators[37] hold that this was the moment when the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV – Basque Nationalist Party) was essentially created, Arana did not announce its official birth until 1898. The coalition with the liberal bourgeoisies widened the audience of the party, and later in that year, it earned him a seat in the Spanish national parliament. But, the merging venture was also costly in that Arana had to tone down his separatist calls. His proposals for autonomy as a deputy radically departed from the initial phases of his discourse. His investments in various local enterprises were completely the opposite of what Roman Catholicism and Basque egalitarianism endorsed. Yet more changes were still to come. For Sabino Arana had fallen ill with Addison's disease and by 1902 he had already been imprisoned twice.[38] Moreover, the party did not seem to be doing very well: a very limited number of supporters meant very limited revenues, and the lack of both made the political evolution of the party extremely difficult.

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[36] Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p. 53.
[37] Antonio Elorza, 1978. *Ideologías den Nacionalismo Vasco, 1876-1937*, San Sebastian: Aranburu, p. 148; Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 58.
[38] The first time was in 1895, after he lost a trial to a Basque liberal, and the second, in 1902, when the letter he sent to President Roosevelt congratulating him for liberating Cuba from slavery (i.e. Spanish occupation), was intercepted.

After he was released from prison, Sabino Arana had decided to reconcile with the liberalist forces of Madrid, as well as Euskadi, and more importantly he accepted that a united and prosperous Euskadi could exist within Spain. He realised that nationalists, instead of being hostile to the development of the industry and the economy, they could put both in the service of Basque language and culture.[39] There seem to be different opinions on the reasons why such a change took place. Conversi refers to it as Arana's "second conversion" and points to the political failure of the party as the cause of Arana' s political reorientation.[40] Payne asserts, "Arana' s change of direction was but a temporary ruse to gain power"[41] and Granja goes so far as to say that Arana's conversion has been influenced by the movements siblings in Galicia and Catalonia,[42] even though Arana refused to see them as separatist movements.[43] Heiberg, on the other hand, presents one ideological and one economic reason: the moderating influence of the middle bourgeoisie over Arana and PNV' s growing need for money.[44] The same commentator gives a very characteristic description of the change in Arana' s dogma:

> "Whereas industrialisation was the source of spiritual indifference and fanaticism, the destroyer of nature and the corrupter of moral beauty, it was also a product of Basque race. Bilbao was simultaneously the focus of a contagious virus and an example of 'the energy of our race'".[45]

Sabino Arana died in 1903 without explaining what had caused that sudden change. Following his death at that same year, the party had its biggest political success, winning two seats in the national elections. The legacy of his incoherency, nevertheless, accounted for the conflictive relationship between the liberals and the nationalists in the party. His change of posture through the years had attracted different sectors of the Basque community, with diverse interests and objectives. What is more, he was the only one "able to keep all the different political, social and ideological interests united as well as loyal to PNV".[46]

[39] Mees, 2003., op.cit., p. 11.
[40] Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 69.
[41] Payne, 1975, op.cit., p. 81.
[42] José Luis Granja, 1986. *Nacionalismo y II República en el País Vasco*, Madrid: Siglo XXI, p. 18.
[43] Corcuera, 1979, op.cit., p. 188.
[44] Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p. 65.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Mees, 2003, op.cit., p. 11.

The end of the civil war (1933-1939) marked the beginning of General Franco's dictatorship, during which, all nationalistic movements were considered separatist and their political leadership operated from the exile. The regime had achieved to suppress 'successfully' all nationalist movements in Spain for its first twenty years. The economy was shattered and the economic policies of the regime were making sure that there is plenty more room for deterioration, at least until the mid-1960s.[47] The shining exception was again the Basque country, where the aristocracy had achieved the protection of its industrial establishments from the fury of the civil war, contrary to the rest of the country.[48] This allowed for further development of the region and of course more waves of immigrants, this time far larger than those of the previous century. During Franco's first years of rule, the Basque region seemed to have abandoned the nationalist discourse. This, though, lasted only until the 1950s, which saw the emergence of nationalist youth in the Basque region. This youth would lay the foundations of extremism, terrorism and political violence not only in Euskadi but also in the whole of the country.

ETA & the emergence of political violence

The weakness and the general apathy of the nationalist sectors of the Basque society during Franco's dictatorship, made evident the laxity of the nationalist cause. Besides, Franco's oppression was hard to beat. In the 1950s, the nationalist discourse revived once again, this time under the auspices of a magazine, *Ekin*, founded by some upper middle class young university students. Their objective was their familiarisation with the Basque tradition through the writings of Basque intellectuals (including Arana). At the same time, the PNV' s youth, *EGI*, also begun to develop a nationalist action, albeit a more radical one: graffiti and pro-nationalist slogans painted in the walls of the cities and the smaller towns. They lacked the intellectual capacity and depth of the members of Ekin because they came from the smaller industrial towns, where *euskera* was spoken and where access to higher education was not easy, mainly because of their economic situation. In 1956, Ekin merged with EGI and its representatives asked PNV – which was then in exile in Paris – for recognition

[47] For a detailed analysis on the regime's economic policy see Stanley Payne, 2000. *The Franco Regime: 1936-1975*, London: Sage, pp. 384-396.
[48] According to Heiberg (1989: 92), "[t]he mass destruction of industrial installations and infrastructure characteristic of the rest of Spain had not occurred in the Basque region, thanks mainly to the battalions of *gudaris* (soldiers) posted by the PNV to protect the Basque heavy industry from left-wing sabotage".

and support, a demand that was declined by PNV' s cadres. The party's refusal was received by the nationalist youth as an unwillingness or inability to confront Franco's authoritarian regime.[49] Their immediate response to PNV' s stance was the creation of *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA – Basque Homeland and Freedom), whose immediate implication was that PNV would cease to be the only legitimate representative of Basque nationalism.[50]

ETA's emergence brought with it a change in the basic assumptions of Basque nationalism, although its ideological foundations were not so distant from Arana's racist and ethnic calls. A book titled *Vasconia*, written by Federico Krutwig, one of ETA's most important intellectuals, was to mark the shift from Aranism to modern Basque nationalism. One main difference, espoused by Krutwig, was the subordination of ethnicity to language. As Clark puts it, "[t]he Basques were defined as unique by their ethnicity, which in turn was a product of their language. Were Euskera to disappear, the Basques would disappear as a nation".[51]

A second change concerned the supplanting of Arana's racist cronies and the introduction of ideas on revolutionary or guerrilla war, as the only viable way that could lead to the much-desired independence. The concept of revolutionary war, as advocated by Krutwig, was closely linked with the anti-colonialist battles of third world countries of the time. Euskadi was presented as a Spanish colony and the resort to violence was, naturally, the only means of liberation. Krutwig's theoretical influence came from Franz Fanon, while the struggle of the Algerians against the French and the determination of the Cubans against the Americans were, for Krutwig, examples of theory put into practice.[52]

A third deviation from the dogma of traditional Basque nationalism concerned the influence of Catholicism. In *Vasconia*, Arana's assiduity in Catholicism "was replaced by the idea of politics as a vocation".[53] The main reason for this is that the regime espoused the ideals of 'National Catholicism' (*nacionalcatolicismo*). To put simply, the clergy adopted the same totalitarian practices as Franco's political regime. As Carr and Aizpurua explain "[i]t was the blessing of the church […] that sanctioned

[49] Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p. 106.
[50] Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 89.
[51] Clark, 1984, op.cit., p. 33.
[52] Ibid., p. 34; Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p 95.
[53] Conversi, op.cit., p. 93.

– almost sanctified – Franco's rule to the average Spaniard in the 1940s and after".[54] In return, the church was provided with the control of secondary education.[55] It is under the principles of *nacionalcatolicismo* that the Church maintained its silence over the atrocities committed by the regime. "This stiff attitude on the part of the Church was another factor in encouraging many believers to join ETA or support its activists".[56]

At the beginning, ETA enjoyed the support of the majority of the Spanish population all over the country, thanks mainly to one event: the Burgos trial. In 1968, the police killed one of ETA's most renowned militants during a demonstration. In retaliation, ETA killed the head of the police forces in Guipúzcoa (August 2, 1968), well known for his 'effective' methods during interrogation. Sixteen of those involved in the assassination were tried in Burgos, in 1970. The verdict involved six death sentences and a total of over 700 years of imprisonment. ETA had become the symbol of resistance, not only of the Basques but also of all Spaniards against the regime.[57] Using the security forces as its targets, ETA appeared to be aiming at overthrowing the regime, rather than fighting for an independent Euskadi. The assassination of the regime's Prime Minister, and Franco's possible successor, Admiral Carrero Blanco, in December 20 1973, enhanced the sympathy of the population for ETA's cause, for it signified that the regime was not invincible.[58]

After the death of Franco, however, and well into the period of democratisation ETA continued the violent confrontation with the Spanish state, without any concern for popular support. ETA was open to anyone who wanted to become a member. In fact, it was based on the Basques' choice whether they would resist oppression or whether they would surrender. Although a discussion of cultural and political nationalism would follow, it must be noted that this was the first time elements of political nationalism appeared in a culture-based Basque nationalism. It is also the chief reason why ETA's history is one of splits, schisms, and fragmentation. Its ranks cover all sorts of ideological spectra: culturalists, anti-colonialists, Marxists,

[54] Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, 1979. *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy*, London: Allen and Unwin, p. 28.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 95.
[57] Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p. 107.
[58] Interestingly, one of ETA's leading cadres of the time had stated that the assassination of the Prime Minister was not part of a plan that would lead to a change of the regime. See Florencio Domínguez Irribaren, 2000, "La Violencia nacionalista de ETA" in Santos Juliá (ed.), *Violencia Política en la España del Siglo XX*, Madrid: Taurus, pp. 327-364. Quote at p. 338.

militarists. The region's proximity to France and the fact that most Basques spoke French also meant that most ideological influences came through France. Many distinguished Left-wing French intellectuals, with Jean-Paul Sartre being the leading figure, had expressed their respect and support for the Basque cause.[59]

In 1974, ETA suffered its last partition, into those who supported the continuation of violence, ETAm (military), and those who advocated an abandonment of violence and the turn to a more political mobilisation and confrontation, ETApm (political-military). After democratisation, the latter progressed into a political party (Euzkadiko Ezkerra, EE – Basque Left), thus paving the way for the extremists to dominate both the organisation and Spanish political life. ETA's list targets no longer consisted only of members of the security forces: Basque industrialists, politicians, journalists, as well as military and police personnel, were now under threat. It was particularly after Franco's death and during the transition to democracy that ETA stepped-up its campaign. Half of ETA's 91 victims in 1980 were civilians. In an effort to oblige the new Socialist government to negotiate, throughout the 1980s, ETA maintained its momentum. It was not until 1993, that is, after the amelioration in the professional relationships of the Spanish with the French Security Forces and agencies, that ETA's number of strikes and victims registered a fall.

In its forty-year long campaign, ETA has ceased fire four times. The first took place in January 1989 and was announced it would last 15 days. It was prolonged, however, until April of the same year because its declaration led to the first negotiations in Algiers between the Spanish government and members of the organisation. These ended unsuccessfully and ETA resumed its activities until 1996, when it declared a week-long ceasefire as a gesture of invitation to the new centre-right government of José Maria Aznar to take the political initiative to re-commence negotiations. The government did not respond until after ETA, in September 1998, declared an indefinite ceasefire and its then political wing Herri Batasuna (HB) signed an accord (The Pact of Lizarra) of national unity with the remaining regional parties of the Basque Country, aiming at the construction of the Basque nation. Government representatives and ETA members met in the Spanish city of Burgos in January 1999, and five months later in Zurich. This round also failed and, fourteen months after its

[59] Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 232.

initiation, the ceasefire came to an end with ETA claiming that the remaining parties repeatedly failed to comply with the terms of the Pact of Lizarra.

Since the recommencement of its activities, ETA has carried out one hundred and six attacks, seventy-six of which involved deaths and/or injuries. Its strength has been undoubtedly limited, a fact attributed mainly to the increased collaboration between French and Spanish authorities but also because of a more systematic approach to the subject by the Spanish security forces. In 2001 alone, 135 of its members were arrested and an enormous amount of invaluable information was confiscated from their bases, which produced a domino effect of arrests that led to the capture of 131 more members in 2004, among them some of its principal ideologues and strategists. The government's response was also fierce on the political level where in 2002 ETA's political wing Batasuna (formerly HB) was banned from political participation.[60] As recently as January 2005, the Spanish National Parliament rejected a proposal of the Basque Premier Ibarretxe, upheld by the regional Parliament and aimed at the provision of semi-independence for Euskadi. The reappearance of the Socialists in government that followed the traumatic experience of Al Qaeda's attack on March 11, 2004, in conjunction with the reduced capacity of the organisation (there have been only five attacks from May 2003 until May 2005, none of which has been deadly) have made many believe that the violent overdrives of Basque nationalism might soon vanish. However, despite the more orchestrated efforts recently deployed by the security forces as well as the political parties, ETA and those sectors that offer support have still to show signs of commitment to a purely political process, even though the government declares its wish to initiate a new round of negotiations if violence ceases (May 2005).

The following chapter critically examines the literature of nationalism and offers an analysis into both the contributions of the most significant, yet quite disparate, understandings of nationalism. It also highlights the inefficiencies of these theories and brings forward a critical understanding of the mechanisms that, on the one hand, are common to all nationalisms and nations through the use of symbols and cultural diachritica, and, on the other, employs that critical thinking in order to explain the particular dynamics of Basque nationalism.

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[60] Daniele Conversi, 2006. "Why do peace processes collapse? The Basque conflict and the three-spoilers perspective" in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds.), *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*, New York; Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp.173-199. Quote at p. 187.

CHAPTER 2

Theories of Nationalism: Culture, Identity and Symbolism

This chapter analyses and explains the formulations of the major theories of nationalism. It looks at the diverse explanations for the emergence of nationalism and critically assesses and evaluates them in an attempt to find where is it that these theories have been successful and what are their drawbacks. This will help the thesis bring forward the definitions it will adopt throughout the text.

The field of nationalism has been the subject of extensive research since the 1960s, and new ideas and challenges to the already existing theories were put forward during the last two decades of the twentieth century. As a result, the student is faced with a plethora of definitions for the nature of the phenomenon. 'Nationalism', as well as 'nation', could be classified as 'essentially contested concepts', which, according to W. B. Gallie, are "concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users"[1] – a condition which might well be proved to render every research flawed from the very beginning of its undertaking. As Alter argues, "*nationalism* does not exist as such, but a multitude of manifestations of nationalism do".[2] This implies that there are cases of nationalisms that share common characteristics and elements, which help build a theory that renders nationalism instantly recognisable from other forms of ideology, social action or manifestations of popular will. As we shall see, the process of identifying those common characteristics has given birth to a number of different interpretations of nationalism. In order for one to reach a comprehensive definition of nationalism, one has to look at the different schools of thought in the field of nationalism. Although the number of definitions equals the number of scholars in the field, a broad

[1] W. B. Gallie, 1962. "Essentially contested concepts", in Max Black (ed.), *The Importance of Language*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, p. 123.
[2] Peter Alter, 1994. *Nationalism*, London: Arnold, p. 2 (original emphasis).

generalisation can be made that distinguishes four main schools of theory: the *primordialists*, the *instrumentalists*, the *modernists* and the *perennialists*. For years, the debate in the field of nationalism consisted of primordialist and instrumentalist[3] theories. In fact, modernists could be classified as instrumentalists, and "perennialists were always primordialists of one kind or another".[4] As the study of nationalism progressed, however, new themes and alternative proposals emerged that cannot be entirely classified as either primordialist or instrumentalist. The modernist and the perennialist approaches complete the works of scholars undertaken so far by looking at nations and nationalism from a different perspective. This categorisation does not follow a strict rule nor is it an exhaustive list of schools of thought. Rather, it is based on certain elements and beliefs that are common and recurrent in the thought of many scholars.

Ethnic/Cultural vs. Civic/Political

At this point, it has to be stressed that despite the number of theories or analyses of nationalism, most authors distinguish between *cultural* and *political* nationalism. Although the two always intertwine in their relationship with nationalism[5], it is a normative distinction in the field, which helps indicate the origins of nationalism in a particular case study. Cultural or ethnic nationalism is the type of ideology adopted by a community, which employs its cultural links (language, history, origins, traditions) to designate its limits. In cases where the national identity is eliminated, or in the process of, Hutchinson explains, cultural nationalism operates as "a movement of moral regeneration", whose aim is to re-unite the different aspects of the nation and, thus, re-introduce the national identity.[6] It is for this reason, continues Hutchinson, that its proponents were members of cultural and academic societies. These intellectuals concentrated on the detailed study of history in order to establish the origins of their ancestors and their patterns of life, a process also known as 'historicism'.[7] The romantics of the late eighteenth century are considered to be

[3] Also known as 'situationalist' and 'circumstantialist'. See David Brown, *Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics*, London; N.Y.: Routledge, 2000, p.13.
[4] Anthony D. Smith, 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*, London; N.Y.: Routledge, p. 159.
[5] Ibid., p. 126.
[6] John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), 1994. *Nationalism*, Oxford; N.Y.: Oxford University Press, p. 123.
[7] Anthony D. Smith, 1981. *The Ethnic Revival In The Modern World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 88.

cultural nationalism's earliest advocacies, with the German philosophers occupying a high post in the diffusion of its cultural ideals and values.

In fact, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) was the first to use the term 'nationalism'. Herder saw nature as the driving force behind the shaping of every nation. The formation of a nation is primarily based on the natural environment. Every nation is different from each other because every nation is located in a different geographical environment. It is the environment that shapes the cultural characteristics of a nation, its language or customs. As Llobera puts it, the existence of different nations is, for Herder, "a God-willed natural phenomenon".[8] Thus, any attempt to eliminate the differences between nations was an act directed against nature and the will of God.

> "Nothing seems more obviously opposed to the purposes of government than the *unnatural* enlargement of states, the wild mixing together of different human species and nations under one sceptre."[9]

It is this line of logic that made Herder view humanity under a different prism. Unlike other philosophers, principally the French ideologues of the Enlightenment, Herder could not see the global dimension of humanity. In other words, he could not see the individuals forming one large and encompassing entity. Neither could he see the individuals as entities separate from each other and unique in themselves. Instead, he viewed individuals as part of communities, each of which was based on different cultures and traditions and whose aim was to preserve those markers that helped distinguish the group from other groups.

> "Humanity was not composed of atomised individuals, whose essence was a universal reason and whose spatially and temporarily specific traits were irrelevant, but, on the contrary, that it was composed of nations/cultures, and their essence and value lay precisely in their specificity."[10]

Language was the primary tool for the preservation of diversity in a world of nations, for "without its own language, a *Volk* is an absurdity (*Unding*), a contradiction of terms".[11] Language, for Herder, equals with thought, thus, each community has its own mode of thought. That is why it can only be learnt in the community and it is a

[8] Josep Llobera 1996. *The God of Modernity: The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe*, Oxford; Dulles: Berg, p. 167.
[9] Herder quoted in John Breuilly, 1993. *Nationalism and The State*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 339; my emphasis.
[10] Ernest Gellner, 1994. *Encounters with Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 68
[11] Herder quoted in F. M. Barnard, 1965. *Herder's Social and Political Thought*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 57.

form of defence of the diversity that surrounds the world.[12] Herder focuses on cultural characteristics and lends them a primordial significance by asserting that these characteristics belong to the natural sphere, and "human intervention could only enhance this process, but in no way could it be in a position to impose change from the outside".[13]

Herder's views were echoed in the thoughts of another German philosopher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). Herder and Fichte are two of Romanticism's leading thinkers. Fichte followed the post-Kantian doctrine of the state, according to which,

> "[t]he end of man is freedom, freedom is self-realization, and self-realization is complete absorption in the universal consciousness. [...] It is only when he and the state are one that the individual realizes his freedom."[14]

Notwithstanding, Fichte adopted a more radical stand on the significance of language than Herder. As Reiss puts it, Fichte "begun as a Radical, as a Jacobin, as a champion of the rights of the individual, and ended as an advocate of Nationalism, who placed the interests of the community above those of the individual".[15] Fichte argued that the original and pure languages are superior to the synthesised languages and, also, the means to "allow a nation to realize itself and attain its freedom".[16] 'Nation', as Fichte understands it, is defined by language: a group that shares the same language is a nation (*ibid.*). As for the political dimension that Fichte gives to the nation, it resembles United States President Wilson's authority of "every nation, a state", in the latter's Fourteen Points Speech.[17] Kedourie explains that, for Fichte, the nation will lose its language if it fails to develop into a state; and, what is more, the disruption of the cohesion of such a group by political frontiers is unnatural and

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[12] Breuilly, op. cit., p. 337.
[13] Llobera, op. cit., p. 167.
[14] Ellie Kedourie, 2000. Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 30.
[15] Hans Siegbert Reiss, 1955. The *Political Thought of the German Romantics 1793-1815*, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 11.
[16] Kedourie, op. cit., pp. 60-62.
[17] Wilson Woodrow, 1918. Fourteen points speech delivered to the Joint Session of Congress on January 8, 1918. Available at http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918/14points.html; last checked, August 3, 2007. Allen Lynch offers an interesting account on how President Wilson's concept was misunderstood by European nationalisms. See Allen Lynch, 2002. "Woodrow Wilson and the Principle of 'National Self-Determination': A Reconsideration", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 419-436.

unjust.[18] Ethnicity, therefore, should be congruent with the formation of a state. And the only way, for Fichte, to recognise or establish a unified culture was through primordial criteria. But historicism is prone to manipulations, for example by traditionalists[19] or the intelligentsia itself.[20] Herder writes that where the cultural links and traditions are relaxed or extinct, they should be "rediscovered".[21]

Political or civic nationalism, on the other hand, rests upon the will of the individual. As Hutchinson puts it, "political nationalists have as their objective the achievement of a representative national state that will guarantee to its members uniform citizenship rights".[22] The origins of political nationalism are as old as those of cultural nationalism, that is, they developed during the middle or late eighteenth century. Abbé Emmanuel Sieyès is considered to be one of the first political nationalists. In his *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat?*, Abbé Sieyès (1748-1836) calls the people of France to unite against those that have been denying their freedoms. The true nation is the Third Estate for Abbé Sieyès, whereas the first two represent the castes of the *ancien régime*. "Thus, what is the Third [Estate]? It is everything, but it is hindered and oppressed. What would it be without the privileged order? Everything, but it would be free and blooming".[23] He viewed nation as "a body of associates living under *common* law and represented by the same *legislative assembly*.[24] It is evident that there is no space for language or ethnicity or indeed any other cultural trait in the process of nation formation.

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), too, is considered to have identified the nation as a political association. For Rousseau, language, wealth and laws were the three basic standards for human beings with laws being more significant than either language or wealth.[25] The judicial system was, for Rousseau, nothing but an invention of the rich to steal more from the poor and thus maintain, if not raise, their elevated social status.[26] Rousseau was convinced that inequality was the cause of all social troubles. Thus, men needed to consent to the creation of a civil government whose

[18] Kedourie, op. cit., p. 62.
[19] Smith, 1981, op. cit., p. 125.
[20] Anthony D. Smith, 1979. *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Martin Robertson & Co. Ltd, p. 27. See also John Breuilly, op. cit.
[21] Herder quoted in Anthony Smith, 1991, *National Identity*, London; Reno: University of Nevada Press, p. 75.
[22] Hutchinson and Smith, op. cit., 124.
[23] Emmanuel Sieyès, 1970. *Qu' est-ce que le Tiers Etat?*, Geneve: Librairie Droz, p. 124.
[24] Ibid.: 126
[25] A. M. Cohler, 1970. *Rousseau and Nationalism*, New York: Basic Books, p. 128.
[26] Llobera, op. cit., p. 159.

natural objective is to maintain the equality of its members.[27] Though Rousseau recognised the insufficiency of the political will of the individuals in the nation-building process, he was a fervent advocate of patriotism. He did not rule out language, culture or identity as unnecessary for a nation to be formed but he identified nationalism with patriotism because all that mattered was the relationship between the state and its members.[28] As he wrote in 1772, "every true republican has drunk in love of country, that is to say love of law and liberty, along with his mother's milk. This love is his whole existence".[29]

Ernest Renan's (1823–1892) writings of the nineteenth century are of equal importance. Indeed, one might say that Renan was one of the earliest modernists since he acknowledged nations as creations of modernity.[30] In a speech he gave to Sorbonne in 1882, Renan dismissed many theories – some of which are still quite prominent in the contemporary debate – that attempted to explain the nature of the nation. Renan rejects theories according to which nations were formed because of the wars and the interests of dynasties, and refers to the United States and Switzerland as an example of political association. Race should also be avoided as a criterion because "the noblest countries, England, France, and Italy, are those where the blood is the most mixed".[31] Renan dismisses the romantics' claims of the importance of language by saying that it only acquires political significance because it is perceived as a sign of race. But, Renan points out, one should bear in mind that prior to any personal or national culture there is a human culture that should be respected. Furthermore, religious affinities and material interest are also insufficient to create a "spiritual principle" like the nation. For Renan,

> "[a] nation is a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make for the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarised, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is […] a *daily plebiscite*, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life".[32]

[27] Ibid.: 160
[28] Ibid.: 164
[29] Quoted in Nira Yuval-Davis, 2001. "Nationalism, Feminism and Gender Relations", in Monserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson (eds.), *Understanding Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 128.
[30] Homi Bhabha, 1990. "Introduction" in Homi Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration*, London ; New York : Routledge, p. 9.
[31] Ibid.: 14.
[32] Ibid.: 19. My emphasis.

There exists a tendency, among the scholars of the field, to identify civic or political nationalism as 'liberal', whereas cultural or ethnic nationalism is perceived as 'regressive' and 'reactionary'. For example Friedrich Meinecke, an early twentieth century historian, juxtaposes the voluntarist, freedom-led character of political nationalism with the coercion of the cultural type,[33] and Hans Kohn distinguishes between a voluntarist Western nationalism and an excessive and militant Eastern nationalism.[34] It has been suggested that this is so because the former projects sovereignty as the main motive for the formation of a nation, whereas the latter must necessarily refer to the uniqueness of the people's culture or descent.[35] This project recognises the validity of the distinction, insofar as it refers to two ideal types the nationalist phenomenon can adopt, but cannot accept any connotations of either virtue or meanness, as it were, for it recognises that the purpose of all nationalisms, whether cultural or political, is *more* self-determination. Furthermore, as the description of the Basque case will show, nationalism is a social movement and as such it depends very much on the broader political, economic, and social circumstances. Its manifestation, therefore, is susceptible to many changes that cross over the divide between the political and the cultural.

Primordialism: Culture and Genes

The primordialist school is founded on the belief that nations predated modernity and nationalism as we experience it, or have experienced it in the recent past. One approach sees it as an organic phenomenon, that is, a nation is live enough to be considered part of the natural order. This approach focuses on the cultural aspects of a community: its customs, language, history. It was initiated as a notion by the German Romantics who called upon such characteristics in order to help people

[33] David Brown, 1990. "Are there good and bad Nationalisms?", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 5, No.2, pp. 281-302.

[34] Hans Kohn, 1967 [1944]. *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*, New York: MacMillan. For Kohn, Western nationalism refers to the United States of America, Britain, France, the Netherlands and it was voluntarist due to "a sophisticated urban middle class vernacular culture [which] had gradually developed from the Renaissance onwards" and due to which, the boundaries of the nation-state "had or were about to be formed" (Hutchinson 1994: 127). The 'organic' nationalism that developed in the East, on the other hand, referred to a greater territory and comprised East and Central Europe, as well as Asia. It was a response to Western nationalism, only that there was no strong middle class to undertake the task of building a nation. Instead, it was the intelligentsia who resorted to the emphasis of memories, traditions and similar cultural characteristics in order to create "a national public opinion in favour of an authentic political community based on it 'natural' homelands and providing thereby a platform for later modernist political nationalist movements" (*ibid*.: 128).

[35] See Liah Greenfeld, 1992. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

realise which nation they belonged to. In more contemporary times, the first academic to use the term "primordial" in order to describe the strength of ties in societies was Edward Shils. In an article published in 1957, Shils observed that the primordial ties of families and religions not only had survived industrialisation and modernity, but were also very significant during those periods, strongly characterised by individualism and secularism.[36] In 1973, Clifford Geertz took Shils' study one-step further and published his findings on the primordiality of ethnic ties.[37] In his study on new states in Africa and Asia, Geertz observed that there were two different sets of links that held the societies together. The first set focused on the civil ties of the entire nation-state, which guaranteed stability and security and which reflected the political mentality of the West; the second set consisted of cultural ties that shaped and dictated the sense of belonging of the individual. Geertz asserted that the existence of primordial ties of a community is based on cultural 'givens' like blood, race, language, locality, religion or tradition.[38] It is these cultural givens that make an individual feel strongly for his/her fellows, and it is according to these givens that an outside observer can differentiate between communities.[39] For Geertz, these elements can be either natural or given and they are coercive for the individual. That is, the individual has no other choice but to obey the feelings that these givens generate. Nonetheless, Geertz concludes that theories of social interaction cannot explain the way in which these primordial ties work, precisely because they are based on emotions and feelings. In other words, the effect of these feelings can be seen, but what makes them surface remains "ineffable".

Geertz's theory fails to recognise the symptoms or to define the cause. What is more, it accepts that the sociological field is incapable of producing a logical explanation of the nationalist phenomenon, because the latter emanates from emotions and not from social interaction. This very argument lies at the heart of a critique

[36] Smith, op. cit., p. 151.
[37] Clifford Geertz, 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*, London: Fontana.
[38] Ibid., p. 259.
[39] The 'primordialist/instrumentalist' debate of the late 1960s and 1970s, draws from an earlier socio-anthropological debate that started off by Edmund Leach's study. Leach argued that "social units are produced by subjective processes of categorical ascription that have no necessary relationship to observers' perceptions of cultural discontinuities" (Carter G. Bentley, p. 24, 1987. "Ethnicity and practice", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.29, No.1, pp. 24-55), which departed from the established method of studying the differences projected by the units themselves.

formulated by Eller and Coughlan.[40] In their article, the two scholars have launched a ferocious attack on Shils and Geertz for their failure to perceive kin or ethnic attachments as produced by the interaction of the members of any, and indeed every, society. These ties are socially constructed and their existence always serves objectives and ends. In other words, ethnic identity is manipulable and socially constructed, and in order to become that, the meaning and significance of ethnic ties must also be manipulated or constructed. The remedy offered by Eller and Coughlan is "a social-constructionist approach (to affect and attachment) set within a cultural-reproduction paradigm (to ethnic identity)".[41]

Their argument provoked other scholars from the primordialist camp to answer back, which made some authors talk about the revival of the debate between instrumentalists and primordialists. Steven Grosby wrote his article a year after Eller and Coughlan published their study, and his argument was no less ferocious than the one he was trying to dismiss. According to Grosby, Eller and Coughlan had missed the basic point of primordialism according to which, human beings classify themselves and others according to primordial criteria, like the family, the homeland, the language, the religion, etc. Humans use these criteria, according to Grosby, to identify the group in which they participate and differentiate it from other groups. It is the perception that all people of the nation share the same origins, and not the real history, that cannot be subjected to sociological research. But why do we give so much importance to those criteria? The answer, according to Grosby, is because

> "the family, the locality, and one's own 'people' bear, transmit and protect life. […] the national state has the power to protect one's life and all that which is *familiar* to one. To some extent, the power over life can be manipulated […] to some extent these powers remain beyond our manipulation; that is one of the reasons why human beings stand in awe of them: they remain *ineffable* and *coercive* […] this is one of the reasons why human beings have sacrificed their lives and continue to sacrifice their lives for their own family and for their own nation".[42]

A second version of primordialism is based on socio-biological theories. Sociobiology seems more useful than 'pure' primordialist theories because it attempts to explain the importance of ethnic attachments and ties by locating them in the

[40] Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, 1993. "The poverty of primordialism: demystification of ethnic attachments", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.16, No.2 (April), pp. 183-202.
[41] Ibid.: 197.
[42] Steven Grosby, 1994. "The verdict of history: the inexpungeable tie of primordiality – a response to Eller and Coughlan", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.17, No.1 (January), pp. 164-171; original emphasis. Quote at p. 169

human genes. The foundational tenet of these theories rests on the assumption that nations and ethnic groups are an extension of families and kinship. Pierre van den Berghe is the main proponent of this approach.[43] Van den Berghe looks at the mechanisms of animal sociality in order to explain the process which gives prominence to such feelings of belonging and inclusion. For van den Berghe, "animals are social to the extent that co-operation is mutually beneficial. What sociobiology does is supply the main genetic mechanism for animal sociality, namely *kin selection* to maximize *inclusive fitness*".[44] Inclusive fitness is a theory according to which,

> "genes will spread if their carriers act to increase not only their own fitness or reproductive success but also that of other individuals carrying the same genes. A person's inclusive fitness is his or her personal fitness plus the increased fitness of relatives that he or she has in some way caused by his or her actions ".[45]

The relationship between kin selection and inclusive fitness is dual. Animals prefer kin over non-kin, or close kin over distant kin, in order to increase co-operation and thus maximise their benefits. By reproducing with members of the same species, animals automatically achieve the enhancement of the group's fitness because the new members of the group will co-operate with each other in order to maximise the benefits, and so on. But inclusive fitness cannot be achieved unless the reproduction process takes place within the group's limits.

Human sociality, for Van den Berghe, is not that different from animal sociality. Ethnic groups, from the very first moment they appeared, were "in-breeding superfamilies".[46] They were different from neighbouring populations, and what is more, they used cultural and physical boundaries in order to differentiate themselves and, therefore, maximise inclusive fitness. This form of nepotism is viewed by sociobiology as a basic genetic function of the human species. And it is this nepotistic behaviour that, over the years, helped evolve the process of kin selection into ethnocentricisim. But, as van den Berghe argues, common descent and the sharing of a common identity needs to be, to a certain extent, fictive. It would be naïve to claim

[43] Pierre Louis Van den Berghe, 1981. *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, New York; London: Elsevier.
[44] Pierre Louis Van den Berghe, 1978. "Race and ethnicity: a sociobiological perspective", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.21, No.4 (July), pp. 401-411. Quote at p. 402
[45] Vernon Reynolds, Vincent Falger and Ian Vine (eds.), 1987. *The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: evolutionary dimensions of xenophobia, discrimination, racism and nationalism*, London: Croom Helm, p. xvii.
[46] Pierre Van den Berghe, 1978, op.cit., p. 404.

that all French people have the same descent, or that the Maltese all share the same blood. Similarly, in the ancient times, the process of endogamy of a group and the 'purity' of its identity was inevitably broken down and blurred by conquest and migration. Cultural traits, therefore, are necessary for the preservation of the identity.

At this point, the reader might find van den Berghe's argument confusing. It is claimed that these sentiments are rooted in the human genetic code (real), but cannot come into effect unless there is a cultural (fictitious) stimulation. Van den Berghe's theory is that fantasy alone cannot help sustain a group's identity. The myth of common descent "has to be rooted in historical reality to be accepted. Ethnicity can be manipulated but not manufactured".[47] Unlike animals, however, humans do not use physical characteristics in order to distinguish kin from non-kin. Rather, they turn to cultural marks, like language, religion, tradition, in order to differentiate themselves from the 'others'. That is something to be expected for van den Berghe, since small groups needed to distinguish themselves from neighbouring populations, rather than from people whom they have never contacted before.[48] Van den Berghe's theory of human sociality rests on three pillars, with kin selection being only one of them. *Reciprocity* is another characteristic of human sociality and refers to the co-operation between members of one or more communities for the mutual and equal exploitation of scarce resources. This form of co-operation enhances the inclusive fitness of the groups. *Coercion* is the third basic element of human sociality and takes the form of an imbalance of power between two or more communities. The dominant community is also the one that sees its inclusive fitness maximised.

Both the sociobiological perspective and Geertz's theory reflect upon ethnicity and ethnic identities rather than nationalism. This, of course, does not constitute a criticism in itself, since, in order to explain nationalism, one has to understand the dynamics of ethnic identity and ethnicity and the way in which these affect human behaviour. But my understanding of Geertz's theory is that it can only recognise the constitutive parts of ethnicity, without being able to justify how these come about. Even if one accepts Grosby's explanation, that it is the "*perception* on the part of the group members that such things as kinship, language and religious practice are

[47] Van den Berghe, 1981, op.cit., p. 27.
[48] Sigmund Freud moved along those lines and argued that "it is precisely small communities with adjoining territories, and related to each other in other ways as well, who are engaged in constant feuds and in ridiculing each other" (Freud, in Daniele Conversi, 1999. "Nationalism, boundaries and violence", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.28, No.3, pp. 553-584, p. 578).

primordial",[49] one can see that it too is flawed because it does not deliver a tool that explains how are these perceptions shaped and what is it that shapes them. It is flawed because it fails to consider, for example, the children and grand children of immigrants who would still give their life for the nation of their predecessors, even though they themselves have grown up in a different locality, with different traditions, different language, and so on. It is flawed because it fails to explain how people give their lives for an ethnic community other than the one they belong to, as was the case with the *philhellenes* in the Greek War of Independence (19th C.) and the British volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Primordialism "naturalises ethnic groups and justifies ethnic sentiments"[50] because, by failing to explain how or why do people perceive these ties as primordial, it merely accepts the claims made by nationalists about the (usually, very long) history of the group, its language and its age-old traditions. Finally it is flawed because, as Nagata has argued, those characteristics described as 'givens' and perceived to be ineffable and coercive may, or may not, be stressed as part of the ethnic identity.[51] For example, religion is considered as an important marker of the Jewish ethnic identity, whereas it makes no sense in the case of German ethnic identity.[52]

Furthermore, and despite the fact that both Geertz and van den Berghe take migration and/or conquest into consideration, primordialist approaches attempt to lend a sense of rigidity and eternality in the notion of 'culture'. In the case of the Romantics, culture is what determines a nation and if a nation loses its culture, or vital elements of it, a nation ceases to be one. On the other hand, Geertz claims that the 'cultural givens' are natural and van den Berghe insists that culture must, to a certain extent, reflect reality. The fallacy committed in the first instance is that it presents culture to be dictating an individual's behaviour. An individual develops such 'ineffable' and 'coercive' feelings because of the cultural givens that he received. The fallacy committed by sociobiological theories, on the other hand, is that certain

[49] Stephen Cornell, 1990. "Land, labour and group formation: Blacks and Indians in the United States", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.13, No.3, pp. 368-388.Quote at p. 369.
[50] Richard Jenkins, 1996a, "Ethinicity etcetera: social anthropological points of view", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 19, No.4, pp. 807-822. Quote at p. 811.
[51] Judith Nagata, 1981. "In defense of ethnic Boundaries: the changing myths and charters of Malay identity" in Charles Keyes (ed.), *Ethnic Change*, Seattle; London: University of Washington Press. Quote at pp. 92-95.
[52] Nonetheless, and in order to do justice to primordialist claims, one needs to stress that, although Nagata's point is clear, it fails to consider that at least one cultural trait will always be stressed as part of the identity. In the German example, that would be the language.

cultural elements (if not the entire culture) that we experience are actually the same as those of our forefathers. Clearly, culture is one aspect of communities that is shaped under constant change. Language, in particular, is one trait that changes continuously and more often than others, say tradition or religion. Furthermore, an individual's culture is shaped according to the environment that surrounds him. And in the days of globalisation, although differences exist and are maintained constantly, one can see that a kind of global culture emerges, most notably in sport and entertainment. It is along these lines of change and culture, as well as the constraining effect ethnic identities presumably have on human behaviour, that Fredrik Barth based his criticisms and developed his thoughts on the relationship between *ethnic borders* and *ethnic contents*.[53] Barth was the first to develop an instrumentalist approach to the explanation of ethnic ties and preservation of ethnic identities.

Despite the lack of a strong theoretical and epistemological foundation that would allow for further research and provide empirical evidence, which might explain the ineffability of such sentiments and emotions, the primordialist approach is quite significant in the study of nationalism. Thompson refuses to dismiss it as "unscientific" or "unsociological".[54] Gil-White emphasises the fact that by stressing the cognitive perception of individuals, primordialism does not claim that nations *are* a feature of eternity, or that new ethnic identities cannot emerge.[55] And Jenkins admits, that "crude primordialism is essentially a common-sense view with enormous power in the world".[56] The latter comment is perhaps the one that reflects the greatest truth about primordialism, one which should guard us from dismissing it as an old-fashioned theory. For, its identification of the past through the analyses and explanation of culture and genes, is useful in identifying the processes by which these elements become constitutive parts of the greater phenomenon that is called Nationalism. In other words, these theories offer an insight into the existence (perceived or otherwise) of links between the past and the present. From that point of view, the ethno-symbolic framework employed in this study takes primordialist

[53] Fredrik Barth (ed.), 1969. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Culture Difference*, Boston: Little Brown.
[54] Thompson in J.D. Eller and M.R. Coughlan, 1993. "The poverty of primordialism: demystification of ethnic attachments", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 183-202.
[55] Francisco Gil White, 1999. "How thick is blood? The plot thickens…: if ethnic actors are primordialists, what remains of circumstantial/primordialist controversy?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.22, No.5, pp.789-820. Quote at p. 803.
[56] Jenkins, 1996a, op.cit., p. 814.

contributions into account, in order to explain how the (proto-nationalist) past leads to a nationalist present. But it also employs contributions brought forward by instrumentalist theories, whose studies showed that ethnicity and identity are socially constructed notions, and as such, they can be manipulated and changed.

Instrumentalism: ethnic borders vs. ethnic content

Barth's study fundamentally departs from the, until then, established method of looking at the cultural characteristics of a group in order to determine its nature and identity. Instead, it focuses on the way members of the group interact, both with each other and with members of distinct groups, and how this interaction shapes the perceptions of the members with regards to their identity. Barth argues that humans use ethnic diachritica, that is, they ascribe ethnic characteristics to an individual, in order to classify him "in terms of his basic, more general identity, presumptively determined by his origin and background".[57] In other words, it is a process by which group members define themselves (internal definition) and others (external definition).[58] Ascription, according to Barth, makes the existence of social boundaries evident; those who share culture A are different from those who are of culture B. Culture is the ethnic content that the boundaries enclose, and as such, it marks the limits of the boundaries.

Nonetheless, one cannot neglect the transactional processes that take place between different communities. Such transactions, Barth argues, require shared codes and values, which facilitate communication and promote further interaction. Despite the fact that the differences between two or more groups are reduced, however, ascription still takes place, thus making ethnic boundaries persistent. Ethnic groups, then, are formed when the members of the group use ascription for the purposes of interaction[59] and ethnic identity emerges from the formation, and maintenance, of boundaries. The conclusion of this line of thought is that it is the boundaries, rather than the content, that have the primary role in shaping ethnic identity. And those boundaries are created by the members' perceptions.

Barth and his collaborators have studied ethnic groups that have undergone a change of ethnic identity because they were forced to by circumstances that were

[57] Barth, 1969, op.cit., p. 13.
[58] Richard Jenkins, 1994. "Rethinking ethnicity: identity, categorization and power" *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.17, No.2. Quote at pp. 198-199.
[59] Barth, op.cit, p.14.

affecting their material or socio-political interests, vital for the subsistence of the group. In order to enjoy equal status with the other members of the new group, or to become fully assimilated, those individuals also underwent a change of culture. This argument, of course, is in sharp contrast with the primordialist claims that ethnic identity is part of the human genome and has constraining effects on human behaviour. Barth and his colleagues have demonstrated that individuals can choose how to define their identity depending on where their interests lie. When this change takes place, culture appears to be fairly elastic and not as a constrain to the individuals' behaviour. Whereas primordialists attempted to explain ethnic conflicts by projecting the incompatibility of interests and/or goals between two different ethnic groups, the instrumentalist approach views ethnic conflict as a product of the way in which society is organised. Social organisation is based on cultural differences, which, in turn, serve as pillars in the construction and maintenance of social boundaries, whose purpose is to contrast ethnic groups so as to differentiate one group from another. Barth's study allows us to see cultural differentiation as an effect of boundaries, rather than a cause, since, the stronger the boundary, the greater the variation of culture will be between two or more ethnic groups. In fact, Barth's findings are foreshadowed in Robert Park's work, a prominent figure of the Chicago School, who were the first to observe the elasticity and manipulation of ethnic identities.[60]

Barth's study, although reflecting on a pre-existing debate within the socio-anthropological field, it has formed the basis for further study and the prism under which many scholars were to examine ethnicity and ethnic identities. Jenkins accepts[61] the correctness of the theory and only highlights the importance of external categorisation, which he believes should be looked at with more detail by future scholars who embrace the Barthian approach. Jenkins believes that the internal definition does not suffice for an ethnic identity to be formed. The way others see us and the way we see others, is equally important.[62] The same could be said for Stephen

[60] The Chicago School brought together urban sociologists and anthropologists in an attempt to explain the way in which the ethnic groups of the American cities maintained their distinctiveness (Thomas Hylland Eriksen, 1993. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, London; Chicago: Pluto Press, p. 18).

[61] Jenkins, op.cit., 1994 and 1996a.

[62] Triantafyllidou has taken up on this particular theme and differentiates between 'others' and 'significant others'. The difference is that the 'significant other' poses a clear threat for the coherence of the in-group. There are *internal* (e.g. ethnic communities and immigrants) as well as *external*

Cornell, although his view is that the flaw in the formation of the theory lies with the nature of circumstance.[63] For Cornell, Barth and his collaborators have not paid sufficient attention to the fact that the circumstance plays an equally important role in the formation of ethnic groups, as does the interaction between circumstance and content, implying, thus, that the individual actor is not as free to choose whether to change an ethnic identity or not, as it is assumed by Barth.

The majority of criticisms Barth's work has received focus on his failure to take into consideration the role of history in the shaping of ethnic identities.[64] In later studies, Barth recognised that history is a chain of events constitutive of the present and as such it cannot leave people's perceptions unaffected.[65] Scholars, however, have identified more problems with the Barthian approach, implying that it is no better in explaining ethnic identity formation than primordialism. One such criticism comes from Bentley who argues that neither of the two schools can account effectively on how the individuals come to recognise the commonalities of culture that bring them together. More concretely, they fail to account "for the sense of compulsion that attaches to ethnic identities".[66] Bentley bases his work on Pierre Bourdieu's 'theory of practice', according to which the products of collective history (language, economy, culture, etc.) are founded on the 'habitus', that is, "systems of durable transposable dispositions".[67] Following the theory of practice, Bentley shows that ethnic identities are "[r]ooted in preconscious patterns of practice that are not susceptible to conscious apprehension or alteration",[68] but rather emanate from the social environment in which the individuals are placed. In other words, people act and react according to the perceptions that have been shaped under the 'habitus' in which they found themselves, and this does not necessarily points to a rational, interest-seeking behaviour.

On the other hand, Francisco Gil-White has criticised the Barthian model because it confuses the nature of ethnic groups with their mobilisation. For example, it might be true that some groups do indeed shift and alter their ethnic ascriptions but

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'significant others'. Anna Triantafyllidou, 1998. "National Identity and the Other", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.21, No.4, pp.593-612.

[63] Cornell, op.cit., 1990. See also, Stephen Cornell, 1996. "The variable ties that bind: content and circumstance in ethnic processes", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.19, No.2

[64] Jenkins, op.cit.; Bentley op.cit.; see also Conversi, 1999, op.cit.

[65] Jenkins 1994, op.cit., p. 198.

[66] Bentley, op.cit., 48.

[67] Bourdieu, quoted in Bentley, op.cit., p. 28.

[68] Ibid.

this does not necessarily guarantee that all ethnic groups follow this pattern.[69] Moreover, the justification that this change takes place because of the pursuit of personal interest cannot stand because in many cases, as Gil-White explains, personal economic interest has been sacrificed for the good of the community. Gil-White explicitly doubts the empirical evidence given by Barth himself on instances of ethnic identity alteration, and argues that such changes cannot happen in the first generation, thus indicating an "active primordialist model".[70] In a similar critique, Paine asserts that Barth concentrates excessively on the instrumentality of ethnic identities, thus rendering himself incapable of explaining why actors develop strong feelings for their communities. Paine also criticises Barth for confusing values with strategy.[71] Contrary to Barth's claims, that values are implicit in every transaction and every transaction can be translated as a strategic way of maximizing value, Paine responds by identifying *intrinsic* and *extrinsic* values.[72] The former connotes faith and belief whereas the second indicates strategy and transaction. Interestingly, Bourne and Sivanandan claim that Barth can be easily misunderstood because, by highlighting the behaviour of the actors, as it is shaped by the pursuit of their interests, he seems to blame the actors themselves for their cultural difference that has proved to be a disadvantage.[73] Furthermore, Handelman also focuses on culture and says that Barth overlooked the dual relationship between culture and boundaries: the culture serves to designate what its limits are, whereas the boundaries indicate what they enclose.[74] Other commentators have supported that the primordialist and the instrumentalist approaches should not be viewed as opposites but rather as accommodating.[75]

One must indicate at this point, that ethnicity is often confused or presented as synonymous to 'race', partly because certain ethnic groups highlight the importance of 'race' as a factor of the group's cohesiveness. Here too, however, scholars are divided as to what the exact meaning of race is and its role in social relations.

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[69] Gil-White, op.cit.. The clan Fur in Sudan is one such clan. See Gunnar Haaland, 1969. "Economic determinants in ethnic processes", in Fredrik Barth, op.cit.
[70] Gil-white, op.cit., p. 810.
[71] Robert Paine, 1974. *Second Thoughts about Barth's Models*, Occasional Papers No.32, London: Royal Anthropological Institute.
[72] Ibid.: p. 11.
[73] A. Bourne and J. Sivanandan, 1980. "Cheerleaders and ombudsmen: the sociology of race relations in Britain", *Race and Class*, Vol.21, No.4, pp. 331-352. Quote at p.345.
[74] D. Handelman, 1977. "The organization of ethnicity", *Ethnic Groups*, Vol.1, pp. 187-200. Quote at p.200.
[75] Nagata, 1981, op.cit., p. 111.

Wallman characterises the debate between the two notions as a 'quibble',[76] while, at later writings, she stressed that phenotype or 'race' is only one of the ethnic boundary markers.[77] Banton, whose contribution to the study of race and racism is enormous, has argued that 'ethnicity' differs from 'race' because the former denotes the in-group by highlighting cultural differences, whereas the latter denotes the out-group by stressing phenotypical or physical characteristics.[78] Furthermore, Jenkins argues that, "while 'ethnic' social relations are not *necessarily* hierarchical, exploitative and conflictual, 'race relations' would certainly appear to be".[79]

Nonetheless, one cannot deny the effect that Barth's study had on the development of the studies of nationalism. First of all because its basic premises are widely accepted by social anthropologists and the criticisms it received concerned mainly a disagreement on which aspects should be emphasised more.[80] Second, because it implied that ethnic identities are not always conflictual, thus, inciting researchers to look at the circumstances that draw ethnic groups into conflict. The majority of scholars who explained nationalism as a modern phenomenon have accepted the instrumental element that comes along with ethnic feelings, namely the establishment of an ethnic identity. As it has been noted in the beginning, the terms 'modernist' and 'instrumentalist', in so far as they designated schools of thought in the field, were synonymous. But, as Benedict Anderson has indicated, since the early 1980s the traditional literature has been qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, enriched, thus in need of reconsideration.[81] The following section discusses the modernist literature, which is branded as such because opinions on the classification of the authors that are examined in the following lines, or rather their work, may vary because of the different aspects they highlight in their studies, for example modernity or instrumentality. However, since the 1960s, the majority of studies have considered

[76] Sandra Wallman, 1978. "The boundaries of race: processes of ethnicity in England", Man, No.13, pp. 200-217. Quote at p. 205.
[77] Sandra Wallman, 1986. "Ethnicity and the boundary process in context" in John Rex and David Mason (eds.), *Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 226.
[78] Michael Banton, 1983. *Racial and Ethnic Competition*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press., pp. 1-14.
[79] Richard Jenkins, 1996b. *Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations*, London; New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 74-75.
[80] Erikssen, op.cit., p. 58.
[81] Benedict Anderson, 1991. *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso, p. xii.

not only nations to be a modern phenomenon, but that modernity is the sole factor that allowed the emergence of nations' elements.[82]

Nationalism: the beast of modernity

Elie Kedourie was one of the first scholars to give a historical account of nationalism, viewed trough the prism of modernity.[83] The influence of the Romantic movement and the discourses of the German philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century is the point Kedourie highlights as a main cause of nationalism in Europe. As we saw earlier in the text, the German philosophers insisted on racial and linguistic purity as necessary ingredients for the survival of any state. The cultural characteristics of a nation, with language in particular, were considered to be what differentiated one community from another and they had to be preserved. Fichte differentiated between original and derived languages and, of course, supremacy was granted to the former.[84] For, original languages are natural languages and they are the only ones that can point to a true nation. And such a nation should preserve its language and protect it form foreign borrowings or intrusions. Earlier in the text, we saw Herder's incitement for the rediscovery of the nation.

For Kedourie, nationalism is an essentially modern phenomenon because the Romantic movement surfaced out of the frustration of educated youth and ostracised intellectuals who where denied a role in the building of the German nation. As it is explained,[85] these intellectuals belonged to the lower social classes. But when they completed their education, "they found that their knowledge opened no doors"[86] and that the nobles and aristocrats had secured every access to the state apparatus for themselves and threw away the keys. The German philosophers, advocates of the Kantian philosophy of personal freedom[87], followed an ideological style of politics that emerged from the French Revolution and which is "inherent" in nationalist movements.[88] It is because of the importance of Europe and its ability to influence the

[82] Smith, 1998, op.cit., p. 24.
[83] Elie Kedourie, 2000 (4th Ed.), *Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell.
[84] Ibid., pp. 56-65.
[85] Ibid., pp. 35-43.
[86] Ibid., p. 36.
[87] It must be stressed, however, that Kedourie clarifies that Kant is no nationalist; rather, it is "the idea of self-determination, which is at the centre of Kant's ethical theory [and which] became the governing notion in the moral and political discourse of his successors, notably Fichte" (Kedourie 2000: 137).
[88] Ibid., p. 140.

rest of the world that the doctrine spread.[89] For Kedourie, it is these advocacies that resonated in the calls for birth of other nations in Europe, and which had an immense impact on ethnically mixed communities.

Ernest Gellner is the scholar whose insights on the emergence and development of nationalism were original and influential enough to establish the modernist approach in the field. As early as 1964, when his *Thought and Change* was published, he argued that uneven modernisation was the driving force behind the rise of nationalism. Industrialisation favoured the urban centres and contributed to their growth by attracting workforce from the impoverished and undeveloped countryside. Language, for Gellner, was the only means for the immigrants to maintain their distinctiveness vis-à-vis the other newcomers and/or the urban population. This kind of population shift, according to Gellner, brought with it social and ethnic conflicts, between the immigrant population – which was uneducated, poor and often of distinct language and culture – and the urban and modernised population – the educated and property holders. These ethnic conflicts later developed into nationalist ones when the intelligentsia, of either side, began demanding the right to self-determination and secession. This is the most important point of Gellner's argument, for it is nationalism that creates states and not the other way around. "Nationalism […] invents nations where they do not exist – but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on".[90] Where ethnic conflicts did not emerge and ethnic groups were assimilated, they were so because of the creation of a public and standardised education system that was working on the national language.

In 1983, Gellner presented a fuller picture of his argument. In *Nations and Nationalism* he explains how the transition from an 'agro-literate' society to a modern, industrialised one is where scholars should focus in order to explain nationalism.[91] A typical agro-literate society might have its own state but where it didn't, nationalism did not emerge because society was stratified in such a way that the creation of a nation was impossible to seek. In an agro-literate society, Gellner argues, there are different strata, like the clergy, the military, the administrative and

[89] Ibid. John Hall quotes Patrick Moynihan's famous complaint that many of the Third World nationalists have been trained in the West. See John Hall, 1995. "Nationalisms, classified and explained" in Sukumar Periwal (ed.), *Notions of Nationalism*, Budapest; London: Central European University Press, pp. 8-33.
[90] Ernest Gellner, 1964. *Thought and Change*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, p. 168.
[91] Ernest Gellner, 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell.

commercial classes, and the agricultural populations of the countryside, which are, of course, at the very bottom of the social pyramid. The ruling classes are vertically differentiated by the 'simple' people and, not only there is not much contact between them, but the ruling classes refuse to share their culture with people from the lower strata. This is one reason why nationalism could not surface, but its emergence was debilitated by the fact that the ruling classes were also horizontally differentiated with each other. As Gellner explains, "the more differentiated in style of all kinds the various strata are, the less friction and ambiguity there will be between them".[92] Implicitly, this quote gives only an impression of why the Third Estate thought they should do once and for all with the *ancien régime*.

On the other hand, an industrial society is fluid and mobile because it is an ever-expanding one. Growth is what modern societies are after. That is why there is a great level of professional specialisation and a unique mode of production based on the division of labour. Industrialisation, thus, only functions in a society whose members can be mobile, able to interact and communicate with other people, outside their localities. This requires a standardised vernacular, which in turn requires universal literacy, which brings about the necessity for one standardised education system undertaken by the state, since it is the only actor that can provide the means for such a task. It is this "new form of social organisation, based on deeply internalised, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state" that causes nationalism to emerge.[93] Gellner distinguishes between high or 'garden' cultures and low or 'wild' cultures. The high cultures are indicative of the modern era. They are based on education and literacy and they are pervasive, contrary to the low cultures that reflect the customs and traditions of only a small community of people and which need no special organisation. Many of the low cultures cannot survive the drive of modernisation, hence the dominance of the high culture. Others are taken up and become part of the latter. Quite often, nationalism invents itself cultures, which it presents as part of the main, national culture. Gellner explicitly refuses to identify nationalism as a phenomenon of will (political nationalism) or as one of culture (cultural nationalism). Rather, nationalism combines both aspects, in the sense that only when a society's culture is pervasive, education-based, "homogeneous" and "centrally sustained", then, and only then, the members of the society feel the need to

[92] Ernest Gellner, 1983, op.cit., p. 10.
[93] Ibid., p. 48.

protect their culture politically and those who share it. That is why "nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent".[94] Modernity and modernisation create the only circumstances under which nationalism can emerge. Gellner accepts that nationalist intelligentsias interfere with the authenticity of the culture(s) they purport to defend, but he claims it is impossible for nationalism to be born out of their influence. "A high culture pervades the whole of society, defines it and needs to be sustained by the polity. *That* is the secret of nationalism".[95]

As far as modernisation is concerned, there are a few points that need to be made and that scholars have stressed since the text's publication. Firstly, although Gellner's theory is based on the fact that modernisation does not affect all places at the same time, it assumes, however, that it affects all places in the same way. Where modernisation is accepted or established, nationalism will surface because industrialisation, and therefore modernisation, depends upon the building of one single nation and of one homogeneous community in order to function properly. It is clear that modernisation, presented like this, does not leave much scope for the individual to act. The involvement of individuals – the elites or the intelligentsias – is seen as a consequence rather than a cause of nationalism. This claim, in turn, brings about another problem with Gellner's theory, mainly that it fails to explain the emergence of nationalism in pre-industrial societies, thus rendering itself functionalist. Smith cites Japan, Ireland, Mexico, Finland, Serbia and Australia as such examples.[96] Hall points at the cases of Britain and France, where nationalist sentiments emerged before the appearance of industry and were caused by the dissatisfaction with the *ancien régime*.[97]

Smith doubts the importance of a mass education system because, as he claims, it is a product of the nationalist elites themselves but only after they had come to power.[98] Thus, the standardisation of language and the establishment of one national culture through mass public education could not have constituted a cause of

[94] Ibid., p. 1.
[95] Ibid., p. 18; original emphasis.
[96] Anthony D. Smith, 1998. Nationalism and Modernism, London; New York: Routledge, p. 36.
[97] Hall, 1995, op.cit., pp. 12-14. See also Michael Mann, 1992. "The emergence of modern European nationalism", in John Hall and I. C. Jarvie (eds.), *Transition to Modernity: Essays on Power, Wealth and Belief*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[98] Smith, 1998, op.cit., pp. 39-41.

nationalism. Benedict Anderson, a scholar whose contribution to the explanations of the rise of nationalism is no less significant than Gellner's, wrote:

> "Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity' rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation'. In this way he implies that 'true' communities exist which can be advantageously juxtaposed to nations."[99]

Furthermore, although Gellner gives an analytic account of the process that transforms high cultures into national ones, he fails to explain how these high cultures became high and why people are prepared to defend them so eagerly. Despite its profound and lasting impact, Conversi argues, Gellner's theory on cultural homogenization was excessively centred on language and industrialisation, overlooking thus other circumstances that were both present before the industrialization and catalytic to the process of cultural homogenisation itself.[100]

Influenced by Gellner's explanatory focus and theoretical approach, Hobsbawm's work focused on the explanation of nations and nationalisms as artefacts, products of a modern era and under historically particular circumstances. In *The Invention of Tradition*, Hobsbawm and his collaborators present in their case studies precisely what the title suggests. For Hobsbawm, the nation and everything that is associated to it (nationalism, national symbols, traditions, etc.) is a "comparatively recent historical innovation" and the tradition serves as the platform that holds it together.[101] By 'invented tradition, Hobsbawm understands

> "a set of practices governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past".[102]

Hobsbawm does not claim that all traditions are invented, or that they are all a full product of someone's fantasy. The national traditions of modernity can be either totally new or based on pre-existing traditions, as was the case of Switzerland, cited

[99] Benedict Anderson, 1991. *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso, p. 15.
[100] Daniele Conversi, 2007. "Homogenisation, nationalism and war: should we still read Ernest Gellner?", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 371-394.
[101] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 1983. *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 13.
[102] Ibid., pp. 1-2.

by Hobsbawm.[103] However, it must be recognised that, in both instances, the mechanisms that project tradition back to the people (flags, images, ceremonies and music) are new in history and to a large extent invented.[104]

It was not until 1990 and the publication of *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* that Hobsbawm developed further his views on the emergence and evolution of nationalism.[105] Nationalism, for Hobsbawm, must be viewed in conjunction with the nation-state, since all nationalisms aspire to the creation of an independent nation-state in the territory occupied by their members. Hobsbawm stresses frequently the 'threshold principle', according to which only large nations could aspire to building a nation-state for the reason that they were the only ones considered to be culturally and, more importantly, economically viable. Hobsbawm distinguishes two processes of nation building, civic and ethnic, and traces the emergence of nationalism and nation-states to the *proto-national bonds*, that is, the type of associations formed in pre-modern states.

These are of two types: a) "supra-local forms of popular identification" and b) "political bonds and vocabularies of select groups more directly linked to states and institutions".[106] Language is one criterion of proto-nationalism, but the evidence we have left, Hobsbawm argues, are of literate people in an age where the majority were illiterate. Thus, although we cannot know precisely how and if the *populus* identified language as a criterion significant enough for the creation of their nation, it is hard to imagine language being high in their priorities, particularly because every locality spoke a different and distinct vernacular.

Ethnicity too, whether viewed as race or culture, was only significant insofar as it highlighted obvious physical characteristics between the in-group and the out-group, thus, contributing to the process of identification of 'us' versus 'them'. Hobsbawm considers religion to be 'semi-significant' for pre-national societies, because the majority of religions were of universalist nature. Where religion was given an elevated role as a 'proto-national bond', it was because it served as a strong cultural marker in the process of the group's definition, internal as well as external. The fact that religious feelings come to be identified with nationalist feelings only

[103] Ibid., p. 6.
[104] Ibid., p. 12.
[105] Eric Hobsbawm, 1990. Nations *and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[106] Ibid., pp. 46-47.

when nationalism adopts a mass form, rather than at its initial stages, shows the manipulation that took place. The only important criterion of proto-national identities, for Hobsbawm, that has contributed to the process of transformation from a 'proto-national' society into a nation-state, was that of "the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity".[107]

The influence of the romantics that swept Europe for much of the late eighteenth century was, for Hobsbawm, a crucial aid in the nationalist elites' attempt to delineate their own nation states and one of the reasons why, from 1870 until 1914, nationalism began to shape and to gain ground all over Europe and elsewhere. The 'threshold principle' was effectively supplanted, since any body of people considering themselves a nation had the right to self-determination. The change in the evolution of nationalism was brought forward by three significant social developments:

> "the resistance of traditional groups threatened by the onrush of modernity, the novel and quite non-traditional classes and strata now rapidly growing in the urbanising societies of developed countries, and the unprecedented migrations which distributed a multiple diaspora of peoples across the globe, each strangers to both natives and other migrant groups, none, as yet, with the habits and conventions of coexistence".[108]

This change became possible because nationalisms, with or without a nation-state, concentrated more on the cultural and ethnic characteristics, highlighted by the Romantic movement. Nationalisms and nationalist discourses began to move progressively to the right, projecting a national sentiment of fear against other nations. This fear, in turn, is what led to the rise in exclusionist policies and anti-Semitic feelings in Europe towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of twentieth century.

Nonetheless, Hobsbawm delivers a historical account for the emergence of nationalism and, more concretely, the emergence of nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth century. But the picture he paints for the future is a quite different from the one he described in the rest of the book. The rise in intergovernmental relations, international and supranational organisations and the increase of interdependence between states make him reach the conclusion that nationalism is no longer strong enough to mobilise the masses for the creation of their own nation-state, because "it is historically less important" and not "a global political programme" as it used to be for

[107] Ibid., p. 73.
[108] Ibid., p. 109.

the last two centuries.[109] It is unfortunate for Hobsbawm that shortly after the publication of his work, Europe was experiencing one of the bloodiest wars in its history since the Second World War.

Even if Hobsbawm is acquitted for his error, on the grounds that history cannot be foretold or predicted, he commits other fallacies that debilitate his theory's capacity to provide us with a complete account of how nationalism surfaced and established. First of all, he does not take into consideration the masses; the groups of people that get behind a nationalist ideology and for which nationalism claims to speak. He criticises Gellner for not having paid "adequate attention to the view from below"[110] but himself fails to focus on the social strata that form the base of the social pyramid. Rather, Hobsbawm concentrates on the elites and the attempts they make in order to establish a state. The 'low cultures', to borrow Gellner's terminology, have no role to play in the state-building process, although they will identify strongly with the state once it is constructed. Moreover, the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms is of questionable utility in the theory since any given nationalism employs both and the notions and concepts nationalism uses intertwine between the political and the cultural sphere.

Invention and fabrication of history and identities was not the only insight Gellner's work produced. His model, based on industrialisation and modernisation, has incited researchers to look further at the destabilising effects of development and capitalism. Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter have focused their work on precisely this theme, with Nairn noting frequently the importance of Gellner's work and the extent to which it influenced Nairn's study. Nairn argues that "nationalism is *as a whole* quite incomprehensible outside the context of that process's *uneven* development".[111] For Nairn, England and France are considered to be the centres out of which capitalism emerged, and the rest of Europe is considered to be the periphery. Nairn talks about the "nationalism-producing" dilemma, according to which eastern and central Europe's middle classes had to choose between substituting the old dynastic regime with capitalism and progress imported by Westerners – and, thus, succumb to imperialist policies – or they could "beat progress into a shape that suits their own

[109] Ibid., p. 181.
[110] Ibid., p. 11.
[111] Tom Nairn, 1977. *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*, London: NLB, p. 96; original emphasis.

needs and class ambitions".[112] In order to do that, the intelligentsias and the middle classes had to reconcile their agenda with the diversity of local cultures and traditions that existed throughout the territory. And for that, they turned to the advocacies of the Romantics.

The spread of capitalism is inherently uneven and imperialism is a consequence of this inequality. The only defence against imperialism is mass mobilisation, which can only be successful if it is "still located culturally upon a far anterior level of development, […] upon a level of (almost literally) 'pre-historic' diversity in language, ethnic characteristics, social habits, and so on".[113] Nairn recognises the importance of the intelligentsia and the middle classes in the surfacing of nationalism, but argues logically that it is due to the masses that nationalism has transformed to such an overwhelming phenomenon. Nairn speaks of nationalism as a Janus-headed process, which is due to the constructions and inventions of the elites. That is, all nationalisms look to the past in order to be guided into the future. But, Nairn continues, nationalism is also essentially populist, for, without the *populus*, the calls made by nationalist advocates would have probably had no effect. "The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood".[114]

Although he is correct in pointing out the populist spirit of nationalist ideologies, Nairn pays excessive attention and gives great significance to the romantic element that surrounds nationalist doctrines. Nairn's implication that all nationalisms are romantic is problematic for two reasons. First, although all nationalisms require some form of culture that is used as a platform on which nationalism stands, not all nationalisms developed a radical discourse of racial and linguistic purity, as Fichte incited. The Swiss and the American cases spring to mind as an example – indeed those that could be classified as 'political' or 'civic'. Second, the Romantic movement was born in Britain in the eighteenth century (a capitalist and imperialist centre of the West, in Nairn's analysis) and was taken up by the French and the Germans towards the end of the same century.[115] Thus, although it retained its basic assumptions for the pursuit of every thing 'ideal', it is logical to assume that it underwent a certain process

[112] Ibid., p. 100.
[113] Ibid., p. 101; brackets in the original.
[114] Ibid., p. 340.
[115] Smith, 1998, op.cit., p. 54.

of transformation, necessary in order to reflect the aspirations and expectations of the different ethnic identities that called upon it.

Furthermore, Scotland is for Nairn the only case which saw the establishment of capitalism without the extreme consequences of nationalism.[116] This line of thought indicates that Nairn's approach is problematic on another field, namely the difference between centre and periphery in the West. In Spain, for example, industrialisation and capitalism were by far the fields of supremacy for both the Basques and the Catalans, but none of them attempted to integrate the rest of the country into one single nation;[117] rather nationalism developed because of the centralist policies of Madrid, which, in modernisation terms, was less developed than the two regions. At the same time, if one turns Nairn's argument around, did all areas that experienced uneven development transform into nationalist movements? Smith answers negatively and cites the examples of southern Italy and southern Egypt, as well as those of northeast England and Crete.[118] Orridge, on the other hand, criticises Nairn for having developed a theory that, although it gives a good understanding for the emergence of nationalism and the nation-states, fails to explain why the nation-state is "so appropriate for a society to develop" and so attractive to the nationalists.[119] Nonetheless, Nairn's approach has left its mark on the field, leaving other authors to tag Nairn's work as a "plausible and impressive argument"[120] and "the most illuminating account of nationalism"[121] coming from someone who is affiliated with Marxism.

Following the principle of uneven development, Michael Hechter brought forward the argument that internal colonialism, a consequence of uneven development, generates nationalism under certain conditions.[122] Hechter studied Britain and the rise of Celtic nationalism, from the Tudors to the 1960s, and his conclusion was that Ireland, Wales and Scotland were England's internal colonies,

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[116] Ibid., pp. 108-125.
[117] It must be stressed, however, that out of the two, Catalan nationalism was more integrative and peaceful than its Basque counterpart, in that it projected Catalonia as part of Spain, albeit with its different culture and traditions. See Daniele Conversi, *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain*, London: Hurst & Co.1997.
[118] Smith, op.cit., p. 54.
[119] A. W. Orridge, 1981. "Uneven development and nationalism", *Political Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 184.
[120] John Breuilly, 1982. *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 26.
[121] Anthony Giddens, 1985. *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism Vol. 2: The Nation-State and Violence*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 213.
[122] Michael Hechter, 1975. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development*, London: Routledge.

since England was always the politically dominant one. But one cannot speak of internal colonialism without the existence of modernisation, for it is the combination of dominance and development that lead to the exploitation of the peripheries by the dominant centre. Hechter's argument is that where the peripheries consist of ethnic groups different from that of the core, the ethnic difference will play a major role in the stratification of the society. Since the core is always more developed than the peripheries, its dominance over the ethnically different peripheries will drive it to adopt a colonial behaviour towards the latter. This 'internal colonialism' is the cause for the emergence of nationalist discourses.

In setting out the preconditions necessary for the apparition of internal colonialism, Hechter claims that one should distinguish "between development as a result of factors endogenous to a specific society" and development as a result of "basically exogenous forces".[123] The first was observed in the West, where cities and countries developed through the aspirations of its citizens. In the second case, where colonies started to develop, it was only to serve the metropolis' interests. But even when the colonies did develop, economic dependence of the periphery, relative lack of services, lower standard of living, migration from the periphery and national discrimination on the basis of cultural elements were still the main ingredients of the relationship between the centre and the periphery.[124] The reason for this was the "cultural division of labour; a system of stratification where objective cultural distinctions are superimposed upon class lines".[125] Those of metropolitan culture always occupied higher occupation posts and social status than the local population. It was simply another way for the metropolitan bourgeoisies to keep in control of the colonies, and according to Hechter's point, it need not happen only with overseas colonies. The cultural division of labour contributes to the formation of ethnic identities because it "determines individual life-chances".[126] The greater this is, argues Hechter, the greater the individual will depend on his ethnic identity. Where cultural division of labour occurs in Europe, "ethnic identity will be the strongest

[123] Ibid., p. 30.
[124] Ibid., p. 33.
[125] Ibid., p. 30.
[126] Michael Hechter and Margaret Levi, 1979. "The Comparative Analysis of Ethnoregional Movements", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 260-274. Quote at p. 262.

among those groups placed at the bottom of the stratification system", because the poor have always fewer chances than the rich.[127]

For Hechter, development differentiates between centre and periphery in another way too: the core is characterised by class solidarity, which "assumes an individual orientation towards the marketplace", whereas the periphery enjoys status group solidarity, which involves a group.[128] The question Hechter asks is why status group solidarity is stronger in the countryside than in the metropolis. The answer is that by applying a cultural division of labour in the periphery, the metropolis automatically denies assimilation of the local population to the core culture. Where the metropolis is to attempt to acculturate them later, it might be perceived by the periphery as an oppressive situation and, thus, lead to calls for independence or secessionist policies.

The argument is, of course, in sharp contrast with Nairn's illustration of the Scottish case, as well as the Basque and Catalan nationalisms. Scotland was quite developed and industrialised and it enjoyed its share of high occupational posts, especially in the fields of education and law. Hechter recognised the flaws of his argument and introduced a second mechanism of group formation, the "segmental division of labour", that is, "the extent to which members interact wholly within the boundaries of their own group".[129] For Hechter, the above named institutions allowed the interaction of all strata of the local population with the periphery culture and, thus, more likely to identify with it. But, as Orridge points out, even if Hechter's improvements are taken into consideration, it is naïve to argue that a national identity is sustained because of the occupational post someone holds.[130] Hechter's 'segmental division of labour' is falsified by the Basque case, as indeed happened with the 'cultural division'. As we shall see in the following chapters, the Basque aristocracy had identified itself with the kingdom of Castile and had adopted a Spanish ethnic identity long before Basque nationalism surfaced. And when it did emerge, it confronted not only the Spanish but also the Basque elites for having forgotten their traditions and language and had sided with the enemy.

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[127] Ibid., p 263.
[128] Hechter, 1975, op.cit., p. 37. This distinction draws on Max Weber's work. For Weber, social classes are groups that have no conscience of a common identity and may or may not undertake collective action, whereas status groups "necessarily possess some awareness of common identity" (Orridge 1981: 188).
[129] Hechter and Levi, op.cit., p. 263.
[130] Orridge, op.cit., p. 189.

When the first nationalisms appeared in Europe in the late eighteenth century, almost all of them, invariably, claimed their right to a sovereign state. This might be an exception in the Catalan or Quebecois case, but it tends to be the norm in the majority of cases. And it is precisely this norm that has made scholars view at nationalism from an exclusively political angle. John Breuilly has worked on nationalism as an ideology and movement, and has stressed the significance of its political character.[131] Nationalism can manifest in three different ways, *reform*, *unification* and *separation*, all of which are connected with the existence of a state. The state is what delineates the territory that belongs to the nation. The state is the only institution capable of protecting the nation. The state is also universal. "There should be no area or person that is not subject to the rule of a state".[132] Nationalism emerges from the split between the modern state and society. Where the two do not coincide, nationalism, as a form of politics, will claim to unify them.

> "A nationalist argument is a political doctrine built on three assertions:
> (a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
> (b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
> (c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires the attainment of at least political sovereignty".[133]

Breuilly accepts all previous explanations for the emergence of nationalism but makes it clear that they are nothing more but preconditions of nationalism. Nationalism is extremely potent when it comes to mobilising the masses and bringing them together irrespective of class or social status, something that industrialisation, or the establishment of a public mass education system, or even print capitalism cannot do. Even the role Kedourie has given to intellectuals cannot account for the emergence of nationalism, for, as Breuilly explains, "intellectuals who lead nationalist movements are not subject to the kinds of constraints from their supporters as apply to many other political leaders".[134] For Breuilly, historicist practices have an ultimately political end, that is, the creation of a sovereign state. Nationalist movements connect culture and politics by inventing symbols, myths and traditions of their 'unique nation' and present their uniqueness as a reason for their right to form a state, "a body of citizens – that is, a wholly political conception – and self-determination is justified

[131] John Breuilly, 1993. *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd ed., Manchester: Manchester University Press.
[132] Ibid., p. 369.
[133] Ibid., p. 2.
[134] Ibid., p. 50.

in terms of universal political principles".[135] The contradiction found in nationalist discourses between 'universality' and 'uniqueness', highlighted by Breuilly, seems to complement Nairn's characterisation of nationalism as 'Janus-faced', albeit from a different perspective.

Breuilly's theory is significant in that it discusses exhaustively the role of nationalism in the construction of a state. It has shown that the political sphere of nationalism, as much as its manifestation is covered by a culture and a history that are most probably fabricated, it is the principal motor of nationalism. However, his theory is not clear of anomalies. For example, Breuilly focuses excessively on nationalist drives for the creation of a state, thus failing to connect nationalism with an already established nation-state. Furthermore, although he is correct in pointing out the political drives of the intellectuals, he fails to see that it is the intellectuals of the French Revolution that advocated the creation of states was the epitome of the people's freedom. It is they who argued for a voluntary participation of people in the construction of a political entity that would guarantee their equality and freedoms in exchange for loyalty.

The modernist camp has provided some of the most insightful thinking in the theory of nationalism. It was influential not only because it inspired more scholars to follow in the footsteps of authors like the above-named, and therefore contribute further to the understanding of the phenomenon, but also because its flaws inspired useful criticism leading to further theoretical dichotomisations and differentiations in the approaches. One such approach, termed *perennialist*[136] and represented principally by the works of Walker Connor and Donald Horowitz, is one that combines the positions brought forward by both the primordialists as well as the instrumentalists/modernists. It does so by accepting the modern character of the nations but regards them as having emerged from the evolution of ethnic groups, which were always present. A second approach, which will be discussed in the following pages, is a post-modern understanding of the nation based on codes of historical imagination without which, *ineffable* feelings like those described by the primordialist school could not have emerged.

[135] Ibid., p. 62.
[136] Smith, 1998, op.cit.

Perennialism: First, an ethnos; then, a nation.

Walker Connor has expressed his ideas on the emergence of nations and nationalism in a series of articles, which have been put together in a single volume.[137] His approach borrows elements of the primordialist theories,[138] that is, he regards ethnic communities to have existed since the early years of humanity. It has existed in the minds and hearts of its members and it is due to felt kinship ties. The ethnic group, like the nation, is perceived by its members to be an extended family. For Connor, what binds people together in ethnic groups is that the "members share an intuitive conviction of the group's separate origin and evolution".[139] Connor recognises that this sense of common descent will not reflect the real history of the group. "It is not chronological or factual history that is the key to the nation, but *sentient* or *felt* history".[140]

Unlike primordialists, however, Connor recognises the modern character of the nations by arguing that one should deal cautiously with nationalist arguments claiming the antiquity of their nation. As was noted above, Connor argues that it is ethnic groups that form the nations. But the two are essentially different in that, ethnic groups are not self-conscious as such. Rather, they first experience what they are not, by comparing themselves to neighbouring populations, before they know what they are.[141] And it is only when the members of a group realise that their coming together forms a group distinct and distinguishable from other groups, that a nation is formed. "While an ethnic group *may*, therefore, be other-defined, the nation *must* be self-defined".[142] Although this sounds like an essentially modernist formulation, and despite the fact that other scholars consider him a "late modernist",[143] Connor rejects several theories brought forward by modernists and/or instrumentalists.[144]

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[137] Walker Connor, 1994. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[138] Horowitz is one scholar that has categorised Connor as a primordialist. See Donald Horowitz, 2004, "The Primordialists", in Daniele Conversi (ed.), *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism*, London: Routledge.
[139] Ibid., p. 202.
[140] Ibid.; my emphasis.
[141] Ibid., p. 103.
[142] Ibid.; emphasis in the original.
[143] Daniele Conversi, 2004, "Conceptualising Nationalism" in Daniele Conversi (ed), Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World, op.cit., pp. 1-19. Quote at p. 7.
[144] It must be stressed at this point that Connor rejected all forms of categorizations and labeling when it came to the study of nationalism. See Daniele Conversi, 2004, "Resisting Primordialism and other -isms" in Daniele Conversi (ed), op.cit., pp. 269-290. Quote at pp. 270-271.

The reason for that is because they cannot account for the passions that either nationalism or ethnicity stir. The feelings one has for his community/locality/country are perceived by the members of the modernist camp to be subdued to the dictates of rationality and interest, rather than those of the heart or soul. Paraphrasing Chateaubriand and reminding us of Grosby,[145] Connor argues, "people do not voluntarily die for things that are rational".[146] On the other hand, Connor claims that economic explanations play the game of nationalists, since there are many cases in which, the ethno-national movements that emerged correspond to groups that are economically better off than the groups they oppose.[147] Furthermore, it is more appropriate to speak for the *catalytic*, rather than *causal*, impact of modernisation on nationalism. "It has held greater import for the tempo of nationalism than for its substance".[148] It is with modernisation and the establishment of mass communications that the message of the French Revolution spread around the globe and led to the ebullience of ethno-nationalist movements in the 1960s and 1970s.

Donald Horowitz, like Connor, recognises the importance of ethnic identities and nations and stresses the importance of perceived kinship for the members of a group.[149] Horowitz's study focuses on ethnic conflicts that take place in former colonial territories in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. His argument is that it is the perceived kinship and the myth of common ancestry that distinguishes ethnic groups from other social groups. It is also the mechanism that operates collective self-esteem and allows the group to compare and differentiate itself from other groups. "In the modern state", Horowitz argues, "the sources of ethnic conflict reside, above all, in the struggle for relative group worth".[150] Horowitz distinguishes between advanced and backward groups and regions in order to reach a typology of secession in multi-ethnic states. His study is focusing primarily on circumstances that can lead to the dismemberment of a multi-ethnic state, by secession or irredentism, and for this reason his work is examined with more details in the lines that follow.

His contribution to the understanding of ethnic and national identity lies in his recognition that the arrival of the colonisers signalled the emergence of new ethnic identities. Due to administrational purposes, groups that have never contacted each

[145] Grosby, 1994, op.cit.
[146] Connor, 1994, op.cit., p. 206.
[147] Ibid., p. 147.
[148] Ibid., p. 174.
[149] Donald Horowitz, 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
[150] Ibid., p. 143.

other now fell under the same ethnic categorisation. Boundaries changed and along with them, new ethnic identities were formed. Assimilation policies by the colonisers meant that a large number of distinct groups would be recognised as one single *ethnie*. It is for this reason that ethnic conflict only surfaced after the end of the colonisation. Assimilation meant that the ethnic and cultural diversity of a group could only be defended by returning to the past and searching the history, often invent it where it didn't exist, in order to prove their distinctiveness. "These groups commonly result in an explosive and violent assertion of group separateness".[151] Thus, while ethnic identities are shown as artificial and constructed, their impact on the group members and, in particular, the stability of the region is of paramount importance. In this way, Horowitz combines the modern with the perennial. He shows how ethnic identities and bonds have developed where they were previously inexistent and he highlights the importance that felt kinship plays for the perception of the group's members. This constant academic battle on whether certain elements, and which, of ethnic and nationalist importance are real or perceived gave rise to post-modern approaches that deconstructed the nation and have explained its dynamics by focusing on processes of homogenisation and assimilation, as well as nationalism's narratives, imagery and symbolism, and the way in which these latter came to the fore.

Post-Modernism & Ethno-symbolism

Anderson views nationalism as an essentially modern phenomenon, but, on the other hand, attempts to explain its strong resonance to the masses. For Anderson, it is only very small communities that are not imagined. All other communities are too large to allow a 'face-to-face' contact and therefore are imagined. This is the main point Anderson makes in his book and the one that has contributed greatly to the study of nationalism: "[the nation] is an imagined political community".[152] And for this reason it cannot be claimed to be either genuine or false. Rather, what differentiates nations is the style in which they are imagined. Nonetheless, the emergence of all nations, according to the author, is based on two fatalities: human mortality and linguistic unification. In pre-modern societies, religions had the role of connecting mortality with eternity, or continuity as Anderson terms it. "[F]ew things

[151] Ibid., p. 72.
[152] Anderson, 1991, op.cit., p. 15.

were (are) better suited to this end than an idea of nation".[153] Secondly, linguistic plurality in the world is an inescapable condition but, whereas in pre-modern societies one could find, say a million languages, with the arrival of print capitalism, the number of languages is far smaller. That's because "these varied idiolects were capable of being assembled, within definite limits, into print-languages".[154]

Anderson too looks at the cultural roots of nationalism and argues that nationalism has to be looked at in conjunction with the "cultural systems" that preceded it. He identifies three such systems, the first of which is "the idea that a particular script-language offered privileged access to ontological truth".[155] Latin was, until the early seventeenth century, the language in which the majority of books were written and probably the only language taught, since it was considered to be the only 'true' language. The explorations of the world by Europeans, however, and the connection with the rest of the world proved quite the contrary. A second cultural system consists of "the belief that society was naturally organised around and under high centres", monarchs who claimed their rule to be God's law. The growing dissatisfaction of the elites and other segments of the population, so often depicted in the French Revolution, achieved the overthrowing of the *ancien régime* and its substitution by a national principle. As Anderson remarks, many states continued to be dynastic until 1914, but they had at least adopted a "national cachet".[156] The final cultural characteristic without which nationalism could not emerge is "a conception of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the world and of men essentially identical".[157]

In pre-modern societies, people perceived of time as "a simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present".[158] It was impossible to conceive of history as the past, and the present as the making of history. In modern societies, however, Anderson argues that 'simultaneity' has adopted a meaning of "'homogeneous, empty time' […] marked by temporal coincidence and measured by clock and calendar".[159] Anderson gives two examples in which a newspaper and a novel are to be considered the two major forms of imagining in the eighteenth century Europe. When reading a

[153] Ibid., p. 19; brackets in the original.
[154] Ibid., p. 46.
[155] Ibid., p. 40
[156] Ibid., p. 28.
[157] Ibid., p. 40.
[158] Ibid., p. 30.
[159] Ibid.

novel, or a newspaper, the reader does not see what is described, but rather he pictures it in his mind. Moreover, they both allow the conception of different acts being carried out by different actors at exactly the same time. Consider, for example, a newspaper, which bears a date and a set of news. A reader can see that certain acts will take place in different places, by different actors but at the same time, or day for this purpose. But the reader can be sure they happened although he never witnessed them. Consequently, a man will most probably never meet all of his co-nationals. "He has no idea what they are up to at any time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity".[160] It must be underlined at this point that for Anderson no single fatality of those described above can be a pre-condition for the emergence of nationalism. Rather, it is the interconnection between the three that allows for nationalist discourses to surface. For Anderson, the French revolution would not have had such an impact if it was not put on a piece of paper and be read by millions of people. Only then did it transform into a 'concept' and a 'model'.[161]

Yet, scholars have criticised Anderson for having concentrated excessively on print-capitalism and language. Smith, for example, argues that there is a variety of media through which a people can identify with their co-nationals.[162] On the other hand, language as the sole criterion of the existence of a nation leaves little room for ethnicity, religion and/or race to play a role in the genesis of a nation. In a similar point, Kellas notes that it is not necessarily the case that nationalism will replace religion.[163] In fact, there are many examples where religion and nationalism went hand-in-hand in establishing and delineating the nation. Nonetheless, Anderson's analysis is considered as an exemplary work of the modernist approach in the field of nationalism and one, which, along with that of Gellner and Hobsbawm, has contributed greatly in the understanding of the rise of nationalism.

In a similar approach, Bhabha dissects the idea and notional projection of nation and argues that the *otherness* and its perceptions are very significant for the way in which we perceive ourselves, or the nation.[164] His post-colonial approach was a critique of the way in which the nation (indeed, any nation) was perceived to have

[160] Ibid., p. 31.
[161] Ibid., pp. 77-78.
[162] Smith, 1998, op.cit., pp. 138-142.
[163] James Kellas, 1991. *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Basingstoke; London: MacMillan, p. 48.
[164] Homi Bhabha, 1990. "Dissemination: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation" in Homi Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration*, London; New York: Routledge.

been continually existed since the beginning of time – a "linear narrative of the nation" as Bhabha calls it.[165] That is reflected in the colonial practice of dividing (or grouping) populations and branding them "nations" in a way that totally failed to reflect any cultural homogeneity between them. Bhabha employs the notion of *mimicry* to contextualise the colonisers' wish to assimilate the natives to their culture, but without necessarily integrating them fully. "Colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite".[166] Consequentially, this desire gives rise to a hybrid culture which consists of cultural elements of both the colonisers and the colonised. Hybridity, in effect, "is a problematic of colonial representation and individuation that reverses the effects of the colonialist disavowal, so that other 'denied' knowledges enter upon the dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its authority".[167]

When the colonised will demand their right to self-determination, according to Bhabha, hybridity will play an important role in the construction of their national identity. For instance, the very means by which national identity will be established and/or spread will invariably be the same as those of the colonisers, namely historicist literature. The present construction of the past in order to serve the purposes of a narrative of a nation, for Bhabha, manifests the liminality of the nation. The following quote explains the same point but with reverse logic:

> The transnational dimension of cultural transformation - migration, diaspora, displacement, relocation - makes the process of cultural translation a complex form of signification. The natural(ized), unifying discourse of nation, peoples, or authentic folk tradition, those embedded myths of culture's particularity, cannot be readily referenced. The great, though unsettling, advantage of this position is that it makes you increasingly aware of the construction of culture and the invention of tradition.[168]

By depriving the narratives of the nation from historicism, Bhabha argues, the nation is transformed from "being the symbol of modernity into […] the symptom of an ethnography of the 'contemporary' within culture",[169] and only then can we perceive of its narrative constructing the 'people' through the "repetition and pulsation of the national sign".[170]

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[165] Homi Bhabha, 1994. *The Location of Culture*, London; New York: Routledge, p. 142.
[166] Ibid., p. 86.
[167] Ibid., p. 114.
[168] Homi Bhabha, 1992. "Postcolonial Criticism", in Stephen Greenblatt and Giles Gunn (eds.), *Redrawing the Boundaries*, New York: Modern Language Association of America, p. 468.
[169] Bhabha, 1990, op.cit., p. 298.
[170] Ibid., p. 299.

While Bhabha himself states early in DissemiNation that he is more interested into the workings of culture than those of nationalism, his approach constituted a critique and a challenge for scholars of nationalism to re-examine the phenomenon considering the post-colonialist findings. Anthony D. Smith's research moves along those lines of inter-marrying a modernist approach with an explanation that takes into consideration past proto-nationalist phases.[171] In fact, he recognises that to regard nationalism as exclusively modern, with no links to the past, is a common anomaly found in most modernist theories. Smith, although he concedes that nationalism is an essentially recent historical phenomenon, he underlines that it is impossible for nationalism to emerge if there are no foundations upon which to built a nationalist doctrine. It is what he calls *la longue durée*, the examination of origins and formation of nations over long periods of time and has termed his approach as *ethno-symbolism*. Nationalism is a historical phenomenon, not only because it emerged at a particular historic moment and has been established over long period of time, but also because it projects myths, symbols, and shared memories that were born in the distant past. Smith identifies three ways in which nationalist doctrines connect the past with the present and the future. The first is *recurrence*, which indicates the existence of a pre-modern cultural identity that resembles, but is not identical to, the current or modern identity of the group in question. If certain key identifying components of an ethnic identity can be traced back to generations and can still be observable today, however, then the ethnic past is linked to the nationalist present through *continuity*. Finally, *appropriation* of the past is another way in which the present, and certainly the future, can be linked to the glorious past. Smith refers to the historicist attempts of nationalist intelligentsia to invent 'their' ethnic past.

Smith looks at nations and ethnic communities, to which he refers as *ethnies*, as two different entities. The distinction seems to draw on the analogy between civic/ethnic nationalism, since "nations are defined by the historic territory they occupy and by their mass public culture and common laws", whereas *ethnie* are defined by their ancestry myths and historical memories".[172] His purpose was to demonstrate that there was some kind of national continuity observable in certain *ethnies*, which were then used as the foundation for the creation of the nation. *Ethnies*

[171] Smith, 1998, op.cit. See also, Smith, 2000. *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
[172] Smith, 2000, p. 65.

came about by the shared experiences, myths, symbols and memories of several generations of cohabiting populations. It is these myths and symbols that indicate the distinctiveness of each group and it is precisely because of the memories, the traditions and the culture that lead to ethnic persistence and mobilisation. In other cases, for example the Swiss, the geographical environment might also be depicted in the ethnic identity.

Smith identifies two patterns of nation formation, that is, the evolution and transformation of *ethnies* into nations that depend on the type of *ethnies*. The first type of *ethnie* is a "lateral" or aristocratic whereas the second is "vertical" or demotic. Aristocratic *ethnies* are usually separated from the lower social strata and interaction between the two is scarce. They are often the constructors of the nation-state in which they constitute the ethnic core. By establishing a centralised and bureaucratic state and a mass public education system, they incorporate adjacent populations to the culture and territory of that state. The second type of *ethnie* corresponds to nationalism's cultural type and reflects the historicist attempts of an indigenous intelligentsia to fabricate and appropriate, for political purposes, "the vernacular cultures of the lower strata and through the *vernacular mobilisation* of these strata attempts to rouse them to political action so as to create ethnic nations".[173] Like other modernists, Smith has identified certain themes that are repeated in all nationalist ideologies. These are:

> "1 the world is naturally divided into nations, each of which has its peculiar character and destiny;
> 2 the nation is the source of all political power and loyalty to it overrides all other loyalties;
> 3 if they wish to be free, and to realise themselves, men must identify with and belong to a nation;
> 4 global freedom and peace are functions of the liberation and security of all nations;
> 5 nations can only be liberated and fulfilled in their own sovereign states".[174]

Both arguments of the content of nationalist ideology and the distinct types of *ethnies* are recurrent in the modernist paradigm and, therefore, there is nothing new in Smith's theory about it. What is path breaking, and also ethno-symbolism's major contribution in the field, however, is that it identifies one's primordial feelings for his nation as generated not by nationalism but by the power of the symbols the nation

[173] Ibid., p. 72; emphasis in the original.
[174] Smith, 1998, op.cit., p. 187.

carries and projects. As an example, Smith looks at the European Union and notes its incapability to transcend the modern nations and evolve distinctly and separately.[175] The reason for this weakness, for Smith, is the lack of symbols and myths that will generate such feelings. The situation becomes even worse if one thinks that Europe's past cannot offer shared experiences other than wars and national antagonisms, even long after the European Union was born.

Smith's theory is the most inclusive of all and it offers significant insights for the approach of a study on nationalism. Smith has recognised that the most important question to be answered by ethno-symbolists is to prove the historical links between the pre-modern identities and the modern nations. But it is a theory that encompasses the insights provided by many scholars so far, and through a useful critique and/or reassessment, it accounts for the passion that nationalist phenomena stir and the political games that accompany them.

Definitions of the concepts

Taking into consideration the above formulations and findings of the scholars, this section will attempt to define the concepts that will be used throughout the text. As it has been noted above, many commentators distinguish between ethnicity and nationality, between ethnic group and nation. Yet, the terminological chaos has ensured that many of the concepts are not aligned with their meaning. Therefore, while there might be stateless nations like the Kurds and the Palestinians, the term 'national identity' is often used as a synonym to 'citizenship', denoting the geographic place and the cultural background of the state of which the individual is a citizen. Instead, the term 'ethnic identity' is used to describe members of nations residing in a state other than the one of their own, for example Algerian immigrants living in France. In the Basque case, similarly, everyone speaks of the Basque ethnicity but there is only one nationality to speak of, the Spanish, even though the vast majority of Basques, moderate and/or extremists, feel as a nation.

It is therefore appropriate to provide the definitions of the concepts that will be used in this thesis and evaluate whether they could lead to a more sophisticated understanding of the concepts used in this field. An ethnic group, thus, is defined as *the association of a group of people that share certain cultural characteristics,*

[175] Ibid., p. 75.

experiences and memories, and the perception that they are all of common descent. These characteristics are unique and they are the factors that ascertain the distinctiveness of the group from other groups. This definition can be applicable to most ethnic groups, because it does not take into consideration the status of territoriality and, consequently, it omits any questions with regards to the sovereignty over the specified territory. To include these parameters in a definition of ethnic groups, one would have automatically assumed that every ethnic group's objective is to reach independence and self-sovereignty. Yet this claim would have been misleading, if one takes into account the vast communities of immigrants in west European societies currently.

On the other hand, including only the issue of territoriality without taking into consideration that of sovereignty, one is led to a formulation of the definition of a nation: *the association of a group of people that occupy a specific territory and share certain cultural characteristics, experiences and memories, and the perception that they are all of common descent. These characteristics are unique and along with their geographic location they are the factors that ascertain the distinctiveness of the group from other groups*. This definition is applicable to sovereign as well as stateless nations. The Basques, for example, would qualify under this classification, as would the Kurds and the Palestinians.

The confusion that arises from the interaction of the concepts of 'state', 'nation' and 'ethnic' is self-evident. This is because most states are currently multi-national nation-states, what I define as *an association of the people of one or more ethnic groups, possessing common cultural characteristics, shared experiences and memories, common citizenship rights, and occupying a unified, sovereign territory*. The concepts of 'sovereignty' and 'statehood', however, are key in defining nationalism per se. In a Bhabhian framework, the argument would be that in the eye of stateless nationalists, a fulfilled nation is not only territorially defined but sovereign as well – that is, they are all after the very thing it is they oppose. Stateless nationalisms, like the Basques, will always drive towards more self-determination, either in a democratic or a violent fashion, primarily because the violence which they faced from the State because of their cultural difference, has galvanised the very concept of their difference (vis-à-vis the "others") in their cultural identity. State-nationalisms, on the other hand, will also be driven by power, and direct it either against internal enemies that undermine the national identity and cohesion – as was

the case in Franco's Spain – or against both internal and external, as was the case with Nazi Germany.

However, this thesis does not concentrate on instances where state-nationalisms have generated inter-state conflicts. Rather, the reference to Franco implies that the Basque nationalism might as well be a reaction to the policies and tactics of state-nationalism, something that, as a general cause of irredentism, is well accounted for in the literature. This project will utilise Smith's definition of nationalism, which sees it as "*an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential nation*".[176] The Basque nationalist movement is bound together by the same elements that form the nation, that is, the cultural characteristics, boundaries and relationships. This formulation of the definition makes explicit the political focus of the movement, and does not distinguish between ethnic or civic forms of nationalism. As explained by Levinger and Lytle, nationalist rhetoric operates in a triadic structure that uses the past in order to conquer the future.[177]

This thesis argues that no nationalism is 'good' or 'bad'.[178] Neither does it purport that all stateless nationalisms lead to violence. Rather, the Basque case makes evident the need for contextualisation of the study of nationalism. Had it not been for the heavy-handed policies of the Francoist regime against the Basques, and the strong historicist literature which served as the basis for the rebirth of the Basque nation, perhaps the scenario would have been different.[179] The popular reaction to the persistence of violence, however, indicates that there is a prioritisation in the human and social needs of a very large sector of the Basque population. Namely, the importance of peace in parallel with the development of the national culture and identity, or, to a greater extent, a nationalist project. The message sent from such a stance is that nationalist ideology can exist without becoming a synonymous of terrorist practices. Basque civil society has recently risen to reject any political representations that purport to exist in its name, and has repeatedly taken a stance against violence. Yet, the mass rejection of violence was not a decision that was part

[176] Anthony D. Smith, 1983. *Theories of Nationalism*, 2nd ed., London: Duckworth, p. 171.
[177] Matthew Levinger and Paula Franklin Little, 2001. "Myth and Mobilisation: the triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 175-194.
[178] Alter, 1994, op.cit.
[179] Franco was never as aggressive towards the Catalans partly because Catalan culture was more pervasive, at the time, than the Basque in the Basque country. See Conversi, 1997, op.cit.

of a greater dichotomy, that is, the elimination of violence does not necessarily imply the abandonment of the original target of the nationalist project: incremental autonomy – which entails political negotiations – that will lead to independence. While nationalism is presented as something artificially (even artfully) constructed, and despite the fact that it has been deconstructed so as to be understood properly, the great mass for which it claims to exist, the 'people', are more often than not absent from the action. What the Basque case shows is that, under specific circumstances, the people can decide for themselves and impose on their representatives, elected or self-appointed, a strategy for the development of the nationalist project. In order to make the correlations between violence and nationalist ideology evident in the Basque case, the following chapter analyses theories of political violence and how terrorism came to be understood and explained academically.

CHAPTER 3

Theories of Terrorism: Critical Approaches to Violence

This chapter examines theories of terrorism and looks at the different problems that surround the study of the subject. It will examine the typologies of political violence and the typology of terrorism as presented in the literature. It will offer a historical overview of the academic efforts to theorise terrorism, and it will list those factors that scholars have identified as possible causes of terrorism. The principal aim of this chapter is to critically assess orthodox theories of terrorism,[1] the majority of which was brought forward during the Cold War and, as such, exhibits a rigid theoretical framework which considers violent actions against the State to be illegitimate, without necessarily and always seeking for the roots of said violence. Particularly in cases where the violent opposition takes place against a liberal democratic state, the majority of the early literature uncritically sides with the state anti-terrorist discourse, even if the state itself has failed to deal with the claims of the opposing group. This means that by terming them "terrorists", academia does not only adopt a term but also its implications on the illegitimacy of that group's claims. Moreover, in ethno-nationalist terrorism, there has been many a debate as to the legitimacy claims of the terrorists, giving rise to the proverbial "one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter". "The means become the end" is another phrase often used to describe the irrationality of terrorist actors, implying that the acts of violence are void of symbolisms, meaning and, therefore, context.

However, this thesis proposes that terrorism as an activity cannot exist, or be studied, secluded and isolated from its socio-political environment, which implies that the study of terrorism can be contextualised.[2] The fact that terrorism is more effective in liberal democratic settings should not automatically imply that liberal democracies

[1] Jason Franks, 2006. *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 3. See also, Jenny Hocking, 1984. "Orthodox theories of terrorism: The power of politicised terminology", *Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 103-110.
[2] Martha Crenshaw, 1995. *Terrorism in Context*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

do not violate human rights. The extra-judicial anti-terrorist killings during the Socialist party's office in mid-1980s reversed the falling rates of ETA's popularity among the Basque population, and helped resurface the feeling that Spanish discrimination against the Basques did not end along with the dictatorship.[3] Orthodox terrorism theories do not move beyond the unidimensional focus that is the State and its integrity, primarily because of the Westphalian discourse that surrounds States and statehood, and hence fail to account for conflicts generated by, or including, issues of identity and representation.[4]

Typology of Political Violence

The majority of the scholars in the field are keen to underscore the differences between terrorism and political violence, and to correct the mistake that terrorism equals political violence automatically. Wilkinson argues that the term 'political violence' should be perceived of as an umbrella notion that includes many a different manifestation of violence for political ends.[5] He offers two typologies of political violence, one based on the number of participants – mass or small group political violence – and the escalation of intensities, and another founded on the type and purposes of those who promote, support or simply utilise political violence. The former includes riots, rebellions, revolutions and war, as far as mass political violence is concerned, and everything from isolated attacks on property to guerrilla warfare, domestic or international, for the small group political violence. The second typology, that concerns the aims of each genre of political violence, includes nine different types that range from inter-communal violence, to violence with revolutionary objectives.[6]

Many of the forms of political violence may create fear and terror but that type of fear cannot be compared to that provoked by terrorism. When a riot takes place, for example, it might lead to clashes with police, other groups or property damage. But this is not the same type of violence used by terrorism, nor the same type of fear

[3] Daniele Conversi, 1996. *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation*, London: Hurst & Co, pp. 148-149. See also Robert Clark, 1979. *The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond*, Reno: University of Nevada Press; Paul Preston, 1986. *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain*, London: Methuen.
[4] Andrew Silke, 2001. "The devil you know: continuing problems with research on terrorism", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 1-14. See also Oliver Richmond, 2003. "Realising hegemony? Symbolic terrorism and the roots of conflict", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.289-309.
[5] Paul Wilkinson, 1983. *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, Basingstoke; London: MacMillan.
[6] Ibid., pp. 32-33.

provoked by terrorism. Thackrah[7] observes that the confusion of the meaning of terrorism with that of rebellion, civil strife, insurrection and other forms of political violence "inflates the statistics" and "makes understanding the specific character of terrorism and how to cope with it more difficult".[8] Quinton shares this view and argues that riot must be distinguished from terrorism, because the levels of violence are usually limited to property damages.[9] Revolution is also different from terrorism in that violence is not a necessary ingredient for one to take place. What differentiates terrorism from other forms of violence, argues Quinton, is that the victims are "passive means to the realisation of ends which they are themselves in no position to promote".[10] Rubenstein (1987) on the other hand, asserts violence is inherent in terrorism because of terrorism's objective, which is to create a mass movement;[11] "whereas guerrilla war, sabotage, or assassination may simply represent a choice of weapons by the mass movement".[12] This is also the view put forward by Wilkinson, who locates the differentiating factor between terrorism and other forms of political violence to be the *systematic* use of violence or threat of violence by terrorists.

Theorising Terrorism

Even though the concept of terrorism is relatively new, the phenomenon is not. The world's first terrorists, according to Wardlaw, were the Assassins, a religious sect who had developed a "doctrine that justified the murder of their religious and political opponents".[13] However, the use of terror in politics is located in time by many authors in the era of the French Revolution. O'Sullivan identifies the diffusion of three major assumptions that emerged during and after the Revolution to be the basis of the emergence of terrorism.[14] The first is the assumption that the restructuring of a degenerated society was possible. Radical change of society is one of the primary objectives of today's terrorists. Second, there is the assumption that humans are inherently good. Evil is generated in society "and may therefore be removed from the

[7] Richard Thackrah, 1989. "Terrorism: a definitional problem" in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair Stewart (eds.), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, pp. 24-41.
[8] Ibid., p. 25.
[9] Anthony Quinton, 1990. "Reflections on violence and terrorism" in Martin Warner and Roger Crisp (eds.), *Terrorism, Protest and Power*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
[10] Ibid., p. 38.
[11] Richard Rubenstein, 1987. *Alchemists of the Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World*, London: I.B. Tauris.
[12] Ibid., p. 194.
[13] Grant Wardlaw, 1990 (2nd ed.). *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-measures*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 18.
[14] Noel O' Sullivan (ed.), 1986. *Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution*, Brighton: Wheatsheaf.

world by making the appropriate social changes".[15] This transformed politics into a religion and the new mission was to awake the people, to show them that they need to be liberated and indicate to them the group responsible for the evils of their society. Marxism, Nazism, and anti-colonialists all resorted to the above discourse and terrorists are no exception. Third, for O'Sullivan, was the influence of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, namely the principle of sovereignty. Its impact on the emergence of nationalist and liberation movements, the anti-colonial struggles and the increased calls for self-determination has been highlighted in the previous chapter. Hoffman on the other hand, draws parallels between modern day terrorism and Robespierre's *régime de la terreur*.[16] It too was organised, systematic and espoused the belief that terror and violence would bring about a regenerated society.

The Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), however, has attracted more attention by scholars because its members openly expressed the belief that violence can constitute the wake-up call for the masses and initiate the revolution. The group consisted of young students who attacked the Czarist regime long before the Russian Revolution, and whose idea was that although their actions do not constitute a revolution, they are its precursor.[17] Most prominent among them was Sergey Nechayev. Nechayev himself had written that the aim of their violence is to provoke such an aggravation to the people that it will lead to a popular uprising.[18] Almost a century later, Carlos Marighela, a member of the Brazilian urban guerrilla, promoted this idea of spiral violence, arguing that the actions of the Brazilian government will exhaust the people and turn them into supporters of the guerrilla movement.[19] For Marighela, the role of the urban guerrilla was only supportive to the use of rural guerrilla.[20] In other words, he recognised that use of terrorism only was insufficient for the revolution. An opinion that is also shared by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who also highlights that depending solely on terrorism would endanger the course and significance of the revolution, since it endangers the lives of too many people that could have been part of the revolution.[21]

A philosopher contemporary to Guevara and Marighela is Jean-Paul Sartre, who is considered to be one of the most passionate advocates of violence. In his

[15] Ibid., p. 7.
[16] Bruce Hoffman, 1998. *Inside Terrorism*, London: Victor Gollancz, pp. 15-17.
[17] Rubenstein, 1987, op.cit., p. 30.
[18] Nechayev, quoted in Rubenstein, op.cit., p. 98.
[19] Carlos Marighela, 1971. "Minimanual of the Revolution" in Robert Moss, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare*, London: Institute of Strategic Studies, p. 28.
[20] Ibid., p. 20.
[21] Che Guevara, in Wilkinson, 1986, op.cit., p. 59.

works, the depiction of the world resembles that of Hobbes'. Notions like 'love', 'sympathy', 'affection', and 'compassion' have no place in humanity, for the human species is purely antagonistic and everyone's life depends on someone else's death. For Sartre, as for Hobbes, the state was brought together by fear and terror and, ultimately, it is these two that hold it together. When man is confronted with violence, it is violence he should reply with, for it is cleansing and cathartic. "It is man recreating himself".[22]

Franz Fanon moves along the same line, recognising that political violence liberates its practioners from psychological manipulation.[23] Fanon's work centres on the anti-colonial struggles of the second half of the twentieth century. His theory holds that colonialist oppression took place because of the feelings of inferiority of the native populations. By resorting to violence, the natives declare their will for independence and at the same time affirm the existence of their community *vis-à-vis* the oppressor(s). State violence, in Fanon's theory, is an indispensable ingredient in spreading a general 'national awareness' among the wider population, instigating them to fight back.[24]

The previous chapter has stressed the importance of anti-colonial struggles in Africa and Asia and the Marxist revolutions attempted at Latin America, and the significance both phenomena had for the development of similar movements in Europe. The aforementioned ideas of the philosophers of urban guerrilla and the theoreticians of terrorism have been echoed in the strategies, rhetoric, and identification of many organisations that appeared later in time. Technological advance and the spread of the Internet has contributed to the dissemination of these ideas and has facilitated knowledge on how to construct bombs made from ordinary and readily available materials (as was the case, for example, with the Unabomber). The statement that the amateur terrorist can now be just as destructive as his professional counterpart[25] is increasingly verified in the last decade or so.

Typology of Terrorism

As with 'nationalism' and other essentially contested concepts, there is an overwhelming disagreement on the field as to the precise definition of the term

[22] Jean Paul Sartre, 1967. Preface to Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, pp. 18-19.
[23] Rubenstein, op.cit., p. 100.
[24] Daniele Conversi, 1997. *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain*, London: Hurst and Co., p. 244.
[25] Hoffman, op.cit., p. 203.

'terrorism'. The number of definitions virtually equals that of the number of scholars who have written on the subject and the levels of oscillation are great. Indicative of the terminological chaos is the study carried out by Schmid and his collaborators, who, in the second edition of their research guide to terrorism, still did not manage to encounter one common definition.[26] The result was 109 different formulations that were, supposedly, defining the same 'thing'.

As desperate as the situation might look on the theoretical level, there have been certain characteristics that most commentators highlight in their studies. Evidently, such characteristics would be the unpredictability of the terrorist attacks, the arbitrary nature of the violence, the fear and terror that it instils and its magnitude and duration. Every terrorist act is conducted against a hated political economy[27] and it aims at a social and/or political change. At once, it manifests the grievances of the group that carried the attack and it attempts to disclose the weak side of the incumbent authority. Thus, every terrorist act is politically motivated. The political aim and the symbolism inherent in every terrorist act are the factors that differentiate it from common criminal acts. As Hoffman argues criminal violence does not affect a large audience nor does it convey a long-term intention to terrorise.[28] Along these lines, it must also be noted that every terrorist act consists of two targets: the *target of violence*, that is the victim itself, and the *target of terror*, which involves a greater group of people, whether of the same social and/or professional status as the victim (say, a politician or a member of the security forces) or the population in general. Berry (ibid.) also argues that the reactions of the target of terror are the ones that pose the greatest threat to a liberal democratic country faced with terrorism.

Although the magnitude of terrorist actions is overwhelming and tends to attract comments concerning the sanity of the perpetrators, most commentators warn that it is a grave mistake to view terrorists as maniacs, lunatics, or psychopaths of some form or another. Their actions require some form of organisation, the level of which is critical for the 'success' of the operations. Contrary to the psychopath's violence, which can often be unjustified, there is always a cause lying behind every terrorist act. In fact, "the terrorist […] seeks to persuade us of the reasonableness of

[26] Alex Schmid, Peter Jongman et al., 1988. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature*, New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
[27] N.O. Berry, 1987. "Theories on the efficacy of terrorism" in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair Stewart (eds.), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, pp. 293-306.
[28] Hoffman, op.cit., pp. 41-42.

his acts, fantastical as they may sometime seem".[29] Perhaps, then, it is their motivation that should be examined in order to identify and assess possible injustice and grievances.

Before engaging in a discussion of authors and the issues they have highlighted as important in the study of terrorism, it must be noted here that the terrorism of the state is of equal importance for the field as that of small groups that defy the state. State terrorism usually indicates the support a state gives to terrorist activities elsewhere, if that is found to be in its interests. This support involves funding of activities, facilitation in the acquisition of military equipment – if not direct concession of it –, training, and any other action that would augment the strength of the organisation. State terrorism, however, should also indicate the degree to which authoritarian and totalitarian regimes use terror and force in order to suppress opposition and thus maintain the current political and social status quo. This is what Reinares terms "vigilant terrorism".[30] Philosophically, it is difficult to see how one can separate the notion of 'terror' form the very nature of such regimes, since fear and destruction are measures universally applied by the world's dictators. Notwithstanding, theory would dictate that state-terrorism and liberal democracies don't go hand-in-hand, despite the many instances in which liberal democratic countries have utilised terror outside their borders and when in their interests to do so. The Cold War – which was pretty 'hot', as it were, elsewhere – and the anti-colonial struggles of the 1960s and 1970s have proved just that.

State terrorism is central in the Basque conflict not least because it accounts for the emergence of terrorism in the 1960s as a response to Franco's oppression. However, there has been one very critical instance during the mid-1980s, when the *Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* (GAL), an extra-judicial anti-terrorist branch formed during the Socialist Party's government, executed Basque individuals inside French territory that served well to the aims of the nationalist movement and its extremist wings. Considering that the high cadres (including a former Minister of Interior) that were found responsible have served or are still serving prison, it is a case that is now closed. Its repercussions, however, were more important and as such must be analysed in the light of a nationalist-separatist organisation that acts *within* the borders of a liberal democratic country, where, allegedly, the use of extreme or indiscriminate violence from the part of the state cannot even be conceived of.

[29] Paul Gilbert, 1994. *Terrorism, Security and Nationality: An Introductory Study in Applied Political Philosophy*, London; New York: Routledge, p. 5.
[30] Fernando Reinares, 1998. *Terrorismo y Antiterrorismo*, Barcelona: Paidós.

Exploring the general purpose of terrorism, Wardlaw underlines the importance of fear and anxiety. The unpredictability of danger is the most psychologically damaging factor, since it leads to a break-down of social normality and it upsets the social structure (1990: 35).[31] But, as studies from World War II air raids have shown, violence might have adversary results on the targeted audience. Instead of inciting political action, regular and/or successive terrorist attacks might numb the senses of the public. Wardlaw defines terrorism as

> "the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to the established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators".[32]

Wardlaw notes that provocation of terror might not be the sole purpose of terrorism. Rather, there have been specific terrorist actions whose aim was to secure material gains (ransom) or political concessions (release of prisoners). Publicity is another objective terrorists are after, since any terrorist attack is guaranteed to attract the attention wished for by the terrorist. It is widely recognised that the media play an important role in the indirect 'advertising' of the terrorists' cause by covering their actions. Wardlaw examines the role of the media and cites numerous examples that have played on the hands of the terrorists, mainly due to the disobedience of journalists towards the advice given to them by those handling the situation. He stresses that the media often magnify the effects and consequences of terrorism. The result is that "it is our reactions to terrorism which may constitute the primary danger, not terrorism itself".[33] In Spain's case, both the GAL scandal and the negative predisposition of the centre-right governments of Jose Maria Aznar in the 1990s to any form of negotiations (either with nationalist parties or ETA itself), contributed further to the prolongation of terrorism, precisely because the political will to understand the problem was not present.[34] Notwithstanding, Wardlaw notes the internal situation of the group must also be examined, for an attack may take place to build the morale or vanquish the doubts of the rest of the members.[35]

[31] Wardlaw, op.cit., p. 35.
[32] Ibid., p. 16.
[33] Ibid., p. 86.
[34] Ludger Mees, 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 114-5.
[35] Wardlaw, op.cit., p. 40.

Phillips, on the other hand, explicitly claims that defining terrorism is not such a daunting task.[36] "Terrorism is the direct attack upon innocent people with the intention of radically altering some political or social situation".[37] The difficulty that academics, journalists and politicians have faced, Phillips argues, lied in defining terrorism in such a way that it would be an "appropriate description of the activities of our opponents but not of our own".[38] In a similar spirit, he rejects the claim that the terrorists aim at destabilising the state.[39] It has never happened despite the triumphs that terrorists have marked over the past years. There are two reasons for this: first, fear and terror targeting the public but directed against the state, tend to drive the public more towards the state's arms; second, it is war on the cheap. Even where assassination is employed as a tactic, Phillips argues that it is morally risky since it entails a subjective judgement about the victim that may or may not be true. For Phillips, assassinations could be justified in times and places of extreme oppression, but this claim has no validity in a democratic state.[40]

For Phillips, terrorism is directly linked with three large philosophical ideas that emerged in the last three centuries: popular sovereignty, self-determination and ethical consequentialism. The principle of popular sovereignty claims that the people should be the state, each armed with a vote and, thus, a share in political power. Therefore, Phillips asks, is not the people's responsibility to defend the state and bear any attacks upon it? Although no answer so far has been satisfactory enough, the claim that there are no innocents still forms part of terrorist rhetoric. The same can be said about the principle of self-determination. It is a flawed concept, argues Phillips, formulated in such a way that it could be claimed by innumerable religious or ethnic groups.[41] But then, the question that arises is which group is entitled to self-determination, in other words, who are the people, and who decides whether they are entitled to this status. Furthermore, ethical consequentialism is also of cardinal importance in the way terrorism is perceived. Phillips argues how the Western cultures are an amalgam of Classical and Christian culture. The point where the two meet is that "good life involves strict adherence to moral principles".[42] Justice and virtue – or rather, being good –, for example, is of paramount importance to both the

[36] Robert Phillips, 1990. "Terrorism: historical roots and moral justifications" in Martin Warner and Roger Crisp (eds.), op.cit.
[37] Ibid., p. 68.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid., pp. 75-76.
[40] Ibid., pp. 76-77.
[41] Ibid., p. 70.
[42] Ibid.

ancient philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, and the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The Just War Theory is only an example of the foundations of western cultures. Consequentialism, on the other hand, surfaced with Machiavelli, who, was the first to 'bend the rules', as it were, laid by the Classics and the Christians. His theory was that the end justifies the means. While the Prince should always adhere to the good, there would always be instances where some good had to be sacrificed in order for the state to be saved.[43] By the nineteenth century, this came to imply that moral rules are breakable, if good will be maximised by such defiance.

Taking into account the lethal consequences of terrorist strikes, it would be logical for one to draw a parallel between terrorism and war, in much the same way one compares a region where crime is rife with another experiencing war. In fact, certain commentators have termed terrorism 'war on the cheap'.[44] In reality, however, this is a claim that comes from the terrorists themselves, who often present themselves as freedom fighters, defenders of democracy, and other similar notions denoting virtue and nobility, hence, the well-worn cliché, "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter". Terror, as has been observed by many a commentator, is a subjective procedure. Instances of violence, like the once employed by the Mafia, are not considered to be terrorist acts, although they do aim at inciting terror and fear. George upholds the above statement and argues that "it is possible to fight for freedom by means other than terror and to employ terror in pursuit of other ends than freedom".[45] But, he argues, it is pointless to attempt to explain the difference between the two by a means/end dichotomy. The only insights it can offer is that freedom fighters will restrict their violence towards non-innocent targets and limit it solely to the attainment of freedom, whereas in terrorism's case both principles are ignored.[46]

A better way of understanding the distinction between freedom fighters and terrorists is by looking at the selection of targets, whether they are legitimate or illegitimate. The just war theory, which will be explored further below, distinguishes them by considering combatants as legitimate targets and non-combatants/civilians as illegitimate. As noted above, freedom fighters will point their violence towards combatant targets and they themselves will constitute legitimate targets for their enemy. Terrorists usually act in the opposite way. Moreover, terrorists usually operate

[43] Ibid., pp. 72-73.
[44] Ibid., p. 76.
[45] David George, 1990. "Terrorists or freedom fighters?" in Martin Warner and Roger Crisp (eds.), op.cit., p. 55.
[46] Ibid., p. 62.

in peacetime, "so there are no combatants (and hence no non-combatants) to attack".[47]

Wilkinson also rejects the claim that terrorists operating in a liberal democratic setting are or can be seen as 'freedom fighters'.[48] Rather than fighting for freedom in its democratic sense, they are seeking

> "their own freedom to use the gun and the bomb in an effort to impose their *own* petty minority tyranny on the majority, because they have been forced to recognise that they cannot win the support for their ideas through the ballot box".[49]

Wilkinson distinguishes four types of terrorism.[50] The *criminal* makes constant use of terror for material gains. The *psychic* terrorism aims for mystical or religious ends. *War* terrorism aims at the annihilation of the opponent. And, finally, *political* terrorism is identified as the systematic use or threat of violence to achieve political goals. The latter genre of terrorism differs from war terrorism, as Wilkinson explains, in that it seeks to control, rather than annihilate the opponent. Wilkinson usefully distinguishes between political *terror* and political *terrorism*. The former refers to an isolated act or a series of random acts that are neither organised nor systematic.[51] On the contrary, political terrorism "is a sustained policy involving the waging of organised terror either on the part of the state, a movement or faction or by a small group of individuals".[52] It requires some form of organisational structure and "some kind of theory or ideology of terror".[53]

Wilkinson divides political terrorism into three distinct categories: *revolutionary*, whereby violence is the precursor to the revolution; *sub-revolutionary*, where small groups utilise violence "for purposes short of revolutionary seizure of power";[54] and *repressive*, indicating the use of terror by states in order to suppress opposition movements. For Wilkinson, just like for most of the earlier theorists of urban guerrilla and political violence, terrorism is a method used by guerrillas and as such it cannot be said with certainty that it will evolve into full-scale revolution. Whether it will do so depends on a number of factors, for example its capacity to gain

[47] Ibid., p. 58; brackets in the original.
[48] Paul Wilkinson, 1990. "Some observations on the relationship between terrorism and freedom" in Warner and Crisp (eds.) op.cit., p. 48.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Paul Wilkinson, 1974. *Political Terrorism*, London: MacMillan.
[51] Ibid., p. 17.
[52] Ibid., p. 18.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Wilkinson, 1986, op.cit., p. 57.

popular support, its capacity to maintain access to warfare material and the counter-terrorist policies of the state attacked.[55]

Causes of Terrorism

Issues and problem with the study of terrorism are not exclusive to definition. The community also lacks a solid theoretical background on which to base its assumptions on what causes terrorism, or even if causes matter. There has been an array of inter-disciplinary approaches to the study of terrorism, including, psychological, sociological, economical and rational choice explanations. However, they all seem to be inadequate in one way or another, primarily because they attempt to isolate the phenomenon of violence from its very origin.

Rubenstein, for example, looks at the issue of terrorism from its revolutionary side. He asserts that terrorism is a form of political communication. If the world of politics is one of "promises and excuses, equivocation and lies, only violence is unambiguous and trustworthy".[56] Use of that type of violence, Rubenstein argues, has been, and still is, the use of the anarcho-communist intelligentsia. Radical members of the intelligentsia who cannot find support from a party or other institution are more probable to make the leap and adopt the language of violence.

Intellectuals who believe themselves to be minds in search of bodies, they see in the masses a body in search of a mind.[57] When the masses fail to mobilise in support of the terrorists, the means become the ends. The radicals see themselves as the only ones responsible to fulfil the deed.[58] The difference between the anarcho-communist and the nationalist intelligentsias, for Rubenstein, is that the former breaks up its ties with both the upper and the lower classes, whereas the latter already disposes of an audience. This view is also shared by Wilkinson who considers the anarcho-communists, or "ideological" terrorists as he names them, to be "more analogous to tiny gangs of bandits than to serious political movements".[59] The socio-economic stagnation and instability that followed the period of growth in Europe and Latin America in the late 1960s and early1970s had left many of the middle-classes and the intelligentsia aggravated.[60] This was the case in Italy with the emergence of

[55] Paul Wilkinson, 2001. *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, Portland; London: Frank Cass, pp. 16-17.
[56] Rubenstein, op.cit., p. 9.
[57] Ibid., p. 146.
[58] Ibid., p. 163.
[59] Wilkinson, 2001, op.cit., p. 26.
[60] Rubenstein, op.cit., pp. 75-83.

the Red Brigades after the Historic Compromise between the Communists and the Christian democrats, and in Germany after the Communist party was banned.

However, Rubenstein's findings do not explain why the intelligentsia is prone to violence. as we will see in greater depth in the chapters that follow, the Basque case was not characterised by socio-economic stagnation. The Basque nationalist intelligentsia did adopt the Marxist discourse appropriate to the era but the economic goals of the entire movement were always second to the importance of independence. Considering that the Basque region was and is the motor of the Spanish economy, along with Catalonia's industry, Rubenstein's theory seems slightly misfit. While the mechanisms he identifies in the emergence of terrorism are observed in the Basque country (intelligentsia, use of violence as a means of communication), his variable of socio-economic stagnation is absent. As with Hechter's nationalism, Rubenstein's approach is not echoed in the Basque case.

Psychological approaches to terrorism have contributed significant insights to the study of terrorism, although some findings are too narrow to be taken into account in theory formulations. Wardlaw, for instance, recognises cases where the motivation for the terrorists was "based on the thrills of terrorism and destruction for destruction's sake".[61] The above statement rather makes things hazier and prompts the question, "if violence takes place for fun is it not a-political, therefore not terrorist?" The answer to the question is provided by Quinton, who claims that

> "a member of a politically motivated group who takes part merely because he likes killing people or blowing things up is still a terrorist, because his violent action is part of the declared and, for the most part sincerely, politically motivated violent activity of the group".[62]

Crenshaw, on the other hand, analyses the psychology of terrorism from the point of view of strategic choice.[63] Those who take up arms, usually do so because they desire a "radical" change in the status quo or they attempt to prevent one from happening. Usually, but not exclusively, these changes are linked to socio-economic privileges.[64] The decision to resort to violence could be the last in a sequence of choices and it normally reflects the weakness of the organisations to confront the

[61] Wardlaw, op.cit., p. 194.
[62] Quinton, op.cit., p. 35.
[63] Martha Crenshaw, 1990. "The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behaviour as a product of strategic choice", in Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-24.
[64] Ibid., p. 17.

enemy, that is, the state.[65] Interestingly, Crenshaw does not refer to the strategic importance of the organisations' small numbers. Rather, she assumes lack of popular support which can be attributed to a number of reasons – Crenshaw points to failed mobilisation, the cause's lack of appeal to the majority and fear of retaliation, if in a repressive state.[66] Time, writes Crenshaw, is equally important to the development of terrorist strategies and tactics. A moment of weakness for the state, for example, might be perceived by the terrorist as the perfect opportunity to strike.

For Crenshaw, the costs of terrorism are clearly outnumbered by the advantages. While it will most often attract punitive reaction by the state, it has "an extremely useful agenda-setting function".[67] A terrorist strike will not only provoke fear but will also bring the original cause to the forefront of public life. "The government can reject but not ignore an opposition's demands".[68] If the strategy followed is one of indiscriminate violence, the terrorist risks losing, rather than attracting, popular support. But their violence may be intended as a preliminary step to revolution. Terrorist violence shows that the regime is not all-powerful and, as such, it inspires resistance. Linked to the above, is the strategy of spiral violence, whereby a terrorist strike is supposed to attract the repression – preferably mass and indiscriminate – of the state's security forces, which will push more people into the ranks of the organisation. The advantages are obvious but, as Crenshaw notes, they depend heavily on the "lengths to which the government is willing to go in order to contain disorder, and on the population's tolerance for both insecurity and repression".[69]

Another psychological approach is that of Bandura, who focuses on the mechanisms that allow moral reactions to disengage from inhumane conduct, especially those mechanisms used by the terrorists to either operate or recruit.[70] These processes take place gradually and the subjects might not be aware of the transformation. 'Cognitive reconstrual', for example, is useful in presenting as honourable that which is wrongful.[71] "Adversaries sanctify their own militant actions but condemn those of their antagonists as barbarity masquerading behind a mask of

[65] Ibid., p. 11.
[66] Ibid., pp. 11-13.
[67] Ibid., p. 17.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid., p. 19.
[70] Robert Bandura, 1990. "Mechanisms of moral disengagement" in Walter Reich (ed.), op.cit., pp. 161-191.
[71] Ibid., p. 163.

outrageous moral reasoning".[72] The use of language, and particularly the use of codified language, is also of importance for Bandura. "Soldiers "waste" people rather than kill them, […] bombing attacks become "clean, surgical strikes", […] and the civilians they kill are linguistically converted to "collateral damage"".[73] Equally significant is what Bandura calls the advantageous comparison, whereby a killing might even seem negligible when compared to genocides. "Cognitive restructuring of behaviour through moral justifications and palliative characterisations is the most effective psychological mechanism for promoting destructive conduct".[74] Another mechanism is the replacement of responsibility, whereby the terrorists do not recognise their acts as a consequence of their will but, rather, as a consequence of the grievance that others have caused upon them. Dehumanisation is one more mechanism common to all humans and not only among the terrorists. As Bandura explains, punitive conduct is more easily justified and accepted by people if it is directed against someone deprived of his humanness. On the contrary, when such conduct is directed against people depicted in humanised terms, such conduct is more often rejected.[75] Interestingly, Bandura concludes that, historically, dehumanisation was more a result of conducive social conditions, than that of the plans of monstrous minds.[76]

Several of the insights that Crenshaw and Bandura note in their studies are useful and in many cases hold to be true. Yet it fails to explain how terrorist, rather than political, violence becomes a strategic choice, particularly when such choice is mounted against a liberal democratic state. Is the wish for a radical change so common in so many individuals, that it drives all of them to murderous acts? Similarly, Bandura identifies the symbolism inherent in terrorist organisations and reminiscent of the ethno-symbolic model of nationalism, but he concedes that social standards and constructions may have some influence as to what degree is violence accepted. In the Basque case, the society has been rejecting any violence that has been used in its name for the last 15 to 20 years. What is more, Bandura's approach cannot explain the participation in ETA of descendants of Spanish immigrants, or other individuals who did not experience the barbarity of the Francoist regime or the anti-terrorist consequences of the GAL of the mid 1980s.

[72] Ibid., p. 165.
[73] Ibid., p. 170.
[74] Ibid., p. 172.
[75] Ibid., p. 181.
[76] Ibid., p. 182.

Ehud Sprinzak puts forward the argument that group psychology can also be useful in explaining *ideological* terrorism.[77] Sprinzak's study, focusing on the Weathermen case of the late 1960s and early 1970s, shows how group identity gradually takes over the members' personal identity. Sprinzak argues there are three psycho-political stages of transformation, the first of which is a *crisis of confidence*. It "involves an angry critique of the established authorities or rulers from the very ideological assumptions on which the regime itself is founded".[78] The group will confront the establishment ideologically, that is with protests, demonstrations and disobedience. The second stage is *conflict of legitimacy*, the point where the group becomes radicalised, in that its dissatisfaction with the establishment expands to include the system.[79] The fight against the ruler is insufficient because the system is also dysfunctional, thus, a better system altogether is the goal. The next step is the development of an ideology of delegitimation that will lead to a rupture with the current political establishment. This is the moment when the opposing group becomes more radicalised, something that is reflected in the group's political actions, language and rhetoric. The final stage is that of the *crisis of legitimacy*, and it involves further radicalisation of the group's members, to the extent that every individual associated with the political order is considered not only guilty, but also becomes dehumanised and depersonalised in the eyes of the terrorists. A process that Sprinzak considers necessary if the terrorists are to become "morally disengaged".[80] The moral manifestation of this psycho-political stage is revolution while the political manifestation is strategic terrorism. Sprinzak accepts that most radicals stay well behind the line that separates the second level from the third. Those that do, consider themselves the true avant guarde and look down on the other radicals, what Sprinzak calls the rearguard. But, he argues, without the latter it would be virtually impossible for the terrorists to exist politically as well as operationally. Sprinzak's theory seems self perpetuating, and not allowing scope for explanations of the many instances where terrorists have become politicians (like in N. Ireland, Cyprus, Kosovo and elsewhere) or that have taken an active role in advocating the benefits of a ceasefire (as in the Basque Country). That process alone should be considered as one indicator

[77] Ehud Sprinzak, 1990. "The psychopolitical formation of extreme left terrorism in a democracy: the case of the Weathermen" in Walter Reich (ed.) op.cit., pp. 65-85.
[78] Ibid., p. 80.
[79] Ibid., p. 81.
[80] Ibid., p. 82.

to the fact that using political violence as a language is only a circumstantial option and therefore it cannot be isolated and studied separately from those conditions.

Gurr on the other hand, offers what could be termed a 'corrected' version of Sprinzak's theory of delegitimation.[81] He asserts that the political context in which terrorism surfaces in a liberal democratic country always follows one of two paths: *radicalisation* and *reaction*. The former refers to the dissatisfaction of some of the group's members with the failure of the movement to achieve the goal. Similarly to Sprinzak's theory, these individuals intensify their efforts for the common goal and look for greater impact in their actions. Reaction, on the other hand, denotes a process where the group's members resort to terrorism "in response to threatening social change or intervention by authorities".[82] Gurr usefully notes that in many cases, including those of the Basque Country and Northern Ireland, the two seem to intermingle. But, insofar as theory is concerned, Gurr notes that it is insufficient to look at the terrorists alone in order to produce a theory. In his view, one must also examine the relationship between the terrorists and the public, especially in a democratic setting. Indicative of the importance of the above statement is the erosion that most terrorist organisations suffer after a period of time.

Gurr highlights three processes by which the organisation's support base decreases. The first, *backlash*, indicates the instances where terrorist activities alienate, rather than attract the public, as was the case in Quebec. However, lack of popular support towards violence does not presuppose a similar lack of popular support for the cause. A second process of erosion is caused by *reforms*, that is, government policies oriented towards alleviating some of the group's grievances. When the relationship between the group and the political establishment has entered the phase, political violence may in fact hamper, rather than speed, any policy of concessions or any process of negotiation. Finally, the political establishments should always focus on *deterrence*, whether it is traditional law-enforcement techniques or special counter-terrorist policies – like the Italian example of incentives to defect. Nonetheless, governments should be wary of the use of deterrent measures, since they are closely linked with the degree of popular support the organisation counts with. Where an organisation is known to enjoy support, strong anti-terrorist initiatives will be counter-productive.

[81] Ted Robert Gurr, 1990. "Terrorism in democracies: its social and political bases" in Walter Reich (ed.), op.cit., pp. 86-102.
[82] Ibid., p. 89.

From the sociological point of view, Michel Wieviorka's study is considered to be one of the seminal works in the field.[83] Wieviorka views terrorism as the product of a social anti-movement. Social movements, argues the author, are characterised by three principles: identity, opposition and totality. A social antimovement begins by inverting these principles into one. The principle of identity ceases to make reference to some social entity and instead focuses on a mythic or abstract entity. The principle of opposition, in turn, no longer focuses on adversaries and antagonists but rather on enemies. And lastly, the principle of totality moves further away from future objectives and plans, and instead focuses on the present and how that present can be destroyed.[84]

Terrorism as a social phenomenon exhibits the same symptoms, only that in this case they are far more aggravated and *fused* into one, rather than *inverted*. The principle of identity becomes so narrow that is impossible for the terrorist to define himself without referring to his cause. It is the stage where the terrorist proclaims himself to be the vanguard of a degenerated society. The principle of opposition becomes even more blurred than in social antimovements, and the enemy can now be located on everything that pertains to the opposite group. Consequentially, the principle of totality does not refer to a new society or a new structure that would alleviate the present grievances, rather it concentrates on how to demolish the present structure and bring down the incumbent authorities.[85] Nonetheless, Wieviorka is quick in pointing out that, although there is a great deal of commonalities between terrorism and social anti-movement, the two are significantly different. One such difference is that the formation of an antimovement does not imply the adoption of violence as a strategy. And even if it does, it cannot be termed terrorist violence. It only becomes such when an armed group, in the absence of any direct or concrete relationship to a communal reference group, declares itself to be the latter's spokesperson.[86]

Intellectuals are of great importance to the terrorist organisations because they can drive a group of people into political violence or deter them. In the first case it will be the radicals who do not conform to the ideas of more moderate intellectuals calling for negotiations and compromises. Wieviorka underscores the necessity of an

[83] Michel Wieviorka, 1993 (trans. by David White), *The Making of Terrorism*, Chicago : University of Chicago Press.
[84] Ibid., pp. 5-7.
[85] Ibid., pp. 7-9.
[86] Ibid., p. 20.

ideological base for every terrorist organisation. However, and taking into consideration the above processes, the ideology expressed by a terrorist organisation is almost never that advocated by the movement that the organisation claims to represent.

> "*In every case* in which a terrorist initiative has been launched, it has always entailed a *disengagement* from and a *reversal*, on the part of its militants, of their position with regard to the intellectual matrix from which they had proceeded prior to moving from non-violent resistance to armed confrontation, or from limited violence to all-out terrorism".[87]

An obvious example to the above statement is the Marxist and Leninst ideologies that have been misinterpreted by the leftist movements of the 1960s.

As Wilkinson has argued, the lack of a grand-theory in terrorism studies certainly hampers the efforts to understand as well as explain the phenomenon.[88] It is not certain to what extent a grand-theory is what the field is lacking, but the interdisciplinary approach that is currently emerging should not be viewed as threatening to the quest for an understanding. Partial theories might be just as useful in the theoretical fulfilment of the field. No matter how promising such an approach looks, however, lack of coordination between the academic community and the existence of hidden agendas within it might indeed leave us with nothing more than bits and pieces of a phenomenon, which might turn out to be far clearer and easier to grasp than it was thought of.

In fact, as I have argued in the beginning of this chapter, what the field of terrorism lacks is contextualisation. Looking at terrorism into its proper notional and physical surroundings, allows us to see the contributions of the different theories. Groom's is one such theory that allows for the contextualisation of terrorism and allows for an explanation as to why violence should become an option.[89] It points to relative deprivation[90] or status disequilibrium. The deprived, that is those that are struck directly by structural violence, will challenge authority when it is not distributed equally. "Authority without coercion can only be sustained on the basis of a continuously renewed consensus".[91] One more cause identified by Groom is the unrealised demand for social change. If problems that gravely affect the socio-

[87] Ibid., p. 32; original emphasis.
[88] Paul Wilkinson, 15 October 2003. Inaugural Lecture of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St Andrews.
[89] A.J.R. Groom, 1978. "Coming to terms with terrorism", *British Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 4, pp. 62-77.
[90] Ted Robert Gurr, 1970. *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[91] Ibid., p. 65.

political system have been identified and indicated to the incumbent leadership but the latter's reaction remains minimal, this inaction might give rise to, among others, challenges of authority and to the growth of perceptions of relative deprivation.[92]

Yet, correct as the identification of the cause may be by Groom, it cannot account for the emergence and sustainability of terrorist practices in a liberal democratic state, where, theoretically, there are institutionalised means for the citizenry to deal with its government. In the Basque case, for example, Groom's theory can almost identify the reasons as to why political violence emerged, yet it fails to explain why its most dramatic phase was once democracy was established, and why does it persist to our days. Perhaps he fails to take into consideration the fact democracy's majoritarian rule can be a tyranny for the interest of a permanent minority, like, for instance, the Catholic minority of Northern Ireland.[93] It is at this point that Crenshaw's strategic choice theories are useful and have already been accounted for by former ETA members.[94] The radical change in the status quo that Crenshaw and Sprinzak and other authors have identified, in the Basque case is nationalism. Detaching the practices of the Basque extremists from the totality of historical and socio-political circumstances hampers the analysis of the very phenomenon and impedes us from obtaining useful conclusions that can be used elsewhere.

Terrorism and the Law

The claim that the terrorists' struggle is nothing short of war has been analysed by many commentators, especially from the field of political philosophy and international law. Prominent among those analyses is the employment of Just war theories and models, the medieval doctrine that determines the permissibility to engage to war and which was developed by moral theologians, principally St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas. Just war theory divides the conditions to engage to war into two sets: the *jus ad bellum*, the permissibility to go to war, and the *jus in bello*, what is right in war. Both sets consist of further conditions which must be met for the permissibility to be guaranteed. Briefly, for the first set, those conditions are a just cause, a right intention, a legitimate authority, a formal declaration of war and the

[92] Ibid.
[93] Gilbert, op.cit., pp. 94-95.
[94] Fernando Reinares, 2001. *Patriotas de la Muerte*, Madrid: Taurus. See also Florencio Domínguez Irribarren, 1998, De *la Negociación a la Tregua ¿El final de ETA?*, Madrid: Taurus.

use of war as a last resort.[95] *Jus in bello*, on the other hand, requires non-combatant immunity, a dogma protected until today by international treaties and agreements. The two sets of conditions have also given birth to two different strands of theory, the punitive and defensive.[96] The first sees *ad bellum* as punishment of a wrong and *in bello* as the correction of a wrong. The second strand of Just War theory understands *ad bellum* as a prevention of wrong and *in bello* as the furthest point required to repel a wrong doer.

Gilbert examines the phenomenon of terrorism in the context of Just War theory. He is sharp to point out although the public uses the theories to refute terrorist claims, it is those very theories that are evoked by terrorists in order to justify their choice of targets. In this context, Gilbert attempts to explain the targeting of innocent people. According to the punitive branch of the just war theories, "many not engaged in war itself may be regarded as legitimate targets because they are engaged in activity that furthers an injustice".[97] Examples can be a builder who was killed by the IRA because he was contributing to the activities of the British Army;[98] where terrorists operate in liberal democracies, particularly with mass-killing violence, their argument is that there are no innocents.[99] The public participates by voting its representatives and thus contributes to the injustice, whether it is real or perceived to be real by the terrorists. On the other hand, the defensive theory regards as legitimate targets those who can be termed as 'combatants', and the loss of one's life as a necessary step for the preservation of someone else's life is unacceptable (what Gilbert calls the double effect of the principle of discrimination)

Terrorists are waging a kind of war, which, evidently, lacks the *jus ad bellum*. That is precisely, as Gilbert claims, what makes them terrorists rather than freedom fighters.[100] Gilbert likens terrorism to tyrannicide and draws a specific analogy between tyrannicide and revolutionary terrorism. Utilising the just war theory as his guide, Gilbert claims that it is not always distinguishable whether revolutionary terrorists have always a just cause. Rather, "if the punitive theory can provide a justification for war then its application to terrorism would be the more convincing the more closely the internal situation resembles that of external aggression".[101]

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[95] Ian Holliday, 2002. "When is a cause just?", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3, p. 560.
[96] Gilbert, 1994, op.cit., p. 8.
[97] Ibid., p. 12.
[98] George, 1990, op.cit., p. 56.
[99] Phillips, 1990, op.cit.
[100] Gilbert, op.cit., p. 21.
[101] Ibid., p. 25.

Another criticism Gilbert explores regards the terrorists' lack of proper authority. According to the just war theory, war is a form of public killing and needs to be supervised and exercised by public authorities. As Hoffman indicates "the absence of any existing, publicly identified central command authority is significant in that it may remove previous inhibitions on the terrorists' desire to inflict widespread, indiscriminate casualties".[102] But in order to find an answer to the question whether that removes the just cause for the terrorist group, one needs to examine which of the groups that claim to be fighting for the people really do so. And since one of the most basic terrorist tactics is to maintain a low profile by making themselves indistinguishable from ordinary civilians, thus putting everyone else's life in danger, it is not very convincing that the terrorist struggle is in the people's interests. In fact, Gilbert claims, guerrilla warriors only pose a threat to the population when pretending to be civilians whilst fighting. But even then, Gilbert continues, the level of risk for the population depends not on the presence of guerrilla fighters but by the ability of the state's security forces to distinguish them from proper civilians.[103]

Furthermore, Gilbert refutes the argument that terrorists cannot wage war during peacetime by pointing at the nature of the terrorist groups. Their attacks can be seen as the first steps towards a war. Therefore, even when the terrorists are using the population as a shield, it does not suffice to show that they are not engaged in war.[104] Equally, terrorists are not acting outside the law. War is governed by international law, which, in turn, consists of agreements made between the states and thus it rules an activity that, usually, takes place between states. Insurgents, however, almost certainly will not possess a state of their own and therefore the conflict will be an internal one. The situations where an internal conflict becomes international, as set out briefly by Gilbert, are rare. What is important, however, is that the state is in a position to call the shots. "Simply by declining to [resort to military force] the state can prevent recognition under international law that terrorists are engaged in warfare".[105]

This has been the practice so far as international institutions are concerned. Many of the forms terrorism has adopted are sub-state. International law, however, concerns practices among states, and the religiously preserved Westphalian dogma of

[102] Bruce Hoffman, 2001. "Change and continuity in terrorism", *Studies in Conflict and Political Violence*, Vol. 24, No. 5, p. 418.
[103] Gilbert, op.cit., p. 33.
[104] Ibid., p. 44.
[105] Ibid., p. 46.

non-intervention has made it difficult for other states to intervene unless their help is explicitly asked for. Terrorism is viewed as an 'evil thing' that must be combated, and that was the view long before September 11, 2001. In regards to that, it seems ironic, as Cassese notes, that even when the aspirations of some terrorist organisations are endorsed and even legitimised by the international community, "the means used to assert these aspirations are condemned with great firmness by the majority of states".[106] The Palestinians and the Kurds are just two such cases. The United Nations has yet to reach and apply a resolute definition of what constitutes terrorism. A breakthrough came in 1994 when it adopted a resolution that condemned terrorism in all its forms and called upon nations to combat it,[107] while it has drafted more or less fifteen treaties and conventions on various forms of terrorism. However, because of the lack of a law-enforcing agency with regards to states, practice in the field of counter-terrorism rests upon the needs of the state, or, where there is more than one state involved, it is regulated by bi- or multilateral agreements of cooperation.

On the other side of the 'terrorism is war' claim lays the statement that terrorism is nothing more than crime, especially in a liberal democratic setting. It is the "preferred practice of Western governments",[108] namely that terrorists are treated as mere criminals, only with a political motive. Gilbert has elaborated substantially on this model, which "locates the *criminal* character of terrorism outside of its political motivation".[109] If it did otherwise, the state would have automatically given reason to the terrorists' cause and/or claims. Gilbert, however, notes that the state's denial often "underscores rather than denies [the terrorists'] warlike aims".[110] As an example Gilbert shows that states treat condemned terrorists quite differently from other criminals: they are tried by special courts and might serve their punishment in special facilities. The political crime model is inapplicable in liberal democracies because "in such societies there is no justification for pursuing political ends by other means".[111]

In an interesting analysis, Gilbert elaborates how terrorism's criminal character emanates from the state's dual responsibility to preserve security *and* civil order. In order for one to wage a war, one needs to surpass the limits of civil order. Terrorists do so by committing murder or material damages. The reasons why

[106] Antonio Cassese, 1989. *Terrorism, Politics and Law: the Achille Lauro Affair*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 4.
[107] United Nations General Assembly, 1994. *Measures to eliminate International Terrorism*, A/RES/49/60, 9 December 1994.
[108] Gilbert, op.cit., p. 50.
[109] Ibid., p. 49; original emphasis.
[110] Ibid., p. 51.
[111] Ibid., p. 49.

violence becomes a choice for the terrorist are explained by Gilbert in juxtaposition with other ways of expressing one's grievances to the state. Disobedience, protest, and conversion – to cite only a few – are all forms of political manifestation that enable one to communicate his complaint(s) to the state. The significance of non-violence, however, lies in its contracting scenarios. "Those who are committed to it must accept the limitations they impose on what can be achieved thereby".[112] Those using violence do it to incite constitutional changes, social and, in our case, national. Gilbert explores the dynamics of revolutions from the left and the right, noting that, more often than not, nearly all revolutions claimed to have been in the interests of the people. But 'the people', for Gilbert, is at the very core of the problem because there is no agreement on who 'the people' are. Democratic procedures run out of inspiration when this stalemate is reached and that is why terrorism is likely to emerge in disputes involving national statehood.[113] The idea of the ruling majority, which must hold in every liberal democracy, does not always constitute an effective solution for minorities, especially those that are characterised as 'permanent'.[114] And if majority rule is the case, then statehood will most probably be shaped according to the majority's will. What Gilbert highlights is the majorities' ability and capacity to determine the political organisation of a territory, leaving minorities outside. What voluntarism does not explain is who or what "determines from *what* population the majority should be drawn".[115]

Just War theory is considered by orthodox terrorism theories to be a useful guide in determining the legitimacy of the terrorists' claims. It is the tool that distorts the picture when liberal democracies find themselves fighting terrorists. Considering that the theory is a product of the Westphalian system of ideals, its utilisation as a standard of academic research when it comes to conflicts of identity and representation is inadequate. Not because every liberal democratic state is justly opposed to by terrorist with true grievances, but because certain cases like the Basques and the Northern Irish do. More importantly, Just War theory is primarily a doctrine that concerned practices among states and as such, it is relatively weak when applied to sub-state groups wishing to engage to war.

[112] Ibid., p. 83.
[113] Ibid., p. 95.
[114] Ibid., pp. 94-95.
[115] Ibid., p. 100.

Counter-Terrorism

Most of the authors dealing with the study of terrorism are keen to present lists of measures that are proved, or are thought, to be effective counter-terrorist policies. Most analyses of the kind clearly regard the use and application of such measures in liberal democratic countries faced with the threat of terrorism. Logically, if one was speaking about the threat of terrorism that totalitarian regimes face, one would find himself in a semantic dead-end, since these types of regimes themselves involve terroristic elements in their political behaviour. On the other hand, there have been studies based on statistical and comparative analyses, according to which terrorism and democracy usually go hand-in-hand.[116] Terrorism has come to be seen as "a perversion of pluralism and democratic freedoms".[117] It is partly due to this and similar perceptions that the approach taken for the proposals of anti-terrorist measures has taken the form of 'war'. Scholars, without necessarily having been correct in their hypotheses about or understanding of terrorism, seem to share the idea that terrorism is evil and must be combated at all costs. When it comes to this section the field resembles a medieval 'witch-hunt' that is not – or at least, should not be – proper in academic circles. Indicative of this approach is the study made by Cotler, who advocates that terrorism is an attack to the human rights principle and, unless the international, as well as domestic, law and counter-terrorist policies focus principally on the infringement of human rights by it, the battle against terrorism will be feeble.[118] At no point does the author attempt to reflect, for example, on the possibility that the terrorist's human rights were violated before he found refuge in the use of political violence. Albeit not an ubiquitous element, the early days of Basque terrorism attracted social support precisely because it was seen as a response to the lack of human rights from the part of the State.

Wardlaw suggests no less than fifteen options governments have in their fight against terrorism.[119] Stricter legal criteria and treatment for terrorists, creation of specialised anti-terrorist forces and increased control over the members of society are some of those choices – although, in regards with the latter, it must be noted that Wardlaw does stress the importance of the measures taken to be seen to be directed to

[116] William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, 1998. "Terrorism and Democracy: what recent events disclose", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 108-118. See also Eubank and Weinberg, 2001. "Terrorism and democracy: Perpetrators and victims", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 155-164.
[117] Wilkinson, 1990, op.cit., p. 47.
[118] Irwin Cotler, 1998. "Towards a counter-terrorist law and policy", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 3-23.
[119] Wardlaw, op.cit., pp. 68-70.

terrorists only. Quoting Bobrow,[120] Wardlaw lists four policy models governments can adopt when handling terrorist situations: *the domination model* – the annihilation of terrorists is more important than the hostages; *the contingent concession model* – the fate of hostages is a consideration but still of secondary importance to the elimination of the terrorists; *the ransom with entrapment model* – where the aim is to deceive the terrorists into liberating the hostages but receive no ransom; and finally *the ransom with eventual retribution model* – where control of situation lies wholly on the hands of the terrorists and the only solution for the government is to accede to their demands.[121]

Considering the use of the military in an anti-terrorist policy scheme, Wardlaw warns against the difference of operability between the regular police and the army itself. The former is part of the civil life and its main concern is to uphold the law and protect the civilian population. The latter has its own internal code of behaviour, it is not as much a part of the public as the policeman is seen to be and it is subject to orders which it must obey if it is to function properly. Using the army to combat terrorism "implies an extremely serious threat which could easily be used by the terrorists to their own propaganda advantage".[122] Its presence in the situation denotes that less violent measures have failed.[123] Furthermore, unless its presence is carefully controlled and fully justified, it might have the opposite effect of the one originally intended. Wardlaw points out that the creation of a 'third force' will offer a more appropriate and 'balanced' response to terrorism. It should be part of the civil police force – although not involved in routine police work –, it should be highly specialised in dealing with incidents like terrorism, and it should be "ready to respond in force at very short notice".[124]

Wilkinson's orthodox approach to combating terrorism consists of nine guidelines:

1. Overreaction and general repression, which could destroy democracy far more rapidly and effectively than any campaign by a terrorist group, should be avoided.
2. Underreaction – the failure to uphold the constitutional authority of the government and the law – will bring the threat of sliding into anarchy or the emergence of no-go areas dominated by terrorists, war lords, Mafia gangs and drug barons, and so should also be avoided.

[120] D. B. Bobrow, 1978. "Preparing for unwanted events: instances of international political terrorism", *Terrorism: An International Journal*, Vol. 1, pp. 397-422.
[121] Wardlaw, op.cit., p. 75.
[122] Ibid., p. 94.
[123] Ibid., p. 95.
[124] Ibid., p. 98.

3. The government and the security forces must at all times act within the law. If they fail to do this they will undermine their democratic legitimacy and public confidence in, and respect for, the police and the criminal justice system.
4. The secret of winning the battle against terrorism in an open democratic society is winning the intelligence war: this will enable the security forces, using high-quality intelligence, to be proactive, thwarting terrorist conspiracies before they happen.
5. The secret intelligence agencies and all the other institutions involved in combating terrorism must be firmly under the control of the elected government and fully accountable to it.
6. If emergency laws are found to be needed in a particularly serious terrorist conflict the laws must be temporary, subject to frequent review by parliament, and subject to parliament's approval before any renewal.
7. There should be no concessions of special status for convicted terrorists: terrorists are not convicted for their beliefs but for committing crimes of a particularly atrocious nature and for violating the basic human rights of fellow citizens.
8. Terrorist campaigns of propaganda and defamation must be fully countered: if they are not there is a danger that terrorists may achieve through their political manipulations what they have been unable to achieve by the bomb and the bullet.
9. Despite, or perhaps because of, the dilemmas facing governments in hostage crises, governments should avoid granting major concessions to terrorists.[125]

Wilkinson accepts that minor concessions might be a strategic and very convenient way for the governments to escape from terrorist threats. But it depends heavily on the number of innocents involved, the losses it will suffer due to the concessions and the degree to which the terrorists are ready to accept such an offer. It is generally thought, however, that successful terrorism depends on the reactions of the target. As Frankin puts it, "terrorism wins only if you respond to it in the way that the terrorists want you to; which means that its fate is in your hands and not in theirs".[126] Generally, as noted above, it is suggested that the state should avoid complying to terrorist demands because that could give rise to their beliefs that the state is indeed weaker and they might indeed achieve its break-down, if they can maintain or increase the levels of their campaign(s).

This is an argument put forward by Pedahzur and Ranstorp, whose study seeks to explain the deficiency of the "war" and "criminal justice" models in counter-terrorist policies.[127] The authors identify certain grey areas in-between the two types of policy and advocate that a tertiary model can address these grey areas and be useful in identifying the pragmatic degree of threat posed by terrorist activities. Pedahzur and Ranstorp argue that the two models are insufficient because, although the war model is guided by well-defined principles and has clearly marked boundaries, the criminal justice model is considered to be quite elastic when it comes to dealing with terrorism. The special treatment that most terrorists receive when captured in a liberal

[125] Wilkinson, 2001, op.cit., pp. 94-95.
[126] Frankin, in Groom, op.cit., p. 68.
[127] Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp, 2001. "A tertiary model for countering terrorism in liberal democracies: the case of Israel", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 13, No.2, pp. 1-26.

democracy, as was noted above, the greater powers allocated to the security forces, and the curtailment of certain fundamental liberal democratic principles, sometimes deemed as necessary for the protection of the state and the efficient combat of terrorism, are all an example of the above statement. This deficiency, the authors argue, can be countered with the use of an "expanded criminal justice" model that is situated between the other two, thus operating as a continuum between them, and makes the classification of terrorist policies, or any significant changes to it, easier to identify.[128]

Rich and diverse as the study on terrorism has been and still is, it has not managed to find the common ground necessary for satisfactory explanation and understanding. The reasons are many and situated in various levels and types of analysis, whether methodological, epistemological or other. For example, Gordon identifies a difference between terrorism and other, already established disciplines in academia.[129] Whereas the latter have a closed scientific system that involves circulation of information from academic circles to the outside world, in the terrorism research community, the flow is reversed. Researchers, gather their data by sources external to the academic research. More often than not this is down to the difficulties inherent in such study, namely, the classification of documents by governments, the difficulty in speaking with the subjects of the study, etc. The following section addresses further and more precisely problems encountered in the study of terrorism and presents alternatives that have been claimed to solve some, if not all, of the field's maladies.

Problems in the Study of Terrorism

Traditionally, as Jenkins argues, terrorists "find it unnecessary to kill many, as long as killing a few suffices for their purposes".[130] Indeed, until 1995 the number of terrorist incidents was falling steadily. However, the number of the victims in each terrorist incident was rising. This has been accepted by the scholars as an indication of the 'new terrorism' the international community would have to face. The Oklahoma city bombing, the poisoning of the Tokyo underground system and the incidents of September 11, 2001 verify at once these claims and the fact that traditional theories of terrorism have become obsolete and need to be reformulated and their ideas revisited.

[128] Ibid., p. 4.
[129] Avishag Gordon, 2001. "Terrorism and the scholarly communication system", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 116-124.
[130] Hoffman, 1998, op.cit., p.199.

Richmond exposes this view and argues for the study of terrorism not only by scholars of the terrorist field but also by students of conflict in general.[131] Terrorism is after all a form of conflict, more concretely an asymmetric one. The asymmetry indicates not only the numerically weak side of the terrorists *vis-à-vis* the state apparatus, but also the advance of technology and the every-day activities that have facilitated the disguise and camouflage of the terrorists and, thus, have turned the scale in the latter's favour. However, no matter what the impact of a terrorist incident or the degree of strengthening of the terrorist organisations, Richmond asserts that terrorists could never balance the asymmetry between them and the state. Thus, terrorism is not literally a war but it moves to a level beyond that of war. The symbolism inherent in every terrorist action transforms terrorism into a symbolic dispute of the legitimacy of the hegemon in the eyes of the terrorist's as well as in the eyes of the hegemon's audience.[132] Because of the asymmetry then, the only option left to terrorists is the escalation of violence. The greater the impact, the greater the dispute of the legitimacy.[133] This new form of terrorism has emerged as a phenomenon in the post-Cold War era, which, according to Richmond, is a manifestation of anti- and counter-hegemonic behaviour.

However, Richmond's analysis on the post-Cold War characteristics of the international system, and how they have contributed to the transformation of terrorism, provides insights on the examination of the role of other factors as well. It is not only the element of bipolarity missing from the post-Cold war era, and all the strategic advances that emanate from it – for example, knowledge of the opponent's capabilities, symmetry of conflict, etc. Although it is a process and as such it requires large periods of time to operate and develop, it is with the fall of bipolarism that globalisation has transformed the world into a tiny village. The argument explained above, that the greater the terrorist strike is, the greater the dispute of the legitimacy, could thus be turned on its head. Never before did the terrorists dispose of such a large audience and never before were their actions so extensively covered, so fast. It could be argued, hence, that because they have attracted the whole planet's attention, they are willing to mount more spectacular –and, therefore, deadlier – attacks, in order to provoke an impact similar in size with their audience.

[131] Oliver Richmond, 2003. "Realising hegemony? Symbolic terrorism and the roots of conflict", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.289-309.
[132] Ibid., p. 300.
[133] Ibid., p. 301

On the other hand, one could argue that under a bipolar international system, the conditions were not ideal for carrying out attacks such as some of those that took place in the last decade. Although there were many incidents where terrorist attacks were mounted with the support of one superpower in order to undermine the strength of the other, no terrorist attacks took place that defied the joint capabilities of both superpowers. That could be either because the world was utterly absorbed by bipolarity and, as a result, nothing could be thought of outside that context; or because it was calculated as 'mad', irrational and senseless by a terrorist group to enrage both superpowers, offering them some common ground and the opportunity to co-operate in eliminating the mutual threat. A critique of this line of thought could be that two years after the declaration of 'war on terror' and the international backing and co-operation it has received (which logically involves more resources than any two superpowers), the culprits are still on the run and no serious and tangible results have been achieved. However, the present 'war on terror' might not be a good counter-argument, since it is claimed that it has assumed ends, values and objectives different from those it originally set out to defend.

Another approach is proposed by Brannan, Esler and Strindberg, in which social identity theory has a prominent role.[134] The authors ferociously attack the school of terrorism as obsolete and inherently inadequate to answer significant questions about terrorism. A very large part of the literature is based on secondary sources and, even where there may be opportunities for primary source investigations, the latter will be turned down. Therefore, most of the assumptions made about terrorism do not necessarily reflect much truth. This is one of the most fundamental reasons why the field has developed "an attitudinal predisposition and framework of analysis that has the researcher approaching her or his research subjects antagonistically, as a threat, with a view to facilitate its defeat".[135] This is, they argue, the reason why the terrorism studies community has come to see itself "as an adjunct of the agencies, an intellectual counterterrorist vanguard".[136] On the contrary, the approach proposed by the authors is derived from social identity theory, which is itself non-reductionist. Theories of social identity argue that membership of the group contributes to the individual's identity, in that they offer a sense of belonging and

[134] David Brannan, Philip Esler and Anders Strindberg, "Talking to "Terrorists": Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol.24, No.1, pp. 3-24.
[135] Ibid., p. 4.
[136] Ibid., p. 12.

become part of the self-concept. The authors argue that no objectivity can be reached unless researchers realise the importance of first-hand experience for the outcome of credible conclusions. But even then, scholars must guard against the cultural gap between them and their research subjects, for it may hamper the entire effort. This means that the phenomenon in question should be situated "in its own particular cultural context" and that "the researcher's own and different culture does not cause a misinterpretation of the persons and data under consideration".[137]

It must be noted here that the problems accounted for by Esler and Strindberg are not new. Equal criticisms have been addressed by Ronald Crelinsten,[138] nearly fifteen years before Esler and Strindberg's study. Crelinsten too addresses the maladies of the subject that have resulted in a "skewed focus" from the part of the researcher, the "narrow conceptual frameworks utilised" and the "ahistorical, linear causal models which ignore the historical and comparative aspects of terrorism".[139] Similarly, Andrew Silke[140] has compared terrorism research with similar field of social science (forensic psychology and criminology) and has found that despite the similarities in the conduct of research between the three fields, the terrorism subject "exists on a diet of fast-food research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious".[141]

Conclusion

The conclusion that comes out of these critiques on the methodological and epistemological aspects of the study of terrorism is two-fold. Firstly, they indicate the inadequacy with which the subject has been approached and studied for during all these years. By inadequacy, I mean primarily in terms of contextualisation and lack of deeper understanding when it comes to recognising the reasons that lead to its conception and adoption as a vehicle of mobilisation and/or resistance. In the Basque case, the majority of the orthodox terrorism theory fails to go beyond the territorial boundaries and the claims that surround them and include a cultural perspective in its examination of the conflict. The history that surrounds the Basque ethnonationalist movement, and the elevation that it has received either in the form of historicism or in

[137] Ibid., p. 16.
[138] Ronald Crelinsten, 1987. "Terrorism as political communication: the relationship between the controller and the controlled" in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair Stewart (eds.) op.cit., pp. 3-23.
[139] Ibid., pp. 3-8. See also Michel Wieviorka, 1995, "Terrorism in the context of academic research" in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), *Terrorism in Context*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
[140] Andrew Silke, 2001. "The devil you know: continuing problems with research on terrorism", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 1-14.
[141] Ibid., p. 12.

the form of popular myth, is virtually irrelevant to the motivations of the terrorist and the achievement of his/her objectives. This highlights that in a world that is constantly under pressure to change, theories like those of terrorism cannot remain unchanged, since the phenomenon they study is itself subject to alterations and transformations.

On the other hand, those same studies highlight the immense reserve of thought that lies in other disciplines, related and much closer to terrorism than originally thought, with significant insights for the resolution of key problems in the study of terrorism as a form of political violence. After all, a grand theory might not be readily available, or even necessary, as Wilkinson observed, but many small theories derived from inter-disciplinary approaches might help us steer the study of terrorism in a direction that is certainly more correct than the one it has so far followed. A direction, which, for Gordon has already been adopted and is leading towards "more structured research and greater conceptualisation",[142] thus turning the field into an established discipline.

So far, however, we have only understood how the individuals behave once inside the organisation, what are their preferred strategies, ways of recruitment, and so on. Yet, what is it that makes the same thing, terrorism, accessible to such a variety of movements? As some of the works discussed above indicate, grievances that are related to basic material and cultural needs are the primary reason. The view of terrorism as only one method of conducting a war, even if it is on the cheap, or communicating political grievances to a central authority allows for an understanding of the phenomenon that is not parted from the greater environment in which terrorism emerged. Because, as the Basque case will show, nationalisms are not always bad or always good. They can be both civic and ethnic, at different stages of their development. This thesis concentrates on this very moment, whereby the primary identity of a social movement – in our case, a nationalist one – sees fit to utilise violence in order to promote its grander objectives, and not because violence per se is synonymous to all social movements.

[142] Gordon, op.cit., p. 124.

CHAPTER 4

Theories of Conflict Resolution: Root Causes and Human Needs.

This chapter intends to outline the development of theories of conflict and conflict resolution. It intends to do so by focusing on the theoretical perspectives offered through the years, as well as by looking at the practical application of those theories by actors in the international arena – states, institutions like International Organisations (IOs) and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), leaders, etc. The aim of the chapter is to identify those theoretical frameworks that have been applied to ethnic conflicts around the globe, not dissimilar to those of the Basque Country, and to establish whether practice and theory have matured enough so as to be more functional when applied to the case study of this project.

Early Days of Conflict Research

The meaning of conflict has been explored in many different situations, ranging from the personal level, for example conflict in the workplace, to that of societies, for example war between states. As such, it has inherited a plethora of definitions, most of which focus on the goals and aspirations, the values and interests, and the needs of the parties involved. In the simplest way, conflict denotes an incompatibility of goals and values between two or more parties.[1] That is the broadest generalisation that can be made out of different psychological, political and social approaches to the study of conflict. Conflict is, of course, as old as man himself, and the same can be said about the study of conflict, if one takes into account the legacies of Sun Tzu and Thucidydes. Conflict resolution, however, is very young. It sprang in the 1950s and began to establish towards the late 1960s. Many commentators refer to Mary Parker Follett as the pioneer of conflict resolution.[2] Her work aimed at the

[1] Jacob Berkovitch, 1984. *Social Conflict and Third Parties*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 6.
[2] Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, 1999. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, Oxford: Polity Press, pp. 40-41.

improvement of labour-management relations through the adoption of a mutual gains approach, contrary to the distributive approaches that took place until then and which led to confrontations.[3] Hers, then, was the first study of behaviour during conflict and how it, and the values held by the parties, affected or transformed the conflict itself.

Sociologists and psychologists were the first to establish research on conflict and come up with theories, which were to be later espoused by scholars of the International Relations field. The argument that aggression, a form of conflictive behaviour, presupposes the existence of frustration was formed as a psychological hypothesis.[4] If certain goals that are perceived to be necessary for one's existence are not met, the survival instinct prevails and humans adopt conflictive behaviours in order to achieve their goals. Sociologists, on the other hand, attributed a more positive role to conflict. Simmel viewed conflict as a mechanism that lets off tension between members of society.[5] A mechanism, in other words, that brings members of the group closer, forces them to communicate the reasons of the friction and, thus, contributes to the group's bonding. His view rested on the idea that the negative connotations of conflict in a society could be juxtaposed to the positive ones. That is, just as people need someone to whom they feel attracted to, they also need someone who they can hate, an object towards which they can direct their frustrations and 'hostile impulses'.

Based on Simmel's work, Louis Coser observed that conflict "can occur only in the interaction between subject and object"[6] and more often than not, it is the conflict's purpose to preserve the interaction between the two.[7] Conflicts are seen as either realistic or non-realistic, the former denoting conflicts that are directed towards the presumed frustrating object; non-realistic on the other hand, are those conflicts that "are not occasioned by the rival ends of the antagonists, but by the need for tension release of at least one [of the parties]".[8] Nonetheless, as Schmid argues, these

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See also Louis Kriesberg, 1997. "The Development of the Conflict Resolution Field", in William Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen (eds.), *Peacekeeping in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, Washington: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 23-50. Quote at p. 52.

[3] Miall et al., 1999, op.cit., p. 42.

[4] John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, O.H. Mowrer and Robert Sears, 1944. *Frustration and Aggression*, London : Kegan Paul, p. 1.

[5] Georg Simmel, 1955. *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations*, New York: Free Press. The theme of the functionality of conflicts was later taken on by Deutsch. See Morton Deutsch, 1973. *The Resolutions of Conflicts, Constructive and Destructive Processes*, London; New Haven, CO: Yale University Press.

[6] Louis Coser, 1968. *The Functions of Social Conflict*, London: Routledge, p. 59.

[7] Ibid., p. 49

[8] Ibid.

definitions and researches are very subjective to be accepted.[9] The difference, as Galtung demonstrated,[10] was that frustration is not only the consequence of another party's actions; the system is often to blame for the emergence of conflicts. Galtung has described as 'structural violence' the situations in which the means to eliminate grievances exist but no action is taken against those very grievances.

Galtung's work was a breakthrough in that it took research on conflict one step further. The focus was not only on the actor's objectively identified needs, goals, or objectives, but it accounted for the perceptions of the parties and how these perceptions influenced the conflict dynamics. Galtung came up with the idea that a conflict consists of three parts[11] (also known as the 'ABC triangle' of conflict): the conflict attitudes of their parties – their perceptions and misperceptions for themselves and 'the others' – (A), the conflict behaviour of the parties (B) and the contradiction or conflict (C) that is characterised by an incompatibility of goals between the actors. The model can be applied to symmetric conflicts, as well as to asymmetric conflicts and it holds that conflict can erupt from any of the three corners: a hostile *behaviour* towards someone is likely to attract a hostile *attitude* by them, which in turn might lead to *goal incompatibility*; similarly, hostile attitudes – for example, ethnic superiority vis-á-vis the enemy – may generate hostile behaviour and goal incompatibilities between the two groups. Finally, if goal incompatibility emerges first, it is more likely to lead to hostile attitudes and behaviours. The disclosure of this set of conflict dynamics made Galtung speak of conflict transformation rather than merely resolution: "the parties need to be transformed so that the conflict is not reproduced forever".

Galtung's research is not pioneering only because he was among the first to discern the cognitive and cultural aspects of conflict. His theory came as a solution to the problem that he himself identified in the research surrounding conflict and conflict resolution in particular. In 1964, in the Editorial of the first issue of the Journal of Peace Research, Galtung differentiated between two kinds of peace: the *negative* and the *positive*. The former implies nothing more than the freezing of the status quo, it brings about security by fomenting stability. In the simplest of words, it denotes the

[9] Herman Schmid, 1968. "Peace Research and Politics", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 217-232. Quote at p. 224.
[10] Johan Galtung, 1964. Editorial, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 1-4.
[11] Johan Galtung, 1996. *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilisation*, Ohio: International Peace Research Institute, p. 72.

absence of war. Positive peace, on the other hand, is that which transcends the levels of merely managing the conflict and goes into practices and processes of resolution.[12] The picture that Galtung painted was to set the standard for the field to take on a new direction. The binary statement provided by Galtung proves very useful in describing the different approaches taken by scholars through the years in their attempt to understand, explain and intervene in conflicts.

The easiest way to follow the developments in the field would be to offer a chronological description of the dominant theories. In essence, there are three distinctive phases in the evolution of peace and conflict thinking. The first is the traditional one and goes back to the rules and norms that emerged from the Treaty of Westphalia[13], which ended the Hundred Years War. Its prevalence lasts until well into the Cold War, at which point it is incrementally challenged by more liberal approaches (Galtung's being one of them) whose objective was not only to critique their predecessors, but rather to explore *de novo* the sources of conflict, its causes and multi-faceted manifestations, and to demonstrate that conflict, if dealt with constructively, *can* be transformed. This branch of theory, else known as the 'human needs theory', became quite popular towards the end of the Cold War and dominated the Post-Cold War academic circles. By the end of the 1990s, however, it too came under criticism and it was not long before it was challenged by a new generation of thinking. One, which seems to have been developed as a response to a fast-changing world, insofar as popular demands, values, ideologies, practices, norms and cultures are concerned. The following lines examine the above points through the literature of each period.

Pre-Cold War and Cold War

The Treaty of Westphalia signalled the end of the Hundred Years War. Its premises held that all states are equal, every state is sovereign and none is allowed to intervene in the internal affairs of another state. Although it concerned a very small part of the world and it was only an attempt to regulate (to an extent) the relations between the countries-parties to the agreement, the treaty's legacy bequeathed the way the international system was to function for the next four hundred years. The

[12] Galtung, 1964, op.cit., p. 2.
[13] Author unknown, *The Treaty of Westphalia; October 24, 1648*, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, available online at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm, accessed on 10/02/2004.

principles of sovereignty and non-intervention were to be codified into the form of international law and become widely accepted by the majority of states. Westphalia was a pioneering move not only because it introduced two key concepts for the function of international relations but also because it showed the essence of diplomacy as understood even in our days, and that norms in the behaviour of states *can* be set, although these have to be accepted by all, or, better put by Cassese, "[o]nly when the interest of many States coincide can general legal standards - that is, standards applicable to all States – emerge".[14] The Congress of Vienna in 1815 strengthened the view that the way in which a state deals with its internal conflicts is solely a matter for that state and that state only. Metternich of Austria went to great lengths to avert the sponsoring by British and Russians of Greek revolutionaries in their fight against the Ottoman rule, for fear that it will spark similar claims by minorities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and it will reinforce claims of independence by Italian principalities and duchies. But, it is precisely for this reason that the Congress was also seen as the first attempt to preserve peace through a co-ordination of foreign policies, mutual consultations, the establishment of demilitarised zones[15] and a distribution of power among the participants that would render aggression prohibitive.[16] The Congress was substituted by the Concert of Europe (1830-1884), which provided the ground for debates between and deliberations among the foreign policy makers of that time. In 1899 and 1907, the Conferences of Hague were organised in order to elaborate laws of warfare recognised by the participant states. The innovation in this gathering was the participation of extra-European countries, clearly indicating a growing will to take control of the conflicts springing around the globe.

However, it was the impact of the First World War that proved to be the catalyst for a serious attempt to solidify such a controlling framework of international appeal and scope. The formation of the League of Nations, a precursor to our contemporary United Nations, was designed to achieve that specific goal. As Article 10 of the League's Covenant stressed, the goal was "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all

[14] Antonio Cassese, 2003. *A Big Step Forward for International Justice*, Crimes of War Project, available online at http://www.crimesofwar.org/icc_magazine/icc-cassese.html, accessed 30/03/2004.
[15] Gordon Craig and Alexander George, 1995. *Force and statecraft : diplomatic problems of our time*, New York : Oxford University Press.
[16] Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe and Roger Coate, 1997. *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 22-23.

Members of the League".[17] Nonetheless, it was later seen as having been flawed from the very beginning of its inception, something that was also proved by the break out of the Second World War. For instance, the right to go to war was only restricted, rather than prohibited for the League's members.[18] On the other hand, it never managed to obtain the global membership it envisaged, as it lacked not only the necessary mechanisms to enforce decisions or even membership to the club itself, but also lacked the commitment of the then great powers to its ideals.[19] Indicative of the League's failure was the crisis that emerged with Italy's invasion of Abyssinia (both, members of the League at the time). The League's decision to impose sanctions to Italy was not deemed to be an effective measure, as it excluded the prohibition of material vital for the conduct of war. Similarly, the arms embargo imposed on both sides was catastrophic for the Abyssinian army, that was after all much smaller, weaker and inexperienced than the Italian. Furthermore, the League was suffering from complex internal mechanisms that they themselves undermined its mission. The requirement of unanimity in its decision-making procedures made it hard for international pressing matters to be addressed properly and, more importantly, on time. And the lack of clarity between its two substitute parts, the Assembly and the Council, further impeded its establishment as a globally accepted actor. Although it was officially dissolved in 1946, the League became inactive prior to the hostilities of the Second World War.

The post-war era saw the rebirth of the concept of the League of Nations into that of the United Nations. Traditional attitudes as to state sovereignty and non-intervention continued to exist, only this time around the organisation was designed "to actively maintain peace around the world, to mobilise military might if necessary, to enforce international decisions and to shift from unanimous to majority voting".[20] The views on state-centricity in the practice and conduct of international relations were also pre-eminent in the circles of scholars dealing with conflict and international politics. Early on, the study of conflict in the international sphere was dominated by

[17] Author Unknown, *The Covenant of the League of Nations*, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm#art10, accessed on 04/03/2004
[18] Weiss et al., op.cit., p. 25.
[19] The United States never joined the League despite the expectations that were raised by Wilson's presidency. Japan began as a permanent member but left the organisation in 1932; similarly with Italy, leaving in 1937. Germany became a member in 1926 but left at 1933 and Russia joined in 1934 but was expelled after it invaded Finland in 1939.
[20] Weiss et al., op.cit., p. 29.

geopolitics. Stemming from the legacies of Westphalia and the, until then, established practices between states, the studies were focusing on the geographical position of the conflictive parties and the resources that that particular piece of land had to offer. Friedrich Ratzel supported that it is easier for states that occupy large territories to become dominant[21] and his view was echoed in Halford Mackinder's writings that "rule of the heart of the world's greatest landmass could become the basis for world domination".[22] For Mackinder, the inner part of Eurasia (that is, Eastern Europe and North Asia) is the pivot area of international politics, due to its resources and its strategic place in the globe.[23] This statement is better understood when put into the historical context in which Mackinder was referring to. Eurasia was standing right in the middle between the European powers of the time and some of their most important colonies in South East Asia (British India and Hong-Kong, French Indochina, Spanish Philippines etc). Furthermore, Russia and Eastern Europe in particular seemed to have been of particular strategic importance, if we take into consideration the numerous battles and the equally diverse powers (Austro-Hungarians, French, Prussians and Ottomans, to name but a few) that went after the two regions. And of course one must not omit Napoleon's and Hitler's efforts to dominate in Europe's biggest and only one country that is also part of Asian territory. However, as Cohen has observed, the geopolitical claims were based more on normative rather than empirical studies.[24] It makes perfect sense to claim that big states will attempt to become dominant, whether globally or regionally, but that is not a *sine qua non* of international conflict. It is also true that there is no institution to prevent large states from expanding further, particularly through war, but that in itself is not the cause of war, as it will be explored below; rather, it should be designated as a permissive factor.

This period immediately prior and during the Cold War is characterised by the establishment of the Realist school in the field of International Relations and, thus, its influence on statesmen and practitioners was to a certain extent unavoidable. The hypotheses that states feed only on power, and power is all they will ever need if they

[21] Saul B. Cohen, 1999. "Geopolitics in the New World Era: A New Perspective on an Old Discipline," in George J. Demko and William B. Wood (eds.), *Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century*, Oxford; Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 40–68. Quote at p. 51.
[22] Ibid., pp. 51-52.
[23] Halford Mackinder, 1962. *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, New York: W. W. Norton and Co, pp. 268-278
[24] Cohen, 1999, op.cit., p. 55.

are to survive in a system which lacked the indispensable authority to set up accepted norms of behaviour for all and adjudicate in every dispute,[25] hence itself a generator of conflict,[26] did not leave much scope for original thinking to emerge, as far as conflict resolution is concerned. On the other hand, the fact that states were conceived of as the only actors in the international scene, or that they were unitary and rational in their international affairs, further complicated matters not only for the emergence of practices that would allow conflicts to be resolved, but also for the emergence of research that could grasp the idea that such a vision – the resolution of a conflict – is indeed possible. The principles of the Westphalian order can clearly be reflected in the realist view of international relations. Of course, the same can be said of the assumption that the national interest is the highest good[27] and that states have no other option but to take great care of that interest, since the anarchical nature of the system itself compels them to do so.[28]

…and the Practice

During this period, international politics is dominated by one word: sovereignty. Since the Treaty of Westphalia, its respect was the norm; its violation would most probably carry a heavy penalty. States were the main protagonists in the international arena, every state was a nation, it was sovereign, and conflict (in the international context) was considered to be harmful only if it took place between states. Thus, if war between states was seemingly negatively affecting the security of neighbouring countries (as is the case with Cyprus and Turkey, or Lebanon and Israel), or that of the entire system of nations (as is currently the threat of 'rogue states' obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction), it was the states themselves that would run to the rescue. First and foremost, responsibility for the resolution of the conflict lied with the warring parties themselves. As the UN Charter states,

> "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice".[29]

[25] Hans Morgenthau, 1960. *Politics Among Nations*, New York: Knopf.
[26] Kenneth Waltz, 1979. *Theory of International Politics*, London; New York: McGraw-Hill.
[27] Morgenthau, op.cit.
[28] Waltz, op.cit.
[29] Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI, Article 33.

The settlement practices described above were usually undertaken by the UN but an equally important role was also played by regional agencies, like the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or the Organisation of African Union (OAU), and by individual countries willing to offer their services as mediators or negotiators to the warring parties. Definitions of mediation and negotiation face the same problem as that of 'nationalism', 'terrorism' and other essentially contested concepts discussed in this project: every study offers a different perspective. For instance, while some authors argue that mediation and negotiation should not be anything other than the mere facilitation of communication between the conflictive parties by a third party,[30] others have called for a more active and involving role of the third party, where "leverage is the ticket to mediation",[31] while others have stressed that the mediator's role is not as important as that of the conflictive parties.[32] Certain attributes, however, have been identified as recurring to all mediation processes[33]: it is a form of negotiation, it is non-coercive and non violent and it is voluntary, in that the parties retain control over the outcome and, more often than not, over the process.[34]

Although much ink has been spent on separate and in-depth analysis of the above named practices (for instance on techniques and methods of successful mediation and negotiation), they both seem to fall under the broader spectrum of peacekeeping efforts. Peacekeeping was another form in which international intervention materialised, and it aimed at detaining the levels of violence "by separating the belligerents as much as possible through the interposition of a military or police units".[35] These units were unarmed or lightly armed and would only use

[30] Oran Young, 1967. *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in international Crisis*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
[31] Saadia Touval and William Zartman, 1989. "Mediation in International Conflicts" in Kenneth Kressel and Dean Pruitt (eds.), *Mediation Research: the Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp. 115-137. Quote at page 129.
[32] M., Ott, 1972. "Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution", *International Organisation*, Vol. 26, pp. 595-618. See also M. Harbottle, 1979. "The strategy of Third-Party Intervention in Conflict Situations", *International Journal*, Vol. 35, pp. 118-131.
[33] Jacob Berkovitch, 1997. "Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, a Review of Practice" in William Zartman and Louis Rasmussen (eds), *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 125-113. Quote at pp. 127-8.
[34] Oliver Richmond, 1998. "Devious objectives and the Disputants' View of International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 707-722.
[35] Stephen Ryan, 1990. "Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 54-71. Quote at p. 66.

force when their security was threatened. However, while these units would observe the freezing of the status quo, mediations and negotiations would run in parallel with peacekeeping operations in an attempt to promote a breakthrough that would lead to a kind of compromise between the parties. But, no matter how well combined these methods were, peacekeeping did not manage to escape from the notional, as well as operational restraints of conflict management. As the late UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Sergio Vieira de Mello noted, "peacekeeping has been perceived as an *ad hoc* response […] to contain fighting, prevent the resumption of hostilities and restore international peace and security".[36]

Interventions made by the international community were very rarely based on its genuine wish to intervene. The norm of non-intervention did not only mean that internal conflicts were to be dealt exclusively by the state itself, but also that no intervention by outsiders could take place without the warring parties asking for it. Neither the UN nor any country that might have been willing to play a third-party's role could enforce peace on the belligerents. They had to be 'invited'.[37] A common scenario for that period would see international intervention unrolling only after a ceasefire agreement was reached by the parties themselves, or by what scholars have termed a 'ripe moment' in the conflict[38] (for example, one where both or all parties have been exhausted by the conflict and are not in a position to continue with their hostilities) that would allow for a successful intervention. The consent of the warring parties to such multinational efforts automatically granted the latter with the necessary legitimacy to intervene in the conflict. On the other hand, the very nature of these missions, that is, the fact that they were multi-national, or better put, comprised of individuals whose identity was 'indifferent' to the conflict dynamics, carried a sense of neutrality and impartiality. Furthermore, their military equipment was so minimal that it was quite difficult for the peacekeeping units to be perceived of as a threat by either party.

Keeping always in mind that the foundational reason for the UN's creation and existence was to seek peace and stability, Chapter VII seems like a logical

[36] Sergio Vieira De Mello, 2001. "The Evolution of UN Humanitarian Operations" in D. S. Gordon and F. H. Toase (eds.), *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, London: Frank Cass, pp. 115-124. Quote at p. 115.
[37] However, consent may be withdrawn or reduced, as was the case with the UN's peacekeeping force in Egypt (UNEF), in 1967. See Marrack Goulding, 1993. "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 69, No. 23, pp. 451-464. Quote at p. 454.
[38] William Zartman, 1985. *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, New York: Oxford University Press.

continuation of the peacekeeping operations of the previous Chapter, in that it allows the UN to intervene militarily in order to prevent escalation of the conflict, and everything that comes as a direct consequence of that, be it a humanitarian crisis in the country, for instance, or that the conflict seriously threatens regional security and stability. Article 42 of Chapter VII states: "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."

The unrolling of the Cold War was another factor that impeded the development of theories capable of taking interventions into conflicts one step further than simply containing them. Despite the euphemistic name of the period, the situation was pretty 'hot', as it were, in regions outside the western world. The two superpowers were themselves involved directly or indirectly in several of these conflicts, and that alone would render (and in some cases has rendered) any effort to meaningfully resolve a conflict impossible. Furthermore, the bipolarity and the arms race climate that had dominated the international scene were calling for, indeed very cold, calculated and strategic moves by either side, whose interest was limited to the avoidance of a major (global and/or nuclear) war. This approach only reinforced the pre-existing attitudes of managing rather than resolving conflict. In Mearsheimer's famous words, "simplicity breeds certainty; certainty bolsters peace".[39]

In a sense, then, the foundations of the international system that carried through since the 17th Century did not leave much scope for states, as well as statesmen, to deal effectively with international conflict. This is reflected in the mechanisms adopted for such crises, all of which were guided by the Westphalian principles mentioned above. As Aall notes, there were only fifteen peacekeeping missions between 1945 and 1988, "all of them reflecting a consensus that these operations should play an impartial role vis-à-vis the conflict and should avoid exposing the peacekeepers to risk".[40] The problems posed by such approaches can be discerned today. The cases of Cyprus, the Middle East, Kashmir, and many others around the world have become protracted, partially because they were not developed

[39] John Mearsheimer, 1990. "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold war", *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 266, pp. 35-50. Quote p. 37.
[40] Pamela Aall, 2000. "NGOs, Conflict Management and Peacekeeping" in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, London; Portland OR: Frank Cass, pp. 121-141. Quote, p. 122.

to a point past that of conflict. Conflict has frozen, and with it the attitudes and the behaviours of its parties.

The Liberal voices

Despite the poor frameworks on which the practical aspects of conflict regulation of the pre-1990 era were founded, there started to emerge voices which raised questions about the validity, the orthodoxy and the functionality of such approaches. Those waves of revolutionary thinking begun to emerge in the 1960s and were developed incrementally for the thirty years that followed. Galtung's voice was certainly one of those that questioned the Realist assumptions, and his contribution to the field is not limited solely to his studies and writings, as was indicated above, but also to the influence he generated and the spiritual heritage he left for future generations of conflict scholars that followed.

The Australian John Burton was another scholar who has written extensively on the importance of change in the direction of the field. His thinking was revolutionary because it distanced itself from the power-related approaches of the realist legacies and instead examined the inner self of individuals and groups, the 'human needs theory' as it came to be known.[41] It was this more esoteric dimension in his examinations that made him bring forward his theory of international relations not through the analysis of states, but one centred on the global and multidimensional cobweb of religious, linguistic, commercial and other social relationships.[42] Burton's was a theory "based upon individual needs and the system of issue-related linkages established by such needs".[43]

Burton's basic argument is that humans are not driven only by material interests and needs, such as power, resources or territory. The human psyche, for Burton, consisted of inner drives and needs that the realist explanations could not account for, for example security, identity and recognition. For Burton this was the only way to explain protracted conflicts.[44] What made people *not* to reach an

[41] John Burton (ed.), 1990a. *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
[42] John Burton, 1972. *World Society*, London: Cambridge University Press. For an overview see Dennis Sandole, 2001. "John Burton's Contribution to Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: A Personal View", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol 6, No. 1, available online at http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol6_1/Sandole.htm, accessed 12/08/2006.
[43] Fred Halliday, 1994. *Rethinking International Relations*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
[44] John Burton, 1987. *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflicts: A Handbook*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

agreement with the opposite site, and thus not to compromise, was not the inherent malleability of the human gene, as Morgenthau claimed;[45] it was the fact that these needs were a) tantamount for and common to every human being, and b) in the cases where conflict had broken out, they were obviously violated/unsatisfied.

Burton argues that the use of power or force was a common measure taken against severe disobedience or disagreement with the institutions, in all levels, from the family to the international.[46] Nevertheless, in all of those levels, power had failed to prove an efficient suppressive measure against the manifestation of conflict. Certain conflicts were recurrent no matter how much force was applied to them, which highlighted the deficiencies of power-related theories. Their insolvability should therefore be sought elsewhere, and in particular within the human self. As he noted elsewhere:

> "What we are referring to in this context are needs that are always present: individual needs that are as basic to harmonious social relationship as food and shelter are to the individual. They do not depend on stages of development. The argument is that without the satisfaction of these needs the individual will find the norms of society in which he behaves – primitive, traditional or industrial – to be inappropriate because these norms cannot be used by him to secure his needs. He will invent his own norms and be labelled deviant, or disrupt himself as a person, rather than forego these needs"[47]

It is in this context that Burton differentiates between disputes and conflicts. The former refers to physical resources and a compromise can be negotiated; but conflicts point to human needs, which are non-negotiable and thus cannot be compromised. Burton argues that it is the failure of the distinction by earlier theories that blurred our vision towards the true dynamics of conflict, and this failure he attributes directly to Morgenthau.[48] This wrongful impression has left its stamp on the organisation and function of domestic as well as international institutions, who still operate with policies designed around and on the use of power as a suppressive

[45] John Burton, 1998. "Conflict Resolution: The Human Dimension" *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, available online at http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol3_1/burton.htm, accessed August 13, 2007.
[46] John Burton, 1993. "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy" in Dennis Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press.
[47] John Burton, 1979. *Deviance, Terrorism and War*, Oxford: Martin Robertson, p. 60.
[48] Burton, 1998, op.cit.

measure. Unless these institutions begin to fulfil and accomplish the unmet human needs of groups in conflict, conflict as such, will never be effectively dealt with.

As a dedicated scholar of conflict resolution, Burton is a strong supporter of the problem-solving workshops, a form of informal diplomacy organised and directed by academics like himself.[49] His view was that the parties to the conflict bear all of the responsibility for its resolution. However, in order to do so successfully, there has to exist some form of communication which facilitates the mutual definitions of the conflict and enhances the understanding of the other party's views on the situation. The establishment and facilitation of communication depends on the third party whose responsibility is to make sure that the relationship disposes of the confrontational context that has as its main element in the past. These workshops were unofficial and secret, keeping all information exclusive to the academics/facilitators themselves. Burton asserts that this kind of communication does not stop at the moment when the conflict is terminated.[50] He speaks of *pro*vention as the most appropriate response to conflictive behaviour. A framework that takes into account the conflict issues and attitudes, and sets up a mechanism that keeps conflict manifestations in a rather controlled, 'healthy' environment. As he himself put it, "provention implies the promotion of an environment conducive to harmonious relationships"[51] whereas "prevention has a negative connotation".[52]

Burton's views and similar liberal voices were paid more attention with the end of the Cold War that changed dramatically the academic as well as the practical field of international relations. The major change for the scholars of conflict was that they found themselves in a new phase where identities are inextricably woven into conflicts. The more the world was heading towards the 21st century, the less the states were involved in stereotypical conflict. From 1989 to 1994, only four of the ninety-four identified conflicts studied by Wallensteen and Sollenberg were conventional

[49] Other facilitators in problem-solving workshops have also published their results and the experiences gained out of such meetings. On conflicts in the Horn of Africa see Leonard Doob (ed.), 1970. *Resolving Conflict in Africa: The Fermeda Workshop*, London; New Haven: Yale University Press; See also Benjamin Broome, 1997. "Designing A Collective Approach to Peace: Interactive Design and Problem-Solving Workshops with Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Communities in Cyprus", *International Negotiation*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 381-407 for workshops dealing with the two communities in Cyprus.
[50] Burton, 1990, op.cit, p. 2.
[51] John Burton, 1990b. *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, p.2
[52] Ibid., p. 3.

inter-state conflicts.[53] That meant many of the assumptions adopted until then, such as the prevalence of the state or that of consent, were rendered obsolete in a very short period of time. By 1992, according to Goulding,[54] the number of United Nations peacekeeping operations increased five-fold, and along with that came the complexities and the necessities of different approaches to ending conflict. Many of these conflicts were not new, but the change in the system of International Relations brought forward a different, somewhat more pragmatic face of these conflicts. Azar has termed "protracted social conflicts" those conflicts that are long, on-going and seemingly unresolvable.[55] These are social conflicts, in which the marginalisation of one of the parties took place along the lines of the communal and/or regional spheres.[56]

Post-Cold War Approaches

As the post-Cold War order became used to as *the* norm, academic thinking begun to flourish with regards to the causes of conflict, and consequently of conflict resolution. In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Gali provided the official recognition that conflicts in the post-Cold War world were different, and as such they required different treatment from that applied since then.[57] In his report "An Agenda for Peace", it is recognised that conflicts between ideological blocks is no longer the sole genre of conflict but rather a new wave of ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious and social factors was becoming predominant in the eruption of conflicts. Disease, malnutrition and environmental imprudence tend both to strengthen and also to conflict. The Agenda for Peace was the first official claim that the until then scope of the widely accepted peace-keeping operations needed to be defined in a broader way, and in order for them to achieve the aims of the Organisation, they had to be accompanied by strategies and policies that would enhance not only the cessation of hostilities, but also the development of policies and practices that would indicate when a conflict was imminent and measures and policies that would stabilise

[53] Peter Wallensten and Margareta Sollenberg, 1995. "After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict, 1989-1994*" Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No.3, pp. 345-360
[54] Goulding, op.cit., p 451.
[55] Edward Azar, 1986. "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions", in Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Brighton: Whitesheaf.
[56] Edward Azar 1990. *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict*: Theory and Cases, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, p. 130.
[57] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992. *An Agenda for Peace*, New York: United Nations.

effectively the region where conflict erupted. The Secretary's proposal focused on peacemaking and peacebuilding (albeit post-conflict) as practices that should go hand in hand with peacekeeping. In the Supplement to the agenda for Peace, published three years after the original report, the Secretary General further highlights the change in the nature of conflict, and especially the way the UN should confront them.

The criticism that the realist assumptions were seen as too mono-dimensional in their approach was also applied to the human needs theories. These were too fixated on the socio-biological aspects of the individual that left no room for the exploration of their psychological traits. One such criticism comes from Avruch, who claims that Burton's conception of the problem-solving workshops is essentially flawed.[58] The reason for this is because every individual has his/her own perception of reality, which is in turn shaped by every one's different customs and habits. As such, two parties in a conflict have different pictures for the same conflict. The same goes for the mediator/facilitator who cannot leave his culture outside the workshop.[59] Thus, the argument goes, one should not shut culture outside the conflict resolution room, but rather accept it and utilise it in order to find the common understandings needed for the initiation of a solution. Avruch and Black[60] coined the term *ethnoconflict theories* to denote the analyses of conflicts viewed through the cultural prism. *Ethnopraxis*, on the other hand, takes place when culture is utilised by the conflict resolution processes.

Tarja Vayrynen shapes her argument along the same lines and strongly criticises Burton's work.[61] By following theorists of phenomenology, Vayrynen criticises almost every aspect of his work. As she informs us, phenomenology was born as a science in order to criticise the increasing positivist tendency in social and philosophical sciences. Phenomenologists set out to observe the world as it is through the eyes, and consequently through the actions, of the actor. However, the researcher or interpreter of those actions "never comprehends the meaning in its totality, because the other's stream of consciousness always eludes that of the interpreter".[62] This is

[58] Kevin Avruch, 1998. *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.
[59] Kevin Avruch and Peter Black, 1993. "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Problems and Prospects," in Dennis Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, op.cit., pp. 131-145.
[60] Kevin Avruch and Peter Black, 1991. "The Culture Question and Intercultural Conflict Resolution", *Peace and Change*, Vol. 16, pp. 22-45.
[61] Tarja Vayrynen, 2001. *Culture and International Conflict ResolutionL A Critical Analysis of the Wrok of John Burton*, Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press.
[62] Ibid., p. 91.

sharply contrasted to Burton's assumptions that the human needs are universal for all, hence there is a basis for common understanding. Phenomenology holds that the realities we live are socially constructed and our natural attitude is to accept these realities as "unquestionably given until further notice".[63] According to her study, some of Burton's assumptions are not fruitful because needs are also socially constructed realities and attention should be paid on the context in which they arise.[64] Culture has a great potential of offering insight to the way conflicts develop, arise and are handled, because "the 'identity' of a person is created through the social groups and in accordance with the cultural patterns which prevail in the groups the person belongs to".[65] More explicitly:

> "Any society considers itself as a little cosmos, and the maintenance of the cosmos requires symbols to keep it together. Societies, social groups, need their central myths, or dominant ideologies, to justify and to establish foundations for self-interpretation. Social groups can be distinguished by virtue of their commonly held relevance system from which typifications arise".[66]

Typification indicates a certain way of behaviour, different in every culture, because it is precisely governed by that culture. That means, not only do the parties have to find a point where their respective cultures meet, it does not only mean that the responsibility for the emergence of this point lies with the facilitator, but it also implies that the facilitator must be aware of *his* culture *vis-à-vis* those of the belligerents.

The very nature of the technique of the problem-solving workshops, the fact that they originated in North America by middle class whites, has been increasingly questioned. Avruch wonders to what extent the problem solving workshops, advocated by Burton and others, have done just as much damage as the realists, in that they complicated further the relationship between the conflictive parties by considering them and projecting them back to themselves as equal.[67] A criticism also

[63] Schutz, in Vayrynen, p. 92.
[64] Vayrynen, p. 107.
[65] Ibid., p. 110. See also Henri Tajfel, 1982. *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[66] Vayrynen, p. 105.
[67] Avruch, 1998, op.cit., p. 50.

espoused by Jabri, who notes that the approach creates a 'myth of equals' by 'negating power asymmetry'.[68]

While Avruch's might be a harsh criticism, the insights he offers are useful in that they help re-locate the context of the conflict closer to the perceptions and culture of the parties. Nonetheless, and as it will be seen in the case study, the 'human needs' framework is the most suited to explain not only the emergence of violence as political communication of grievances but also to explain the necessity for peace and dialogue in the Basque region that the civil community itself, unaided by the political protagonists, has raised. The formation of peace groups and NGOs in the Basque country emerged as an apolitical initiative by members of the local civil society and targeted other members of that society who disagreed with the manifestation of the use of violence.[69] The incremental participation of the local population in anti-violent manifestations and projects shows that Avruch's criticisms do not take into account societies' ability to adapt to change. In the Basque case, the basic human need of being a member of an independent state is subordinated to that of pursuing the very same objective but in a total absence of violence. It is an interesting element to highlight since, anthropological fieldwork has identified both, cultures that dispose of conflict-resolution systems[70] and cultures where such frameworks are inexistent, thus rendering conflict endemic.[71] This has made commentators turn to those mechanisms that are products of the local society and its culture, "models that emerge from the resources present in a *particular* setting and respond to needs in *that* context".[72]

Agnew's analysis, for instance, is very reminiscent of A. D. Smith's ethnosymbolic model, in that he recognises the role and significance symbolism can have in conflicts, particularly those of a nationalist nature.[73] He asserts that intractable social conflicts generate practices, interests, goals and symbols that cannot be mediated discursively and it is only through the transformation of the above

[68] Vivenne Jabri, 1996. *Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 155.
[69] Interview with Gorka Espiau, Director of Elkarri, Bilbao 22/11/2004.
[70] Edward Evans-Pritchard, 1940. *The Nuer: A Description of the Nodes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[71] K. F. Koch, 1974. *War and Peace in Jalemo: The Management of Conflict in Highland New Guinea*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[72] John Paul Lederach, 1997. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington D. C.: United States Institute for Peace, p. 57; emphasis added.
[73] John Agnew, 1991. "Beyond Reason: Spatial and Temporal Sources of Ethnic Conflict" in Louis Kriesberg, Terrell Northurp and Stuart Thorson (eds.), *Intractable Conflicts and their Transformation*, New York: Syracuse University Press, pp. 41-52.

conditions that an intractable conflict can be resolved.[74] In ethnic conflicts, more particularly, Agnew recognises the role that territory plays, and even becomes the very source of intractability of the conflict. First, because conflict tends to encourage definition of group membership in mutually exclusive terms.[75] Thus a shared living space becomes divided and serves as an evident factor of differentiation. Second, ethnic conflict is usually sustained by the performance of rituals that make reference to a past while at the same time point to a wanted future. Territory is an indispensable feature of these rituals. Finally, the situation is aggravated by the competition between the ethnic groups over the spatial distribution of political-economic benefits.[76] The previous chapter has shown how terrorist conflicts utilise the symbolism of nationalist ideology. Agnew's rituals are not much different from those, considering a case, like the Basque, where virtually all accounts of the past are filled with words on heroes, martyrs, fighters, freedom, etc. What Agnew describes as the transformation of the rituals, the goals and the strategies, in the Basque case took place as a transformation of the local culture with regards to this very symbolisms. The violence of the extremists succumbed to the need of peace of the moderates.

Agnew identifies three factors in the rise of ethnic conflicts: a) "the degree of geographical-economic differentiation within a country and its relationship to ethnic divisions; b) the increased bureaucratisation of the state and the growth of the welfare state; c) the growing internationalisation of economic and political activity".[77] Clearly, one must take into consideration the fact that conflicts are not fixed, when one examines the possible temporal causes of conflict; rather, they are dynamic and fluid precisely because they are the product of social interaction, which is itself a process of continuous change. According to Agnew, ethnic conflicts usually produce new material stakes in the perpetuation of conflict and they constantly produce new symbolic issues. At the same time, and as observed in terrorist conflicts, this symbolism is expressed by "war-talk": the dehumanisation of the other and its transformation into an enemy. Also, ethnic conflicts involve sacrifices, for which reason they tend to mobilise people in terms of principles rather than interests. Interests can be negotiated; principles cannot.[78] "Intractable ethnic conflicts are ones

[74] Ibid., p. 41.
[75] Ibid., p. 46.
[76] Ibid., p. 48.
[77] Ibid., p. 44.
[78] Ibid., pp. 47-48.

which are dynamically reproduced through the mutual exclusivity of competing territorial claims and the constant production of new causes as the conflict continues".[79] It is worth remembering here that there is no universal type of intractable ethnic conflicts, or a universal form of their resolution. The only possibility to identify and achieve common ground is the crystal-clear identification of the sources of intractability, the root causes of the conflict.

Lederach calls this approach 'elicitive', whereas Burton's model is merely prescriptive. The elicitive model indicates that the conflict resolution phase has started from below. Lederach identifies three main levels of peacebuilding: top-level, middle range and grassroots. The first refers to those individuals who assume the role of the peacemaker. These are the actors whose role is most important when it comes to the management of conflict. Lederach argues that the potential for successful conflict resolution offered from this level is insufficient because peace is often negotiated between the third party and the leaderships of the conflictive parties. Thus, the public's condescension for the ending of the conflict is more often assumed than real. The middle level "holds the potential for helping to establish a relationship- and skill-based infrastructure for sustaining the peacebuilding process"[80] because it is addressed to individuals who have a key role in the conflict and are in a position of influencing its outcome. The last level refers to the masses of people who constitute the conflictive parties broadly. But, like the top level, its contribution to the realisation of an effective framework for conflict resolution is limited, often because it is the very same people who pay the disastrous consequences of the conflict. It is the middle level that holds the key to the transformation of the conflict.

As the next chapters will show, the transformation of the Basque conflict dynamics was definitely affected by the role of the middle level actors. But it must also be underlined that the transformation of the conflict attitudes originated by the grassroots level and the key players of the middle level acted because they succumbed to the enormous pressure raised by the grassroots level.[81] The posture of the central government until 2004, which recognised no political problem but rather only a problem of violence,[82] did not prove to be flexible enough for those members of the

[79] Ibid., pp. 51-52.
[80] Ibid., p. 51.
[81] Interview with Gorka Espiau, Director of Elkarri, Bilbao, 22/11/2004.
[82] Ibid. This was also claimed during an anonymous interview with a cadre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Madrid, 4/11/2004. See also, Ludger Mees, 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The*

Basque society that were repelled by violence but were not prepared to abandon nationalist politics. The same circles, of non-violent nationalists, experienced a similar frustration by the posture of the constant re-generation of the extremists bands of the nationalist movement. The reaction of the Basque society therefore, when viewed under these circumstances, seems quite logical when it comes to the elimination of violence as an accepted social response and norm. And as such, it clashes directly with Lederach's theory that the grassroots level is weaker than the actors present in other levels.

While efforts to create a stable and efficient framework that will support actions of conflict resolutions from all levels (where possible), Lederach also warns against mono-dimensional analyses of the conflict situation. He talks of the subsystem and explains that it is not only the issues that can fuel conflict, but also systemic changes that need to be made if conflict is to be transformed. Lederach's argument is better understood when represented in a linear time-span: at the short-term end, responses to conflict aim at alleviating the latter's most evident consequences (emergency relief, food supplies, etc); at the other end, the long-term end, responses to conflict should be concentrating on picturing a common future. But for that to happen, one needs to transform the conflict dynamics. "Reconciliation-as-encounter suggests that space for the acknowledging of the past and envisioning of the future is the necessary ingredient for reframing the present".[83] Transformation of the conflict lies at the very middle of the time-line, and links crisis (short-term response) with change (long-term goal). His insight is that "an infrastructure for peacebuilding should be understood as a process-structure, […] made up of systems that maintain form over time yet have no hard rigidity of structure".[84] As he argues, such an infrastructure should originate from the conflict in question, thus taking into consideration cultures and contexts. In the Basque case, as it was mentioned earlier, the transformation of the conflict was prompted by the needs of the vast majority of the Basque society, the grassroots level in Lederach's terminology. As such, it would have been difficult to ignore the local culture and the context in which the conflict was placed. In that sense, then, it may be argued that where the conflict is addressed not only by its key actors but by the victims that find themselves in the middle of the

Basque Clash of Identities, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 115 for an analysis of the official state discourse vis-à-vis ETA in the late 1990s.

[83] Lederach, 1997, op.cit., p. 27.

[84] Ibid., p. 84.

key players' violence, the cultural encodings and the broader context of the conflict will be embedded in the attempts to transform it.

The contributions discussed so far reveal the perception of some of the scholars that peace is just another dimension that can be accessible yet, for a number of reasons, its attainment has proved elusive. Some have even gone so far as to imply that peace is the normative dimension and that "warfare is only an invention".[85] More contemporary studies on peace have increasingly criticised this perception, that peace can be readily established if only one is educated about its benefits. For start, 'peace' is another essentially contested concept that has attracted multiple interpretations.[86] Its understanding, particularly in the West, was so far focused on the violence that *must* precede it. "[M]ilitarisation or force has normally been a key mechanism for its attainment".[87] Furthermore, it is a liberal understanding that originated in the West and is reflected in Western attitudes and behaviours in the international system,[88] for example through humanitarian interventions, human rights establishment, and democratisation.[89] Despite their (usually) benevolent aims, even the peacebuilding approaches of the 1990s, according to Richmond, could not shake off some aspects of the victor's peace, primarily because the non-state actors' activity would be regulated by the dominant actors, the states.[90]

The most recent theoretical block[91] concentrates on an emancipatory dimension of peace that is built on consensus, "rather than an assumption of consensus tinged with moral superiority".[92] The poststructuralist and critical theory literature envisages a peace that is achievable once the necessary reforms are introduced that will allow, or even guarantee, representation and participation to those actors and discourses that have been hegemonically overlooked.[93] If war is seen to derive "from purposive human conduct situated within deeply embedded institutional

[85] Margaret Mead, 1995. "Warfare is only an invention, not a biological necessity" in Leon Barmson and G. H. Goethals (eds.), *War*, New York: Basic Books, pp. 269-227.
[86] David Barash, 2000. *Approaches to Peace*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 63.
[87] Oliver Richmond, 2005. *The Transformation of Peace*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 4.
[88] Michael Howard, 2002. *The Invention of Peace and the Re-Invention of War*, London: Profile.
[89] Ian Clark, 2001. *The Post-Cold War Order*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[90] Richmond, 2005, op.cit., p. 130.
[91] See indicatively Vivienne Jabri, 1996, op.cit.; Andrew Linklater, 1997. *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*, Oxford: Polity Press; Howard, 2002, op.cit.; Richmond, 2005, op. cit.;
[92] Richmond, 2005, op.cit. p. 185.
[93] Ibid., p. 201.

frameworks"[94], then, peace too should be conceptualised as a counter-discourse, seeking "to understand the structurated legitimation of violence and challenge the militarist order and exclusionist identities which encompass it".[95] However, just like with 'nationalism' or 'terrorism', a consensus on the definition of 'peace' will be too difficult to attain. Richmond identifies nine typologies of peace as it is conceived of, theorised and practiced,[96] and Reychler identifies three areas that will constitute a challenge to peace research: a) the extensive oscillation of violence in social relationships; b) the reactive nature of virtually all preventive efforts in the international level; and c) the vast gap between the perceived and the preferred world order.[97] Nonetheless, according to the findings of Gurr and Marshall, armed inter- as well as intra-state conflict has not reached such low levels since the late 1950s,[98] which is perhaps the best manifestation of the accumulation of knowledge in the field, if not an indication of the capacity of practice to keep up to date with theory. Particularly with regards to self-determination conflicts, findings suggest that, where autonomy is provided, "most parties to conflict accept and work within the framework of autonomy while a few spoilers may continue to fight in the hope of forcing greater concessions".[99]

And it is in this spirit that this thesis insists that the causes of the Basque conflict as presented by the violent minority have long ceased to exist, as was shown by the retirement and re-socialisation of thousands of its members shortly after the transition to democracy.[100] What persists and is observed to our days, at least since the establishment of democracy in Spain, is the reproduction of a conflict that finds it increasingly difficult to persuade not only its audience(s) but its very key-players about the validity of its intractability. The social attitude towards the behaviour of the conflictive parties, as will be seen in greater detail in the following chapters, is the

[94] Jabri, 1996, op.cit., p. 75.
[95] Ibid., p. 146.
[96] Richmond, 2005, op.cit., pp. 184-198.
[97] Luc Reychler, 2006. "Challenges of Peace Research", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1-16.
[98] Monty Marshall, 2005. "Global Trends in Violent Conflict" in Ted Gurr and Monty Marshall, *Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed-Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy*, University of Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p. 11-16. Quote at p. 11.
[99] Deepa Khosla, 2005. "Self-Determination Movements and their Outcomes" in Ted Gurr and Monty Marshall, op.cit., pp. 21-27. Quote, p. 25.
[100] Ludger Mees, 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. See also J. Tussell and A. Soto (eds.), 1995, *Historia de la Transición 1975-1986*, Madrid: Alianza, and A. Soto, 1998, *La transición a la Democracia*, Madrid: Alianza.

catalyst of the transformation of the Basque conflict, precisely because it has successfully transformed the perceptions held about one or the other party of the conflict. 'Peace' therefore, in the Basque context, should signify not only the absence of violence, or threats of violence, from both sides of the conflict, but also the right to pursue self-determination through the political and constitutional means available to both parties.

Conclusion

The analysis of the literature on conflict resolution provided for an understanding of what processes and mechanisms are in the disposal of political figures that are the protagonists in a conflict. The end of the Cold War facilitated the spread of liberal ideas concerning the generation, emergence and protractability of conflicts, and highlighted their complex nature. The significance of the cultural context of the conflict contributed to the improvement of the understanding of different conflicts and at the same time equipped the mediators and negotiators with the necessary tools to address the relevant grievances. Furthermore, the development of the human needs framework has provided another starting point in the understanding of conflict in general. If the human needs thesis is false, if it is human aggression that is the problem, then there must be reliance on coercive means of social control to avoid conflict. As Burton claims, it is only if needs satisfaction is the problem that conflict resolution can be justified as a process.[101]

Yet, in the Basque case, the attitude of the state was precisely a reliance on its security forces and little more than that. There was never a 'peace process' initiated in the conflict,[102] and several talks occasioned between the central government and the terrorist organisation were constantly undermined by both sides, either with false promises or because they were a strategic move by either player in the greater conflict. Furthermore, as it will be explained in the following sections, the ambivalence of the regional political players with regards to their petty-political plans and contrary to the human need for peace the local society was demanding, has constituted a further obstacle to the transformation of attitudes and conflict in general, despite the often used rhetoric that they are working for the resolution of the conflict.

[101] Burton, 1998, op.cit.
[102] Mees, 2003, op.cit., p. 60.

Basque civil society organised itself through workshops, which were catalytic for the commencement of dialogue between the local societies themselves, considering the dictatorship, as well as the conflict, have left their marks on its capacity to communicate.[103] The relative thriving of non-governmental organisations in the Basque country dealing with the conflict is at once, an expression of the society which has become frustrated with the inability of the key-players to move beyond the management of the conflict, and it is directed to all levels, from the grassroots, to the players to the negotiators/mediators. The most significant observation, however, is the transformation of the conflict itself. In a small country where everyone is relative to someone who was targeted by the conflict (that is, by either of the sides), and where everyone lives with the fear of being the next target, society decided to change its attitude towards the symbolisms that flamed the conflict. Effectively, it accepted that what was taking place in its name was not heroic, and certainly not worthy of the future that they were ready to demand. The reasons to recycle such discourses and persisting beliefs on the local societal values had virtually ceased to exist, and the incremental state of autonomy provided by the democratic regime made the vast majority accept that violence was now an obstacle to the very objective it set to achieve.

In terms of the literature, then, the human needs approach seems to be the most appropriate to explain the Basque case, particularly if one considers that criticisms concerning the imposing of a foreign culture of mediation do not hold. First, because negotiations between the two warring parties in this conflict have already taken place, and second, because it is the attitude of civil society itself that points at a basic and undisputed need. However, while the human needs approach cannot account for the attitude of the vast majority of the local population, it is not very helpful in examining either of the 'spoilers'[104] of the peace: the militant nationalist circles on one hand, and the Spanish government on the other. Moreover, the War on Terror was another destabilising factor in the conflict, which was seen by Aznar's government as the perfect excuse to radicalise its policies vis-à-vis the

[103] Joseba Zulaika, 1995. "The Anthropologist as Terrorist" in Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius Robben (eds.), *Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival*, London; Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, pp. 206-222. See also Fernando Reinares, 2001. *Patriotas de la Muerte: ¿Quiénes Han Militado en ETA y Por Qué?*, Madrid: Taurus, for a collection of interviews with prisoners of ETA.

[104] Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds.), 2006. *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*, New York; Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

nationalist movement and impose a new reality on the conflict.[105] But what is critically missing from the human needs approach and instead identified by the more recent literature on peace and conflict resolution, is that conflict, particularly a prolonged and protracted one, tends to adopt its own structures and discourses, and in the Basque case this is more than evident.[106]

Both the human needs approach and the poststructuralist and critical theories formulated after it help explain not only how the continuous stalemate of the conflict has given rise to the active stand adopted by the local civil society, but also the circumstances and the reasons why violence and terrorism were hailed as the political solution to a political problem. Furthermore, they are significant in uncovering the discourses of the main actors of the conflict, and the patterns they adopted, and the reasons why, throughout the entire time span of the conflict. Ultimately, unless these factors are examined, an explanation of the case in terms of human needs is elliptical. But that shows that post-human needs theoretical frameworks have not necessarily rendered Burton's contribution old or irrelevant. Rather, the Basque case indicates that the two literatures are compatible as well as complementary. In this light, and also taking into account the findings from the theoretical blocks of Nationalism and Terrorism, the following chapter sets out the major hypotheses of this project and establishes the theoretical framework on which this thesis is developed.

[105] Daniele Conversi, 2006. "Why do peace processes collapse? The Basque conflict and the three-spoilers perspective" in Newman and Richmond, 2006, op.cit., pp.173-199.
[106] Gurutz Jáuregui, "Consolidación y crecimiento de ETA (1969 – 1975)", in Antonio Elorza (ed.), 2000, *La Historia de ETA*, Madrid: Temas de Hoy, pp. 253-274, p. 272; William Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, 1990, "On the interpretation of terrorist violence: ETA and the Basque political process", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.32, No.2, p.254; Daniele Conversi, 1996. *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation*, London: Hurst & Co, p. 226 – interview with Juan José Echave.

CHAPTER 5

Framework of Analysis

In this chapter I present a theoretical model of analysis for my case study, which draws on the insights of the academic literature presented in the previous chapters. In those, I have presented the approaches followed by scholars in their attempt to explain the emergence of nationalism and political violence, the different facets of both phenomena, as well as the diverse trajectories they may potentially adopt. Moreover, the previous chapter presented the different techniques of conflict resolution and how, where and if those have made a difference in the lives of individuals that found themselves in the middle of a conflict, or whether they became just another part of the problem. This chapter will present a theoretical framework for the analysis of the Basque case, which represents an advancement on previous theoretical approaches. With the exception of Smith's ethno-symbolic model, it has already been seen that the theories of terrorism and those of conflict resolution are insufficient to explain satisfactorily the persistence of violence manifested in the Basque case. Orthodox theories of terrorism contribute to our understanding of the Basque case only insofar as the violence of Basque insurgency constituted a response to the oppression of the Franco's dictatorial regime. Yet, they fail to provide sufficient insights as to why that violence is still manifested despite the transition to democracy and the incremental provision of autonomy by the central institutions. On the other hand, conflict resolution approaches according to which the grassroots level is too weak to effectively guide conflict resolution initiatives,[1] do not coincide with the research conducted for this thesis, which claims that the local civil society's role in the rejection of violence and any stereotypes or symbolisms connected to it was paramount for the alteration of perceptions with regards to violence's usefulness in achieving a political aim.

[1] John Paul Lederach, 1997. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, p. 51.

The ultimate objective of this thesis is to make use of the more recent findings of conflict resolution scholars that have explained ethno-nationalist violence in a framework of identity clash, combined with the insights that the human needs approach has offered. This was the reason this project begun, yet the research for the root causes of the violence, at least as it manifested in the Basque country and Spain in general, constantly pointed at best to nationalism and at worst to the mere dichotomy 'us vs. them'. Even though the form of violence observed in the conflict has been isolated and is studied on its own, the Basque case showed that the conflict dynamics evolved around problems located in the 'nationalist' sphere.

Therefore, in order to trace possibilities of resolution in such a conflict, one need not concentrate in the type of violence used, but the cause behind such violence. Consequently, one needs to re-examine any relation that exists between nationalism, as an ideological movement of particular origins and with concrete aims, and terrorism, as the former's manifestation and only one element of the former's strategy and tactics, rather than a transformation from means to an end. This hypothesis has more implications for the school of terrorism studies than that of nationalism, in that it does not need to aspire to build a grand and all-inclusive theory. It is also contributing to previous theories of conflict resolution for which the civic society is merely a pawn in the discourses of the conflictive parties, irrespective of whether that conflict has been identified as one based on claims of identity or not. Ultimately, this thesis aims at the understanding of a particular type of violence, as it is generated by another set of beliefs and principles, and how one's understanding of the latter can be substantial for the transformation or elimination of the former. It will do so by addressing the weaknesses of the theories of the three different schools, with regards to the Basque case.

Nationalism

The third chapter has demonstrated the different approaches that were used to explain the nationalist phenomenon and the terminological chaos that was inherited from the totality of those. With the exception of Anthony Smith's 'ethno-symbolic' model, the remaining schools of thought are not as inclusive in their explanations of nationalism in general, as well as the Basque nationalism in particular. Using primordialist theories to explain nationalism, for example, would resemble the

nationalist discourse itself, although, as Jenkins observed,[2] it also represents a widespread view among the public. Nonetheless, national feelings cannot be ineffable because, as we shall see in the following chapter, the Basques came close to shifting their identities and loyalties and, in that, they were aided by Basque intellectuals, like Miguel de Unamuno, who regarded Euskera an obstacle to human progress.[3]

The above example seems to be rather more suited to the instrumentalist theories, where a change of identity may take place if it serves an individual's or a group's interests. In our case study, Basque identity had almost been assimilated into the Spanish culture, with the urban settings (where the elites were predominant) leading the transformation. However, as it has been already explained, these theories lack the necessary historical and ethnographic context, which, in the Basque case, helps highlight the revival of local culture, this time to the detriment of the Spanish one. And on the other hand they cannot account for the persistence of the phenomenon examined in this project: nationalist violence, the fervour with which individuals and groups will invoke their culture in an attempt to justify their use of violence.

Modernist theories of nationalism,[4] on the other hand, seem better equipped than either primordialist or instrumentalist theories of nationalism when it comes to the study of the Basque case. Basque nationalism is certainly a modern phenomenon that emerged in the 19th C, after a wave of industrialisation that brought with it large waves of migration from the rest of Spain. As it will be explained in the following chapter, in its first steps, Basque nationalism rejected industrialisation as the motor behind the elimination of Basque culture and targeted the immigrants for the same reason. As was common with other nationalisms of the time, early Basque nationalism was heavily influenced by the Romantics' discourse. This became evident in its posture towards the immigrants and anything that was related to the rest of Spain. Furthermore, invention and fabrication also took place in the development of Basque nationalism.

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[2] Richard Jenkins, 1996a, "Ethinicity etcetera: social anthropological points of view", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 19, No.4, pp. 807-822. Quote at p. 811.
[3] Ludger Mees, 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 12.
[4] Elie Kedourie, 2000 (4th Ed.), *Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell; Ernest Gellner, 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell; Eric Hobsbawm, 1990. Nations *and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Michael Mann, 1992. "The emergence of modern European nationalism", in John Hall and I. C. Jarvie (eds.), *Transition to Modernity: Essays on Power, Wealth and Belief*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

However, unlike the prescription given by economic theories of nationalism, such as those brought forward by Hechter[5] or Nairn,[6] the Basques were far richer than the rest of Spain and to our days this balance has remained unchanged. Moreover, during the second wave of industrialisation in the Basque country (1950s and 1060s), many of the immigrants adopted, and were assimilated to, the local culture.[7] And while the Romanticist movement might have influenced the manifestation of the phenomenon, it certainly does not suffice to produce a mobilisation of the masses, such that would even entail use of violence. On the other hand, the modernist separation between cultural and civic nationalism poses more problems than it actually solves, mainly because of the connotations it carries. As seen, the ethnic model is regarded as backward and manipulative, often leading to secessions, clashes, wars and therefore being quite horrific as well as costly. On the contrary, the political model is considered more modern, overlooking the cultural heritages and traditions, as it aims to unite a group under true democratic values (equality before the law, basic freedoms, etc) and promote the common objective(s) through political channels that are not so menacing for the regime's existence. However, a culture-founded nationalist group, is perfectly entitled to use its diachritica to differentiate itself from others and, if given the opportunity through the exercise and experience of democratic government, it can mature enough and communicate its grievances and pursue its objectives in a way that not only is consistent and compatible with democratic means but also capable of enhancing democratic procedures because, in a sense, the above is what democracy itself presupposes. This is clearly the case in the Basque country. Since 1979, when the autonomous Constitution was adopted, the region's levels of autonomy have been rising and the same also holds true for the movements against the use of violence. These two characteristics seem paradoxical when looked upon from the point of view of 'modernism vs. backwardness'.

As stressed in the earlier chapters, Anthony Smith's ethno-symbolist paradigm[8] is the one that encompasses most elements from theories developed to explain nationalism. Smith's focus on the symbolic nature of cultural interactions that, in pre-modern times, were the ones that helped differentiate socio-ethnic groups,

[5] Michael Hechter, 1975. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development*, London: Routledge. See also Michael Hechter and Margaret Levi, 1979. "The Comparative Analysis of Ethnoregional Movements", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 260-274.
[6] Tom Nairn, 1977. *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*, London: NLB.
[7] Daniele Conversi, 1997.*The Basques, the Catalans and Spain*, London: Hurst & Co., pp. 206-207.
[8] Anthony D. Smith, 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*, London; N.Y.: Routledge

departs fundamentally from the pre-existing modernist approach, and sheds more light on the ineffable feelings the primordialists had put forward as a case. Briefly, Smith accepts nationalism is a very recent historic phenomenon that, nonetheless, requires an image from the past that will help it move forward. In other words, the common objective that underlines any nationalism's future does not suffice to mobilise the masses, whereas appeals to ancestors, heritage and centuries-old cultural identities are essential in marking out the individual character of an ethnic group. Social memory thus is more powerful and more useful in achieving nationalistic aims. As we shall see in the following historical chapter, the claim is verified in the case of Basque nationalism in both its modern and contemporary phases.

Nonetheless, and despite the fact that there seems to be some kind of verification for the primordialist claims by Smith's theory, the extent or rigidity of the social memory is not the only force behind the development of a nationalist movement. Other factors must be examined as well, most of which have been raised by the majority of theories brought forward so far: the role and nature of the opponent-state (strong and centralist, like the French, or weak and centrifugal like the Spanish), international developments of global repercussions (spread of nationalist ideology, anti-colonisation), the interests of the elites. Nonetheless, Smith's model is the only one that is all encompassing, highlighting those elements common to all nationalisms, yet at the same time allowing room for the particularities of each case to show. It is this theoretical capacity that allows it to be verified in cases of violent nationalisms, like the Basque, and non-violent nationalisms, like the Catalan.

Violent nationalisms almost invariably seem to justify use of violence as a *reaction* to an aggressive *action* perpetrated by an already established state. Republican nationalists in Northern Ireland, for example, have always regarded their militant posture as a reaction to the social and political discrimination against them from the part of the protestant state and elites. Thus, the role of the state also needs to be examined, and in particular the extent to which it impedes the existence and/or fulfilment of the ethnic group(s) in question. Although the above statement seems to be playing in the hands of the nationalists, it would be an error to view the state uncritically, just as it would be an error to equate nationalist extremists to freedom fighters. In the Basque case, the role of the state is highly significant, both in the 19th C proto-nationalist movement and the emergence of ETA in the 1960s. In the first instance, it is the weakness of the Spanish Crown to assimilate the different ethnic

groups into one Spanish nation, thus the centrifugal tendencies. In the latter instance, nationalist violence is seen as a reaction to the oppression imposed by the Francoist regime.

The aforementioned indicates that the only successful way to study nationalism is to do so in a proper context. The conclusions brought forward by many a scholar of the field of nationalism are all valid but they cannot single-handedly explain any and every nationalism. It is possible to encounter a number of different theories evolving through a case study, but when these are specifically tested on a different nationalist movement, may prove to be inadequate. As Smith has observed, the rivalry between the different theories might be more apparent than real, but the comparisons are not easy to be drawn since they all seek to answer different questions.[9] It is for this reason that this project claims that the study of nationalism must be contextual, evolving from the analysis and explanation of a case study and taking into account details that help identify the differentiating processes between similar movements.

One more factor that advocates for the contextualisation of the study of ethno-nationalist movements is the posture of the international community and international law with regards to claims for independence and self-determination. The reasons for this are that, from the point of view of the international law, self-determination of a people is just as sacred as the inviolability of a state's territorial integrity. Since the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* in 1960, the United Nations accepts self-determination as a "legal principle", establishing that "all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development".[10] Equal importance to the principle of self-determination is given by other international bodies like the Organisation for the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which accepts that

> "by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development"[11]

[9] Smith, op.cit, p. 222.
[10] UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 15 December 1960; see also, UN General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966.
[11] Principle VIII (2) of the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975.

The anomalies of the international system of states and International Law become evident, however, in UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. Under its principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, it is stated that "[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people". Nonetheless, this generalization of the right to self-determination, understood in the Resolutions to mean the right of a people to found a State because it was designed as a response to the anti-colonial rather than ethno-political movements[12], would have a profoundly destabilizing effect, which is obviously inconceivable for an international community comprised first and foremost of sovereign States. Thus, in the same resolution of 24 October 1970 it is clarified that the modes of attaining self-determination described above do not "authoris[e] or encourag[e] any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity and unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". As described previously, the caution not to equate the right to self-determination with a right to secession is based not only in practical problems that would arise (indefinite divisibility, unviable states), but also on normative aspects (minorities entrapped within the seceding groups, as is the case with the remaining Serb population in Kosovo).[13]

Even though self-determination became a principle during a particular context, in the post-Cold War era, where most colonies have already achieved independence and even though some ethno-political movements still present their case as one of 'colonisation', as is the case for example with the Basques, the ambiguities surrounding both principles of self-determination and territorial integrity have yet to prove worthy of inciting a common stand on behalf of the UN and the rest of the international community. Richmond has explained this paradox by analysing the international system in three levels[14]: that of the civic society, where notions of justice, humanitarianism and independence are eminent; the state level, where

[12] Pakistan's independence from the UK in 1947, for this purpose, is of a different context from the secession of Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) in 1971.
[13] Lee C. Buchheit, 1996 [1978]. *Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press pp. 20-30. See also Alexis Heraclides, 1991. *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics*, London: Cass, p. 28.
[14] Oliver Richmond, 2002. *Maintaining Order, Making Peace*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave.

traditional realist theories of power and sovereignty lie and; the international level, which increasingly adopts the same notions and values as those engulfed in the first level. The paradox seems to stem from the third level where the input of the international civic society and the formulation of the states' policy concerning their security meet. It has already been seen that in international humanitarian crises and/or instances where the international stability and security are endangered, as for example with Kosovo, public opinion in conjunction with humanitarian NGOs and pressure groups have achieved the intervention of the international community and hence the disruption of the principle of inviolability. It seems that the international society is more likely to adopt this stand when the aggrieved group in question has minimal chances and modes of defence, whereas in cases like the Kurdish movement or even the Basques, where terrorism has been employed as a method to achieve self-determination, the international community is far more hesitant. Other commentators stress that even if "self-determination is not an *authorization* of secession by minorities, there is nothing in international law that *prohibits* secession or the formation of new states".[15]

This point is quite important when analysing the case of Basque nationalism and self-determination. Since Spain is a liberal democratic state and, as such, upholds all democratic values set forth and defended by International Organisations, it will be extremely difficult for the Basques to earn the international community's sympathy and aegis by pointing to their 'unbearable' situation due to their gross violation of human rights from the part of the Central Spanish State. While no one claims that the Spanish authorities perform their tasks in an angelic way, it is certainly not the case that there is a humanitarian crisis in the Basque Country, or that the losses suffered can be equated to that of the Palestinians or the ethnic wars in the Balkans. However, it seems appropriate to speculate that if the UN's, and indeed every international organisation's, objective is stability and promotion of peace, secession can indeed be acquired through entirely civilised and democratic means and institutions, such as those provided by a liberal democratic state like Spain. Since there is no international law impeding secession, and as long as the 'divorce' is by mutual consent, as was the case with the 'Velvet Revolution' in Czechoslovakia, then the result stands high chances of being accepted by the international community and a new status quo

[15] Rosalyn Higgins, 1994. *Problems and Process: International Law and How we Use It*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 125; emphasis in the original.

established and recognised. With that in mind, the formulation of the first hypothesis can be brought forward: If Basque nationalism's objective is more self-determination, the Basques will pursue that goal, primarily with the political means available to them through the existing democratic institutions. That is, through the election of parties favouring further autonomy or independence, or through a plebiscite, if that is granted to them by the central state. In the case where the majority of the Basques perceive their political status as well as cultural heritage (identity, language, customs) to be threatened by actions of the central government, political violence will be seen as a justified measure of self-defence and will be included in their means to attain more self-determination.

The implications of this hypothesis are multiple. Firstly, although it is highly unlikely to see a high-scale war between the Spanish and the Basques, the mere presence of the terrorist organisation ETA, and in particular the circles from which it draws its support, denote the will to justify violence when the situation concerning their objective is unfavourable. On the other hand, while the organisation's activities are condemned by a broad spectrum of the Basque population, which recognise the achievements in the extended degree of autonomy they enjoy are due largely to the democratic procedures and institutions, a large part of that majority considers it natural, when "push comes to shove", to defend their separate identity by defending their country. This, in turn, implies that any nationalism can adopt both violent and non-violent facets, depending on the political environment and the circumstances it generates. Furthermore, it implies that there are no 'good' and 'bad' nationalisms but, rather, all nationalisms can be both at different stages of their evolution.[16] In the Basque case, where a degree of autonomy is already in place and basic freedoms are far from being threatened, the struggle for more self-determination will take place through the already existing political and democratic institutions, local or national. In the Basque country this is evident, on the one hand, by the political activities of the ruling moderate PNV. While it condemns the violence adopted by ETA, the consolidation of further autonomy and independence forms a basic pillar of its political programme. The most recent manifestation of this is the initiative of the *Lehendakari* (Basque Prime Minister) Juan Jose Ibarretxe to bring forward a plan (known as the 'Ibarretxe Plan') that would transform the relationship between the

[16] Peter Alter, 1994. *Nationalism*, London: Arnold, p. 2. See also, Daniele Conversi, 1997, op.cit.

Basque country and the rest of Spain into one of "freely associated States".[17] Abandoning and condemning violence does not mean that the "national" project is impeded and that the central state has secured its integrity (although such analysis should carefully examine the motives of the local leadership behind such 'grand-visions').

On the other hand, the Basque society itself has become increasingly an actor in the conflict with both anti-violence as well as pro-independence demonstrations. In the former camp, there are a number of NGO and citizen initiatives that reject violence and develop strategies and activities that evolve around the promotion of peace in the Basque country and the condemnation of ETA's terrorist actions. However, only Elkarri, possibly the biggest in terms of support and participation, and the most active, attempts to promote peace in parallel with *dialogue* and *agreement*, because it recognises that the core of the conflict is the popular support for independence. Indicative of its two-fold objective and the appeal it finds among the local population are the 251.323 signatures gathered from May 1993 until May 1994 in a campaign calling for "dialogue and agreement through peaceful resolution".[18]

With regards to the pro-independence circles and the defensive reflexes of the Basque society, these were manifested as early as November 2004, when the banned (since 2002) political party Batasuna gathered thousands of supporters in a party rally. Its supporters also made their presence felt with manifestation and protests directed against the government and its initiative to ban the party on the grounds that it maintained links with the organisaiton and for failing to condemn ETA's actions and the loss of life it caused. Finally, the disclosure that between 1983 and 1987 a mysterious 'death squad' group, known as GAL (*Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* – Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups), was claimed to have abducted and killed around twenty-nine ETA activists and sympathisers provoked a massive condemnation throughout the country and strengthened Basque popular support for the movement. The case, known in Spain as *guerra sucia* (dirty war), was tried in the

[17] Basque Government, "Propuesta del Gobierno Vasco para la Convivencia en Euskadi" (Proposal for Coexistence in the Basque Country), http://www.nuevoestatutodeeuskadi.net/docs/comparecencia_lehendakari_20050202_2_cas.pdf, accessed 12/10/2004. The plan, which is in effect an alteration/update of the Basque constitution, was approved by the Basque Parliament on December 30, 2004 but was rejected by the *Cortes*, the Spanish national Assembly in January 2005 because it violates the Spanish constitution, which prohibits unilateral secession.

[18] Elkarri, "What is Elkarri", http://elkarri.org/en/pdf/WhatisElkarri.pdf, accessed 12/10/2006.

late 1990s and has resulted in the imprisonment of six highly positioned ministers, police commanders, local politicians and political parties' figures.[19]

In order to test the hypothesis, the case study will seek to identify not only the nationalist actors (political parties, syndicates, intelligentsia, NGOs, social movements and civic society) but also the role of the central state in the development of Basque nationalism. In other words, I argue that the development of a nationalist movement does not solely depend on its members' drives and objectives or the rigidity and validity of its symbolism, but is susceptible to, hence shaped by, its environment, immediate as well as international. One such instance that has been highlighted in the Basque case is the radicalisation of the anti-nationalist, rather than counter-terrorist, policies adopted by the centre-right government of José Maria Aznar, who, in light of the War on Terror appeared to radicalise further the nationalist sentiment in the Basque country and provoke even the moderate nationalist circles.[20] While the adoption of such policies against Basque nationalism are located in the state level, the international circumstances that provoked it have been accounted for by Conversi for derailing the "powerful, spontaneous and hugely popular movement" of the Basque civil society against the use of nationalist violence.[21]

The definition of nationalism used here is borrowed from Smith's work and denotes "an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential nation".[22] Smith argues that the definition of the "nation" should not depart fundamentally from that of nationalism and should be based on its etymology, according to which, nation should be defined as "a group of human beings, possessing common and distinctive elements of culture, a unified economic system, citizenship rights for all members, a sentiment of solidarity arising out of common experiences, and occupying a common terrirtory".[23] However, the infusion of the notion of the state ("a unifying economic system,

[19] http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a4/guerrasucia.html, last accessed 25/11/2001.
[20] Daniele Conversi, 2006. "Why do peace processes collapse? The Basque conflict and the three-spoilers perspective" in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds.), *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*, New York; Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp.173-199. See also, Ludger Mees, 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 115 for an analysis of the official state discourse vis-à-vis ETA in the late 1990s.
[21] Conversi, 2006, op.cit., p. 195.
[22] Anthony Smith, 1983. *Theories of Nationalism*, 2nd ed., London: Duckworth, p. 171.
[23] Ibid., p. 18.

common citizenship) into that of the nation often leads to complex definitions that do not necessarily reflect reality. For, although it is already known that states are in their majority multi-ethnic or multi-national, the current typology identifies as nations both groups that are stateless as well as ethnic groups that have evolved into a state. In the case of Spain, the matter is further complicated since the Spanish constitution recognises that it is the different 'nationalities' (nacionalidades) in their totality that constitute the Spanish nation. It is necessary to differentiate between a 'nation-state' and a 'nation'. The former will be defined as *the association of the people of one or more ethnic groups, possessing common cultural characteristics, shared experiences and memories, common citizenship rights, and occupying a unified, sovereign territory*. What differentiates a nation-state from a nation is that the latter refers to a human population with shared history, memory and culture, associated with a specific territory and is the constitutive part of a broader nation-state, whether it is the dominant nation in that nation-state or not.

It is evident from the above that the Basque case is an identity-based, as well as identity-driven, conflict. The dynamics and processes behind nationalism ought to be analysed in order to understand the dynamics and processes behind the participation in militant groups of nationalist ideology. What the above discussion on self-determination has revealed is the reason for which nationalist movements adopt violent methods. In general terms, every human holds something that is dear to him/her, and in the contemporary world it seems that the family and the *patria* are the two most common things that people confess they would fight for (although, currently, religion too seems to be gaining ground fast). Prior to the formation of nation- and national-states, the protection of kin in order to ensure survival drove people to protect their families; in the modern world, it is nationalism that drives people to fight for their country because the country is the imagined family and the extended kin of our era.[24] And it is at this point that the so-called 'sovereignty trap' appears. The establishment of a territorially integral State has been set as the best way for an ethnic group to protect and pursue its needs and interests. When an ethnic group suffers oppression, denial and/or violation of human rights because its mere existence is against the interests of the state of which it is part, it is highly likely that

[24] Benedict Anderson, 1991. *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso. Homi Bhabha, 1990. "Dissemination: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation" in Homi Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration*, London; New York: Routledge.

if the necessary means are available, the group will mount a mechanism of defence. Terrorism, as already explained, is the intention of the weak to mount an attack against the mighty. In line with the concept of 'ethno-nationalism', which has been used to describe stateless nationalisms,[25] and considering that the concept of 'terrorism' has been applied indiscriminately to religious, ethno-nationalist and other groups, this thesis, will refer to the Basque violence as *ethno-terrorism* in order to make explicit that the particular use of violence emanates from a greater objective, which is the attainment and formation of an independent and sovereign Basque state.

However, even though conditions of repression and state-terrorism apply to the early phases and justify the emergence of the Basque movement, they do not account for the persistence of the terrorist phenomenon under the democratic regime. Even at the turn of the century, when the centre-right government of Madrid radicalised its policies against the Basques and almost alienated the moderate nationalists as well as the popular anti-violence movement, ethno-terrorist violence is hardly justified when the political and social institutions and structures exist for the promotion of autonomic concessions. Besides the need to fulfil the deed and realise the objective, there are a number of reasons that arm the nationalist hand. One of these is the internal politics of the terrorist organisations or the liberation movement in general. Fractions of the movement can also be the target audience of particular terrorist actions, as was the case with ETA during the period of its continuous splits. Furthermore, great attention should be paid on the balance between the political and the military fractions of the movement. Subordination of the latter to the former extents the possibilities of a political solution to a political problem, as the Good Friday Agreement has shown in Northern Ireland. On the contrary, Batasuna's subordination to the demands and strategies of ETA have taken away its opportunities to initiate a breakthrough in the stalemate. Moreover, the general climate that emerged post September 11, 2001 and the impact the Madrid bombings had on a nation already familiarised with terrorism, are principal factors in the formation and execution of militant nationalist politics. The fact that the leader of Batasuna condemned the attacks of March 11, 2004 is more than interesting. Last but not least the policies of the liberal state must also be examined, particularly when that state has only recently emerged from almost half a century of dictatorial regime. While the persons and the

[25] Ma Shu Yan, 1990. "Ethnonationalism, ethnic nationalism, and mini-nationalism: a comparison of Connor, Smith and Snyder", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 527-541.

faces may change, the structures, especially those burdened with the security of the state, need more time to adjust to the political changes.

All this points to the need for a closer examination of the terrorist branches of nationalist movements. For, even though nationalism is the motor that drives terrorism, in the Basque case at least, terrorism can obtain a momentum of its own and impede, instead of advance, the wishes of the majority. The following section describes how terrorism can be used as a method of nationalist movements to achieve their self-determination and provides the definitions adopted in the analysis and explanation of terrorism.

Terrorism

While there seems to be great discord among the scholars of the terrorism field about substantial and foundational issues regarding the subject, some common characteristics can be drawn. The principal of those is that terrorism carries political connotations. Every terrorist act is politically motivated and can emanate from a state, embedded in its policies, as well as from individuals or groups that seek to delegitimise an already established political economy. It is not synonymous to political violence, but rather a subcategory of it. On the other hand, the etymology of the word underlines one of its main characteristics: the unpredictability of a terrorist attack and the fear it generates are more valuable to the terrorists than the attack itself. The fear is also part of the symbolism that terrorist acts carry, as it immediately differentiates between target audience and target of violence and it is again this symbolism that obscures the asymmetry of the warring parties and makes terrorism resemble war. Furthermore, a terrorist group is often seen as a microcosm, the internal dynamics of which make it harder for its members to abandon it altogether and, thus, perpetuate violence.

A common theme in both the nationalism and terrorism literature was the explanation of the phenomena through the instrumental and the behavioural approach. Individuals, and/or groups, promote nationalism or use terrorism because that is what serves their interests for achieving a particular objective. Similarly, in instrumental terms, those individuals/groups that actively participate in conflict will cease their activities if they feel that a specific conflict resolution does not harm their interests. Indeed, as we have seen, some parties may use conflict resolution attempts in order to promote further their interest in conflict (see Richmond 1998). On the other hand,

behavioural approaches have insisted that the nature of nationalist and/or terrorist organisations is such that cannot be fully accounted for by instrumental explanations. Such organisations are usually comprised of large numbers of individuals with diverse experience, motives and mentality. Hence, claiming that all members of a terrorist group share the same interest in all of the organisation's activities and manifestations could be mistaken. Behavioural approaches bring forward the idea that every individual has its own motives and expectations from his membership in nationalist and/or terrorist movements.

Recent analyses on terrorist organisations stress that a combination of both approaches offers more potential for structurally sound explanations on the phenomenon. Irvin, for example, combined the two approaches in her examination of ETA in Spain and PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army) in N. Ireland.[26] Her findings suggest that the strategies adopted by militant nationalist movements are the result of endless debates between the different subcategories of the movements' activists. While the movement as a whole has a broadly defined and commonly agreed desired objective, for instance independence, not all members agree on a single strategy that will materialise said objective. A minimum standard of agreement between the sub-coalitions of a movement is required if such a movement is to be successful in the pursuit of its interests. Alternatively, the discords and disagreements between the subgroups will lead to the dissatisfaction of members, which in turn may provoke a split in the ranks or, simply, the degeneration of the movement itself.

Splits in the ranks of ETA have taken place in numerous occasions since its emergence. ETA's persistence in the use of violence is largely attributed to those splits, with, on the one hand, moderates advocating the cessation, or at least limitation of the use of violence, particularly after 1981 when the Socialist Party PSOE won the elections (an indication that the country had surpassed the danger of the political right), and, on the other, the hardcore extremists who saw in violence the only potential to bring forward the cause. Every time, the story ended with the latter subgroup taking full control of the organisation. Nonetheless, it has been pointed out[27] that the debates and the type of strategy ultimately adopted by a movement depend largely on its capacity to mobilise the necessary resources (from popular

[26] Cynthia Irvin, 1999. *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country*, London; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
[27] Paul Wilkinson, 2001. *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, Portland; London: Frank Cass, pp. 16-17; Irvin, 1999, op.cit, p. 38-39.

support to access to warfare material); on the ability of its leadership to sustain a flow in the ranks and repel competition from other ethnonationalist organisations; and finally, on the nature of the state the terrorists attack and its policies towards their organisation as well as their cause.

What the above shows is that, while most of the assumptions that have been made about terrorism are true, they all do possess a weakness: they attempt to build a separate school of thought, one that focuses very narrowly on what we call 'terrorism' (even though we have no agreement about what it is), but forgetting at the same time that object of their study is not a stand-alone practice and certainly not disconnected from other phenomena like nationalism or religion that put it to use. While I accept the different classifications and typologies of terrorism, I focus on ethno-nationalist political violence, with terrorism being only one of its manifestations. It defines terrorism as *the incitement of, or threat to incite, terror by killing innocents in an attempt to maximise gains in a conflicting political relationship*. This definition describes both types of state-terrorism as well as anti-state terrorism, since terror is inherent in both scenarios, and points to the nature of terrorism as a method. The thesis regards terrorism as *one* method of conducting ethno-nationalist conflicts; a method to incite the kind of violence encountered in war, with all the symbolism that war carries, but lacking the appropriate means to reach the scale. By symbolism of war, I mean that, if war is the ultimate solution and the cause is deemed as significant, men will go on and fight. Indeed, if I may paraphrase Clausewitz, terrorism is politics by other means. It might be war on the cheap, as classic terrorism theory informs, but that does not move away the intention, which in turn is promoted by a greater cause. Besides, terrorism is terrorism because it feeds on political and social stability. The greater the stability, the bigger the impact a terrorist attack will provoke. In other words, terrorism in war is not as useful since the horror of war is already too great to let the horrors of terrorism exceed it. Moreover, terrorism also makes use of and projects the symbols that emanate from the greater cause it claims to be fighting for, be it the proletariat, the nationalist, or the fundamentalist. Rather than just make use of a standardised language, common to all terrorist organisations of all sorts of causes, each one employs discourses that emanate from the cause the terrorist organisation has set out to protect and promote. It is hard to explain how some authors dismiss

such discourses as "fantastical",[28] especially when these are formed against a liberal democracy. Instead, one should keep in mind the conclusions brought forward by Crenshaw, that terrorism cannot be fully understood, nor explained, when detached from its historical, social, economic and political background.[29]

One argument why terrorism is a method put in the service of higher ideologies is that there are so many variations of it, ranging from political assassinations to mass terrorism. The choice of violence depends not only on the internal dynamics of the terrorist group but also on the general environment this group finds itself, namely the objectives and support of the broader ideological movement, the nature of the state, the group's capacity to mobilise, and so on. Furthermore, some groups use warnings or try to provoke not as big a damage because the creation of fear works better than when threats are materialised. Again, it would be impossible to explain a particular choice by focusing solely on the group. Even in instances of state terrorism, it is self-evident that terrorism is a method to preserve power, order, to dilute any attempts of delegitimisation, and so forth. The fact that terrorism can be encountered in several levels, for example local, state and international, strengthens the view that it is used as a means to achieve higher ends.

Some will be quick to refute the argument by claiming that it equates to terrorist propaganda. However, if terrorism were a one-way option for nationalists, every single nationalist would be automatically filling the ranks of the terrorist organisations. Yet, there are people who have opted not to use violence when promoting their political interests, and furthermore, people who were once members of terrorist organisations but have since renounced violence, even former terrorists that are now accepted and legitimate politicians. To do that, it means that one is of the opinion that under specific circumstances violence is necessary. That type of justification is what needs to be examined.

A widespread view on this matter is that in instances where the state uses and directs terror towards its citizens, the violence used by them is seen as a legitimate means of defence. However, in liberal democracies terrorists have been branded as

[28] Paul Gilbert, 1994. *Terrorism, Security and Nationality: An Introductory Study in Applied Political Philosophy*, London; New York: Routledge, p. 5.
[29] Martha Crenshaw, 1995. *Terrorism in Context*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

"petty minorities"[30] and criminals, as is the preferred term for the authorities. Yet, one must not uncritically accept the role of the state, even if that state is a liberal democracy. Because, even though they brand them as criminals, liberal democratic states do adopt a different and harsher attitude towards terrorists than towards mere criminals, indicating perhaps with their behaviour that these criminals are somewhat more dangerous for the state than any other criminal. Here is where Crenshaw's claim about terrorism's agenda-setting function[31] is important: if ethno-nationalist terrorism is political and it is taking place in a liberal democracy, not only is it not criminal, but it also manifests a grievance that has most certainly been overlooked. And the fact that it takes place in a liberal democracy should not necessarily qualify it either as criminal or irrational, or even "fantastical". Instead, one should question the nature and behaviour of that liberal democratic setting towards the satisfaction of the demands of the aggrieved group.

If we accept that terrorism is a method, then it is evident that one must ask how did this method become established/agreed? In the case of Spain, terrorism first developed as an answer to the oppression of the dictatorial regime. But, with the establishment of democracy, it has not been eliminated, albeit it has certainly been limited in the last few years. But for that explanation to emerge, one must not only look at the structure and organisation of the group. It is certain that the numerous splits and long discords in the circles of ETA provide a partial answer as to why violence still persists.

Nonetheless, it would be wise to examine the nature and behaviour of the state the terrorist claims to oppose. In the case of Spain, as it has been referred to in earlier chapters, there are plenty of examples of state-terrorism and a bleak period in Spanish counter-terrorist operations that became known as "the dirty war". However, such practices not only have been abandoned but the perpetrators of the crimes were tried and convicted. Yet Basque ethno-nationalist terrorism is still there, refusing to abandon weapons, mentalities and attitudes. Maybe, then, one should ask what has the state done in terms of not merely terrorism but ethno-nationalist terrorism. That is, try

[30] Paul Wilkinson, 1990. "Some observations on the relationship between terrorism and freedom" in Martin Warner and Roger Crisp (eds.), *Terrorism, Protest and Power*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp 44-53. Quote at p. 48.
[31] Martha Crenshaw, 1990. "The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behaviour as a product of strategic choice", in Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-24. Quote at p. 17.

and analyse the greater cause the terrorists project and intervene in the process where a nationalist is transformed into an extremist and decides it is time to pick up the gun. Unless the deeper roots of the problem are analysed and unless the state refrains from re-evaluating its superficial anti-terrorist policies, either the liberal state will cross the line of authoritarianism, as terrorism theory informs, or it risks the possibility that terrorism is here to stay.

So far, the Spanish State recognises violence and terrorism as the only dimension to the Basque problem. The political demands of the Basques for self-determination and their political and institutional efforts to promote change are not viewed positively by Madrid. The recent successes of the security agencies and the international co-operation have certainly dealt some blows to the organisational ability of ETA but have not succeeded in cutting out the umbilical chord that feeds its ranks. There seems to be no educational initiative that addresses ways in which to transform political conflict into constructive dialogue. Indeed the only two measures the central State relies on are the regulation of the granted autonomy – which serves as an appeasement for the nationalists – and police and intelligence efficacy – which in effect act as the main deterrent for wanna-be terrorists. From the nationalist point of view, the former is more like a treat since it stops short of the grand objective and is always dependent on the state, thus there is great imbalance when it comes to expressing demands and having them satisfied. On the other hand, police and intelligence operations may result in errors, while imprisonment policies like the ones currently in force in Spain (where the convicted terrorists are transferred in prisons all over Spain, thus impeding contacts with their families) achieve everything but the State's plan to reassure the members of the minority that their needs and interests can be looked and dealt with. Indeed, in such instances, these policies have the adverse effect of what they set out to achieve and it is the state that is accused as an instigator of terror. It seems that the most important deterrent in the use of violence comes from the public itself: everyone in the Basque Country knows of or is related to a victim of terrorism. And what is more, the social movement would not have been so strong if the need for peace was not there.

Conflict Resolution

The above helps bring forward the third hypothesis of this project: if terrorism in liberal democratic states is there to stay, those states have a limited gamut of

counter-measures at their disposal, particularly due to the openness of their societies. A successful strategy would be, on the one hand, to employ counter terrorist methods directed towards the particular individuals and organisations that propagate the spread of political violence; and on the other, to adopt measures that facilitate the communication, and to a certain extent the alleviation, of the group's grievances through the political and democratic institutions.

A liberal state's mission in the fight against militant ethnonationalism is threefold. First, it must protect its citizens and those under threat by terrorist organisations. This implies that counter-terrorist measures and operations must be very precise in their targeting, and not to be extended to large masses of the population. In Spain, this has been recently achieved by a reformulation of strategy in conducting security and intelligence on Basque terrorism that would avoid the failures and the extremisms of the GAL plan. Aided also by close collaboration with foreign agencies, the result was the detainment of several high-ranked ETA members, whose absence became evident in the organisation's strategic capability. Second, the state must prove itself to be a truly open and democratic state not only by welcoming communication of grievances and injustices, but also by rectifying them where they exist. This is clearly more of a conflict resolution, rather than counter-terrorist, approach and the Statute of Autonomies (that divides Spain in autonomous regions) was the first step, from the central authority's side, for repairing the wrongs. The fact that the Basques (along with the Catalans) enjoy a greater deal of autonomy than other states within Spain, shows both the persistence and focus of Basque politics as well as the commitment of the central state to policies of appeasement. The third pillar of a liberal state's fight against militant ethnonationalism should be the provision of assurances that the political institutions are more beneficial to the social group itself, and its relationship with the central authority, than the systematic use of violence. As it was mentioned earlier, terrorists have turned politicians.

The problem that should be of concern, however, is those people that have still to renounce violence. We have seen that a decline of a movement depends on its degeneration, the loss of support from its broader movement, as well as the effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures and policies. However, when the problem is seen as not the manifestation of violence but rather as the broader movement that creates spaces and allows for violent subgroups to emerge from its ranks, then violence cannot be dealt with effective policing and intelligence only. The state

should not look how to arrest and imprison those who use violence and those who support them, but also provide proofs and guarantees to the whole movement that their goals stand a better chance of being materialised without violence. Nonetheless, as it will be shown in the chapters that deal with the case study, in Spain this role seems to have been undertaken by the civic movement, particularly that of the Basque country, whereas the state seems to have been limited to effective, yet at the same time inadequate, policing.

How does all this help us bring forward a framework for analysis of the Basque conflict in order to better understand why is it that terrorism persists despite the existence of the most favourable of conditions for the resolution, or even transformation, of this conflict? Earlier, it was explained how nationalism can be transformed into terrorism, that is, how violence can become part of the nationalist agenda. In a schematic way, and where **N** denotes Nationalism and **T** denotes Terrorism, this can be explained as



Figure 1

As explained earlier, the problem of comprehension does not lie in the fact that people find refuge in violence when it comes to protecting their ethnic group and everything that comes associated with it (primarily identity, but also language, culture, customs, etc.); rather, the question is why do they still opt for violence when democratic institutions are there and can be used for the acquisition of the same objective. At this point however, it must be noted that the functionality as well as the operability of said institutions might be perceived to be insufficient to democratically promote the demands of the minority. In the Basque case for instance, shortly after the transition, both the extremists as well as the moderate nationalist circles, including the PNV,[32] rejected the central government's concessions for autonomy because they perceived it to be simply another way in which the Spanish state would continue to violate the rights of the Basques.[33]

[32] PNV Communiqué of 19 November 1978, quoted in Ludger Mees, 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 38
[33] Conversi, 1997, op.cit, pp. 148-149. Mees, 2003, op.cit., p.34; See also Robert Clark, 1979. *The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond*, Reno: University of Nevada Press; Paul Preston, 1986. *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain*, London: Methuen

The central authorities have accepted the nationalist dimension of the problem, but only insofar as autonomy is concerned; for them, the problem has already been solved. Therefore violence, which is what hurts the state both in terms of functionality (for example, a weakness to protect its citizens), as well as in terms of prestige/legitimisation, is criminal. What this points to is, as explained repeatedly throughout the text, that the central state has *efficiently* intervened in the process where nationalism is transformed into terrorism, but has failed to do so *successfully* precisely because it has failed to identify the ideology that gives rise to nationalist violence.



Figure 2

The state's role in this schema is highlighted by its counter-terrorist (**c-t**) policies and strategies. Yet, police and intelligence efficiency are not conflict resolution-oriented approaches (**CR**). That would involve not only tactics that aim to eliminate violence but also educational and communicative approaches like workshops in every socio-political level (grassroots, informal political, formal political), institution building that reflects the remedy of grievances of the particular minority rather than an enforcement or imposition of a solution, and negotiations between political parties as well as between administrations. If then, the root cause (**RC**) of a terrorist conflict is identified correctly by the conflict resolution approaches, then, not only is there a possibility to stop nationalism from adopting terrorism but also to enhance the civic and democratic elements within that nationalist movement.



Figure 3

Up to a certain extent, this has already taken place in the Basque Country, primarily because of the local NGOs and the will of the people to see an end to violence. In Burton's terms, while a separate identity, and perhaps independence, is certainly a need for the vast majority of the Basque citizens, peace is just as important a *human need* to them. The difference, as shown by the peace movement in the Basque country, lies in the prioritisation between the two: for the majority, peace comes before the nationalist objective. Peace, as the local movement has shown, is not simply the absence of violence of the extreme nationalist circles, but also the absence of violence and provocation from the part of the central authorities who want to impose their realities on the local population. The state, in parallel with the local peace movement, should target those individuals or groups that seem to invert that prioritisation and place violence above peace.

This hypothesis has strong implications about the theoretical aspects of conflict resolution theory and is, again, closely linked with Burton's writings on provention: By identifying the mechanisms with which the process from 'moderate' to 'militant' nationalist takes place, one automatically knows of ways and instances in which to intervene and change such processes. And, in order to identify those mechanisms correctly, one must be certain that it is the original root of the conflict (**RC**) that is accounted for. Certainly, the violence encountered in the Basque Country emanates from a nationalist cause. Yet, nationalism itself and in its totality is not the root of this conflict. Rather, it is those sectors of ideology that include violence in their nationalistic aspirations. Provention, hence, would include the development of systems and processes that are conducive to a form of civic nationalism (for example, through education and enhancement of social values engulfing peace; simultaneously, through strong political will to part with violent structures) that does not give up its objective or ideology but also unreservedly rejects any form of violence that seeks to accompany the nationalist drive. At the same time, the state should guarantee to the nationalist group that the necessary political and institutional framework will be granted in order for that group to safeguard its interests and diversity. It is only by orchestrating a combined effort of all actors – the local population, since it is they who are primarily concerned with and affected by any political decision regarding their status quo; the local political forces, since it is they who have access to the central state's structure and institutional means; and the state itself since it has the monopoly of violence and, most importantly, sovereignty – that a transformation of

the conflict can occur. Considered as such, terrorism is eliminated from the equation as a concept, and therefore as practice or even tautology, of nationalist ideology.



Figure 4

The major drawback of the argument depicted in fig. 4 is that it depends heavily on an ideal political climate of consociationalism. A general climate where both parties must accept that being together is proved more fruitful than being apart, even though they are different. I consider this to be a serious theoretical flaw because it has its foundation on a limited, undefined and, maybe, unpredictable moment of time. It is also unaided by the fact that it fails to recognise there is scope for the manipulation of the scenery by the promotion of personal or partisan agendas.[34] However, the examples of Quebec[35] and Catalonia[36] have proven that constitutional nationalism can bring greater results when it comes to the protection of the nation and the promotion of different identity. While that very moment in which all conditions are favourable for the transformation of the conflict is unpredictable, both the Quebec and the Catalan case (hopes are constantly on the rise for Northern Ireland) prove that without this moment there is no foundation which will allow, through time, the necessary alteration of socio-political behaviours and mentalities to take place. Systems take time to evolve and, taking into consideration the particularities of each individual case, the development of such a strategy is just as unpredictable.

[34] Oliver Richmond, 1998. "Devious objectives and the Disputants' View of International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 707-722; Michel Wieviorka, 1993 (trans. by David White), *The Making of Terrorism*, Chicago : University of Chicago Press; Irvin, 1999, op.cit., pp. 38-39; Wilkinson, 2001, op.cit., pp 16-17.
[35] Michael Keating, 2001 (2nd ed.). *Nations Against The State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave, pp. 77-139.
[36] Keating, 2001, op.cit, pp. 141-198; Conversi, 1997, op.cit.

Conclusion

In order to determine whether Basque terrorism is indeed dying out or whether it will continue to lie somewhere on the surface of Spanish politics, only to remind to the Basques, as well as to Madrid, that the problem remains unsolved, a variety of institutions, actors and sets of beliefs need to be analysed and explained. This thesis will seek to identify the institutions that facilitated the transformation of the majority of the population's stance towards ETA, as well as the changes of the central state towards the nationalist movement, particularly since the establishment of democracy. More concretely it will seek to address the changes that these institutions (Spanish political parties, Basque political parties, central legal system, central and local security forces and, incrementally, non-governmental organisations) have undergone, and how and if they have affected popular support for violent tactics. At the same time, the case study will seek to identify the extent to which the general shift of the Basques from a violent to a non-violent strategy can be attributed to a set of beliefs widely shared among the population (whether, for instance, violence is justified in a hostile and violent political environment but not in a democracy), or whether every individual had its own particular motives for abandoning militant activities (ranging from a non-belief to violence, to dissatisfaction with the organisation). In sum, the answer as to how did this transformation in popular support took place, and whether it has indeed been successful, can only be brought forward by an examination of the influence of the central state towards the disaffected social group and vice versa, as well as the interests and motives of both to bring forward and sustain such transformation.

The above lines will certainly prove very useful in the examination of the case study in question in this project, but they also highlight the complexity of ethnonationalist insurgent movements. For a totally accurate picture of the motives of individuals belonging in terrorist organisations, an examination of the desired goal only, and how the lack of it drives people towards a wish, or even will, to wage war, does not suffice. Examination of the drives, the wishes, the needs and experiences of every individual member would be needed for a fuller picture to come forward. And when that is achieved, it will then be necessary to proceed to further analyses of and observations on the social, political and economic environment that surround ethnonationalist movements and the terrorist organisations that spring from them. The

complexity of this framework might serve as an analogy to the difficulty of building an effective approach to the understanding and explanation of nationalist violence in this study, without giving prominence to either the nationalist or the centralist discourses and, most importantly, without being trapped in sketching who is the terrorist and who is the freedom-fighter (even though this dichotomy will never cease to exist).

The three basic tenets of this project, nationalism, terrorism and conflict resolution, are at the core of the Basque question. The first two depict the nature of the problem, while the third, if applied carefully, highlights the possibilities for a solution to that problem. In order to *comprehend* the dynamics and forces behind phenomena such as nationalism and terrorism, one must view and examine each of them separately. However, if one is to fully *explain* and at the same time *understand* the particular peculiarities of the Basque problem, one must build a more complex image consisting of both the nationalist and the terrorist dimensions. Comprehension of nationalist discourses, and how they give rise to politically violent movements, complements the understanding of the dynamics of terrorism. Terrorism and political violence are employed as a method that is supposed to eventually satisfy a nationalist, and not terrorist, desire. For, even though the means might seem to transform into ends, as classical terrorism theory informs, one must not forget that for the few still believing in the power of the gun, their motive continues to be the very same objective they set out achieving in the beginning. Using the nationalist sentiment as a path to explain militant activity and behaviour can, in turn, provide the foundation for past conflict resolution initiatives to be assessed and future ones to be designed. The following chapter aims to highlight the instances whereby Basque nationalist discourse has given rise to, and justified, ethno-terrorist practices, while chapter Seven will explain the ways in which Basque civil society stole the conflict resolution initiative from the two main actors.

CHAPTER 6

Ethno-Terrorism and the Basques

The previous chapter has offered a historical account of the emergence and perseverance of Basque nationalism and the different paths the nationalist movement has followed since its creation. Although accounts of the earlier phase of Basque nationalism, or Aranist period, seem too distant to enable us to understand and explain the dynamics of the contemporary movement and the individuals behind it, it is highly relevant to our examination because it is understood as part of the Basque tradition in general, its people's customs, and national and cultural identity. Despite the transformations in his discourse, Sabino Arana is celebrated in the Basque Country as the father of the nation. The largest and most powerful nationalist party in the country is the one founded by him. Most importantly, and despite the differences in their approach, Arana and ETA were equally fierce in their defence of anything Basque not only vis-à-vis the Spanish, but also against Basques themselves who considered anything Spanish (language, customs, modus vivendi) to be either superior or convenient for their bourgeois interests. Had it not been for Sabino Arana, the literary works read and analysed in the congregations and meetings of groups like Ekin and EGI would have probably been very different, if not solely confined to purely folk material. And this is precisely what links Arana's period with the contemporary matters: it is the nationalistic feeling. It is the sentiment that this group of people called Basques share and which they wish to transform into the foundation of an entity that allows them to govern themselves and hold themselves responsible for their prosperity, their misfortunes, their successes and failures in all spheres of politics.

This chapter's aim is to highlight the nationalist nature of the violence that has engulfed Spain in the last four decades. In doing so, it will provide the reader with the reasons that permitted violence to perpetuate and, unlike orthodox theories of terrorism, it will argue that it is impossible to understand the (Basque) terrorists' motives, strategies and broader militant mentality without making direct references to the nationalist doctrine, which they themselves claim is their most fundamental inspiration. The argument moves along the lines of the broader critique that study of

terrorism as an isolated phenomenon cannot provide us with a sufficient explanation as to why it emerges or why and when can it be as persistent as in the Basque case.

Terrorism in the Basque country has only been used as a method by the Basque radical elements of the nationalist circles, with the objective of achieving something that was not terrorist, namely self-determination and independence. The political behaviour of the Francoist State towards the ethnic elements of the Basque life provided a justification to the Basques, as well as the rest of Spain, that militant action was the only measure capable of dealing a blow to the regime. In fact, as we have seen, during the early years of the conflict and until well into the transition in Spain, independence and self-determination of colonised nations enjoyed the support of the UN. At that moment, the Basque movement was dually legitimised: as a self-determination movement in the eyes of the Basques, and as the only movement capable of mounting a credible resistance to the regime, in the eyes of the Spanish. The latter view, combined with the fact that in its very beginning, ETA only targeted individuals that had direct connections to the regime itself (police and military cadres, judges and members of the government), facilitated the establishment of credibility towards the movement and, consequently, afforded them with high levels of support. Of course, the movement was branded a terrorist one by the Francoist State, and as it was explained in the theoretical section of this thesis, it is mainly the State (any State) that shows no or very little restraint in the use of the term, particularly in circumstances where its legitimacy is disputed and its monopoly of violence is duplicated by a non-mainstream political and violent actor. However, the definition of "terrorism" in this project and the theoretical clarification that terrorism is only one of many manifestations of ethno-nationalist violence, automatically imply the fluidity of objectives and tactics in a nationalist movement. In 1962, the general command of ETA, Zutik, was verifying the above claim by stating that "between Ghandi's non-violence and a civil war there are intermediate methods of struggle".[1]

The causes behind such a change of tactics and objectives are certainly important because they help highlight the links between a movement of self-determination and the utilisation of terrorist violence for the promotion of the movements primary objective. The reaction of the public, however, is equally

[1] *Documentos Y*, vol 2, p. 229. Most of the earlier publications and pamphlets by ETA and its commands are extremely rare. Between 1979 and 1981, the Hordago editorial amassed the vast majority of such publications and published them in 18 volumes, titled *Documentos Y*, and covering the period from 1954 to 1977.

relevant, because it defines the moment in which that transformation began. In the Basque country, the failure of the movement to abandon its violence towards state mechanisms and actors after the regime's fall and during the transition discredited the movement in the eyes of the general public. What is more, during that same period, ETA never sought to assure the general public that its enemies lie solely in the aforementioned categories.[2] Rather, it escalated its violent attacks and broadened its targets to include party members in both sides of the border, making sure that there will be no misunderstanding of its aims or its persistence from the part of those that opposed it. Therefore, with regards to the terminological transition, it would not be far from the truth to claim that it was ETA's actions, which in turn transformed the general public's reaction and view on the movement's efforts (the Spanish as well as that of moderate Basque nationalists who abandoned ETA's ranks with the end of the dictatorship) that equalled Basque nationalism with terrorism. Because, unlike the dictatorship era, when governmental claims of fighting terrorists were discredited in the eyes of the Spanish citizenry, during and after the transition it was that very same public that supported anti-terrorist initiatives and policies from the part of central government.

The description of the political and social circumstances during the transition set the context in which Basque extremism verified its supremacy inside the entire movement and the path it followed thereafter, with a discourse still very much under the light of colonialism despite the alteration in the rules of the game. This is followed by an analysis of the reasons why terrorist tactics obtained such a paramount role in the development of the movement's strategy. The latter part of this chapter will look at the cultural structures that facilitated the consecration and perpetuation of violence. As stressed in earlier chapters, the Basque case is, on the one hand, an identity-based conflict and, on the other, it is a protracted one that has been on the fore for more than forty years. As such, it is worth uncovering circumstances where the violence has become part of the nationalist culture, not only exhibited by terrorist acts but also by those social circles who continue to support ETA, and often provide a fertile ground for its recruitment.[3]

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[2] One may also ask whether it was not only ETA's selection of targets linked to the regime, but also the (mis-) perception of the Spanish public that the regime itself was the only reason for ETA's existence, and that the former's disappearance implied the automatic disappearance of the latter as well.

[3] Daniele Conversi, 2006. "Why do peace processes collapse? The Basque conflict and the three-spoilers perspective" in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds.), *Challenges to Peacebuilding:*

The Transition and the Democracy

The transition to democracy was a generally smooth process and, along with Greece and Portugal, it is recalled as one of the successful models for substituting authoritarianism with democracy.[4] For most Spanish regions, transition equalled the transformation of a dictatorial regime into a parliamentary democracy. As was explained in the historical chapter, the moderate government of Adolfo Suárez had contributed greatly to the smoothness of the change. It established free elections and a bi-cameral parliamentary system, and legalised all trade unions and political parties (including the Communist and the nationalist parties). Shortly after the first free elections of June 1977, the Suárez government responded to the (until then suppressed) nationalist claims of Catalonia and the Basque Country by establishing provisional regional governments and institutions. In Catalonia, the political parties responded to that gesture by abandoning their offensive against the monarchy (which until then was seen as illegitimate) and the state apparatus, which was still manned by Francoist cadres.[5] What is more important, all Catalan political parties present in the Parliament campaigned for the proposed Constitution of 1978.

In contrast, the situation in the Basque Country was more confrontational due to the fact that it was more complex. As Mees describes, democracy for the Basques equalled self-government, and there is no self-government when there is three-dimensional violence:

> "violence used as an instrument of the defenders of the dictatorship – including the anti-ETA terror commandos from the extreme right – against the Basque (nationalist and non-nationalist) opposition, violence as a consequence of the lack of democracy and self-government, and violence as a means of political pressure and intimidation in the hands of the 'armed vanguard' of ETA".[6]

As many other commentators have noted, the transition was perceived in the Basque country as just another way in which the Spanish state would continue to violate

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Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, New York; Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp.173-199. Quote at p. 187.

[4] J. Tussell and A. Soto (eds.), 1995, *Historia de la Transición 1975-1986*, Madrid: Alianza. See also A. Soto, 1998, *La transición a la Democracia*, Madrid: Alianza.

[5] Albert Balcells, 1992. *Historia del nacionalisme català, dels origins al nostre temps*, Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, p. 204

[6] Ludger Mees, 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.34. Author's brackets.

Basque rights and customs.[7] Indeed, the transitional government did not do much to reassure the Basque population of its commitment to the reforms programme. The same police units that operated in the Basque Country during Franco remained unchanged, and their massive presence did not help any political reform efforts to be seen favourably. A police assassination of five workers who were on strike on March 1976, further aggravated the situation and triggered support demonstrations and strikes all over Spain.[8]

On the political front, the situation was the complete opposite of what took place in Catalonia. PNV had declared that reinstatement of the Foral system was the only way the Constitution could be accepted by the Basques, but it had no means of promoting it as a clause in the text, since, due to its small party-size, it was left out of the parliamentary committee responsible for the drafting. And although the "historic rights" (the Fueros) of the Basques were mentioned in the document, the party continued to view reforms as "nothing but a simple act of delegation put into effect by the central power of the state itself".[9] It is in this context that one must view the low turnout of the Basques in the referendum for the Constitution in December 1978 (Table 1).

The sheer number of abstentions has been incorporated as an argument into the nationalist discourse – not only that of the labour & nationalist left (*izquierda abertzale*) but also that of the PNV –, pointing to the fact that a Constitution that has not been voted for by the people can only be imposed. Thus, any notion of autonomy is fake. One must also take into account a second, perhaps more mental and less practical, dimension of imposition: the fact that ETA, as it has been described in previous chapters, grew out of a discourse which was very much based on the decolonisation struggles taking place all over the world, and as such, it viewed violence as its legitimate protection. Although it is very difficult to measure the extent to which it could have been effective – mainly due to the levels of the Basque

Table 1 Referendum on the Spanish Constitution (1978) in the four Basque provinces.[10]

[7] Daniele Conversi, 1997. *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation*, London: Hurst & Co, pp. 148-149. See also Robert Clark, 1979. *The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond*, Reno: University of Nevada Press; Paul Preston, 1986. *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain*, London: Methuen

[8] Mees, 2003, p. 35; Clark 1979, p. 269-271; Preston 1986, p. 82-83.

[9] PNV Communiqué of 19 November 1978, quoted in Mees 2003, p. 38

[10] Figures from different sources differ: according to the Basque Government, the abstention reached 55.4% (Yes = 74.6%; No= 25.4%; Blank & Null= 7.3%) (See http://www9.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/q93Desplegar.jsp). Fusi and Palafox, on the other hand, report a

	Votes	%
Yes	480.175	68,8
No	166.461	23,8
Blank/Null	51.692	7,4
Voters	698.328	100
Abstention	836.048	54,5
Census	1.534.376	--

Source: Euskobarometer, University of the Basque Country, http://www.ehu.es/cpvweb/pags_directas/resultadosFR.html

society in general getting accustomed to violence[11] – deterrence of violent actions by the official cadres of the PNV during the transition period was totally absent. PNV's older generation (those in and close to the leadership circles) showed the same inaction as they did during the dictatorship. ETA was the main protagonist of Basque nationalism and the PNV leadership seemed to consider that violence was justified since it was reactive to the violence experienced by the central institutions – although it was quite aware of the disadvantages this stand would accrue on its relationship with the central government. In fact, the party was entangled in an ambivalent position not only with regards to violence, but also on the political level: whereas it manifested its pragmatism under the circumstances by participating in negotiations for the establishment of the Basque Statute of Autonomy with the government of Madrid, at the same time the party was ascertaining that whatever the degree of autonomy, the end goal is always independence, presenting thus a radicalism usually found in the more extreme circles.[12]

This general climate was to solidify into the main blocs that have characterised the Basque nationalist movement since then: mainstream political actors who wanted a piecemeal but nevertheless steady and stabilised process of autonomy, leading to independence, (PNV, socialist parties like Euskadiko Ezkerra – Basque Left, social

46,7% abstention. See Juan Pablo Fusi and Jordi Palafox, 2003. *España: 1808-1996. El Desafío de la Modernidad*, Madrid: Espasa.

[11] Gurutz Jáuregui, "Consolidación y crecimiento de ETA (1969 – 1975)", in Antonio Elorza (ed.), 2000, *La Historia de ETA*, Madrid: Temas de Hoy, pp. 253-274, p. 261 . This is also what Horowitz describes as "the routinization of terrorism". See Irving Horowitz, "The Routinization of Terrorism and its Unanticipated Consequences" in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), 1983. *Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: the Consequences of Political Violence*, Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, pp. 38-51.

[12] S. de Pablo, L. Mees and J. A. Rodríguez Ranz, 2001. *El Péndulo Patriótico: Historia del Partido Nacionalista Vasco, vol. II: 1936-1979*, Barcelona: Crítica.

democrats like Eusko Alkartasuna) and, on the other hand, radicals and extremists such as the Basque National Liberation Movement (MLNV), headed by ETA and including parties and trade unions of the nationalist ambit (LAB, HB) as well as other organisations not so much related to the nationalist claim but rather more appropriate to the era (feminists, ecologists, youth movements etc)[13]. The clash between the two groups was not confined to the issue of how fake the autonomy is but also on the issue of territoriality. It was unthinkable for the members of the extremist factions to accept any autonomy offers by the Spanish government, so long as it granted Navarra separate autonomy and made no reference to Iparralde (the three Basque provinces in French territory).[14] The moderates were accused of betraying the Basque nation by effectively burying the last chance for its salvation, and the extremists, with ETA at the vanguard, tried to destabilise the transition process by perpetrating more attacks and killing even more people. During the dictatorship, ETA did not cause more than forty fatalities in a year. Between 1978, when the Spanish Constitution was voted, and 1980, when the Basque Constitution was upheld, two hundred and forty seven people died as a direct result of ETA's actions (Table 2).

Table 2: ETA's terrorist attacks since the transition

YEAR	ATTACKS	MORTALITIES	INJURIES
1978	261	67	92
1979	232	80	173
1980	219	100	94
1981	219	33	36
1982	254	39	48
1983	237	40	66
1984	222	33	52
1985	152	37	66
1986	128	40	164
1987	74	50	211
1988	78	19	98
1989	104	19	39
1990	108	25	111
1991	126	45	286
1992	48	26	69
1993	49	14	58
1994	45	13	28
1995	57	15	96
1996	78	5	55

[13] Mees 2003, pp. 42-43. For a discussion on the organisations constituting the MLNV see José Mata, 1993. *El Nacionalismo Vasco Radical: Discurso, Organización y Expresiones*, Bilbao: Universidad del Pais Vasco.
[14] Ibid., p.52.

1997	68	13	21
1998	30	6	4
1999	ETA ceasefire		
2000	47	23	54
2001	45	15	67
2002	24	5	63
2003	21	4	17
TOTAL	**2926**	**766**	**2068**

Source: Colectivo de Víctimas de Terrorismo en el País Vasco (www.covite.org)

The polarisation inside the circles of the nationalist ambit was transfused to the Basque society in general, where the population was divided in two fronts: those in favour of independence at any cost despite the change of regime (independistas), and those who saw the transition as a change in the rules of the game and either favoured a political negotiation towards independence, or even accepted autonomy in a Spanish context (españolistas). Mees' description of the situation is most appropriate for the evolution of the two sides of Basque nationalism, not least because it brings forward the moment of transfusion of the nationalist symbols into the violent strategy:

> "Political violence became consecrated and the celebration of ETA activists, dead, imprisoned or alive, produced a mystical and emotional aureole around the movement, which penetrated even into the smallest rural area and destroyed familiar and friendship ties between those who joined the movement and those who did not".[15]

The idea of violent reaction first emerged in the years after the Second World War, and although it never materialised, it was left as a legacy – almost as if it was part of the Basque tradition, that violent confrontation is what the ancestors would have done – until the mid-1950s when ETA was born out of the fusion between the two youth movements, Ekin and EGI.[16] Even though ETA only started its violent attacks in 1968, the discourse about its usefulness and the potential benefits had started with the publication of Krutwig's *Vasconia*, in 1963. From then on, as it was explained in the previous chapter, ETA built the theoretical model of "action-repression-action"[17] until the convention of its Fifth Assembly (1966-67), when the

[15] Ibid., p.57.
[16] José Maria Garmendia, 2000. "ETA: Nacimiento, desarollo y crisis (1959-1978), in Antonio Elorza (ed.), *La Historia de ETA*, Madrid: Temas de Hoy, pp. 77-168.
[17] See José María Garmendia, 1996, *Historia de ETA*, San Sebastian: Aramburu, p.242, for a report from ETA's Fourth Assembly.

first schism took place between the advocates of mass insurgency and those of a more anti-capitalist focus. The latter would be the first group to abandon the organisation and form anew, which is also what happened to the Trotskiyist faction during the Sixth Assembly (1970), after a failed attempt to convince the militants that the organisation should move closer to the workers' movement and utilise its capacity through their ranks.[18] Both instances verified that the militants' supremacy would guarantee the continuation of violence, although they would not abandon the class-struggle rhetoric, since it was a social issue most felt by the vast immigrant communities in the Basque Country[19] and it maintained the centuries' old traditions of equality and social justice.[20] That moment, according to many commentators, was the last moment of ideological debate inside ETA.[21]

From that moment on, the only debate was how to combine the armed-struggle with the worker's movement. That brought about a new division, between the majority of the organisation's members who wanted a legal political platform but were prepared to couple it with violence in order for their efforts to be successful – ETA politico-militar (pm) –, and those whose focus lay solely with the armed struggle – ETA militar (m).[22] While they both escalated their attacks and caused significantly higher casualties and damages than before, it was the latter that was the more militarily prepared, while the former endured the State's wrath in the form of mass detentions, torture and further oppression in the Basque country. The response of the central security forces led to its demise from as early as 1976, until its complete dissolution and transformation into EE (*Euskadiko Ezkerra* – Basque Left) in 1982.[23] Some of its more extreme elements that avoided arrests joined forces with ETA (m). Once again, the hardcore elements of an entire movement were presented with the opportunity to take complete control of violence, during the transition and for the following thirty years.[24] This branch of the organisation, ETA(m), is the one that still

[18] Gurutz Jáuregui, op. cit., p. 261.
[19] Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p.102
[20] Ibid., p.106
[21] Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 148; Jáuregui, op.cit, p. 260.
[22] Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, 2001. *ETA Contra el Estado: Las Estrategias del Terrorismo*, Barcelona: Tusquets, p. 56. While both subgroups agreed on the usefulness of violence alongside politics, their differences concerned the direction and organisation of violence.
[23] Jáuregui, op. cit., p. 266.
[24] For a detailed account of the internal schisms and debates in ETA, and an excellent analysis on the predominance of the extremist fractions inside the organisation see Cynthia Irvin, 1999. *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

exists to this day, and references in this thesis to ETA will imply the aforementioned group.

Virtually uncontrolled by the exiled members of the PNV, the strength of the organisation grew in terms of sympathy and support, fuelled mainly by the success of its attacks. ETA's first-ever assassination of Melitón Manzanas, a well-known police interrogator and torturer in the Basque Country, the abduction of the German Consul in San Sebastian, which made Franco revoke the death sentences of the sixteen individuals captured and tried in Burgos for Manzanas' death, and the assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco, Franco's top aide and successor, all contributed to the establishment of heroic and powerful images for the organisation. For the Spanish audience, it was because ETA functioned as a vehicle of mobilisation against the regime. The Spanish general public had an opportunity to attach itself to ETA's violent vehicle in order to defy the regime. It is the only way one can explain the state of civil disobedience that grasped the entire country during the Burgos trial[25], and the many strikes that took place, both in Euskadi as well as in the rest of Spain. In the Basque country, on the other hand, it was not just that the organisation was fighting an oppressive regime, but a foreign one at that. Even though ETA's every action would guarantee a state of emergency declared in the Basque Country, "open criticism of ETA was judged as open support for the regime".[26] The international attention and recognition received after the Burgos trial and assassination of Admiral Blanco automatically disqualified the regime's claims of fighting a terrorist organisation and, in a sense, also cleared the path for the successors of General Franco.

ETA maintained the members of the security forces as its primary targets, but from 1986 it made frequent use of car-bombs, which were more indiscriminate than the assassinations and caused many fatalities against civilians. The reasons for this, as explained by several authors,[27] are the activity of the paramilitary group GAL that formed part of the State's anti-terrorist policies, the beginning of collaboration between the French and the Spanish authorities, which put an end to the safe-heavens

[25] Conversi, 1997, op.cit., pp. 100-101.
[26] Marianne Heiberg, "External and internal nationalism: The case of the Spanish Basques" in Raymond Hall (ed.), 1979, *Ethnic Autonomy, Comparative Dynamics*, New York, Pergamon, pp. 180-200.
[27] Florencio Domínguez Irribarren, 1998, De *la Negociación a la Tregua ¿El final de ETA?*, Madrid: Taurus, p.56; Francisco Letamendía, 1994, *Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco y de ETA*, San Sebastian: R & B Ediciones, Vol. 3, p.27; Cuenca, 2001, op.cit., p. 98.

and the amnesty enjoyed by Basque activists, and finally the disarticulation of ETA's leadership during 1985 and 1986. The collaboration between the French and the Spanish administrations proved an invaluable weapon in the fight against ETA, as it is explained in greater detail in the following chapter. During the 1990s, and in a period where all political forces in the Basque Country, with the exception of HB (ETA's political wing), were united against terrorist violence,[28] ETA's reaction was to perceive such actions as a threat not only to itself, but also to the grand plan of national independence. And since the threat was now identified as political, ETA broadened its targets to include members of the Socialist and, in particular, the Conservative party, university professors, journalists and businessmen.

With the arrest and detention of its leadership again in 1992, the result was further escalation of violence, both in terms of number of actions as well as nature of targets, and a rise in the kidnappings and robberies that guaranteed resources to ETA. As Mees points out, that "provoked generalised popular stupefaction" and a feeling that "nobody, except the group's own followers, could exclude the possibility of becoming a target of political violence with complete certainty".[29] Despite the general negative feeling of the same people that the organisation claimed it represented, ETA showed its real aspiration by targeting the then President of the PP (*Partido Popular* – Popular Party), José Maria Aznar and King Juan Carlos in 1995. Both attempts failed, but are indicative of the degree to which ETA was prepared to utilise violence.

In 1997, two of its kidnappings had an important repercussion in the public's perception of and stand against ETA. In the first case, the victim (a prison worker) was held for 532 days and the plan was to starve him to death unless the central authorities agreed to the transfer of Basque prisoners into Basque prisons. The image of a skinny and extremely debilitated young man that emerged from a cellar room brought back memories of Nazi concentration camps and generated great antipathy, even among the organisation's followers.[30] A week after his release, the organisation kidnapped Miguel Ángel Blanco, a young town-councillor belonging to PP, and gave the authorities 48 hours for all ETA prisoners to be moved to Basque prisons. The

[28] The political collaboration was agreed in the Pact of Ajuria Enea, in January 1988. The text can be accessed at http://www.diariodirecto.com/mm/14509.pdf#search=%22pacto%20de%20ajuria%20enea%22, last accessed on 2/8/2006.
[29] Mees, op.cit., p. 73.
[30] Belén Delgado Soto and Antonio José Mencía Gallón, 1998, *Diario de un Secuestro: Ortega Lara, 532 Días en un zulo*, Madrid: Alianza.

small period of time given to the government to complete the task almost made certain the victim's execution. His death provoked massive, multiple and, most importantly, spontaneous demonstrations with the message directed both towards ETA, to put an end to its attacks, as well as "to the policy makers to start working seriously on a solution to the conflict".[31] Despite the unpopular environment they found themselves in, HB officials blamed the central government's inaction and the moderate nationalists' stand for Blanco's execution. The result, as Mees notes, was the identification of the party by the public as nothing more than ETA itself.[32]

Taking into account the building up of the violence and the change in the strategy and selection of targets, that social spontaneity can be interpreted as the final reaction to a feeling that has been growing in parallel with the organisation's attacks.[33] The Spirit of Ermua, as it was to become known and which takes its name from Blanco's township, is a clear verification of the transformation of the organisation from a revolutionary one to a terrorist, since a) democracy has already been established both in Spain and in the Basque Country with its extensive Autonomy, and para-state activities with regards to anti-terrorist policies no longer occurred; b) the selection of targets does not verify the claims of occupation, but, rather the dictatorial style of a petty minority;[34] and c) any activity is condemned by the very people that the terrorists claim to represent. The fact that the arrest of HB's leadership, a few months after Blanco's execution, did not provoke any protests or solidarity manifestations[35] should be indicative of the disapproval of the tactics and the de-legitimisation of violence in the nationalist context.

From that moment on, ETA found itself increasingly isolated. Despite the end of the ceasefire in January 2000, arrests and detentions of key-individuals inside the organisation, and closer co-operation with the French authorities, led to the dismemberment of the leadership once again in 2004 and a new, indefinite ceasefire was declared by ETA in March 2006. So far I have described the social and political circumstances, both in the legal as well as the clandestine ambits, under which violence was first introduced and favoured as a choice. I have also described the effect the lack of political consensus from the part of Basque nationalists had on

[31] Mees, op.cit., pp. 74-75.
[32] Ibid., p. 80.
[33] For a historical categorisation of the public's attitude to ETA see Jáuregui, op.cit., p. 272
[34] Paul Wilkinson, 1990, "Some observation on the relationship between terrorism and freedom" in Martin Warner and Roger Crisp (eds), *Terrorism, Protest and Power*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, p. 48.
[35] Mees, op.cit., p.80.

Spanish and Basque society, and its acceptance and support, respectively, of manifestations of violence. Finally, I have explained the reasons behind the changes in strategy and target selection, and the reverberations they had on the local and national society, the organisation and the nationalist movement in general.

This analysis is fundamental and must be taken into consideration before exploring the reasons why violence became so strong an idea that it divided the entire community over its selection, and over such a large period of time. Furthermore, such analysis explains the reason why violence was still accepted and supported was because the political ambiguities and social uncertainties were not replaced by a much-sought stability by the end of the transition and with the establishment of democracy. It is also helpful in uncovering the links behind nationalism and terrorist violence; the fact that nationalist rhetoric can be dynamic enough to usurp the notion(s) of violence, virtually purify it from negative connotations and present it as a noble gesture, particularly in a strong, cultural context.

The consecration of violence

The majority of commentators recognise three phases in ETA's history. The first, situated roughly between 1968 and 1978, reflects the organisation's attempts to generate a revolutionary mass-movement that would be conducive to independence; the second, between 1978 and 1998, highlights ETA's strategy of engaging into a war of attrition against the Spanish State; the last period, which began with the ceasefire in September 1998, lasts until our days, despite the fact that that ceasefire ended 14 months later and another one was announced by ETA in March 2006.[36] This last period focuses on the nationalist front, with non-nationalist civilians (politicians, journalists, academics) as the main targets and its principal objective is to pressure the Basque moderate nationalist political parties to include ETA and its political branches in the political process, rather than to form alliances with non-nationalist parties.[37]

These categorisations do not only constitute an academic theoretical framework which will contribute to the understanding of the terrorist dimension of an organisation but are the very views of many ex-militants interviewed in a study

[36] Cuenca, 2001; Florencio Domínguez Iribarren, 2000, "El enfrentamiento de ETA con la democracia" in Elorza, op.cit.; for the first two periods see also Pedro Ibarra, 1987. *La Evolución Estratégica de ETA (1963-1987)*, San Sebastian: Griselu; Patxo Unzueta, 1997, *El Terrorismo. ETA y el País Vasco,* Barcelona: Destino.
[37] Cuenca, op.cit., p. 64.

conducted by Reinares.[38] Other wars of independence by colonised nations, notably Algeria,[39] showed them that, at least at that moment, violence was the only way to achieve something, which was unattainable by any other means.[40] That view was strengthened by the fact that the only element present in the relationship of the State towards the Basque nation was violence.[41] The fact that the authoritarian as well as the democratic regime had succumbed to ETA's pressure, the first through numerous occasions and the latter through negotiation rounds and secret talks, showed to them that ETA was the only force that could bring independence closer for the Basques.

> "Support to ETA does not depend as much on the successes or failures, the wise moves or the mistakes of the organisation, but rather it has profound psycho-sociological roots that are connected to elements of personal and political self-superiority. A self-superiority that is projected trough ETA."[42]

There are two things the above quote makes obvious, one of which is the fact that ETA seemed to be acquiring a life of its own, despite – or, precisely because of – the numerous disagreements and schisms. Whether it is the ideological supremacy of the more extreme factions, or whether it is the departure of the organisation's less radical members, ETA's name is always linked to violence. Despite the vacillations between labour and secessionist discourses, Juan José Echave, one of ETA's leaders, admitted that "ETA has never been defined by an ideology (in the strict sense), but by its spirit of struggle".[43] In the same line of spirit, Douglass and Zulaika claim that ETA draws its strength because it is a structure as much as it is a concept, and the constant supremacy of violent fractions is attributed to the nationalist legends that have surrounded ETA itself.[44] The fact that everyone, from academic scholars to people in the street, has referred to and continues to refer to the organisation as ETA, despite its schisms and divisions through the years, verifies its conceptual nature.[45]

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[38] Fernando Reinares, 2001, *Patriotas de la Muerte: ¿Quiénes Han Militado en ETA y Por Qué?*, Madrid: Taurus.
[39] Ibid. p. 90 – interview 37; see also, Mees, op.cit, p.68.
[40] Ibid. p. 91 – interview 35; p. 93 – interview 31.
[41] Ibid. p. 89 – interview 14. see also pp. 126-145.
[42] Jáuregui, op.cit., p. 272
[43] In Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 226.
[44] William Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, 1990, "On the interpretation of terrorist violence: ETA and the Basque political process", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.32, No.2, p.254.
[45] Ibid., p.252.

In a study which provides an analysis into ETA's strategies, Cuenca notes that for ETArras, an independent Euskadi is more important than a socialist Euskadi.[46] His claim is that ETA is a rational actor, precisely because the changes in its strategy always reflect an attempt to balance the power(s) of the enemy, the Central State, but never disturb the centrality of the issue of independence. He also refutes the argument that all violence has taken place for the sake of ETA's survival, even as a concept. To think otherwise, he notes, "would not explain why ETA would adjust its strategies through the years with the clear objective of gaining independence".[47] Besides, the fact that there are factions who have abandoned the organisation and formed new political and non-violent groups shows precisely that the survival of the organisation is not the basic tenet for its members.

Despite the anti-imperialist discourse ETA adopted after the Sixth Assembly, Jáuregui attributes the prevalence of the organisation over the last thirty years to the francoist regime, not so much as the cause of ETA's apparition but rather its condition. As he elaborates, the basic tenet of Basque (extreme) nationalism is that anything Basque is automatically and naturally opposed to anything Spanish.[48] The two cannot be reconciled, for, in such instance, what is Basque is automatically under threat. That, as Jáuregui explains, is the main motor behind the feeling of the Basques being occupied by a foreign country and the Francoist regime served to verify the 'reality' experienced by those Basque nationalist circles.

The second observation with regards to the quote given earlier is very much linked with Jáuregui's analysis and makes evident the Aranist model of exclusivist nationalism: the self-superiority of the Basques against the Spanish that is manifested through ETA's actions. The past (myths, realities, circumstances) never disengages from the present when it comes to Basque nationalist discourse. In fact, what strengthens the argument of this thesis, that in the Basque case it is the nationalist sentiment that fuels the violence, is that the violence of the ETA militants follows the same pattern as the triadic structure of nationalist rhetorics,[49] explained in the theoretical part of this study. The glorious past in the Basque case was so because Euskadi was independent and that was purely because the Basques fought for their

[46] Cuenca, op. cit., p. 48
[47] Ibid., p. 43
[48] Jáuregui, op.cit., p. 267
[49] Matthew Levinger and Paula Fanklin Lytle, 2001, "Myth and Mobilisation: the triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 7, No.2, pp. 175-194.

independence.[50] It is the same principle as the one advocated by Arana; as is the second principle, concerned with the current degeneration of the nation, and the third, with the projection of a future which depends largely on the (pro-active) attitude of its members. The difference between the two discourses is the element and dimension of violence. As Muro explains, in the contemporary version of the movement "the nationalist triad legitimises the use of political violence as it is only the latter that will ultimately restore the nation's original purity".[51]

In the Aranist period, the idea of independence was equally valued by the few proto-nationalists and the sympathisers of ETA, but the circumstances that led violence to become the trident of Basque nationalism differ between the two phases. In the early stages, and despite his racist cronies against the maketos, Arana did not advocate any more violence than the description of the Basques' past as one of fighters and heroes. His primary concern was independence but first he had to awake that lacking national consciousness of the Basque people and, second, separate them from the maketos. Mobilisation for his cause was difficult and his audience was very limited. In ETA's years, however, the circumstances that favoured violence are different. First, the study of the Basque past had now become more extensive and more systematised than when Arana first started working on it. Invariably with other nationalist movements around the world, the historicists' legacy was treated as true existing historical references that proved the Basque's glorious past and served as a measure of comparison with the degenerative present. ETA was born from such a group of students. Second, the anti-colonisation struggles and the admiration they generated among Basque nationalists, in a context where 'colonialism' and 'occupation' would be the only regimes mentioned by Basques in order to describe the situation in Euskadi. But third, and most important, the violence exerted by the authoritarian (and later corrupt, in the case of the GAL) State, and which legitimised the feelings and discourse about anti-colonial efforts, and strengthened the myths that came to surround the entire movement first, and ETA later, once it was evident that it is the strongest and most ruthless actor in the game.

Further ethnographic examination of the transfusion of violence into the nationalist discourse makes discernable certain cultural elements that serve as a link

[50] Diego Muro, 2005, "Nationalism and nostalgia: the case of Basque radical nationalism" *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol.11, No.4, pp. 571-589.
[51] Ibid., p. 586.

between the present and the past both in terms of identity, and also in terms of guidance and action. The word *ekintza* means precisely that (action), and it was used during the first moments of ETA and is used until today to describe any violent actions of the organisation. Its verb form, *Ekin* (to do), was the name of ETA's forerunner and its "founders conceived it as opposed to the static, outdated and passive attitude of the old […] generation".[52] The meaning of action in the Basque life has been attributed to the religious doctrine of living a life strictly dictated by the religious belief,[53] and it has come to represent Basques virtually as a national definition.[54] As in the Aranist discourse, a true Basque is one who fights for Euskadi's liberation[55] and defends the symbols of the nation's cohesion and differentiation.[56]

After four decades of existence, "ETA has acquired its own legends, myths and martyrs" and "each ekintza has the potential of becoming a morality tale with its own heroes and villains".[57] Certainly, this view is shared by many of Reinares' interviewees, who claim that the mysticism and ritualism that surrounded the organisation and, to a certain extent the entire movement, aided their nationalist sentiment and contributed to their decision to become active members.[58] The social prestige, however, that comes with heroic acts is a fallible justification, because, as Cuenca notes, in a society where the notion of national independence is so strong, no-one will be accorded the status of a hero if it is perceived that gaining recognition was the ultimate objective of their actions.[59] And while social prestige and admiration are closely linked with ethno-nationalist conflicts, in the Basque case they seemed to enforce, rather than generate *de novo*, the pre-existing motivations on the issue of violence and its utility.[60]

Even during the nineties, when public support for ETA, principally in the Basque country, began to erode, the justifications for the continuation of violent

[52] Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p.204.
[53] Joseba Zulaika, 1988, *Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament*, Reno: University of Nevada Press.
[54] Teresa del Valle, 1989, "Basque ethnic identity at a time of rapid change" in Richard Herr and John Polt (eds), *Iberian Identity: Essays on the Nature and Identity in Portugal and Spain*, Berkeley: University of California, p.127.
[55] Heiberg, op.cit, p.187.
[56] Ibid., p. 195.
[57] Douglass and Zulaika, 1990, op. cit., p.254.
[58] Reinares, op. cit., pp.112-119. See also interview No. 39, p. 79.
[59] Cuenca, op.cit., p.39.
[60] Reinares, op. cit., p.115. See also pp. 157-158.

actions were found in the treatment of prisoners, which generated in the prisoners themselves, as well as their friends and relatives, a strong feeling of hate for anything Spanish and a sense of revenge.[61] Independence was felt as the only way to channel that revenge and the only cure for the Spanish 'occupation'. In his study, Reinares makes particular reference of the fact that independence comes before everything else for ETA's militants, even before the type of regime a future Euskadi would have.[62] The issue of independence is not just an occasion for ETA, because if it is merely a pretext, then, the very moment that the pretext disappears, ETA will have no reasons to utilise violence.[63] Interestingly at this point, Preston notes that the abandonment of violence was not an easy process for the ex-members of ETA(pm) and that the decision generated "internal division, schisms and a nostalgic longing for armed action"[64], which makes Conversi highlight the violence's role as "a functional unifying imperative"[65], thus verifying theories of moral disconnection, which allow for justification of violent actions in the context of a just war,[66] and/or processes of inversion, whereby the means become the ends.[67]

While discussions of moral disengagement have been brought forward by orthodox terrorism theories in order to justify the ways in which terrorists operate and, ultimately, justify violence in order to utilise it, the fact that violence is abandoned by the very actors who advocated its usefulness, ultimately proves that they ceased to believe in its instrumentality.[68] The continuation of violence as a method to reach the desirable goal, by those who maintained a belief in its utility, stems from the perception that the goal itself is obtainable. ETA is the product of a broader set of myths and it is also the vehicle that generates the perception around the success of achieving the objective. It is the same sentiment that transformed ETA into a symbol and an emblem in the first place, for those circles of Basque nationalism that considered the organisation to be not only the first throughout Spain to have effectively opposed the Forces of General Franco, but also the first to actively defend

[61] Ibid., pp. 138-143.
[62] Ibid., p. 154. Some have even claimed that as long as the decision is made by the Basque nation alone, they would be ready to accept whichever type of regime.
[63] Cuenca, op. cit., p.44.
[64] Preston, op.cit., p. 125
[65] Conversi, 1997, op.cit, p.149
[66] Bandura, 1990, "Mechanisms of moral disengagement" in Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, States of Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 161-191.
[67] Michel Wieviorka, 1988, *Sociétés et Terrorisme*, Paris : Librairie Artheme Fayard.
[68] Cuenca op. cit., pp. 34-35.

Basque interests and promote a solution to the problem of 'occupation', since the establishment of the Second Republic in the 1930s. It is this feeling of 'occupation' and every negative element that it brought forward, and which facilitated the further dichotomisation of identities, that generate such an expression of nationalism that allows violence to continue.

Nevertheless, that does not equal the academic descriptions of individuals being violent simply for the sake of it, or instances where violence substitutes the end goal, because the latter is no longer realistically attainable. The instrumental character of the violence in the Basque case is always present and the higher drive or cause is readily identifiable. The fact that for most observers, as well as members of the communities involved, it is reasonable to assume that under the current liberal institutions on which the Spanish state is founded, and with such a broad political agreement between local and central political parties, the end goal is very unlikely to materialise through the use of violence, it does not necessarily mean that the same image is shared by militants. For, even if their actions are for revenge, or hide other, more complex personal justifications, the desire for an independent or, better put, the discourse of an occupied Euskadi, is always behind their strategies. This argument, along with the existence of a concept of strategy (guerrilla war, war of attrition, avoidance of political exclusion), verify the tenet of this thesis that when one speaks of or studies political violence, one cannot separate the 'political' from the 'violence' and examine the latter irrespectively of the former.

The Radicalisation of Counter-terrorism

Throughout the conflict, there was little effort from the Central authorities to co-ordinate a serious counter-terrorist strategy. What little was done, reflected the attempts of other nations that were faced with terrorism. It was in that context that the GAR (*Grupos Antiterroristas Rurales* – Rural Anti-terrorist Groups) were formed and their primary objective was to guard against a transformation of ETA's urban warfare into a rural guerrilla and the elimination of the possibility that ETA might want to create "liberated zones" where the State would have to fight to regain control of.[69] Furthermore, the speed of the political transition did not equal the reform of the

[69] Florencio Domínguez Iribarren, 2000. "El enfrentamiento de ETA con la democracia" in Antonio Elorza (ed.), *La Historia de ETA*, Madrid: Temas de Hoy, p. 310.

security forces and other civic aspects of the state apparatus.[70] As a result, violation of human rights by these agencies was frequent.

The first systematic attempt to combat terrorism was made in 1981, when the Minister of the Interior – also responsible for the initiation of the re-insertion procedures in 1982 – decided for the creation of a single and centralised system of intelligence exclusively on matters of terrorism (*Mando Único para la lucha Contraterrorista*). It was under this set of initiatives that social reinsertion of the terrorists was allowed and its major effect was the self-dissolution of ETA(pm).[71] Towards the mid-1980s, the collaboration between Spain's Socialists that were in office and their French counterparts deprived ETA of its sanctuary, since France not only stopped granting political refuge to ETA members, but also actively participated in the uncovering of ETA's commandos and high cadres hiding in its territory.[72] Iribarren also claims that the changing in the French posture coincided with a period in which the organisation had visibly stopped growing; the arrests totalled more than the new memberships/insertions.[73] Furthermore, the special status the ETA prisoners enjoyed, that is, isolated from other criminals and grouped together, was reformed in the mid-1980s, and ETA prisoners are now dispersed all over Spain – an issue that is of great importance to their families as well as the nationalist circles who view this policy as a violation of the prisoners' and their families' human rights.

During the 1990s, the civil society throughout Spain, and particularly in the Basque Country, began to actively participate in rallies and protests against ETA's acts, which in 2000 – ETA's deadliest year since 1992 – reached a million participants in Madrid only.[74] ETA's increasing violence contributed to the adoption of that stand by the civil society, and José Maria Aznar's centre-right Partido Popular election in 1996 picked up the social pulse and adopted a quite tough stance against

[70] Fernando Reinares, 1996. "The political conditioning of collective violence: Regime change and insurgent terrorism in Spain", *Research on Democracy and Society*, Vol.3, pp. 297-326.
[71] Fernando Reinares & Oscar Jaime Jimenez, 2000. "Countering Terrorism in a new democracy: the case of Spain, p. 134, in Fernando Reinares (ed.), *European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Co-operation*, Aldershot: Ashgate Dartmouth, pp. 199 - 145.
[72] Ibid.: 135. See also Sagrario Morán, 1997. *ETA entre Francia y España*, Madrid: Editorial Complutense, and Iribarren, 2000, op.cit., p.320. Iribarren claims that prior to the French and Spanish agreement on extraditions, the French government asked from ETA to try and negotiate again with the Spanish State, making it quite clear that if this view was not taken seriously, then it (the French government) would have no other option but to ally with Madrid.
[73] Iribarren, 2000, op.cit., p. 321.
[74] Conversi, 2006, op.cit., p. 183. Mees speaks of a total of 8 million participants in cities throughout Spain. See Mees, 2003, op.cit., pp. 91-100.

terrorism. As Prime Minister Aznar himself declared, appeasement was not a viable solution to the problem of violence,[75] and the police efficacy in arresting Etarras and dismembering the local cells of the organisation proved to him that this was indeed the only viable way. During his first period in office (1996-2000), Aznar's party depended on the collaboration with Basque and Catalan moderate nationalists in order to form a government. Despite that fact, however, his centre-right government did not reconsider the demands of the Basque parties for a re-examination of the penal policies that were in place since the Transition, and which allowed for the dispersion of prisoners throughout Spain.[76]

Inspired by the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland[77] the nationalist parties in the Basque Country agreed to bring forward an agreement – the Pact of Lizarra of September 1998 – which, among others, called for the continuation of negotiation without the exclusion of any of the implicated parties, even though direct mention of ETA was avoided in the document.[78] Furthermore, the agreement defined the Basque conflict as a purely political one, it called for the continuation of agenda-less negotiations for the resolution of the conflict and, more crucially, it recognised the sovereignty of the citizens of the Basque Country.[79] Even though the Pact brought forward the first indefinite and unilateral ceasefire announced by ETA, Conversi argues that the clause on sovereignty gave Aznar's government the excuse it needed in order to criminalise the entire nationalist block in the Basque Country.[80] As Mees states, Aznar's commitment to the cease-fire as well as to a potential process of resolution through the ceasefire was questionable, considering how in 1999, during a round of negotiations with two of ETA's negotiators in Zurich, the Spanish government leaked the names of the mediators with the arrest of one of the two interlocutors as a result.

Aznar's hard-line, non-collaborative stand during his first election in office, as well as the police efficiency and trans-border co-operation with the French agencies, resulted in an increasing membership for the party, even in regions like Guipuzcoa

[75] Aznar, quoted in Mees, 2003, op.cit., p. 116.
[76] Mees, 2003, op.cit., p. 103.
[77] The information that ETA members had met with IRA leaders in Montevideo was first reported by an Argentine daily, *La Nación*, and was reproduced by *El Diario Vasco* on 27 April 1998.
[78] Mees, 2003, op.cit., pp. 139-141.
[79] Ibid., p. 139.
[80] Conversi, 2006, op.cit., p. 182.

that until then had been the most nationalist province in the Basque country.[81] The profitability of the party's discourse that the core problem of the Basque conflict is terrorism rather than nationalism,[82] peaked in 2000, when the party won the elections with an absolute majority. Until then, Aznar based his counter-terrorist policy on a cessation of negotiations, a refusal to give in to blackmail, as his Minister of the Interior confirmed.[83] But the absolute majority with which the PP was elected in office seemed to be the perfect opportunity for Aznar to promote a set of policies that signalled to the Basque nationalist block that, again, terrorism was not the problem for the central State, but rather the will of the local population to differentiate itself culturally. The ban of the political party Batasuna in August 2002, and the closure of Egunkaria, the only Basque newspaper, in 2003 and the arrests of its staff were perceived as an attack to the freedom of speech and verified to the local population (particularly to the moderate nationalists) their fears that originated in the beginning of transition: that the State was against the cultural differentiation of the Basque Country. "The very Francoist roots of [PP] were now laid bare to see and were rediscovered as an argument of popular polemics".[84] The result of these policies were the radicalisation of the nationalist block, not only of the extremist circles but also of the more moderate ones who now felt as threatened as the individuals that utilised violence and as such posed an obstacle to the wishes of the more moderate, more liberal nationalist sectors. This chronography of counter-terrorist context manifests, at the very least, not just the alignment of Aznar's government with orthodox theories of terrorism, where the terrorists must be fought in every possible way in order for the state's liberal structures to survive, but also the failure to prevent complicating the conflict further and, thus, making the stalemate impenetrable.

Conclusion

What the latter part of the 1990s shows us, at least from the part of the public reaction towards ETA's activities, from the dictatorship until into the new century, is that ETA must be seen as a product of Basque nationalism in order to understand how it usurped its myths and symbols and used them, ultimately, against itself and the people it claimed to be part of. Unless this connection is achieved, it will be

[81] *El Diario Vasco*, 24 January 1998.
[82] Spanish Minister of the Interior, Jaime Mayor Oreja, *El País*, 19 December 1997.
[83] *El Diario Vasco*, 5 April 1998
[84] Conversi, 2006, op.cit., p. 185.

impossible to incorporate a framework of conflict transformation, and ultimately resolution, that identifies correctly the roots of ethnoterrorist activity. Far from espousing the terrorists' discourse, this thesis seeks to understand their motivations. As I have shown, the belief in independence was very much the motor behind the violence experienced in Spain and Euskadi, and any attempts to resolve such a conflict must identify and focus in that root cause. That identification should concentrate on both the discourse of the ethno-terrorists as well as the actions and discourse of the State. In the first case, the authoritative nature of the dictatorial regime made evident that the only way the Basques could defend themselves was by achieving self-determination. In other words, break every link and association with a state that manifested *violently* that the Basque Country had no legitimate right to claim its past and difference of culture. Different, that is, from the culture of the central State. This is the very moment that self-determination as an objective is linked to ethno-terrorism, which is the means to achieve the objective. Furthermore, the myths and historicisms of the different culture become the very justification not only of the end-objective but, most crucially, of the means for its attainment.

On the other hand, the State contributed greatly at instilling the feeling of difference and the need for separation in the Basque population, not only during its dictatorial phase, but also later, when democracy was well established. As a result, not only did it not impede the association of violence with the objective of self-determination but it provided further justification for the Basques that, whether in a dictatorship or in a democracy, the Spanish State did not wish to understand and work with the local population in order to remedy its grievances. In other words, both the State and the nationalist movement (with extremist as well as moderate circles) became locked into the paradigm offered by the orthodox terrorism theories that the State was defending its survival by fighting the terrorists, whereas the nationalists were fighting the 'terrorist' State in order to gain their freedom. Under these circumstances, therefore, and despite the numerous meetings and negotiation rounds between the State and ETA, it becomes evident that there is little scope for conflict resolution approaches to have a significant impact in the transformation of the attitude of either side. This is the point where my thesis' argument becomes relevant, because the active involvement of the local civil society manifests that it is the only actor that is ignored by both the State and the organisation and it highlights that ethno-terrorist violence as well as the violence exhibited by the State only manage to reinforce the

dead-end conceptions of the nature of the conflict. The implications for the orthodox theories of terrorism are that dichotomisations of such nature inhibit, rather than contribute, an understanding of the root causes of ethno-nationalist violence. On the other hand, the very attitude of the local civil society also has implications for theories of peace-building and conflict resolution according to which the grassroots level is incapable of initiating an entire process of conflict transformation that can lead to the rejection of violence, first, and the adoption of liberal institutions for the promotion of the end objective, even if that seemingly contravenes the structures of the State and, seemingly again, poses a threat to its survival.

The following chapter will analyse the counter-terrorist methods employed by the Spanish state, both in political as well as security terms, and is based on the fact that such perceptions, if analysed correctly, can be useful in the drawing of a resolution, and perhaps pro-vention,[85] framework that will see the links between the ideology and the selected method collapse. That was certainly the reaction of a large part of the Basque public and its role as a civil society will be of equal importance to the State's practices in bringing forward such a framework.

[85] John Burton, 1990. *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

CHAPTER 7

Conflict Resolution and the Basques: The Human Need for Peace.

The previous chapter has shown how the internal dynamics as well as the external circumstances have favoured the perpetuation of violence. It was also seen how the violence experienced in the Basque country is generated by the perception and/or belief for certain groups of the Basque population that violence is justified by their part, as long as the objective remains to make the central State succumb to the extremists' demands. It is logical to assume that these groups of people consisted not only of the active members of the organisation, but also by a circle of supporters, who provided invaluable help with the logistical aspects of the organisation (funding, hide-outs, etc), even though the general stand of the broader Basque society was incrementally distancing itself from any type of nationalist violence, and at the same time, the efficacy of the security forces, the cross-border collaboration with France, and international circumstances like September 11th and the subsequent War on Terror have verified that the organisation was nowhere near winning the war of attrition and imposing itself and its demands on the central authorities. It was also shown in the previous chapter how that perception was reinforced, in the beginning and until the early 1990s, by the anti-terrorist practices of the State which were conducive to the idea that it is not the terrorists that are sought, but rather an elimination of the Basques.

This chapter will explain the lack of political initiative for the generation of a viable solution to the Basque conflict. It will show how this absence of serious political dialogue that would actively seek to marginalise the terrorist organisation and the social networks on which it finds support, was not the fruit of political deliberation and party negotiations. Rather, the Basque society itself was the main motor behind the anti-violent machine that started emerging in the Basque Country at the end of the 1980s and has gained such momentum that it is now inconceivable to

speak about attempts to resolve the conflict, or even kick-start a political dialogue, without social organisations and civic platforms taking part. More than anything, it was these organisations that showed the parties what the social bases really wanted from them and paved the way to a 'normalisation' of political life in Euskadi. That is, an adherence from the part of the extremists to the liberal institutions established with the Statute of Autonomy for the local community as well as an adherence from the part of the state to its pluralist nature and the cessation of undermining of the very institutions that it conceded to the Basque Country.

The previous chapter offered an analysis of the major characteristics of counter-terrorist policies and strategies as they were deployed by the central state from the end of the transition until the first year of the new century. Such analysis is useful, not only because it highlights the administrative transition from an authoritarian regime to a liberal democracy, but also because it underlines the principal discourse of the state that there is no conflict with the Basques any more but rather with elements of the Basque nationalist movement who are unnecessarily more violent than other individuals of the same ambit.

In order to analyse the resolving tendencies (or lack thereof) of the principal actors in this conflict, this chapter is divided in two parts. The first lists the major ceasefires that the organisation has announced since the end of the transition and explains the reasons and the circumstances that led to their cancellation. The persistence of the organisation until now does raise suspicions as to whether they were indeed ready to lay down their weapons and to what extent these ceasefires were genuine or in fact part of a broader strategy of devious objectives,[1] primarily that of engaging with the state in a war of attrition. This part also details the most critical of the several attempts that were made for a negotiation to take place between the two actors and the reasons that led to their cancellation.

The second part of this chapter looks at the social initiatives that led to the mass mobilisations experienced in Euskadi, the establishment of a strong anti-violence conscience and the repercussions that the new civic movement had on the design of the political discourse and the emergence of political alliances that focused not on electoral gains and discourse supremacy but rather on the end of violence and the promotion of the same objectives with categorical non-violent means. The very

[1] Oliver Richmond, 1998. "Devious objectives and the Disputants' View of International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 707-722.

nature of these movements and their social, as well as political, behaviour is the key to understanding the basic thesis of this project. Non-violent nationalist discourses and political designs can exist in a liberal democracy even when independence and secession are the ultimate objectives. The possibility that no central authority will commit political (and territorial) 'suicide' and allow for such a decision to be made by the minority group that claims to be entitled to such a decision, is almost irrelevant, so long as such decision rests on constitutional means and, evidently, expresses the wishes of a large part of the population affected by such decision.

The question this chapter raises is how can the violent variable be eliminated from the entire nationalist equation, irrespective of the degree of success of the end objective or not. The exploration of the aforementioned factors will lead to an understanding of such circumstances and will throw further light on the possibilities that self-determination can be debated upon in a liberal democracy and, in the absence of violence and where the circumstances are favourable (political and social will, an unquestionable rejection of all forms of violence related to the end objectives, and a commitment to dialogue both among the diverse political forces of the region as well as those of the rest of the country), the benefits of such an approach can be superior to and more easily accessible as well as achievable, than those of a terrorist strategy.

Failed ceasefires, incomplete negotiations

The first ceasefire was announced in 1981 by ETA(pm), even though they were to resume activities one year later, which gave the green light to the leader of the Euzkadiko Ezkerra (EE) party to enter into negotiation with the then minister of the Interior.[2] No substantial political matters were discussed, as Mees records, but that was due to the fact that the Basque negotiators were not in a position to push their demands, at the time when the acceptance of the Statute of Autonomy was already causing serious reaction to right-wing and military circles of the Spanish society. The attempted military coup in February 1981 was a verification of that reaction.[3] And secondly, the implementation of the Statue and the electoral success of EE in its first year were received by some militant nationalist sectors as a first-class opportunity to the normalisation of their lives and their re-integration in society and (nationalist)

[2] Ludger Mees, 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities,* Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 65.
[3] Ibid.

constitutional politics.[4] The result of the negotiation was the amnesty, albeit bureaucratically slow, to around 200 of ETApm's paramilitaries.[5] The plan's success was manifested with the dissolution of ETA(pm) in 1982.

From that moment on, the only protagonist in the violent game would be ETA(m), strengthened by the infiltration of former ETA(pm) members who disagreed either with the softness of the negotiations, or with the organisation's dissolution and still wanted to be active members in the fight for independence.[6] It is interesting, however, to point that the re-integration of former activists was not received well by ETA(m), who considered these individuals to be co-operating with the enemy. That gave the organisation the perfect excuse to turn the weapons against its former members, as a result of which, very few activists came forward to petition for pardon.[7] ETA had dealt a blow to the State's anti-terrorist policies by obtaining full control of its imprisoned members.

Despite that ferocity, it was the political and strategic aspects that led ETA, in 1986, to start a new round of negotiations in Algeria. With regards to the former, PSOE's (Spanish Socialist Party) government for two consecutive mandates was an indication of the political stability enjoyed nationally and the westernisation of the economy (and politics) of the country. On the other hand, the change of practices from the part of the French authorities, who extradited Basque activists to Third World countries and kept them incommunicado from their comrades, significantly damaged ETA's re-organisational capability and, hence, negotiations could at least buy them some time.

During the Algerian round, ETA's ceasefires were somewhat theoretical, since neither the killings nor the kidnappings and the robberies stopped. When the negotiations broke down in 1989, it is assumed that the main reason was the belief of both parties that a military win against the enemy is still possible.[8] In the case of ETA, its negotiators were of the Old Guard and hence, they had a pragmatic view on the possible gains of such meetings. Their pragmatism, however, was in direct

[4] Ibid., p. 63.
[5] Robert Clark, 1990. *Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975-1988*, Reno: University of Nevada Press, p. 109.
[6] Mees, 2003, op.cit., p. 66.
[7] The most famous case is that of Dolores González Catarain "*Yoyes*", who, after having discussed her decision with older leaders of ETA, she was murdered in the centre of her home town, in front of her 3-year old son. Before the pardon, *Yoyes* was the head of ETA's political office and in exile in Mexico.
[8] Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, 2001. *ETA Contra el Estado: Las Estrategias del Terrorismo*, Barcelona: Tusquets, pp. 126-135.

contrast to the views held by the leadership of the organisation, which originated from the hardcore elements of ETA(m) and was based in France, something that denotes the distance between them and the speed and character of the events. What is more, there was a natural discord between the two factions, with the latter claiming that they are negotiating from a powerful position and can afford to torpedo the talks; more violence, as a cause of the breaking-down, would push the state into new rounds and hence help ETA achieve its principal objective.[9]

On the other hand, the negotiators of the Socialist party were in a similar situation. As Mees explains, they were not in a powerful position that offered them influence within government circles, nor did they command a prestigious position in the party's circles.[10] Furthermore, the involvement of the Secret Service annulled the efforts of the negotiators and put further pressure back in Madrid to not succumb to any terrorist demands. Judging by ETA's communiqué, in which it blamed the government for not sticking to the terms of the final agreement, make commentators assume that it is possible that the terms to which the government's negotiators agreed were not accepted by their superiors in the Ministry or the Presidency.[11]

The beginning of the peace process in the nineties was nowhere near promoting a sustainable, or better still, a self-sustaining peace. The coming to power of PP brought with it a change in counter-terrorist policies. Whereas the PSOE had inherited some policies brought forward by the transition government (for example, the social re-insertion schemes) and its public discourse was always one of exploration of possible ways out of the violent path, PP came to power virtually because of its pre-electoral campaign which was based on tough measures against terrorism and almost no concessions in the political field. The objective of the two parties, therefore, was diametrically opposed, with ETA having independence as the top priority and the government unwilling to talk about anything other than security issues and prison policies.[12]

It is true that despite these difficulties, it was at the end of that decade and with PP in power that ETA announced its most important ceasefire and the one that lasted longer than any other before. In 1998, and following a contact made by ETA,

[9] Florencio Domínguez Iribarren, 1998, *De la Negociación a la Tregua ¿El final de ETA?*, Madrid: Taurus, pp. 73-74.
[10] Mees, op.cit., p. 69.
[11] Ibid., p. 70.
[12] Ibid., p. 62.

PNV came to an agreement with the organisation and the radical nationalist parties to redefine the rules of the game. In line with the progressive and exemplary events taking place in Northern Ireland, the organisation announced an indefinite ceasefire. While a more elaborate explanation of the comparison between the Basque and the Northern Irish case, with regards to the ceasefire, is given further below, suffice it to say here that HB was not as empowered as Sinn Fein was, and that the agreement for the ceasefire was between the moderate political forces and the terrorists themselves, rather than their political leaders. Some commentators highlight the importance of the social reaction to ETA's mounting attacks, which at the time focused almost exclusively on councillors and members of the PP. The kidnapping and cold-blooded assassination of Miguel Ángel Blanco in 1997 is one of the instances recognised by commentators as catalytic to ETA's decision,[13] not least because it manifested to both ETA and PNV that the principal debate for the Basque citizenry was the usefulness of terrorism, not that of nationalism.[14] The instances of arson and general attacks to the political offices of HB throughout the Basque Country were the most vivid trace of the popular sentiment towards nationalist extremism.[15]

However, the negotiations between PNV and ETA that led to the declaration of the ceasefire were not made public until ETA announced its cancellation and blamed both the PNV and EA for having broken their promises as they were set in the agreement.[16] Thus, the public was justified in believing that the Northern Irish case was in fact the very example that ETA chose to follow.[17] Furthermore, as it was explained in the previous chapter, the most important actor missing from this agreement was the state itself, represented by the state-wide political parties. The implications of this are that the base for a political dialogue between the aforementioned and the moderate nationalist parties had been condemned,[18] since such an initiative by the nationalist ambit was seen as a populist tool that would

[13] Cuenca, 2001, op.cit., pp. 192-194; Domínguez Iribarren, 1998, op.cit., p.245; Mees, 2003, op.cit, pp. 131-132.
[14] Cuenca, 2001, op.cit., p. 207.
[15] Iniciativa Ciudadana ¡Basta Ya!, 2004, *Euskadi: Del Sueño a la Vergüenza*, Barcelona: Ediciones B, p. 260.
[16] *Gara*, 30 April 2000.
[17] For a comparative analysis between the Good Friday Agreement and the Pact of Lizarra that kickstarted ETA's ceasefire, and the differences between the two, see Rogelio Alonso, 2004. "Pathways out of terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The misinterpretation of the Irish model", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 695-713.
[18] Interview with Gorka Espiau, Director of Elkarri, Bilbao, 22/11/2004.

guarantee them the image of peace-makers[19] and would bring them the necessary votes of the extremists parties, thus securing their political and constitutional supremacy in the Basque Country.[20]

With the collapse of the ceasefire fourteen months after its announcement, the situation returned to the previous state of efficient police and intelligence efforts focused exclusively on the violent elements of the movement, while the political initiatives have been scarce. It must also be noted that, aside from the social reactions, it is also the changes in the international set of circumstances (September 11, 2001; the Madrid train bombings and the political game of blindly blaming ETA; and the repeated successes of both the French and the Spanish security agencies in the dismemberment of the organisation's leadership) that have debilitated significantly the organisation and have provided the Basque country with a normalisation of the situation where actions still take place, but they are limited in causing material damage. On the other hand, this was the preferred method for the State to claim that the only dimension there is in the Basque conflict is that of violence and there are no political problems since the Basques enjoy a degree of autonomy that equals virtual independence.[21] Furthermore, seeing how ETA and its violence were used by the moderate circles in the past in dealings with the central State, perhaps it makes sense to assume that it is in the benefit of the latter to eliminate ETA in order to then have an advantage in its negotiations with the Basque nationalist parties.

The greatest contribution, however, to the transformation of the conflict would come from the very actor that both the State and eTA claimed to represent, the civil society. Although it obtained a massive momentum in the 1990s, the reaction of the civil society in the Basque Country began expressing its rejection of violence since the end of the previous decade. The initiative of the Association of Human Rights (Asociación Pro derechos Humanos) to help people express their indignation and rejection of violence culminated in a move that involved the sending of letters to the offices of HB with the words "Ya no me callo", which is literally translated into "I will not shut up any more".[22] 400.000 people participated in that form of protest and the numbers were bound to swell, particularly after the foundation of more a-political,

[19] Mees, op.cit., p. 144
[20] Iniciativa Ciudadana ¡Basta Ya!, op.cit., p. 269-270.
[21] Anonymous interview with a cadre of the Ministry of the Interior, Madrid, 4/11/2004. See also Domínguez Iribarren, *De la Negociación*, p.239; Mees, 2003, op.cit, p. 115
[22] Cuenca, 2001., op.cit., p. 191.

citizen-based initiatives that transformed into NGOs with the aim to bring together the vast sectors of the local community for whom violence could not be justified, and for whom its elimination and substitution with a state of self-sustainable was of paramount importance.

Political and Social Transformations

The previous chapter has demonstrated the inability of the nationalist parties, and particularly the PNV, to reject totally and directly ETA and its actions. The benefits of the organisation's activity had come in handy many a time for the moderate nationalists, who often presented Madrid with the dilemma "You can negotiate with us or cope with ETA".[23] This posture often attracted the criticisms and open accusations of the Spanish state-wide parties active in Euskadi (mainly PSOE and PP). The political ambivalence of the nationalist ambit ended, for the first time, in 1985 when, following the assassination of an Ertzaintza (Basque Police) Superintendent, the PNV justified police and judicial action against terrorist acts.[24] This transformation was not only a reaction to the indiscriminate violence of ETA, but also a product of political collaboration between parties and driven by the social demands for peace.

The year 1987 was the bloodiest in ETA's history. A bomb in a Barcelona supermarket left 21 shoppers dead and later in the year, when the organisation targeted one of the Civil Guard's barracks in Zaragoza, 5 of the 12 victims were children. This type of *ekintzas* produced massive social repulsion nationally as well as in the Basque country. As Llera put it, it took ten years and hundreds of deaths for the Basque society to realise that ETA is more of an obstacle than anything else.[25] Basque society's attitude had made it imperative for the Basque political parties to explore any points, in a strategy against ETA's violence, that were shared among them. The result of these discussions was the Pact of Ajuria Enea,[26] brought forward by the Basque Prime Minister on the 12th of January 1988, and whose signatories were the members of all Basque parties with the exception of HB, even though the latter

[23] William Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, 1990, "On the interpretation of terrorist violence: ETA and the Basque political process", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.32, No.2, p.252.
[24] Domínguez Iribarren, *El enfrentamiento*, p. 323.
[25] Francisco Llera, 1994, *Los Vascos y la Política*, Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, p. 104.
[26] Named after the Basque Presidential Palace, where the pact was agreed. The text is titled "Pact for the Pacification and Normalisation of Euskadi" and can be accessed at http://www.diariodirecto.com/mm/14509.pdf, accessed on 2/8/2006.

participated in the preliminary rounds of the negotiated text.[27] The Pact's main elements were that it differentiated between the problem of violence (which needed to be resolved) and the constitutional politics of nationalism (which could survive without the violent dimension); it accepted the necessity of action by the security forces and judicial services, and their legitimacy, in order to achieve resolution to the problem of violence, but it also pressed for dialogue and commitment to further the status of Autonomy; in that context, it also negated to ETA the excuse of territoriality and the question of Navarre, by recognising Navarre's constitutional and provincial status; and it accepted that there can be dialogue with the extremists, but that it would not be on political issues and only after violence was renounced.

However, despite the unanimity and collaboration expressed in the Pact, the problem of political violence was made the central theme of the 1996 pre-electoral campaign by PP and, as a result, it was not long before political discords and confusions arose anew. The electoral victory of PP and its establishment in office brought with it a revision in and of anti-terrorist policies, which were further strengthened during the party's second term. In the Basque country, a renewed effort from lehendakari Ardanza to revive the Pact was rejected by both PP and PSOE, which left little room for the PNV to move, other than attempt to build bridges with HB. From that moment on, whether local, national or international, the only reactions to the manifestations of political violence were those of the Security and Intelligence Agencies.

Nevertheless, the political and social significance of the Pact should not be undermined, for its contributions and the reverberations of its spirit laid the foundation of something even more valuable and, probably, more tenable than any of the counter-terrorist tactics. In essence, the Pact was a manifestation that the political world in Euskadi was ready to isolate ETA and those around it, and remove any link they attempt to express to politics and ideology. As Mees observes, Ajuria Enea moved the identity clash away from the old cleavage present until that moment in Euskadi ('nationalist vs. non-nationalist') and substituted it with the 'violent vs. non-violent nationalist'.[28] The most important contribution, however, to the fight against violence was that, on the one hand, it transmitted a sense of legitimacy and, on the

[27] Domínguez Iribarren,*De la Negociación*, p. 249
[28] Ludger Mees, 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities,* Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 110.

other, it gave the necessary momentum to the few but persisting organisations/platforms that allowed citizens to voice their opposition to the violence that was exerted in their names. Iribarren and other authors branded this period as the "time of silence", referring to the ten years where public disagreement or protest against ETA was scarce.[29] Besides, the disparity of interests of the political parties with regards to nationalism and nationalist violence was one of the primary causes of the public's disorientation and limited mobilisation during the 1980s.[30]

Midway through the 1980s, the cleavage between nationalists and non-nationalists had been transformed to one of extremists versus pacifist nationalists, with the non-nationalists siding with the pacifist movement. Prior to the establishment of democracy, most *ekintzas* happened outside the Basque Country, mostly in Madrid, but also the rest of Spain. After the democratic consolidation, and with the broadening of the organisation's targets, the conflict moved closer to home, with ETA's actions rising significantly in Euskadi. The proximity of the conflict is one reason, according to Mees, that has taken away the romantic value the Basques held for ETA's actions and substituted it with disbelief at first, and later rejection.[31] Rincón, too, recognises the importance of physical distance but also highlights that the murder for alleged drug-dealing of two unrelated but highly esteemed members of their respective communities, was the catalytic moment for the transformation of Basque social attitudes towards (Basque) political violence: the social posture that followed after every assassination ("he must have done something to deserve it"), could no longer be justified in the cases of Eibar and Egoibar (the two villages where the murders took place).[32]

The first platform that brought together several small pacifist groups was Coordinadora Gesto por la Paz en Euskal Herria (Co-ordination of a Gesture for Peace in the Basque Country) in 1987. As the name suggests, the organisation began as the infusion into one of several smaller organisations that wanted to make a public reaction to the nationalist violence. As the organisation itself proclaims, "the attitude and message of Gesto focus on the violence that is born out of *presumed political*

[29] Florencio Domínguez Iribarren, op.cit., p. 240 and 253-254. See also Mees, op.cit., 94.
[30] Francisco Llera, op.cit., p. 115.
[31] Ludger Mees, 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 93.
[32] Luciano Rincón, 1994, *Políticos Y Ciudadanos*, Bilbao: El Tilo, p. 185.

motivations with respect to the Basque Country".[33] The "gesture" refers to the silent manifestations following the perpetration of murderous terrorist attacks and its principal aims were and still are to reinforce the social mobilisation and to promote a culture of peace. A culture that is not simply present due to the absence of violence, but a more positive peace, which makes certain that violent phenomena are dealt by the instinctive pacifist social response.[34] In a way, and judging also by the massive protests the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004 have caused, the organisation has succeeded in instigating that spirit of social responsibility. After the train bombings, when the first assumptions focused on ETA rather than Islamist activists, the manifestation of social reflexes and the mass protests throughout the Spanish state attracted equal, if not more, attention by the media covering the attacks. It must be noted, however, that despite its a-political nature, the organisation has suffered splits and divisions similar to those of the political parties,[35] even though none of the splinter-groups had a debilitating effect on Gesto's ability to mobilise the masses on such a particular issue.

A second organisation whose involvement lies more on the political sphere, rather than Gesto's ethical approach, is Elkarri. Unlike Gesto, Elkarri's work goes much further than the simple, yet unambiguous, rejection of violence because Elkarri recognises that there is a political side to the problem of violence. As Gorka Espiau explained in a personal interview, this can be seen by the very instances when violence ceased, that is, during ceasefires: nationalism is still the centre of the political discourse in Euskadi and of the talks between the regional parties and the state-wide ones.[36] Therefore, it is not enough to simply reject violence. Rather, it must first be recognised that the Basque conflict is essentially a political one, and as such violence must be substituted with dialogue. Elkarri's recognition of the political nature of the conflict differentiates it from other civil platforms in that it attempts to build a response that is equally political, that is, utilise dialogue in order not only to transform the attitudes of the local society towards violence but to also highlight that a non-violent political solution to the problem is achievable so long as the stereotypes

[33] Coordinadora Gesto por la Paz en Euskal Herria, *Principios de Actuación de Gesto por la Paz*, http://www.gesto.org/principios.htm, last accessed, 9/8/2006. My italics.
[34] Coordinadora Gesto por la Paz, 2001, *Educándonos para la Paz*, http://www.gesto.org/educarparalapaz.htm, last accessed 9/8/2006.
[35] In 1992, Denon Artean (Between Us) was created and a further split in Gesto's ranks led to the creation of Bakea Orain (Peace Now)
[36] Interview with Gorka Espiau, Director of Elkarri, Bilbao 22/11/2004.

between the nationalists and non-nationalists, as well as between Basques and Spanish is very much possible.

Similarly with Gesto,[37] the organisation works on three levels: political social and international. On the political level, Elkarri attempts to facilitate and, in certain instances, initiate a process of dialogue between the political parties. Espiau indicated that the organisation had succeeded in initiating a round table that consisted of all political parties in Euskadi, with the exception of PP and Batasuna (although it was present at the first ever meeting). On the social level, Elkarri's objective is to organise "dialogue projects" and debates on the local level. At the time I conducted the interview, there were 60 to 100 local dialogue fora that brought together people from all political shades. The topics of these workshops consist of the same issues that are brought by Elkarri to the round tables of the political parties. The conclusions of the workshops are then sent by Elkarri to the political parties in an effort to ascertain that the public's view was not ignored by the political parties, as well as the fact that it provided a map for them to work on a political solution that would reflect the demands and wishes of the popular base. Espiau referred to a petition signed by 122.000 people urging the political parties of the Basque Country and Navarre to initiate a process of dialogue between them for the exploration of possible solutions both to the political as well as the violence problem.[38] The international level of Elkarri's work consists of mainly informational actions that aim at making known the dynamics and dimensions of the Basque conflict and, at the same time, attract support and consultation for conflict resolution projects that can guarantee the institutional stability and development of the Basque country.

The main reason for Elkarri's emergence was the absence of a serious political actor that would occupy the space between nationalist and state-wide party discourses: the former constantly pointing at the political roots of the violence and the latter permanently refusing to accept the political aspect, due to the existence of the Statute of Autonomy. Even where platforms like Gesto por la Paz were, to a certain extent, already covering the grey area, there was no institution or initiative that would act politically on the problem. The immediate consequence of the political bi-polarity was reflected in the Basque society, for which violence had become a taboo, aided in

[37] For an analysis on the political involvement of Gesto por la Paz, see Mees, op.cit, pp. 95-96.
[38] See Elkarri, *Propuesta dirigida a los Parlamentos vasco y de Navarra en ejercicio del Derecho de Petición con el apoyo de 122.513 firmas*, 17/6/2004, http://www.elkarri.org/actualidad/object.php?o=1713, last accessed 6/7/2006.

that by the lack of educational policies or social initiatives that indicated the irrationality of violence and projected alternative constitutional paths to the achievement of political objectives. What made Elkarri popular in the Basque society was that, like other anti-violent platforms, it recognised the faults[39] of the state yet, at the same time, recognised that neither terrorism nor the *kale borroka* could right the wrongs of the central structures. Hence, the need for a political dialogue that, for Elkarri, should necessarily include some form of communication with ETA, because negotiating with ETA does not necessarily mean that the state will automatically cede to the organisation's demands. Furthermore, the issues that ETA raises can certainly be put on the table of the negotiations conducted by the political parties (for example, the prisoners).

It must be noted at this point, however, that Elkarri and Gesto por la Paz are not only the largest and most active of the existing platforms; they are also the only ones that have located themselves between both discourses. This strengthens my argument that, while use of ethno-terrorism is justified as the only option for most ethno-nationalist movements who suffer grievances, here is a case of a group of citizens who feel that their nationalist sentiment does not only express the wish for cultural differentiation that will lead to self-determination. Placing themselves between the two nationalist discourses, that is, between that of the State which intends to superimpose its own nationalism on a culturally different minority, and that of the minority which copies the State in that it uses violence to promote its own minority nationalism, manifests the identification of a path that makes the elimination of violence possible, but at the same time intends to utilise the liberal institutions currently in place in order to both manifest their ethno-cultural difference as well as to communicate any grievances they have.

Other than Elkarri and Gesto Por La Paz, the map of social platforms and civic organisations comprises groups that reflect either of the discourses. After the shock and the debilitating morale that spread through the nationalist movement after the increasingly popular anti-violent demonstrations and silent protests, the nationalist movement responded with a copy-cat move, at first organising counter-manifestations in favour of an *ekintza*, and later establishing and bringing forward platforms and

[39] Such issues are the prison policies and the cases of torture in prisons, the illegalisation of political parties, and the closing down of nationalist media (newspapers and TV stations).

organisations that dealt with the issue of the prisoners (*Gestoras Pro Amnistía*),[40] or their relatives (*Sanideak*). As for the former, it is noted that these counter-manifestations were frequently intimidating[41] and often ended up as the usual exhibition of street violence, or *kale borrokka*. Similarly, at the other end of the spectrum, there are organisations who do not consider violence but *nationalism* in its totality to be the problem in the Basque country (Foro de Ermua, ¡Basta Ya!), and therefore tend to identify more with the policies that emanate from Madrid and to question the political tendencies that originate in Euskadi.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the social platforms map resembles closely that of the political parties and ideologies, it must be remembered that both the nationalist and the anti-nationalist platforms emerged only after the creation of organisations of the calibre of Gesto or Elkarri, which, judging by the direct and indirect membership they attract, reflect the views of the vast majority of the Basques. In other words, the creation and, most critically, the social support these organisations attracted, forced the political actors to devolve power to their grassroots and imitate the actions of the other two. Whether this action was a genuine mobilisation attempt based on the efficiency demonstrated by Gesto and Elkarri, or whether it was a reaction that would allow the respective social bases of both nationalist and anti-nationalist movement to rally around and challenge the rest, the bottom-line is that after almost a decade of inaction, all sectors of both the Basque as well as the Spanish societies were obtaining a greater say in the theatre of political violence, or rather its elimination.

The question that must be asked, therefore, is whether there are any tangible effects of the organisations, particularly those that occupy the middle-ground, on the Basque conscience? The answer is yes and it can be observed in a number of ways. A set of surveys organised by the University of the Basque Country has been recording the social attitudes towards ETA since 1981 (Table 3). Certain elements and tendencies are hard to leave unnoticed. First of all, total rejection of ETA has doubled since 1987. Second and most importantly, there is a normalisation of the percentage of population that does support the same aims as the organisation but not through the same means. From nine percent of the population that supported ETA's aims but not

[40] The organisation's leadership was charged with membership to a terrorist organization in 2001 and was incarcerated. See *Gara*, 5/11/2001.
[41] Domínguez-Iribarren, *De la Negociación*, p.245.

its methods in 1989, the percentage rose to 16 in 2000 and has been pretty much stable ever since. That is an unambiguous verification of the vacuum represented only by the social platforms. Finally, a similar process is discerned for the percentage of population that supported ETA at a previous stage (dictatorship, or during the 1980s) but not under the current constitutional framework. This social group rose by seven points in ten years (1995-2005). Although the authors of the survey do not make it clear whether and how many of those asked in this group *do* support the objectives of ETA under the current constitutional framework. What is important in all cases is that the emergence of the social platforms and the diverse organisations in the Basque Country and later in the rest of Spain coincides chronologically with the changes in the patterns of social attitudes.

Table 3: Social attitudes towards ETA

	2000 %	2001 %	2002 %	2003 %	2004 %	2005 %	2006 %
Total Support	2	1	-	1	1	-	1
Critical Support	6	3	3	2	2	3	2
Aims yes, Means no	16	9	11	12	12	12	13
Before yes, Now no	15	20	21	16	19	20	17
Indifferent	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Fear	4	4	3	5	5	4	2
Total rejection	53	57	60	62	58	58	61
N/A	4	6	2	2	2	3	2

	1987 %	1989 %	1995 %	1996 %	1997 %	1998 %	1999 %
Total Support	1	3	2	1	2	1	2
Critical Support	6	5	5	5	4	4	9
Aims yes, Means no	12	9	12	11	10	12	15
Before yes, Now no	19	15	13	18	12	15	20
Indifferent	2	3	3	2	2	5	6
Fear	4	4	6	7	5	6	6
Total rejection	34	45	55	51	59	53	35
N/A	22	16	6	5	6	6	7

Source: Euskobarometro, University of the Basque Country, http://www.ehu.es/cpvweb/paginas/series_eusko/series_20.html

Another way in which the stigma of such organisations is evident in the Basque population is the study of their very activists. Iribarren[42] mentions a sociological report which verifies, on the one hand, the absence of the political world

[42] Iribarren, *De la Negociación*, pp. 243-244.

in the social demands for peace and dialogue and, on the other, the very youth that forms the core of pacifism in the Basque country: almost 40 per cent are less than 20 years old; 22,2 per cent are between 21 and 24. The majority of the interviewees admitted that their group emerged after an agreement between friends (42 per cent) or through initiatives of the Church (39 per cent). Only a tenth of the population, however, became involved through schools or institutes of education.[43] Sociologists were quick to point out that according to the data, ETA's death is in the hands of the young, just like its birth.[44]

The Human Need for Peace

The emergence of this new cleavage verifies the position of this thesis that violence is used as a method in a broader clash that is characterised by nationalism. Whereas orthodox terrorism theory informs us that more often than not "the means become the end", the social attitude of the Basque civil society that not only is this not the case but that the means can be altered in order to accommodate new needs without necessarily altering the end. Moreover, it also runs counter to those conflict resolution approaches according to which the key to the transformation and/or elimination of a conflict is held by the middle and the top level actors in that conflict.[45] That is, the very actors in the Basque case that totally undermined the conflict, its dynamics, and, of course, spoiled any possible efforts for its resolution. Furthering nationalist plans to the point of independence is the objective of both divisions of the cleavage; the disagreement lies in the means used for the advancement of said goal, not only in its moral dimensions, but also in its strategic. The reiteration of the supremacy of constitutional means and the dedication of the Basque political life does not only seek to delegitimise the myths and legends that ETA carries, but also to highlight that the latter's activity may be hampering the same objectives, sought with different means, and which so far have been very effective, considering the Statute of Autonomy, the co-operation of the state-wide parties with their nationalist counterparts, and the electoral preference for the parties of the Democratic Block since the transition.

What the analysis of the public attitude, as it was captured by the surveys and the initiatives of the social platforms, has made obvious is that, irrespective of their

[43] Ibid., p. 244.
[44] Mees, op.cit., p. 99.
[45] John Paul Lederach, 1997. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington D. C.: United States Institute for Peace.

nationalist or non-nationalist tendencies, the majority of the people are expressing a need for peace. Since the mid-1990s, this need has been incrementally verified to be as important as the need to have the right to an identity of your choice, and to exercise functions that are linked to that identity. The participation of the civil society in protests and manifestations shows that the social attitudes reject not only the violence of a minority of extremists that claims to represent them, but also the violence of the State which seems to be interested in equating every nationalist activity and ideology as potentially violent and thus potentially undermining its conceptions, intentions and, ultimately, survival. The attitude of the local civil society has shown that the safeguarding of a national identity and its further development is the primary issue in a region that is laden with violence for precisely the same reasons. As seen, it is not only the human cost and social bereavement caused by violence; where there are political aspirations whose fruition is closely linked with manifestations of political violence, such aspirations may be hampered by the very strategy of terrorism. The social stands that have been recorded since the mid-1990s reiterate the need not only to create an environment in which violent trends will automatically be disqualified, if not restrained before they even surface, but one which will not neglect the second most important need, that of national fulfilment. The discourse brought forward by organisations of the middle way, like Gesto and Elkarri, point to that spirit of *pro*vention,[46] where non-violent attitudes should unequivocally and uncritically be implemented in the social structures and behaviours.



This does not solely depend on the society, although it admittedly bears the brunt when it comes to changing attitudes, perceptions and behaviours that are so

[46] John Burton, 1990. *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

fundamental that are used as the very symbolisms that equal the society's ontology. Society seems that it can decide whether violence is a method for obtaining higher ends or whether it is an obstacle to such aspirations. The transformation of the social attitude from one of support and exaltation of ETA during the dictatorship, into its total rejection and isolation, shows precisely that. But the greatest change in attitude concerns the state itself. Even in the hypothetical situation where violence is completely eliminated in the Basque country, it is hard to imagine a situation in which the Basque country will reach its independence with the blessing of the State. Since every nationalism is directed against a greater nationalism, a central authority which became one due to its nationalism, then, every nationalism will be combated by that authority because that's what the survival instinct implies. In a sense, these are the reflexes any state structure would have, if we are to accept that this is an anarchic world where the only use of violence lies with the central authority and any other violence is illegitimate. On the one hand, these type of structures do not favour the appropriate posture, whereby a state would nurture a movement that is directed against itself, only to make sure that violence does not emerge. On the other hand, proventing violence is a strategic option with great implications on the costs for peace – for both sides.

Conclusion

What is observed in effect is a transformation of the *conflict* through the transformation of the *attitudes* that were both based on the ethno-nationalist nature of the conflict but also fed the conflict itself when the State manifested its very own nationalism by rejecting the minority nationalism. That manifestation of the State's nationalism was not less violent as seen, nor was it perceived to be less violent. Persecution, at first, negation of any sets of grievances later, particularly with the adoption and concession of the Statue of Autonomy, non-collaboration, and even damnation of the nationalist movement in the turn of the century, even if the occasion that brought the latter forward was of an international nature and it served primarily partisan objectives and micropolitical agendas. The human need for peace, as manifested by the civil society, rejects both forms of violence precisely because they endanger the primary aspect of this conflict which is the nationalist differentiation.

It is the human need for peace that was directed against the janus-faced violence: on the one hand, against the ethno-terrorist practices that risked

undermining the higher cause of the entire nationalist movement (extremist and moderate) because they would attract the wrath of the State which, ultimately, was an important actor in conceding to the demands of the local society as a whole; on the other, against the violence of the State that seemed to be indifferent towards the radicalisation that it caused among the nationalist circles, thus turning violence into a vicious circle that did away with any opportunities for resolution. And of course, against the State's indifference towards the general feeling of cultural diversity espoused by the local community and the very institutions and social and political mechanisms it had received by the very State with the end of dictatorship. In other words, then, while violence is the problem in the current situation, it is the violence that originates in the nationalist ideology of both parties in the conflict. The alteration of the social attitudes of the local society, at least, shows that grievances and the need for differentiation from the culture of the central State are still there, but the means for the legitimisation of such needs has moved away from the use, and particularly the need of use, of violence. If this transformation can take place with regards to the minority nationalism, the popular feeling is that such transformation is also possible for the central nationalism. The demands of the civil society vis-à-vis the violent practices shows that conflict resolution can have an equally legitimising role when it comes to grievances, as violence did when it was the only means to fight the oppression and dynastic practices of the State. Ultimately, it proves that freedom-fighters do not necessarily have to be terrorists. In a liberal democratic State that respects the legal frameworks which it claims to employ in its fight against terrorism, and which are socially acceptable and legitimate,[47] the dichotomisation of the well-worn cliché is possible through the ballot box or, perhaps, through the utilisation of pan-European frameworks, such as those employed by the European Union (EU), even though there have been expressed concerns as to the effectiveness of those with regards to the state-oriented approaches of anti-terrorist policy implementations,[48] the

[47] Peter Chalk, 2000. "The Third Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs: Cooperation, Anti-terrorist Collaboration and Liberal Democratic Acceptability" in Fernando Reinares (ed), *European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation*, Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 175-210. Quote at p. 186.

[48] David Bonner, 2000. "The United Kingdom's Response to Terrorism: the Impact of Decisions of European Judicial Institutions and of the Northern Ireland 'Peace Process'" in Fernando Reinares, op.cit., pp. 31-71. Quote at p. 57. See also Ronald Crelinsten and Iffet Ozkut, 2000. "Counterterrorism Policy in Fortress Europe: Implications for Human Rights" in Fernando Reinares (ed.), op.cit., pp. 245-271.

protection of human rights,[49] the concentration of power in one location (Brussels), which, in effect, is a copycat move reflecting the typical State behaviour,[50] and, ultimately, the political will (rather than the legal or policial) necessary for the enforcement of any counter-terrorist framework.[51]

[49] Peter Chalk, 2000, op.cit.
[50] Bruno Frey, 2004. *Dealing with Terrorism – Stick or Carrot?*, Cheltenham; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, p. 88.
[51] Malcolm Anderson, 2000. "Counterterrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation" in Fernando Reinares (ed), op.cit., pp. 227-243

CONCLUSION

> "But let the men of Hartford imagine that they were not in the position of being voters at all, that they were governed without their consent being obtained, that the legislature turned an absolutely deaf ear to their demands, what would the men of Hartford do then? They couldn't vote the legislature out. They would have to either submit indefinitely to an unjust state of affairs, or they would have to rise up and adopt some of the *antiquated means* by which men in the past got their grievances remedied"[1]

Thus spoke Emmeline Pankhurst, on November 13, 1913, addressing an American audience on the women's right to vote. It is not my intention to bring in feminism into a debate over terrorism and its definitions, nor is it to analyse its role in ethnonationalist conflicts. However, I have used these words because they are indicative of the reaction in situations where a large group of people perceive to suffer a political injustice. One of this thesis' objectives was to establish an understanding of terrorism in the Basque case, according to which it – and, indeed, any type of political violence – is a method of pressure on the political authorities to look at and rectify any grievance their socio-political behaviour might have inflicted on the social group and/or movement that utilises violence. The fact that feminist movements, nationalist and religious fundamentalist movements make use of terror in order to promote their demands, communicate their grievances, or retaliate the injustice suffered certainly provokes feelings of disgust and disappointment, but, when analysed objectively and away from moral engagements, it clearly constitutes an option that is based on the nature of the grievance(s), the objectives of the movement and the resources and nature of the authorities it claims to be fighting against.[2]

The first chapter of the thesis offered a historical analysis of the emergence and development of Basque nationalism. By doing so, it set the context for the understanding of the reasons that made violence become a legitimate option according to the perception

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[1] Emmeline Pankhurst, "Freedom or Death" Speech, Hartford, Connecticut, 13 November 1913, http://www.guardian.co.uk/greatspeeches/story/0,,2059235,00.html, last accessed, 24 April 2007. My emphasis.

[2] Paul Wilkinson, 2001. *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, Portland; London: Frank Cass, pp. 16-17.

of the Basques, a legitimation which eroded slowly as democracy in Spain became more and more rooted. In other words, it described the Basque 'truth' for the reasons they decided to oppose the Spanish State during its darkest years, as well as the truth of the increasing, but persistent, extremist minority that seemingly never shook off the particular discourse according to which the State has always been the oppressor, despite its transformation into a liberal democracy.

In chapter Two, I critically examined the literature of nationalism and offered an analysis into both the contributions of the most significant, yet quite disparate, understandings of nationalism. I also highlighted the inefficiencies of these theories and, based on the ethno-symbolic paradigm, I brought forward a critical understanding of the mechanisms that, on the one hand, are common to all nationalisms and nations through the use of symbols and cultural diachritica, and, on the other, I employed that critical thinking in order to explain the particular dynamics of Basque nationalism. I have argued that the identification of culture and identity, as well as the perceptions of the definitions of the in-group and the out-group, by the post-modernist theories highlight not only the elasticity of such concepts, but also the fluidity of the boundaries that such concepts create. Hence, while violence was a constitutive part of the Basque identity primarily because of the injustices of the Francoist regime towards them, it slowly eroded and the majority of the civil society, which supported ETA until well into the 1980s, began to distance itself from its use and has finally come to reject it in the most manifesting ways.

Chapter Three examined the literature of terrorism with the aim of highlighting the elliptical understanding of terrorism offered by the orthodox theories of terrorism. It argued that the majority of these lacked a contextualisation of the examination of terrorist phenomena. Such contextualisation is necessary primarily because of the diverse nature of the groups that make use of terrorism,[3] as well as the diverse nature of the States that they oppose. If in the Basque case, the Francoist State violence legitimised the Basque claims for self-defence and manifested their grievances,[4] according to the theories, the

[3] Brynjar Lia, and Katja Skjolberg, 2004. *Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature*, Norway: Kjeller (FFI/Rapport-2004/04307)

[4] Martha Crenshaw, 1990. "The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behaviour as a product of strategic choice", in Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-24. Quote at p. 17.

transition to a liberal democratic regime and its concessions of autonomy should also signify the abandonment of violence from both parties and the transformation of the conflict into a non-violent political one. Yet, as seen, orthodox terrorism theories fail to account for the use and the meaning of cultural symbols in an ethno-terrorist conflict and the catalytic way in which they transform the perceptions of both the militants, as well as their surrounding environment. Furthermore, orthodox terrorism theories seem too focused on the Westphalian standards with regards to the state and, as such, overlook the basic assumptions about the anarchy of the international system. The monopoly of violence, the inviolability of borders and automatic legitimacy the Treaty of Westphalia conferred to states is an attempt to regulate an anarchical international system. Yet, it is the lack of a higher, normative authority that makes possible the emergence of terrorist organisations who wish to contest the legitimacy,[5] as well as the violence, of the state. Finally, I have argued that the lack of a Grand Theory of terrorism[6] is not necessarily as impeding as some scholars have argued. Instead, contextualising the study of terrorist phenomena should provide us with enough insights to allow us to build a case-by-case understanding of the mechanisms and the root causes of terrorism as they are projected by the diverse group that find refuge in its use.

The examination of the literature concerned with conflict resolution in chapter Four highlighted the obstacles posed by the implementation of the Westphalian framework, and its exaltation of the nature and survival of the State, the legitimation and monopoly of violence within their borders and the inviolability of those. This chapter also highlighted how the study and practice of conflict resolution was incrementally transformed as the bi-polar order of the Cold War came to an end, which gave rise to the study of factors like culture, identity and the perceptions of security of the actors involved that are significant in identifying correctly the root causes of conflict and allow for an equally correct implementation of means and methods that can be conducive to the transformation and, ultimately, resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, the identification of human needs[7] and its adoption as the new paradigm for a more effective way of the

[5] Richmond, 2003, op.cit., p. 301.
[6] Paul Wilkinson, 15 October 2003. *Inaugural Lecture of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence*, University of St Andrews.
[7] John Burton (ed.), 1990a. *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

ways in which conflict resolution approaches can be more successful was catalytic in the understanding of the violent dimension of the Basque conflict as well as the explanation of the civil society's total rejection of extremist and State violence.

In chapter Five I have analysed my framework of analysis on which I based my thesis, and which brought together a comprehensive understanding of all three schools of study in order to explain the Basque conflict. Using the ethno-symbolic model I have argued that there can be no normative description of nationalisms as either good or bad. Instead, and drawing from the analysis of the Basque case, I argued that the nationalist discourse is reflected circumstantially and as such it can alter its basic structures and orientation from a predominantly ethnic or cultural one into a civic, or political, nature. The transformation of the Basque civil society's perceptions with regards to the utilisation of ethno-terrorist violence, as well as the meaning it confers to their ethnic identity and the highlighting of their difference towards the Spanish identity, shows just that. Therefore, if the basic ingredients of a particular manifestation of nationalism can change, as happened in the Basque case, then it is obvious that conflict resolution techniques can capitalise on this precondition and, with a contextualisation and correct identification of the motives behind the use of ethno-terrorism in ethno-nationalist conflicts, it is possible to isolate such discourses and underline the stalemate which they are conducive to with the detrimental effects to the conflictive parties, as well as the society in general. My argument is based on the perceptive change that took place in the Basque local society with regards to the conflict, and it is the identification of that very society's attitude that elevated it to the role of the conflict transformator, precisely because the discourse of both the Basque militants as well as the Spanish central authorities were locked in a war of attrition that contributed to the perpetuation of conflict. The examination of both discourses made evident that, were the State to examine some of the Basque demands for alleviation of grievances (for instance, the issue of prisoners) without examining them under the prism of its own nationalist discourse, and, more importantly, show in practical terms to the Basques that it respects their difference and has all the necessary resources that a pluralist liberal democratic state has to provide remedies to their grievances, perhaps the change in the attitude of the

society would have come sooner. This, in turn, implies that the society and its perceptions do have a role to play when it comes to the perpetuation of violent discourses and actions.

Chapter Six examined the emergence of Basque violence as a constitutive part of Basque nationalism and attributed it to the pragmatic injustices carried by the Francoist regime towards the Basque society. In fact, not only was it attributed, but it was also perceived by the vast majority of the Spanish population that ETA and its members were the only group capable of opposing the dictatorship. As it was highlighted, however, it is important to remember that from the point of view of ETA and the Basques in general, the attacks did not just aim to end the dictatorship but to lead to a decision where the Basques would be recognised as something different from the Spanish population. That is not only evident by the continuation of violence and the persistence of ETA, which by now has acquired a life of its own and has become a legend of the Basque people,[8] but also by the mass reinsertion of ETA(pm) militants in 1982 and their establishment of a political party that had exactly the same goal as the militants, only it accepted the new rules of the game. All nationalisms rest on the assumption that the present is inadequate and that, if the nation is to walk towards a glorious future, it must find inspiration in its glorious past.[9] The Basque case is not an exception to the case. Invariably among nationalisms, the glorious past consists of legends, myths and heroes who fought for the nation's recognition and establishment. When violence becomes perceived as something virtually genetic ("we always fought for our freedom"), it becomes accepted and exalted by society. The emergence of ETA was a result of the nationalist readings its pioneer members occupied themselves with, and the unjust regime against which it stood only reinforced the nationalistic symbols of martyrs and heroes. It is precisely this point which verifies that terrorism is only a method used by the Basque nationalist movement to achieve its higher aims. Unlike orthodox theories of terrorism I have argued that, in the Basque case, terrorism cannot be isolated from the study of the nationalist discourse, precisely because the perception of the local population – at least during the dictatorship and the transition to democracy – consisted of the belief that violence was the only choice

[8] William Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, 1990, "On the interpretation of terrorist violence: ETA and the Basque political process", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.32, No.2, p.254.
[9] Matthew Levinger & Paula Franklin Lyttle, 2001. "Myth and Mobilisation: the triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol.7, No.2, pp. 175-194.

that could guarantee the avoidance of succumbing to the violent assimilation the State was leading them to.

Terrorism, as explained in chapters Five and Six, can be viewed as the continuation of politics by other means. Ethno-terrorism, I argued, is a form of political communication and the level of violence, that is, the intensity of the communication, can vary. In the Basque case, the identification of many Spanish citizens with ETA against the regime certainly underlines the overall will of the citizenry to wage a war against their very government – a verification of Pankhurst's introductory quote. From the moment the transition is complete and the establishment and operational merit of democracy is fully functional, one would expect the violence to end because one can see the peaceful alternatives. Yet, as it was explained, neither the transition nor the establishment of democracy brought any alleviation to the Basques. In the first case, it was because the security forces in the Basque country remained manned by the same people that served in them during the dictatorship. In the second case, the scandal of the GAL threw some of the popular support behind ETA, despite later disclosing and punishing those responsible for its conception and materialisation.

When one intends to wage war, one is prepared to suffer losses and cause damages. The fact that, up until the end of the Cold War, war was only a mostly inter-state phenomenon should not forbid us from highlighting the intention behind the desire. The asymmetry of the conflict, in other words, does not deny the terrorist opportunities in which to start a war with the state. Quite the opposite, in fact, since deadlier and more spectacular attacks are taking place to counterbalance that asymmetry and dispute the state's legitimacy.[10] In the Basque case, as this thesis has shown, the intention to wage war against the state was justified, to a certain extent, by the majority of the population and when that subsided, violent fractions of Basque nationalism still enjoyed rigorous support from the few remaining networks of support.

The examination of both sides of the conflict, that is, the central authorities vis-à-vis the militant nationalists, was necessary in order to reveal the third actor in this conflict, the local society. Chapter Seven analysed the strategic choices made by the two principal actors and highlighted the political and operational stalemate that emerged as a

[10] Oliver Richmond, 2003. op.cit.

result of spoiler tactics employed by both sides at different times.[11] It showed how the emergence of a civil society that positioned itself against terrorism but in favour of nationalism was a direct consequence of that stalemate. The identification of a local "culture of violence" as a further spoiler to the process[12] makes the transformation of societal attitudes even more significant and relevant because it manifests a change in the core value that violence is useful in promoting the Basque claims as well as defending their ethnic difference. The peculiarity of the Basque society's stand is that it automatically disqualifies the aforementioned sides' argument that they act in the name of 'the people'. On the one hand, the central authorities' claim that any political problem has been solved with the Statue of Autonomy; on the other, the extremists' allegations that the only political problem is the Basque country's lack of independence. The formation of a civil society that rejects violence but not any nationalist aspirations is a reply to the former that independence is still very much a cause affecting many Basque citizens, and at the same time it constitutes a warning to the latter that their violent behaviour undermines the society's efforts to promote the same cause with the constitutional means available.

The political games played by both the local as well as the state-wide political parties are a direct cause for the emancipation of the local society with regards to its involvement in the conflict. Furthermore, it can also be understood as the society's defensive reflex that was generated by the fact that in the last 15 years ETA's targets involve more and more Basque citizens of any profession. In other words, ETA reached the point described by Wilkinson where a petty minority imposed its tyranny on the majority.[13] The number of people affected by the 40 year conflict is too large for such a small region, to the extent where virtually everyone has some relative with experiences of violence either from the part of the state – that includes not only deaths and injuries but also the vital matter of the allocation of Basque prisoners in prisons outside the Basque country – as well as from the part of militant nationalist organisations. It is in this light that the Basque civil society emerged as the only active resolution generator and

[11] Conversi, 2006, op.cit.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Paul Wilkinson, 1990. "Some observations on the relationship between terrorism and freedom" in Martin Warner & Roger Crisp (eds.), *Terrorism, Protest and Power*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 44-53.

promoter in this conflict. Indeed, it was the only actor that ceased to constitute a "spoiler" for the resolution of the conflict.

It is on these findings this thesis was founded to show that an end to ethno-terrorist practices is possible if the circumstances of its emergence are clearly and objectively analysed, free from political discourses and biases. For the part of the State this can be made possible by examining the role and importance of the local discourses as they are expressed, rather than as the State authorities interpret them. The key practices that can allow for the isolation of the terrorists from the communities they claim to represent is for the State to provide assurances to those communities, through practical application of liberal pluralist models of government, that a) it recognises it is the most important actor in the alleviation of their grievances, and b) that it is working for said alleviation in a way that instils the confidence in the population that a non-violent, political process is preferable, as a strategy, for the political bargaining entailed in the demands for further autonomical concessions.

Clearly, one of the criticisms for this study is that, even though States have conceded to demands of secession in the past, it is mostly very hard for them to accept it immediately and unconditionally, not least because of the predominance of the Westphalian traditions. However, it is not this thesis' aim to prescribe a normative framework of secession. Rather, it is to claim that a more organised political planning could have eliminated the violence in the Basque country much earlier. Lack of political guidance and will by the primary nationalist parties in the early stages of the democracy allowed violence to continue being considered as the most viable alternative. The central authorities, on the other hand, and their security forces, behaved as if the violent organisation were nothing but obtrusive insects, thus, deluding themselves that violence is the only dimension of this conflict. While this thesis does not claim to be providing a framework that can explain *every* terrorist conflict that surfaces, nonetheless it sets the parameters under which the emergence of terrorist activity can be contextualised and understood beyond moral judgements and predicaments.

By focusing on a critical analysis of the theories of nationalism, terrorism and conflict resolution, my thesis identifies a section that permits all three to be used conjointly in order to explain the ethno-terrorist nature of a nationalist conflict and the

possibilities for its termination. While all three fields have existed and have been analysed separately, the critical frameworks that have been brought forward in the recent years and which I have analysed, have showed me that a correct identification and analysis of the dynamics and practices of all three allows for a better contextualisation of ethno-nationalist conflicts and, crucially, brings to the fore the possibilities that such conflicts might be only circumstantially protracted. That is, the until recently lack of a comprehensive understanding of how nationalist ideology operates and the instances in which its cultural elements attract and incorporate violent practices, which in turn recycle those cultural traits, made almost impossible the identification of those elements in the conflict that could be identified as the key-mechanisms that should have attracted the attention of conflict resolution scholars.

What my argument makes clear in theoretical terms is that conflict resolution can constitute a tool of intervention in the process in which Nationalism gives rise to ethno-Terrorism. As the Basque case has shown, the circumstances under which ethno-terrorist practices become tautological with the broader ethno-nationalist discourse can be disrupted if conflict resolution identifies effectively the cultural and symbolic implications that legitimise the use of violence for the sake of the nationalist objective, that is, independence. For that to be achieved, conflict resolution must be directed towards a) the minority, which perceives both the nationalist as well as the violent dimensions to be legitimate, and b) the State, which, ultimately, has a vested interest in assuring the minority that, not only does it possess the capacity and resources to alleviate possible grievances but, crucially, that it is willing to adopt or extend any political mechanisms that allow the minority to differentiate itself politically from the central structures without finding refuge to violence, which is in turn perpetuated by discourses that take advantage of the cultural structures that are the basis for said differentiation. In order for that process to be successful, the State must co-operate with any local actors, such as NGOs, civil society initiative groups or moderate nationalist platforms that oppose violence. Besides rejecting any temptations to radicalise its anti-terrorist practices that may mistakenly expand to target non-violent nationalist circles, the implementation of the typical tools offered by conflict resolution, such as workshops or informal dialogue can contribute to the clarification of both perceptions and objectives of both sides. Such

practices will also be beneficial because they will help persuade the civil society of the State's willingness to attend to their demands and, as a result, will make the utilisation of violence seem a rather 'suicidal' option. I use the term 'suicidal' because, as is evident in the Basque case, where concessions have been made and there exists the political will to further the political cooperation and elaboration of a possible resolution, any violent manifestations may lead the State to back down or reject further concessions. This was the case in Spain during the centre-right government of José Maria Aznar of the second half of the 1990s, the main difference being, of course, that said government miscalculated the support it received from both the local as well as the national society with regards to its anti-terrorist objectives, as explained in chapter Seven.

Having said that, it is the persistence of the Basque civil society during the same period to continue rejecting any manifestations of nationalist violence, despite the radicalisation of the State-wide government to radicalise its anti-terrorist discourse and strategies, that helps my thesis bring forward a new ontological, methodological and epistemological analysis and understanding of ethno-terrorism in ethno-nationalist conflicts. If political violence is an umbrella notion[14] that incorporates many a different ways for a group to manifest its rejection of State policies, and to set an agenda of their grievances and/or disapproval of such policies,[15] then it becomes evident that freedom-fighting is not necessarily synonymous to terrorism and should not be compelled towards the escalation of political violence into the use of ethno-terrorism, especially in cases where the freedom sought is from a liberal democratic state that has become oppressive towards the minority, precisely because the latter is a 'permanent' minority in a framework that favours the decisions made by the majority. On the contrary, my thesis speculates that alternative actions, for example mass protests, industrial mobilisations, or civil disobedience of the strongest form, can constitute means by which the minority can make its case in very strong terms, thereby exerting pressure on the State in order to initiate or, at least, participate in a process where the demands of said minority will be taken into account and acted upon. This, of course, rests on the idea that the notion of terrorism in the case under examination is properly understood by being correctly and

[14] Paul Wilkinson, 1983. *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, Basingstoke; London: MacMillan, pp. 32-33.
[15] Crenshaw, 1990, op.cit., p.17.

accurately contextualised through an explanation of discourses that are critically analysed, precisely because, after the beginning of the War on Terror, states have been seen to succumb to the temptation to brand virtually any non-institutional opposition as ‘terrorists’.

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Personal Interviews

Informal:

This comprised of many casual conversations and unofficial dialogue with representatives of the Ministry of the Interior and the Popular Party in Madrid. It also included many unofficial conversations with citizens of Madrid with regards to their views on the conflict, and the attitudes of both the terrorist organization as well as the government's attitude towards the conflict and ETA. In the Basque Country, unofficial conversations included a member of the PNV, a member of the Aralar party, and two ex-militants from the village of Marketa that have participated in the organization during the 1980s. All asked to remain anonymous, though their words are recorded in my field notes.

Formal:

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