FAMILY, AMBITION AND SERVICE: THE FRENCH NOBILITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE STANDING ARMY, c. 1598-1635

Daniel Thomas

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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November 2010

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I, Owen Daniel Thomas hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 80,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will contend that a permanent body of military force under royal command, a ‘standing army’, arose during the first three decades of the seventeenth century in France. Such a development constituted a transformation in the nature of the monarchy’s armed forces. It was achieved by encouraging elements of the French nobility to become long-term office-holders within royal military institutions. Those members of the nobility who joined the standing army were not coerced into doing so by the crown, but joined the new body of force because it provided them with a means of achieving one of the fundamental ambitions of the French nobility: social advancement for their family.

The first four chapters of this thesis thus look at how the standing army emerged via the entrenchment of a system of permanent infantry regiments within France. They look at how certain families, particularly from the lower and middling nobility, attempted to monopolise offices within the regiments due to the social benefits they conferred. Some of the consequences that arose from the army becoming an institution in which ‘careers’ could be pursued, such as promotion and venality, will be examined, as will how elements of the the nobility were vital to the expansion of the standing army beyond its initial core of units. Chapters Five and Six will investigate how the emergence of this new type of force affected the most powerful noblemen of the realm, the *grands*. In particular, it will focus on those *grands* who held the prestigious supra-regimental military offices of Constable and Colonel General of the Infantry.

The thesis concludes that the emergence of the standing army helped to alter considerably the relationship between the monarchy and the nobility by the end of the period in question. A more monarchy-centred army and state had begun to emerge in France by the late 1620s; a polity which might be dubbed the early ‘absolute monarchy’. However, such a state of affairs had only arisen due to the considerable concessions that the monarchy had made to the ambitions of certain elements of the nobility.

CONTENTS

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Tom Coombes and Matt Jennings back home in Dorset. At St Andrews, I'd particularly like to thank Russ Coombes, Cathal McDermott, Paula Kelly, Mark Byrne, Martin Maher, and Andy Drinnon for their friendships.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Archival sources

AAE	Archives des affaires étrangères, Paris
AMC	Archives du musée Condé, Chantilly
AN	Archives nationales, Paris
BnF	Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris
Cabinet	Cabinet d'Hozier (BnF)
Carrés	Carrés d'Hozier (BnF)
Cangé	Réserve des imprimés, collection Châtre de Cangé (BnF)
DB	Dossiers bleus (BnF)
Dupuy	Fonds Dupuy (BnF)
Ms.Fr.	Manuscrits français (BnF)
Na.Fr.	Nouvelles acquisitions françaises (BnF)
PO	Pièces originales (BnF)
MC	Minutier central des notaires parisiens (AN)
MD	Mémoires et documents, France (AAE)
NA	The National Archives, London
SP	State Papers (NA)
SHDAT	Service historique de la défense, fonds de l'armée de terre, Vincennes

Printed primary sources

Avenel	D.L.M. Avenel (ed.), *Lettres, instructions diplomatiques et papiers d'état du cardinal de Richelieu*, (8 vols., Paris, 1853-1876).
ACL	François de Bonne, duc de Lesdiguières, *Actes et correspondance du Connétable de Lesdiguières*, ed. Louis Douglas & Joseph Roman, (3 vols., Grenoble, 1878-1884).

Bassompierre, *Mémoires*	François de Bassompierre, *Journal de ma vie: mémoires du maréchal de Bassompierre*, (4 vols., Paris, 1870-1877).
Brienne, *Mémoires*	Henri-Auguste de Loménie, comte de Brienne, *Mémoires du comte de Brienne*, in Claude-Bernard Petitot and Louis Jean Nicolas Monmerqué (eds.), *Collection des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France*, (78 vols., Paris, 1820-1829), XXXV-XXXVI, numbered I-II in text.
Code Michau	A.L Jouran, J. Decrusy and F.A. Isambert (eds.), *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises depuis l'an 420 jusqu'à la Révolution de 1789*, (28 vols., Paris, 1821-1833), XVI.
Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*	François du Val, marquis de Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires de messier François Duval, Marquis de Fontenay-Mareuil [...]*, in Joseph-François Michaud and Jean-Joseph Poujoulat (eds.), *Nouvelle Collection des mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu'à la fin du XVIIIe siècle – 2e série*, (10 vols., Paris, 1837-1838), V.
LMHIV	B. Xivrey and J. Guadet (eds.), *Recueil des lettres d'Henri IV*, ed. B., (9 vols., Paris, 1843-76).
Pontis, *Mémoires*	Louis de Pontis, *Mémoires du sieur de Pontis*, in Claude-Bernard Petitot and Louis Jean Nicolas Monmerqué (eds.), *Collection des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France,*

	(78 vols., Paris, 1820-1829), XXXI-XXXII, numbered I-II in text.
Richelieu, *Mémoires*	Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal de Richelieu, *Mémoires du cardinal de Richelieu*, in Joseph-François Michaud and Jean-Joseph Poujoulat (eds.), *Nouvelle Collection des mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu'à la fin du XVIIIe siècle – 2e série*, (10 vols., Paris, 1837-1838), VII-VIII, numbered I-III in text.
Rohan, *Mémoires*	Henri de Rohan, *Mémoires du duc de Rohan*, Claude-Bernard Petitot and Louis Jean Nicolas Monmerqué (eds.), *Collection des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France*, (78 vols., Paris, 1820-1829), XVIII-XIX, numbered I-II in text.
Sully, *Mémoires*	Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, *Mémoires des sages et royales oeconomies d'estat, domestiques, politiques et militaires de Henry le Grand*, in Joseph-François Michaud and Jean-Joseph Poujoulat (eds.), *Nouvelle Collection des mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu'à la fin du XVIIIe siècle – 2e série*, (10 vols., Paris, 1837-1838), II-III, numbered I-II in text.

Secondary Sources

Courcelles, *Dictionnaire universel*	Jean-Baptise-Pierre Courcelles, *Dictionnaire universel de la noblesse de France*, (5 vols., Paris, 1820-1822).
Haag, *La France Protestante*	Eugène Haag and Emile Haag, *La France Protestante ou Vies des protestants français [...]*, (10 vols., Paris, 1846-1859).
La Chesnaye	François-Alexandre Aubert de La Chesnaye Desbois, *Dictionnaire de la noblesse*, (2nd ed., 15 vols., Paris, 1770-1786).
Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*	Simon Lamoral Le Pippre de Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique et historique de l'origine, des progress et de l'état actuel de la Maison du Roi et de toutes les troupes de France*, (3 vols., Liège, 1734-5).

Conventions

All regimental names have been italicised throughout the thesis, in order to distinguish them from geographical regions or noble families. For example, *Champagne* refers to the regiment of Champagne, rather than the province, whilst *Vaubecourt* refers to the regiment of Vaubecourt, rather than, specifically, the Nettancourt-Vaubecourt family.

All quotations from primacy sources have retained their original orthography. Abbreviations and contractions have been silently expanded.

Introduction

The Nobility and Military Change in Early Modern France.

The present thesis is concerned with the relationship between the French nobility and the royal army during a period roughly spanning the first three decades of the seventeenth century. At its heart, the dissertation will argue that there was a change in the nature of royal military offices during this era owing to the emergence of a standing army, and that elements of the French nobility were not only affected by this process, but in many respects enabled it. This was not an imposed, top-down development. Whilst at its base this work is one of military history, it is one which is also fundamentally concerned with wider patterns of social, political and cultural change in early modern France. As such, before the main lines of argument are laid out, it is necessary to define some of the key issues with which the thesis is concerned, and to explore the historiographical background that surrounds the nobility and military change in early modern France and Europe.

I – The Nobility in Early Seventeenth-Century France

By the early sixteenth century, members of the French nobility were 'persons of superior status', who enjoyed certain privileges.[1] For example, nobles had separate law courts to the rest of the population; they expected to play a leading role within the realm's governance; they enjoyed certain fiscal exemptions; and they engaged in practices which were designed to emphasise their social superiority to the non-noble masses, such as publicly carrying arms. Nobles were not expected to engage in commerce or labour. Instead, they were to 'live nobly' through the revenues they accrued from their seigneurial lands, although from the reign of Henri IV the state began to encourage noble investment in wholesale trade and overseas commercial ventures. Within France, these manifold privileges were attributed to whole families and could be passed onto multiple inheritors.[2] The nobility comprised just over 1% of the French population by the early seventeenth century, which approximated to 40-50,000 families.[3]

[1] William Beik, *A Social and Cultural History of Early Modern France*, (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 70-72.
[2] H.M. Scott and Christopher Storrs, 'Introduction: the Consolidation of Noble Power in Europe, c. 1600-1800.', in H.M. Scott (ed.), *The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, (2 vols., London, 1995), I, p. 11-16.
[3] Michel Nassiet, *Parenté, noblesse et États dynastiques, XVe-XVIe siècles*, (Paris, 2000), p. 23.

Yet, the fact that a person benefited from special privileges did not automatically make them a nobleman – members of the clergy also enjoyed certain rights, for instance, and they formed a separate estate. Moreover, perceptions of what constituted noble status had changed by the early seventeenth century. The medieval image of nobility was largely that of a chivalric knight who held a position of semi-independent authority. Yet, by the mid sixteenth century certain non-military government offices had began to ennoble their incumbents. The rise of this new type of nobleman – the so-called *noblesse de robe*, in contrast to the older *noblesse d'épée* – helped entrench the idea that military service was not fundamental to noble status.[4] Indeed, nobility was increasingly defined by the late sixteenth century as a status based on birth, rather than occupation.[5] Concurrently, the monarchy was pushing harder than before its right to monopolise the conferral of nobility, against medieval practices whereby noble status could potentially be acquired through a form of customary social acceptance. Thus, by the early seventeenth century, nobility was 'a special legal status' in France, which was 'transmissible through the male line', and which marked a family as distinct from non-nobles.[6]

However, the nobility did not form a uniform group. Instead, they formed a hierarchical pyramid, with a noble's stature based on the wealth, offices, titles and lineage they enjoyed. At the risk of over-generalisation, the nobility can broadly be divided into three groups: the high nobility, or *grands*; the upper-middling nobility, or *noblesse seconde*; and the lower nobility, or *petite noblesse*. The *grands* were the kingdom's aristocratic elite and included the royal family itself. They played a central role in governing France, whether in terms of the offices they held at court, or in other institutions in Paris and the provinces. They enjoyed incomes of over 50,000 *livres* per year, were extremely wealthy by contemporary standards, and formed only around 1%

[4] It should be noted that many of those who bought ennobling offices were already noble, and that in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries there was little concept of a robe/sword distinction. This developed in the late sixteenth century to distinguish those members of the nobility who were relative newcomers to the estate and whose principal attribute were their "plume" offices, from others whose noble origins dated back to the fifteenth century or earlier, and whose character continued to be defined by matters such as military service or 'living nobly' on their estates. For more on relationship between office-holding and the nobility, and between the *robe* and *épée*, see James Wood, *The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux, 1463-1666*, (Princeton, 1980), pp. 43-98,

[5] Ellery Schalk, *From Valor to Pedigree: Ideas of Nobility in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, (Princeton, 1986), pp. xiv-xv, 3-35, 115, 208.

[6] Wood, *Nobility*, quote on p.12, see also pp. 20-42

of the nobility.[7] Below the *grands* were the *noblesse seconde*. These families had revenues of between 10-50,000 *livres* per year. They enjoyed greater income and influence than the mass of provincial nobility, but did not form part of the very highest noble elite. They constituted 13% of noble society by the eighteenth century, but may have been less than 5% during the early seventeenth century.[8]

The remaining 90-95% of French nobles can be deemed *petite noblesse*. These men often only held the title of 'seigneur', 'écuyer', or 'baron'. By the early seventeenth century, around 5% of French noble families would have enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle, with revenues of 5-10,000 *livres* per year. The remaining 85-90% of families would have had yearly incomes of less than 5,000 *livres*, which would have enforced a significantly more modest existence, with very few servants and little in the way of extravagant expenditure. Indeed, a large percentage of nobles had very low revenues indeed. Within the *élection* of Bayeux, 51% of noble families in 1639 had an income of less than 400 *livres* per year, whilst in Brittany two-thirds of the nobility had annual revenues of less than 500 *livres* by 1700. Below this level, there existed a final grouping of nobles whose revenues were less than 100 *livres* per year. By the late seventeenth- and early eighteenth century, Dewald has estimated their numbers at around 8-14% of Norman noble society, whilst Nassiet has stated that they were 'nombreuses' in Brittany. Thus, in the period of this dissertation between one-half and two-thirds of all nobles had revenues of less than 1,000 *livres* per year, whilst

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[7] Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701*, (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 363-4; David Parrott, 'Richelieu, the *Grands*, and the French army', in Joe Bergin and Laurence Brockliss (eds.), *Richelieu and his Age*, (Oxford, 1992), pp. 136-138; Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, *The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century: From Feudalism to Englightenment*, (Cambridge, 1985), p. 52.

[8] Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret stated that 13% of French nobles had revenues of 10-50,000 *livres* by the eighteenth century, Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, *The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century: From Feudalism to Englightenment*, (Cambridge, 1982), p. 52. By contrast, Wood has stated that in 1639 only 7% of nobles in the *élection* of Bayeux had an annual income of over 5,000 *livres*: Wood, *Nobility*, p. 121. Whilst Wood's figure should not be overly-generalised, it would be difficult to argue that those enjoying revenues and influence which would make them significant provincial power-brokers would be higher than 5% of total noble society during the early seventeenth century. The use of the term *noblesse seconde* within this thesis does not necessarily imply the acceptance of the arguments advanced by Laurent Bourquin and Jean-Marie Constant, who have contended that such a group received patronage directly from the monarchy in order to weaken the power of the *grands*. Such a definition exaggerates the independence of the *noblesse seconde* from the *grands* and, as Robert Descimon has argued, is difficult to transpose onto non-border provinces. J.-M. Constant, 'Un groupe socio-politique stratégique dans la France de la première moitié du XVIIe siècle: la noblesse seconde' in P. Contamine (ed.), *L'État et les aristocracies: France, Angleterre, Écosse: XIIe-XVIIe siècles*, (Paris, 1989), pp. 279-301; Laurent Bourquin, *Noblesse seconde et pouvoir en Champagne aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles*, (Paris, 1994); Robert Descimon, 'Chercher de nouvelles voies pour interpréter les phénomènes nobiliaires dans la France moderne. La noblesse "essence" ou rapport social?', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 46 (1999), pp. 11-12

maybe one in ten nobles were 'pauvres', subsisting at a level barely above that of the better-off peasantry.[9]

The boundaries between these three categories of nobility were often blurred. The social standing of noble families could fluctuate, based on matters such as changing royal favour,[10] or declining revenues from seigneurial estates, and the only unifying factor between the court elite and the *noblesse pauvre* was their legal status. Indeed, it is important to re-state that military service was not an *essential* constituent of noble status by the early seventeenth century. Perhaps fewer than 10% of nobles performed regular military service in the century prior to Louis XIV's 'personal rule'.[11] Nevertheless, in propaganda, conduct manuals and noble mythology, military service to the monarch and chivalric qualities were placed centre stage from the reign of Henri IV. Further uncovering the exact relationship between the nobility and military service is thus a central goal of this thesis.[12]

Such an investigation will reveal much about the nobility's relationship to wider governmental change in early modern France. Traditionally, the strong, centralised states that were believed to have emerged in this period across Europe, often labelled as 'absolute monarchies', were seen as requiring the destruction of noble power, due to their independent authority and capacity for social discord. Yet, as Ronald Asch has put it, modern research now portrays the nobility as 'triumphant rather than defeated' in the seventeenth century.[13] With reference to the early modern nobility, terms such as 'consolidation' or 'transformation' are now favoured, rather than 'crisis' or 'decline'. These ideas have largely been accepted by historians of early modern France. Instead of being engaged in a struggle for power, the monarchy is now

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[9] Chaussinand-Nogaret estimated that 87% of the French nobility had incomes of less than 10,000 *livres* by the turn of the eighteenth century, Chaussinand-Nogaret, *French Nobility*, pp. 52-3. Based on the figures cited by Wood, Dewald and Nassiet, and Wood's contention that there were 'substantial increases in noble income' between 1639 and 1666, I would argue that a higher percentage of nobles in the early seventeenth century would have had lesser incomes than those in the eighteenth century, not least because many of the poorest members of the nobility fell out of the order in the interim. Hence my estimate that 85-90% of noble families had incomes of less than 5,000 *livres* per year. Wood, *Nobility*, p.121; Jonathan Dewald, *Pont-St-Pierre, 1398-1789*: *Lordship, Community and Capitalism in Early Modern France*, (London, 1987), pp.98-99; Michel Nassiet, *Noblesse et pauvreté: la petite noblesse en Bretagne XVe-XVIIIe siècles*, (Rennes, 1993), pp. 125-126, 375-376.

[10] See Nicolas Le Roux, *La faveur du Roi: mignons et courtisans au temps des derniers Valois (vers 1547 – vers 1589)*, (Paris, 2000), for a study of the effects of royal favour in the sixteenth century.

[11] Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l'État moderne, (1559-1661)*, (Paris, 1989), p. 45; Wood, *Nobility*, pp. 81-90.

[12] For a work which considers the wider importance of violence to the nobility, see Stuart Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France*, (Oxford, 2006).

[13] Ronald G. Asch, *Nobilities in Transition, 1550-1700: Courtiers and Rebels in Britain and Europe*, (London, 2003), p. 4.

seen as using at least elements of the nobility as agents of growing royal authority, with certain nobles accepting such a role due to the social and political advantages it afforded them.[14] The nobility's vital role in the informal interpersonal networks of 'clientage' or 'affinity', which were perhaps more important to the flow of power than formal avenues of administration, meant the monarchy could not easily dispense with the nobility in the exercise of authority.[15] Other historians have suggested how the nobility adapted to change at a more conceptual level, in terms of evolving ideas of merit, or how aspects of aristocratic experience allegedly prepared the nobility for modernity.[16] Naturally, notes of caution have been inserted into these discussions.[17] Yet, overall, it would appear reasonably indisputable that the nobility was more firmly in royal service by the final third of the seventeenth century than it had been a century beforehand, and that this process helped to create a more powerful form of French state headed by the monarchy. This dissertation will seek to understand how such an evolution occurred in one of the monarchy's central institutions: its armed forces. However, before such an investigation can transpire, it is first necessary to understand the wider context of early modern military change.

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[14] See, for example: Wood, *Nobility*, pp. 156-170; Ariane Boltanski, *Les ducs de Nevers et l'État royal*, (Geneva, 2006); Katia Béguin, *Les princes de Condé: rebelles, courtisans et mécènes dans La France du grand siècle*, (Seyssel, 1999); David Potter, *War and Government in the French Provinces, Picardy 1470-1560*, (Cambridge, 1993); Bourquin, *Noblesse seconde*; William Beik, *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Authority in Languedoc*, (Cambridge, 1985); Rowlands, *Dynastic State*. The work which perhaps most vividly portrays the nobility's transition between 1560 and 1660 from self-conceived independent guardians of the 'bien public' to advocates 'd'un pouvoir royal fort' is Jouanna, *Devoir*, particularly pp. 7-12, 219-223, 394-396.

[15] The central interpretive work on early modern French clientage is Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France*, (Oxford, 1986). For examples of how noble affinities operated see Mark Greengrass, 'Noble Affinities in Early Modern France: The Case of Henri I de Montmorency, Constable of France', *European Studies Quarterly*, 16 (1986), pp. 275-311; Stuart Carroll, *Noble Power During the French Wars of Religion: The Guise Affinity and the Catholic Cause in Normandy*, (Cambridge, 1998); Malcolm Walsby, *The Counts of Laval: Culture, Patronage and Religion in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century France*, (Aldershot, 2007). Certain historians have questioned the strength of noble clientage networks during the sixteenth century: Kristin Neuschel, *Word of Honor: Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century France*, (Ithaca, 1989); Robert R. Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite: the Provincial Governors of Early Modern France*, (New Haven, 1978).

[16] Jay M. Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789*, (Ann Arbor, 1996); Jonathan Dewald, *Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture: France, 1570-1715*, (Oxford, 1993).

[17] Dewald has noted how certain nobles struggled to adapt to new capitalistic forms of economy: Dewald, *European Nobility*, pp. 67-87, 105-106.

II –Military Change in Early Modern Europe, and the Emergence of the Standing Army in France

The European armies of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were quite clearly different to their medieval counterparts.[18] The introduction of gunpowder had led to the growing importance of infantry and artillery, at the expense of heavy cavalry formations. Armies generally grew in size from, for instance, the 30,000 troops used by Charles VIII of France in 1494, to the army of around 320,000 men fielded by Louis XIV during the 1690s.[19] Warfare had also become more continuous and expensive in nature. Yet, beyond these statements, historians continue to debate how these changes occurred, and the effect they had on wider government and society.

One means of exploring the transformation of early modern warfare has been to explicitly link it to state-formation. This interpretation found perhaps its most famous exponent in Michael Roberts' theory of the 'Military Revolution', which has provoked considerable discussion amongst historians over the exact relationship between war and the state.[20] A different approach can be found in the recent works of David Parrott, who sees the system of military enterprise as the key to understanding warfare between 1560 and 1660.[21] Such a system saw the responsibility for the administration of warfare devolved to military entrepreneurs – private individuals who levied and commanded entire army groups on the behalf of a government. Only with the widespread use of private investment could early modern warfare be successfully propagated, rather than an anachronistic programme of centralised state construction. Indeed, Parrott argued that many of the failings of the French army under Richelieu resulted from the monarchy's official rejection of such a system.[22]

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[18] Frank Tallett and D.J.B. Trim, '"Then was then and now is now": an Overview of Change and Continuity in late-Medieval and Early-Modern Warfare' in Frank Tallett and D.J.B. Trim (eds.), *European Warfare, 1350-1750*, (Cambridge, 2010).
[19] Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, p. 1.
[20] Michael Roberts, 'The Military Revolution, 1560-1660' in Michael Roberts (ed.), *Essays in Swedish History*, (Minneapolis, 1967), pp. 195-218; Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Europe*, (Boulder, 1995); Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*, (Cambridge, 1983); Jeremy Black, *A Miltiary Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1500-1800*, (Basingstoke, 1991).
[21] David Parrott, 'The Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe', *History Today*, 42 (1992), pp. 21-7. The fundamental work on early modern military enterprise remains Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Entrepreneur and his Work Force: a Study in European Economic and Social History*, (2 vols., Wiesbaden, 1964).
[22] David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642*, (Cambridge, 2001); David Parrott, 'From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies: War, State and Society in Western Europe, 1600-1700', in Tallett and Trim (eds.), *European Warfare*, pp. 74-95.

Parrott's findings mesh well with other recent writings on the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century French army.[23] James Wood, for example, has concluded that the royal army suffered from an 'incomplete military revolution' during the early Wars of Religion: the French state had neither monopolised the means of waging war, nor did the wars create structures which would have allowed the monarchy to easily defeat the Huguenot rebels.[24] Analysing a later period, Guy Rowlands has sought to explain how Louis XIV was able to field larger armies and propagate more successful warfare between 1661 and 1701. Whilst an improvement in administrative structures was important, Rowlands concluded that such a change was fundamentally achieved by turning the army into an institution which could more effectively satisfy the nobility's private interests, encouraging them to invest their credit in the institution[25] The recent work by Hervé Drévillon has also stressed the importance of satisfying the interests of officers to forming a more successful army under Louis XIV, by the creation of a career army that could satisfy the honour of the nobility through sustained royal service.[26]

As can be seen through a comparison of the armies found in the works of Wood on the one hand, and Rowlands and Drévillon on the other, the armed forces of the late seventeenth century *were* significantly different from those of the early to mid sixteenth century. Indeed, in many respects, the greatest military change of the seventeenth century was the rise of what might be called the 'standing army'. Robert Frost's definition of the 'new armies' that emerged between 1600 and 1720 in Europe perhaps comes closest to capturing the essence of the 'standing army', even if he did not use the term himself. They were:

> [P]ermanent, regular armies composed of career soldiers and career officers. These new forces possessed a permanent regimental and administrative structure, a clear

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[23] In addition to the works by Wood, Rowlands and Drévillon cited below, see David Potter, *Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480-1560*, (Woodbridge, 2008); André Corvisier and P Contamine (eds.), *Histoire militaire de la France*, vol. I, *Des origines à 1715*, (Paris, 1992); John Lynn, *Giant of the* Grand Siècle*: the French Army, 1610-1715*, (Cambridge, 1997); Jean Chagniot, 'Le régiment des Gardes du roi d'après les roles de montres conservés à la Bibliothèque nationale de France (1584-1643)' in B. Barbiche and Y.-M. Bercé (eds.), *Études sur l'ancienne France offertes en hommage à Michel Antoine*, (Paris, 2003), pp. 101-114.

[24] James Wood, *The King's Army: Warfare, Soldiers and Society During the Wars of Religion in France, 1562-1576*, (Cambridge, 1996).

[25] Rowlands, *Dynastic State*.

[26] Indeed, there are perhaps more similarities between Rowland and Drévillon's interpretations than might appear at first glance, as will be shown in Chapter Two, Section II. Hervé Drévillon, *L'Impôt du sang: le métier des armes sous Louis XIV*, (Paris, 2005).

hierarchy of rank, and the modern division into officers, non-commissioned officers and private soldiers.

Such forces produced a 'new military culture' which was 'recognisably modern'. *Esprit de corps* was able to develop, especially amongst officers, as regiments 'invented their traditions'. Indeed, such was the importance and spread of these new armies in Europe by the late-seventeenth century, Frost has contended that they justified Roberts' overall concept of Military Revolution.[27]

However, it is perhaps unwise to dub the rise of the 'standing army' as a 'military revolution'. As will be seen in Chapter One, the emergence of such a force in France occurred in such a haphazard manner that the term 'evolution' might be more appropriate. Moreover, the 'statist' connotations of the theory, as traditionally conceived, might underplay the vital role of private interest in the construction of standing armies.[28] Nonetheless, this dissertation will argue that a force compatible with that described by Frost had begun to emerge in France by the early seventeenth century, when around a dozen royal regiments entrenched themselves as permanent bodies. In particular, the regiments permitted administrative continuity between peacetime and wartime forces to occur, and the pursuit of long-term military careers by certain officers began to take place.

This was a significant contrast to the situation prior to the 1560s, when no permanent French infantry forces had existed. The royal army was predominantly made-up of foreign mercenaries, and was almost completely levied and disbanded at the start and end of each campaign.[29] The move towards a new, standing army in France began during the second half of the sixteenth century, but was not truly confirmed until the period of this dissertation. Hitherto, the vital era in the emergence of a standing army in France has usually been dated to the second half of the

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[27] Especially as Frost interpreted Roberts' thesis as a relatively broad 'shift in the relationship between communities, territorial states and the armed forces' in early modern Europe. Robert Frost, *The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721*, (London, 2000), pp. 307-10. An alternative definition of a 'standing army' can be found in Olaf van Nimwegen, 'The transformation of Army Organisation in Early-Modern Western Europe, c. 1500-1789', in Tallett and Trim (eds.), *European Warfare*, p. 161. However, Frost's definition is preferable to van Nimwegen's, as it can accommodate the presence of large numbers of foreign troops in a state's 'standing army'.

[28] Indeed, it should be noted that not just governments but also military enterprisers such as Wallenstein produced forces which were close to those of 'standing armies' during the Thirty Years' War. Indeed, in some respects, the armies of the enterprisers were models that governments subsequently followed, rather than mere temporary anomalies in the nature of military force.

[29] Wood, *King's Army*, pp. 41-42. David Potter's argument that the 'birth' of the French infantry occurred during the first half of the sixteenth century will be addressed in Chapter One, Section I. David Potter, *Renaissance France*, pp. 95-123.

seventeenth century.[30] Yet, many of the aspects of this later force can be found in the early seventeenth-century army. Indeed, if the early seventeenth century is seen as an odd period in which to make claims for military development, this is largely a product of its neglect by French military historians, rather than it intrinsically being an era of inertia or decline.[31]

Whether the regiments were the *first* standing army in French history is perhaps debatable due to the creation of the permanent *compagnies d'ordonnance* in 1439. Better known as the *gendarmes*, these heavy cavalry units formed the elite of the royal army until the outbreak of civil war in the 1560s. Yet there are several difficulties in describing the *gendarmerie* as a standing army. Firstly, the *gendarmerie* was not an entire army, but merely a branch of arms. Whilst this dissertation will focus mainly on the royal regiments, a smaller portion of the new standing army was also comprised of permanent cavalry and artillery units in order to form a complete body of arms. Secondly, instead of grouping *gendarme* companies into intermediary corps, such as regiments, the *gendarmerie* was essentially a disparate collection of stand-alone units. This inhibited the creation of a collective identity, which was vital to the mentality of a standing army. The cost of serving in a *gendarme* unit was also prohibitively expensive for most of the nobility; a situation that progressively worsened during the civil wars. Whether many nobles were able to pursue a coherent 'career' within the *gendarmerie* is thus questionable, even if they had managed to obtain an officer's commission. Finally, even during its pomp, the *gendarmerie* never became the majority or even the core of royal forces, unlike the infantry regiments, and by the end of the sixteenth century the *gendarmerie* was quite palpably in terminal decline. By the 1620s, it formed little more than a tiny auxiliary force within the royal army.

Thus, this thesis will argue that a new form of military organisation, the 'standing army', emerged in early seventeenth-century France, based on the consolidation and adaptation of the system of infantry regiments that had emerged during the second half of the sixteenth century. The regimental system was a response to the changing demands of early modern warfare, although it is questionable whether

[30] Drévillon, *L'Impôt*; van Nimwegen, 'Transformation.'; Rowlands, *Dynastic State*.

[31] Even David Parrott's superb study of the army during Richelieu's ministry, i.e. 1624-1642, largely drew its conclusions from the period after France entered into war against Spain in 1635. Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*. For a notable exception, see Xavier Audoin, *Histoire de l'administration de la guerre*, (4 vols., Paris, 1811), II, 142-90, which ascribed the vital role in early modern French military reform to Henri IV, if in a rather crude, statist fashion.

this formed part of any rational move towards 'state-formation' by the monarchy. Indeed, the emergence of the standing army can only be understood through its relationship to the private interests of a wider section of society: the nobility.

III – Family, Ambition, and Service: The French Nobility and the Emergence of the Standing Army in France

This dissertation will contend that the French nobility not only adapted to military change in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but that important elements of this estate were vital to the creation and development of the standing army. The creation and maintenance of the regiments was ultimately decided upon by the monarchy, and the overall campaign objectives of the early seventeenth-century army were determined by the priorities of the Bourbon dynasty. Yet, one should be sceptical of any interpretation which alleges that either the crown, or an abstract 'state', could somehow hoist new structures, such as the standing army, onto an unsuspecting society. As David Parrott has put it, a 'reified "state"' did not exist 'apart from the wider social context' in which 'military systems operated' in the early modern period. Instead, '[a]rmies and military institutions represent the relationship between rulers and political elites'. The development of armed forces necessitated the 'willingness' by societal 'elites to "invest" – socially, financially, culturally – in military activity and institutions'.[32]

The standing army thus emerged in France due to the willingness of a section of the nobility to "invest" in such a structure, and it was thus partially shaped by their interests and concerns. Why this occurred should be understood in terms of the words which partly comprise this dissertation's title: family, ambition and service. Put simply, certain noble families sought out royal service in the standing army in order to satisfy their ambitions of social advancement. Far from being comprehensively threatening, changes in the nature of royal military offices were a source of new opportunities for many noble families. Consequently, the men within the regiments helped to reconfigure the wider relationship of service between the monarchy and the nobility. During the early seventeenth century, the regimental system helped the

[32] Parrott, 'Miliary Enterprise', p. 77. See also: Jan Glete, 'Warfare, Entrepreneurship and the Fiscal-Military State' in Tallett and Trim, *European Warfare*, pp. 301-321; Tallet and Trim, "That was then", pp. 11-15.

monarchy to make great strides towards enforcing a monopoly over the legitimate use of armed force within France. Indeed, whilst certain nobles benefited from the new regimental system, the standing army also forced an alteration to the family ambitions of certain *grands* who held supra-regimental military offices. Increasingly, their social ambitions and prestige were becoming defined by the royal military offices that they held, rather than their independent military authority. Thus, much of this thesis will ultimately consider the extent to which the nobility redefined themselves as a 'military service élite' in the employ of the crown during the early seventeenth century, why and how they did so, and to what extent this situation was reversible by 1635.[33]

The importance of satisfying family ambition to the French nobility will be apparent throughout this study. Therefore, it is important that the exact meanings of both 'family' and 'ambition' are defined, as early modern perceptions of these concepts differed to our own. Indeed, as Nassiet has stated, the definition and importance of familial links is a socio-cultural, rather than biological, construct.[34] According to Beik, '[t]he family was the basic unit of society' in early modern France.[35] As such, many works which have used a study of a noble families as their starting point have not only revealed much about the 'assumptions, aspirations, mentalities and lifestyles of the nobles' but have also provided profound insights 'into the impact of royal demands and state development, economic and financial problems and social relations.'[36] It has become clear that notions of 'parenté' and 'parents', roughly understood as kinship and kin, not only encompassed blood relations in the early modern period, 'but also affinity caused by marriage' and 'spiritual kin in the shape of godparents.' There was also a greater consciousness of distant relatives and their interests than exists today, seen through the myriad references to 'cousins' in seventeenth-century sources. Overall, due to the stress placed on both 'ancestry and issue', it is important to realise that early modern families conceived of themselves as long-standing dynasties, whose futures required meticulous planning in order to achieve continued stability and success.[37] As Rowlands has demonstrated, the

[33] Scott and Storrs, 'Introduction', pp. 41-46.
[34] Nassiet, *Parenté*, pp. 11-13.
[35] Beik, *Social and Cultural*, p. 225.
[36] Quote from Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, p. 13. For examples of such studies see: Carroll, *Noble Power*; Dewald, *Pont-St-Pierre*; Boltanski, *Nevers*; Béguin, *Condé*; Walsby, *Laval*; Raymond Mentzer, *Blood and Belief: Family Survival and Confessional Identity among the Huguenot Provincial Nobility*, (West Lafayette, 1994).
[37] Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, pp. 13-14.

importance of dynasticism to the nobility became perhaps most obvious during the second-half of the seventeenth century. However, this dissertation will contend that a concern for dynastic strategy is already quite evident amongst the nobility who inhabited the standing army in the decades immediately after 1598.

The nobility's concern for their family's welfare, and their conception of this unit in 'dynastic' terms, is vital to understanding French society and state-development in this period.[38] Dynasticism played a crucial role in the emergence of the state because French noble families held ambitions towards improving their social standing, and at least a section of noble society found an outlet for such desires within emerging royal institutions. Admittedly, such an argument rests on a modern definition of 'ambition'. As Jay Smith has contended, early seventeenth-century nobles would have conceived of ambition in negative terms as an "uncontrolled passion for glory and fortune", which 'epitomized the selfishness and cupidity' of the peasantry or bourgeoisie rather than the nobility.[39] Smith's argument is borne out by appearances of the word in early seventeenth-century dictionaries and memoirs. As Richelieu, perhaps ironically, put it: 'ceux qui ont le moins de mérite ont d'ordinaire le plus d'ambition'.[40] Yet, the importance of ambition to the nobility should not be discounted if understood in the non-pejorative present-day sense as 'a desire to rise to high position, or to attain rank, influence, distinction or other preferment.'[41] This definition of ambition lies at the heart of the actions of many noble families during the early seventeenth century. Most considered it a matter of prime importance that the social station of their dynasty was constantly improved, both in terms of their material wealth, but also through the increased sense of honour and prestige that such ascendancy entailed. Moreover, noble families realised that such ambitions could only be achieved through a conscious planning of family strategy, especially with relation to matters such as marriage and profession. Families were not always united in their

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[38] Rowlands argued that dynasticism played '*the* [...] crucial role' in French state-formation, leading to his conception of the 'dynastic state' under Louis XIV. Ibid.

[39] Smith, *Culture of Merit*, p. 44. The first quote is a citation from Antoine Fuertière's *Dictionnaire universel* published in 1690.

[40] Richelieu's comment was directed against Charles d'Albert, duc de Luynes. Richelieu repeatedly used 'ambition' in a pejorative sense both to defame Luynes and to explain his supposedly unjustified rise to power: Richelieu, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 153, 154, 157, 222, citation on p. 154. Held for many years as a classic example of an early modern 'ambitieux', Luynes reputation has recently received a boost in Sharon Kettering, *Power and Reputation at the Court of Louis XIII: the Career of Charles d'Albert, duc de Luynes*, (Manchester, 2008).

[41] "ambition, n.", *The Oxford English Dictionary*, (2nd ed., 1989). <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50006948> [6 September, 2010].

actions. Due to contemporary perceptions of what constituted 'parenté', the sheer breadth of certain dynasties inevitably led to intra-familial disputes.[42] Yet, at least within the standing army, the unity of family members in the pursuit of higher social status is more evident than discord.

Overall, that a section of the French nobility realised that family ambitions could be achieved through royal service in regimental offices is not just the key to understanding the emergence of the standing army in France, but also to the development of a new relationship between the nobility and the monarchy. Much of this thesis is thus concerned with how a new type of state, with the monarch much more firmly at the apex of power, would start being built in France, based on the convergence of the dynastic interests of the crown and elements of wider noble society.

To understand how an army functions in almost any era requires a historian to go beyond research of a purely military nature, in order to comprehend the wider societal context which both produces and moulds armed force. Accordingly, this thesis employs both military and non-military sources in an attempt to uncover the relationship between the emerging standing army and the nobility. As with most studies of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, there are inherent limitations placed on this study due to the amount of surviving documentation. Moreover, as the administrative structures of the standing army were only emerging during this period, many of the documents used to study the French military during later periods simply do not exist. To cite one notable example, the mass of correspondence housed in the French military archives at Vincennes, emanating largely from the secretaries of state for war, does not truly begin until after 1631, and thus little information has been mined from this location.[43]

The two fundamental types of archival sources on which this study is built are thus found in the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris. Firstly, and at the heart of this thesis, is an examination of 1,051 *montres et revues*, or muster rolls, within the *Manuscrits français*.[44] In an attempt to reduce fraud, each *revue* listed every soldier

[42] Carroll, *Blood and Violence*, pp.29-37.
[43] Thierry Sarmant, 'Introduction' in Jean-Claude Devos, Marie-Anne Corvisier de Villele, Thierry Sarmant, Samuel Gibiat (eds.), *Guide des archives et de la bibliothèque*, (Vincennes, 2001), pp. 18-21.
[44] Within BnF Ms.Fr. 25764-25901 there are some 12,859 *revues* covering the period between 1347 and 1716.

within a military unit who was to receive payment from the crown, in order to theoretically prevent commanders from reporting an artificially high number of soldiers and pocketing the difference. The company and regiment of each unit were listed on the *revue*, and its officers, often down to the level of sergeant, were specified.[45] The *revues* I have studied cover a forty year period beginning with the accession of Henri IV to the throne, specifically the years 1589-1590, 1593, 1597-1601, 1605-6 and finally 1609-1629.[46] Given that a *revue* was meant to take place every 36 days, and that a regiment consisted of around eighteen to twenty companies, around 180-200 *revues* should have occurred each year for each permanent regiment. Yet, the number of *revues* which remain for each year fluctuates quite dramatically: there are 220 rolls preserved from 1593, in comparison to 250 in total between May 1610 and December 1619. On the basis of the 1,051 rolls I have studied, which contain every roll from 1610-1629 and the majority from 1597-1609, there remain only 124 *revues* for the best preserved regiment, the *Gardes*. Nonetheless, enough *revues* remain in total for an effective prosopographical analysis of regimental officers to be undertaken. Indeed, it is not necessary to see every *revue* from this period to discern general trends regarding the length of officer service, and how certain companies changed in composition over time.[47] This is especially the case when *revues* are used in collaboration with *états*, documents which show the 'state' of a certain fraction of royal military force at a given point in time. Whilst *états* often only show the name of commanding officers, such as regimental captains, and rarely show subaltern ranks, such as lieutenant and ensign, they are still an extremely useful resource for information on the composition of the infantry officer corps.[48]

After using the *états* and *revues* to construct a database of regimental officers, genealogical research was conducted on these men and their families. Hence, a major source for this thesis is the *Cabinet des Titres* within the Bibliothèque Nationale. The *Cabinet* contains a multitude of pieces relating to the family history of the French nobility, most notably: notarial acts; essays on the history of individuals or families;

[45] The date and location of each *revue* was also usually listed.
[46] BnF Ms.Fr. 25817-25818, BnF Ms.Fr. 25825-25827, BnF Ms.Fr. 25831-25835, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837-25839, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841-25849.
[47] Unfortunately, whilst *revues* of *gendarme* and light-cavalry companies also exist within the Ms.Fr. 25000 series, they do not occur to the same extent as infantry companies, largely precluding an in-depth analysis of their changing composition over time.
[48] Collections of *états* for this period can be found at: BnF Ms.Fr. 16997-16730; BnF Na.Fr. 24841-24842; BnF Cangé 5, f. 5r-8r; 'lettres patentes du roy...', 12 August 1588, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, n.p.; 'estat des regimens...', January 1597, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, n.p.

documents from the *Chambre des Comptes*; family-trees; and proofs of lineage. Due to the fact that many officers within the permanent regiments emanated from the *petite noblesse*, often only a very limited amount of documentation has survived for their families. Nonetheless, when the data found in the *revues*, *états* and *Cabinet des Titres* is combined with printed and non-printed letters and memoirs, along with printed genealogical dictionaries (such as that of La Chesnaye Desbois), a picture emerges of the dynastic strategies undertaken by a section of the nobility, and how these related to royal military offices. As a whole, the research for this thesis is thus based upon an array of relatively well-known printed sources, and a concerted degree of research performed in several archives in both France and England, using a large number of underused or neglected military and non-military sources.

The thesis is organised into six chapters, which investigate how each of the three levels of the nobility defined in Section I of this introduction interacted with the new military offices of the early seventeenth century. Chapter One gives an overview of the emergence of the standing army via an investigation into the murky origins of the royal regiments, and the significance of the decision to maintain permanently a handful of such regiments in the late 1590s. The dominance of certain *petite noblesse* families within the regiments will be explored in Chapter Two, as a consequence of this new standing army. The relationships between families in the regiments will be considered, as will their wider societal goals, to show how service within the royal infantry began to provide a means by which the *petite noblesse* could achieve their wider ambition of social advancement. Chapter Three will delineate how the royal army began to be perceived as a 'career' army by its officers, which meant that informal practices relating to promotion and venality started to occur. These two factors militated against the dominance of a narrowly-constituted closed oligarchy within the regiments, and precipitated future debates over how a noble's 'merit' should be judged with respect to royal service. The bulk of the first three chapters will focus on the *vieux* regiments of the *Gardes, Picardie, Navarre, Piémont* and *Champagne*. These were the first regiments maintained on a permanent basis after 1598, and were recognised by contemporaries as being the elite units of the royal infantry.[49] A fourth chapter will explore how the standing army expanded through a

[49] The *Gardes* will be consistently included within the *vieux*. Due to the intermittent differences between the *Gardes* and the other *vieux*, the term *quatre-vieux* will be occasionally used to make reference to *Picardie*, *Navarre*, *Champagne* and *Piémont* alone. Whilst formally designated as *vieux*

study of *Normandie* and the *petits-vieux* – newer-regiments which followed in the wake of the *vieux*. In particular, the chapter will investigate the critical role played by members of the *noblesse seconde* in the formation of these regiments.

The final two chapters will investigate how the new standing army affected the relationship between the *grands* and royal military offices, particularly with reference to those members of the high nobility who held supra-regimental military *charges*. Chapter Five will look at an office which was theoretically the most prestigious military position of the realm, that of the Constable, between 1593 and 1626, a period which saw both the revival and abolition of the *charge*. It will display how the Constable's overall lack of definite powers over the new standing army meant the *charge* could be marginalised within royal military structures, precipitating its extinction. The final chapter will focus on the duc d'Épernon, and his office of Colonel General of the Infantry. In particular, the chapter will investigate the level of both formal and informal authority he held over the standing army, how this was affected by changing notions towards royal service amongst the lower nobility who held regimental office, and the impact this had on Épernon's overall military influence within France. Across both final chapters, the argument will be made that the new standing army began to lessen the reliance of the monarchy on the military power of the *grands* – at least in periods of low-intensity warfare – and that members of the high nobility increasingly turned to royal *charges*, rather than their independent authority, as a means to achieve or consolidate their social prestige. This situation was, however, by no means irrevocable in 1635.

This dissertation's focus on the nobility is partially forced. The officer corps of the army, down to the level of company subalterns within the regiments, was almost completely dominated by nobles. Uncovering the details of soldiers' lives below the level of company officers is fraught with difficulties due to a lack of available source material; it would not be until the mid- to later-seventeenth century that military administrators began to record greater amounts of information about the 'ordinary' soldiers who formed the mass of the French army. Thus, whilst Robert Chaboche was able to give some idea of the social background of troops during the second third of

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regiment from c. 1617, the use of the term *vieux* in this dissertation does not include *Normandie* unless otherwise stated. This owes to the fact that *Normandie* belonged to a different era of regimental creation, as will be shown in Chapter Four, Section II.

the seventeenth century,[50] it is only from around the 1670s, when sources such as the *contrôles de troupes* began to materialize, that a huge amount of information relating to the 'ordinary' French soldier appears for historians to exploit.[51]

Yet, in other respects, the decision to focus on the nobility's relationship to the army is a conscious choice. Based on the research conducted for this thesis, it would appear that a, if not *the* crucial determinant in the evolution of the French early modern army was whether the private interests of the nobility, or at least elements of it, could be achieved through the holding of royal military office. That the monarchy was increasingly able to satisfy noble ambitions within the royal army during the early seventeenth century explains the higher level of functionality, and even success of this force than those of the preceding and succeeding periods described by Wood and Parrott. Indeed, through the following analysis of the early standing army, a fuller picture of not only the relationship between the monarchy and the nobility, but also of the mutating early seventeenth-century French state, will hopefully be provided.

[50] Robert Chaboche, 'Les soldats français de la guerre de trente ans: une tentative d'approche', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 20 (1973), p.10-24.

[51] Accordingly, it is no surprise that the first in-depth study of the French soldiery uses material which dates from the late-seventeenth/early-eighteenth century: André Corvisier, *L'armeé française de la fin du XVII siècle au ministère de Choiseul: le soldat*, (2 vols., Paris, 1964).

Chapter One

The Emergence of the Standing army: the Rise of the Regimental system in France, c. 1550-1635

In the sixteenth- and early seventeenth century, a regiment was an intermediary unit of military administration. It existed between a company, the smallest unit of military organisation, and an army group. The regiment's commanding officer, after whom the regiment was sometimes named, was called the *mestre de camp*. A regiment was constructed from several smaller groups, known as companies, which were each commanded by a captain. The *mestre de camp* would also personally command one of the regiment's companies. There was no set-figure for how many companies a regiment should have, but it was rare for a regiment to have less than five or more than twenty during the early seventeenth century. The strength of each company varied according to political and military circumstance. Regiments could vary from a few hundred men, to a top-end figure of around 4,000. Overall, the regiment was intended to be a unit that was large enough to undertake reasonably significant military action, but small enough to alleviate problems relating to logistics and discipline. Disorder would be reduced through placing a more manageable number of troops under the control of low-ranking officers than in previous infantry formations, whilst the new *mestres des camp* could further monitor the actions of company officers.[1]

This section will explain when this form of military organisation came into being in France, not least because there have been surprisingly few recent attempts to survey the early history of the French regimental system.[2] One has to return to studies published prior to the twentieth century - and especially the militarised nationalism of the nineteenth century - to find sustained analyses of the regiments prior to and during the period of this dissertation.[3] More importantly, this chapter will examine at what

[1] Wood, *King's Army*, p. 106. It is important to note that regiments and regimental companies were largely administrative units, rather than tactical. During warfare, companies from several regiments could be temporarily amalgamated to form battalions. See, for example, the deployment of royal troops at the Ile-de-Ré in 1622: Robert Arnaud d'Andilly, *Journal inédit de Arnaud d'Andilly*, (6 vols., Paris, 1888-1909), I, 1622, p. 23.

[2] The best overview of the early French infantry is found in Potter, *Renaissance France*, pp. 95-119. Jean Chagniot makes some extremely illuminating comments in a short article on the *Gardes* between 1584 and 1643: Chagniot, 'Gardes'. James Wood provided a short discussion of the early regiments during the 1560s and 1570s: Wood, *King's Army*, pp. 106-110. Parrott does not offer a sustained analysis of the regiments in his work, but did present a wealth of details on how this form of organisation related to matters such as tactics, size, venality and clientage: Parrot, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 42-56, 226, 333-4, 471, 552. Rowlands and Drévillon both provided detailed analyses of the regiments and their officer corps, but their works focused on the second half of the seventeenth century: Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, pp. 153-226; Drévillon, *L'Impôt*, *passim*.

[3] Gabriel Daniel remains an invaluable starting point for analyses of the early regimental system: Gabriel Daniel, *Histoire de la milice françoise [...]*, (2 vols., Paris, 1721), II, pp. 260-284, 331-434. However, the fundamental work on the French regimental system remains Louis Susane, *Histoire de l'ancienne infanterie française*, (8 vols., Paris, 1849-1853), even if it is not entirely reliable. This should be read in conjunction with his more general survey, Louis Susane, *Histoire de l'infanterie française*, (5

point certain regiments achieved a guaranteed level of permanency within the royal army, an estimate of the numbers of troops that were maintained within them, and where these units were stationed in the early seventeenth century. Finally, it will demonstrate that the security afforded to regiments was extended to the officers who composed them.

The achievement of stability by certain royal regiments was a critical moment in the history of the early modern French army. It marked a point when the monarchy began to maintain permanently a core of infantry units and officers regardless of whether a state of war existed or not. Accordingly, the royal army began to enjoy a degree of administrative continuity that had previously not existed. The regiments in this chapter thus provided the basis for a new standing army, compatible with the definition found in the introduction to this thesis. This army would persist for the remainder of the *Ancien Régime*, whilst the regiments, as an overall form of infantry organisation, remain in use by the French state to this day.

I – French Infantry Organisation c.1450-1590: the Origins of the Regimental System

The regiments were not the first form of infantry organisation employed by the French monarchy. Indeed, the starting point for most discussions of the royal infantry remains the *ordonnance* of 1448, which outlined the creation of a notably new form of force, the *francs-archers*. This force was formed from around 18,000 troops by the 1470s.[4] A few historians have ascribed some importance to these units, arguing that they marked

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vols., Paris, 1876-7). The nineteenth century produced a number of other analyses that contain interesting interpretations and information on the early regiments: Audoin, *Histoire*, II, pp. 82-190; Lt-Col Victor Belhomme, *Histoire de l'infanterie en France*, (5 vols., Paris, 1893-1902), I, pp. 308-333; Edgard Boutaric, *Institutions militaires de la France avant les armées permanentes*, (Paris, 1863), pp. 317-347, 370; Edouard de La Barre Duparcq, *Histoire sommaire de l'infanterie*, (Paris, 1853), pp. 25-30; A. Dareste de La Chavane, *Histoire de l'administration en France*, (4 vols., Paris, 1848), II, pp. 304-307. Many individual regimental histories appeared in the late nineteenth century. These were often written by infantry officers, and were undoubtedly an attempt to restore national pride in the wake of France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Many of these authors attempted to trace the history of nineteenth century infantry units back to sixteenth-century formations, whilst stressing the mutations that the regiments had undergone in the interim. For example, see: Benjamin-Charles-Lucien Amiot, *Historique du 24e régiment d'infanterie*, (Paris, 1893); Cpt Faivre d'Arcier and Lt Roye, *Historique du 37e régiment d'infanterie, ancien régiment de Turenne, 1587-1593*, (Paris, 1895); Marius Bourgue, *Historique du 3e régiment d'infanterie, ex-Piémont, 1569-1891*, (Paris, 1894); Émile Coste, *Historique du 40e régiment d'infanterie de Ligne*, (Paris, 1887); Henri Demiau, *Histoire du 5e régiment d'infanterie de ligne, 1569-1890*, (Caen, 1890); Louis-Victor-Alfred Jeanneney, *Glorieux passé d'un régiment, 1562-1899*, (Calais, 1899); Noël Lacolle, *Histoire des Gardes-françaises*, (Paris, 1901); M. Méjécaze, *Historique du 6e régiment d'infanterie*, (Paris, 1889).

[4] Potter, *Renaissance France*, p. 102.

a notable improvement in the discipline, permanency and pay of French infantry forces.[5] Yet, this method of organisation was ultimately abortive: Louis XI initially abolished the *francs-archers* in 1481, and, despite intermittently appearing afterwards, their definitive abolition occurred in 1535.[6] François I's system of legions, consciously modelled on the ancient Roman method of organisation, fared little better. An *ordonnance* of 1534 stated that seven legions of 6,000 troops each were to be raised in certain provinces, in an attempt to reduce the monarchy's reliance on foreign troops. Each legion would have six captains commanding 1,000 troops each, with one of them also named as colonel of the legion. All officers were to be from the provinces to which the legion was ascribed. Despite some initial success, problems of indiscipline soon arose and largely overwhelmed the force. After attempts to modify the system during the 1550s, the legions appear to have fallen into disrepute by the early 1560s.[7]

However, by the first half of the sixteenth century, another form of royal infantry organisation had emerged: the *bandes*. These were divided into two types: 'old' and 'new'. According to Susane, the 'old' *bandes* emerged during the monarchy's wars of the late fifteenth century. They were recruited in one province, commanded by local nobles, and were maintained on a permanent setting, being dispersed into garrisons during peacetime. The units which had been fighting in the duchy of Burgundy and northern France became known as the *bandes de Picardie*, whilst those engaged against the Habsburgs in Italy were called the *bandes de Piémont*. This in turn led to the division of royal forces between those 'deçà les monts' and those 'delà les monts'. Whilst the 'monts' in question were thus originally the Alps, the authority of the administration 'delà les monts' gradually extended to encompass all the southern provinces during the sixteenth century. Thus, the 'old' *bandes* may have provided the framework by which the increasingly dominant section of royal military accounts, the *trésorerie de l'extraordinaire des guerres*, became organised for the majority of the *ancien régime*.[8] The 'new' *bandes* arose in the 1530s as it became clear that the legions had been a failure. Whilst both 'old' and 'new' *bandes* had similar organisational structures, the 'new' *bandes* were not considered permanent, and were disbanded at the end of each campaign. Moreover, the 'new'

[5] La Chavane, *Histoire*, II, pp. 293-7; Belhomme, *Histoire*, I, pp. 110-117; Boutaric, *Institutions*, p. 319.
[6] Potter, *Renaissance France*, pp. 103-104.
[7] Potter, *Renaissance France*, pp. 112-117; Belhomme, *Histoire*, pp. 304-305.
[8] Susane, *Infanterie*, I, pp. 31-64; David Potter, *War and Government in the French provinces, Picardy 1470-1560*, (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 170-1. For the *extraordinaire des guerres*, see Potter, *Renaissance France*, pp. 220-224; Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, pp. 112-114.

bandes were widely held to be filled with 'aventuriers', a pejorative term which had the meaning of both 'foot soldier' and 'pillager'.[9]

Whilst Susane and Potter were sceptical about the success of the 'new' *bandes*, both stressed the importance of the 'old' *bandes* to the development of the French infantry. Potter stated that the 'old' *bandes* had 'effectively evolved into regiments by the 1540s', as they were 'kept on a permanent footing and regularly paid', with some already based on systems of ensigns commanded by a colonel. Overall, Potter concluded that 'a recognisable French infantry' had come into being by the middle of the sixteenth century, with the 'volunteer battle-hardened veterans' of the 'old bands' of Picardy and Piedmont being the basis of a 'permanent and top-class' force.[10]

Certainly, Potter was right to argue that the origin of the French regiments was not a clear-cut event. The *bandes* of Picardy and Piedmont were far more permanent and regularised than previous forms of French infantry. Some noblemen had even begun to divide the troops under their command into smaller units, along the lines of regimental organisation, by the mid-sixteenth century. Yet the size, unwieldiness and impermanency of command within the *bandes* show that they can only be considered an imperfect step towards an infantry-based standing army. The *bandes* meant that French infantry before 1561 was largely divided under the authority of two Colonels General of the Infantry, based on the administrative division of military France into 'deçà' and 'delà les monts'.[11] Both Colonels only maintained a very small number of permanent captains under their command. Susane himself conceded that the *bandes* were only permanent as an overall framework – indeed shell – of organisation; their actual composition was subject to frequent mutation. Troops from *Picardie* were sent into the *bandes de Piémont* when war erupted, and regular, arbitrary disbanding of troops occurred according to political and military circumstance.[12] Large numbers of captains had to be levied at the start of each war, each could be in control of up to 2,000 men,[13] and they were organised in such a manner that created 'confusing lines of authority'.[14] Moreover, there remained no real form of intermediary organisational level between the company and the army group. Whether any form of *esprit de corps* could possibly have emerged from such a system is highly questionable. It is,

[9] Potter, *Renaissance France*, p. 107.
[10] Susane, *Ancienne*, II, pp. 228-9; Potter, *Renaissance France*, pp. 108, 110, 122-123.
[11] These posts would be combined into one position in 1569, Belhomme, *Histoire*, pp. 261-2.
[12] Susane, *Ancienne*, II, pp. 229-230.
[13] Susane, *Infanterie*, I, p. 90.
[14] Wood, *King's Army*, p. 106.

therefore, difficult to see the *bandes* as true precursors of a proper regimental system, nor do they appear to meet the requirements for a standing army as defined in this thesis' introduction.[15]

The foundation of the first truly recognisable royal infantry regiments can therefore still be seen as occurring in 1561, when the duc de Guise placed three units, consisting of 12 companies of 200 men, under the command of a *mestre de camp*. These regiments formed the core of the royal army which fought in the campaign of 1562-1563. Guise's steps should not be over-estimated, however. All the regiments that were levied for the first civil war had been disbanded by the outbreak of the second in 1567. The only regiment that survived was the *Gardes*, which was established from the best companies of the disbanded regiments in 1563 to provide a bodyguard of veteran soldiers for Charles IX. As such, the *Gardes* has the best claim to being the monarchy's first permanent infantry regiment.[16] After the start of the second civil war in 1567, certain other regiments began to be maintained during peacetime. However, the majority of regiments raised between 1567 and 1598 continued to be levied at the start of each war and disbanded at their end.[17] Moreover, even the regiments that were maintained during peacetime, from the late 1560s, were not necessarily the same units that fought during subsequent conflicts, or which were maintained during resulting periods of peace, such was the flux of reformation, redistribution and disbandment.

No regiment could count on a long-term lifespan during the first twenty years of the civil wars; even the *Gardes* underwent significant re-organisation during this

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[15] It does appear, however, that many officers and troops from the *bandes* were re-deployed into the new regiments during the 1560s: Susane, *Infanterie*, I, pp. 126-150; Susane, *Ancienne*, II, pp. 236-7; Lacolle, *Gardes*, pp. 5-14; Demiau, *Histoire*, pp. 13-14; Bourgue, *Piémont*, pp. 13-27. However, given the continued flux seen in the new regiments during the early civil wars, as the rest of this section will show, it would be simplistic to state that the regiments were merely a re-branding of the existing *bandes* system; the reorganisation appears both more fundamental and haphazard than that. As will be seen below, certain contemporaries did try to claim seniority for a regiment based on links that it allegedly held to older forms of infantry organisation such as the *bandes*. These claims were frequently driven by self-interest, and thus contain a fair degree of ahistorical manipulation.

[16] Wood, *King's Army*, pp. 107-8. The *Gardes* was thus part of the royal infantry throughout the period under examination, rather than the *Maison du roi*. The regiment was not a detached bodyguard unit, and should be considered as central to any discussion of the early evolution of the royal infantry. It is only during the reign of Louis XIV that one might contend that the *Gardes* became part of the *Maison du Roi*, as Chagniot and Drévillon have done: Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 101; Drévillon, *L'Impôt*, pp. 61, 72-3. However, Rowlands has argued against such a belief: Guy Rowlands, 'Louis XIV, Aristocratic Power and the Elite Units of the French Army', *French History*, 13, (1999), p. 316.

[17] Whilst he does include Protestant and foreign units as well, Susane lists over 300 regiments as being levied between 1561 and 1597, of which the overwhelming majority did not survive past 1598: Susane, *Ancienne*, VIII, pp. 18-67

period. In 1566, the regiment was broken-up, with certain units maintained in garrison in Picardy, and the unit confusingly referred to as either the regiment de Strozzi or de *Picardie*, after its *mestre de camp* and location. After more coherent reorganisation in the late 1560s and early 1570s, the regiment was again disbanded by Charles IX in 1573. Susane has plausibly ascribed this action to the king's suspicions that the *Gardes* was becoming overly favourable to his brother, the duc d'Anjou. Indeed, one of the *duc*'s first acts on becoming king, as Henri III, was to re-establish the regiment.[18] In any case, it was only from the mid-1570s that the *Gardes* enjoyed a reasonably stable existence.

Similarly, it is convenient to state that the origins of *Picardie, Piémont,* and *Champagne* can be traced to a reorganisation of royal forces that occurred in 1569.[19] Yet, these units were born from the debris of disbanded regiments in the late 1560s, which themselves had been little more than a haphazard re-deployment of certain units from the 'old' *bandes*. The new regiments would then be subject to further bouts of reorganisation during the 1570s and early 1580s. Indeed, until the mid-1580s, both *Picardie* and *Piémont* continued to be known under the name of whichever *mestre de camp* commanded the regiment.[20] It was not until the 1580s, therefore, that a more stable existence for the *Gardes*, *Picardie, Champagne* and *Piémont* was assured. As Wood has put it, 'it is difficult to trace an incontrovertibly continuous life for even a single French regiment' until 'well past' 1576.[21]

The early life of the other *vieux* regiment, *Navarre*, is even murkier, as it did not enter the royal army until Henri IV's accession to the throne in 1589. Until this date it had been known as the 'Gardes du Roy de Navarre', a Protestant regiment founded in 1569 to protect Henri, who was then prince and heir-apparent of the kingdom of Navarre. The regiment appears to have been initially formed from the remnants of disbanded local *bandes* which had been serving in the south-west of France.[22] When it officially entered into royal service in 1589, the regiment promptly took the name of its *mestre de camp*, François de Valirault, undoubtedly in deference to the royal *Gardes* now under Henri's control. It only took the name of the *Régiment de Navarre* on Valirault's death in 1594, a moment when Henri also elevated *Navarre*

[18] Susane, *Ancienne*, II, pp. 19-22; Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 112.
[19] Susane, *Ancienne*, VIII, p. 34.
[20] Ibid., II., p. 240; Bourgue, *Piémont*, p. 27.
[21] Wood, *King's army*, pp. 108-9.
[22] Susane, *Ancienne*, III, pp. 1-10; Demiau, *Histoire*, p. 16; Daniel, *Milice*, II, p. 358.

to *vieux* status.[23] Thus, *Navarre* only became part of the royal army due to Henri IV's accession to the throne, a major dynastic accident given there were three adult male Valois still living at the time of the regiment's foundation in 1569. Prior to 1589, it was merely a private defence-force under the control of a junior sovereign prince. Moreover, if one were to accept the 1560s for the regiment's date of origin, it is still necessary to recognise that this unit was probably only a reorganisation of pre-existing south-western defence forces.

The ambiguous origins of the *vieux* are significant, as by the latter part of the sixteenth-century seniority disputes began to arise amongst regimental commanders. A regulation of 1588 stated that the regiments of the *Gardes*, *Picardie* and *Champagne* should march based on the date on which they had entered into royal service. If necessary, the date of the commission of their *mestre de camp* would act as a tiebreaker.[24] Later, at the siege of Chartres in 1591, Valirault had argued with the commander of *Picardie* over which was the senior regiment. Henri ruled, undoubtedly for political reasons, in *Picardie's* favour. This manoeuvre entrenched *Picardie*'s position as the second most senior regiment below the *Gardes*, but did not end the disputes between the remaining three *vieux*. In 1620, Fontenay-Mareuil stated how the army's operation continued to be occasionally hindered by disputes among *Piémont*, *Navarre*, and *Champagne* over regimental seniority. Each had its own argument as to why it 'devoir aller le premier'. *Champagne* simply stated 'l'ancienneté de creation', *Piémont* claimed it could trace its origins back to the *Colonel général* 'delà les monts', whilst *Navarre* argued that its seniority derived from its former status as the 'Gardes du Roy de Navarre'. Fontenay-Mareuil claimed that this dispute was ended by Louis XIII in 1620. The king enforced a compromise whereby each regiment was declared of equal rank, and that 'de six mois en six mois ils auroient la preference les uns sur les autres'.[25] Other evidence suggests that Louis did not make this ruling until 1629, and, in any case, seniority disputes would continue into Louis XIV's reign, as the army grew to encompass more permanent regiments from the 1620s.[26]

The very existence of these disputes over seniority attests to the ambiguous origins of the royal regimental system. The transition from a system of impermanent

[23] Demiau, *Histoire*, pp. 16-27; Susane, *Ancienne*, III, p. 29.
[24] 'Ordre et le Reglement que le Roy veut estre desormais gardé en la presence de marches des regimens de ses gens de pied Francoise', 12 November 1588, BnF Cangé, 5, f. 15r. Additional tiebreakers also existed if the *mestre de camp* had received their commissions on the same day.
[25] Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*, p. 149.
[26] 'Rang des regiments d'infanterie', BnF Cangé, 5, ff. 276r, 278r-280v.

infantry to *bandes*, and subsequently to permanent regiments was confused and by no means certain. Indeed, Susane's histories, and those of other nineteenth-century regimental historians, were partly attempts to uncover a definite hierarchy in the early French infantry that was unclear to many of those who had actually fought in the regiments. Yet, it is probably significant that arguments of seniority began to emerge in the late 1580s and early 1590s. It was not until this period that the *vieux* had developed enough institutional self-consciousness to begin to conceive of themselves as permanent bodies with discernable histories, even if they could not exactly determine their origins.

II - The Retrenchments of the 1590s and the Maintenance of the Regiments after 1598

The preceding section has shown the difficulties in trying to pin-point the exact period, let alone year, in which regiments definitively came into existence, due to their linkage to older forms of military organisation, coupled with the constant reorganisation and disbanding of regiments which occurred for much of the second half of the sixteenth century. Rather than attempting to uncover the exact moment of their creation, it is more instructive to approximate the period in which the organisational stability of certain core regiments was *truly* confirmed, if one wishes to develop a more precise understanding of the evolution of the royal army into a permanent force.

This did not happen until 1598 and the succeeding decade. Due to the signing of the Edict of Nantes, which ended the crown's wars against the *Ligue*, and the Peace of Vervins, which terminated hostilities with Spain, a mass disbandment of royal troops occurred in the summer of 1598. This was a moment of reckoning for the royal infantry. The monarchy had to decide which regiments would have their status as permanent units of force confirmed. Most did not survive. In the wake of the peace treaties of 1598, almost the entire French infantry was disbanded. This was the first such *réformation* to occur since the start of the eighth war of religion in the early 1580s, when only the *Gardes*, out of all the infantry regiments, had truly assured permanent status. As such, if the earlier wars of religion had given birth to the regiments, only after 1598 did the monarchy *categorically recognise* which regiments had earned the right to exist on a permanent and secure basis, warfare or not.

Such a situation was partly borne from necessity. Maximilien de Béthune, baron de Rosny and future duc de Sully, had written to Henri in April 1598 to tell him that once the general peace was declared, the monarchy would have to retrench a 'bonne partie' of the infantry regiments along with certain garrisons, a situation which reflected the dire financial straits of the monarchy by the late 1590s.[27] In November 1598, Henri wrote to Sully that he was pleased a payment had been made to 'le regiment de mes gardes, comme quatre aultres regimens', and, by May 1599, Sully had begun to regularise payments to these units.[28] Thus, only the original five *vieux* regiments had been confirmed as permanent in 1598. That these regiments were maintained from this date can be seen through their consistent appearance on *revues* and *états*. The *revues* analysed for this dissertation in the Ms.Fr. 25000 series show company musters from *vieux* regiments throughout 1598 to 1601 and 1605 to 1606. There is no reason to believe that they were disbanded between these dates. Together with their appearance on *états* from 1608 to 1610, this demonstrates that the *vieux* were maintained throughout the 1600s, despite the decade being perhaps the most peaceful of the 1560 to 1660 century.

However, whilst the regiments as an overall unit of infantry organisation were consistently maintained after 1598, the size of each regiment was variable. Indeed, it is difficult to give any definite number for the size of the *vieux* during this period, not least because any historian who attempts to calculate the size of an early modern army is faced with multiple methodological problems.[29] For one, deciding on a specific moment when one should record an army's size as representative of a whole period is fraught with difficulties, and borders on the futile, at least until the improvements in military administration that occurred under Louis XIV. Accordingly, the following paragraphs will merely give an overview of both the royal attempts at standardisation, and the actual fluctuations in company and regimental size, of the *vieux* during the first thirty years of the seventeenth century.

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[27] Sully, *Mémoires*, I, p. 281.

[28] Henri IV to Sully, 6 November 1598, 8 May 1599, LMHIV, V, p. 64, VIII, p. 732. For convenience, Maximilien de Béthune will be referred to as Sully throughout this dissertation, despite the fact he did not acquire the baronnie of Sully until 1602, which became a duché in 1606.

[29] The most pertinent of these issues is when and what does one record as army size? The peak size it reaches during mobilisation? Its final strength after a long campaign? The most realistic number that the monarchy could maintain over an entire campaign? Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 164-222, considers many of these issues, whilst also attempting to give a very reasonable estimate of French army size during a slightly later period to that of this thesis.

Unfortunately, no *états* remain from the immediate post-retrenchment years of 1598 or 1599 to judge how the coming of peace affected the regiments in the extreme short-term. Yet, it is clear that the general trend between 1598 and 1610 was one of contraction. Between 1597 and April 1598, the theoretical maximum strength of *vieux* companies seems to have been set at 100 men.[30] At the same time, the number of companies in each regiment varied. In January 1597, the *Gardes* had twenty companies, *Picardie* forty-six, *Navarre* twenty-five, *Piémont* twenty, and *Champagne* twenty-seven. In the aftermath of the peace treaties, the prestige of the *Gardes* was emphasised as its companies were larger than those in the other *vieux*. Between 1601 and 1610, the regiment had a peacetime strength of 80 men per company.[31] In contrast, most of the other companies in the *quatre-vieux* were reduced to a peacetime strength of thirty-five men per company by 1601.[32] The only exceptions were a small number of companies from *Navarre*, *Champagne* and *Piémont* maintained in Provence, which had eighty-five men per company. Efforts at reducing the number of companies per regiment to around twenty also appear to have occurred during the 1600s.[33] By the end of the decade, the *Gardes* had been reduced to eighteen companies, *Picardie* fifteen, *Navarre* twenty, *Piémont* eighteen, and *Champagne* nineteen. Thus, by Henri IV's death, the total theoretical peacetime strength of the *Gardes* and *quatre-vieux* was 4,505 men. To this figure can be added two companies of 'gens de guerre a pied Suisses de cent hommes chacune servans pres sa Majesté pour sa garde'. These may well have been the *Cent-Suisses de la garde*, although it is notable that *two* companies of 100 Swiss are listed. Additionally, there were ten companies of sixty men in *Bourg*, and five companies of 100 men in *Nerestang*, which were also permanently maintained from the mid-1600s.[34] This gives the permanent infantry a total theoretical peacetime strength of 5,805 men between 1607 and early 1610.[35]

Further attempts to standardise both the size and number of companies in the permanent regiments occurred in the aftermath of Henri IV's assassination. In a peacetime *état* from 1611, the number of companies in the *Gardes* was set at twenty, with each company composed of 120 men. The other *vieux* were also to contain

[30] *Revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1391, 1416-7, 1427, 1430); Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 107.
[31] *Revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1940-3) for June 1605, and BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2183-6) for April 1609.
[32] *Revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835.
[33] *État*, BnF Na.Fr., ff. 140r-170r; *état*, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 130r-146v.
[34] The origins of *Bourg* and *Nerestang* will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
[35] In addition, approximately 6,500 troops were maintained solely for garrison purposes across the kingdom during the same period: *État*, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 1r-126r.

twenty companies, yet at a uniform strength of fifty men each, causing a decrease in troop numbers for those companies stationed in Provence, and an increase for the remainder. The regiments of *Nerestang* and *Bourg* were to maintain ten companies of fifty soldiers. Finally, the Swiss were to increase the strength of each of their two companies from 100 to 300 soldiers.[36] This increased the permanent peacetime royal infantry forces to a theoretical strength of 8,000 men. On the basis of surviving *revues*, the measures of this *état* appear to have taken hold, although fluctuations are visible.[37]

During periods of warfare, company sizes naturally increased, yet there remained a difference between companies in the *Gardes* and *quatre-vieux*. 100 men per company was the theoretical campaign strength of *quatre-vieux* companies during the warfare of the 1620s, just as it had been during the siege of Amiens.[38] In contrast, *Gardes* companies technically had a combat strength of 200 men per company between 1610 and 1629, although their actual size was usually between 160 and 180 persons. However, during the Mantuan campaign in 1630, the size of *Gardes* companies was increased still further to 300 men.[39]

It would thus be misleading to give a definitive figure for company or regimental size in this period, other than to say companies tended to range between 80 and 200 men for the *Gardes*, 35 and 100 for the *quatre-vieux*, and that *vieux* regiments contained around twenty companies after 1598. Official company size was dependent on whether the monarchy was at peace or at war, and attrition rates caused the wartime sizes of companies to further vary. Whilst regimental sizes may have fluctuated, the key contention of this section is that a certain number of infantry units were permanently maintained throughout the early seventeenth century. This force was built on the basis of several permanent regiments: the *Gardes*, *quatre-vieux* and, from the mid-1600s, *Nerestang* and *Bourg*. These regiments were thus increased and decreased in response to war and peace, instead of completely new units being levied at the start

[36] *État*, BnF Cangé, 21, ff. 21r-22r. This document does not list the names of any of the officers within the regiments, and merely outlines their proposed organisational structure.

[37] For example, in early 1620, i.e. between the first and second Wars of the Mother and Son, many *quatre-vieux* companies appear to have been reduced to 35 men: *état*, BnF Ms.Fr. 16718 ff. 185r-198r.

[38] A *revue en masse* took place in Poitiers in September 1620 of the *quatre-vieux*, where both their theoretical strength of 100 was listed, and their actual size, which varied between sixty-eight and ninety men per company. Subsequent *revues* from September 1621, March 1622, and October 1628 confirm that 100 was the theoretical maximum warfare company size after 1620 for the *quatre-vieux*. *État*, BnF Ms.Fr. 16718 ff. 205v-252v; *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (285); *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (293); *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (518).

[39] *Revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (149-152); *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (540, 543-7); Chagniot, 'Gardes', p.107.

of each campaign. They constituted a core of permanent infantry force under the monarchy's command.

III - The Stationing of the Regiments during Peacetime, 1598-1610.

The *revues* and *états* can also be used as a means of ascertaining where the *vieux* were stationed after the 1598 retrenchment and during the largely peaceful 1600s. Attempting to expand the discussion beyond this date is problematic. Firstly, many more *revues* have survived from the period between 1598 and 1610 than that of 1611 to 1629. Secondly, certain *états* do not state where units were stationed. On the 1608-10 *états*, sixteen out of eighteen *Gardes* companies, all fifteen in *Picardie*, sixteen out of twenty in *Navarre*, fourteen out of eighteen in *Piémont* and five out of nineteen in *Champagne*, are noted as merely 'serviront a la campagne et autres lieux selon et ainsy qu'ilz seront ordonnez et departies par Sa Majestie'. Finally, after 1610, most of the *revues* and *états* that have survived were taken whilst the army was on campaign, and thus can only be taken as a temporary representation of where the regiments were located.

These caveats aside, certain trends are discernable with relation to *vieux* stationing during the 1600s. Père Daniel stated that the *Gardes* was headquartered in Paris, but that its companies were stationed in various suburbs around the city.[40] From the remaining evidence, this contention appears to be broadly correct. Fifty-one of the sixty-seven *revues* of the *Gardes* between May 1598 and the end of 1610 took place in Paris or its immediate vicinity. Three rolls from January 1598 state that the *revues* were occurring in the 'plaine de Vaugirard' near the 'châteaux de Paris', which at that point was located on the south-west outskirts of the city.[41] Whether these *revues* merely occurred outside Paris due to the necessity of finding space to effectively muster so many men, or whether they reflected the fact the regiment was not garrisoned inside the city itself is unclear. However – and whilst neither part of the *Maison du Roi*, nor an outright bodyguard regiment – the location of the *Gardes* was probably linked to the king's movements, given the access to the Court that many *Gardes* captains clearly enjoyed.[42] Indeed, certain revues took place at or near royal

[40] Daniel, *Milice*, II, p. 180.
[41] *Revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25852 (1413, 1415-6)
[42] See Chapter Two, Section II of this dissertation.

palaces, with two occurring in Fontainebleau, and one in St Germain-en-Laye,[43] whilst seven *revues* occurred at Melun or Montereau-Fault-Yonne, both within reasonable proximity to Fontainebleau. This kept the regiment, during the 1600s, at least within the Île-de-France, if not within the wider confines of Paris itself.

Companies from the other *vieux* regiments were mainly stationed in border provinces. On the *revues*, regimental companies were noted as being in a certain place 'pour le service du roy', and thus appear to have been considered temporary adjuncts to, rather than parts of, the permanent garrisons in the towns in which they were located. *Picardie* seems to have been based mainly in Picardy, with thirty-three of the thirty-seven *revues* occurring in towns of this province. For the three other *vieux*, the *états* state that four companies from *Navarre*, four from *Piémont* and five from *Champagne* were 'present en plusieurs endroicts du pais de Provence'; eight companies from *Champagne* were stationed in 'plusieurs lieux du pais de Bresse'; and the *mestre de camp* company of *Champagne* was named as being in Champagne. The *revues* help confirm this information, but also hint to other places where the regiments were stationed. Thus, whilst six of *Navarre*'s thirty-five *revues* were made in Provence (all in Toulon), twenty-two occur in Picardy, with the remainder made in Normandy, Burgundy, and Bourg-en-Bresse. For *Piémont*, twenty-two out of thirty-five *revues* occurred in Picardy, with the remainder in Provence, Champagne, Bourg-en-Bresse, and Verdun. Finally, for *Champagne*, all but three of its *revues* occurred in Champagne itself.

The *vieux* thus seem to have been mainly distributed between towns within Picardy, Champagne, Provence, Bresse and the Three Bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun. The presence of units in Provence and Bresse may well have been a hangover from the Savoy War of 1600-1601. Bresse had been acquired in the treaty of Lyon in 1601, and garrisoning the area allowed the French to threaten the passage of Habsburg troops along the Spanish Road. Troops may also have been sent into Provence to bolster the security of France's south-western frontier due to the loss of Saluzzo to Savoy.[44] Indeed, the overall spread of *vieux* troops probably reflected the monarchy's belief that any threat to the kingdom was most likely to come at its north-east, east, and south-eastern borders. Moreover, the notably high presence of *vieux* troops in

[43] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1592); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1947); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2182).
[44] Geoffrey Parker, 'The Treaty of Lyon (1601) and the Spanish Road', in *Empire, War and Faith in Early Modern Europe*, (London, 2002), pp. 126-142.

Picardy not only reflected where much of the conflict of the 1590s had occurred, but strengthens Potter's argument regarding the royal militarisation of this province during the first half of the sixteenth century.[45] Presumably, the monarchy's regular garrisons in the south-west and west of France were felt to be sufficient to defend the kingdom from any form of direct attack from Spain or on France's western seaboard, or that the likelihood of such events was considered slim. It is perhaps notable, however, that this area corresponds to that part of the Midi with a major Huguenot presence. Indeed, regimental troops do not seem to have been stationed in this region until after the campaigns of the early 1620s, when *Champagne* was kept in garrison near La Rochelle, and *Picardie* and *Normandie* were stationed in Montpellier, in the aftermath of the peace treaty of 1622. Henri IV may have thus considered this area to be relatively pacified during the 1600s, or may not have had, or wished to spend, the finance necessary to raise additional regimental troops to form adjunct-garrisons in these areas or to contest Huguenot military authority. In any case, that the three major mobilisations of the royal army between 1598 and 1610 occurred in Savoy, Sedan and Jülich appears to vindicate the monarchy's positioning of its regiments.

Despite these regional concentrations, the standing army thus appears to have been a much more of a kingdom-wide body than previous royal forces such as the *bandes*, which had often followed the relatively rigid division of troops into those 'decà' and 'délà les monts'. A few other points are worthy of note. Firstly, troops from more than one regiment were rarely placed together in the same town. The main exceptions to this rule are in Picardy, where troops from *Picardie* and *Navarre* are found in certain towns in similar periods,[46] and in Metz, where companies from the *Gardes*, *Picardie*, and *Champagne* can all be found during the 1600s.[47] Additionally, that units from *Navarre*, *Champagne*, and *Piémont* were all stationed in Bresse may suggest that they served in relatively close-quarters. Secondly, several units were stationed in the same town for fairly considerable periods of time. For example, the *Navarre* company under Jacques de Laur can be found in Montreuil in late 1599, before four *revues* place it in Doullens between 1601 and 1611.[48] This may have

[45] Potter, *War and the Provinces*, pp. 15-20.
[46] For instance in Ardres, *Revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1934-5), and Doullens, *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1660, 1692).
[47] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1674); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1898); *revue*, BnF PO 609 (14320), piece 9.
[48] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25384 (1583); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1692); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25839 (1991); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (86).

given regimental captains the opportunity to interact with the nobility of the local area, as will be explored below.[49] Whether or not captains remained in the same area or not, the repeated appearance of certain captains on *revues* hints at a trend which will now be more fully discussed: the permanency of regimental companies, and the security of officer positions within them.

IV– Companies: Steps towards Permanence and Stability within the Vieux

As has been stated in the previous section, a regiment was divided up into a number of smaller sub-units called companies.[50] Each company was commanded by a captain. Serving under him were a number of subordinate officers, including men in the subaltern ranks of lieutenant and ensign, and lower officers such as sergeants and corporals. The stability of company composition within the regiments during the period of this dissertation has not previously been investigated, yet is a matter which says much about the evolution of royal military office during the early modern period.[51] Indeed, permanency of regimental organisation does not necessarily imply stability among the command and organisation of companies. As can be seen after 1635, the crown frequently exercised its ability to disband and reorganise regimental companies when it saw fit;[52] a policy which echoed, in many respects, royal attitudes toward regimental companies during the early stages of the civil wars.

Tracking the stability of regimental captains during the period of this dissertation can be primarily achieved through tracking the names of captains who are recorded in a series of *états* between 1588 and 1623.[53] As Jean-Louis de Nogaret de La Valette, duc d'Épernon was technically always captain of the *compagnie colonelle*,

[49] See Chapter Two, Section II of this dissertation.
[50] Companies are occasionally referred to as ensigns in contemporary documents, a hangover from the sixteenth century.
[51] The closest to such an analysis is a 'chronologie des capitaines des trente-trois compagnies des gardes francoises depuis leur creation' found in Noeufville, *Abrégé Chronologique*, III, pp. 191-280. In this work, the captains of each *Gardes* company are listed (although their full names are not always stated) from a company's inception until 1734-5. The companies are listed in deference to their hierarchy in the early eighteenth century, rather than the date of their first levy. Unfortunately, no similar chronology exists for the other regiments.
[52] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 328-330.
[53] Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate an *état* from 1629-30, which would have shown how the regiments were disrupted by the warfare of the 1620s. All subsequent reference to *états* will come from the following sources: 'Lettres patentes du Roy…', 12 August, 1588, SHDAT, $X^{1}4$, n.p.; 'Estat des regimens …' January 1597, SHDAT, $X^{1}4$, n.p.; *état*, 1600, BnF Cangé, 5 ,8r; *état*, 1610, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 130r-146v; *état*, 1620, BnF Ms.Fr. 16718 ff. 156v-163r, 205v-252v; *état*, 1623, BnF Ms.Fr. 16726 ff. 203r-206v and 293r-297r.

this company will be discounted from this discussion unless it is possible to identify and compare changes to its lieutenancy, as the person who held this position was both the *lieutenant colonel* of the regiment and the *de facto* commander of the company.[54] This section will note whether 'new' captains were actually 'new' to the regimental system, or whether they had merely been promoted from other positions of regimental command, whilst leaving a detailed examination of the mechanics of promotion for discussion in another chapter. Whilst this section will mainly focus on regimental captains, certain references to the permanency of subaltern positions will also be made to emphasise the wider security of regimental office during this period. Finally, for the sake of brevity, examples will be taken mainly from companies within the *Gardes, Picardie* and *Navarre*.

On the basis of the only *vieux* regiments recorded on the 1588 *état* – the *Gardes, Picardie*, and *Champagne* – relatively high levels of fluctuation among captains are visible during the warfare between 1588 and 1597. Of the twelve *Gardes* captains listed in 1588, only 'Saincte Colombe', 'Campagno', and 'Crillon' (the *mestre de camp*) are still present in 1597. Additionally, the 'Montigny' listed in 1588 was Antoine de La Grange de Montigny, sieur d'Arquien, who had become *lieutenant colonel* by 1597. Of the fifteen *Picardie* captains named in 1588, only two re-appear in any sense in 1597. Captain 'Forille' was Blaise de Chaumejean, sieur and later marquis de Fourilles, who would become a *Gardes* captain in 1594, and thus subsequently appears on the 1597 *état* within the *Gardes* regiment.[55] The 'La Serre' who appears as a *Picardie* captain in 1588, reappears on the *états* of 1597, 1620 and 1623. Three muster rolls from 1605, 1609 and 1611 have Antoine de La Serre as a captain in *Picardie*, with Paul Cochon, sieur de Goupillon as lieutenant and Charles de Blecourt as ensign. Given that a 'Goupillon' is again listed as being the lieutenant of a 'La Serre' on the 1623 *état*, there is the possibility that the same 'La Serre' had command of this company from at least 1588 to 1623.[56] None of the captains listed in the *Champagne état* of 1588 appears to be still serving by 1597.

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[54] The *compagnie colonelle* was a regimental company in which the Colonel General technically held the power of appointment over all company positions. They are listed on all the above *états* for each *vieux* regiment, except for *Champagne* between 1588 and 1610, for unknown reasons. Whilst Parrott has stated that these companies existed in every *régiment entretenu*, the extent to which they were present in non-*vieux* regiments will be considered in Chapter Six of this thesis. Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 471.

[55] Anonymous biography, BnF DB 178 (4640) f. 15r.

[56] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1934); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2171); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (74).

Thus, of the thirty-one captains named in the three *vieux* regiments in 1588, only six definitely survived, in any sense, until 1597. Whilst this number may appear low, it should be recalled that the period 1588-97 saw the *vieux* almost continuously engaged in warfare against the *Ligue* and Spain, during which a number of regimental captains were killed in action. Moreover, even in the 1690s, only a minority of officers enjoyed a military career lasting more than ten years in total, including their time spent as subalterns.[57] That several captains can already be found, by the 1590s, holding their positions for at least a decade points to a degree of stability having emerged within the regiments with regard to company-level office-holding. This trend may well have emerged over the course of the eighth War of Religion, when the *vieux* regiments appear to have no longer been subjected to the periodic bouts of reorganisation that they had previously suffered.

If the picture in the decade prior to 1597 suggests that office-holding within *vieux* companies had begun to stabilise, and that captaincies could be held for lengthy periods of time, this trend is confirmed in the thirty years after the Peace of Vervins. Three of the captains recorded in the *Gardes* in 1588 are still present in the *état* of 1620: the sieurs de Sainte-Colombe, Campaigno and Fourilles.[58] These numbers increase if the *états* from 1597 and 1620 are compared, with an additional six companies appearing under the same name throughout: 'Tilladet', 'Drouet', 'Valence', 'La Salle', 'Castelnau', and 'Meux'. Whilst this number is high in itself, especially compared to the flux of the 1588-97 period, it would still imply that almost half of the captains in the *Gardes* changed in the twenty-three years after 1597.

However the actual level of fluctuation of company command can be questioned through a more detailed study of changes between 1597 and 1610. Two companies – those commanded by the Gaillard de Salerne and Daniel Germaincourt, sieur de Buffé – were disbanded, reducing the size of the regiment from twenty to eighteen companies. Out of the remaining eighteen companies, only five captaincies changed command. One did so after 1600, when Charles de Blanchefort, marquis de Créquy took over the position of *mestre de camp* from Crillon. The other four all received their appointments between 1597 and 1598. The sieur d'Arquien was appointed to the position of *lieutenant colonel*, at some point in 1597. The three other positions were vacated by Jean de Salbeuf, François de Colleville and Jonathan de

[57] Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, p. 253.
[58] Sainte-Colombe was promoted to *lieutenant colonel* of the regiment in 1610.

Thianges, sieur de Roulet who had all died at the siege of Amiens.[59] They were filled by 'Mansan', 'Casteljaloux' and 'Mainville' between 1597 and 1598. All of these names were listed as captains on the 1597 *état* for *Picardie*, and they remained in the *Gardes* until the 1620 *état* and beyond. Thus, after the 1597 *état* one of the five captaincy changes within the *Gardes* came from the promotion of an existing captain within the *Gardes*, and another three may have come from captains promoted from *Picardie*. Moreover, the *Gardes* only underwent one change of company commander between the 1598 retrenchment and the beginning of 1610. Overall, therefore, few captaincies within the *Gardes* changed hands in the 1600s, and those.vacancies which did arise may largely have been filled by existing captains within the permanent regiments.

By 1620, nine of the companies remained under the same command as they had been in 1610. The *Gardes* had been re-set to twenty companies in 1612. Three of the 'new' captains were products of internal promotion. Sainte-Colombe was made *lieutenant colonel* at some point after Arquien's resignation in 1610, whilst 'Montigny' and 'Besne' had previously been colonel-ensign and a lieutenant within the regiment, respectively, and took over the companies previously commanded by Sainte-Colombe and Bellay. One of the new captains, 'Toiras', had only taken over the company of Joachim de Montagu, sieur de Frémigières in 1620 itself, after the latter had been appointed to command it at some point between 1588 and 1596. Applaincourt took over the company of the sieur de Bours on his death in 1616. Of the other new captains, 'Bourdet', had received one of the newly levied companies in 1612, 'Gohas' was a Biran, and thus related to the Casteljaloux, and 'Roderie' subsequently left his company to a family member at an unspecified future date.[60] Due to the absence of a full *état* of any of the regiments in the later 1620s, it can only be speculated how the *Gardes* was affected by the warfare of this decade. Of the new captains that it is possible to identify, continuity of overall company command and further appointments from the other *vieux* are visible. 'Porcheux' was promoted from *Navarre*, whilst Toiras left his company to Restinclières, his brother, after being appointed *mestre de camp* of *Champagne*. Overall, therefore, there was a significant level of stability at a company level within the *Gardes*. Almost half of the regiment's

[59] J. François d'Hozier, *L'impôt du sang, ou la noblesse de France sur les champs de bataille*, (3 vols., Paris, 1874-1881), III, p. 326; *état*, BnF Cangé, 5, f. 5r.
[60] *État*, BnF Cangé, 5, f. 9v; Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 110.

companies are recorded as being under the same name between 1597 and 1620, around three-quarters of captains maintained their offices throughout the shorter 1597 to 1610 period, and many 'new' captains may have in fact been promoted from other *vieux* regiments.

Owing to its larger number of companies in 1597, the composition of *Picardie* was initially subject to a greater degree of flux than the *Gardes*. *Picardie*, in January 1597, had been composed of a colossal forty-six companies.[61] By the 1608 *état*, recorded in late 1607, *Picardie* was comprised of only 15 companies, before being increased to twenty companies in 1611. Yet, and despite *Picardie* shrinking to almost a third of the size that it had been at the end of the eighth civil war, continuity amongst its captains is still evident after 1597. Aside from the three captains who had possibly moved into the *Gardes* regiment, seven of the captains on the 1610 *état* are under the same name as those on the 1597 *état*. Of the twenty-three companies listed in 1620, eleven are listed under the same name as in 1610, including the continuation of the Sieur de Salcède as *lieutenant colonel*. The *état* for March, 1623, taken whilst the regiment was stationed in Montpellier, saw the regiment reduced to twenty companies, of which nine were listed under the same name as in 1620. Thus, despite *Picardie*'s role at the forefront of much of the warfare which had taken place in the first three years of the 1620s, around half the captains had ostensibly managed to retain their command. If the composition of *Picardie* in 1597 is compared to 1623, *prima facie* only four captains appear to have stayed the course. However, two other captains present on the 1610, 1620 and 1623 *états* can also be found on muster rolls dating back to 1600-1601, and would thus have had a captaincy within the regiment for at least twenty years.[62] Thus, just as in the *Gardes* there is enough evidence to suggest that stability of command was reasonably assured in *Picardie* after the 1598 retrenchment. Whilst many captains did lose their company in the first decade of the century, this was largely due to the bloated nature of the regiment by the culmination of the warfare of the 1590s. Continuity in captaincy holding was therefore a far more achievable goal in *Picardie* in the early seventeenth century than it had been in the second half of the sixteenth century.

Of all the *vieux*, the regiment which most clearly exhibits continuity of command after 1598 is *Navarre*. Unfortunately, a full *état* of company commanders

[61] Forty-nine if one counts the three companies that are listed as having been 'licentiées'
[62] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1620); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1660).

does not appear to have survived from the late 1580s or the early 1590s, so it is not possible to detect how much flux there was within its companies during the period when it became part of the royal army. However, on the basis of two *revues* that survive from 1593, continuity does appear to be present between certain captains of the 1590s and the post-1598 period. Bertrand de Mazelière, a captain in 1593, had risen to the position of *lieutenant colonel* by at least 1601, and retained this position until some point before 1617 when the sieur de Joffre was promoted.[63] Similarly, Valirault's lieutenant in 1593, Antoine de Montamet, may well be the 'Montamet' listed as a captain on the 1597 *état*.[64]

Some captains clearly lost their commissions in the decade after 1597 as by 1610 the regiment was reduced to twenty companies from twenty-five. However, of these twenty captains, fifteen are listed under a name which also appeared in 1597. If Mazelière had obtained the position of *lieutenant colonel* by 1597, which is probable, this would increase the figure to sixteen.[65] Moreover, of the four remaining 'new captains' in 1610, Laur is found on a muster roll as Jacques de Laur in September 1597, whilst a member of the Saint-Cricq can be found commanding a Navarre company in rolls from 1600.[66] When one compares the *états* of 1610 to 1620, twelve of the commanders are listed under the same name (thirteen if Joffre's promotion to *lieutenant colonel* is counted). Finally, if one compares the 1597 *état* to the 1620, nine of the captains appear under the same name, to which number should be added the other long-term commanders Joffre, Laur and Saint-Cricq. Thus, after 1597, *Navarre* enjoyed a great degree of stability, with over half the regiment's companies recorded under the same family name over a twenty-year period.

The appearance of the same name across multiple *états* does not necessarily imply that the exact same individual held the captaincy for the entire period in question. Determining whether this is the case or not can be achieved in two main ways. Firstly, where possible, names on the *états* can be cross-referenced with *revues* from the same period. These *revues* not only give a better impression of an individual's full name, and hence whether they are being recorded on the *état* by their surname or *seigneurie*, but can also give an immediate answer as to whether the same person is commanding the same company. Moreover, the *revues* can also be used to

[63] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25826 (857); Bassompierre, *Mémoires*, II, p.185; Le Roux, *Faveur*, p. 531.
[64] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25826 (836).
[65] The 1597 état does not list any of the *lieutenant colonels*.
[66] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1393); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1613).

demonstrate that security of office had spread to the lower company grades within the *vieux* during the same period. Secondly, documents within the *Cabinet des Titres*, and other genealogical sources, are often helpful in fleshing out the service records of certain individuals and families.

Clearly some of those named on the *états* refer to the same individual commanding the same companies throughout the period. 'Bonnouvrier', who appears on the 1588, 1597, 1600 and 1610 *états* clearly refers to Pepin de Bonnouvrier, who had been provided with a *Gardes* captaincy in 1583, maintained it until his death in 1617, and who appears as a captain on muster rolls in 1598, 1603, 1609 and 1615. One of his subalterns and one sergeant are also consistently seen, showing that Pepin was commanding the same company throughout.[67] Other examples can be found within the *Gardes*. 'La Salle', found on 1597, 1600, 1610 and 1620 *états* is Louis I de Caillebot, sieur de La Salle, who can be found in *revues* from 1598, 1605, 1613 and 1621 captaining a company with the same lieutenant and two sergeants. Louis I de Caillebot had received his *Gardes* commission in 1596, and commanded the same company until his death in 1624.[68] 'Castelnau' who appears on the *états* of 1597, 1610 and 1620, is Mathurin de Castelnau, a figure never referred to on *revues* by his full title, the sieur de Rouvre, and who can be found commanding the same company in *revues* from 1598, 1605, 1609 and 1613. He held the captaincy of this company from 1596 until his death in 1622.[69]

Similar examples can be pieced together from the other *vieux*. 'Busca' found on the 1597, 1610, 1620 and 1623 *Picardie états* is Barthélemy de Montlezun, sieur de Busca, found captaining the same company on *revues* from 1601 and 1605. A marriage contract from 1632 states that Barthélemy was still a captain in the regiment which, together with a 'commission de capitaine' from May 1589 for a company within *Picardie*, shows Barthélemy de Montlezun served as a captain within the same regiment for at least forty-three years.[70] 'Hames', on the 1597, 1610 and 1620

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[67] Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 253; *revue* BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1451); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2186); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (152); *revue*, BnF PO 413 (9211), p. 4.

[68] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1500); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1975); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (113); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (271); *revue*, BnF DB 148 (3722) f. 10r.

[69] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1485); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr 25838 (1966); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2233); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (111); Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 111; Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 250.

[70] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1665); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1958); marriage contract, 30 January 1632, 'Commission de capitaine d'une compagnie [...]', 6 May 1589, BnF Cabinet 246 (6504), ff. 22r, 23v.

Picardie états, can be found as Paul de Hames, sieur du Fresnoy in *revues* from 1597, 1598 1600 and 1611. The composition of the subalterns and sergeants within his company remained entirely stable between 1597 and 1600, suggesting that captains that were maintained *sur pied* after the 1598 retrenchment were allowed to keep the same companies as they had done previously.[71] Finally, within *Navarre*, the 'Porcheux' on the 1597, 1610 and 1620 *états* is Charles d'Aubourg, sieur de Porcheux, who can be found commanding a company with the same lieutenant between 1601 and 1622, and the same ensign between at least 1605 and 1620.[72]

However, other cases show that companies did change hands between relatives in this period, despite being recorded under the same name on the *états*. The name Campaigno, appears in a variety of spellings, on the *Gardes états* for 1588, 1597, 1600, 1610, 1620, along with being on the *Picardie état* for 1588. The Campaigno named in the *Gardes* in 1588 is Bertrand Patras, sieur de Campaigno. He had held a commission in *Picardie* until 1584 when he resigned it in favour of his brother, Michel Patras de Campaigno, who still held the charge in 1588, but who no longer did so by 1597. Judging by *revues* on which he is present, Bertrand continued to hold his captaincy in the *Gardes* until at least 1609. As Bertrand died in 1617, and a Campaigno can be found on the 1620 *Gardes état*, the company must have changed hands whilst remaining under the control of the Patras. Indeed, Chagniot has stated that the family commanded the company until 1622. As such, the case advanced by de Noeufville is plausible: that a 'Michel de Patras de Campagnols' inherited the company from Bertrand, who was probably the brother listed above, and that the company was subsequently commanded by Gaspard de Coligny, sieur de Saligny (who was not related to them).[73]

Within the *quatre-vieux* similar examples exist which are even harder to flesh-out. In 1597, 1610 and 1620 a company appears on the Champagne *états* under the name of 'Lezines'. However, on the basis of two muster rolls found, the company seems to have changed hands between a Jean de Lezines found in 1599 and a Charles

[71] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25831 (1378); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1502); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1612); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (72).
[72] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1667); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1899); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (295). Porcheux's ensign is listed on the 1620 état.
[73]Unfortunately, Noeufville does not give dates for when these changes in command occurred: Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 247. See also: J.B. de Luppé, *Mémoires et caravanes de J.B. de Luppé du Garrané. Suivis des Mémoires de son neveu, J.B. de Larrocan d'Aiguebère*, (ed.) Joseph Louis, comte de Luppé, (Paris, 1865), p.200; *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1463); *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1974); *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2185); Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 110.

de Lezines recorded in 1620. Due to a lack of genealogical information, the exact relationship between these two men is unclear.[74] Finally, within *Navarre*, a 'Trion' found on the 1597, 1610 and 1620 *états* appears three times in the *revues*, twice as Pierre de Trion in 1599 and 1601 and then as François de Trion in 1622. A nineteenth-century historian, Émile Coët, cited evidence that Pierre de Trion, sieur de Dancourt was an 'ancien capitaine' of *Navarre* by 1625, yet did not die until 1630.[75] In the cases of both the Trion and Lezines, the two men named may well have been related, but this cannot be confirmed.

Lastly, even in cases where the command of a company did change during this period, subaltern and lower-ranked company officers usually remained in place.[76] This can be seen quite clearly in the *Gardes*. Créquy maintained Crillon's subalterns and NCOs when he took over the latter's company in 1605.[77] When François de Jussac d'Ambleville, sieur de Saint-Preuil took over the captaincy of Saligny's company in 1627 (Saligny himself probably having received his appointment in 1622), he maintained Saligny's subalterns in place, including Louis de Pontis as lieutenant.[78]

Overall, therefore, the stability of company office within the *vieux* during the period of this dissertation is quite striking. Many units are recorded as being under the same command for periods of over ten years. When a company did change hands, the 'new' captain had often been promoted from another *vieux* company or had some form of relation to the previous incumbent. Moreover, due to the security of office also enjoyed by subalterns and sergeants, it can be seen that many 'new' captains were in fact taking over pre-existing companies, rather than levying completely new units. Thus, *vieux* companies do not seem to have been subjected to either frequent changes in commander, or wider reformation or reorganisation during the early seventeenth century.

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[74] *Revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1551); *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25845 (261). Another sieur de Lezines is also found in the 1620 *Picardie état*.
[75] *Revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1557); *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1661); Émile Coët, *Histoire de la Ville de Roye*, (2 vols., Paris, 1880), I, p. 134.
[76] This contention, and its repercussions, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, Section II.
[77] If *revues* from 1601 and 1609 are compared, Crillon's former lieutenant – Albert de Grillet, sieur de Brissac - had moved up to ensign, and both his sergeants remained in the company. *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1717); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2183).
[78] Pontis, *Mémoires*, II, 12-23; *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (543).

V – Bridging the Gap between Peace and War: Captains 'retenuz' in Service

Interestingly, a certain number of *vieux* captains can be found in a different section of the 1608 to 1610 *états* to the rest of their regiments. In this part of the document, the monarchy stated that it was to provide for 'l'entretenment' of a certain number of *mestres de camp* and captains 'appoinctez qui estoient des Regimens cy apres declarez que Sa Majesté a choisis et retenuz pour estre appointez a son service et entrer cy apres en la place de ceulz qui seront retenuz ausdites Regimens vaccation d'iceulx advenant'. These were, therefore, officers who had previously served in royal regiments, who had lost their companies during a period of disbandment, and who were being retained on lower pay until a commission became available for them to fill.[79] Thirteen of these captains were listed under *Picardie*, compared to only one for *Piémont* and three for *Champagne*, with thirty-four other captains listed under the names of regiments which were not permanently kept *sur pied*. The tone of the document thus suggests that captains would be placed back into regiments in which they had previously held commissions, although this is not explicitly spelt out. Four of the captains on the *Picardie* 1597 *état* – 'Bidache', 'Brussailles', 'Brasse', and 'Baradat' – are listed as being captains 'retenuz' in the *Picardie* section of the 1610 *état*. Thus, the monarchy was showing an eagerness to retain captains in royal service even if they had lost their regimental companies, in order that they could be placed back into their old regiments when positions became available. These 'retained' captains were paid about a third less than their full-time compatriots, earning 100 *livres* per *montre* as opposed to 150. Yet, this still equated to a fairly sizeable pension of 1,000 *livres* per year.

By paying these captains, the monarchy showed it had grasped the advantages of having an officer corps of experienced soldiers ready at the start of each war that extended past the number of total companies kept permanently *sur pied*. These captains could be used to ensure that newly levied companies did not have to have 'freshman' officers. For captains within the regiments, it further enhanced the idea that their commission was permanent, even in times of peace when the army would undergo retrenchment, although it must have introduced some doubt as to whether

[79] None of the *mestres de camp* correspond to those found on the 1597 *état*, BnF Na.Fr. 24842 f. 163r.

they would always have a company to command. The existence of these captains would seem to foreshadow that of the *officiers réformés* found under Louis XIV: a system of support (usually half-pay) for officers who had lost their commissions in a post-war demobilisation or 'réforme'. Rowlands' contention that 'there was no real support for "reformed" officers' before 1659 may not be completely true therefore as at least one of the captains 'retenuz', 'Brusailles', had regained the command of a company within *Picardie*.[80] Whilst slim, there thus remained a chance that a captain could regain a company after being reduced to 'retenuz' status, and if war broke out these chances were undoubtedly improved.

The civil wars that engulfed France after 1561 gave rise to a new form of military organisation within the royal army: the regiment. Determining the exact moment when certain regiments came into existence is, in many respects, an unanswerable question, due to the multiple, confused links between these newer forms of military administration and older institutions such as the *bandes*. Moreover, the early existence of even the *vieux* regiments was unstable, with the units being subject to arbitrary moments of reorganisation and even disbandment, as occurred with the *Gardes* in 1573. Instead, this chapter has sought to focus on a more discernable and important moment: the point at which certain royal regiments achieved a degree of security which confirmed that they were permanent administrative units. As such, 1598 has been taken as a key date in the evolution of the royal infantry regiments, and thus of the standing army. The peace treaties of that year, and the dire financial situation of the French monarchy, forced it to decide which part of the forces it had raised for the wars of the 1580s and 1590s would be maintained in peacetime, if any. The answer to this question, at least in terms of the infantry, was the *vieux*. Accordingly, and despite their more or less continual existence from the late 1570s to early 1580s, it is possibly only from 1598 that one can categorically consider them as *régiments entretenus*.

This chapter has also sought to show that not only were the *vieux* confirmed as permanent at a regimental level, the companies which constituted them also achieved security of tenure, as did the men who officered them. Many of the captains cited in this chapter were able to hold their captaincies for periods of between ten and twenty years. This would appear to match, if not better, the figures cited by historians for

[80] Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, p. 175.

officers under Louis XIV. Moreover, it also appears that those holding company offices below the level of captain, such as subalterns and sergeants, were also able to securely hold their positions. If anything, the period of relative peace and low-level international conflict in the 1600s and 1610s may have favoured the long-term holding of office within the *vieux* more than the high-levels of warfare during the 1690s and 1700s. At the very least, it should be recognised that long-term holding of regimental office can be found in the early seventeenth century. In holding their positions, captains could command the same company for lengthy periods of time, rather than being subject to reassignment or regular reorganisations of companies. Indeed, save for a few rare cases where *vieux* regiment captains were removed from their commission for committing demonstrable acts of fraud or disloyalty to the monarchy (which will be discussed below), captains were able to maintain command within the same company for as long as they wished to exercise their charge. There was, therefore, a significantly higher level of personnel and administrative continuity within the regiments and their companies after 1598 than during the second half of the sixteenth century.

Overall, this chapter has used prosoprographical data to provide a comprehensive analysis of how the standing army emerged during the early seventeenth century. It has demonstrated the central importance of detailed investigations into office-holding as a means of charting how a permanent body of royal regiments arose, rather than relying on the largely anecdotal evidence that hitherto has been the basis for much of the historical discussion on the early standing army. In doing so, it has shown that the rise of permanent infantry force in France was dependent on the monarchy finding a body of men who were able, and willing, to enter into long-term office-holding within royal military structures. Accordingly, the next chapter of this thesis will explore the relationship between elements of the *petite noblesse* and this new form of military force, as these families constituted the bulk of the regimental officer corps.

Chapter Two

The Satisfaction of Private Interest: Family Ambition, Social Relations and the Early Standing Army.

The stability of company composition demonstrated in the previous chapter allowed certain noble families to dominate the royal army's regimental structures. As has already been implied, it is evident that many captains were able to pass their captaincy on to a relative when they relinquished their command, thus keeping the company under family control. Captains also had a considerable degree of influence over the appointment to vacant positions within their companies, and usually took the opportunity to implant family members or *amis* within subaltern positions wherever possible. Such was the commitment of some families to the regiments, some were able to obtain the command of more than one company within the *vieux*. Indeed, the implantation of *petite noblesse* families within the regiments is so marked that it is necessary to consider why they sought commissions within the infantry so fervently.

This chapter will advance the overall contention that families sought service within the royal regiments as they were a means by which they could achieve social advancement. Military service still remained the main means by which a family could prove their nobility and hence status; a factor which had become even more marked due to the wide-scale re-militarisation of the French nobility during the Wars of Religion. Regimental service offered the potential for financial gain, promotion to the higher ranks of the army, and, particularly within the *Gardes*, the ability to put one's self in the 'royal gaze'. Many *vieux* officers were personally known to the king due to the prominent role they played in warfare, placing them in a prime position to both receive and distribute royal patronage. Moreover, service within the regiments allowed families to enter into a new social environment, within which they could forge new relationships. These were often formed with other noble families within the army. Many of the bonds that regimental officers developed were thus with families of a similar social station to themselves; 'horizontal links' that allowed them to entrench their new-found social status as part of a group of families who constituted the regimental officer corps. This chapter will focus on how the army's new found stability allowed such links of affinity to occur, leaving an examination of the more 'vertical' clienteles within the army to part two of this thesis.

Overall, when placed in a larger context, it becomes clear that regimental service became part of the wider family strategy of members of the *petite noblesse*, which was governed, above all, by their dynastic ambitions for social ascension. Indeed, the ability of the early standing army to satisfy the private interests of at least a

section of the French nobility was central to the evolution of royal military offices during the early seventeenth century.

I – The Implantation of Noble Families within the vieux *Regiments.*

The French monarchy attempted to maintain control over appointments to its infantry from an early stage in its development. Parrott has cited the 1439 *ordonnance* which stated that a 'certain nombre de gens d'armes *et de traict* sera ordonné pour la conduite de la guerre, lesquels capitaines seront *nommez et esleuz* par le Roy'. The conditions of this *ordonnance* were frequently republished up to at least the 1580s.[1] Indeed, an *ordonnance* first published by François I in 1514, and subsequently republished by Henri III, regarding 'la levee, amas et conduite des compaignies des gens de pied' stated that no levies of infantry troops could be made 'sans expresse commission de nous [the crown]' and that all 'capitaines […] auront charge & commission' from the monarchy. Those captains who 'tiennent la campagne sans charge' were to be 'tailler en pieces'.[2] This would seem to imply that the monarchy sought to maintain full control over the appointment of infantry captains over the course of the sixteenth century. Indeed, the king does appear to have intervened on occasion with appointments to vacant company positions, and formal approval of the inheritance of companies by family members remained necessary. However, the terms of these *ordonannces* say nothing of the subaltern positions within the company. Moreover, between the 1580s and the *Code Michau* of 1629, infantry *ordonnances* failed to set forth any further guidelines relating to appointment within the infantry regiments during a crucial period in their development, as the primary concern of military legislation was a largely futile attempt to maintain discipline amongst soldiers during the civil wars.[3]

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[1] 'Gens de traict' would have referred to archers within the army in the fifteenth century, and this definition may well have expanded to more broadly encompass other infantry by the sixteenth century. Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 288. My emphasis.

[2] Barnabé Brisson and Nicolas Frerort (eds.), *Les basiliques ou edicts et ordonnances des roys de France […]*, (Paris, 1611), pp. 1376-7.

[3] See, for example, Brisson and Frerort, *Les basiliques*, pp. 1345-8, 1375-6, 1378-85, 1385-91, 1393-6 for *ordonannces* specifically relating to 'gens de pied' before 1589. The infantry *ordonnances* published under Henri IV seem to have focussed almost entirely on maintaining discipline, e.g., *ordonnances*, BnF Cangé 20, ff. 20-26v, 109r-111r from 1596 and 1603, the latter being a reprint of a document from 1590.

Whatever powers the king theoretically maintained over regimental appointments, it is quite clear that, in practice, regimental captains had an enormous influence over the choice of their subalterns and even their successor to the company command. This can be seen through the many cases of progressive installation of family members within a company during the period of this dissertation. Barthélemy-Scipion de Biran, sieur de Casteljaloux acquired his *Gardes* company in August 1597 due to the death of Jean de Salbeuf at the siege of Amiens. Five muster rolls then appear between 1598 and 1629 which show firstly that Barthélemy-Scipion maintained control of the company for the entirety of this period – at least one of his sergeants, Ramond de Luquet, stayed in the company for the entire period in question. In 1598, Barthélemy-Scipion had Royal de Montbel, and Nicolas Möy, sieur de Riberpré as his lieutenant and ensign, persons to whom he does not appear to have had a close relation, and who may have been Salbeuf's subalterns. But by 1613, Alexandre de Biran, sieur de Carbon, and Fabien de Biran, sieur de Osseboc had become lieutenant and ensign within the company, both of whom were younger brothers of Barthélemy-Scipion, and who were both still holding their charges in a *revue* conducted in 1629. According to a document from 1631, Jean de Biran de Casteljaloux, Barthélemy-Scipion's son, had become the ensign of his father's company, by this date. How long Barthélemy-Scipion commanded the company after this date is unclear, but it would seem that Alexandre, Barthélemy-Scipion's brother, was the inheritor of the company, and the *seigneurie* of Casteljaloux, rather than Jean. It appears likely that the family resigned their company by 1640, due to the provision of a commission from that year for a company in the *Gardes* 'vacante par la demission du sieur de Casteljaloux'. It would thus appear that the Biran de Casteljaloux had control of this *Gardes* company for at least forty-three years, and that Barthélemy-Scipion progressively filled its subaltern positions with family members, facilitating the probable passing of the company from either brother to brother or father to son.[4]

[4] Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 215, states that the company was not resigned until 1644. Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 110; *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1487); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1698); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (110); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (537); *minute*, 5 July 1631, AN MC ET/XII, f. 61 quoted in Madeleine Alcover, 'Le Bret, Cuigy, Casteljaloux, Bignon, Royer de Prade et Regnault des Boisclairs: du nouveau sur quelques bons amis de Cyrano et sur l'édition posthume des États et Empires de la Lune (1657)', *Les Dossiers du Grihl*, 24 February 2009, <http://dossiersgrihl.revues.org/3414> [10 February 2010], p. 52; Luppé, *Mémoires*, p. 201; letters of commission for a *Gardes* company, BnF Carrés 145, f. 149r.

A similar example can be cited for the Chaumejean de Fourilles, who controlled a *Gardes* company for at least 60 years. Blaise de Chaumejean, marquis de Fourilles, had received his captaincy in 1594, and a 'Fourilles' is subsequently found on the 1597, 1600, 1610, and 1620 *états*. On the basis of musters which survive for this company, family implantation is not immediately clear, yet the *revues* only cover the period between 1597 and 1609. Through reference to the *Dossiers Bleu*, however, it is clear that family members began to be parachuted into the regiment after 1609. By 1617, when Blaise resigned his captaincy due to a higher *charge* he had received, his eldest son René was lieutenant in the company. A commission signed by Louis XIII and Secretary of State Villeroy in 1617 allowed René to receive his father's company 'en survivance', with his younger brother Michel as lieutenant. Michel would become captain of the company in 1632, when his brother resigned the *charge*, and would continue holding it until appointed *lieutenant colonel* in 1655.[5]

It was not just within the *Gardes* that these trends were occurring. Barthélemy de Montlezun, sieur de Busca, controlled a company within *Picardie* from 1589 to at least 1632. The two *revues* found for his company only relate to 1601 and 1605, and do not seem to indicate the presence of family members within the company. However, in a marriage contract from 1622, Jean de Montlezun, sieur de Saint-Léonard, is named as the ensign of his father's company. By 1632, François de Montlezun, sieur de Lianne, was similarly named the ensign of his father's company, and thus, in the intervening period, his elder brother may have become lieutenant.[6] Paul de Hames, sieur du Fresnoy, who appears on all the *Picardie états* between 1597 and 1623, initially had no family members on a *revue* from 1597, yet between March and September 1598 – during which time the company was at the siege of Amiens – his brother Abdias de Hames had entered into the company as ensign and, on a subsequent *revue* from 1611, Abdias now occupied the position of lieutenant.[7] Similar examples exist for families for whom we do not appear to have any remaining genealogical information. Within *Piémont*, a 'Realz' on the 1597, 1610 and 1620 *états* may well be linked to the Cesar de Realz who appears on several *revues* between 1599

[5] Genealogy, anonymous family biographies, BnF DB 178 (4640) ff. 8r, 15r-18r; *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr 25831 (1377); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2198); La Chesnaye, IV, p. 389.
[6] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1665); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1958); marriage contracts, 30 January 1632, 1622, BnF Cabinet 246 (6504) ff. 22r, 30v.
[7] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25831 (1378); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1427); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1502); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1612); *revue* BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (72); genealogy, BnF DB 345 (8902), f. 3r.

and 1610, with a Constantin de Realz as his lieutenant throughout.[8] The 'Du Belloy' who appears on *états* for *Navarre* in 1610 and 1620 appears on one *revue* in 1605 with another Du Belloy at ensign.[9] In each of these cases, whilst family implantation within companies is clear, it is not possible to discern whether family members subsequently inherited the companies.

Captains were also clearly able to place more distantly related 'parents' and non-related 'amis' in their companies. Between 1609 and 1615, Pepin de Bonnouvrier appointed Philippe de Garges ensign in his company, someone who was undoubtedly a relation of Bonnouvrier's wife, Charlotte de Garges.[10] Individuals attempted to exploit remote links of 'parenté' to try and gain positions within the regiments. Pontis received his first commission as ensign in the *Champagne* company of his 'parent' Boulogne in 1605.[11]

However, captains showed a preference towards favouring immediate family members – particularly brothers, sons and nephews – wherever possible, as the evolution of the *Gardes* company under the Raynier de Droué demonstrates. The company was initially commanded by Elie du Raynier who received his commission in 1591, and who is still listed in 1596 as being the commander of the company.[12] Isaac du Raynier, sieur de Droué, took over command of the company on his brother Elie's death in 1597. Isaac can be found as captain on five *revues* between 1601 and 1609, in which none of the three subalterns listed have the Raynier patronym. However, at least two of these individuals had connections to the Raynier. Jean de Herce, lieutenant throughout this shorter period, was Isaac and Elie's brother in law, whilst Valentin de Coutances, ensign from 1601 to 1605, was named as godfather to Isaac's son, Valentin I, in 1604 and his family were territorial neighbours of the Raynier. Despite having sublaterns who were clearly family 'amis', Isaac seems to have placed direct relations in the company as soon as possible. By 1620, his eldest surviving son, Charles du Raynier, was a lieutenant in the *Gardes* before dying at the siege of Montpellier in 1622. Isaac's next son, Valentin I, become a lieutenant in the *Gardes* by 1627. Whilst it is not possible to determine absolutely whether Charles and Valentin I held lieutenancies within their father's company, it is quite probably the

[8] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1548); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (1-2).
[9] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1964).
[10] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2237); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (152); *revue*, BnF DB 112 (2764) f. 2r.
[11] Pontis, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 242 and 253.
[12] *État*, BnF Cangé, 5, f. 5r.

case with at least Valentin I, as in 1629 he became captain of this company due to Isaac's resignation. Indeed, by 1632, Louis and René du Raynier, two of Valentin I's brothers, were his lieutenant and ensign. Given that Jean de Herce lived until at least 1649, he had clearly left the regiment to make way for one of Isaac's sons to take his *charge*, although whether he voluntarily resigned his position, and/or was compensated for it, is unclear.

On Valentin I's death in 1632, Isaac was able to reassume command of the company, until resigning it again in 1634, in order that his other son Louis could take up the captaincy. Whilst Chagniot has argued that René in turn succeeded Louis to the position of company commander, other accounts suggest that René acquired his own *Gardes* captaincy in 1643, and that the Raynier subsequently controlled two companies within the regiment. There is some debate as to the exact date Louis and René resigned their *charges*, but they both seem to have done so between 1654 and 1661.[13] In any case, the Raynier dominated at least one *Gardes* company for around sixty years, with several successive family members becoming captain in order of seniority, and may well have acquired a second company by the 1640s. The family were able to place 'amis' and non-immediate 'parents' into Isaac's company as subalterns, before more immediate family members were eventually implanted into the unit. This helped to guarantee the maintenance of the company under Raynier command.[14]

A similar example concerns the company under the command of the Cassagnet de Tilladet. Bernard de Cassagnet, sieur de Tilladet, had received his *Gardes* captaincy from Henri IV in August 1589. His family subsequently monopolised positions within the company until 1644. *Revues* show that several non-immediate 'parents' were placed within subaltern positions by the late 1590s, such as Brandelis de Bézolles, ensign from 1599 to 1607, and François du Bouzet, Sieur de Rocquépine, as lieutenant in 1615. However, by 1613, Paul-Antoine de Cassagnet, Bernard's eldest son, had become ensign and by 1615 he had risen to lieutenant, with the fate of Bézolles

[13] BnF DB 555 (14592), p. 4; Chagniot, 'Gardes', p.110. Christian Leger cites a document from 1646 which stated that a condition of Louis' marriage of that year was that 'sa charge de capitaine aux Gardes du Roi destiné à ses héritieres "de son côté et ligné" seulement': Christian Leger, *Droué et son passé: recueil de documents pour servir à l'histoire de la commune*, (Blois, 1985), quote on p. 66, also see pp.58-9, 64-7. Noeufville has more explicitly claimed that the Raynier controlled two *Gardes* companies: Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, pp. 211 (where René is listed under his *seigneurie*, Boisseleau), 225.

[14] Chagniot, 'Gardes', pp. 110-1; Leger, *Droué* pp. 45-53; *revue*, BnF MS.Fr. 25835 (1710); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1896); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1976); *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2199, 2208).

unknown.[15] On Bernard's death in 1622, Louis XIII issued a commission to Paul-Antoine in order that he could take control of his father's company. By 1623, one of his brothers, Roger, was Paul-Antoine's lieutenant, and may well have succeeded to the company captaincy, had he not died in 1629. Instead, it appears that another brother, Gabriel, inherited the company captaincy from Paul-Antoine, until selling the *charge* in 1644.[16] Thus, the Cassagnet de Tilladet's forty-plus year control of its company followed similar lines to that of the Raynier de Droué: an initial implantation of 'amis' and/or non-immediate 'parents', followed by a progressive appointment of immediate family members over time, in order that when the company became vacant, either by resignation or death, a relative was in a position to be allowed by the king to take up the captaincy.

The ambition of regimental officers went beyond merely dominating their own company. Indeed, and as the Raynier quite possibly show, several examples exist of families implanting relatives in multiple companies, either within or without the same regiment. A clear example of multiple implantations can be seen in *Picardie* in the early 1620s with the Faudoas. The family had clear military heritage in the nascent regiments, with Jean de Faudoas, sieur de Sérillac having been the third *mestre de camp* of the regiment that would become *Picardie* between 1579 and 1585, and two of his brothers having been captains in the *Gardes*. Two of Sérillac's sons can be found captaining *Picardie* companies in the early seventeenth century: Pierre de Faudoas, sieur de La Mothe-Sérillac, who received his commission between the 1597 and 1610 *états*, and Jean-François, sieur de L'Isle-Sérillac, who was given a company by the king in *Picardie* in 1621. In addition, another brother would achieve a commission in *La Marine*.[17] Within the *Gardes*, family ties also existed between the companies under the control of the sieur de Casteljaloux and the sieur de Gohas. Both were members of the Biran family, with the Gohas branch having split from the Casteljaloux in the late fifteenth century.[18] Whilst this link seems remote, to modern eyes, they would undoubtedly have recognised each other as 'parents' if not 'cousins'.

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[15] Bernard's father, Antoine, had married Jeanne de Bézolles, and Bernard's grandfather, Bertrand, had married Marguerite de Bouzet. Genealogy, BnF DB 156 (4069) f. 2v; *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25831 (1376); *revue*, BnF PO 609 (14320) p. 4; *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (118); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (149)

[16] *Gardes* company commission, 4 August 1622, genealogy, BnF DB 156 (4069) ff. 8v, 17r; La Chesnaye, III, pp. 532-533; Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, pp. 238-239.

[17] La Chesnaye, VI, pp. 265-266; *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (285); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (518).

[18] Genealogy, BnF Cabinet 46 (1135), ff. 3r-v.

Examples of families holding multiple commissions within the same regiment are relatively rare in comparison to the holding of captaincies in different regiments. This trend can be seen when, on the 1588 *état*, a 'de Campagnol' can be found as a captain in both the *Gardes* and *Picardie*, referring to Bernard Patras de Campaigno, who held a commission in the *Gardes* until the mid-1610s and his brother, Michel Patras de Campaigno. Similarly, on the 1597 *état*, two 'de Baradat' can be found: one in *Picardie* and the other in *Navarre*. By 1610, a 'de Baradat' still appeared on the *Navarre état*, but the one in *Picardie* had been reduced to a 'capitaine retenuz'. The 'de Baradat' commanding the *Navarre* company was Lizander de Baradat, vicomte de Verneuil, who also appears as a captain on *revues* between 1599 and 1601. This is confirmed by a royal act of 1613, which recognised Lizander as the captain of a *Navarre* company. The act also stated that his elder brother Jean de Baradat, sieur de Cahusac, was the captain of an infantry company 'entretenue' for royal service; although it is not specified whether this captaincy was in *Picardie*, nor whether Jean had regained his status as a full captain.[19]

An even more successful case of family implantation across multiple companies and regiments can be seen with the Aubourg. None of the *revues* of the companies of Charles d'Aubourg, sieur de Porcheux, between 1601 and 1622, whilst he was a captain in *Navarre*, or the *revue* of his *Gardes* company in 1627, after his 1626 promotion, reveal the presence of his family. Moreover, none of the subalterns or sergeants listed on his final remaining *revue* from *Navarre* in 1622 appear on the only *revue* of his *Gardes* company in 1627, suggesting that none had made the inter-regimental crossing with him. However, it is also clear that three of his sons, Charles II, Henri, and Louis, all became captains in *Navarre*. Thus, the picture of family implantation is rather nuanced. Charles II had received his own *Navarre* captaincy in 1622, rather than assuming command of his father's company in the same regiment. It is also clear that when Charles II subsequently received a commission into the *Gardes* during the 1630s, he took over the company previously belonging to the sieur de Saint-Preuil, rather than inheriting the company of his father, who had died in 1628. However, it does appear that, by royal 'gratification', a nephew of Charles II received his *Gardes* company after his death in 1643, whilst Louis is named as becoming a captain in *Navarre* 'apres son frere' Henri, suggesting that he had inherited a company

[19] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1558); *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1635, 1649); genealogies, BnF DB 55 (1288) ff. 2r, 5r.

under his brother's command. Thus, whilst the *revues* of Charles d'Aubourg's companies do not reveal it, implantation of the Aubourg at a company level surely did occur, if at least two members of his family were able to inherit companies from relatives in both *Navarre* and the *Gardes*, with the family as a whole establishing a cross-regimental position of influence.[20]

However, and as has already been seen, it should be noted that the king's explicit approval was still a prerequisite for passing on a company between relatives. Gaining this was not a *fait accompli*, even if family members had been implanted. When Mathurin de Castelnau died in 1622 his company in the *Gardes* was given to an illegitimate son of the duc d'Épernon – Jean-Louis Nogaret, Chevalier de La Valette – despite Mathurin having succeeded in placing his eldest son, Charles, as a subaltern in his company by 1613. Whether Charles had been in a position to obtain the company in 1622 is not clear, but it would appear that La Valette was an external appointment to the company. A *revue* from 1627 records Louis de Castelnau, Mathurin's younger son, as La Valette's lieutenant, showing the family had not completely lost their position within the regiment or company.[21] In a similar case, Louis I de Caillebot de La Salle, after having received his commission in 1596, succeeded in placing his brother, Louis, and son, Jacques, as lieutenant and ensign in his *Gardes* company by 1621, allowing the captaincy to pass to Louis I's brother on his death in 1624. However, the brother was subsequently stripped of his command by the king in 1627/8 on charges of muster fraud, with the king installing Charles Cruzy, sieur de Marcillac in the company as captain.[22] It is perhaps telling, nonetheless, that both families ultimately regained their position within the *Gardes*, with Louis I de Caillebot's son, Louis II, and Mathurin de Castelnau's son, also Louis, obtaining captaincies in the regiment in 1640 and 1633. Clearly, the ties of some families to the *vieux* were extremely deep, and could be restored even after temporary losses of royal favour.

Thus, certain families clearly attempted to exploit the new-found stability of the *vieux* by monopolising appointments at a company level, and even gaining *charges* in multiple regimental companies. Captains did this by placing, wherever possible, either 'amis', distant relatives or, and in what was clearly the best-case scenario,

[20] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1667); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1899); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (85); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (295); *revue*, genealogy, BnF PO 126 (2579) pieces 10, 118; anonymous biographical information, BnF DB 37 (333), f. 2.
[21] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (111); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25848 (480); anonymous biography, BnF DB 157 (4109), f. 23r.
[22] Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 110; *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 258346 (271); genealogy, BnF DB 148 (3722) f. 10r.

immediate relatives such as sons, brothers or nephews as their subalterns. By installing them in these positions, not only did other members of the family receive the benefits of permanent military office, a position might also be created whereby the company could be retained in family possession when a captain was either voluntarily or involuntarily removed from office. As André Corvisier has previously stated with relation to the domination of certain families within the *ingénieurs du roi* during the seventeenth century, the ability of regimental officers to 'accorder une place au fils' within the officer corps may well have been a means by which the monarchy could 'récompenser les services du père'.[23] That the king had to approve the inheritance of the company by a new family member may have thus created a perception that service within the regiments could bring demonstrable royal favour to a family. Kinship-based affinities are thus clearly visible within the regimental officer corps. They had probably been allowed to prosper due to a royal desire to recompense loyal military officers for long-term service. Indeed this idea of 'recompense for service', where recompense is understood in not just a material sense but also in terms of improved social status, was fundamental to the reasons why *petite noblesse* families sought positions within the army, as the following section will show.

II- The Nobility and the Reasons for Regimental Service

That *petite noblesse* families coveted officerships within the regiments is unquestionable. Wherever possible, families sought to dominate the composition of company offices, and to gain as many companies under their control as they could, commensurate with their wealth and demographic nature. It is critical to understand, therefore, why they did so, if one is to comprehend both the motivations of the lower nobility in this period, and why the royal army evolved in the way it did during the early part of the seventeenth century.

At a symbolic level, service within the royal regiments tapped into a potent seam of ideas concerning the relationship between nobility and military service. War might not have been a prerequisite for noble status, but, as Arlette Jouanna has put it, 'l'épée

[23] André Corvisier, 'Clientèles et fidélités dans l'armée française aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles' in Yves Durand (ed.), *Homage à Roland Mousnier: clientèles et fidélités en Europe à l'époque moderne*, (Paris, 1981), p. 228.

restait le signe distinctif par excellence de la noblesse'.[24] If the civil wars of the sixteenth century had done much to destroy ideas of chivalry and military valour, the near continuous campaigning had also done much to militarise the French nobility and wider society on a much larger scale than during the more intermittent and external conflict of the Habsburg-Valois Wars of c.1480-1560.[25] Indeed, the importance of warfare to noble status certainly permeated down to the *petite noblesse*, for whom the holding of royal military office helped construct 'an aura of nobility', which was crucial to building up subsequent social status. If nothing else, the holding of office itself demonstrated that a person was 'in the ranks of the governors, not the governed'.[26]

This is not to say, as John Lynn has implied, that the holding of military office was almost an end in itself. For Lynn, the French nobility appear to have sought military office primarily for 'cultural reasons'. It allowed them to display courage on the battlefield, and thus acquire family honour and *gloire*. Such was their desire to acquire these cultural markers, regimental officers were willing to sacrifice their personal fortunes in a fiscal-military system which saw the monarchy massively exploit their credit.[27] Another, more nuanced approach which has stressed the importance of honour to military service is found in the work of Hervé Drévillon, who focused mainly on the later stages of Louis XIV's reign. Drévillon argued that a new army was created under Louis XIV, which improved procedures for officer promotion, and allowed the creation of a 'nouvelle culture de mérite'. Louis thus succeeded in moulding a force which satisfied the French nobility's desire for 'honneur', understood not only in the sense of heroic battlefield actions, but also through serving the monarchy with 'exactitude et discipline.[28] Drévillon's wider conception of honour as a motivation for service is more plausible than Lynn's excessive concentration of

[24] Arlette Jouanna, 'La noblesse française et les valeurs guerrières au XVIe siècle' in (eds.) G.-A. Pérouse, A. Thierry, A. Tournon, *L'Homme de guerre au XVIe siècle*, (Saint-Étienne, 1992), pp. 205-217, quote on p. 206. For more on the importance of warfare to perceptions of nobility during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries see Potter, *Renaissance France*, pp. 88-95; Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 313-320.

[25] At the very least, the French nobility became considerably more predisposed towards feuding and the use of violence during the second half of the sixteenth century: Carroll, *Blood and Violence*, pp. 264-284. For the violence of wider society, one could point to the multiple *ordonnances* passed between the late 1590s and 1620s which sought to restrict the use of firearms among the general populace: BnF Cangé, 20, ff. 66v-68v; BnF Cangé, 21, ff. 11v-12v, 23r, 147r-149r.

[26] Parrot, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 317.

[27] Lynn, *Giant*, pp. 221-3, 238, 251-2.

[28] Drévillon, *L'Impôt*, *passim*, quotes from p. 14. However, Drévillon does at times seem to share Lynn's beliefs regarding the central importance of *gloire*: 'John Lynn a raison de souligner que la gloire et le courage demeuraient des horizons indépassables', p. 393.

battlefield *gloire*, which so downplays the importance of materialist motivations to the French officer corps that it reduces them to vain, 'self-deluding idealists' as Rowlands has put it.[29]

Whilst one should not dismiss the importance of battlefield conduct to the nobility, Lynn's ideas do not plausibly explain why certain members of the French nobility remained in military service during relatively lengthy periods of peace, such as those in the early seventeenth century. Indeed, Drévillon's argument is perhaps closer to Rowlands than he admits, as Rowlands did not solely conceive of 'private interest' in the materialist terms that Drévillon ascribed to him. Drévillon's focus on the importance of rationalised career structures demonstrated that an officer's conception of his honour was not static, and that he sought to improve it, and hence his social standing, by progressing through the army's ranks. These arguments are important as they can be transposed onto the earlier period studied in this thesis. Ultimately, and just as Rowlands has described for the men who inhabited the officer corps under Louis XIV, the men who staffed the nascent regimental structures did so for the same reason that drove many of the major actions in their lives: military service offered the prospect of tangible social advancement, which would help improve their status of their dynasty.

Indeed, at a practical level, the possibility of a regular and fairly sizeable salary could make a regimental officership desirable. In 1610, a *Gardes* captain would receive 306 *livres* per *montre*, with a lieutenant and ensign paid 110 *livres* and sixty-six *livres* each. The amount was less within the other *vieux*, with all four having the same pay scale of 150 *livres* per captain, sixty *livres* per lieutenant, and forty-five *livres* per ensign.[30] Those within the *Gardes* thus earned almost twice as much as their counterparts, and despite the recognised superiority of *Picardie* over *Navarre*, *Champagne* and *Piémont*, its officers were not paid a higher salary. The prospect of doubling one's salary by staying in the regiments for long-enough to receive a promotion to the *Gardes* may have been an incentive for long-term service.

Whilst these amounts might appear small, it should be recognised that most regimental officers, below the level of *mestre de camp*, came from the *petite noblesse* and were of extremely modest financial means. As shown in this thesis' Introduction, the *petite noblesse* constituted 95-90% of noble society, with 85-90% of French nobles

[29] Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, pp. 155-7.
[30] *État*, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 131r-v, 133r, 134r-v, and 135v. There were ten *montres* per year.

enjoying yearly incomes of less than 5,000 *livres*, and around 50-60% of the nobility having incomes of less than 1,000 *livres* per year.[31] If one considers that the annual income for a *Gardes* captain was 3,060 *livres*, and 1,500 *livres* for a captain in the *quatre-vieux*, it is clear that the salary of a regimental officer would have represented a sizeable amount of money for the majority of the nobility. Even if a proportion of wages had to be put aside for work-related expenditure, the wages of regimental officers had the potential to move a person out of the poorest 50% of noble society.

Jean Guezille, sieur de La Barre-Chevrie can be seen as an example of how the warfare of this era, and the new military structures it spawned, could dramatically improve the living standards of nobles who became officers. La Barre-Chevrie earned yearly revenue of 62.5 *livres* from his seigneurial lands, yet on becoming a captain in the royal infantry in 1594 he began to receive a wage of 100 *livres* per month. Accordingly, Michel Nassiet has argued that careers within royal military structures were extremely lucrative (in a relative sense) for members of the *petite noblesse*, although he has also contended that it was only from 1636 that a substantial number of durable military offices became available for members of the Breton nobility.[32] Whilst La Barre-Cheverie might be a somewhat extreme example, and one should not forget the expenses that military service entailed, it would be plausible to suggest that serving as an officer may well have led to an increase in income for many nobles within the regiments.

Indeed, a number of officers may well have turned to regimental service in order to avoid becoming financially destitute, due to practices relating to inheritance. Louis de Pontis recounted how in 1597, at the age of fourteen, 'tout le bien' of his family had passed to his older brother when their parents had died, 'selon la costume du pays'.[33] His subsequent entry into the regiments thus not only helped him to demonstrate his nobility symbolically, but also brought him a much needed form of reasonably steady income. As such, when payment problems did arise, such as when the army began to undertake a greater amount of relatively high-intensity warfare in

[31] Due to the relative lack of genealogical evidence, it has not been possible to calculate an average for the yearly revenues that regimental officers received, yet few seem to have enjoyed incomes above that of the *petite noblesse*.

[32] Nassiet does not state whether Barre-Chevrie was part of a to-be-permanent regiment, or merely a temporary infantry formation employed in the wars against the *Ligue* in Brittany during the 1590s. Nassiet, *Pauvreté*, p. 140-146.

[33] Pontis *Mémoires*, I, pp. 213-4. By 'bien', Pontis probably referred to property. He may well have received a proportion of the family's other wealth, even if, as it would appear, this was not considerable.

the 1620s, they could not easily be ignored. In 1627, Pontis stated to Louis XIII that his current position as a *Gardes* lieutenant had recently caused him a 'dépense beaucoup plus grande que mon bien […] je m'endettois beaucoup dans ma charge'.[34] For a person like Pontis, no matter how important honour or *gloire* was, it was still necessary for him to earn enough money from positions of regimental command to at least remain solvent; there was a limit to the financial sacrifices he was prepared to make in the exercise of his command.

Pontis may well have exaggerated the state of his impoverishment in 1597, yet his story is not implausible. Even taking into account regional variations in inheritance law, the practice of primogeniture was deeply ingrained in French noble society, with eldest sons often inheriting over two-thirds of their family's property.[35] Amongst *petite noblesse* families with very few assets to begin with, a younger brother could often be left with very little, even if they were not completely disbarred from the inheritance. Indeed, that a notable amount of regimental officers were younger brothers, particularly amongst those who had entered service prior to 1598, may suggest that Pontis' experience was far from unusual.[36] Regimental service may well have been increasingly seen as an attractive career option for the relatively disenfranchised younger brothers of *petite noblesse* families by the late sixteenth century, giving them the practical and symbolic means to maintain their noble status. But, by the 1620s, the growing costs of service in the *vieux* as a captain, even if not as a subaltern, may have given the advantage to better-endowed eldest sons in competition for this rank.

During the period of this thesis, it does seem that the monarchy was reasonably successful in maintaining regular wage payments to its officers. Pontis' complaints in 1627 were largely based on the fact that this income had only *recently* become less reliable. Moreover, officers could receive other financial benefits. Pierre du Bellay,

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[34] Ibid., II, 21-3.

[35] Mentzer, *Blood and Belief*, pp.104-106. See also Nassiet, *Parenté*, pp. 45-56, for a discussion of the concept of 'l'aînesse'.

[36] Whilst it has not been possible to uncover the genealogies of all regimental officers, from the *Gardes* alone at least Mathurin de Castelnau, Blaise de Chaumejean, Pierre du Bellay, Jean-Jacques de Montesquiou, and Albert de Grillet were all junior members of their families when they entered the regiments. Interestingly, some of these younger brothers' eldest sons subsequently joined the regiments after 1600, showing how the benefits of regimental service were increasingly becoming desirable enough to attract senior family members. Genealogy, BnF Cabinet 79 (2066), ff. 10v-11r; genealogy, anonymous biography, BnF DB 178 (4640), ff. 8r, 15r-16r, 18r-19v; genealogy, BnF DB 81 (1848), f. 4v; genealogy, BnF DB 459, ff. 11v; genealogies, BnF DB 333 (8474), ff. 1v-3r, 35v. The importance of military service to younger sons in the nobility has already been recognised: Scott and Storrs, 'Introduction', p. 45.

sieur de La Courbe, was granted a delay of three years to pay his debts during the siege of Amiens.[37] Whether these debts had been acquired due to military service or not, it showed that captains within the permanent regiments were able to acquire significant financial favour due to their proximity to the king. The monarchy undoubtedly did not want to see its closest body of militarily-loyal families fatally impoverished. Furthermore, the value of a captain's office, and the guaranteed income they received, or were at least meant to receive, as a company commander may well have assisted regimental captains when it came to acquiring credit. This must only have entrenched the perception that becoming a regimental officer was not a financially ruinous form of employment, and could even be profitable. Thus, Drévillon's statement that, during the reign of Louis XIV, 'l'économie de la guerre avait la particularité de n'enrichir personne' does not appear to hold true for the early seventeenth century.[38]

This assessment can only have been strengthened by other financial rewards that could be distributed on the basis of loyal service. For example, Fabien de Biran, ensign of his father Barthélemy-Scipion de Biran, sieur de Casteljaloux, received an exceptional gratification of 600 *livres* in October 1621.[39] The most significant financial recompense were the pensions that the monarchy occasionally accorded to its regimental officers. Such was the desire to maintain the Grillet de Brissac in royal service, the pension of 2,400 *livres* granted to Albert de Grillet, sieur de Brissac, in 1636 was passed on to his children in 1647.[40] Isaac du Raynier, sieur de Droué, was accorded a pension of 3,000 *livres* per year in 1613, not only for the 'bons fidelles et agreable services' to the monarchy over 'vingt six ans de batailles rencontres et autres occasions', but also so that Isaac would have 'moyen' of continuing these services in the future.[41] Isaac's pension was thus a reward for past service, but also a bribe for continued loyalty to the monarchy, and specifically to Marie de Médicis, in the politically uncertain mid-1610s. Similarly, Bernard de Cassagnet, sieur de La Tilladet, was granted a pension of 3,000 *livres* in 1619 together with orders to increase the size of his *Gardes* company, thus simultaneously buying, ordering and rewarding his

[37] 'Lettres données par le Roy', 29 July 1597, BnF DB 81 (1848), f. 85r
[38] Drévillon, *L'Impôt*, pp. 440-441.
[39] Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 101.
[40] Genealogy, BnF DB 333, f. 35v; letters patent, 22 March 1647, BnF Cabinet 174 (4411), f. 4r.
[41] Letters patent, 17 January 1613, AAE MD 769, f. 2r.

continued loyalty.[42] This would suggest that the levels of expenditure that *Gardes*' captains had to make on their units was high, and that even with levels of pay above those of the other *vieux* it was still necessary to grant additional monies during periods of company expansion.

Aside from strictly financial matters, the holding of regimental office also allowed persons to prove that they were worthy of consideration for higher military posts. Isaac du Raynier became *maréchal de camp* in 1640, after almost fifty years of regimental service, whilst Blaise de Chaumejean received a similar commission on resigning his *Gardes* company in 1617. His sons, René and Michel-Denis, who in turn took over the captaincy of Blaise's former *Gardes* company, also eventually received higher promotions, with René reaching the rank of *grand maréchal de logis* by 1638 and Michel-Denis eventually rising to the position of *lieutenant général des armées* in the late 1650s.[43] Jean du Caylar de Saint-Bonnet, marquis de Toiras, underwent an extremely rapid ascension after acquiring his *Gardes* company in 1620. After becoming *mestre de camp* of *Champagne* in 1624, he acquired the position of *maréchal de camp* in 1625, and was awarded the dignity of *maréchal de France* in 1630 due to a string of military successes at La Rochelle and in northern Italy. Had he stayed as Louis XIII's *capitaine de la volière*, the position he had held before his *Gardes* commission, it seems unlikely he would have enjoyed such a rise.[44] Regimental service also offered the chance of receiving town-command commissions. Albert de Grillet, sieur de Brissac was appointed *commandant* of the citadel of Nancy in 1635, Bernard de Cassagnet, sieur de Tilladet had been appointed *gouverneur* of Bourg-sur-Mer by the time he made his will in 1618, whilst Isaac du Raynier was made *gouverneur* of Royan after the town was taken during the 1622 campaign.[45] The prospect of further advancement through the royal military establishment was thus achieved by at least some *vieux* officers.

Finally, becoming an officer in the *vieux* allowed a member of the lower nobility to place themselves in the 'king's gaze', and to potentially earn his favour. For example, Henri IV asked the Constable, in 1597, to write letters on his behalf to captains in the *Gardes* in order that Henri could praise them for the speed in which

[42] Commission to increase size of *Gardes* company, 6 May 1602, BnF DB 156 (4069), f. 8r.
[43] La Chesnaye, IV, p. 389.
[44] E. de Balincourt, 'Le maréchal de Toiras, 1585-1636', *Revue du Midi*, 3, (1889), pp. 113-123.
[45] Genealogy, BnF DB 156 (4069), f. 3v; genealogy, BnF DB 333, f. 35v; Charles Bernard, *Histoire des guerres de Louis XIII contre les religionnaires rebelles de son estat* (Paris, 1633?), p. 301.

they had assembled their companies during the siege of Amiens.[46] Henri can also be found writing directly to a captain 'Des Combes' in 1597, who held a commission in *Navarre*, and to Paul d'Hames in 1610.[47] Whilst Henri's tone was not necessarily positive – Henri lambasted Combes for not being at the siege of Amiens, and de Hames for not properly organising his company prior to the Jülich campaign – both letters demonstrate that regimental officers were known by the king, and had some form of direct relationship with him. This relationship led to many regimental commanders receiving highly coveted positions within the court and central government. That these positions had been earned through military service can be seen in a letter of 1622, in which Louis XIII stated that 'les services que me rendz le sr des Bolez capitaine au regiment de Navarre *m'obligent d'avoir soing de sa personne*'. The captain was subsequently appointed to the position of 'maitre de la maison du roi' due to his service 'pendant toutes ces guerres passees'.[48] Bernard de Cassagnet had become a *gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi* by 1618, whilst Isaac du Raynier by the 1630s also held this position, along with that of 'conseiller du Roi en ses conseils d'Etat'.

These positions were important as they emphasised the proximity of officers to royal favour, something which was key to their exercise of patronage, and to the perception of their social standing.[49] Officers prized almost any position or activity which displayed a direct relationship to royal power: by 1607, the long-standing *Picardie* captain Barthélemy de Montlezun had found service in the royal 'paneterie'. This charge might appear humble, yet, as the document which recorded his charge showed, it meant he had access to the king's council.[50] Moreover, military service also allowed the possibility of further honorific *charges* and activities tied to the monarchy. Paul d'Antist, sieur de Mansan was made the *gouverneur* of Gaston d'Orléans during the 1600s; Blaise de Chaumejean's son, René, was 'nourri enfant dhonneur [*sic*]' of Louis XIII.[51] Albert de Grillet was able to engineer a marriage with the daughter of François Tardieu, who served on royal councils and was *maître des requêtes de l'hôtel*

[46] Henri IV to Montmorency, 22 April 1597, LMHIV, IV, p. 747.
[47] Henri IV to 'Cappitaine des Combes', 2 July 1597, Henri IV to 'Cappitaine Hames', 31 March, 23, 25 April 1610, Ibid., IV, p. 795, VII, pp. 879, 887, 889.
[48] BnF Ms.Fr. 3722, ff. 71v-72r, 73r. My emphasis. The captain referred to is probably the sieur des Boullets found on the 1597, 1610 and 1620 *états*, a 1597 *revue*, (BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1505)), and in Bassompierre, II, p. 185.
[49] Walsby, *Laval*, p. 79.
[50] 'Lettres de Comittimus', 4 August 1597, BnF Cabinet 246 (6504), f. 23v.
[51] Luppé, *Mémoires*, pp. 14, 214; anonymous biography, BnF DB 178 (4460), f. 16r.

du roi. Tardieu's daughter was a 'fille d'honneur de la Reine', and both the queen and Louis XIII's sisters were present at his wedding which took place in the Louvre.[52] Whilst their presence and the location of the wedding undoubtedly owed more to his bride than Grillet, without his lengthy years of service in the *Gardes* Grillet would not have been able to pull off such a marriage, with all the attendant benefits to his social standing that it conferred. Indeed, on the basis of where the regiment seems to have been stationed,[53] the *Gardes*' close proximity to the king and the royal court can only have helped its officers form connections such as these.

These were the advantages of prominent military service. On the downside, it obviously brought great risks. In the *Gardes*, seven captains were killed in action between 1620 and 1629, whilst Andilly lists eleven other *vieux* and *petits-vieux* captains who were killed or crippled during the 1621 campaign alone.[54] Yet even death could not stop certain families. The Aubourg de Porcheux lost two family members who held commissions in the *vieux* during the warfare at La Rochelle in 1627-8, but still maintained a captaincy in *Navarre* and would ultimately regain a captaincy in the *Gardes*. Indeed, the attempt to place as many family members in regimental positions as possible was an attempt to ensure that their position within the *vieux* could be maintained if disaster struck.

Families spread their bets in this manner because regimental service satisfied many of the dynastic ambitions that they held. Indeed, service within the new standing army appears to justify Parrott's statement that early modern elites sought to engage in military service for cultural, social and financial reasons.[55] At a cultural level, waging war was patently still an important part of a French nobleman's self-perception and justification of their elite status within society. However, military service in itself, and any subsequent attainment of *gloire*, was not enough for the men who formed the regimental officer corps. Financially, as Pontis pointed out, few officers wished to be bankrupted for the pleasure of royal military service. Even if outlays could be extensive, officers were paid very reasonable wages, especially within the *Gardes*, with even more substantial pensions, or other forms of financial benefit, a potential prospect. That these financial rewards became larger as one progressed through the ranks and regiments encouraged lengthy periods of service, as did the special legal

[52] La Chesnaye, VII, p. 456; genealogy, BnF DB 333 (8474), f. 3r.
[53] See above, Chapter One, Section III.
[54] Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 273; Andilly, *Journal*, I, 1621, p. 150.
[55] Parrott, 'Military Enterprise', pp. 78-79.

privileges that members of the *Gardes* received.[56] In terms of social aspirations, regimental service could lead to promotion to higher positions within the royal military establishment and even to the command of towns and citadels. It also meant that an officer became known to the king, increasing the likelihood of directly receiving royal patronage and improving the perception of their social standing. Members of the *petite noblesse* thus coveted regimental positions as they allowed them to enter a world where they could potentially improve the position of themselves and their family within the vertical hierarchy of French society. Indeed, not only did regimental service in itself lead to the progressive attainment of benefits, it allowed men to cultivate new kinship links within a new social environment, both within and without the regiments. The following sections will explore how officers exploited this opportunity.

III- The Standing Army and Social Networking: Horizontal Links of Kinship and Affinity between Regimental Families

Many of the noble families who held commissions within the *vieux* entered into relationships with each other. Indeed, much of what has been written on affinities in late sixteenth-century France can be transposed onto the regimental system. An affinity, like the standing army, constituted 'a pyramid of authority', with the greater nobility and ultimately the king at its apex.[57] Within an affinity, members of the lower nobility entered into 'fluctuating ties and diverse bonds' with patrons of a higher social status but also amongst other families of similar social standing.[58] Indeed, for Stuart Carroll, 'horizontal ties of sociability and kinship were as important as vertical bonds of deference, loyalty and material security' to nobles within the Guise affinity.[59] Another instructive example can be found in the work of Raymond Mentzer, who has

[56] All officers above the level of ensign in the *Gardes* had the right to have their 'causes commises' in the first instance before the 'gens tenans les requestes de nostre palais à Paris', just like other royal officers and servants. Letters patent, BnF Cangé, 20, ff. 123r-4r.
[57] Walsby, *Laval*, pp. 45-7. André Corvisier has similarly stated that for much of the *ancien régime* the French army was formed from a 'pyramide de contrats d'homme à homme': Corvisier, 'Clientèles', p. 219.
[58] Carroll, *Noble Power*, pp. 6-7. Mark Greengrass, 'Functions and Limits of Political Clientelism in France before Cardinal Richelieu', in Neithard Bulst, Robert Descimon and Alain Guerreau (eds.), *L'État ou le Roi: Les foundations de la modernité monarchique en France (XIVe-XVIIe siècles)*, (Paris, 1996), p. 73. Connections between regimental officers and the high nobility will be explored in the final two chapters of this thesis.
[59] Carroll, *Noble Power*, p. 53.

shown how families from the provincial lower nobility in Castres focused on 'nurturing and maintaining' the day-to-day horizontal links they had with houses of similar political and social standing, rather than the weaker links they had with members of the higher nobility.[60]

These comparisons are valid because the regiments were also a structure in which social networking transpired. Not only did military service itself confer benefits upon regimental officers, obtaining an office within the regiments allowed members of the lower nobility to enter into a new social framework, often on a broader geographical basis due to the stationing of their companies, where officers could mix with nobles of both their own and higher social station. And to many officers, it would be the horizontal links they cultivated which would impact most on their lives. By relying solely on the friendship of a non-related and more powerful patron, an officer was subject to the caprices of favour and health.[61] Through entering into ties of horizontal kinship, regimental families could act in unison to protect their interests and the improved social standing that military service could bring.

The importance of constructing firm bonds with other officers can be demonstrated by examining the vicissitudes of the life of Louis de Pontis. Whilst familial links were central to him receiving a commission in the company of his 'parent' Boulogne, Pontis' career became more volatile when he left this company, and followed an *ami*, Jean de Zamet, who was *mestre de camp* of *Picardie* between 1617 and 1622. Despite initially receiving a promotion to the newly created position of 'lieutenant de la mestre de camp' company, Zamet subsequently resigned his command and, in effect, abandoned Pontis, who was fortunate that Zamet's successor, the sieur de Liancourt, showed himself to be well-disposed towards Pontis. Similarly, when he received a promotion into the *Gardes*, Pontis had to earn the *amitié* of his captains, Saligny and Saint-Preuil, in order to make his position comfortable. Pontis himself seems to have recognised the difficulty in only relying on *amitié* to further his military career, writing an emotional letter to Zamet on the latter's resignation from *Picardie* in 1622, in which Pontis stated how he had voluntarily left a stable position in *Champagne* in order to be 'uniquement attaché' to Zamet.[62] The subtext of this letter was something that clearly must have weighed heavily on the minds of many

[60] Mentzer, *Blood and Belief*, pp. 153-161.
[61] As Corvisier put it, 'La mort du protecteur risque d'être prejudiciable au protégé', Corvisier, 'Clientèles', p. 233.
[62] Pontis, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 300-6, 344-6, II, pp. 10-18. Quote on I, p.344.

lesser nobles. By relying solely on the *amitié* of a non-related and demonstrably more powerful patron, a person was subject to their caprices. Through entering into ties of kinship, regimental families could act in unison to protect their interests and the improved social standing that military service could bring.

Several regimental officers formed marital bonds between their families. Jean-Jacques de Montesquiou, sieur de Sainte-Colombe, captain and subsequently *lieutenant colonel* of the *Gardes*, married Antoinette de Chaumejean, the sister of Blaise de Chaumejean, another *Gardes* captain, in 1610.[63] The daughter of Barthélemy-Scipion de Biran married another *Gardes* captain, Jean-Jacques de La Barthe, sieur de Giscaro, in 1623.[64] Yet another *Gardes* marriage may have taken place between the *Gardes* captain Pierre de Guigneaudeau de Montigny and Anne de Chesnel, the daughter of another *Gardes* captain, Charles de Chesnel, sieur de Meux, although this is disputed.[65] Siblings of the Faudoas brothers in *Picardie* also seem to have entered into two marriages involving other families within the regiments. Their sister, Marguerite, married Antoine d'Esparbez, a *Picardie* captain found on the 1597 *état* and a *revue* from 1599, but who was no longer a captain by 1610. Pierre de Faudoas, Baron de Sérillac, a nephew of Marguerite and the Faudoas in *Picardie*, married Susane de Biran in 1640, the daughter of the *Gardes* captain, the sieur de Gohas.[66]

Other marriages which were not directly between regimental families still display evidence of horizontal linkage. When the *Gardes* captain Louis I de Caillebot, sieur de La Salle married Léonore de Molitard in the early 1600s, another *Gardes* captain, Isaac du Raynier, sieur de Droué, was present at the wedding in his capacity as the brother-in-law of the bride's father.[67] A kinship bond now existed between the two captains as they had both married into the same family. At the wedding of Jacques du Laur, another captain from *Navarre* was present, Gratian de Saint-Cricq.[68] At the marriage of Fabien de Biran, son of Barthélemy-Scipion de Biran, sieur de Casteljaloux, Joachim de Montagu, sieur de Frémigières was present. That

[63] Genealogy, BnF DB 178 (4640), f. 8r; genealogy, BnF DB 459 f. 11v.
[64]Gabriel O'Gilvy and Pierre Jules de Bourrousse de Laffore, *Nobiliaire de Guienne et de Gascogne*, (4 vols, Paris, 1856- 1890) I, p. 245.
[65] The Beauchet-Filleau alleged that Anne de Chesnel may have been the daughter of Josias de Chesnel, sieur de Reaux, who was not a regimental officer. Henri and Paul Beauchet-Filleau, *Dictionnaire historique et généalogique des familles du Poitou*, 2nd ed. (7 vols., Poitiers, 1891-), IV, pp. 601-2.
[66] La Chesnaye, VI, pp. 266, 268.
[67] Marriage contract, undated, probably early 1600s, BnF Carrés 145, f. 145r.
[68] Genealogy, BnF DB 386 (378), f. 4v.

Frémigières was noted as being 'ambassadeur de Malte' demonstrated the elevated level of French society that some *Gardes* captains could reach.[69] These examples of officers being present at each other's weddings hint at a potentially deep relationship between certain regimental families.

Nevertheless, not all regimental officers were so cordial towards each other, and examples also exist of disputes within the *vieux*. In 1604, a quarrel between two lieutenants in *Piémont* reached the point where it had to be settled by the Constable.[70] A gambling dispute between the sieurs de Canaples and Saligny led to the latter resigning his *charge* in the *Gardes*.[71] Isaac du Raynier's son, Valentin I, who took over command of Isaac's company in 1629, died in a duel in 1632. The second of his opponent, Bouchavannes, was named 'Careget', and was the ensign in the sieur de Tilladet's *Gardes* company. Louis XIII was angry enough to condemn the two survivors of the duel to death, although he allowed the Raynier to maintain control of their *Gardes* company.[72] Even within these disputes, however, the close bonds between officers are visible. The argument between the two *Piémont* officers had arisen when one lieutenant felt he had to defend the honour of his absent captain, presumably against the slurs of the opposing lieutenant. And Pontis alleged that he was willing to support Saligny in any action he wished to take against Canaples.

That a degree of friction existed between the men who staffed the regiments is hardly surprising. These were men highly attuned to violence in a society which generally held few qualms about resorting to severe acts of aggression, even over relatively trivial matters. Moreover, as the duel in which Valentin I du Raynier was involved shows, the *petite noblesse* could hardly escape from the notions of honour and vindicatory inter-personal violence that coloured much of the nobility's actions in this period.[73] However, it would appear that links of *amitié* and kinship between regimental families largely outweighed negative bonds. These horizontal links demonstrate that most *petite noblesse* families in the regiments preferred to work

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[69] Marriage contract, 2 October 1617, BnF Cabinet 46 (1135), f.16r. Frémigières was *Ambassadeur de l'ordre de Malte* in France between 1617 and 1624: Claude Petiet, *Le roi et le grand maître: l'Ordre de Malte et la France au XVIIe siècle*, (Paris, 2002), p. 604.

[70] 'Accord de la querelle de Capitaine Capdeuille [...] et Capitaine Mesples [...]', 15 October 1604, BnF Cangé, 20, f. 122r.

[71] Pontis, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 16-18.

[72] Leger, *Droué*, p. 53.

[73] For an overall examination of the role of violence in early modern society, and the greater acceptability of its use see Julius Ruff, *Violence in Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge, 2001); for an examination of noble feuds, and the extremely prevalent use of violence within them, see Carroll, *Blood and Violence*, *passim*.

together rather than against each other. Entering into kinship alliances with other regimental officers solidified the impression that both were part of the body of families from which the officer corps was primarily drawn, entrenching the idea that they belonged to the wider military social milieu that included the most powerful members of the French nobility. The links which existed between them were thus constructed for the same reasons families sought to gain multiple commissions within the regiments. They were both means by which a family could entrench their position within the regimental military structures, in order to continue to gain the social benefits that could be accrued from holding such office.

IV- Links of Kinship, Military Service and the Wider Strategy of Noble Families

That the *petite noblesse* entered into ties with each other to consolidate and improve their social standing can be seen through the wider family strategies they pursued. Gaining a company command exposed officers to a variety of new opportunities within wider military structures and society. Indeed, to understand why families sought commissions in the army, and why they entered into horizontal bonds with each other, one often has to look at their actions outside of the military.

The relationship between the Montlezun de Busca and the Patras de Campaigno offers an example of such wider strategy. As stated earlier, a member of the Patras family had attended the wedding of a Montlezun in 1622, hinting at a relationship between the two families. One quite clearly did exist, based partly on military service within the regiments. Barthélemy de Montlezun is recorded as being the lieutenant in the company of 'M. de Campagnol' in 1587, referring to the *Picardie* company controlled by Michel Patras.[74] Yet, not only did the families have ties due to shared regimental service, both had significant links to the town of Boulogne. Bertrand Patras, sieur de Campaigno, was, in addition to his *Gardes* captaincy, commander of a company within the Boulogne garrison, and, from 1597, *sénéchal* of Boulonnais.[75] He passed this latter position to his nephew on his death in 1617. Both positions were undoubtedly a reward for loyal service to the monarchy throughout the 1580s and 1590s, which had culminated in Bertrand's successful defence of Boulogne

[74] Marriage contract, 7 June 1587, BnF Cabinet 246 (6504), f. 22v.
[75] *État*, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 8v-9r.

in 1597.[76] Marriage contracts relating to the Montlezun de Busca also show that the family had clear links to Boulogne by the late 1580s, and that these ties were still in place by the early 1630s.[77] Moreover, both families had only relatively recently settled in Boulogne, as both were of Gascon origin. Thus, it is not hard to imagine why links existed between the two families. Both shared a common heritage, had improved their social standing through serving in the regiments, with the Montlezun clearly benefiting from the slightly higher social standing that the Patras enjoyed, and subsequently both had become part of the Boulonnais elite. Regimental service had offered new opportunities to both families, forming a basis on which they became notable provincial families. Maintaining links of affinity with each other, drawing on long-standing ties, was one means by which to consolidate the social advances they both had made.

At least two members of the regiments arranged marriages based on where their unit had been stationed. The *Navarre* company under the command of Pierre de Trion can be found stationed in Rue, Picardy, between 1599 and 1601. In 1617, his daughter married the son of Antoine de Séricourt, sieur d'Esclainvilliers, who was the royal lieutenant in the town and citadel of Rue. That this was part of a wider attempt to aggrandise Trion power in Picardy can be seen through Pierre's subsequent appointment as *gouverneur* of the town and chateau of Roye after 1625, by which point he no longer held his commission in *Navarre*.[78] In a comparable case, the *Navarre* company of Lizander de Baradat, vicomte de Verneuil was stationed in Montreuil between at least 1599 and 1601.[79] Lizander would subsequently marry Anne des Essarts, a relative of Charles des Essarts, sieur de Maigneux, who was the *gouverneur* of the town and citadel of Montreuil. That Verneuil was made *gouverneur* of Château-Thierry in 1613 shows that, like Trion, he was attempting to build up a dynastic power-base in Picardy.[80] Both men had thus built affinity links based on

[76] M. Lefebvre, *Histoire générale et particulière de la ville de Calais et du Calaisis, ou Pays reconquis*, (2 vols, Paris, 1766), II, p. 408; 'Campagno' to Montmorency, 2 August 1597, AMC, L, XXXV, f. 25, shows how desperate the defence of Boulogne had become by August 1597. Bertrand's rise may also have been linked to a possible connection to the duc d'Épernon, who was *gouverneur* of the town.
[77] Marriage contracts, 30 January 1632, 1622, BnF Cabinet, 246 (6504), ff. 22r-v, 30v-31r.
[78] Villefosse, 'Histoire de l'Abbaye d'Orbais', *Revue de Champagne et de Brie*, 19, (1885), p.157; Émile Coët, *Histoire de la Ville de Roye*, (2 vols., Paris, 1880), I, p. 137.
[79] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1558); *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1649).
[80] Genealogy, BnF DB 55 (1288), f. 2v; Baron de Saint-Pern and Mle. de l'Estourbeillon, 'Réformation de la noblesse de Bretagne', *Revue de l'Ouest*, 12, (1896), p. 242.

where their regimental companies had been based, in order to consolidate the advances in social standing they had achieved due to regimental service.

Finally, the life of Isaac du Raynier quite clearly displays the priorities of the *petite noblesse* families who officered the regiments. Isaac married his daughter, Marie, to Étienne de Vallée, sieur de Pescheray, the son of a *Ligueur* captain, Louis de Vallée. Isaac subsequently employed his new son-in-law as a lieutenant in the *gouvernement* of Royan, until Étienne's untimely death in 1622. From Marie's second marriage, she married her third daughter Madeleine to Henri de Senneterre, duc de La Ferté in 1655, who had become a *maréchal de France* in 1651. The Raynier's acquisition of a direct kinship link to a *maréchal de France* represented a mark of considerable social ascension from the social station they had occupied in the 1580s. Indeed, René du Raynier, Marie's brother and Isaac's son, was subsequently able to obtain the charges of *gouverneur* of Mirecourt and *bailli* of the Vosges thanks to La Ferté's intervention.

Isaac also dedicated much of his time to the aggressive acquisition of *terres* and *seigneuries*. He acquired the *seigneuries* of Fontenalle and Ancize, but employed much of his energies to improving the *seigneurie* of Droué, which had been of only minor importance prior to the seventeenth century. The process was not straightforward, and in 1644 Isaac married the daughter of a local landowner, Joachim de Fromentières, in order to end several disputes between the two which had arisen over Isaac's acquisitions. Despite these difficulties, Isaac constructed roads, houses, a church and, perhaps most significantly, a château, improving Droué to the extent that he can be considered the 'veritable fondateur' of the town.[81]

That Isaac chose to crown his municipal improvements with a château is telling. The building was a symbol of the ambition of the *petite noblesse* officers within the royal regiments, an expression of dynastic power through architecture in a way comparable to the prestige towns constructed by Charles de Gonzague, duc de Nevers at Charleville or the duc de Sully at Henrichemont.[82] Whilst Isaac had come from a noble

[81] Leger, *Droué*, pp.49-59; La Chesnaye, VI, p.361; Christophe Levantal, *Ducs et pairs et duchés-pairies laïques à l'époque moderne (1519-1790): dictionnaire prosographique, généalogique, chronologique, topographique et heuristique*, (Paris, 1996), p. 666.

[82] David Parrott, 'A "prince souverain" and the French crown: Charles de Nevers, 1580-1637' in (eds.) R. Oresko, G.C. Gibbs and H.M. Scott, *Royal and republican sovereignty in early modern Europe*, (Cambridge, 1997), p. 159; Simon D. Hodson, 'Sovereigns and Subjects: The Princes of Sedan and Dukes of Bouillon in Early Modern France, c.1490-1652', (D.Phil. dissertation, University of Oxford,

background, he had risen far beyond the social standing he had been born into, and the château was an expression of the family's new-found elevated status. This ascension had been achieved primarily through service within the new standing army. The permanency of regimental offices at a company level had allowed Isaac to rise through the ranks not just to the position of captain, but also to enter a higher social milieu, one in which he was recognised by the king and where he could construct both horizontal and vertical alliances to benefit his family. Further service, coupled with the considerable influence that captains held over appointments to their companies in this period, had allowed Isaac to first place relatives within his company, before bequeathing the unit to his sons, and the attendant benefits that came with it, whilst he himself moved on to higher *charges*.

The Raynier might have been one of the more successful families within the royal regiments, but their story is by no means entirely unique. The entrenchment of permanent offices within the regiments, and the clear social benefits that holding such positions allowed, meant the *vieux* were incorporated into the wider strategy that the lower nobility pursued in order to achieve its fundamental ambition: the improvement of their family's social standing. That certain families quite clearly attempted to dominate and even monopolise company positions not only provides evidence that the lower nobility possessed and pursued recognisable strategies for dynastic advancement; it also demonstrates how important regimental commissions began to be seen to this strategy. Service within the royal regiments thus became part of the larger goal for the *petite noblesse* that the Droué château symbolised: their ambition to be perceived as powerful, notable members of French society, *petits rois* of their own domains.

The rise of the standing army thus meant that a body of noble families came together to form the royal infantry's first permanent officer corps. Indeed, the inter- and intra-regimental links between noble officers evidenced in this chapter creates the impression that one needs to see the *vieux* as a bloc of units, rather than as separate and enclosed regiments or regimental companies. More generally, one could argue that if the regiments had *not* satisfied the ambitions of the *petite noblesse* which constituted the officer corps, the standing army may well have evolved in a different manner, or may not have emerged at all during this period. Only by making service within its

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1999), pp. 171-2; Bernard Barbiche and Ségolène de Dainville-Barbiche, *Sully: l'homme et ses fidèles*, (Paris, 1997), pp. 312-6.

ranks attractive to a section of the French nobility could the standing army have found the officers necessary for its formation. In the light of the remilitarisation of the wider nobility in the later sixteenth century, a new corps of military officers could not be imposed on French society; it had to materialize from that body. Accordingly, the emergence of the standing army hints at a wider change between the monarchy, royal military offices, and the nobility, in which at least a section of the latter placed themselves more solidly in royal service, as it was in both their and the crown's interests. The consequences of such an evolution were potentially profound with regard to the power of the *grands* within royal military structures, as the final two chapters of this dissertation will show. For now, the next chapter will discuss certain factors that helped to determine which noble families would enjoy the privilege of service within the standing army.

Chapter Three

Adjudicating Appointment: Promotion, Venality and Merit within a Career Army.

The picture painted hitherto is one of the almost untrammelled dominance that certain lower nobility families enjoyed within the permanent regiments, and the benefits they could accrue through such service. This chapter will nuance this impression by exploring some of the other major consequences of permanent regimental office, which placed restraints on the formation of a closed military oligarchy within the infantry. Firstly, a form of customary law emerged influencing how promotion occurred; secondly, venality began to appear within the regiments, placing financial constraints on the pursuit of military office. Both these developments arose due to the rise of a standing army which allowed the pursuit of military careers in the early seventeenth century.

The early seventeenth-century army has not previously been seen as a body in which a 'career' could be pursued. In some respects this might appear justifiable. It was not until the *Code Michau* of 1629 that a royal document was promulgated which explicitly set out regulations relating to a practice invariably found in career armies: promotion.[1] Moreover, certain historians have argued that it was not until the second half of the seventeenth century that career structures within the royal infantry truly began to take shape. Chagniot has stated that it was not until 1651 that subaltern officers in the *Gardes* were regularly promised at their 'tour d'ancienneté' a captaincy within any regimental company that became vacant.[2] Drévillon has argued that it was not until 1664 that a regimental captaincy would go to the lieutenant who possessed 'la plus grande ancienneté' within the regiment, thus ensuring that promotion followed 'une norme objective et équitable'. Moreover, he has asserted that it was not until the status of *officier réformé* emerged in 1668 that structures were erected to support officers in royal service during periods of peace between wars. As such, it was only after this moment that the principle of 'continuité du service' was established, which 'ouvrait la possibilité de faire carrière' in the army, leading to the 'professionalisation de la fonction d'officier'.[3]

[1] The *ordonnance* stated that 'le soldat' could, 'par ses services', rise through the charges of his company 'de degré en degré, iusques à celle du Capitaine', and even beyond, 's'il s'en rend digne'. *Code Michau*, art. 229.
[2] Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 109-110.
[3] Drévillon, *L'Impôt*, pp. 52, 218-221, 440.

Whatever the merits of Drévillon's arguments,[4] this chapter will contend that the stability of regimental office evidenced in the first two chapters gave rise to the idea of a 'career army' much earlier than the 1660s. This can be seen by the emergence of certain practices surrounding regimental appointment associated with permanent bodies of force in the period of this dissertation. This chapter will firstly demonstrate that by the late 1620s, *ad hoc* conventions relating to promotion had emerged within the infantry. In certain cases, these allowed officers to pursue long-term structured careers, limiting the ability of certain families to dominate regimental appointments completely. Moreover, another practice linked to long-term office-holding also emerged within the permanent infantry: venality. As regimental offices were both limited in number, and prized because of the social benefits they could confer, certain noble families were able to sell their positions if they were unable to pass them onto a designated successor. As royal regulations did not keep pace with the evolution of the infantry into a standing army, neither the system of promotion nor venality was formally codified, and both can be seen as 'bottom-up' evolutions in French military thinking. Accordingly, neither was always respected by the monarchy.

Overall, as it became clear that the regiments *were* a permanent structure in which socially beneficial careers could be pursued, three main factors organically emerged which began to profoundly, yet unofficially, affect how appointments occurred to this body: money, 'ancienneté', and nepotism. A person could gain an office within the standing army based on either their previous service within the regiments ('ancienneté'), the ability to buy regimental *charges*, an individual's nepotistic connections, or a mixture of these influences. And whilst they were not mutually exclusive, a tension could exist between these factors. Beneath these considerations, it also appears that only noblemen were considered for regimental officerships. A noble's 'merit' for office within the new standing army was thus

[4] As already noted, the 'officers retenuz' found on the 1608-10 *états* heavily prefigure the *officiers réformés* of the second half the seventeenth century. See Chapter One, Section IV. Moreover, Rowlands has also questioned how equitable systems of promotion were under Louis XIV. He has contended that even after the 1660s very few subalterns actually attained the position of a captaincy, and were only kept in royal service by an enormous degree of 'hope'. Indeed, Rowlands argued that officer posts within the *Gardes* were increasingly monopolised by a 'narrow elite pool of the court, of senior *robin* families, and of families with existing connections to the *Gardes*' in the final third of the seventeenth century. Moreover, the 'huge price increases for posts', caused by the increased prestige of certain positions and the rising cost of warfare, further reduced the number of potential officers. Thus, patronage and money weighed heavily on the practice of appointment within at least certain regiments until the end of the seventeenth century: Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, pp. 157-8; Rowlands, 'Aristocratic Power', pp. 321-8.

judged in a variety of uncodified ways, and the monarchy did not always take the lead in the process of adjudication. These factors meant that a wider section of the *petite noblesse* could aspire to both service and progressive reward within the regiments than if a narrow and closed military oligarchy of office-holders had entrenched themselves throughout the emergent standing army.

I – the Tension between Promotion Based on Service and Family Domination

Within the regiments, an unwritten system of promotion is clearly visible during the period of this thesis. This system was primarily based on factors such as the 'ancienneté' of a person within a company, and the recognised hierarchy between the *vieux*. If 'merit' was used as a consideration for promotion, it thus seems to have been primarily conceived of in terms of the length of an individual's regimental service. This form of customary law had arisen due to the ambiguity of official procedures for regimental promotion and appointment before 1635. As many officers undoubtedly desired some form of progressive system of reward in return for their long-term service, they essentially encouraged unofficial procedures of promotion to address this need, rather than waiting for royal legislation.

Such trends are firstly visible with relation to the position of *lieutenant colonel* within the *compagnies colonelle* of the *vieux*, as this person had to have previously held a captaincy of his own before his appointment to the office.[5] For example, within the *Gardes*, when Antoine de La Grange de Montigny, sieur d'Arquien was appointed to the position of *lieutenant colonel* by 1597, it was due to his 'ancienneté' and 'merite', after having being made a *Gardes* captain in 1577.[6] Admittedly, that Antoine's brother was François de La Grange – who would become maréchal de Montigny in 1616, and who was powerful enough in 1597 to have been placed in charge of the light cavalry at the siege of Amiens – would have helped Antoine's cause, as would the family's connections to the constable.[7] Yet his appointment appears to have also been made, at least in part, on the basis of his lengthy regimental

[5] Chagniot has recognised that this was already occurring in the *Gardes* during the first half of the seventeenth century, despite stating that an overall system of graduated promotion based on length of service did not come into existence before the 1650s. Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 109.
[6] Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 59.
[7] Anselme de Sainte-Marie, *Histoire généalogique et chronologique de la maison royale de France [...]*, 3rd ed., (9 vols., Paris, 1726-1733), VII, p. 424.

service. He certainly did not earn the role on the basis of any amity to the Colonel General of the Infantry, the duc d'Épernon.[8]

When Arquien resigned the charge of *lieutenant colonel* in 1610, his replacement was Jean-Jacques de Montesquiou, who had been a captain in the *Gardes* since 1577, and who had been recognised as the 'premier capitaine' of the regiment by 1600.[9] This designation, which appears frequently in contemporary accounts, was not noted on *revues*, yet was often implied on *états* through the order in which captains are listed. The term seems to designate the most senior captain in the regiment, after the *lieutenant colonel* and the *mestre de camp*. As such, Montesquiou was already the third captain listed, and thus 'premier capitaine', on the 1597 *état*, indicating that he had inherited this position from Arquien after the latter's promotion.[10] In turn, the 'premier capitaine' seems to have been the first in line for the position of *lieutenant colonel* when the *charge* became available. Bonnouvrier became 'premier capitaine' after Montesquiou's promotion, and was succeeded after his death in 1617 by Isaac du Raynier. Again, it would appear that each succeeded to the rather *ad hoc* position of 'premier capitaine' on the basis of length of service, with Bonnouvrier having held a captaincy in the *Gardes* since the mid-1580s, as opposed to Raynier who had only done so since the 1590s.[11] Similar trends can be seen in *Navarre*. Bertrand de Mazelière can be found commanding a company in the regiment de Valirault in 1593, and by 1601 he had reached the position of *lieutenant colonel*.[12] That this progression was based on some form of relation to seniority can be seen in the career of his successor, the sieur de Joffre. Joffre had been designated 'premier capitaine' of *Navarre* since at least 1602, appearing third on the list of captains on the 1610 *état*, before undoubtedly succeeding Mazelière as *lieutenant colonel* in 1617.[13]

The positions of *lieutenant colonel* and 'premier capitaine' both seem, therefore, to have linked ideas of seniority and length of service to career progression.

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[8] Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, pp. 59-60, 256. The relationship between Arquien and Épernon, and Épernon's influence over appointments to the *compagnie colonelle*, will be considered more fully in Chapter Six, below.

[9] Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, pp. 60-1.

[10] Once in place, the *lieutenant colonel* appears to have wielded some influence with regard to appointment; by 1621, a Bernard de Montesquiou was ensign of the *compagnie colonelle*, who may have been either Jean-Jacque's son, or his first cousin once-removed. *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (272); genealogy, BnF Ms.Fr. DB 459 f. 11v; La Chesnaye, X, pp. 338-339.

[11] Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 253; Leger, *Droué*, pp.47-8.

[12] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25826 (836); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1655).

[13] Jean Martellière, 'Généalogie du la famille du bienheureux Agathange de Vendôme', *Bulletin de la société archéologique, scientifique et littéraire du Vendômois*, 45, (1906) p.123; Bassompierre, *Mémoires*, II, p.185.

That this service was considered meritorious was often taken as implied due to its length. These ideas were by no means limited to these two positions, however, and examples exist within the regiments of subalterns gradually working their way up the company officer grades. For example, Albert de Grillet, sieur de Brissac can first be found as an ensign in the *Gardes* company of the *compagnie mestre de camp* of the sieur de Crillon in 1601, an appointment he had probably gained on the basis of a shared Avignonese heritage with his captain. In 1609, after Créquy had taken over the position of *mestre de camp*, and command of Crillon's specific company, Brissac had not only maintained his position within the company, but had risen to the rank of lieutenant. Subsequently, Brissac was appointed captain of Bonnouvrier's *Gardes* company on his death in 1617, in reward for thirty-three years of service within the regiment. Thus, even before the second half of the century, examples can be found of a lieutenant with, quite possibly, 'la plus grande ancienneté' being rewarded with a promotion to the captaincy of another company within the regiment.[14] Examples of individuals rising through the ranks within a single regimental company can also be found. To name but one, Jules César de Gastault was recorded in 1599 as the lieutenant of Barthélemy de Robert in *Champagne*, a position that Gastault was still holding in 1605. After Robert's death in 1621, Gastault can be found captaining the company in 1623, with Robert's ensign between 1599 and 1621 also promoted to the position of lieutenant.[15]

Despite the success of these individuals, the unwritten nature of the customs relating to promotion ensured much ambiguity remained within the nascent system, as exemplified in an anecdote recounted by Louis de Pontis. When an ensign of a *Champagne* company died in 1624, the captain of the company wished to give the charge to 'un des messieurs ses parens qui sembloit n'avoir guères d'autre mérite pour cette charge que celui d'être son parent'. Pierre de La Mothe, sieur d'Arnaud, the regiment's *mestre de camp*, by contrast stated that too many regimental appointments were being given to 'parens' of captains 'sans regarder au mérite', and that he wanted to appoint a 'brave soldat qui avoit bien servi le Roi dans les armées' instead. Pontis

[14] Although, as Chapter Five, Section II will suggest, Brissac's possible connections to Épernon may also have helped secure him the promotion. Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 254; *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1717); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2183); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (116); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25848 (460); 'Lettres patentes', 22 March 1647, BnF Cabinet 174 (4411), f. 4v; genealogy, BnF DB 333 (8474) f. 3r.

[15] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1550); *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1918); *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (319); Pontis, *Mémoires*, I, p.303.

does not record how the incident was resolved.[16] Either way, the episode showed that a potential tension existed in the regimental appointment system between captains attempting to place family members at any given opportunity into their companies, in contrast to ideas that only those with records of regimental service should receive such positions.

These tensions are apparent even in cases where captains did succeed in appointing multiple family members to companies. In the aforementioned case of Brissac, for instance, by the time of a *revue* in 1627 he had still not been able to place any family members within his company – some ten years after his appointment as captain. It would appear, however, that Brissac did eventually succeed in gaining a subaltern position for his nephew, and it has also been suggested that Brissac's son-in-law inherited the company in 1639. Similarly, when Paul de Hames appointed his brother to the *Picardie* company under his command during 1598, he can be initially found in the position of ensign. Jean Musnier, Hames' lieutenant, remained in place. This situation changed at some point between the two other rolls for this company from 1600 and 1611, when Hames' brother became lieutenant and Musnier disappears from the roll.[17] Thus, Hames had only been able to place his brother within his company due to the position of ensign becoming vacant. He had not been able to parachute him straight into the position of lieutenant, and again, had to wait until this position had been vacated. Clearly, existing officers could not be arbitrarily removed from their posts on the nepotistic whim of their captain.

Indeed, examples exist of precedence being given to seniority of service in situations where family members might also have been considered for a company captaincy. In 1597 the ensign of the *Gardes* company of Pierre du Bellay, sieur de La Courbe was Abraham de La Besne. Besne had risen to the position of lieutenant by 1605, and by 1609 Guy du Bellay, Pierre's only son, can be found as the company ensign. When Pierre du Bellay died in 1615, Besne was promoted to the captaincy of the company. This was despite the fact that Guy clearly wanted to inherit the company from his father, and that Guy's claim was supported by the duc d'Épernon. As no *revues* exist for the company after this date, it is unclear how long, and indeed whether, Guy stayed in the company after 1615. However, Andilly stated that in early

[16] Pontis, *Mémoires*, I, pp.428-30.
[17] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25831 (1378); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1427); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1502); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1612); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (72); genealogy, BnF DB 345 (8902), f. 3r.

1617 a duel was fought between 'La Courbe fils d'un capitaine des gardes, et la Beyne (qui a eu la compagnie)'.[18] Whilst the duel does not appear to have been fatal, one might doubt whether Guy remained in the company after the event, even if he had initially done so after La Besne's promotion. It is not unreasonable to infer from this example that the rivalry over promotion had contributed to bad blood between the two officers, as it might have done in other cases. Thus, on the one hand, certain noble families may have begun to conceive of their companies as near-heritable property, with the right to maintain command after a relative's death or resignation; on the other, long-serving regimental officers appear to have increasingly felt that they should be progressively rewarded by promotion for long-term service, even if this was at the expense of a captain's designated successor.

La Besne's story of progressive promotion trumping family nepotism was far from unique. Within *Piémont*, similar events occurred within the company of Hector Damon. His lieutenant in 1598 was Jean de La Marque who remained in the company by a *revue* of 1616. Between this *revue* and one in 1601, Hector had succeeded in placing a relative, Jean Damon, at ensign, with La Marque blocking any higher appointment or progression. By the 1620 *état*, a 'La Marque' is listed as a captain, with no member of the Damon on the list.[19] Similar examples can be found elsewhere.[20]

These cases illustrate that whilst a captain clearly wielded a significant level of influence over company appointments, this authority was limited by emerging customs relating to promotion that the standing army had engendered. In general, ensigns do not seem to have been able to jump straight from their grade to that of captain, nor does the arbitrary dismissal of a company's subalterns by a captain seem to have occurred with any great frequency. Family members had to enter the company at the position of ensign and rise to the position of lieutenant if they wished to maintain the

[18] I.e., that Guy was the son of a former *Gardes* captain, but that Besne was the current company captain. *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25831 (1375); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1901); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2182); genealogy, BnF Cabinet 37 (873), f. 2r; genealogies, BnF DB 81 (1848), ff. 5r, 16v-17r; genealogy, BnF Cabinet 43 (1061), f. 2r; Guillaume Girard, *Histoire de la vie du duc d'Espernon*, (3 vols., Paris, 1730), III, pp. 18-19; Robert Arnaud d'Andilly, *Journal inédit d'Arnauld d'Andilly (1614-1620)*, ed. Achille Halphen, (Paris, 1857), p. 257. For more on the implications of this appointment, see Chapter Six, Section II.

[19] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1496); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (163).

[20] See, for instance, the failure of Josias de Montmorency de Bours to pass the captaincy of his *Gardes* company onto his son after Bours' death in 1616, despite his son having acquired the position of company ensign prior to this date: *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2175); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (275); René de Belleval, 'Les Montmorency du Ponthieu', *Revue nobiliaire*, nouvelle série, 1, (1865), p. 253.

company in family hands when the previous captain vacated his position. If relatives had not managed to rise to this grade, and if no external appointment was forthcoming, the company lieutenant could be considered for promotion instead. This may have especially occurred in cases such as those involving the Bellay and Besne, where the issue of military experience may have been considered. Besne had clearly taken part in the wars of the 1590s whilst Guy du Bellay had only been born in the late 1580s. Hence, in 1615, when the company became vacant, he probably had little to no combat experience, in contrast to Besne. Longevity of service, and perhaps even military talent, were thus considerations in regimental appointments, potentially to the chagrin of certain noble captains' nepotistic designs. Whilst the pressures of *ancienneté* and nepotism on regimental appointment often came into conflict, both could only have emerged as structural issues due to the perception that the royal army had become a permanent body, capable of offering long-term service to noble families; put simply, a career army.

II – Inter-Regimental Promotion and the Security of Subaltern Positions.

Not only do cases exist of promotion occurring within regimental companies, there are also examples of promotions which crossed regimental boundaries. As previously mentioned, something approaching a hierarchy existed among the permanent regiments by the early seventeenth century, with the *Gardes* seen as the top regiment, followed by *Picardie*, and the other three *vieux* contesting for pre-eminence before their equality was established by the king in the 1620s. Most inter-regimental promotion was thus centred on eventually receiving a commission to the *Gardes*, and had been since perhaps the 1570s.

For example, Isaac du Raynier, Bertrand Patras and Blaise de Chaumejean had all received commissions to hold captaincies within the *Gardes* after holding *Picardie* captaincies.[21] Other captains skipped straight to the *Gardes* from one of the other *vieux* companies without holding a *Picardie* commission in the interim. Pepin de Bonnouvrier had earlier been promoted to a *Gardes* captaincy from *Champagne* in 1583, whilst Charles d'Aubourg was promoted straight into the *Gardes* from *Navarre*

[21] Leger, *Droué*, p. 47; Luppé, *Mémoires*, p. 200; BnF DB 178 (4640), f. 15r. As implied above on p. 37, Barthélemy-Scipion de Biran, sieur de Casteljaloux, Paul d'Antist, sieur de Mansan and François de Mainville may also have been promoted from *Picardie* to the *Gardes* between 1597 and 1598.

in 1626. A *Gardes* captaincy may have even be considered more prestigious than the position of *lieutenant colonel* in other *vieux* regiments. 'Pigeolet' and 'Miraumont' were *lieutenant colonels* of *Champagne* and *Picardie* respectively before receiving *Gardes* captaincies in 1622 and 1631.[22] Indeed, holding the position of *lieutenant colonel* in a *quatre-vieux* regiment may have been a means by which an officer could demonstrate that he had sufficient seniority to receive a *Gardes* captaincy. In many cases, therefore, it may well have been considered the pinnacle of a *petite noblesse* officer's career to receive a commission in the *Gardes*, explaining why many families tried so hard to maintain companies in this regiment under their command once they had received one.

Yet, due to the uncodified nature of the promotion system, there was no right to receive a promotion to the *Gardes*, even after lengthy service. Moreover, some officers may have preferred to maintain or receive positions in the lower regiments if they considered them more prestigious. Whilst it is unclear whether he ever received an offer to take up a *Gardes* captaincy, an officer such as Jean de Montlezun, sieur de Busca may well have preferred to retain his position as 'premier capitaine' in *Picardie* rather than being an ordinary captain in the *Gardes*, possibly explaining why he still remained in this regiment in 1632 after over forty years of service as a captain. Conversely, any promotion *out* of the *Gardes* into other regimental positions could sometimes actually be seen in a questionable light. When Jean de Toiras received the position of *mestre de camp* of Champagne in 1624, after having held a captain's commission in the *Gardes* for five years, it was portrayed by Richelieu as a form of disgrace, especially as Toiras had to travel to La Rochelle to take up the position. Even Toiras' own biographer Baudier noted how much of the court felt that the position entailed a form of voluntary exile, despite the fact that the position of *mestre de camp* of *Champagne* was clearly higher up the regimental scale than a *Gardes* captaincy. This would seemingly strengthen the aforementioned argument that the *Gardes* was often stationed near the king and his entourage, and hence promotions into the regiment were extremely promising in terms of the connections that could be made at the royal court.[23]

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[22] I have not been able to determine the full name of these officers, who are merely listed as such in: Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, pp.213, 263.

[23] See Chapter One, Section III. Baudier, *Histoire du Maréchal de Toiras*, (Paris, 1666), p.64; Richelieu, *Mémoires*, p.499.

The *de facto* recognition of subaltern security of tenure posed another complicating factor. If officers received a promotion into a different regiment, the subalterns of their new companies remained in place; their old subalterns could not be brought with them. For example, after serving as a captain in first *Navarre* and then *Champagne*, on his appointment to the *Gardes* in 1613 Julien de Burosse had a completely new set of subalterns to that of his *Champagne* company in 1610. When Leon d'Albert, sieur de Brante took over the company on Burosse's death in 1617, Brante's subalterns and sergeants in 1618 are identical to those listed under Burosse's command in 1613. Given that two of Burosse's sons had become captains in *Piémont* by the early 1630s, it is conceivable that Burosse would have placed relatives in his *Gardes* and *Champagne* companies if he had been able to do so.

This again suggests that families could not implant members into companies in the short-term, and had to wait for positions to become vacant. Receiving an inter-regimental promotion could thus draw out this process even further, even if they held a more prestigious position in the short-term.[24] The appointment of both Burosse and Brante to the company also illustrates how pre-existing company lieutenants could be overlooked if vacant captaincies were subject to essentially arbitrary moments of external appointment by the monarchy. However, when the *Gardes* companies of Daniel Germaincourt, sieur de Buffé and Gaillard de Salerne were disbanded after their deaths in 1600-1, the subalterns either received life pensions in compensation for their positions, or were re-deployed into other *Gardes* companies.[25] Similarly, in the 1610 *état*, payments can be found to the lieutenants and ensigns of *Champagne* and *Picardie* companies that had been suppressed on the death of their captain. They were to receive the same amount as full-time *quatre-vieux* subalterns over the course of the year, although it was not stated whether these were pensions that had been granted in perpetuity. Even the king, it would seem, was being forced to recognise that officer positions could not be distributed and disbanded merely as he saw fit; and even if

[24] Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p.266; Courcelles, *Dictionnaire Universel*, III, pp.121-2; La Chesnaye, I, 124; *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (112); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25845 (207).

[25] Chagniot, 'Gardes', pp.105-6. Chagniot lists three subalterns from the two companies who received these pensions. However, at least one of these three officers, Robert de Cromy, appears to have received a commission into a new company, that of Pierre du Bellay, rather than, or in addition, to his pension by 1605. Additionally, one of Bellay's sergeants, who had entered the company between 1599 and 1605, Louis du Val, matches the name of a sergeant in Buffé's company in 1598. *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1501); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1515, 1530); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1901).

subalterns were not always rewarded by promotion in turn, there are notable occasions where they received compensation for the loss of their *charge*.

The potential difficulties that families faced due to these customs relating to promotion and subaltern security were clearly not insurmountable, as can be seen in the aforementioned cases of Brissac and Hames. Families, working within the *ad hoc* structures of intra-company and inter-regimental promotion, had to bide their time before implanting family members wherever possible. Whilst it might prolong this process, taking inter-regimental promotions seems to have been the norm if they were offered, as they boosted the family's overall gravitas within the military establishment. The stability of the regiments thus encouraged nobles to think of their offices, and thus military service within the standing army, as long-term investments for their families, in which career progression was possible. This stability may have established customs which limited the nepotistic dominance of certain dynasties, but patient families could certainly work within these unwritten guidelines to their benefit.

III – the Necessity of Nobility: Lower Ranking Officers and Promotion

The security of regimental structures extended beyond the level of the subalterns to the two company sergeants who were usually listed on *revues*. Indeed, it is clear that many sergeants served for long periods of time within the same company, and exploited the new-found permanency of the regiments to undertake long-term military careers.[26] Just as with the higher company grades, sergeants seemed to enjoy security of tenure and do not appear to have been frequently threatened by arbitrary dismissal. Moreover, the tone of the *Code Michau* would seem to give credence to the belief that sergeants could achieve higher office, as it stated that 'le soldat' could rise from the ranks to the position of subaltern, captain or beyond.[27] Whilst ambiguous, the tone of the article would seem to suggest that *any* infantry soldier could achieve this rise, not just a nobleman who had entered at the rank of ensign.

[26] To name but two examples, see the thrity years of service of Jean La Planche in the *Gardes* company of Emmanuel de Valence, or the minimum of fourteen years that Elie Chefart spent as a sergeant in the *Navarre* company of Jacques du Laur: *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1421); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (547); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1393); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (86).
[27] *Code Michau*, art. 229.

Certain examples can be found of lower ranking officers who did manage to acquire higher company positions.[28] Yet, on the basis of the *revues*, it does not appear that many sergeants rose above this rank during the period of this dissertation. Indeed the inertia of many sergeants can be contrasted to the subalterns within their companies who could be promoted to higher company grades. When Brissac moved from ensign to lieutenant between 1601 and 1609 in the Crillon/Créquy company, a new ensign was appointed, whilst the two company sergeants remained in place.[29] Gabriel de Saint Martin is listed as a sergeant on four *revues* between 1609 and 1627 of a *Gardes* company in which the ensign changed three times during the same period.[30]

Thus, it was clearly not standard practice to consider sergeants for promotion to subaltern positions, even if they had served for considerable periods of time. The *Code Michau* regulation pertaining to promotion was not a reflection of the existing situation within the permanent infantry regiments by 1629, at least with regard to sergeants. If anything, the beginnings of a distinction between those considered commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers appears to have begun to emerge by the late 1620s. The requirements necessary for such a commission are unclear, due to the lack of regulations with regard to appointment, but it would appear that some form of title of nobility, or the recognition that they were 'living nobly', however small, may have been needed. Certainly, no form of officer-training college existed as a prerequisite to a commission.[31] Thus, the early seventeenth-century army does not appear to have offered much hope to non-nobles of acquiring officerships within the regiments. Just like wider French society, the army's elite positions, even

[28] Chagniot cites one example of a sergeant reaching the position of lieutenant within the *Gardes* between 1603 and 1621, but also states that such ascenscion was not the norm. Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 112.
[29] *Revue*, BnNF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1717); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2183).
[30] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2175); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (275); *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25848 (479, 481).
[31] See Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 38-41 for the lack of formal military education in this period, in contrast to the arguments of John Lynn, 'Tactical Evolution in the French Army, 1560-1660', *French Historical Studies*, 14 (1985), pp. 189-190. The educational focus of the new noble academies that appeared in the first half of the seventeenth century was on teaching 'courtly graces' such as riding, dancing and fencing rather than the training of military officers, even if the study of military mathematics, or 'fortifications', could also occur. In any case, only a small fraction of the French nobility would have attended such institutions, and there existed little alternative in terms of officer training colleges: Mark Motley, *Becoming a French Aristocrat: The Education of the Court Nobility, 1580-1715*, (Princeton, NJ, 1990), pp. 103, 124-139; Laurence Brockliss, 'Richelieu, education and the state', in J. Bergin and L. Brockliss (eds.), *Richelieu and his Age*, (Oxford, 1992), pp. 237-245.

down to the relatively humble position of company ensign, were dominated by the nobility.

IV- the Acceptance of Venality within the Early Standing Army

In addition to unwritten customs relating to promotion, there is evidence that the practice of venality began to emerge within the new standing army, with certain officers able (or indeed unable) to purchase military office within the regiments during the early seventeenth century. Prior to 1598, regimental offices had either been too short-term or indeterminate in nature for notions of ownership to arise. Only when regimental officerships began to be seen as both permanent and prized possessions did those who held them increasingly begin to feel that they were the proprietors of their *charge*, and that they should receive some form of compensation on resignation of their offices, if they were unable to pass them on to a designated successor. This phenomenon only began to occur in the French infantry as it became a standing army. Indeed, Fritz Redlich describes a similar phenomenon occurring in the Empire between 1600 and 1650, where the greater permanency of military units encouraged certain officers to conceive of themselves as both 'a businessmen and a soldier', with a long-term economic stake in the unit under their command.[32] Certainly, the vigour with which certain families pursued the domination of regimental companies would encourage them to believe they had a role in determining its future.

It is important to note that from the late 1620s venality was ostensibly outlawed within the French military. Indeed, this formal interdiction was part of what David Parrott has called the 'French rejection of [military] entrepreneurship'.[33] As outlined in this dissertation's introduction, few states attempted to field armies which were 'centrally organized and centrally funded' during the period of the Thirty Years' War. Instead, the period was characterised by an almost wholesale devolution of military responsibility to entrepreneurs, who would raise forces on behalf of their employers. Entrepreneurs (especially those with the legal right to raise forces) were turned to, as they had a greater degree of expertise than central government officials in raising troops and were often willing to make initial levies based on their own credit.

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[32] Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Entrepreneur and his Work Force, a Study in European Economic and Social History*, (2 vols., Wiesbaden, 1964) pp. 171-178.
[33] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 313-365.

Yet, the French crown rejected this system, based largely on political considerations. The Code Michau of 1629 explicitly rejected venality and any concept of entrepreneurial ownership of military charges. The monarchy prohibited 'toute vénalité d'offices […] de toutes charges militaires, capitaineries et gouvernements de provinces, places et fortresses', with no person holding a charge in the infantry allowed 'de vendre ni résigner celles qu'ils auront, non plus que d'en achepter'.[34] In theory, all office-holders within the regiments were 'direct employees of the crown'. They received a salary and additional expenses for the costs they encountered in the levy of their unit. Their commissions were revocable, and they 'held no rights of survivance or inheritance'. An officer could be chosen and replaced at will by the monarchy. This, in some respects, might actually make the *charge* attractive to members of the nobility; theoretically, men were chosen for positions within the military on the basis of ability and past service, rather than their financial means.[35]

It is not difficult to discern why the monarchy chose to officially reject independent ownership of military office so vigorously by the late 1620s. If the confusion of private and public property had been a concern since at least the 1570s within the financial and judicial sphere,[36] it was ostensibly utterly unacceptable to legitimise the practice with regard to military force. If the half-century of civil wars before 1598 had not deterred the monarchy sufficiently from devolving military authority into the hands of its subjects, the re-emergence of internal conflict during the regency of Marie de Médicis, and the subsequent wars of the 1620s against the Huguenots certainly appears to have done so.[37]

However, it is telling that only one royal statement regarding regimental venality appears to have been made before the *Code Michau*. This act, written in November 1618, stated that 'tous gens de guerre de quelque qualité ou condition qu'ils soient' were forbidden from buying or selling any 'charges militaires' or faced being deprived of any *charges* they held, prevented from military service in the future, and other 'peines exemplaires'. However, this act appears to have been primarily targeted at venality within the *Gendarmes de la garde*, a company of the *Maison militaire*, as it stated that the king was unhappy that several persons had bought a place within 'nostre

[34] *Code Michau*, art. 190 and 230.
[35] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 320-1.
[36] Mark Greengrass, *Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576-1585* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 260-312.
[37] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 287-90.

compagnie'. As such, the sections of the declaration regarding the infantry may well have been added as an afterthought, and do not appear to have had any effect. Drévillon has stated that this document was not registered in a *parlement*, and was probably a dead letter, particularly with regard to the regiments.[38]

Just as in the case of promotion, therefore, there seems to have been a regulatory vacuum with regard to regimental venality during the first thirty years of the seventeenth century. And, if anything, the monarchy's policy towards the practice within the standing army was one of tacit acceptance. In 1610, Charles Loyseau stated that in the permanent regiments there 'commence déjà bien fort d'en vendre les charges, *non par le Roi, mais les particuliers par sa tolérance*'.[39] Indeed, if one looks outside the *vieux*, military venality had been occurring since at least the early 1580s. The monarchy even seems to have been prepared to accept independent levies of troops without a royal commission during the 1610s, as long as they were put toward royal service.[40]

Sale of office was thus quite clearly accepted within the regiments during the early seventeenth century, and it far from apparent that the *Code Michau* did much to end the practice in the years immediately after its promulgation. Firstly, it is plainly visible at the level of *mestre de camp*. Not all appointments to this position were of a venal nature. Jean d'Escodeca, baron de Boisse-Pardaillan had been a captain in *Navarre* before his promotion in 1593; Jean de Toiras had been a captain in the *Gardes* before being appointed *mestre de camp* of *Champagne* in 1624.[41] It does not appear that either man paid for their new *charge*. However, some of those who acquired *mestre de camp* positions within the *vieux* during this period were men external to the regiments, and in several cases they obtained their commissions via purchase. In 1605, the sieur de Crillon received 30,000 *écus* in compensation when he resigned the position of *mestre de camp* of the *Gardes*.[42] Fontenay-Mareuil noted that at the start of the revolt of 1616-1617, all the *mestres de camp* of the *quatre-vieux* sold their *charges*, as 'se trouvant trop vieux' to serve in the conflict. Unfortunately, he

[38] 'Declaration du Roy portant deffense de vendre a l'avenir les charges et employs militaires sur les peynes cy contenuez', 4 November 1618, BnF Cangé 21, ff. 167r-168r; Drévillon, *L'Impôt*, p. 183.
[39] Quoted in Drévillon, *L'Impôt*, p. 181.
[40] Greengrass, *Governing passions*, p. 284; Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 289.
[41] Haag, *La France Protestante*, IV, pp. 543-545.
[42] Sully, *Mémoires*, II, p. 49. There was a conversion rate of 3 *livres* per *écu* during the period of this thesis: Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p.xv; Richard Bonney, *The King's Debts: Finance and Politics in France, 1589-1661*, (Oxford, 1981), p. x.

does not record the price they received for their positions.[43] In July 1622, Henri de Neufville de Villeroi, comte de Bury had 'achette le regiment de Navarre de Frontenac' for 66,000 *livres* 'dont le roy luy [Frontenac] en donne 20,000'.[44] Not only was the king aware of the venality among his *mestres de camp*, he appeared willing to participate in such transactions in order that they were conducted smoothly. *Mestres de camp* could also make arrangements to ensure *amis* benefitted. When Jean de Zamet sold the *mestre de camp* of *Picardie* to Roger du Plessis, sieur de Liancourt for 22,000 *écus* in 1622, Zamet ensured that Louis de Pontis, Zamet's specially appointed 'lieutenant de la mestre de camp', would receive 1,000 *écus* of the proceeds.[45]

Purchase of captaincies within the regiments can be found, even if, as Parrott has noted, 'the market for officerships was closed and depended primarily upon the deployment of influence and favour'.[46] This was especially the case due to the increasingly high demand for positions within these units. In practice, those purchasing commissions within the *Gardes* and the *quatre-vieux* often already had to have some form of pre-existing link to the core regiments. Thus, when Jean de Toiras bought his *Gardes* company in 1620 he did so from the sieur de Frémigières, who Baudier noted was a 'parent' of Toiras, and he was able to do so thanks to the royal favour he had accrued through rising to the position of captain in the royal *volière*.[47] Similarly, Charles II d'Aubourg's ability to 'traiter' with the sieur de Saint-Preuil for his company in the 1630s was undoubtedly based on Charles II's position as a captain in *Navarre*, and his family's connections to the *Gardes*, after his father had held a captaincy within the regiment in the late 1620s.[48] Louis de Castelnau re-attained his father's old *Gardes* company from the Chevalier de La Valette in 1633 by obtaining the agreement of the court to 'traiter' for the company. The Castelnau were thus formally allowed to engage in a practice which had seemingly been outlawed only four years previously, presumably due to the family's previous service in the regiment. Nepotism and regimental venality were, therefore, often closely linked.[49]

Venality also appears to have spread to subaltern positions within the *vieux*. Jacques de Chastenet de Puységur claims to have sold his position of *ensign* within the

[43] Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*, pp. 111-2.
[44] Louis de Marillac to Richelieu, 3 July 1622, AAE MD 775, f. 180r.
[45] Pontis, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 345-6.
[46] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 334.
[47] Baudier, *Toiras*, p. 12; Balincourt, 'Toiras', pp. 113-4.
[48] BnF DB 37 (333), f. 2.
[49] I have not been able to determine, in any of these cases, the exact figures paid for the captaincies.

Gardes for 18,000 *livres*, before spending 15,000 *livres* and 12,000 *livres* respectively to obtain and co-jointly hold the positions of both major and captain in *Piémont*.[50] Similarly, in 1634, Pontis sold his *Gardes* lieutenancy for 36,000 *livres*; a figure that he noted was a third higher than the usual price paid for lieutenancies in the *Gardes*, as the king himself had acted as an 'entremetteur' in the sale.[51] Indeed, it is difficult to state with any precision if there was a 'standard price' for regimental offices in this period. Parrott has argued that the figure of 12,000 *livres* cited by Puységur for a captaincy within *Piémont* is probably exaggerated, and that 6,000 *livres* may have been closer to the norm for a *vieux* company by 1635. However, Parrott also notes that '[t]he price of captaincies fluctuated according to levels of demand', and by 1656 Puyégur's son paid only 3,000 *livres* for a company in *Piémont*.[52] As military venality was not officially legal before 1629, and was technically illegal after that date, purchase of regimental office was usually done with a degree of circumspection. Determining the number of regimental offices sold in this period, or a normative price for which they were purchased, is therefore almost impossible.

What is undeniable, however, is that by the 1620s the role of money in the regimental appointment system was beginning to come into conflict with the *ad hoc* customs relating to promotion, as can be seen in 1627 when the sieur de Saligny decided to resign his *Gardes* company. Tellingly, Saligny decided to 'vendre sa charge', not merely resign it, and he first offered the position to Pontis, for 2,000 *écus*, as he was the company lieutenant. Pontis could not afford this amount. Boulogne, Pontis' relative, exhorted Pontis to borrow the money, even offering to act as a guarantor. Saint-Preuil, an *ami* of Pontis, and at that time ensign in the colonel-company of *Picardie*, wished to buy the company himself, yet stated that he would lend Pontis up to 4,000 *écus* in order to buy the company as he recognised Pontis' superior claim to the captaincy. Pontis rejected both these offers on the alleged grounds that he did not wish to mix money with friendship. Moreover, he stated that the king had promised him the *charge* when he had received his initial promotion into the *Gardes* in 1623. Pontis thus hoped for the 'liberalité' of the king in receiving the captaincy: that the king would merely grant Pontis the *charge*, rather than essentially forcing him to buy it, as he had done in the case of Saligny himself. This was clearly

[50] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 332.
[51] Pontis, *Mémoires*, II, p. 201.
[52] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p.332. Rowlands has stated that standard infantry companies were being sold for only c.1,000-3,000 *livres* under Louis XIV.

not forthcoming. Pontis thus spelt out his complaint to the king: 'ayant donné parole de me gratifier de cette charge il avoit permis qu'elle fût vendue'. Even though Louis XIII was distinctly unimpressed with Pontis' tone, he still awarded him 4,000 *livres* in return for *not* receiving the captaincy. Pontis can subsequently be found as Saint-Preuil's lieutenant in 1629.[53]

Venality had thus trumped the unwritten customs relating to promotion. Even if someone had put themselves in a position of first refusal by becoming a company lieutenant, they might still have to afford a promotion if they were not related to the company captain and they decided to sell rather than merely resign their *charge*. Louis XIII appears as a king who was not only aware of venality and the unwritten customs relating to promotion within his regiments, but one who was willing to respect these conventions, and who was even ready to inject royal money into the process of regimental purchase, when necessary, in order to grease the system and keep officers happy.

That venality was occurring within the regiments by 1620s is thus reasonably clear. Yet the question of *why* regimental offices were being purchased and sold also needs to be explored, beyond the fact that there was an increasing perception that these offices could be securely held in the long-term. The practice may have been, in part, a recognition of the wider financial burden that regimental officers were potentially expected to shoulder. In 1623, regulations stated that if *commissaires* could not supply the soldiers' *vivres*, 'le chef sera tenu s'obliger en son privé nom de payer ou faire payer à la prochaine monstre ce qui se trouvera estre deub'.[54] Even in 1610, with the monarchy at a level of financial health that it would not enjoy again until perhaps the 1660s, the potential for exploiting the financial resources of regimental officers was one that the monarchy visibly recognised. Will Becher noted that in the military build-up to the Jülich campaign in 1610, Henri had already spent 300,000 'crowns'[55] by mid-March, and had 'husbanded his expenses as neere as possibly he could'. Consequently, Henri had given the responsibility of levying additional regimental units to 'gentlemen of rich howses' rather than his 'most able soldiers' in order to give

[53] Pontis, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 12-23, quotes from pp. 16, 18, 21; *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (543).
[54] 'Reglement', 14 August 1623, BnF Cangé, 21, ff. 251r-v.
[55] The English translation of *écus*.

them ‘hope, that having beene at some charge, for the setting on foote of theyre regiments and companies they shall be afterwards still mayntayned’.[56]

The statement said much about the state of venality within royal military forces in 1610. Even nobles who were being asked to pour their own money into the raising of royal regiments and companies did not officially hold the proprietary rights to the forces under their command, and could only hope that the monarchy chose to maintain permanently their offices after the conflict. Thus, whilst the monarchy did not significantly over-extend itself in the wars it fought in the early seventeenth century (at least in comparison to the warfare it engaged in after 1635) regimental officer credit may still have been exploited on occasions of mobilisation. Regimental venality may have been, at least partially, an attempt by officers to recoup some of the expenses they had incurred during their tenure of their *charge*.

Yet, financial reasoning does not fully explain the practice of venality in the 1620s. Saligny, for example, had only received his company in 1622 when he sold it in 1627, and, as Pontis noted, he had been given the *charge* for free by the monarchy. It would seem unlikely that Saligny had made substantial financial investments in his company during the five mainly peaceful years in which he held it. When Pontis himself sold his lieutenancy in 1634, he did so because Louis XIII was helping him to raise sufficient funds to purchase the position of *Commissaire général des Suisses*. As the *charge* Louis wished Pontis to obtain would cost 90,000 *livres* to purchase, there was obviously a financial dimension to the sale of Pontis’ lieutenancy. Yet he had, like Saligny, received his regimental office for free from the king. Moreover, Louis XIII stated that he wished to get ‘le plus d’argent qu’il se pourroit’ for Pontis, implying that the figure he hoped to raise for Pontis might be higher than any sums he had invested during the tenure of his *charge*.[57]

As Drévillon has suggested for the later seventeenth century, therefore, those buying military office were not doing so due to a ‘stricte confrontation des pertes et des gains financiers’. In his view, venality occurred because it was possible to plan a career within the army by this later period; as such, one could purchase higher charges in order to ‘achète des années de service’. Venality could advance an officer up the military hierarchy quicker than if they waited for non-venal advancement; it could thus

[56] Will Becher to the Earl of Salisbury, 19 April 1610, NA SP 78/56 f. 42v. Becher was the English *chargé d’affaires* in Paris.
[57] Pontis, *Mémoires*, II, p. 200.

more rapidly increase their military grandeur and honour, the primary reasons for which they served.[58] Saligny and Pontis were thus both able to sell offices that they had freely acquired because they knew that a market existed for them; one comprised of families who wanted to join the regimental system due to the social benefits it could confer, and who were willing to pay a premium to do so. Indeed, the purchaser of Pontis' lieutenancy was a 'M. de Chenoise' who bought it not for himself, but for his son, the baron de Boucaut. Chenoise may well have hoped to obtain honour for his son by obtaining a *Gardes* lieutenancy for him, but, at a cost of 36,000 *livres*, it might not be perverse to contend that he hoped to gain some form of wider and more tangible social benefit for his family as well. Indeed, if one is to take the figure Chenoise paid at face value, the relatively small number of permanent regiments in the late 1620s may well have led to inflation in the cost of acquiring regimental office before a number of new regiments were created in the 1630s, which allowed families to more easily acquire regimental office.

That Louis brokered this deal himself, and fought to get the highest price possible for Pontis' position, showed that the monarchy recognised that families were willing to pay large amounts of money in order join a regimental system comprised of secure offices with demonstrable social benefits. Far from stamping out the practice, the monarchy was thus moderating the purchase of military office within the *vieux* by the 1630s. Indeed, it would be outside of the *régiments entretenus* that the continued official illegality of venality would be felt hardest, especially once the army began to considerably expand after the beginning of the war against Spain in 1635.[59] Overall, as a number of cases in this section have evidenced, money had become a factor in the acquisition of regimental office by the 1620s. As such, certain nobles were priced out of acquiring promotions or entry into the permanent regiments. The early stages of a system in which royal military service above a certain level was a privilege which had to be invested in, due to the social benefits it could bestow, are thus visible.

Determining how to regulate appointments to an infantry officer-corps was by no means a dilemma specific to the early seventeenth-century royal army. At the heart of this issue was a larger problem: how to adjudicate the merit of potential appointees to an office. As Fernando González de León has shown, the contemporary Spanish Army

[58] Drévillon, *L'Impôt*, p. 210.
[59] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 349-362.

of Flanders went from appointing officers based largely on their military expertise and service during the sixteenth century, to one which increasingly required noble birth and nepotistic connections for an officership during the seventeenth century.[60] Within France, the criteria for admission to an officership continued to be contested after 1635, as Rafe Blaufarb has demonstrated for the period between 1750 and 1820. Pre- and post-revolutionaries debated whether a person's 'merit', and hence suitability for an officership, should be based on the nobility of their birth and family circumstances, their expertise in military matters, or the loyalty and length of their service in royal structures. That the French officer corps was purged on more than one occasion during this later period showed how the dominant criteria for promotion and appointment could change quite dramatically from one regime to the next, and that the composition of the officer corps could be affected by changing political circumstances.[61]

The question of how to assess the 'merit' of nobles for infantry officerships was only in its infancy in the early seventeenth century, as the rise of the standing army was only itself becoming clear. All that can be said with certainty is that money, and the influence of the idea that long-term service should be rewarded through progressive promotion, prevented the formation of a closed military oligarchy within the regiments. It also appears that an officer had to hold a title of nobility, or at least be perceived to be 'living nobly', before they could be considered for regimental office. That these factors appear to have evolved organically into criteria for 'merit' amongst military officers, rather than being explicitly imposed as grounds for regimental appointment by the monarchy, might question Jay Smith's idea that the 'sovereign's gaze' was the sole adjudicator of merit during this period.[62] Even if the crown, officially at least, had to approve all regimental appointments, the monarch's conceptions of merit at least partially had to reflect those held by the wider nobility, if he wished to retain them in royal service.

In any case, the potential for noble families to join the regimental system, and hence royal military service, and for it to satisfy their ambitions of social

[60] Whilst much of his analysis is insightful, González de Léon's contention that the sixteenth-century Army of Flanders had a 'remarkably meritocratic ideology and structure of promotion' fails to take into account that 'merit' could be conceived of by contemporaries in a variety of ways, and not just in terms of military expertise, as Blaufarb shows below. Fernando González de Léon, *The Road to Rocroi: Class, Culture and Command in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1567-1659*, (Leiden, 2009), pp. 55-87, 159-203, 373-4, quote on p. 373.

[61] Rafe Blaufarb, *The French Army, 1750-1820: Careers, Talent, Merit*, (Manchester, 2002).

[62] The argument regarding the 'sovereign's gaze' can be found throughout Smith, *Culture of Merit*. For its application to the first half of the seventeenth century, see pp. 11-56.

advancement, remained a possibility throughout the period of this thesis. A narrow and closed military oligarchy of office-holders was not allowed to take shape fully within the standing army. Indeed, if the benefits of regimental service *were* limited to a certain group of noble families, this was mainly due to the relative lack of regimental offices available, rather than any innate inadequacies of the officer framework. How the regimental system was expanded to account for the demands of additional noble families who wanted to enter royal military service will be explored in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

The régiment de *Normandie* and the *petits-vieux*: the Expansion of the Standing Army, 1598-1635

The preceding two chapters have demonstrated the ardour with which a section of the French nobility, largely from its lower echelons, wished to achieve commissions within the new standing army. Indeed, the premiums that some noblemen had begun to pay for regimental officerships reflected the limited number of *charges* available within the *vieux*. As such, it should not be surprising to discover that attempts were made to extend this system, and that the standing army that emerged in the first third of the seventeenth century contained more than a handful of regiments and guard companies. By 1635, it contained a further eight regiments, which will be discussed in this chapter. One of these was added to the ranks of the *vieux*; the others formed a new cohort, and were dubbed the *petits-vieux*. Several of the *petits-vieux* had attained the status of *entretenu* by the late 1620s, and had earned the right to carry the *drapeau blanc* (the king's standard). This honour signified that they were considered elite regiments, with a status below the *vieux*, but above the temporary regiments, in the infantry hierarchy.

The term *petits-vieux* does not appear to have been in usage until the reign of Louis XIII; before 1610, many of these regiments either did not exist or had not had their permanency assured. As such, the origins of the *petits-vieux* are often unclear, much like the *vieux*, and even the exact number of *petits-vieux* regiments which existed during the first thirty years of the seventeenth century is a matter of contention. Père Daniel cited only five in his study on the French army, Susane stated there were six between 1616 and 1635, whilst Parrott recorded seven regiments as having attained this status by 1635.[1] The closest to a definitive list of permanent regiments by the late 1620s can be found on an *état* of 1627, on which the following eleven regiments are listed as permanent: the *Gardes*, *Picardie*, *Navarre*, *Piémont*, *Champagne*, *Normandie*, *Chappes*, *Estissac*, *Rambures*, *Vaubecourt* and *Beaumont*.[2] However, it is difficult to give a definitive list of the names of the *petits-vieux*, as their name changed if the position of *mestre de camp* was taken over by a different family. Susane's list of *Chappes*, *Rambures*, *Bourg de l'Espinasse* (often merely referred to as *Bourg*), *Sault*, *Vaubecourt* and *Beaumont* thus seems most representative of the names of the *petits-vieux* for most of the period of this thesis.[3]

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[1] Daniel, *Milice*, II, pp. 390-392; Susane, *Ancienne*, I, pp. 214-5; Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. xvi.

[2] 'Etat de la depense pour l'entretenement de l'infanterie et cavalerie', 'Pour l'année 1627', SHDAT $X^{1}5$, n.p.

[3] Parrott lists the names of the *petits-vieux* in 1635 as being *Nerestang* (previously *Chappes*), *Sault*, *Rambures* (previously *Balagny*), *Vaubecourt*, *Maugiron* (previously, amongst others, *Bourg*), *Bellenaue*

This section will not consider all the regiments which have been deemed *petits-vieux*. Instead, it will focus on three of these regiments, together with *Normandie*, a regiment that one can consider a 'lesser' *vieux*, in order to flesh out the dynamics which were central to the evolution of all these units, and why some had greater levels of status attached to them than others. This section will start with a consideration of the first *petits-vieux* regiments – *Bourg* and *Nerestang* – focusing on their uncertain origins, how they became permanent bodies, and the consequences of this process. The origins of *Normandie* will then be investigated, in order to demonstrate that the regiment has its foundations in the noble factionalism of the mid-1610s, and that the perception of *Normandie* as a *vieux* regiment was due to dynastic politics, rather than the inherent 'ancienneté' of the unit. The final section will then analyse the emergence of *Vaubecourt*, particularly making reference to the position of the Nettancourt de Vaubecourt as a bi-confessional family from an area of ambiguous sovereignty.

Just like the *vieux*, the evolution of the *petits-vieux* into permanent administrative units was a rather haphazard set of developments, yet one which was fundamentally driven by the dynastic ambitions of the nobility who officered the regiments. Rather than explicitly ordering this process, the monarchy appears to have merely allowed the number of permanent regiments to expand as circumstances arose, because it grasped the benefit of having an increased number of noblemen in its service. This dynamic can firstly be seen with the position of *mestre de camp*, where the interests of the monarchy, but also, critically, certain members of the *noblesse seconde*, led to the levying of these regiments, and their subsequent maintenance as *entretenus*. Secondly, the dynastic interests of *petits-vieux mestres de camp* and also *petite noblesse* captains can be seen at work at a company level. Unfortunately, very few *états* and *revues* exist for these regiments during this period, so a reconstruction of the patterns of military office-holding on the scale seen in the preceding chapters cannot be achieved, even if sufficient evidence does exist to allow the highlighting of certain general trends. Ultimately, the new regiments of this chapter came into existence because there was a pool of noblemen outside of the *vieux* who wished to join the new standing army, owing to the social benefits that serving within it could confer.

(previously *Beaumont* and *Chastellier-Barlot*), and *Saint-Luc* (levied in 1620 and known as *La Valette* between 1622 and 1627). Information in brackets based on Susane, *Ancienne*, VIII, pp. 63-5, 69, 80.

I- Nerestang *and* Bourg*: the Initial Extension of the Standing Army, c.1590-c.1620.*

The original *petits-vieux* regiments had their origins in the warfare of the 1590s: both *Bourg* and *Nerestang* were levied in response to the Spanish threat to Picardy in 1597. According to Susane, *Nerestang* was formed in 1597 from 'quelques vieilles compagnies' garrisoned in Provence, whose presence could be traced back to the 'enseignes de Piémont' which had returned to France from Italy in 1559. For *Bourg*, he merely stated that it was formed from 'des bandes anciennes' which had served the *Ligue* from 1589. Indeed, the two *mestres de camp* had rather different backgrounds. Philibert de Nerestang had been a captain in *Piémont* since the 1560s, and faithfully served the monarchy throughout the civil wars. Antoine de Maine, baron du Bourg de L'Espinasse had, by contrast, commanded a *Ligue* regiment during the siege of Paris in 1589, and did not enter royal service until the beginning of 1595. Owing to a lack of evidence, it has not been possible to test Susane's hypotheses, but, at least in the case of Philibert de Nerestang, some of his ideas do appear to ring true.[4] Whatever their origins, both *Bourg* and *Nerestang* appear to be the only non-*vieux* regiments to have survived the 1598 retrenchment. A document from 1616 states that in 1598 'tout linfantereye francaise feust licentyée a lexeption des garde, picardye, champagne, piedmont, Navarre, nerestan & Bourg'.[5] However, the lack of any complete *états* between 1597 and 1608 means that it is impossible to state definitively exactly how these regiments survived the immediate aftermath of the Peace of Vervins. If they did, *Bourg* and *Nerestang* were probably much more substantially reduced in size than the *vieux*. Indeed, Susane has contended that both regiments had been reduced to a sole *mestre de camp* company by the end of 1598. Given that Susane also lists eleven royal regiments as being levied in 1597 which were subject to complete disbandment in 1598,[6] it is unclear why Bourg and Nerestang were chosen to maintain their regiments, in any form, *sur pied*. It would fit Henri IV's overall policy that both an ex-*Ligueur* and a long-standing royal servant were equally rewarded in the late 1590s, though admittedly this is pure conjecture.

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[4] Susane, *Ancienne*, III, pp. 290-1, 388-390; anonymous biography, BnF DB 485 (12731), f. 11r.
[5] 'Memoire sur le rang de ce regiment', SHDAT A[1]13, f. 37.
[6] Susane, *Ancienne*, VIII, pp. 65-67.

The evolution of these two regiments into permanent regiments after 1598 is far from clear, but probably occurred earlier than Susane has claimed. For both regiments, he stated that the 1600s saw their levying and disbanding – or, at best, reduction to a single *mestre de camp* company – as royal military needs saw fit. The regiments both served in the Savoy War and were active in the mobilisation of 1602, without becoming fully *entretenus*. It was not until the mid-1600s that Susane was willing to accept that *Bourg* might have been maintaining a relatively sizeable amount of force permanently under arms, whilst, in his opinion, *Nerestang* was not 'définitivement rétabli' as a full regiment until 1610.[7] Daniel has cited that both men can be found recorded as *mestres de camp* in the *Extraordinaire des guerres* by 1606.[8]

However, indications of permanency are present before this date. A brevet from 1602 stated that Henri had given 'il y a quelque temps' the position of *mestre de camp* to Nerestang and Bourg, in order that they could form regiments to serve on the frontiers of Burgundy and Bresse and 'autres lieux' where Henri required them. Indeed, the brevet's purpose was to establish that *Nerestang* 'procedera et marchera en ordre debvant' *Bourg*.[9] This suggests that by this date the two regiments had already gained enough security that their positional in the regimental hierarchy required formal recognition and regulation. By the mid-1600s, *revues* can be found for both regiments, who appear to be garrisoning towns in the south-east of France. Both regiments additionally had a presence in the Lyonnais, whilst *revues* can also be found for *Nerestang* companies stationed in nearby Bourg-en Bresse.[10] It may well be the case, therefore, that these two regiments were kept in the south-east after the Savoy War, or the mobilisation of 1602, either to garrison newly acquired territory, or more generally to bolster frontier defences in the area. By 1607 both regiments appear after the *vieux* on the accounts of the *Extraordinaire des guerres* as permanent regiments. The accounts of this year state that ten captains in *Bourg* and five captains in *Nerestang*, together with their subalterns, were to receive monthly payments throughout the year in the same manner as the *vieux*.[11] Additionally, a provision of 30 *livres* per month was made for ten 'cappitaines refformez qui seront appoinctez audict

[7] Ibid, III, pp. 291-2, 392-3.
[8] Daniel, *Milice*, II, pp. 393-4.
[9] 'Brevet par lequel le Roy a ordonné que le regiment de Nerestang procedera celuy du Bourg', 2 August 1602, BnF Cangé 5, f. 256.
[10] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1904); *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1912, 1967); *revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1983-1984).
[11] And at the same level of pay as the *quatre-vieux*.

regiment' of *Nerestang*. Whilst a similar concession was not made for *Bourg*, this shows that the effort to keep old captains 'retenuz' in royal service extended past the *vieux*, and it is highly unlikely that reformed officers would have been attached to an empty shell of a regiment.[12]

It would thus appear that by the mid-1600s, both *Bourg* and *Nerestang* had been added to the ranks of the royal army's permanent regiments. Calculating the exact date this occurred is impossible, but is most likely to have occurred after either the mobilisation of the army in 1602 or the Sedan campaign of 1606. In any case, by 1607 both regiments were consistently maintained *sur pied* from that date; something which can be seen in the continuity of service of the regiments' captains. Of the fifteen captains named in the two regiments in 1608, all were again named on the 1609 and 1610 *états*. Between 1610 and 1620, further continuity is visible, despite both regiments changing their *mestre de camp*. *Bourg* had become *Suze* in 1619 when the regiment was taken over by Gaspard de Champagne, comte de La Suze,[13] whilst *Nerestang* had become *Chappes* in 1611 after Jacques d'Aumont, baron de Chappes assumed command. An *état* for both regiments can be found from 1620.[14] Of the ten captains named in *Suze*, six names correlate with those named in *Bourg* in 1610: 'Chantelot', 'Langeron', 'La Molliere', 'Poiviere', 'Toulouson', and 'Moulin'. Similarly, of the five captains recorded in Nerestang in 1610, three names are repeated among the ten captains maintained in Chappes: 'La Maison', 'Faure', and 'Vandemar'. Further information relating to continuity of service can be found with reference to the few *revues* which have survived for these regiments.[15] The 'Moulin' recorded in *Bourg*/*Suze* can be found as Jean du Moulin in regimental *revues* from 1610 and 1616 with the same lieutenant.[16] The 'La Maison' on the *Nerestang*/*Chappes états* can be found as Jean de Pantrieu, sieur de La Maison in *revues* from 1605, 1609, 1610 and 1614.[17] The subaltern and sergeant composition of La Maison's own company is identical in 1605, 1609 and 1614.

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[12] *État*, BnF Na.Fr. 24841, ff.168r-170r for 1608 (signed December 1607); *état*, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 145r-147r for 1610 (signed December 1609).

[13] Suze's tenure over the regiment would be short-lived. Charles, marquis de Lauzieres would become *mestre de camp* in 1620, and this position would change hands another three times before Claude, comte de Maugiron took control of the regiment in 1633. Susane, *Ancienne*, VIII, pp.299, 388-397.

[14] *État*, BnF Ms.Fr. 16718, ff. 198v-199v;

[15] Fourteen *revues* remain for *Nerestang*/*Chappes*, and nine for *Bourg*/*Suze*/*Estissac*.

[16] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (37); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (156).

[17] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1967); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2216); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (8); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (133).

Thus, by the mid-1600s at least, the stability of regimental office-holding found in the *vieux* had been extended to a notable degree to the newer regiments of *Bourg* and *Nerestang*. These regiments were being permanently maintained, and security of office had been made possible for the captains and subalterns who inhabited them. These new, permanent regiments would eventually become known as the *petits-vieux*. This symbolised that they shared many characteristics with the *vieux* regiments, and were part of the standing army, but that they were considered to be of a lesser rank within the regimental hierarchy. In the case of *Bourg* and *Nerestang*, one might assume this lesser status was attributed to them as they had been formed and entrenched in a period quite clearly after that of the *vieux*. However, as will be seen in the subsequent section, the status of regiments entrenched after 1590 was often based on factors other than regimental age and lineage.

II- Factionalism, Dynastic Survival and the Creation of a Vieux: Normandie

The regiment which most clearly shows the central importance of the dynastic ambition of the nobility to the process of regimental creation and entrenchment in the early seventeenth century is *Normandie*. This can be shown through an exploration of a central contradiction relating to the regiment's origins. The regiment was younger than the *petits-vieux* regiments of *Bourg* and *Nerestang* and possibly even *Vaubecourt* if the date of first levy is taken, yet almost immediately after its foundation it was classed amongst the *vieux*. Indeed, if, as Père Daniel put it, the regiment was only definitively founded between 1615 and 1617, 'ce Regiment étant si nouveau [comment] a-t-il eu son rang immediatement après les quatre premiers vieux Corps, & comment a-t-il acquis le titre même de vieux corps?'[18]

For Susane, *Normandie* was a *vieux* as, just like the other regiments afforded this status, it could ultimately trace its origins from 'bandes anciennes' and 'vieilles enseignes françaises' dating back to at least the 1560s, even if the regiment had not definitively taken shape until the 1610s.[19] Yet, whilst Susane's history is wonderfully evocative of the confusing nature of provincial military administration during the civil wars, it is difficult to draw a direct line between the somewhat amorphous forces of

[18] This period, and the status of *Normandie* as a *vieux* is accepted among the few historians who have discussed the regiment's origins. Daniel, *Milice*, pp. 384-8; Susane, *Ancienne*, VIII, pp. 176-87. Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. xvi, accepts Daniel's 'c.1617' as the date of *Normandie*'s origin.
[19] Susane, *Ancienne*, III, pp. 177, 180, 182, 186.

this earlier period and *Normandie*. In the *états* for 1608-10 there is no mention of any form of local defence force or 'vieilles bandes' in Normandy beyond those troops paid to garrison the province's towns, nor is there a mention of *Normandie* in the 'gens de campagne' section of the accounts.[20] There remains the possibility, of course, that these older forces may have formed part of the province's garrison, without being recorded as such in the royal accounts. In any case, as Daniel notes, a regiment entitled *Normandie* cannot be found in the accounts of the *Extraordinaire des guerres* until 1617. As such, instead of attempting to ascribe *Normandie*'s *vieux* status to potentially tenuous connections with older military forces, it is better to look for the origins of the regiment in the factionalism of the mid-1610s, and, in particular, the struggle between Concini and Longueville to dominate Picardy.

Concino Concini, marquis then maréchal d'Ancre, had arrived in France in 1600 after marrying one of Marie de Médicis' ladies-in-waiting, Leonora Galigaï.[21] Whilst he had already manoeuvred himself into a position of favour prior to 1610,[22] his ascension to pre-eminence and position of court-favourite truly began after Henri IV's assassination, and the beginning of Marie's regency. However, Concini did not dominate royal government for the entire period between 1610 and 1617, and Jean-François Dubost has helpfully divided Concini's life into three stages during these years. Firstly, between 1610 and 1614, Concini and his wife concentrated on amassing money, land and offices, with government power largely in the hand of the Secretary of State, Nicolas de Neufville, sieur de Villeroy; from 1614 to 1616, Concini broadened his influence, and made his first interventions in politics. It was thus only from the Peace of Loudun onwards (May 1616) that Concini played a 'full part in the political direction of the kingdom', especially as he was essentially able to form a new ministry through placing creatures in key governmental positions, such as those relating to finance and foreign affairs.[23]

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[20] *État*, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 51r-56r, for troops paid for by the *Extraordinaire des guerres* to garrison Normandy.

[21] The most recent biography of Concini is Hélène Duccini, *Concini: grandeur et misère du favori de Marie de Médicis*, (Paris, 1991).

[22] From 1608 Concini was already strongly 'en vogue' in court, and was in-line to receive a *gouvernement*. F. Pouy, *Concini, maréchal d'Ancre, son gouvernement en Picardie, 1611-1617*, (Amiens, 1885), p. 23.

[23] It is worthy of note that the client who Concini placed in the position of foreign minister was Richelieu: J.-F. Dubost, 'Between Mignons and Principal Ministers: Concini, 1610-1617', in L Brockliss and J.H. Elliot (eds.), *The World of the Favourite*,(New Haven and London, 1999), p. 72.

Between 1610 and 1614, therefore, the Concini acquired enormous pensions from Marie de Médicis, through which Concini was able to buy the charge of *premier gentilhomme de la chambre*, and the *terre* of Ancre by the end of 1610. This began a process by which Concini attempted to solidify his rise to favour, in which he acquired military titles and sought to build a provincial power-base for himself in Picardy. After buying the *charge* of *gouverneur* of Péronne, Roye and Montdidier from the marquis de Créqui in late 1610, Concini was appointed *lieutenant général* of Picardy in 1611. Concini then obtained almost complete control over Amiens, through acquiring the largely military position of *gouverneur* of both the town and citadel, and judicial power as the *bailli* of the town. He duly began a programme of improving the citadel, and placing clients inside it to command the garrison. Only lacking a distinguished military position to cap his ascendancy, this was received when, on the death of Guillaume de Hautemer, maréchal de Fervarques, Concini was appointed *maréchal de France* in 1613.[24] Not only had he thus gained a significant position of military authority, he had brought several towns in Picardy under his control, including the strategically vital town of Amiens with its garrison of 300 men. Concini had given these men 12,000 *livres* in order to try and guarantee their loyalty, but had additionally installed Italian soldiers in the garrison to the chagrin of some members of the local population and the duc de Longueville.[25]

Indeed, this rise to favour did not go unopposed, as Concini's eventual violent assassination in 1617 would most obviously show. Rohan commented on Concini's appointment as *maréchal* that 'il n'y avoit point encore d'exmple d'homme honoré du baton de mareschal de France qui n'eut jamais servit en armée'.[26] However, before his influence on central government became truly marked in 1615-16, the main difficulties Concini faced were related to his attempts to build up his influence in Picardy, as this brought him directly into competition with Henri d'Orléans, duc de Longueville, who was *gouverneur* of the province. Concini had clearly attempted to exploit Longueville's minority: he was only fifteen in 1611, and the Comte de Saint-Pol, his uncle, had exercised the charge of *gouverneur* for him. By the revolt of 1614, Longueville tried to stamp his authority over the town, and thus the province, through

[24] Duccini, *Concini*, pp. 92-103. Dubost has stated that 'as a marshal of France, Concini owned his own regiment'. There is no evidence to suggest that being a *maréchal de France* gave a nobleman the right to own a regiment in the 1610s: Dubost, 'Between Mignons', p. 75.
[25] Pouy, *Concini*, pp. 24. The figure of 300 men is taken from the 1610 *état*, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 10v-11r.
[26] 'Histoire du marechal et de la marechalle d'Ancre, 1610-1617', AAE MD 768, f. 86v.

a failed attempt to take Amiens' citadel by force. Whilst much of the causation of the revolts between 1614 and 1617 can be ascribed to the anger of certain members of the high nobility against Concini's rise and, in their view, usurpation of power, Longueville thus had a particular *casus belli* against the Italian. Longueville would score a victory over Concini at the peace negotiations at Loudun in 1616. In the wake of this treaty, Concini was forced to resign his various positions in Amiens, and swap the position of *lieutenant général* of Picardy for that of Normandy with Hercule de Rohan, duc de Montbazon.

Loudun did not end the kingdom's internal instability, and Condé's subsequent arrest would provoke a resumption of revolt by certain members of the high nobility. Daniel's explanation for the levy of the *régiment de Normandie* comes from this time. He claimed that Concini raised the regiment to guard Condé at Vincennes in the wake of his arrest in September 1616. This explanation is not entirely convincing, as between March and May 1616 six *revues* can be found for this self-same regiment of the maréchal d'Ancre. Moreover, these *revues* all took place in Picardy, at Amiens, Querrieu, and Clermont.[27] Despite the Peace of Loudun, it would seem unlikely that Concini completely disbanded these troops after May 1616, given the continued precariousness of his situation. The original composition of *Normandie* was thus probably of troops from Picardy in areas under Concini's control.

Admittedly, it is impossible to prove whether some of the troops garrisoned in towns such as Amiens may have been formed from the remnants of the 'vieilles bandes de Normandie', and thus Norman soldiers may have been present in *Normandie* from its conception. However, the real Norman tone to the unit was probably given after September 1616, when Concini retreated to the province of which he was now *lieutenant général*. In October 1616, Concini then returned to the court, 'accompagné de quantité de Normans'.[28] This foreshadowed the more extensive levies of early 1617. As revolt re-emerged, Concini levied 6,000 infantry in March 1617, of which 2,800 were French who Daniel plausibly contends were probably levied in Normandy.[29]

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[27] Given the location of the other two places, 'Clermont' would most likely refer to the town also known as Clermont-de-l'Oise, located in the south of the province. *Revues*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (168, 172, 175-6, 178, 180).
[28] Andilly, *Journal inédit (1614-1620)*, p. 217.
[29] Figures from Daniel, *Milice*, pp. 385-6. Daniel states that these figures were taken from a letter from Ancre to the king from March, 1617.

This, therefore, is the likeliest origin of *Normandie*. As its original name suggests, this regiment began life as Concini's private defence force, levied between late 1615 and early 1616 when his position was under threat. It is quite probable that he was merely levying anyone in first Picardy, and subsequently Normandy, whose loyalty he could trust or buy in the mid-1610s, and Andilly certainly notes how Concinis' clients were being appointed to captaincies in the regiment by late-November 1616.[30] Indeed, it appears that Concini further exploited the clientage links he had developed in Picardy in order to raise further regiments alongside *Normandie* that were headed by his supporters in the same period.[31]

Dubost's claim that the regiment was part of Concini's aim to 'establish a permanent royal army worthy of the name […] ready to operate at the first sign of trouble' is therefore rather doubtful, if by royal he means it was not shaped heavily by faction.[32] Richelieu's management of the 1616-1617 war effort was certainly complicated by the shadowy motives Concini stated with regard for his need for money and troops, especially with regard to the levies he made in Liège.[33] If Concini was motivated by a desire to protect the monarchy, this was only because his own position was so intimately linked to the continuation of the status quo by 1617.

The perception of *Normandie* as a dynastic possession of the Concini is enhanced by the fact that in May 1616 the command of the regiment was given to Concini's thirteen-year old son, Henri Concini, comte de La Pesne. Concini was undoubtedly trying to maintain the overall security and position of his family, in reaction to the uncertainty engendered by Condé and Longueville's ostensible triumph over him at Loudun. Indeed, if Susane is correct, and the regiment changed its name to *Normandie* during the period it was under the control of Pesne, this may have been due to Concini's desire to deflect criticisms from his detractors that this unit was a virtually independent body primarily under his control, even if it did contain a significant Norman element by late-1616. *Normandie*'s creation was thus a result of the instability and factionalism of the mid-1610s, and Concini's general ambition to

[30] Andilly, *Journal inédit (1614-1620)*, p. 233.
[31] Concini's relationship with the marquis de Portes, the uncle of the duc de Montmorency, meant that he had been able to use the influence of Portes' sister, the abbess of Caen, to raise a regiment of twelve companies of 100 men in the revolt of 1615-16, i.e. at the same time that the regiment de maréchal d'Ancre appears to have been levied. These men do not appear to have been part of Concini's own regiment, and were known as the 'regiment de Portes': Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*, p. 90; Dubost, 'Between Mignons', p. 76.
[32] Dubost, 'Between Mignons', p. 75.
[33] Joseph Bergin, *The Rise of Richelieu*, (New Haven and London, 1991), p. 159.

protect the elevated position that he had earned for himself within the kingdom, rather than any drive by the monarchy itself to expand the existing regimental system.

That this was the case can further be seen by the regiment's fate after Concini's assassination in April 1617. Pesne was removed from the position of *mestre de camp* and Honoré d'Albert, sieur de Cadenet (later duc de Chaulnes) was put in his place. His appointment was part of a strategy by which his brother, Charles d'Albert, duc de Luynes, set about consolidating his rise to predominance within the royal government and court. Subsequently, much of Luynes' strategy was based on placing family members and allies in positions of importance. This included further building up the influence of the family at court, but also the acquisition of further military positions for his kin. Cadenet would go on to become a *maréchal de France* in 1619. Leon d'Albert, sieur de Brantes, another of Luynes' brothers, was made a captain in the *Gardes* in 1617, before becoming a lieutenant in the *compagnie des chevaux-légers de la garde ordinaire du roi* and a *chevalier des ordres du roi*. Seven of Luynes' kin and twelve of his clients held the position of *gouverneur* over fortress towns.[34] After first receiving the position of captain of a *gendarme* company in May 1617, this family strategy would reach its apotheosis with Luynes' appointment as Constable in 1621.[35] However, Luynes' extensive influence over military appointments clearly preceded his elevation to this office, as it stemmed largely from his position as royal favourite; this can be seen through the Albert's manipulation of *Normandie* after Cadenet had taken control.

First, according to Père Daniel, *Normandie* had taken its rank as a *vieux*, albeit at a rank below the other five, by 1619 at the latest. Daniel states that as Cadenet was Luynes' brother, *Normandie* was treated with 'toute sorte de distinction' from 1617, especially after he received the position of *maréchal de France* in 1619. The rapid ascension of the regiment to the level of a *vieux* can only have been achieved due to the favour that the Albert enjoyed in the late 1610s; there is no other plausible reason as to how Normandie could have attained this status, especially as it was created *after* regiments considered as mere *petits-vieux*, such as *Bourg*, *Nerestang* or *Vaubecourt*. As the *mestres de camp* of the other *vieux* were too secure to arbitrarily replace, the only means to secure a prestigious regiment had been to remove it from the control of the defeated Concini faction, and then artificially inflate its importance in order to

[34] Kettering, *Power and Reputation*, pp. 134-5.
[35] La Chesnaye, I, pp. 110-111, 120, 124.

benefit the new family in control. Certainly, the removal of Pesne from his office of *mestre de camp* in 1617 appears to be a rare moment where the security of regimental office appears to have been undermined, and is a testament to the extent of the purge of Concini kin and clients after his assassination.[36] Whilst overstating the case somewhat, there is thus a kernel of truth in the accusation of one contemporary author, who stated that *Normandie* existed solely so that the Albert could 'avoir la force & la puissance des armes entre leurs mains'.[37] As such, there may have been a clear-out of captains appointed by Concini to the regiment: none of the four captains found on *revues* of the regiment de maréchal d'Ancre in 1616 are found on a 1620 *état* of *Normandie*. Even if these captains had left the regiment owing to more natural causes, the Albert appear to have been successful in placing family allies within the unit. The Berthélemy de Le Vernet found on both an *état* and *revue* from 1620, is surely the 'Barthelemi de Vernet [*sic*]' listed in La Chesnaye as marrying Luynes' sister, Antoinette, in June 1605.[38] Similarly, the 'Du Mons' found on the 1623 *état* is possibly Antoine de Villeneuve, sieur de Mons who married another of Luynes' sisters, Louise, in 1616.[39]

Thus, *Normandie* became part of the standing army in the mid-1610s thanks to the dynastic strategies of two great antagonists during the highly-factional 1610s: Concini and Luynes. Concini had probably initially created the force in the mid-1610s as he grew increasingly concerned about the hostility towards himself of certain *grands*, specifically Longueville. The regiment may well have been made up of largely Norman troops by late 1616/early 1617, but, if so, this may have reflected a change in Concini's own political circumstances, as he was forced to decamp to this province in the aftermath of the Peace of Loudun. In the wake of Louis XIII's coup of 1617, Luynes was able to place Concini's former regiment under his brother's command, and subsequently increase the regiment's status to that of a *vieux* so as to further improve the prestige of the military positions his family held. There is also evidence to

[36] The only comparable example appears to have been Boisse-Pardaillan's removal from the head of *Navarre* during the revolt of 1615-1616. However, according to the negotiations surrounding the Peace of Loudun, he was restored to this position after the revolt's end: 'Articles de gratifications particulieres accordez de la part du Roy [...]', 3 May 1616, BnF Ms.Fr. 3807 f. 124r.
[37] Unnamed author quoted in Daniel, *Milice*, II, p. 385.
[38] La Chesnaye, I, p.110; *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25845 (247).
[39] La Chesnaye, I, p.110. Kettering does not mention a *Normandie* captaincy among the posts held by Mons, but does show how he held a series of military charges, including *maréchal de camp*, and *gouverneur* of the Provençal fortress of Les Baux. Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients*, p. 16.

suggest that Luynes' clients and allies were placed into regimental *charges*, and that these commissions could become secure by the campaigns of the early 1620s.[40]

In this respect, the early history of *Normandie* can be usefully compared to that of *La Marine*. This regiment was created by Richelieu in 1635 and by 1640 had been elevated to the rank of a *vieux*. Even Susane admitted that 'il ne reste aucune trace' of evidence that this regiment was connected to a 'corps plus ancien', despite the fact it had taken such a prestigious rank so rapidly.[41] Just like Luynes, Richelieu had created a regiment in order to meet his own dynastic needs and those of his clients; and, just like *Normandie*, it was necessary that this regiment held a rank amongst the army's highest regiments in order that a commission within it possessed sufficient social gravitas. That it was necessary for Concini and Richelieu to create entirely new regiments in order to advance their power within the infantry further reinforces aforementioned arguments regarding the security of office within the *vieux* already in existence. This also suggests that, in at least two crucial cases, the royal standing army was expanded primarily in order to cater for the interests of royal favourites, again placing noble dynastic ambition at the centre of this period's military developments.

III - Religion, the Frontier, and Dynastic Advancement: Vaubecourt

The centrality of dynastic politics to the newer regiments can be seen in a different context in the case of the *petit-vieux* regiment, *Vaubecourt*. This regiment was named after the Vaubecourt, who formed a branch of the Nettancourt. A few salient factors can be noted about this family. Firstly, whilst Bourquin has claimed that the family had inhabited the French *bailliages* of Vitry-le-François and Sainte-Ménéhould in Champagne since the early sixteenth century,[42] in reality the family inhabited a geographical area of ambiguous sovereignty. They occupied a position on the borderlands between France and Lorraine, meaning that the family had a degree of flexibility in deciding which ruling dynasty to serve. Moreover, any decision to serve the duke of Lorraine had further complications given 'Lorraine' was in fact an amalgamation of territories. It was comprised of the duchy of Lorraine itself ('a

[40] Despite being at the forefront of these campaigns, twelve of the eighteen captains named on the 1620 *état* reappear on a similar document from 1623.
[41] Susane, *Ancienne*, III, p. 236.
[42] Bourquin, *Noblesse Seconde*, p. 126.

"protectorate" of the Empire since 1545'), the duchy of Bar ('through which the duc owed homage to the king of France'), and 'various small territories in the Holy Roman Empire'.[43] The Nettancourt's position thus realistically allowed them to choose whether to enter into the service of either the French monarchy, the duke of Lorraine or the Holy Roman Emperor. To call them and their regiment 'Lorrain', as Susane did,[44] is probably an exaggeration, but it does demonstrate that their decision to levy troops for the French monarchy was not automatic. Secondly, elements of the Nettancourt were Protestant. Mark Konnert has implied that certain family members converted in the 1560s; the Haag brothers similarly stated that one branch of the family, the Bettancourt, embraced Protestantism. This situation appears to have prevailed until the 1630s.[45] Lastly, the Nettancourt can be described as belonging to the *noblesse seconde* as they occupied a stratum of the nobility which was below the *grands* and above the *petite noblesse*.[46] As such, they had resources at their disposal which exceded that of most company captains.

These factors are important when attempting to determine how and why the family entered royal military service. Even if the family was only partially Protestant, this may still have deterred its Catholic members from entering French service in the 1580s, due to the potential of being roped into the Guises' *Ligue* campaigns.[47] It also does not appear that the family raised an infantry regiment for the French monarchy before 1610, even if members of the Nettancourt had served in royal forces since the 1580s. Jean IV de Nettancourt, sieur de Vaubecourt had held a cavalry commission since 1586 and had fought at the battles of Ivry and Fontaine-Françoise, returning to Champagne in the mid-1590s to tend to his wounds. He does not seem to have commanded an infantry regiment.[48]

Whilst the *Dossiers bleus* note the possibility that Jean IV's cousin, Louis I de Nettancourt, chevalier and sieur de Nettancourt, commanded an infantry regiment in

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[43] Phil McCluskey, 'French Military Occupations of Lorraine and Savoie, 1670-1714' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2009), p. 39.
[44] Susane, *Ancienne*, IV, p.51, VIII, p. 68.
[45] Mark Konnert, *Local Politics in the French Wars of Religion: the Towns of Champagne, the Duc de Guise and the Catholic League, 1560-1595*, (Aldershot, 2006), pp. 59-60; Haag, *La France protestante*, VIII, pp. 14-15.
[46] As stated in the introduction, the description of the Nettancourt as *noblesse seconde* should not be taken to imply an acceptance of Bourquin's wider theory that such families were used by the monarchy to reduce the power of the *grands* in Champagne: Bourquin, *Noblesse Seconde*, pp.126-127.
[47] Carroll has shown that during the 1550 and 1560s 'many' Guise clients had Protestant relatives. However, he also implies that, unsurprisingly, the affinity became more hard-line during the period of the *Ligue*. Caroll, *Noble Power*, pp.139-43, 253.
[48] Genealogy, BnF DB 486 (12744), ff. 3r-v.

the 1580s and 1590s, it is far more likely that he merely held the lieutenancy in Brienne's *Gendarme* company during the 1590 as this is the only military position that Henri IV noted him as having held in a letter from 1606.[49] Louis I was chosen to command the garrison in Sedan after the successful royal campaign in 1606 against Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, duc de Bouillon, who had essentially been in a state of rebellion against the crown since his implication in the Biron conspiracy of 1602.[50] Not only did Henri IV quite clearly feel he could rely on Louis I's loyalty (due to the Nettancourt's prior royal service), he was also a Protestant, and his appointment could thus help assuage Huguenot fears over the royal occupation of a significant Protestant stronghold.[51]

It is nevertheless highly doubtful that Louis I levied *Vaubecourt* in 1606. The Treaty of Donchery, which set out the terms of Bouillon's surrender, stated that he would receive a captain appointed by the king into the château at the head of a garrison of fifty men, which Henri IV confirmed would be under the sieur de Nettancourt.[52] Only twenty months later, in December 1607, this garrison was disbanded, and there is no record of *Vaubecourt* on the 1608 to 1610 *états*.[53] It is likely, therefore, that Louis I did not raise an entire infantry regiment during or after the Sedan campaign, and instead had been called upon to raise a small company of troops to garrison the town after operations had ended. Indeed, the experiences of the Nettancourt prior to 1610 seem to suggest that they belonged to a political borderland; one in which even serving Champenoise nobles might have a stronger regional as opposed to royal orientation. The monarchy clearly saw the Nettancourt as a useful family to call upon for its military actions, but they had not become part of the permanent military establishment by the time the 1610 *état* was signed in late 1609.

The person who would bring the family more firmly into royal service was Jean IV's son, Jean V de Nettancourt, sieur and subsequently comte de Vaubecourt. Jean V only entered French service shortly before the Peace of Vervins, and it seems

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[49] Henri IV to La Force, 5 April 1606, LMHIV, VI, p. 602.
[50] Bouillon had inherited Sedan from his wife, Charlotte de La Marck, in 1594. Hodson, 'Sovereigns and Subjects', pp. 271-274, 282-295.
[51] Moreover, the fact that Louis' younger brother, Georges de Nettancourt, sieur de Bettancourt was a lieutenant in Bouillon's Gendarme company might also explain why Bouillon may have been happy to assent to Louis I's appointment in the Treaty of Donchery. Genealogy, BnF DB 486 (12744), f. 5v.

[52] Treaty of Donchery, 2 April 1606, AAE MD 766, f. 217r; Henri IV to La Force, 5 April 1606, LMHIV, VI, p.602.
[53] *Mémoire* for the lieutenant of the Sedan garrison, 30 December 1607, AAE MD 767, f. 21r.

unlikely that he managed to achieve a position of *mestre de camp* before 1598. However, it is almost certain that it was he who was given a commission to levy a regiment of 10 companies of 200 men in April 1610, not his first-cousin once-removed, Louis I.[54] An entry in the family's *Dossiers bleus* mentions that Jean V's eldest son, Nicolas de Nettancourt, baron d'Haussonville and subsequently comte de Vaubecourt, became 'mestre de camp d'un regiment d'infanterie entreteneu crée en faveur de son pere', and Courcelles validates this assertion.[55] It would thus seem that 1610 is the first moment that a Vaubecourt infantry regiment can be justifiably noted as coming into existence.

The decision to give Jean V a commission to levy this regiment was based, in part, on the same considerations that had led to Louis I being given command of the Sedan garrison. Both the proposed and undertaken campaign to Jülich required the royal army to rendezvous in Champagne before heading into Lorraine, pushing into the Empire, and travelling north, as the ability to take a more direct route through the territories of the Habsburg Netherlands was only granted to the French after the siege of Jülich had concluded in September 1610. The monarchy thus took advantage of the Nettancourt as a family with military experience in its service, and which was based in the area through which the army would pass. Troops could be levied locally, easing logistical difficulties. Moreover, Claude de La Châtre, the *lieutenant général* of French forces sent to Jülich, noted that he had thanked the duke of Lorraine for allowing French forces to pass through his 'terres'; employing a family with connections to the duke may have thus eased matters in this respect. Finally, the family's mixed confessional status may have been used to temper some of the marked religious tensions relating to the 1610 campaign.[56]

Another element also certainly influenced the decision to employ Jean V: the fact he *did* have considerable military experience by 1610, which had been accrued outside of French service. After 1598, Jean V, like many other demobilised Frenchmen, had entered into Imperial service as part of the Long War against the

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[54] 'Commission donnée a Monsieur de Vaubecourt [...]', 24 April 1610, SHDAT A[1]12, f. 43.

[55] Genealogy, BnF DB 486 (12744) f. 4r; Jean Baptiste de Courcelles, *Histoire généalogique et héraldique des pairs de France […]*, (3 vols., Paris, 1822-4), II, Nettancourt section, pp. 10-12. In addition, Courcelles states that Jean V also levied both a 'régiment' and a 'compagnie franche' of light-cavalry for the 1610 campaign.

[56] 'Les memoires et receuil de ce qui c'est passé au voyage de Cleves et prinse de la ville et chasteau de Julliers, en l'année 1610', BnF Dupuy 193 ff. 113r, 114r-v, 117v-118r, 132r. This document is a first-hand account of the expedition by La Châtre, ff. 110r-134v.

Ottoman Empire.[57] After distinguishing himself in the sieges of Raab and Belgrade, the Emperor attempted to attach Jean V permanently to his service, giving him the governorship of Savarin, the title of Chevalier and baron of the Empire, and a pension. However, his reputation had grown to the extent that Henri IV also wished to recall him to French service. By 1609, Henri had given Jean a pension, a *gouvernement*, a variety of charges (including *gentilhomme* of the royal *chambre* and *conseiller d'état*), and a range of diplomatic roles with relation to the Empire. Choosing to enter into the service of Henri IV, Jean V returned to France in the late 1600s, and subsequently levied the Vaubecourt regiment in 1610.[58] After proving their military worth to both Henri IV and the Emperor, the Nettancourt's position on the periphery of France, Lorraine and the Empire had thus allowed them to sell the future military service of their family to the highest bidder. Whilst their ties to France may have been slightly stronger due to their geographical origin, Henri IV had to give Jean V an array of titles, honours and money in order to convince him to become part of the French military establishment. Not only had military service thus increased the Nettancourt's family standing, their decision to enter French service was based on the best means to further advance the status of their dynasty, rather than an overt centralising plan by the monarchy.

Nonetheless, and despite its service in 1610, the status of Vaubecourt as *entretenu* was not immediately assured. At the conclusion of the Jülich campaign, the regiment was subject to *réformation* down to a single, *mestre de camp* company. The regiment was then levied again in February 1614, before being disbanded shortly afterwards in the same year.[59] Whilst both Courcelles and Susane have stated that the regiment was permanently maintained from 1616, the unit appears to have been subject to similarly short periods of levying and disbanding throughout the second half

[57] This conflict had begun in 1593, would end in 1606, and is often referred to as the 'Long Turkish War'. Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years' War: Europe's tragedy*, (Cambridge, MA, 2009), pp. 97-102. The only recent study of this confrontation is in German, and focuses mainly on diplomatic history: Jan Paul Niederkorn, *Die europaischen mächte und der "Lange Turkenkrieg" Kaiser Rudolfs II (1593-1606)*, (Vienna, 1993). The closest to a study of the war in English is: Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606*, (Vienna, 1988). Finkel also appears to be the only writer to have focused on French involvement in this conflict: C.F. Finkel, 'French Mercenaries in the Habsburg-Ottoman War of 1593-1606: The Desertion of the Papa Garrison to the Ottomans in 1600', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 55, (1992), pp. 451-471.

[58] Genealogy, BnF DB 486 (12744), ff. 3v, 9v.

[59] Fontenay-Mareuil noted the levying of Vaubecourt in 1614, stating that it had been 'licenciés' on its return from Jülich in 1610. However, his contention that the regiment was permanently maintained from 1614 does not appear correct. Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*, p. 73.

of the 1610s and into the early 1620s.[60] It was only during this later period, when the regiment was charged with the protection of the Champagne border in 1622, and subsequently formed part of the army group sent into the Valteline under the command of François Annibal d'Estrées, marquis de Coeuvres in 1624, that the stability of the regiment seems to have been truly assured. A *revue* from March 1623 states that Jean V was 'mestre de camp dung regiment de douze enseignes de cinquante hommes de guerre a pied Francais', ostensibly confirming the regiment's permanent status from around this date. If this had not been the case, it would have been re-disbanded in the retrenchments that occurred in the period of peace between the end of 1622 and 1624.

Despite the regiment's instability in the 1610s, certain captains seem to have achieved a degree of security with regard to their commissions in the regiment prior to the early 1620s. Jean-Jacques de Montesquiou, sieur de La Serre received a 'brevet of capitaine entretenu' in May 1610.[61] In February 1614, he received another brevet to become one of the ten captains of 200 men to be included in the reconstituted Vaubecourt regiment, and in June 1614 he was awarded the 'continuation d'appointements' despite 'la refforme entiere de Vaubecourt'. He then received commissions to levy or 'licentier' his company in all the years between 1615 and 1618, and it was only from 1619 that his company appears to have truly achieved stability.[62] However, it is telling that La Serre seems to have maintained his captain's commission even when his company was subject to *réforme*, and that Vaubecourt was consistently called upon to organise a regiment throughout the 1610s. This may suggest that both were 'retenuz', as either *mestre de camp* or captain, from the mid-1610s. Alternatively, they may merely have been on royal pensions of a non-specific military type. Moreover, Jean V may have actually profited from the instability of his regiment. Susane has even claimed that, on at least one occasion, Jean V sold troops from *Vaubecourt* for one *écu* per head to the monarchy, when in 1615, 1619 and 1624 troops from the regiment were incorporated into *Picardie* and *Normandie*.[63] This would suggest that many of the men in *Vaubecourt* were subjects of Lorraine or the

[60] Genealogy, BnF DB 459 ff. 43r-44v.
[61] He was a distant cousin of the Montesquiou de Sainte-Colombe found in the *Gardes*, reinforcing the argument that some families were active in several standing army regiments by the 1610s, and this was not confined within the *vieux*.
[62] Genealogy, BnF DB 459 ff. 43r-44v.
[63] Susane, *Ancienne*, IV, p. 51.

Empire, as it is unlikely that Jean V could have sold French soldiers to the monarchy in this manner.

True or not, the overall tone of this allegation is correct: the Vaubecourt regiment was a nakedly entrepreneurial, if not outright mercenary venture, which had entered into French service to aggrandise the wealth and status of the Nettancourt in return for their service to the monarchy. This contention is borne out by studying appointments within the regiment. The commission of 1610 made clear that the responsibility for filling the regimental charges had been left to Jean V, with the exception of one company which was to be managed by Épernon in his capacity as *Colonel général*. No *états* and only fourteen *revues* of the regiment survive from the 1598 to 1629 period, of which eleven date from 1623 to 1624. These *revues* show that in addition to the company he commanded by virtue of his *mestre de camp* commission, both Jean V's second son and brother – Henry de Nettancourt, baron de Vaubecourt and Henry de Nettancourt, sieur de Passavant, respectively – held captaincies in the regiment.[64] Other Nettancourt captains in *Vaubecourt* included Francois, sieur de Passavant d'Autrecourt, son of Henry, sieur de Passavant, and Louis II, sieur de Nettancourt, son of the Louis I who had garrisoned Sedan.[65] Jean V's eldest son, Nicholas, had become a lieutenant in his father's regiment by 1620, before being made captain in 1623. In 1628 Jean V resigned his position as *mestre de camp* and managed to pass the position to Nicholas. Nicholas would subsequently hold the commission until either 1646 or 1649, having been appointed *maréchal de camp* in 1642, and, ultimately, *lieutenant général* of the armies of Flanders and Champagne in 1651, completing his ascension through the military hierarchy. In addition, he would hold, at various times, the command of *gouvernements* such as Verdunois, Perpignan, Metz and Châlons. The Nettancourt's regiment thus allowed one family member to rise from the rank of lieutenant to *lieutenant général*, and to receive significant additional benefits in the process. Their regiment was thus a means by which the family's service to the monarchy could be performed and noted, with progressive improvement of their social standing as their reward.

The Nettancourt were also able to appoint family allies to the regiment. François de Savigny, sieur de Lemont, captain in a *revue* from 1618, was probably related to Jean V's first wife, Catherine de Savigny, whom he had married in 1599. A

[64] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25845 (220); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (324); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (326)
[65] Genealogy, BnF DB 486 (12744), f.6v; Haag, *La France protestante*, VIII, p.14.

document from 1605, at the very least, talks of a long-standing alliance between the Savigny and Nettancourt.[66] Whether they were allies or not, the Nettancourt also acquiesced in the monopolisation of company charges by other regimental captains, such as the Montesquiou de La Serre. A *revue* from 1623 showed Jean-Jacques de Montesquiou, sieur de La Serre had Bertrand and Louis de Montesquiou as his lieutenant and ensign, both of whom were his nephews. Bertrand would subsequently become a captain in the regiment himself, although whether he assumed command of his uncle's company is not clear.[67] Other families were thus also able to use the Vaubecourt regiment for their own ends of dynastic self-improvement, through the acquisition and monopolisation of military charges.

The reality of the creation of *Vaubecourt* is thus of a relatively autonomous family living in a border region, which raised forces for the monarchy in return for social ascension. Whilst the family had been reasonably powerful under Jean IV's father, Georges II de Nettancourt, they had seemingly only had the dukes of Lorraine as patrons by the mid-sixteenth century. The civil wars in France, and the war against the Ottomans in Hungary, allowed the Nettancourt to exploit their position of living on the border of the French kingdom, Lorraine and the Empire to choose military service under the patron who could afford the family the most benefits. This choice may in part have been influenced by religion, although Jean V was happy to serve under the ex-*Ligue* grandee the duc de Mercoeur in Imperial forces during the early 1600s. Indeed, had the war against the Ottomans continued past 1606, Jean V might even have remained in Imperial service, with *Vaubecourt* never coming into existence. The Emperor certainly attempted to persuade Jean V not to return to French service, but after Henri IV showered Jean V with gifts in the late 1600s, and the subsequent levying of *Vaubecourt* in 1610, the Nettancourt remained wedded to French service thereafter. Clearly, consistent loyalty to the monarchy from the 1610s onwards brought the family considerable improvement in its social standing. By around 1622/3 *Vaubecourt* had become fully *entretenu*, and the power of company appointment appeared to have been devolved almost entirely to Jean V for him to manipulate as it best suited him.

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[66] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25845 (219); letters patent, February 1610, BnF DB 486 (12744), f. 56v; La Chesnaye, X, p.717.
[67] *Revue* BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (327); genealogies, BnF DB 459, ff. 45r, 376r.

The creation and entrenchment of *Vaubecourt* as a permanent part of the royal army was thus driven by the tangible benefits it could accrue to the noble family which had raised the regiment, as much as any initiatives on the part of the monarchy to rationally improve the army or engage in 'state-building'. Consequently, the regiment illustrates, from the perspective of the complex frontier regions of France, how the monarchy gradually found increasing numbers of the nobility to serve under long-term commissions in the infantry officer corps. Whether they would achieve similar ascension or not, the Nettancourt surely gave hope to other members of both the middling and lower French nobility that through military service they too could achieve advancement.

Dynastic ambitions was thus central to the process by which the *petits*- and lesser-*vieux* became permanent additions to the standing army. Noble families were choosing to join, or even levy, these new regiments as it enabled them to achieve or consolidate social ascension without necessarily having to join the *vieux*. The standing army was thus able to expand during the early seventeenth century because many noble families demonstrably wished to acquire royal offices within this structure, yet could not do so due to the security of tenure afforded to *vieux* officers. As the monarchy fought new wars in the 1610s and 1620s, new military opportunities became available in recently formed units, and some regiments were subsequently able to acquire security as permanent entities. Whilst it was warfare that allowed these units to come into existence, it was the potential for social advancement that drew these additional families, from both the *petite noblesse* and *noblesse seconde*, into permanent royal military service. Indeed, a family which was able to levy an entire new regiment should be considered as part of the upper-middling nobility or *noblesse seconde*, as opposed to the *petite noblesse* who have formed the bulk of the discussion in this thesis hitherto.

Just as the *mestres de camp* of the *vieux* had done, officers within these newer regiments argued over the status of their unit within the royal military hierarchy, because the prestige of their regiment affected the worth of the office they held, and hence the social status it could afford them. Luynes managed to deflect these arguments by using his favour to give *Normandie* the status of a *vieux*. This measure 'ne laissa pas de faire murmurer' other nobles and gave rise to 'libelles seditieux [*sic*]' against Luynes and his family, showing not all were pleased with his manipulation of

the regimental hierarchy.[68] Yet it also demonstrated Luynes' shrewdness as a political operator. He recognised the rising importance of *charges* within the standing army to the social worth of noble families; and if sufficiently prestigious *charges* did not exist, or were not available, it was necessary to create them. By doing so, Luynes not only took advantage of both the political volatility of the 1610s, but also a new military system that remained malleable below the level of the *vieux*.

Regimental status within the standing army remained up for grabs throughout the period of this dissertation. This situation was aided by the ambiguous origins of many *petits-vieux*, as the main ways by which a regiment's position in the infantry hierarchy was determined – the date of its foundation and/or the date on which the first *mestre de camp* had received his commission – were often unclear. An edict from 1624, which appears to put the regiments in order of hierarchy, placed *Chappes* below *Normandie* and above *Vaubecourt* as the highest *petit-vieux*. Yet by 1635, *Chappes* (now *Nerestang* again) was only the third most senior regiment, below *Rambures* and *Maugiron* (previously *Bourg*), whilst a document from 1666 has *Rambures*, *Castelnau* (formerly *Nerestang*/*Chappes*) and *Auvergne* (previously *Bourg*) all declared equal in hierarchy.[69] Even this document, however, did not fully end the disputes over regimental seniority, which continued to rumble on into the eighteenth century.

Whether it had intended to do so or not, the monarchy had thus created an attractive system of military service due to the emergence of permanent military offices within the standing army, and the crown now had a corps of officers at its disposal who were closely tied to royal patronage structures. Indeed, the disputes over the hierarchy of the new regiments are perhaps evidence of the changing horizons of at least a section of the lower and middling nobility, who had begun to believe that their status, honour and prestige could best best be asserted and enhanced *within* the power structures of royal military institutions. How such developments affected the highest strata of the nobility, the *grands*, will be considered in the final two chapters of this thesis.

[68] Daniel, *Milice*, II, p.385.
[69] 'Estat', 2 May 1624, SHDAT $X^{1}5$, n.p.; Hierarchy of regiments, 1635, BnF Cangé, 5, f.278r-282r.

Chapter Five

‘La première charge de l’épée’? The Constable of France, 1593-1626

The first four chapters of this thesis have largely focused upon the relationship between the *petite noblesse*, the *noblesse seconde* and the emergence of the standing army. The remaining two chapters will now look at those members of society who had traditionally held the key to the raising and deployment of military force in France, the *grands*. Specifically, the following chapters will investigate how two of the monarchy's most prestigious supra-regimental offices, those of Constable and Colonel General of the Infantry, were affected by the rise of the system of permanent regiments in France. More generally, there will be a consideration as to whether a mutation in the nature of the monarchy's military forces led to a change in the relationship between the *grands* and the crown during the early seventeenth century.

The office of Constable was one of the monarchy's oldest and most prestigious military dignities by the period of this dissertation.[1] Indeed, many contemporaries sought to emphasise the power that the position gave to its holder. An anonymous discourse from 1606 stated that the Constable held 'le permier lieu des armées, mene les batailles en labsence du Roy et porter lespée devant luy en ceremonies'.[2] Claude Trabit wrote that the Constable was the 'premier Officier de la Couronne'.[3] Richelieu went one step further in his *Mémoires*, stating that the position was abolished in 1627 as it had become 'très-dommageable, par l'abus de l'absolue autorité qu'elle donnoit des armes du Roi'.[4] Accordingly, the Constable has sometimes been seen as a *charge* which could give its holder, usually a *grand* or at least a noble of significant stature, an amount of influence over royal armed forces which could rival or even trump that of the monarchy itself.

However, a harangue made by Henri IV in 1593, when appointing Henri I de Montmorency-Damville, duc de Montmorency as Constable, gave a more nuanced impression of the actual authority entrusted to the office by the late sixteenth century. Henri IV stated that due to the great divisions within the country, it was necessary to find 'grand et dignes personages' to assist him in the current warfare. As such, the Constable was the king's *lieutenant général*, 'representant nostre personne' in all places, both inside and outside the kingdom. Yet, the Constable was also to ensure that

[1] Daniel listed Constables dating back to the early thirteenth century: Daniel, *Milice*, I, pp. 185-7.
[2] 'Autres discours de rang et precedences', AAE MD 776, f. 206r.
[3] Claude Trabit, *Le pouvoir et jurisdiction de messieurs les connestable et mareschaux de France*, (Paris, 1668), pp. 3-4.
[4] Richelieu, *Mémoires*, I, p. 242.

'noz gens de guerre tant de noz ordonnances que autres' would live in 'bon ordre, police & discipline', whilst also overseeing the payments made to royal soldiers.[5] Thus, certain historians have emphasised how the position was closer to that of an administrator responsible for discipline and certain aspects of military payment, rather than that of an all-encompassing generalissimo of royal forces.[6]

Recent works have advanced an even more limited appraisal of the Constable's authority. David Parrott argued against the view that the Constable's abolition in 1627 was part of Richelieu's drive to reduce the 'excessive power' that the 'great aristocratic commanders' enjoyed over the army. Instead, the fleeting exigencies of factional politics drove the abolition, and the action was not considered as definitive – the office came close to being revived during later political developments in the 1640s and 1650s. Indeed, Parrott's wider comments about the position of Constable were largely disparaging. He stated that the office had been in 'obvious decline since its expedient revival in 1594', and that its 'powers had become vague and narrowly defined' to the extent that it implied 'no specific military function' by the early seventeenth century.[7]

However, Parrott conceded that the Constabulary was still a 'prestigious office' in 1627; had it not been, one might presume that Richelieu would not have bothered with its abolition, temporary or otherwise. Much of the following discussion will thus attempt to investigate more thoroughly the nature of the office of Constable during the early seventeenth century, and, in particular, how it was affected by the new standing army. It will contend that the office was one which continued to be coveted and exalted by even the highest echelons of the French nobility. It could be used as a reward to encourage *grands* to remain in royal service, or as a means by which certain persons could attempt to solidify their ascension to the higher reaches of the French nobility. Yet, the office had few definite powers with relation to the new standing army. As such, the Constable, occupied a slightly odd position by the 1620s, whereby it was the most prestigious military office of the realm, whilst also being, ultimately,

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[5] 'Declaration du Roy du Pouvoir de Monseigneur le duc de Montmorency, pair & connetable de France', BnF Cangé 1, ff. 159v-161.

[6] Trabit, *pouvoir*, pp. 11-28; André Corvisier, 'Les Guerres de Religion, 1559-1598' in P. Contamine and A. Corvisier (eds.), *Histoire militaire de la France*, vol. 1: *Des origines à 1715*, (Paris, 1992), p. 307; Kettering, *Power and Reputation*, pp. 202-3.

[7] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 470. The position was left vacant after the death of Anne, duc de Montmorency from 1567 until 1593, not 1594 as Parrott states. Daniel, *Milice*, I, pp. 184, 186-7; Greengrass, 'Noble Affinities', p. 275.

expendable. Indeed, as the standing army had lessened the monarchy's reliance upon the high nobility for the operation of the royal army, the monarchy and its ministers could dispense with the position if necessary.

I – The Constable's Influence over Royal Military Forces during the 1590s

After Montmorency's accession to the office in 1593, the perception that the Constable was the second-in-command over royal forces held firm for much of the 1590s, as the emergence of the standing army had only begun to crystallise. Indeed, the Constable received correspondence asking for his favour in a variety of royal military affairs. For example, Montmorency received several letters in 1597 and 1598 from Lesdiguières about the campaign he was undertaking against the duke of Savoy. Lesdiguières stated in March 1597 that he had written to the king about delays in receiving finance for infantry levies, but that he had felt it was prudent to write to Montmorency as well as he was the 'principal pilotte' in matters such as these. Indeed, in a subsequent letter, Lesdiguières wrote that he now had a 'tres grande obligation' towards Montmorency, as he had apparently moved to ensure that Lesdiguières received the funds he had requested. However, two subsequent letters from July 1597 contain references to the money not having been received, and by October Lesdiguières was still complaining of the financial advances that he'd been forced to make from his own credit, in order to sustain the army in the field.[8]

Whether Montmorency fully fulfilled Lesdiguières' requests or not, these letters reflected the perception amongst the *grands* that Montmorency's favour was an important factor in the distribution of royal military finance due to his position as Constable, and that nobles could become indebted to Montmorency through his assistance. Indeed, correspondence between other *grands* and Montmorency demonstrates the extent of his influence over financial affairs. In 1596, Charles de Gontaut, duc de Biron asked that Montmorency favour Burgundy in the 'lestat des garnisons' that was currently being drawn up for that year.[9] Nevers wrote to Montmorency in May 1598 to try and ensure that the peace treaty with Spain did not

[8] Lesdiguières to Montmorency, 29 March, 30 April, 9 July, 12 July, BnF Ms.Fr. 3578, ff. 60r, 67r, 71r, 73r; Lesdiguières to Montmorency, 18 October 1597, ACL, I, p. 314.
[9] Biron to Montmorency, 17 January 1596, BnF Ms.Fr. 3578, f. 46r.

lead to the under-funding of Champagne's garrisons.[10] Henry de Bourbon, duc de Montpensier even wrote to Montmorency in June 1597 to ask him to intercede with the king and gain some form of relief from the *taille* for the inhabitants of 'mon pais de Beaujollais jointz avec ceux de Lyonnois'. His justification was the 'miseres' that the people of these areas had suffered 'durant ces guerres', displaying how Montpensier tried to give a military aspect to this request.[11] Yet, the letter also demonstrated how Montmorency's authority as Constable would appear to have sprawled over into a wider influence over general taxation by 1597.

Montmorency also appears to have maintained some form of relationship with certain regimental officers within the standing army. A letter from 'Campagnol' in June 1598, asked Montmorency to ensure that a *montre* was paid to the Boulogne garrison. Given the location, one can presume that this letter was written by Bertrand Patras, sieur de Campaigno, the *Gardes* captain, or at least a member of his family.[12] A letter to Montmorency from Bernard de Cassagnet, sieur de Tilladet, another *Gardes* captain, requested assistance in the recovery of a debt his family was owed.[13] Antoine de La Grange de Montigny, sieur d'Arquien, wrote to Montmorency in October 1597 to apologise for his absence from the siege of Amiens. The tone of the letter suggests a relationship may have existed between the La Grange and Montmorency, which might have helped Arquien achieve his promotion to the position of *lieutenant colonel* of the *Gardes* during this period.[14]

In addition, Montmorency had relatives within the *vieux*. One of his illegitimate sons, Annibal de Montmorency, can be found as a captain in *Navarre* on muster rolls from 1598 and 1610, and on the 1597, 1610 and 1620 *états*.[15] Annibal's lieutenant on *revues* of 1598 and 1610, David de Laur, may well have been a relative of another *Navarre* captain, Jacques de Laur, thus demonstrating a connection between the Montmorency and other families in *Navarre*.[16] A separate branch of the dynasty

[10] Nevers to Montmorency, 12 May 1598, BnF Ms.Fr. 3582, f. 80r.
[11] Montpensier to Montmorency, June 1597, BnF Ms.Fr. 3582, f.11r.
[12] 'Campagnol' to Montmorency, 1 June 1598, AMC, L, XLII, f. 1.
[13] Sieur de Tilladet to Montmorency, 10 July 1598, Ibid., f. 212.
[14] 'Anthoine La Grange sieur d'Arquien' to Montmorency, October 1597, AMC, L, XXXVII, f. 216.
[15] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1511); *revue*, BnF Ms.Fr 25833 (1511); BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (28). On the relation between Montmorency and Annibal: Rohan, *Mémoires*, I, p. 382; Courcelles, *Histoire Généalogique et Héraldique*, II, Montmorency section, p. 10.
[16] Jacques de Laur can be found on several reviews between 1597 and 1611, and on the 1597, 1610 and 1620 *états* as a *Navarre* captain. He would go on to die whilst serving in royal forces during the siege of Montauban. BnF Ms.Fr 15832 (1393); BnF Ms.Fr 25832 (1393); BnF 25835 (1692); BnF 25839 (1991);

can also be found in the *vieux*: Josias de Montmorency-Bours, a distant cousin of Montmorency, who held a captaincy in the *Gardes* from some point in the 1590s until his death in 1616.[17]

Finally, the Constable's perceived authority over the *gendarmerie* also contributed to his elevated status within royal military structures.[18] Whilst this branch of arms had undergone a significant decline during the second half of the sixteenth century,[19] many members of the *grands* continued to hold positions of command within the *gendarmerie*, and directed requests towards Montmorency with regard to their companies. Some appealed for money. La Châtre asked Montmorency in January 1596 to 'avoir memoire de moy en mes affaires et spéciallement pour lentretien de ma compagnye'.[20] In 1596, Biron, amongst other requests, asked that Montmorency divert funds towards his *gendarme* company.[21] Nobles also made requests to Montmorency concerning both the composition of *gendarme* companies, and the staff who administered them. In December 1596, La Châtre asked that a certain sieur du Bois was maintained as a *commissaire des guerres* over the *gendarmerie* despite the retrenchments of officers that were occurring in this area. This appears to have granted, as, in 1601, La Châtre asked Montmorency to ensure that du Bois was maintained in his position for another year.[22] Indeed, these requests continued into the 1600s, when even *princes du sang* wrote to Montmorency with requests for the *gendarmerie*. In September 1611, the prince de Conti asked Montmorency to ensure that the 'Sieur la Clere' who had previously been a 'commissaire en ma compagnie' be continued in his charge of doing the 'monstres de ma compagnies'.[23] Thus, as many

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BnF 25843 (86); Louis Batcave, 'La maison du roy a Orthez', *Bulletin de la société de Borda*, 16, (1891), p. 54; Correspondence of a M. de Vaubourg, 25 April, 1686, AN $G^7$113, ff. 102r-104v.

[17]The Bours-Montmorency line of the family was also Protestant: Haag, *La France protestante*, VII, pp. 492-3.

[18] Indeed, Richelieu cited the Constable's control of the revenues of the *ordinaire des guerres*, the treasury which had responsibility for the payment of the *gendarmerie*, as a contributory factor to the abolition of the *charge*. Parrott has disputed this contention, due to the limited proportion of royal military expenditure that the *ordinaire* represented: Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 469.

[19] It has been beyond the realms of this thesis to enter into a sustained consideration of the changing nature of the *gendarmerie* during the Wars of Religion. However, based on the correspondence received by Montmorency, and the existing historiography on the subject, it is hard to disagree with Greengrass' assertion that the *gendarmerie* was a 'battered remnant' of its former glories by the 1590s. Mark Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV: the Struggle for Stability*, (2nd ed., 1995, London), pp. 222-226; Wood, *King's Army*, pp. 144-152; Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, pp. 68-78.

[20] La Châtre to Montmorency, 17 January, 1596, *Lettres inédites du Maréchal Claude de La Châtre (1536-1614)* (ed.) Baudouin-Lalondre, (Bourges, 1895), p. 229.

[21] Biron to Montmorency, 17 January 1596, BnF Ms.Fr., 3578, ff. 46r-v.

[22] La Châtre to Montmorency, 21 December, 1596, 19 December 1601, Châtre, *Lettres*, pp. 247, 284.

[23] Prince de Conti to Montmorency, September 1611, BnF Cangé, 7, f. 182r.

grands continued to maintain *gendarme* companies into the seventeenth century, Montmorency's position of influence over these units gave him an enviable position within the 'economy of favour' that existed amongst the military nobility.

Thus, it would appear that in the years immediately after his appointment as Constable, Montmorency enjoyed a considerable degree of authority with regard to the operation of royal forces. Not only did members of the *grands* frequently address him with their military requests, Montmorency also held a degree of influence over the *vieux*. Thus, royal military offices existed which could help tie even the highest members of the nobility more closely into royal service, thanks to the patronage opportunities attached to such *charges*. However, the position as Constable did not guarantee Montmorency a position of pre-eminence within royal military forces. Indeed, much of the authority wielded by the Constable in the 1590s was largely the result of the favour in which Montmorency was held by Henri IV. From the late 1590s, other figures were gradually able to usurp the prominent military position that Montmorency had previously enjoyed, due to the relative lack of defined military functions that the position of Constable entailed.

II – Commander-in-Chief? Sully, Villeroy, and the Marginalisation of the Constable, c.1597-1614.

The emergence of the standing army, combined with the rising importance of artillery to the conduct of early modern warfare, meant that the Constable became progressively marginalised by those who held royal offices possessing more defined powers over these arms of service. Indeed, between 1597 and 1614, the position of the Constable became clear: it remained a coveted and prestigious office amongst the nobility, but one which was increasingly expendable in relation to the operation of the royal army.

These trends began to come into focus during the siege of Amiens in 1597. Initially, at least in an administrative sense, Montmorency appeared to fulfil the traditionally conceived role of the Constable being the king's second-in-command over the army, taking the lead in the organisation of troops and finance for the siege. These tasks appear to have superseded any tactical or strategic responsibilities that Montmorency might have fulfilled. Indeed, by early April the duc de Biron was commanding the royal forces at Amiens, with both Henri and Montmorency searching

for finance until the start of the summer.[24] From late June, however, Sully was given an ever-growing responsibility for finding the money and supplies necessary for the royal army at Amiens.[25] This included issues relating to the supply of the royal artillery, despite the fact that Sully was not yet its *Grand maître*. By early July, Henri asked Sully not to leave Paris for Burgundy to deal with personal business, as it would bring 'trop de prejudice' to royal affairs. As Henri put it to Sully by mid-July, without Sully's presence on the *Conseil des finances* 'je desespererois du payement du cinquiesme mois de mon armée'.[26] Whilst it is easy to overestimate the role played by Sully in 1597, Henri himself clearly felt that Sully's contributions had been vital to the siege's success.[27]

However, neither his pre-eminence nor the Constable's marginalisation was guaranteed in late 1597. For one, Montmorency had been present for much of the latter part of the siege with Henri, thus accounting for his diminished role in finding military finance. Sully never occupied a position of critical military leadership during the siege, despite the impression that he would later give in his memoirs.[28] Moreover, the Constable continued to be tasked with vital military operations. After the successful conclusion of the siege at Amiens, for instance, he was ordered to guarantee the security of the north-eastern frontier, whilst Henri undertook a campaign in Brittany against the *Ligue*. Henri thus gave Montmorency considerable authority over one of the most heavily militarised areas of the French kingdom, stating that 'Je remets à vostre prudence ce qui est requis pour la seurété de la dicte frontiere'.[29]

Sully's ascent to a position of considerable influence over royal military structures was only achieved due to his acquisition of two key offices in 1598 and 1599: that of *Surintendant des finances*, and *Grand maître de l'artillerie*. Sully's promotion to the *charge* of *Surintendant des finances* in 1598 gave him control over the drawing up of the *état du roi*, which detailed royal income and how it would be

[24] Henri IV to Montmorency, 24 March, 5 April, 6 April, 8 May, 4 June, 9 June, 10 June, 13 June, 15 June 1597, LMHIV, IV, pp. 717-718, 732-734, 735, 760-1, 775-776, 778-781, 783, 784-5
[25] This was due, in no small part, to the esteem in which he was already held by Henri IV: Barbiche and Dainville-Barbiche, *Sully*, pp. 23-73.
[26] Henri IV to Sully, 13 July 1597, LMHIV, IV, p.810.
[27] For letters which emphasise the importance that Henri ascribed to Sully's ability to organise and find finance for the siege, see Henri IV to Sully, 2 July, 6 July, 8 July, 27 July, 28 July, 10 August, 12 August, 18 August 1597, Ibid, IV, pp.794, 802-4, 814-6, 822-3, 827, 828-9.
[28]Sully, *Mémoires*, I, pp.247-255.
[29] Henri IV to Montmorency, 15 March , 1 April 1598, LMHIV, IV, pp. 929-30, 944. Quote from p.929.

spent.[30] As *Grand maître*, Sully had authority over all artillery personnel, and oversaw the production and maintenance of artillery pieces and munitions. Holding both positions allowed Sully to divert funds to the artillery after he assumed the position of *Grand maître de l'artillerie* in 1599. Thus, in contrast to the general retrenchment of royal military spending that occurred after 1598, the artillery was notably expanded.[31] This process was partly driven by political considerations; as Rowlands put it, Sully and Henri 'recognised the centrality of artillery to royal power'. To help maintain domestic peace, Henri increasingly sought to monopolise the monarchy's right to own and use artillery, whilst, in terms of actual conflict, effective artillery was recognised as vital in a period dominated by siege warfare.[32] Overall, the position of dominance over royal finance and the artillery enjoyed by Sully allowed him to overtake the Constable and achieve a position of supremacy over the new standing army, and thus the royal military as a whole, during the 1600s.

The first real indication of Sully's increased importance to royal military forces would occur during the Savoy War of 1600-1601. Again, one must not uncritically accept the heroic role Sully attributed to himself in his memoirs. He was not present with royal forces at the start of the campaign, nor was he given command of either of the two main army groups that launched the initial assault on Savoy in mid-August 1600. These were commanded by Biron and Lesdiguières.[33] They would remain the leading figures in royal forces for most of the campaign, to the extent that a dispute emerged between the two regarding who should enjoy overall pre-eminence in command.

This disagreement may not have arisen if Montmorency had been present. The king clearly wanted Montmorency to participate in the war, but a 'doulz de genouil' prevented the Constable from serving in the campaign, and the king ultimately

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[30] Barbiche and Dainville-Barbiche, *Sully*, pp.84-88, 107-8; David Buisseret, *Sully and the Growth of Centralised Government in France*, (London, 1968), pp.56-73.

[31] Barbiche and Dainville-Barbiche, *Sully*, p. 116. The *Actes de Sully* shows the considerable number of contracts Sully entered into to acquire powder, munitions, and guns between 1600 and 1610: *Les actes de Sully passes au nom du Roi de 1600 à 1610*, (ed.) F. De Mallevoüe, (Paris, 1911)..

[32] Guy Rowlands, 'The Monopolisation of Military Power in France, 1515 to 1715', in Ronald G Asch, Wulf Eckart Voß and Martin Wrede (eds.), *Frieden und Krieg in der Frühen Neuzeit. Die europäische Staatenordnung et die außereuropäische Welt*, (Munich, 2001), pp.147-148; Buisseret, *Sully*, pp. 143-153. For Sully's overall financial policy, see: Greengrass, *Henri IV*, pp.131-148; Bonney, *King's Debts*, pp. 54-72. For the importance of sieges to warfare in the first half of the seventeenth century, see Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 56-59.

[33] Anonymous account of the Savoy war, BnF Ms.Fr. 7138, ff. 458r-v; Henri IV to Montmorency, 14 August, 1600, LMHIV, V, pp. 273-4; Charles Dufayard, *Le connétable de Lesdiguières*, (Paris, 1892), pp. 236-7.

accepted that Montmorency would not be able to play an active role in the war.[34] Yet it is far from clear that his office would have guaranteed him a position of command pre-eminence had he served. In July 1600, Villeroy had written to Montmorency to inform him that Henri IV had already decided that royal forces would be split into two army groups, one of which the king would command personally (but in reality would largely be under Lesdiguières' management), and the other under Biron.[35] Whether this would have changed if Montmorency had been present is debatable, especially given the strong ties Biron and Lesdiguières had to both the region and some of the auxiliary troops used in the campaign. Indeed, the tone of Villeroy's letters suggests that whilst Henri desired Montmorency presence during the campaign, in order that he could give advice to the king, the Constable would not necessarily be the commander-in-chief of royal forces.

Once the war had begun, it does not appear that the Constable played a considerable role in military organisation from afar. Whilst the king maintained an active correspondence with Montmorency throughout the campaign, Henri IV's main concern was to ensure that the Constable used his influence in Languedoc to levy local forces. In July, he asked Montmorency to muster his *gendarme* company, and ensure it was ready to serve in Savoy. He also asked Montmorency to help organise 'toutes les aultres trouppes et compagnies qui se trouveront derriere' and that they 's'acheminent en deçà le plus tost que faire se pourra'. Henri's correspondence with the Constable for the rest of the campaign was mainly concerned with either keeping him abreast of events in Savoy, or asking him to attend to Languedoc's own military affairs, such as payments to the province's garrisons. The Constable does appear to have been involved in the organisation of royal forces during the post-war demobilisation, with Henri favourably noting that Montmorency had offered troops from *Navarre* to Biron in order to garrison Bourg.[36] Overall, however, Montmorency played a limited role during the Savoy War.

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[34] Villeroy to Montmorency, 22 August and 13 September 1600, BnF Ms.Fr. 3591, ff. 120r, 142r; Henri IV to Montmorency, LMHIV, V, p. 274.
[35] Villeroy to Montmorency, 18 July 1600, BnF Ms.Fr. 3591, f. 117r.
[36] Henri to Montmorency, 12 July, 14 August, 16 August, 1 September, 25 October 1600, 10 February 1601, LMHIV, V, pp. 250, 273-5, 293-5, 330-2, 376-7. Montmorency's post-war influence can also be seen in the letters written to him by Lesdiguières, in which he sought the Constable's advice on how to garrison captured Savoyard territories, Lesdiguières to Montmorency, 1 February, 11 February 1601, ACL, I, pp. 366, 368.

By contrast, Sully's position as *Surintendant des finances* gave him a considerable level of authority over royal forces during the war. It was a measure of his growing importance that, in late June, Henri had entrusted Sully with the movements of key royal units – such as the *Gardes*, light-cavalry companies and the artillery – to Lyon. Days after the campaign began, Henri asked Sully to ensure that the army received its *montres*, and to provide for other expenses, 'auxquelles nous n'avons aucun moyen de pourveoir sans vous [Sully]'. Later in the campaign, he was placed in charge of ensuring logistical supply to certain captured fortresses, and was given significant responsibilities relating to the army's demobilisation, including the reduction in size of the *vieux* regiments.[37] Equally as important for Sully's military influence was his command of the artillery, especially given that The Savoy War consisted almost entirely of sieges. Whilst not present at every siege, Sully's management of the artillery was crucial to the capture of several key fortresses, and, critically, much of the campaign's overall glory was ascribed to him in many contemporary pamphlets.[38]

In mid-October 1600, Henri had written to Sully to tell him that he held 'les deux plus importantes et utiles charges du Royaume', through his authority over royal finances and artillery.[39] The Savoy War does much to bear out this contention, as the offices allowed him to oversee the means by which the royal army could deliver its punches. Thus, over the next nine years Sully, rather than the Constable, essentially became Henri's second-in-command over the royal army. This was in no small part due to the vague powers enjoyed by the *charge* of Constable compared to the specific functions with which Sully's positions were endowed.

Thus, on occasions where conflict did arise between 1601 and 1610, the Constable played only a marginal role. In the Sedan campaign of 1606, Montmorency's only involvement appears to have been when Henri wrote to the Constable in mid-March, asking him to send his *gendarme* company, and to come to the army if his health permitted it.[40] During the organisation of the proposed 1610 campaign, the only military matter that Henri discussed with the Constable was to ensure that the levying of troops in Languedoc went smoothly. Sully was clearly in

[37] Henri IV to Sully, 26 June, 18 August, 19 November 1600, 20 March 1601, LMHIV, V, pp. 244, 277, 352, 396-7
[38] Stéphane Gal, *Lesdiguières: Prince des Alpes et connétable de France*, (Grenoble, 2007), p.85; Buisseret, *Sully*, pp.156-157.
[39] Henri IV to Sully, 'vers la mi-Octobre' 1600, LMHIV, V, p. 323.
[40] Henri IV to Montmorency, 24 March 1606, Ibid., VI, p. 591.

charge of the administration of the main force being assembled to attack in the Empire, with Lesdiguières given responsibility over the smaller army which was to operate in northern Italy.[41] After Henri's death, Claude de La Châtre was placed in command of around 8,000 royal troops which were sent to the siege of Jülich in August 1610. Montmorency played no part in this campaign, and Sully, in the months immediately following Henri's death, was still the most influential figure in the military administration.[42] After La Châtre returned from Jülich, he even stood in for Montmorency as Constable at Louis XIII's coronation in October 1610, possibly in reward for the successful conduct of French troops in the Empire.[43] Even after Sully's disgrace in 1611, the Constable would not regain a position of dominance over royal military forces before his death in 1614.

It could also be contended that the Constable's authority over royal military affairs suffered from the growth in power of certain Secretaries of State.[44] From the 1590s, one Secretary, Villeroy, was gradually able to monopolise control over correspondence with French ambassadors thanks to the favour he held with Henri IV, thereby effectively turning himself into the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.[45] As no similar specialisation occurred in terms of a different Secretary gaining primary responsibility over the conduct of war until at least the late 1610s, Villeroy also gained a degree of influence over the royal military before this date. This development may well have eroded some of Montmorency's authority as Constable, even in terms of the *gendarmerie*. For instance, Montmorency wrote to both Sully and Villeroy in 1606 to ask them to favour the appointment of a 'sieur le Noble' to the Queen's *gendarme* company.[46] On at least one occasion, Villeroy also seems to have acted as an intermediary between the king and Montmorency during the drawing up of the *états*

[41] Henri IV to Montmorency, 20 March 1610, Henri IV to Sully, 27 February, 8 March, 10 March, Ibid., pp. 877, 851, 855, 856; Buisseret, *Sully*, p.161; Dufayard, *Lesdiguières*, pp. 327-335.
[42] 'Mémoire et receuil', BnF Dupuy 193, f. 112v.
[43] Paul Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain, *Mémoires concernant les affaires de France sous la régence de Marie de Médicis [...]*, in Joseph-François Michaud and Jean-Joseph-François Poujoulat (eds.), *Nouvelle Collection des mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu'à la fin du XVIIIe siècle – 2e série*, (10 vols., Paris, 1837-1838), V, p. 305.
[44] For the development of the secretaries of state, see Orest A. Ranum, *Richelieu and the Councillors of State of Louis XIII: A Study of the Secretaries of State and Superintendents of Finance in the Ministry of Richelieu, 1635-1642*, (Oxford, 1963), pp. 49-58. For a more specific discussion of the Secretary of State for War, see Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 367-373.
[45] After being dismissed and alienated by Henri III in 1588, Villeroy had joined the *Ligue*, and only rejoined royal service as a Secretary of State in 1594, after the conversion of Henri IV. Edmund H. Dickerman, *Bellièvre and Villeroy: Power in France under Henri III and Henri IV*, (Providence, 1971), pp.5-6; Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 367-370.
[46] Montmorency to Sully, 11 July 1606, AMC, L, LXXXV, f. 97.

for garrisons, even if Montmorency's 'advis' for the distribution of funds was usually accepted.[47]

Five years after Montmorency's death, a regulation of 1619 was promulgated to try to settle the disputes between the various secretaries over who held authority for correspondence concerned with warfare.[48] It asserted that one secretary of state should have responsibility over at least the 'premiere et principale armée' in any campaign, but that the authority over any other forces would be based on which Secretary had power over the geographical department in which the force was operating. More pertinently for this chapter, the regulation stated that, 'les provisions des estats et offices de connestable grand maitre de lartillerie et colonel general de l'infanterie seront faicte par le secretaire de la guerre'.[49] Whilst the position of Constable was vacant in 1619, the regulation thus signalled that any future Constable, along with the other great offices of the crown, would at least have to liaise more closely with one of the Secretaries of State in the future.

Thus, between 1597 and 1614, Montmorency was not able to exercise the pre-eminent level of power over royal forces which has often been ascribed to the Constable. Whilst Montmorency took a leading role in the events at Amiens, he played only a slight role in the Savoy War, the Sedan Campaign, and both the planning and execution of the Jülich campaign of 1610. This relative marginalisation was partly due to prosaic factors, such as ill-health. But, it is also reasonably clear that the relative lack of formal powers enjoyed by the Constable over the new standing army allowed other figures to usurp his position of influence over royal military structures. In particular, Sully's two offices of *Surintendant des finances* and *Grand maître de l'artillerie* allowed him to more effectively control both the royal infantry and the artillery. This, coupled with the growing royal favour in which Sully was held from the late 1590s, gradually allowed him to become the most influential figure within the royal army, due to the overwhelming importance of these two branches of arms.

[47] Villeroy to Montmorency, 26 October and 27 November 1599, BnF Ms.Fr. 3580, ff. 29r, 31r.
[48] Ranum, *Richelieu*, p.53.
[49] 'Reglement de monsieurs les secretaries d'estat sur le fait de la guerre', 29 April, 1619, AAE MD 772, ff. 83r-84r;

III – Remnants of Prestige: the Office of Constable by 1614

The influence of the Constable was not, however, completely marginalised during the first two decades of the seventeenth century. Montmorency's authority was demonstrably strengthened due to certain specific functions that the *charge* entailed, but also due to the overall gravitas that it continued to give the holder within the economy of prestige and favour then existing among the French nobility. Indeed, had it been a position of no consequence, it would be hard to explain why the office was revived in 1621.

Firstly, the Constable exercised a degree of authority through the jurisdiction that he and the *maréchaux de France* held at the *Table de Marbre* in the *Palais de justice de Paris*. The authority that could be exercised through this body was theoretically quite considerable, covering a variety of matters relating to military discipline and payment.[50] In reality, the Constable's jurisdiction often translated itself into requests for the arbitration of disputes between soldiers from a range of social levels. These included the *grands*, such as the 1602 disagreement between the prince de Joinville and Charles de Valois, comte d'Auvergne.[51] Other nobles of lesser social standing, such as the future *mestre de camp* Charles de Rambures, wrote to the Constable when they encountered difficulties with the enforcement of ordinances pertaining to military matters, such as the prohibition against carrying firearms.[52] Thus, the Constable continued to be looked to as a source of adjudication on military discipline and disputes, in conjunction with the tribunal of *maréchaux*, who continued to exercise such an authority after the Constable's abolition.[53]

The ambiguous nature of the Constable's powers could also, occasionally, benefit the position. Petitioners asked for Montmorency's favour over a variety of military issues, on which they hoped he could bring to bear his influence as Constable. For example, due to the almost complete lack of military hospitals and veteran care in this period, one area in which Montmorency's support was constantly requested was the welfare of old and/or crippled soldiers. Condé, Épernon, and Bouillon all wrote to the Constable during the 1600s to ask him to place certain soldiers on the 'roolle des

[50] Trabit, *Pouvoir*, pp. 20-29.
[51] 'Recit de "l'accommodement faict par monsieur le connestable de Montmorency et Monsieur le duc de Mayenne entre messieurs le prince de Joinville et le comte d'Auvergne', 1 May 1602, and Montmorency to Henri IV, March 1602, BnF Ms.Fr. 3585, ff. 16r, 18r.
[52] Rambures to Montmorency, 23 June 1600, Ibid., ff. 81r.
[53] See, for instance, 'Accord fait par les "marechaux de France" ...', 31 May 1627, Ibid., f. 93.

estropiez', whereby they would be granted pensions reflecting their former royal military service and subsequent old-age or disabilities.[54] Presumably these soldiers were clients of the *grands* who wrote on their behalf. So thanks to the Constable's perceived influence over the list of pensions granted to *estropiés*, he became involved with the high nobility's efforts to reward their clients for military service.

Despite the growth in Sully's power, petitioners also continued to ask the Constable for his favour in matters of royal military finance during the 1600s. In 1601, Bouillon asked Montmorency to help ensure both that the payment of the Sedan garrison occurred, and that officials chosen by Bouillon would be allowed to oversee the process. Interestingly, it seems that Villeroy was in charge of drawing up the actual *état* for the Sedan garrison, and that Bouillon merely wanted Montmorency to use his influence to speed up the payment process.[55] Similarly, Charles de Lorraine, duc de Guise, wrote a series of desperate letters to Montmorency in early 1601, in which he asked for assistance in the payment of troops who had been placed in Provence in the aftermath of the Savoy War.[56] While his influence over these two matters might only have been informal, the Constable appears to have held some formal powers over royal military finance, including the *extraordinaire des guerres*. In 1603, La Châtre told Montmorency that a 'sieur de Sedenay' had been made *contrôleur général de l'extraordinaire des guerres*. As all such offices, and *commissaires des guerres*, were ultimately responsible to the *Table de Marbre*, Sedenay had to present himself and make his oath before the Constable who would then admit him to the *charge*.[57] All three examples thus depict members of the military nobility who placed themselves into Montmorency's debt due to the formal and informal influence he wielded as Constable over areas of the military budget.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there remained a perception that the Constable remained the premier military office of the crown, and that it conferred a substantial degree of gravitas to its holder. That the position could benefit its holder in this manner can be seen by Sully's attempts, from the late 1600s, to secure the future ownership of the *charge*. In 1608, Henri offered Sully both the position of Constable and the *gouvernement* of Normandy, when they became vacant, on condition that both

[54]Épernon to Montmorency, 21 February 1608, BnF Ms.Fr. 3550, f. 89r; Bouillon to Montmorency, 23 June 1608, f. 96r; Condé to Montmorency, March 1608, BnF Cangé, 1, f. 180r.
[55] Bouillon to Montmorency, 21 February 1601, BnF Ms.Fr. 3596, f. 31r.
[56] Duc de Guise, 18 February and 23 Feburary 1601, BnF Ms.Fr. 3582, ff. 19r-v, 22r-v.
[57] La Châtre to Monmorency, August 1603, La Châtre, *Lettres*, p. 301.

he and his son converted to Catholicism. Sully refused this offer, and instead began a campaign of self-promotion to demonstrate his stature in society and importance to government, in order that the king would grant him the position without having to convert.[58] Sully's attempts to obtain the constabulary did not come to fruition before his disgrace in 1611. Whilst it is notable that Sully refused to abjure his faith to receive the position, the fact that he desired the office is a testament to its enduring appeal to the higher French nobility by the mid-1610s. Whilst being *Grand maître de l'artillerie* had given Sully a considerable degree of tangible power over the royal military machine, being Constable gave its holder a degree of symbolic gravitas which was greater than any other royal military office. In Sully's case, the acquisition of the constabulary would have crowned his ascension in influence over the royal army. Indeed, in the ten years which followed Montmorency's death, the office maintained much of its symbolic capital within French society, and became a potent factor in the political machinations of the period.

IV – The Attempt to Acquire Gravitas: Luynes as Constable, 1621.

Thus, despite the office's lack of formal powers over the new standing army, the position of Constable continued to be seen as a potential means to bolster the social and political standing of members of the high nobility during the regency of Marie de Médicis. As such, several figures attempted to acquire the position. In late 1610, Condé had requested the *survivance* of the *charge* but was rebuked; after being appointed *maréchal de France* in 1613, Concini also had ambitions towards the office.[59] Indeed, that the *charge* was left vacant after Montmorency's death in 1614 until Luynes' appointment in 1621 may in itself have been a political calculation. Montmorency had not secured the *survivance* of the *charge* for his son before his death. To grant the position to any other noble family might have provoked the ire of those who had been denied.[60] In particular, the appointment of Concini to the role could only have strengthened the revolts against the regency government that emerged after 1614. The absence of a Constable between 1614 and 1621 was thus possibly a testament to the position's continuing gravitas, due to its capacity to provoke

[58] Barbiche and Dainville-Barbiche, *Sully*, pp. 309-316.
[59] Estrées, *Mémoires*, p.26; Kettering, *Power and Reputation*, p. 102.
[60] Rowlands has made a similar suggestion for why the position of Colonel General of the Infantry was not filled after 1661, Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, p. 189.

discontent amongst unsuccessful pretenders to the *charge* in an already fractious political climate.

That the office of Constable continued to be viewed as one of the realm's most prestigious *charges* after 1614 can be seen through a debate that was sparked in 1620 due to rumours of its re-establishment. One pamphlet, written by 'un bon Francois,' appeared implacably hostile to the position, based on the perception that the Constable enjoyed considerable authority. The Constable would cause royal 'forces' and 'commandemens' to be parcelled out, causing the 'manifeste affoiblissement' of the monarchy. Moreover, deciding who should receive the position was problematic. The title could not be given to a member of the lesser nobility, as this would infuriate members of the *grands*, who were the only figures worthy of holding the office. Yet to grant the position to a *grand* could increase their authority to a dangerous degree, and exacerbate the factionalism that currently riddled the country. Altogether, the position of Constable could threaten both the monarchy, and wider social stability.[61] In response to this pamphlet, another anonymous author defended the office. They stated that previous Constables had proved themselves vital to the organisation of French forces, and that a Constable could never become mightier than the king, due to the inherent grandeur of the monarchy. Whilst 'grands Seigneurs' were preferable, the author asserted that previous monarchs had given the office to lesser gentlemen. The only caveats the pamphlet placed on appointment were that the king should make the decision himself, and, notably, that Protestants such as Bouillon or Lesdiguières should not be allowed to hold the *charge*, as they practised a religion 'contraire à celle de nostre Roy'.[62]

Whether they agreed on the need to re-establish the position or not, the pamphlets demonstrated a shared belief in the power and prestige of the Constable. Neither text went into detail about the exact extent of the Constable's authority, or his relationship to the new standing army, save for rather generic assertions regarding his position as the second-in-command of royal forces after the king. Yet, the overall perception that the Constable remained a position that could potentially grant its holder a leading role in royal military forces is the key to understanding why Luynes,

[61] 'L'Advis au Roy, sur le restablissement de l'office de Connestable', 1620, BnF Cangé 1, ff. 186r-193v.
[62] 'Response au livre intitules advis au Roy sur le restablissement de la charge de Connestable', 1620, Ibid., ff. 194r-200v.

the royal favourite during the late 1610s and early 1620s, was appointed to the position in April 1621.

As Kettering has argued, 'the balance of power' in the relationship between Louis and Luynes probably rested in Luynes' favour in early 1621. He may well have demanded the position of Constable as a condition for accompanying Louis in the campaign.[63] Moreover, Luynes also had clients on the council of state, and the support of prominent figures such as Condé, for his appointment.[64] The machinations by which Luynes' acquired the *charge* are less significant than why he sought to acquire it. Whilst he enjoyed significant royal favour by early 1621, and had been made a duke and councillor of state, without any military experience or offices he could not automatically claim a leading role in any proposed military campaign. This was crucial, as it was predicted in early 1621 that the Midi campaign could last for several months. Luynes knew that if he was separated from the king for this length of time, his position as favourite would come under serious threat. The acquisition of the position of Constable thus allowed him to take up a significant role within the military high command during the 1621 campaign. Overall, Luynes' appointment, and the extravagant ceremony which accompanied it, was not only to 'gain the respect of the *grands*', as Kettering has contended, but was an attempt by Luynes to prove that he had become a *grand* himself, capable of leading royal campaigns.[65]

Unfortunately for Luynes, precisely because the office of Constable *was* still viewed as an extremely prestigious office, his appointment was viewed by many as a travesty. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Henri IV had stated that it was necessary that the Constable should be a 'bon, grand & notable personage, capable & experimenté au faict de la guerre & autres affaires de nostredit royaume'.[66] Luynes did not fit this description in 1621. In a quip which demonstrated the prestige in which contemporaries held the charge, the comte de Brienne stated that 'l'on regarda comme une chose bien nouvelle qu'un homme qui n'avoit jamais tiré l'epée pour le service du Roi fût élevé à *la première charge de l'épée*'.[67] As Fontenay-Mareuil put it, Luynes did not have a reputation as a 'grand capitaine', and his

[63] Kettering, *Power and Reputation*, p. 167.
[64] Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*, p. 157.
[65] Kettering, *Power and Reputation*, p.168.
[66] 'Declaration du Roy', BnF Cangé 1, f. 160r.
[67] Brienne, *Mémoires*, I, p. 350. My emphasis.

appointment to such a 'haute dignité' was widely condemned.[68] Brienne would also criticise Luynes' actions as Constable, stating that instead of 'tenir au camp comme connetable', he merely presided over councils far behind the royal army's siege lines, comfortably out of danger.[69] Even Kettering, in her attempt to prove that Luynes was 'not responsible for the failure of the siege of Montauban', conceded that he was 'militarily inexperienced [...] and his overall performance as Constable was poor'.[70]

Despite these criticisms, acquiring the office of Constable did allow Luynes to play a leading role in the campaign – the primary reason why he had sought the office. Indeed, Brienne's portrayal of Luynes as a 'desk-general' is not entirely fair. At Saint-Jean-d'Angély, Luynes took part in the final assault on the town, whilst at Montauban he inspected royal trenches, observed enemy attacks at close-quarters, and commanded one of the three royal army groups. He may not have consistently been the heroic military leader that certain contemporaries expected of a Constable, but he certainly placed himself in harm's way.[71]

Aside from his role in combat, Luynes was able to exercise a variety of 'advisory and administrative' duties during the campaign deriving from his office.[72] Luynes ordered the execution of three royal soldiers for infractions of the peace after the surrender of Clairac, demonstrating that the Constable had retained a degree of authority over military discipline.[73] He also appears to have influenced military appointments. Bassompierre noted how he, along with 'Crequy, Saint Luc, [and] Termes', had been removed by Luynes from their position as *maréchaux de camp* to make way for the Constable's clients and relatives.[74] Luynes also played a role in the councils of war that were regularly held by the king, and in the overall planning of the campaign.[75] The Constable was also given a leading role in the monarchy's attempts to negotiate the surrender of important Protestant rebels, such as the duc de Rohan.[76]

However, whether Luynes can be considered the commander-in-chief of royal forces directly because of his office is questionable. Once again, the Constable's lack of explicit powers over the new standing army allowed other *grands* to usurp the

[68] Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*, p. 157
[69] Brienne, *Mémoires*, p.356
[70] Kettering, *Power and Reputation*, p. 204.
[71] Ibid., pp. 203-4; Bernard, *Guerres*, p. 193.
[72] Kettering, *Power and Reputation*, p. 202.
[73] Bernard, *Guerres*, p. 195.
[74] Bassompierre, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 286-7.
[75] Ibid., II, pp. 338-40; Bernard, *Guerres*, pp. 163, 193.
[76] Rohan, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 193, 196-7.

Constable's supposed leading position of command. At the siege of Saint-Jean-d'Angély, Épernon's secretary claimed that whilst Luynes was Constable in name, Lesdiguières 'en faisoit toutes les fonctions'.[77] Indeed, Luynes' exact role in command is often difficult to deduce due to the exceedingly chaotic command structure found in the royal army. By the siege of Montauban, Luynes theoretically enjoyed the position of commander-in-chief, as Constable, under the king, the supreme commander. Yet, at Montauban, the army was actually divided into three parts, under three different section commanders: Luynes, Lesdiguières and Henri de Lorraine, duc de Mayenne. The section commanders each had a great degree of authority over their area of the siege, and the level of superiority that Luynes enjoyed over Mayenne and Lesdiguières was negligible. If anything, Mayenne grew in influence during the siege to the extent he was 'acting as commander-in-chief' when he died in September. On his death, Lesdiguières assumed this implicit role, rather than Luynes. Finally, and in a manner reminiscent of Sully during the Savoy War, Schomberg probably wielded a greater influence than Luynes at Montauban due to his position as *Surintendant des finances* and acting *Grand maître de l'artillerie*.[78]

Thus, Luynes' appointment and performance as Constable highlight many of the ambiguities of the office by the early 1620s. On the one hand, many contemporaries continued to view the *charge* as perhaps the most prestigious office of the realm, and one which afforded its holder a prominent role in the high command. Accordingly, much like the lesser nobility within the regiments, Luynes attempted to use and shape royal military office to bolster his and his family's status and interests. Clearly, this effort was not entirely unsuccessful, due to the prominent role that Luynes occupied whilst the army was on campaign. Yet, because the Constable had few defined powers over the most important areas of the royal army by the early seventeenth century, the permanent regiments and the artillery, Luynes did not become commander-in-chief during the campaign of 1621. Indeed, that much of the gravitas of the office was seen in symbolic terms, and as a reward for past military service, further reduced the benefits that Luynes accrued via the *charge*. His tenure as Constable is perhaps best understood through a quote by Arlette Jouanna, which described the king's wider power to shape societal perceptions of nobility. As she put it, 'Le roi pouvait faire un noble; mais il ne pouvait faire un gentilhomme: seuls le temps et la

[77] Girard, *Espernon*, III, p. 267.
[78] Pontis, *Mémoires*, I, p. 287; Kettering, *Power and Reputation*, p. 202.

reconnaissance sociale y parvenaient'.[79] The king could appoint a Constable; but neither he, nor the office, could automatically make a commander-in-chief. For the Constable to be seen as the *true* leader of the new standing army, he had to have already proved his military stature and worth.

V –Lesdiguières as Constable, 1622-1626.

The office of Constable could have remained unfilled after Luynes' death in late 1621, as its relevance to the new military forces under the monarchy's command had quite considerably diminished. As will be seen in the case of Lesdiguières' elevation to the position in mid-1622, that the office was revived says more about its function as a means by which the monarchy attempted to bind certain leading members of the military nobility more closely into its service, through the distribution of a coveted yet largely symbolic reward, rather than the position's status as a necessary part of the high command. Indeed, acquiring the position does not appear to have significantly increased Lesdiguières' military authority, either within or without the royal army.

Lesdiguières' appointment as Constable in 1622 stemmed from persistent doubts about his political loyalty to the monarchy, due to his religion. Despite his consistent allegiance to the crown during the rebellions of the early 1620s, rumours about his trustworthiness had surfaced on more than one occasion. His enemies on the royal high command had, for example, accused him of consorting with the Protestant rebels during the siege of Montauban.[80] By 1622, fears about Lesdiguières reached such a state that the king's councillors told Louis to either 'cut off his [Lesdiguières'] head, or to engage him more firmly in his Majesty's Service'.[81] The means to achieve the latter option was to offer him the *charge* of Constable, on condition of his conversion to Catholicism.

This act may not have been as difficult for Lesdiguières as he attempted to portray.[82] For one, he was to receive a position that was still widely held to be the most prestigious military office of the realm, despite Luynes' tenure in the *charge*, and which continued to be widely coveted by the high nobility. Moreover, rather than

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[79] Jouanna, *Devoir*, p. 29.
[80] Guichard Déageant, *The Memoires of Monsieur Deageant [...]*, (London, 1690), pp. 198-200; Dufayard, *Lesdiguières*, pp. 457-478.
[81] Déageant, *Memoires*, p. 205; Dufayard, *Lesdiguières*, pp. 479-498.
[82] 'Instruction', ACL, II, p. 364.

seeing Lesdiguières' return to Catholicism as a sudden, shocking act of apostasy, Gal plausibly placed it at the end of a pathway of spiritual curiosity that had begun in the early seventeenth century.[83] Lesdiguières also received other benefits during the negotiations for his appointment and conversion. He was able to acquire the means to support an army against the rebel strongholds in the Vivarais in 1622, and was made a chevalier of the Ordre du Saint-Esprit, an exalted order which was open only to Catholic *grands*. This can only have further placated his sense of honour.[84]

The question remains, however, as to whether being appointed Constable notably affected Lesdiguières' military authority, and his overall stature within society. The brevet of July 1622 which appointed him to the *charge* stated that Lesdiguières had earned the office through sixty years of military service, and had thus 'commandé plusieurs armées, assiégé places, [et] donné batailles' on many occasions. Lesdiguières was thus recognised as already being a military grandee, and, whether conscious or not, this statement would appear to implicitly question the legitimacy of Luynes' appointment. The powers it ascribed to the Constable were essentially a restatement of those made by Henri IV in 1593 when appointing Montmorency. It stated how the Constable had a broad authority over military discipline, supplies, and payment, and would be the 'lieutenant général' of the king in all places where he was absent.[85] The brevet's overarching tone thus appeared to emphasise that the Constable held a significant degree of military authority. However, and just as with Montmorency and Luynes, it remained somewhat ambiguous over the exact role the Constable would play in the high command of the new standing army.

Indeed, Lesdiguières' appointment does not appear to have measurably improved his position within royal forces in the short-term. He did not form part of the high command of the main royal army during the 1622 campaign until the siege of Montpellier, which had begun in late August. Until this point, he had spent the majority of his time attempting to maintain the peace in the Vivarais, and may have even sought to avoid joining the main royal force due to the factionalism that was

[83] If anything, Gal saw neo-stoic ideas as perhaps the greatest philosophical influence on Lesdiguières' behaviour. Gal, *Lesdiguières*, pp. 209-316. Gal's overall portrayal of Lesdiguières as a person who was always 'dehors d'une stricte confessionalisation' and 'entre protestantisme et catholicisme' is reminiscent of the ideas found in Thierry Wanegffelen, *Ni Rome ni Genève: des fidèles entre deux chaires en France au XVIe siècle*, (Paris, 1997).

[84] Louis de Marillac to Richelieu, 3 July 1622, AAE MD 775, f. 178v; 'Recit Véritable [...]', 24-25 July 1622, ACL, III, pp. 426-430.

[85] 'Provisions du connétable de Lesdiguières et dispense de serment', 6 and 14 July 1622, ACL, III, pp. 416-420.

besetting its high command. When Lesdiguières did arrive at Montpellier, he was first commanded to try and form a rapprochement with Rohan, before retiring from the army, with Louis' permission, to levy troops in the Dauphiné. It was only from mid-September, when Louis' favour towards Bassompierre, Praslin and Condé had been exhausted, and he was in need of a senior military figure, that Lesdiguières took a leading role in the high command.[86]

Despite being Constable, Lesdiguières was thus relatively sidelined from the main royal army group during the 1622 campaign, not least because suspicions of his political loyalty remained. On 10 October, Louis de Marillac noted that the Huguenots wanted the Constable and Créquy to be in charge of the execution of any treaty's conditions, but that the king wished to give the responsibility to the prince de Joinville. Both the king and Marillac believed that Lesdiguières and Créquy had secret 'desseins' and 'intelligence' with the Huguenots 'de deca', and thus could not be fully trusted.[87] Ultimately, Lesdiguières and Créquy were left in Montpellier, with *Picardie* and *Normandie*, to enforce the peace treaty, yet it is clear that the king, and others in the high command, had not been keen to entrust them with this duty. Thus, at least in the short-term, his appointment as Constable does not appear to have removed the doubts concerning his political loyalty which had preceded it. Indeed, combined with the lack of explicit powers that the office wielded over the new standing army, acquiring the office of Constable did not significantly improve Lesdiguières' position within the royal high command, and he was marginalised for the majority of the 1622 campaign.

Lesdiguières' final campaigns before his death were undertaken in northern Italy between 1624 and 1626. Due to Spain's reluctance to cede control of certain Alpine passes found in the Valtelline, as stipulated by the treaty of Madrid of 1621, by late 1624 the French crown had signed a treaty to attack Genoa, a Spanish ally, in conjunction with Venice and Savoy. [88] The choice of Lesdiguières to command French forces in this expedition was unsurprising. He had considerable operational experience in northern Italy from the wars against Savoy between the late 1580s and early 1600s,

[86] Dufayard, *Lesdiguières*, pp. 519-524; Louis de Marillac to Richelieu 6 September, AAE MD 775, ff. 204r-205v.
[87] Given Richelieu's location in Lyon, 'de deca' can roughly be translated as 'down here'. Marillac thus probably referred to the wider Huguenot population in the south of France: Louis de Marillac to Richelieu, 10 October 1622, AAE MD 775, f. 211v; Richelieu to Madame de Longueville, 30 Septembre 1622 (from Lyon), Avenel, I, p. 732; Bergin, *Rise*, p. 239.
[88] For the wider strategic situation during these campaigns, see:Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 85-8.

and from his incursions to assist Savoy against Spain in 1616-1617.[89] Moreover, he had been chosen by Henri IV in 1610 to lead the proposed invasion of Spanish territories in northern Italy. In short, it is unlikely that Lesdiguières' position as Constable had an enormous bearing on his choice as commander.

Once chosen, it is far from indisputable that Lesdiguières had been given a 'carte blanche' by Louis XIII to 'lever des troupes et diriger la politique Italienne à son gré' as claimed by Dufayard.[90] Prior to leaving for Italy, Lesdiguières had levied 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry in 1624. Several of the permanent regiments had been added to this number, including *Normandie*, *Sault*, *Chappes*, and *Vaubecourt*. Had Lesdiguières truly been operating 'à son gré', it might have been presumed that he would have kept these units, which as part of the *vieux* or *petits-vieux*, formed the elite of the French infantry. Instead, Louis XIII ordered Lesdiguières to send these regiments, along with munitions and supplies, to the marquis de Coeuvres, who was commanding a smaller, separate French force against the Spanish in the Valtelline. Consequently, Lesdiguières was forced to make new levies before he departed for Italy in late 1624. By the time of a *revue* which occurred in February 1625, he had an army of 23,000 men at his disposal, one-third of which was French.[91]

However, almost as soon as Lesdiguières began his campaign in Italy, the monarchy's attentions switched to dealing with the Huguenot revolt that had emerged in the late spring of 1625 under Benjamin de Rohan, prince de Soubise. As Parrott has stated, whilst there is no reason to doubt that Richelieu was sincere in his desire to remove the threat of independent Huguenot military power to the French monarchy, the revolt allowed him to 'back away from an Italian venture that was unlikely to be resolved in French favour'.[92] As such, the forces under both the command of Coeuvres and Lesdiguières soon became starved of reinforcements and supplies. Lesdiguières' force withered away to less than 10,000 men by mid-June. Indeed, such was the attrition in troop-numbers, Lesdiguières was forced to defend himself from accusations that he had stolen part of the payments destined for the army up to early August.[93]

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[89] Dufayard, *Lesdiguières*, pp. 343-72.
[90] Ibid, p. 539.
[91] Ibid., p. 541.
[92] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 88.
[93] Lesdiguières to Louis XIII, 6 August 1625, ACL, II, p. 414.

Whilst Lesdiguières may thus have enjoyed a reasonable degree of operational independence in 1625, he remained heavily reliant on troops, supplies and finance sent to him from the monarchy. He also remained dependent on the crown's assessment of the wider strategic situation. For Lesdiguières, the campaign of 1624 to 1626 was part of his desire to form a pan-European coalition to attack Spanish power in the Italian peninsula, and thus reduce its overall influence in Europe.[94] Accordingly, he attempted to gain the monarchy's support for an 'army of Italy', which was to be composed of at least 20,000 troops, together with the support of Britain, the United Provinces, certain Imperial princes and the Swiss. This force would end attempts to fight the Spanish by diversion, and instead directly attack the duchy of Milan.[95] Whilst initially appearing to back such a scheme, Louis eventually fell into agreement with Richelieu's belief that the monarchy's resources should be focused against the Huguenot rebels. Furthermore, Louis stated that he doubted the success of expanded operations in Italy because Lesdiguières had failed to maintain the infantry regiments placed under his command at an effective strength. The forces controlled by Lesdiguières should instead be placed in garrison in Piedmont for the winter, as the king did not want to harm his own military reputation by allowing a campaign which would be doomed to failure.[96] Lesdiguières thus returned to France, and the monarchy authorised the signing of the treaty of Monzón with Spain in March 1626.

Lesdiguières thus did not enjoy anything near complete operational independence during the Italian campaign of the mid-1620s. The Constable's minimal influence over the new standing army meant Lesdiguières could not prevent the redeployment of troops from the permanent regiments from his force to that of Coeuvres. Once in Italy, Lesdiguières did not have the authority to prevent his army being significantly undersupplied. Finally, his belief that the Italian theatre should be expanded into a wider conflict was ignored in favour of Richelieu's opinion that the destruction of Huguenot military power was the more pressing concern facing the French monarchy. Thus, due to the Constable's lack of explicit powers over the new royal army, even a grandee such as Lesdiguières remained largely reliant on royal favour for army groups under his command to function in a successful manner. And if this favour had been diverted elsewhere, as it was to Richelieu in the mid-1620s, the

[94] Gal, *Lesdiguières*, pp. 209-224.
[95] 'Dernieres Memoires' of Lesdiguières to Louis XIII and his council, October 1625, BnF Na.Fr. 7052, ff. 362r-364r.
[96] Response of Louis XIII to Lesdiguières' memoire of 25 November 1625, Ibid., ff. 365r-v.

limits of the Constable's authority, on the eve of the office's abolition, are brought sharply into focus.

It would not be an exaggeration to argue that the rise of the new standing army in France, allied to the increased importance of artillery to the conduct of early modern warfare, significantly affected the position of the Constable within royal military structures. Put simply, the office's relative lack of explicit powers over these areas meant the Constable had little definite authority over the new royal army that emerged in the early seventeenth century. Consequently, the position was increasingly subject to the vagaries of political fortune and favour, and to marginalisation by royal office-holders who held positions which *did* allow them to influence the new key areas of the army's operation. Sully's offices in royal finance and artillery, for example, granted him a greater degree of tangible authority over the royal military structures than Montmorency enjoyed as Constable. In 1621, Luynes found that being Constable did not automatically entitle him to the position of commander-in-chief over an army dominated by the permanent regiments. Even a figure such as Lesdiguières struggled to impress his opinion on the king whilst Constable, not just due to persistent doubts over his faith, but because Richelieu could quite easily dominate a military office-holder with few definite powers over the new royal army.

The office of Constable was thus simultaneously one of the most prestigious and expendable *charges* of the realm by the 1620s. Its almost mythological past as the leader of the monarchy's older armed forces ensured that it continued to be held in reverence by many French noblemen. Indeed, it was a position which the monarchy could use to reward the most powerful military noblemen of the realm, such as Montmorency and Lesdiguières, and, in doing so, engage them more fully in royal service. Yet the position's inability to adapt fully to the new military forces at the monarchy's disposal made it, ultimately, a dispensable part of the high command. By the mid-1620s, the office could only survive if the monarchy, or its leading ministers, could find a means to advantageously use the position. Indeed, the *charge* had retained a sufficiently powerful aura that Richelieu did not want to see it fall into the hands of a figure who was not a close ally, such as the most likely candidate to follow Lesdiguières, Henri II, duc de Montmorency. Yet, it had become enough of an anachronism that it could be abolished without a great deal of difficulty.

The experience of the Constable thus hints at a wider change between the monarchy, the *grands* and the royal army during the early seventeenth century. Overall, the office is an example of how the monarchy was becoming less reliant on the *grands* for both the construction and operation of its armed forces during the early seventeenth century due to the rise of the new standing army. The crown could instead rely on a core of families, drawn mostly from the *petite noblesse* and *noblesse seconde*, to be the officers of its army. As these men increasingly placed service to the monarchy before that to the *grands*, the crown's new force was thus more monarchy-centred than previous royal armies, in which the *grands* had often rivalled the crown as centres of authority. Moreover, and as can be seen through Lesdiguières' experience during the 1620s, many members of the high nobility were increasingly willing to accept a more servile role within royal forces than they had previously enjoyed. As will be seen in the next chapter, this may well have been because the standing army had notably reduced the *grands* ability to successfully undertake military action without the monarchy's consent.

Chapter Six

The duc d'Épernon, the Colonel General of the Infantry, and the New Standing Army

Much has been written to suggest that the office of Colonel General of the Infantry enjoyed considerable authority over the royal infantry during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[1] In particular, it has been claimed that during the reign of Henri III the office was given extensive powers of appointment over the infantry. Certain historians have thus contended that the Colonel General nominated, and due to his power effectively appointed, all officers within the infantry from the 1580s.[2] Others have been somewhat more circumspect, with Avenel, for example, stating that the Colonel General's power of nomination may have applied to company ranks within the *régiments entretenus*, but that the Colonel and the king had alternating precedence over nomination to these positions.[3] The effect, however, was apparently the same. As Russell Major put it, by the early seventeenth century the Colonel General had 'filled the royal army with his clients'.[4] Moreover, the Colonel General was the captain of the premier company – the *colonelle* – in each of the permanent regiments, and also enjoyed a degree of disciplinary authority over the infantry due to his position as a 'disciplinary executive'in the *prévôts des bandes*.[5] In sum, Camille Rousset contention that the Colonel General 'n'était pas seulement le chef de l'armée dans son ensemble, il était le chef de chaque régiment en particulier' is far from unique.[6] Indeed, Richelieu appeared to validate this argument when he stated that the Colonel's powers were 'de très-dangeureuse consequence et du tout insupportables'.[7]

This chapter will seek to reassess the nature of the authority exercised by the Colonel General during the early seventeenth century. It will build upon the relatively brief remarks made by Parrott, Rowlands, and Drévillon, who have all sought to emphasise the more limited nature of the power wielded by this office during the first

[1] The position can be found for the first time in 1542. There were originally two Colonels General, one each for the *bandes* 'deçà' and 'delà les monts'. These offices were combined in 1569. Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 471; Roger Doucet, *Les institutions de la France au XVIe siècle*, (2 vols., Paris, 1948), II, p. 643; Susane, *Infanterie*, I, pp. 96-98.

[2] Daniel, *Milice*, I, pp. 270, 281-3; Louis André, *Michel Le Tellier et l'organisation de l'armée monarchique*, (Paris, 1906) p.160; Léo Mouton, *Un demi-roi: le duc d'Épernon*, (Paris, 1922), pp. 91,142; Camille Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire*, (4 vols., Paris, 1879), I, p. 175. The most recent adherent to this view is James Collins, *The State in Early Modern France*, (2nd ed., Cambridge, 2009), p. 57.

[3] Georges d'Avenel, *Richelieu et la monarchie absolue*, (4 vols., Paris, 1884-90), III, p. 60.

[4] J. Russell Major, 'The Revolt of 1620: A Study of Ties of Fidelity', *French Historical Studies*, 14, (1986), p. 394.

[5] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army* , p. 471.

[6] Rousset, *Histoire*, I, p. 175.

[7] Richelieu, quoted in Avenel, *Richelieu*, pp. 161-2.

half of the seventeenth century than the figures noted above.[8] Indeed, it should be recognised that historians who have emphasised the powers of the Colonel General have often taken their cue, in part at least, from royal propaganda surrounding the position's abolition in 1661. Whilst Louis XIV did want to bring the infantry under greater royal control, he undoubtedly exaggerated the Colonel General's authority in order to inflate the benefit brought to the monarchy through the position's eradication. Indeed, factors other than entrenchment of royal absolutism were quite clearly at work in 1661, such as the vagaries of dynastic politics, and the fact that the office was already in decline in relation to the Secretary of State for War.[9]

Whatever the office's authority by the early 1660s, this chapter will firstly argue that it was never a position which entitled its holder to supreme power over the infantry or regimental appointment during the early seventeenth century, even if it was a position of notable influence. Indeed, the exact authority of the Colonel General largely reflected the level of favour that its incumbent between 1582 and 1642, Jean Louis de Nogaret de La Valette, duc d'Épernon, enjoyed with the crown or regency at any given point in time.[10]

As seen in the first four chapters, the entrenchment of certain regiments as permanent bodies of force meant that the monarchy had a core of infantry officers at its disposal whose social standing was closely bound to their royal service. As already hinted at in the last chapter, this chapter will more explicitly argue that as long as the monarchy could satisfy the dynastic ambitions of the *petite noblesse* and *noblesse seconde* who served in the standing army, the authority of the *grands* within royal military structures would be weakened. Regimental officers, and thus a section of the military nobility, would be more closely tied into royal service, as few officers would be willing to imperil the social benefits they had earned in the standing army by placing service to *grands* before their duty to the crown. In turn, *grands*, such as Épernon, would be forced increasingly to redefine their social status on the basis of their own royal military service, in offices such as that of Colonel General, rather than placing overwhelming weight on their capacity for independent military action. This

[8] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp.470-5; Drévillon, *L'Impôt*, pp. 25-30; Rowlands, 'Monopolisation', p. 153.
[9] Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, pp. 188-189.
[10] For a consideration of the importance of favour to Épernon's career see Le Roux, *Faveur*. Moreover, the revival of the Colonel General's influence during the 1640s and 1650s was largely due to the favour that Épernon's son enjoyed with the Mazarin-led regency government: Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, pp. 350-351.

was due to their fading ability to influence the lower nobility within royal forces, and, consequently, the crown's lessening dependence on the *grands* for military action. In short, the early seventeenth century would show how the standing army had the potential to loosen, but admittedly *not* destroy, the bonds between the higher and lower nobility which had contributed so greatly to the civil wars of the sixteenth century. Such a development was, however, by no means definite or beyond recall by 1635.

I – The Importance of Favour: The Powers of the Colonel General, 1582-1605

The extensive authority sometimes ascribed to the position of Colonel General was, in reality, a temporary phenomenon of the 1580s, which arose out of factional court politics. Since the late 1570s Henri III had attempted to re-assert his authority in the face of a considerable increase in Guise influence stemming from their position at court, their power over royal offices, and their leading position in the *Ligue*. From his group of *mignons*, or favourites, Épernon was marked out as one of the men whom Henri III had decided to elevate from the provincial nobility into loyal *grands*, in order to bolster royal authority. In Épernon's case, this partly took the form of enormous salaries and pensions, gifts of land, and certain positions at court. But it also entailed him being used to 'reassert[...] royal control in the army', via his appointment as Colonel General of the Infantry in 1581.[11]

By placing a royal favourite at the head of the infantry, and subsequently entrusting him with a wide authority over appointment, Épernon could not only place trusted clients within royal units, but could also make clear to existing officers that unless they looked towards him, and thus the monarchy, they would not enjoy further progression. Consequently, the influence of other, less quiescent *grands* over royal military structures was reduced, which inevitably stoked the ire of figures such as the Guises. Before Henri III's death, Épernon would also acquire the *gouverneurments* of Provence, Metz and Boulogne, and command over the Mediterranean fleet, as part of a calculated wider effort to re-assert crown authority over its military forces.[12]

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[11] Stuart Carroll, *Martyrs and Murderers: the Guise Family and the Making of Europe*, (Oxford, 2009), p. 238.
[12]Carroll, *Martyrs*, pp. 221-242, 262; Le Roux, *Faveur*, pp. 525-533.

Whilst Épernon had received the position of Colonel General in 1581, the *charge* would not become a *grand office de la couronne* until 1584, a move which placed it on a par with other major royal offices, such as that of *Amiral de France*. According to his secretary and biographer, Guillaume Girard, Épernon enjoyed far-reaching powers after this date. Girard ascribed to Épernon the power of nominating 'à toutes les charges vacantes dans les Bandes Françoises, sans excepter même de cette nomination, celle de Mestre de Camp du Regiment des Gardes'.[13] Contemporaries noted that this manoeuvre was successful in reducing the influence of figures such as the Guises over the army. As René Lucinge put it, in 'toutes les armées du Roy il ne s'en trouvera pas un seul [officier] qui aye esté au duc de Guise'.[14]

However, even during the 1580s, the Colonel General never enjoyed the power of *direct appointment* to infantry *charges*, except to an extremely small number of *compagnies colonelle* of certain, still embryonic, *vieux* regiments.[15] Aside from these companies, the Colonel General could only *nominate* persons for an infantry officership, and whether this nomination became an appointment depended on Épernon's relationship with the crown. Thus, due to the enormous favour Épernon enjoyed with Henri III between 1584 and 1588, his regimental nominations were 'accepted unconditionally', but this authority was short-lived.[16] By 1588, the Guises, using the power of the *Ligue*, had achieved Épernon's disgrace and his temporary suspension from the office. Under Henri IV, Épernon would be reinstated in his *charge*, but would never again enjoy the same levels of influence over regimental appointment. Henri IV appears to have been unhappy with the authority that Épernon had retained over royal military structures by the late 1590s, and thus attempted to counteract it by limiting Épernon's right to nomination.

Matters between Henri and Épernon came to a head in 1605 when the *mestre de camp* of the *Gardes*, Louis de Berton, sieur de Crillon, resigned his *charge*, and was replaced by Charles de Blanchefort, marquis de Créquy, the duc de Lesdiguières'

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[13] For 'Bandes Françoises', one can read regiments, by the mid-1580s. Girard dated Épernon's promotion to the position of Colonel General to 1585; this would not tally with the more thoroughly researched dates given by Le Roux, above. Guillaume Girard, *Histoire de la vie du duc d'Espernon*, (4 vols., Paris, 1730) I, pp. 100-104.

[14] René de Lucinge, quoted in Le Roux, *Faveur*, pp. 530-1.

[15] Indeed, on the 1588 *état* only two regiments out of nine are listed as having a *compagnie colonelle*: the *Gardes* and *Picardie*. *Champagne* does not have one, nor do the other regiments listed. This list admittedly, does not include *Piémont*. Moreover, *Navarre* was not yet part of the royal army. For more on the *Compagnies Colonelle* see Section II of this chapter.

[16] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 471.

son-in-law. Henri IV had chosen Créquy for the position in an attempt to cement his relationship with Lesdiguières, who certainly appeared pleased with the appointment.[17] When Henri IV wrote to Épernon about the matter in May 1605, he stated that he had not wished to proceed until he had discussed it with Épernon; yet this was something which Henri felt he had achieved via the letter. Henri thus attempted to present the appointment as non-negotiable, claiming that Créquy was so suitable for the charge that Épernon would have advised Henri to make the appointment himself, 'si vous estiés auprés de moy'.[18]

Whether Henri had intended the appointment to be an attack on the authority of the Colonel General or not, Épernon perceived it as such, especially as he had enjoyed close relations with the previous *mestre de camp*, Crillon.[19] Moreover, Girard stated that Épernon could not accept Créquy's appointment on principle. Épernon could not 'souffrir l'infraction' of the 'prérogatives extraordinaires' given to the Colonel General by Henri III. These included the right to name the new *mestre de camp* of the *Gardes* when the position was vacated. Épernon thus demanded a meeting with Henri IV in order to express his unhappiness at an appointment being made to the position without his consultation.[20] This was granted, but Henri told Épernon to be 'bien resolu de suivre mes volontez'.[21] Indeed, Épernon was unsuccessful in making Henri IV reconsider the appointment, and angrily left the court, travelling to his *gouvernement* in Angoulême. Épernon's brief withdrawal was viewed dimly by Henri, and he made his displeasure clear to Épernon's allies. This, together with the example of what had happened to Biron only three years previously, was enough to bring Épernon back to obedience.[22]

As an act of conciliation, Henri told Épernon that Créquy would 'prester en vos [Épernon's] mains le serment de la charge'. In addition, Girard stated that Créquy had to take his 'attache' from Épernon.[23] An 'attache' was a form of countersignature by a

[17] Lesdiguières to Bellièvre, 29 May 1605, ACL, I, p. 498.
[18] Henri IV to Épernon, 13 May 1605, LMHIV, V, pp. 427-30
[19] Le Roux has contended that Crillon was an 'ami' of Épernon, and that their 'amitié' was sufficient to assure Épernon's '[...] autorité sur le régiment des gardes'. Épernon certainly trusted Crillon enough to send him, with the *Gardes*, to assure Boulogne in 1587. Le Roux, *Faveur*, pp. 517, 557, 583.
[20] Girard, *Épernon*, II, p.244-6. Girard dated these events to 1602, and the aftermath of the Biron rebellion. Consequently, so has Parrott, due to his use of Girard as a source. However, letters written by Henri IV and Lesdiguières show that the appointment, and its attending controversy, occurred in 1605. Indeed, Chagniot dated Créquy's appointment to 31 May 1605. Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 111.
[21] Henri IV to Épernon, 21 May 1605, LMHIV, V, p. 432.
[22] Henri IV to Épernon, 6 June 1605, Ibid., V, pp. 447-8.
[23] Drévillon, *L'Impôt*, p. 26.

Colonel General which activated royal regulations or commissions, and allowed officers to formally take up their functions. It did not constitute the right to veto royal appointments, but did require new office-holders to essentially make an act of deference to Épernon, as Colonel General of the Infantry, before they could take up their new positions. Despite his willingness to go along with this, Créquy was forced to wait for an entire day at the door of Épernon's chamber, and then several days 'à sa suite' before Épernon granted his 'attache' and received Créquy's oath, clearly a statement of defiance by the disgruntled Colonel General[24]

Épernon's discontent with what he saw as an attack on his privileges as Colonel General led to Henri issuing a *traité* which delineated the rights of appointment that the Colonel General would subsequently enjoy.[25] The king would reserve the right to appoint the *mestres de camp* of all *vieux* regiments, although he conceded to the Colonel General that these officers would have to receive his 'attache' before they could take up their office. The Colonel General would have the right to make a nomination to the captaincy of every other *Gardes* company which became vacant, and to all the captaincies of the other *vieux* and *nouveaux* regiments.[26] He would not have the power to make nominations to any of the lower company grades. Moreover, unlike under Henri III, this power of nomination did not effectively equate to appointment, but merely of superior recommendation to the king of potential candidates. Finally, the Colonel General's power over appointments to the *compagnies colonelles* was affirmed, as was his right to appoint a variety of other regimental officers, including disciplinary and auxiliary staff, such as sergeant majors, chaplains and surgeons.

Thus, by the mid-1600s, Henri IV had wrestled back to the crown almost all of the influence over the choice of regimental officers that the Colonel General had temporarily enjoyed during the 1580s. Indeed, as the Colonel General had *never* held the explicit right to make appointments to the regiments, the greatest change between 1588 and 1605 in the office's power was the loss of royal favour suffered by Épernon, at least in comparison to the huge esteem in which Henri III had held him. Indeed, rather than a considerable degradation of the office's formal powers, Épernon had

[24] Girard, *Épernon*, II, pp. 247-9.
[25] Girard doesn't give a specific date for this *traité*, but implied that it was passed in the aftermath of the Créquy controversy. As such, Girard dated it to 1602, but, as he incorrectly dates the controversy, it was probably passed in 1605 when the affair actually took place. Ibid, II, pp. 249-251.
[26] As Parrott pointed out, in the mid-1600s *nouveaux* probably referred to the nascent *petits-vieux*, which would have only included *Bourg* and *Nerestang* at this time.

merely lost the massive leeway over appointments that had been vaguely, and temporarily, accorded to him by Henri III. That the *traité* of 1605 allowed Épernon to make nominations to particular regimental positions, and forced certain officers to receive his 'attache', ensured that he, as Colonel General, retained a position of prominence within the standing army. Yet neither of these powers constituted an absolute right to appointment, nor, as seen in the case of Créquy, a veto over royal appointees. It would seem, therefore, that Henri had succeeded in reducing the influence of Épernon over the standing army. However, to more accurately flesh out the influence that Épernon, and thus the Colonel General, held over the infantry, a more thorough investigation into the wider relationships that existed between Épernon and officers within the royal regiments is necessary.

II – Épernon's Relationships with Infantry Officers, 1589-1619

Certain general points need to be made before attempting to judge the relationship that Épernon maintained with officers within the standing army. Firstly, Épernon's position as a 'military power-broker in south-west France' was vital to his stature, as was his control of key fortresses in Metz and Boulogne. The south-west of France was a 'key area for recruitment', not only of ordinary soldiers, but also for many regimental officers, but even more important were the eastern frontiers, including the zones of Épernon's influence around Metz and Boulogne.[27] Épernon's authority in these areas was such that, during his revolt against the crown in 1619, there were concerns that the 1,500 soldiers under Henri de Mayenne's command would not be enough to secure the province of Guyenne.[28] This geographical basis of Épernon's power was crucial to his relationship with certain officers in the infantry. Secondly, the factors discussed in the first three chapters of this thesis should be borne in mind. The longevity of service of infantry officers, coupled with dynastic politics and customs relating to promotion and venality, not only meant that a limited number of infantry officerships became available, but that Épernon's nomination was far from the only consideration taken into account during the process of appointment.

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[27] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 483.Chagniot has noted the presence of many Gascon officers, or at least men from families of Gascon origin, in the *Gardes*. However, he also stated that many of these men subsequently left the south-west for more northerly provinces. Chagniot, 'Gardes', pp. 112-113.
[28] Déageant, *Memoires*, p. 135.

If Épernon's authority as Colonel General in the 1580s had allowed him to construct 'un réseau de fidelités militaires extrêmement large',[29] the remnants of this influence were still being felt in the early seventeenth century, thanks to the security of tenure that was increasingly being afforded to officers in the *vieux* regiments. A certain number of the clients that Épernon had placed into regimental office during the 1580s remained in their posts until the end of Henri IV's reign, and even beyond. For example, Pepin de Bonnouvrier had gained his captaincy in the *Gardes* in 1583, and held it until his death in 1617, and had clear ties to Épernon. Bonnouvrier was noted as having commanded 'toute l'Infanterie du Duc d'Epernon' at some point prior to 1583, and Épernon can be found using Bonnouvrier as a messenger to the king in 1600. It is also likely that Épernon engineered Bonnouvrier's appointment as the royal lieutenant in the citadel of Metz, at some point between 1610 and 1612.[30]

Ties between Épernon and the Patras de Campaigno, another family of *Gardes* captains, can also be found.[31] Bertrand Patras had earned a captaincy in *Picardie* and 'commanda Bourg, sous M. d'Épernon' before being promoted in 1584 to a captaincy in the *Gardes*.[32] That he maintained his connection to Épernon after this date can be seen through Bertrand's installation as the captain of the garrison of Boulogne, one of the towns over which Épernon was *gouverneur*.[33] That Épernon was in firm control of this town after his appointment as *gouverneur* in 1585 is reasonably clear.[34] Indeed, in 1619, Épernon was easily able to secure Boulogne for the rebellion led by him and Marie de Médicis against Luynes' dominance in government.[35] Due to his connections with this town, Épernon may have also shared the links that the Patras de Campaigno maintained with the Montlezun de Busca.

Aside from clients he had managed to place in the regiments, the *compagnies colonelles* also provided Épernon with a potentially consistent source of authority in the infantry throughout this period. The *compagnie colonelle* was seen as the premier company of each regiment, and was listed first on infantry *états*. The lieutenant of the

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[29] Le Roux, *Faveur*, p. 531.
[30] Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 253; Épernon to Montmorency, 1 December 1600, BnF Ms.Fr. 3550, f. 73r; receipt of payment, BnF PO 413 (9211), piece 6; Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*, p. 40. Épernon's influence over Metz will be described in more detail below.
[31] Le Roux, *Faveur*, p. 532.
[32] Luppé, *Mémoires*, p. 200.
[33] Bertrand can be found on the 1608-1610 *états* in this position as the 'sieur de Campagno': *états*, BnF Na.Fr. 24841, ff. 81r-v, 179v-180r; BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 8v-9r.
[34] La Roux, *Faveur*, pp. 556-558
[35] Deageant, *Memoires*, p. 139; Andilly, *Journal inédit (1614-1620)*, p. 419

colonel company was not only the *de facto* captain of the company, but was also known as the *lieutenant colonel* of the regiment. It was thus a prized office, and its incumbent was required to have held a regimental captaincy before they could accede to the position. As Épernon theoretically controlled appointments to this *charge*, he therefore wielded influence over one of the most coveted positions for regimental officers of the middling and lower nobility.

Épernon clearly realised the value of these offices, and attempted to ensure that as many *compagnies colonelles* as possible were maintained in the regiments. A *compagnie colonelle* is listed for each of the *Gardes*, *Picardie*, *Piémont* and *Navarre* on all the *états* on which they appeared between 1588 and 1620, and it was always placed first in the list of regimental companies.[36] Not content with maintaining *compagnies colonelles* in the *vieux*, Épernon sought to extend them to newer regiments, including those which would become the *petits-vieux*. In the commission given to levy *Vaubecourt* in 1610, it was specified that one of the ten companies of two hundred soldiers was to be 'composé, conduire et exploictez soubz lauctorite' of Épernon. A similar requirement can be found on a commission given to 'monsieur de Bioule' to levy an infantry regiment in 1628.[37]

It does not appear, however, that Épernon was entirely successful in increasing the number of *compagnies colonelles*. The 1608 to 1610 *états* do not list a *compagnie colonelle* for *Bourg* or *Nerestang*. By the *état* of 1620 neither of these regiments, now under the name of *Lauzieres* and *Chappes*, had a *compagnie colonelle*, nor did two other *petits-vieux* listed, *Beaumont* and *Rambures*. Only *Normandie*, a new regiment but, as seen in Chapter Four, technically a *vieux*, had a *compagnie colonelle* alongside the *Gardes*, *Picardie*, *Navarre*, *Piémont*, and *Champagne*.[38] However, other *petits-vieux* regiments, such as *Vaubecourt*, may have had a *compagnie colonelle* by this point, and others could have been created after this *état*. Indeed, on a *revue* of the *compagnie colonelle* of the *Gardes* in early 1621, Épernon was specified as being the 'cappitaine particulier de neuf compagnies' in this and other regiments.[39]

Yet, even if Épernon had succeeded in extending the numbers of *compagnies colonelles*, it is far from certain that he had unimpeded choice over appointments to

[36] Curiously, no *compagnie colonelle* is listed for *Champagne* until the *état* of 1620.The reasons for this anomaly are unclear.
[37] 'Commission donnée a Mr de Vaubecourt [...]', SHAT $A^{1}12$, piece 43; Commission to Monsieur de Bioule, BnF Cangé 22, f. 123r.
[38] *État*, BnF Ms.Fr. 16718, ff. 250r-324v.
[39] *Revue*, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (272).

these units.[40] This was not least because the position of *lieutenant colonel* could only be received by a person who already held a regimental captaincy, placing a degree of structural restraint on the appointment.[41] Bertrand de Mazelière, for example, can be found as, first, captain in 1593 and then by 1601 *lieutenant colonel* of *Navarre*, and continued to hold this position into the 1610s.[42] Because *Navarre* has been Henri IV's private possession as king of Navarre before it became a French royal regiment, it is thus unlikely that Épernon had played a role in Mazelière's original appointment to captain – Henri IV, we know, had a clear antipathy to Épernon's influence over regimental appointments. He may have become a client of Épernon in the intervening period before he became *lieutenant colonel*, and, if not, could well have become one after receiving the *charge*. But the importance of Mazelière's seniority to his appointment, measured in terms of the length of his regimental service, should not be discounted, nor should it be in the case of his successor, the sieur de Joffre.[43] It would appear, therefore, that by the early seventeenth century, Épernon could not parachute anyone he wished into the colonel company due to customs relating to promotion.

Indeed, the case of Antoine de La Grange de Montigny, sieur d'Arquien, *lieutenant colonel* of the *Gardes* from around 1597 to 1610, says much about both Épernon's authority over the *compagnies colonelles*, and his overall influence over the standing army during the second half of Henri IV's reign. Arquien had obtained a *Gardes* captaincy in 1577. Given this date, he probably gained the position before Épernon's influence over the infantry regiments had become marked in the 1580s; it seems unlikely that he gained it on the basis of being Épernon's client. Indeed, it would also appear that his subsequent promotion to the position of *lieutenant colonel* by 1597 probably did not arise due to Épernon's influence. Noeufville stated that Arquien had gained the position due to his 'ancienneté' and 'merite', whilst the La Grange also had ties to the Constable, Henri I, duc de Montmorency, a figure with whom Épernon had a relatively cordial, yet ultimately competitive relationship for influence within royal military structures.[44] Moreover, the La Grange were a powerful military family in their own right. Arquien's elder brother, François de La Grange, sieur de Montigny, already had sufficient standing to command the light cavalry at

[40] As opposed to the assertions found in Le Roux, *Faveur*, p. 531.
[41] As seen in Chapter Three, Section I, above.
[42] *Revue*, BnF 25826 (857); *revue*, BnF 25834 (1655). *État* of 1610.
[43] As suggested in Chapter Three, Section II.
[44] Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 59. Also, see Section I of this thesis' chapter on the Constable.

Amiens in 1597, and would be made a *maréchal de France* in 1616.[45] That Arquien was probably not a client of Épernon, and had not received his position through Épernon's influence, can be seen more clearly in the 1600s. Indeed, whether or not Arquien had been a client before 1597, by 1610 Fontenay-Mareuil stated that Arquien knew that 'M. d'Espernon ne l'aimoit pas'.[46]

This dislike probably stemmed from Henri IV's actions in the intervening period, during which he had used both Montigny and Arquien to challenge Épernon's power in Metz and the surrounding area. Metz was one of the most important fortifications of the French kingdom. It guarded military passageways into the Empire, and was a 'gateway' for allowing or preventing the flow of German mercenaries into France.[47] Control of this area was thus critical to the security of the kingdom, and it appears that Henri IV was not entirely satisfied with Épernon's dominance in this region. Épernon had been made *gouverneur* and *lieutenant général* of Metz, the pays Messin, Toul and Verdun, and the citadel of Metz during the 1580s. Since this period, he had been able to place relatives and clients in local military positions, and thus enjoyed a considerable degree of authority in the area.[48] However, in 1603, Montigny was appointed as royal lieutenant for the *gouvernement* of Metz and the pays Messin, and, in 1604, Arquien was made lieutenant of Metz's citadel. In addition, Arquien was made commander of the town of Metz, in the absence of Épernon and Montigny. Arquien gained his position in the citadel of Metz at the expense of Roger de Comminges, baron de Saubole, who was a cousin of Épernon.[49]

In the short-term, the La Grange may have been successful in reducing Épernon's power in Metz. Arquien had been able to place troops loyal to him in the citadel, with Girard claiming that 'l'autorité absolue' that Épernon had previously enjoyed had been 'entierement perduë' since Saubole's replacement in 1604.[50] This was probably an overstatement as events in 1610, after Henri's assassination, demonstrated. Arquien resigned his post as *lieutenant colonel* in the *Gardes*, and

[45] Anselme, *Histoire*, VII, p. 424.
[46] Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*, p. 40.
[47] Major, 'Fidelity', p. 394. La Châtre had passed through Metz, Verdun and the surrounding area during the 1610 expedition to Jülich: 'Memoire', BnF Dupuy 193, f. 114v.
[48] Le Roux, *Faveur*, pp. 547-555.
[49] Anselme stated that Montigny had been appointed *gouverneur* of Metz in 1603, but the 1608 *état* showed that Montigny was only the town's royal lieutenant, with Épernon maintaining his position of overall authority. Anselme, *Histoire*, VII, p.424; *État*, BnF Na.Fr. 24841, f.95r. For Sobole: Le Roux, *Faveur*, pp. 551, 557; Lacolle, *Gardes*, p. 80.
[50] Girard, *Espernon*, II, p. 360.

travelled to Metz to try and entrench his position in the town's citadel, rather than serve under Épernon, who had taken control of the *Gardes* in the immediate aftermath of the assassination, and deployed the regiment around Paris to maintain order. However, Arquien's manoeuvre was defeated by the actions of *Gardes* captains stationed in Metz who were clients of Épernon: the sieurs de Frémigières and Tilladet.[51] The latter, in particular, had been successful in placing troops loyal to Épernon in the citadel and winning over a number of Arquien's followers, before the latter arrived in the town. Arquien was thus not able to exercise his lieutenancy as Épernon re-established his dominance in Metz. Bonnouvrier was subsequently appointed as lieutenant of Metz's citadel. To placate the La Grange, Arquien was given the *gouvernement* of Calais, vacated in 1610 due to the death of Dominique de Vic.[52]

Thus, and whilst the exact number is hard to quantify, there remained a number of captains within the *vieux* who remained steadfastly loyal to Épernon by the end of Henri IV's reign. Within the *Gardes* alone, Épernon's clients in Metz had moved to shore up the *duc*'s authority during the crisis that followed Henri IV's assassination, with other captains willing to follow Épernon's orders in Paris. The persistence of these clients was not only based on Épernon's position as Colonel General, but on the selective regional influence that he had managed to gain from the 1580s. However, by appointing dependable royal servants to regimental positions – with some men obviously receiving commissions against Épernon's wishes – Henri IV manifested a desire to counteract Épernon's authority over the infantry. Yet the general stability of the regiments, and the overall lack of regimental offices which were becoming available from the 1590s, may have aided Épernon's attempts to maintain clients in royal service, as it limited Henri's opportunities for further appointments of men without connections to Épernon.

With Henri gone, it might be presupposed that Épernon had an opportunity to re-establish the authority over the infantry that he had held prior to 1589, especially during the politically unstable decade following the assassination. Fontenay-Mareuil was certainly of this impression, stating that the office of Colonel General was 'la plus

[51] Frémigières and Tilladet are noted as being 'serviteurs' of Épernon in Girard, *Espernon*, II, p. 357.
[52] Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, pp. 59-60 ; Girard, *Espernon*, II, pp. 355-365 ; Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*, p. 40 ; François Annibal d'Estrées, *Mémoires du maréchal d'Estrées sur la régence de Marie de Médicis (1610-1616) et sur celle d'Anne d'Autriche (1643-1650)*, (Paris, 1910), p. 27; Lacolle, *Gardes*, pp. 80-81.

belle' *charge* of the kingdom once the regency government had begun, because it allowed Épernon to 'nommoit à toutes les companies', including the *Gardes*. Moreover, Marie de Médicis gave the *survivance* of the office to Épernon's son, the marquis de La Valette, in the period immediately after Henri IV's death.[53]

Épernon certainly does seem to have had some success in appointing allies and clients to the regiments after 1610. Jean Bernard de Biran, sieur de Gohas, was appointed to a *Gardes* captaincy in 1614, and 'etoit etroitement uni d'amitié' with Épernon, especially after Gohas was appointed as *gouverneur* of Antibes in 1596. Indeed, such was the bond between the two, Henri IV had even written to Gohas to remind him where his primary loyalty lay.[54] In March 1617, Louis XIII and Secretary of State Richelieu wrote two letters to Épernon which also appear to demonstrate the influence of his *charge*. Louis informed him that a captaincy in *Beaumont* was being filled by the sieur de Contamine, largely due to 'l'estime' in which he was held by Épernon. Louis also stated that he did not wish to appoint a certain captain to *Navarre*, until Épernon judged the nominee 'digne de la remplir'. Richelieu's letter was of a similar tone, asserting that he did not want to fill a captaincy in *Piémont* until he had Épernon's opinion on the matter.[55]

The captain who secured the succession to Bonnouvrier's company in the *Gardes* in 1617, Albert de Grillet, sieur de Brissac, may also have had links to Épernon. Albert's brother, Gabriel, baron de Brissac, had 's'attacha dans la suite' of Épernon in the 1580s, whilst Albert himself is noted as having been raised as a page of Henri III. It is thus eminently possible that Albert could have come to the attention of a *mignon* like Épernon.[56] Albert's initial entry into the *Gardes* was as an ensign in the *mestre de camp* company of Crillon (also of Avignonese origin), who may well have been an ally of Épernon, and it is possible that Albert maintained links to both men, or that he easily switched to Épernon after Crillon's resignation from the *Gardes* in 1605.[57] Thus, it is probable that Épernon's influence helped enable Albert to leap from the lieutenancy of one *Gardes* company to the captaincy of another, especially as it was one which had previously been held by a client of Épernon. The perception that

[53] Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*, p. 34.
[54] 'Genealogie de la Maison de Gouhas de Biran d'Armagnac', BnF Cabinet 46 (1135), ff. 5r-6v.
[55] Louis XIII to Épernon, 10 March 1617, Richelieu to Épernon, 12 March 1617, Avenel, I, pp. 375-6, 378-9.
[56] Genealogy, BnF DB 555 (8474), f. 1v.
[57] Chagniot, 'Gardes', pp. 111-112.

Épernon could potentially manipulate appointments in this manner may have helped him to maintain or even gain clients within the regiments during the 1610s.

However, other appointments to the regiments demonstrate that the Colonel General's authority does not appear to have exceeded that agreed in the 1605 *traité* with Henri IV, despite Épernon's attempts to push its boundaries. For instance, in 1612, the *Gardes* was expanded from eighteen to twenty companies.[58] Épernon attempted to name candidates for both new captaincies, but was only allowed to nominate one person, Jean d'Acarie, sieur de Bourdet, who was subsequently appointed captain.[59] In 1615, the *Gardes* company of Pierre du Bellay, sieur de La Courbe became vacant due to his death. Épernon had, according to Girard, 'aimé' Pierre, and thus interceded to try and obtain the vacant captaincy for Pierre's son, Guy, who had been the company ensign. However, following the unwritten customary rules then evolving, the captaincy was instead given to the company lieutenant, Abraham de La Besne, to the great discontentment of Épernon.[60]

Thus, at least in the case of La Besne, Épernon's desire to influence appointments to the standing army had been defeated by burgeoning ideas, shaped in part by regimental officers themselves, of progressive promotion through the company grades in return for long-term service. His angry response to this failure to secure the appointment of a potential client mirrors his actions in 1605: frustrated by the growing influence of Concini he now left court for Angoulême and may have subtly given assistance to the 1616 rebellion. Whilst he continued to maintain a significant number of clients and 'amis' within the infantry, Épernon's actions in 1615 highlighted his frustration at the relative marginalisation of his *charge* of Colonel General and his limited influence over the regiments, in comparison to that which he had enjoyed in the 1580s. Even during the politically volatile 1610s, he had only been able to reclaim this authority partially, and was instead largely held to the stipulations of the 1605 *traité*. Indeed, the true test of the influence that the Colonel General held over the permanent regiments was about to emerge when Épernon entered into rebellion against the crown in 1619 and 1620.

[58] Probably to fit the requirements of the 1611 *état* discussed in Chapter one, Section II.
[59] *États* (with commentary), BnF Cangé 5, f. 9v.
[60] Girard, *Espernon*, III, pp. 18-27.

III – The Limits of Clientage: Defections of Regimental Officers to Épernon during the Revolts of 1619-20.

After Concini's assassination, Épernon's dissatisfaction at the continuing reduction in his power as Colonel General contributed to his decision to support Marie de Médicis' revolts of 1619 and 1620 against the Luynes-dominated government of Louis XIII.[61] These events are commonly known as the Wars of the Mother and Son.[62] Through analysing the number of regimental units and officers that defected to Épernon and Marie's cause during these rebellions, the true extent of the Colonel General's influence over the infantry can be gauged. Indeed, the revolts constituted a form of acid test for the strength of the bonds of affinity that Épernon held with regimental officers.

The number of regimental defections which occurred during the first 'war' of 1619 – which in reality lasted barely two months, and should be considered little more than a mobilisation – can be seen in an untitled document of August 1619.[63] In this text, Marie sought to restore officers who had joined her rebellion to their former positions. This included Épernon being 'remettre [...] en la jurisdiction de sa charge' of Colonel General, and Boulogne and Metz being put back to 'l'estat auquel ilz estoit', i.e., under his authority. Interestingly, a number of regimental captains who had joined the rebellion were also named on the document, including officers within the *Gardes*. Marie asked that be 'restablie les srs du Plessis, de Fromageries, du Bourdet son lieutenant et ensign, de la Hilliere, de Loustelnau, Signan ensign, La Fousserye ensign au Gardes'. Of this number, Frémigières and Bourdet have already been identified as both *Gardes* captains and clients of Épernon. 'Loustelnau' can be found prior to 1620, as Jephte Loustelneau, a lieutenant in Emmanuel de Valence's *Gardes* company on *revues* taken between 1598 and 1605.[64] Whether he had been promoted to the position of captain after this later date is unclear, but he does not

[61] Épernon had additional grounds for discontentment in 1619. He blamed Luynes for the failure of his son, Louis de Nogaret de La Valette, Archbishop of Toulouse, to obtain the position of cardinal. Épernon had also argued with the Keeper of the Seals, Guillaume du Vair, over precedence at Court. Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*, p. 133; Girard, *Espernon*, III, pp. 48-56; Brienne, *Mémoires*, pp. 334-5.
[62] For overviews of the two revolts, see Bergin, *Rise*, pp. 178-212, Pierre Chevallier, *Louis XIII, roi cornelian*, (Paris, 1979), pp 214-222.
[63] Untitled list of requests from Marie de Médicis, 16 August 1619, AAE MD 772, f. 115r.
[64] *Revues*: BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (14121); BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1492).

appear as such on any subsequent *états* or *revues*. Arnaud d'Andilly noted that La Hillière was the sergeant-major of the *Gardes*, and thus had probably been appointed by Épernon under the terms of the 1605 *traité*.[65] None of the others appear on the musters or *états* of the *Gardes* studied for this thesis, yet this does not rule out the possibility that they held positions within this regiment.[66]

Outside of the *Gardes*, several other regimental officers were named. In all, Marie requested that two captains from *Vaubecourt*, three from *Rambures*, and two from *Piémont* were re-established in their posts. Of these men, three can possibly be matched to officers found on *revues*: 'La Serre' from *Vaubecourt* and both *Piémont* captains, 'Breuil' and 'Bigaret'.[67] The document also requested that all the 'lieutenants, enseignes et officiers' of these captains from *Vaubecourt*, *Rambures*, and *Piémont* were restored, implying that they had been able to carry their entire companies with them into rebellion. This is in contrast to the officers named from the *Gardes*, whose ranks were specified, potentially signifying that not all officers and soldiers within their units had joined Épernon and Marie.

Louis's response to Marie's requests was largely favourable.[68] It was the king's pleasure that Épernon 'jouisse de touttes les functions attribuent a sa charge', although the exact extent of these 'functions' was not specified. The sieur de Mun, an Épernon client, would be re-established to the position he had previously held in Boulogne.[69] Louis also agreed that all the captains from *Rambures*, *Vaubecourt*, and *Piémont* would be reinstated to their former positions. However, Louis appeared hesitant to restore officers from the *Gardes* who had defected, due to the close position this regiment occupied with regard to the 'conservation de sa personne'. This attitude exemplified his conception of the *Gardes* as the foremost infantry formation of the realm, in which only the premier and most loyal regimental officers could serve. Behind this facade, however, the regiment does not appear to have been subject to a

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[65] Andilly, *Journal inédit (1614-1620)*, p. 438.
[66] The exception appears to be 'Plessis', who, in the response made to Marie's requests, is specified as being 'sergent de Bastille'. He may, however, have held this *charge* in conjunction with a *Gardes* commission. AAE MD France 772, f. 191r.
[67] 'Breuil' - Henry du Breuil: *Piémont Revues* from 1599 and 1616, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1545), BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (164). 'Bigaret' - Jean-Jacques de Fau, sieur de Bigarré: *Piémont Revues* from 1606 and 1616, BnF Ms.Fr. 25839 (2019); BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (158). 'La Serre' - Jean Jacques de Montesquiou, sieur de La Serre: *Vaubecourt Revue* from 1623, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (326).
[68] Untitled document (clearly a response to Marie's requests of 16 August 1619), AAE MD France 772, ff. 191r-v.
[69] Girard noted a 'Mun' acting for Épernon in the Arquien/Metz affair of 1610, Girard, *Espernon*, II, pp. 355-6. The exact position that Mun held in Boulogne is not stated.

ruthless purge of the disloyal. Whilst it is not possible to track the subsequent careers for all the *Gardes* officers named, the fates of Frémigières and Bourdet showed that the royal response was more ambivalent than Louis might wish it to appear. That Frémigières' resigned his captaincy in 1620 may well have been due to his implication in the 1619 rebellion. However, far from being arbitrarily cashiered, he was allowed to sell his *charge* to Toiras, thus making, in some respects, a short-term profit.[70] Bourdet retained his *charge* and would fight in the *Gardes* during the 1621 campaign, eventually succumbing to illness at the siege of Montauban. Indeed, Bourdet's actions in 1620 do not appear to have blackened the family name; both his sons held *vieux* captaincies after his death.[71]

Louis' leniency in 1619 may have contributed to new defections of royal regimental officers and units during the much larger Second War of the Mother and Son that broke out in early 1620. Fontenay-Mareuil wrote that regimental defections had 'notablement affoiblie' royal forces. In *Piémont* alone, Fontenay-Mareuil claimed that four captains and their companies, along with 18 lieutenants and ensigns, joined Marie's army. Girard stated that around fifteen to twenty regimental captains abandoned royal forces. Some sent brigades of troops under their sergeants, whilst others were able to bring their entire company with them, leading to some 1,500 men joining the rebel armies. Andilly stated that twelve to thirteen *vieux* companies defected, specifying that five were from *Piémont* and two from *Picardie*. The nineteenth-century historian Belhomme even claimed that eighty captains and lieutenants from the 'vieux corps', together with 'beaucoup' of the soldiers under their command, joined either Épernon in Angoulême, or his son the marquis de La Valette in Metz. Whatever the exact figure, it is undeniable that a notable number of officers and companies from the permanent regiments joined Épernon's forces in 1620. For Girard, the reason for this was simple: 'Il y avoit fort peu d'officiers dans les vieux

[70] Baudier, *Toiras*, p. 12; Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 240. Noeufville stated that Frémigières sold his office for 40,000 *écus*. This figure would appear far too high, given the prices named in Chapter Three.

[71] Bourdet can be seen on the full *état* of the *Gardes* regiment taken at Bordeaux in September 1620, and his death is noted by Andilly, *Journal*, I, 1621, pp. 89-90. Also see, Jules Sottas, 'État militaire de l'Angoumois, Saintonge et Brouage entre les années 1599 et 1623', *Revue de la Saintonge et l'Aunis*, 34, (1914) pp.165-166.

corps qui ne fussent des Creatures du Duc [d'Épernon][...] & qui ne lui fussent obligez de leurs fortunes'.[72]

However, the 1620 rebellion also demonstrated the limits of Épernon's influence over the permanent regiments. Firstly, most of the defections that occurred were as much, if not more, due to Épernon's power over certain provinces, rather than the authority he held by virtue of his office as Colonel General. The majority of *vieux* defections appear to have occurred among the section of royal forces which were operating in Champagne and the eastern border regions, with officers leaving royal forces to join the marquis de La Valette in Metz. Indeed, in Girard's account, the adherence of these officers to Épernon's cause only occurred at the very end of the rebellion, when he ordered the marquis de La Valette to disarm in order to facilitate peace negotiations. The marquis had only then called for the regiments' protection, in response to the rumours that the town's citizens planned to assassinate him. Other defections also display aspects of regional influence. Both 'Verdelin' and 'Realz', named as rebel officers by Girard, can be found stationed in Angoulême in March 1620, a notable centre of Épernon's power.[73] Épernon's ability to pull officers and companies into rebellion thus seems to have been largely based not on a general influence that he enjoyed over all regimental officers but whether they had been stationed, or were operating, in areas in which he enjoyed regional authority. There does not appear to have been the same level of defections in the main body of royal forces which operated in the north and west of the country during 1620.

Indeed, the majority of officers did not join the rebellion of 1620, and instead stayed loyal to Louis. There is no evidence to suggest, for instance, that any *Gardes* troops or officers joined rebel forces, as had occurred in 1619. Before the critical battle of Les Ponts-de-Cé, a general *montre* of royal forces took place at La Flèche, where, amongst other troops, Andilly noted that the regiments of *Gardes*, *Picardie*, *Piémont*, *Champagne*, *Navarre*, *Normandie*, *Rambures* were subject to *revue*.[74] Only seven *montres* remain from that day, but they hint at the overall loyalty of the permanent

[72]Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*, p. 148; Girard, *Espernon*, III, p. 232; Andilly, *Journal*, I, 1620, p.19; Belhomme, *Histoire*, I, p. 327. As will be seen below, it would appear that the figures cited by Belhomme are far too high.

[73] *État*: BnF Ms.Fr. 16718, ff. 186r-v. A Jacques de Verdelin can also be found in Angoulême in a *revue* from 1616, hinting at possible long-term ties to Épernon. BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (188). One of the other four captains recorded in Angoulême in March 1620 is Breuil, suggesting that his bond to Épernon continued after Breuil's involvement in the 1619 rebellion, and his subsequent near-disgrace.

[74] Andilly, *Journal*, I, 1620, p. 36.

regiments.[75] Many of these units were subsequently deployed in battle, and were sufficient to defeat Marie's forces.[76] By the time of another general *revue* of the regiments which occurred in Poitiers on 3 September 1620, only weeks after Pont-de-Cé, the majority of *vieux* regiments were close to their full complement of twenty companies, as designated in 1611.[77] The presence of the *compagnie colonelle* in each of the regiments at Poitiers even suggested that many *lieutenant colonels* had remained loyal to Louis XIII.[78] Indeed, both Louis and Marie were present at the *revue*, which Louis undertook himself. He felt confident enough of his officers' overall devotion that one regimental captain was even dismissed for blatant muster fraud.[79] The *revue* at Poitiers was thus largely a symbolic demonstration of Louis' military strength to a rebel leader, as much as an administrative affair; an attempt to display the core of regimental units that had remained loyal to him during the rebellion.

The presence or absence of a regimental captain and/or company at the *revues* of 1620 does not necessarily imply they did or did not defect to Épernon in 1620 – it would have been possible for a company to have joined and left the rebellion by early September 1620. Yet it is telling that the companies of known rebels, such as Verdelin and Realz, were absent from the September *revue*, and that *Piémont*, as suggested by Andilly, appeared to have the highest number of missing companies. As such, the *revues* of September 1620 would seem to reinforce the view that only around a dozen or so regimental companies defected to Épernon in 1620, out of a potential number of 100-120 *vieux* companies; a figure which was both notable, but, ultimately, relatively small.[80]

Indeed, it may have been the overall loyalty of the permanent regiments which led to Louis, again, showing relative leniency to officers who had joined the rebellion.

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[75] *Revues*: BnF Ms.Fr. 25845 (260); BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (261-266).

[76] Although, the dramatic last-minute defection of the duke of Retz, and his 1,200 infantry troops, from the rebel forces certainly helped matters.

[77] *Navarre*: seventeen companies; *Picardie*: nineteen companies; *Champagne*: twenty companies; *Piémont*: fifteen companies; *Normandie*: nineteen companies. Additionally, twelve companies of *Rambures* and seven of *Beaumont* were present, but it is not possible to judge the reduction in size that these regiments had undergone, as it is unclear what the normative number of companies per regiment was for *petits-vieux* at this time. *États*: BnF Ms.Fr. 16718, ff. 205v-208r, 221v-223v, 236r-237v, 250r-252v, 266v-269v, 281r-282v, 291v-292r. The *Gardes*, who do not appear to have been mustered at Poitiers, were subject to a general *revue* at Bordeaux in late September 1620. All twenty companies were present (albeit with two companies mustered in nearby Blaye), *États*, BnF Ms.Fr. 16718 ff. 156v-163r.

[78] The *lieutenant colonels* of *Piémont*, *Picardie*, and *Champagne* are listed as present.

[79] Andilly, *Journal*, I, 1620, p. 44.

[80] 120 if *Normandie* is included, 100 if not. This figure would also not include the approximately 20 companies of *Beaumont* and *Rambures*, and any other *petits-vieux*.

According to Girard, Épernon placed pressure on Louis to ensure 'l'oubli' of the affair, meaning that the majority of rebel captains were reinstated, despite the 'dangereux exemple' that they had set.[81] However, Louis did initially hesitate over the reinstatements, and Russell Major suggested that rebel captains may have been forced to wait until new openings arose in the regiments, with Louis bringing in other captains to fill the posts they had vacated by joining Épernon.[82] For example, a 'Realz' who can be found as part of *Champagne* in 1623, may well be the rebel Realz found in *Piémont* in 1620. Rebel officers were thus largely forgiven, but their rehabilitation in the regiments was not necessarily immediate.

In August 1618, Will Becher wrote in his diplomatic correspondence that he believed that the *Gardes* would support the Queen Mother if rebellion were to materialise. Girard backed this assertion, stating that the *Gardes* was essentially 'composé des Creatures du Duc [d'Épernon]' in 1618.[83] Yet only a handful of *Gardes* officers joined Épernon's rebellion in 1619, and even fewer, if any, did so in 1620. This does not completely invalidate either Becher or Girard's statements; many regimental officers who stayed loyal to the monarchy may well have owed varying proportions of their careers to Épernon's assistance. It does, however, show that only a small number of regimental officers were now willing to put their loyalty towards a patron, even one such as Épernon, before serving the monarch, especially as Louis had passed his majority and was now ruling as well as reigning. Whilst the amount of regimental defections in 1620 was thus not negligible, Épernon's waning influence over appointment, and the relatively few opportunities to place clients in the regiments, had undoubtedly sapped much of his influence as Colonel General. Yet given the amount of officers who did defect, it would appear that not even all of those who had some form of link of affinity or 'amitié' to Épernon joined the rebellion. Overall, it would appear that few regimental officers, even amongst those with links to Épernon, wished to lose the benefits of their *charge* through entering into revolt against the crown. As such, the overwhelming majority of officers remained loyal to the crown. The monarchy's ability to directly reward a small set of noble officers, largely from the *petite noblesse* and *noblesse seconde* thus meant that it had a nucleus of loyal soldiers permanently available in the form of the new standing army. Whether

[81] Girard, *Espernon*, III, p. 242
[82] Major, 'Fidelity', p. 405.
[83] Becher to the English Secretary of State, 4 August 1618, NA SP 78/68, f. 91r; Girard, *Espernon*, III, p. 57.

intended or not, this could only decrease the independent military authority of military *grands* such as Épernon, and his *charge* of Colonel General, by placing limits on the strength of any bonds of clientage that he could form with regimental officers.

IV – Honour and Service: The Colonel General during the 1620s

Finally, it is worth considering the influence of Épernon as Colonel General in the decade after the Second War of the Mother and Son. Among the few statements made about the extent of the Colonel General's power in this period, Belhomme wrote that Épernon completely lost the right to make future nominations of regimental captains, lieutenants and ensigns after the revolt of 1619, and was reduced to merely countersigning royal appointments. Thus, if Épernon's *droit de nomination* had been limited and contested since the early 1600s, it had effectively disappeared by the early 1620s.[84] Yet, it would be wrong to contend that Épernon's power over the royal infantry, and specifically the influence he bore due to his office as Colonel General, had been completely eroded by the 1620s. In 1622, for example, one of Épernon's illegitimate sons, Jean-Louis de Nogaret, known as the Chevalier de La Valette, was given the captaincy of the *Gardes* company previously held by Mathurin de Castelnau, who had died at the siege of Montpellier.[85] Whilst this nomination may well have been an anomaly, rather than the norm, it suggests that Épernon had not entirely lost the influence he had previously enjoyed over regimental appointments and appointees. If nothing else, a regulation of 1624 reaffirmed that all *mestres de camp* and captains of the regiments had to take their 'attache' from the Colonel General.[86] This forced these officers to make an act of obeissance to Épernon, even if it did not constitute an effective act of veto over appointment to the standing army.

Similarly, according to Avenel, all new officers received into the regiments remained, technically, bound to ceremonially receive their *hausse-col* (a gorget) from the Colonel General before they could accede to their positions.[87] The extent to which

[84] Belhomme, *L'infanterie*, I, p. 327. Parrot accepts Belhomme's assertions: *Richelieu's Army*, p. 473.
[85] Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 111; Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 250. One of Mathurin's sons, Louis, would subsequently buy the captaincy back from the Chevalier de La Valette in 1633. Whether the Chevalier de La Valette's appointment was made in spite of a claim from a member of the Castelnau is unclear. BnF DB 157 (4109), f. 23.
[86] 'Pouvoir de Commettre aux Offices pour le Colonel General de L'Infanterie Françoise', 31 December 1624, BnF Cangé 21, f. 274r.
[87] Avenel, *Richelieu*, III, p. 61. The *hausse-col* was a piece of armour worn over the neck and collarbone. By the nineteenth century, this piece of armour retained only symbolic value, but it may still

this prescription was practically enforced is unclear, but certain officers certainly seem to have undertaken the ceremony. After Pontis' appointment to the position of lieutenant in the *Gardes* in 1623, he visited Épernon to be formally presented with the *hausse-col* that Pontis had, in actual fact, already received from the king. Pontis stated that the *hausse-col* was a mark of authority given to him by the king, but that the right to present it to officers belonged to Épernon. Épernon was apparently 'un peu surprise, mais très-satisfait' by this request, suggesting that this ceremony was probably not frequently undertaken, yet remained an effective means by which regimental officers could defer to Épernon, and by which the Colonel General could retain a degree of gravitas within the infantry. Indeed, the tone of Pontis' account implied that regimental officers recognised that it was preferable for them to maintain good relations with the Colonel General, even if they were not his clients.[88]

It is also undeniable that Épernon was heavily involved in the royal high command during the campaigns of the 1620s, even if the authority he held was far from constant. The invasion of Béarn in late 1620 was an almost immediate opportunity through which Épernon could demonstrate both his contrition and continued importance to the king.[89] Louis appears to have recognised that, despite Épernon's recent indiscretions, he was a vital figure in the achievement of any military success in Béarn, due to his ability to mobilise men and credit in the south-west of France. As such, he was tasked with bringing Béarn to obedience, and laying the ground for the enforcement of the Edict of Nantes in the province. Épernon was even given ten companies from *Picardie* to facilitate this effort, demonstrating the trust in which Louis held his regimental officers. Whilst it could not completely erase his recent disloyalty, Épernon's success in this expedition may have helped to bring him back into Louis XIII's favour and thus inflated the authority of the Colonel General.[90]

During the subsequent campaigns of the 1620s, Louis continued to try and accommodate Épernon within the royal high command, despite the frequent problems caused by Épernon's conception of his status and honour. When Épernon arrived at the siege of Saint-Jean-d'Angély in 1621, for example, he found the duc de Lesdiguières

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have been used for practical purposes in the early seventeenth century. François Sicard, *Histoire des institutions militaires des Français*, (4 vols., Paris, 1834), III, p. 303.

[88] Pontis, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 390-1.

[89] For an overview of the invasion, see Christian Desplat, 'Louis XIII and the Union of Béarn to France', in Mark Greengrass (ed.), *Conquest and Coalescence: the Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe*, (London, 1991), pp. 68-82.

[90] Girard, *Espernon*, III, pp. 251-60.

effectively in command, because of both his position as *maréchal de camp général* and Constable Luynes' willingness to leave the majority of military matters to him. Épernon told Louis XIII that 'il n'avoit jamais recue Commandement que des Rois ses Maistres' and would thus refuse to receive orders from Lesdiguières, especially as Épernon felt he was a 'plus ancien General d'armée, plus ancien officier de la couronne, & beaucoup plus ancien que lui dans toutes les dignitez où ils étoient tous constituez'. Girard claimed that this request was accorded; Épernon would only, effectively, take orders from the king, despite Lesdiguières' position of superiority at the siege.[91] In the aftermath of the siege of Saint-Jean-d'Angély, Épernon was sent with a separate force of around 5,000 troops to blockade and isolate La Rochelle from wider Huguenot forces. Girard stated that Épernon had been chosen for this role due to his authority in the surrounding *gouvernements* of Aunis, Saintonge, and Angoumois, and because the king could trust him not to enter into any form of conspiracy with the Huguenot rebels in La Rochelle.[92] However, his appointment to this position may also have been to defuse any problems within the high command that stemmed from Épernon's refusal to accept orders from anyone but the king. His office of Colonel General could be used, in part, to justify such an arrangement of marginalised superiority.

If Louis XIII was willing to make concessions to Épernon in 1621 over his position in the high command, he appeared less willing to do so in 1622. Whilst Épernon was sent to carry out the initial investments of Royan in late April 1622, the situation at the siege soon turned against his favour. According to Louis de Marillac, Épernon wanted to secure the town before the arrival of the bulk of royal forces, in order that he could acquire 'la gloire de la prise de cette place'. Not only did he not achieve this, but he was soon forced to serve under Louis de Bourbon, comte de Soissons (a *prince du sang*) after he arrived at the town as the king's *lieutenant général* in early May. Épernon publicly voice his displeasure at having to serve under Soissons, and was also unhappy that the *gouvernement* of the town was eventually given to the *Gardes* captain, Isaac du Raynier, sieur de Droué.[93]

By mid-May, Épernon made his discontent even clearer when the king decided to send a force of 10,000 men back to La Rochelle under the command of

[91] Ibid., III, pp. 267-271.
[92] Ibid., III, pp. 277-8;Bernard, *Guerres*, p. 202.
[93] Louis de Marillac to Richelieu, 29 April, 3 and 4 May 1622, AAE MD 775, ff. 148r-149r, 154r-155r, 156r-157r.

Soissons. Épernon was offered the position of Soissons' lieutenant, but maintained his earlier stance, stating that as he had enjoyed the honour of serving 'le roy directement', he 'ne se peult resoudre a lestre sous un autre'. He did not contest Soissons' appointment, due to his status as a royal prince of the blood. Instead, Épernon asked to serve in royal forces with no official *charge*, other than always being near the king's person.[94] He appears to have been granted this relatively ambiguous role, which guaranteed him a degree of independence from other members of the high command, at the cost of occupying a more prominent position within royal forces. Indeed, Girard does not ascribe to Épernon a particularly leading role in royal operations until the siege of Montpellier where, despite being called to the military council convened by the king, his advice was frequently ignored. Épernon continued to acquire positions of independent command away from the bulk of royal forces during the later 1620s. Most of these operations were focused on Guyenne, a province of which he had been made *gouverneur* in 1622.[95] In 1625, he was given a detachment of 3,000 royal troops to pillage the environs of Montauban, which had declared itself in favour of the Huguenot rebellion of that year. Similarly, in 1628, he refused the position of *lieutenant général* under Condé in the campaign undertaken in Languedoc, in order to continue his own independent operations in Guyenne, again stating that he did not wish to lose the privilege of directly serving the king.[96]

Thus, in the campaigns of the 1620s Épernon's position as Colonel General probably added strength to his requests to take orders directly from the king, rather than other members of the high-command. Épernon's authority was further inflated due to the location of much of the warfare, the south-west of France, where he had retained a great deal of military power outside of royal structures. However, his insistence on retaining a position of independence from other members of the high command led to his progressive marginalisation, especially when he refused to serve under princes of the blood. By the 1620s, the position of Colonel General itself therefore did not guarantee Épernon any form of pre-eminent role within the royal army whilst it was on campaign. That Épernon preferred the command of lesser forces under direct royal control, rather than larger forces which placed him in a subordinate

[94] Louis de Marillac to Richelieu, 12 May 1622, Ibid., ff. 162r-163r.
[95] Thus showing he was not completely out of favour during this period. Girard, *Espernon*, III., pp. 323-349.
[96] Ibid., III., p. 403, 460-6, quote on p. 463.

position to another *grand*, says much about the perception he held of his honour and status.

One final area in which the authority of the Colonel General was not only maintained during the 1620s, but perhaps even increased, was that of upholding discipline and order within the infantry. A regulation of late 1624 stated that the Colonel General was to personally appoint the sergeant-major, aide-major and certain other disciplinary officers to the regiments. This was in order to replace the current situation in which *mestres de camp* had taken control of these appointments, with the result that order within the regiments had become lax, as disciplinary officers were only willing to enforce regulations in a manner pleasing to their regimental patrons. The Colonel General was also given the ultimate authority over the granting of leave, in the form of a signed document called a *congé*, to regimental officers and soldiers. This was, again, to make up for the deficiencies in the oversight previously held by *mestres de camp* in this area, who had purportedly given out *congés* too easily.[97]

This document, in many respects, merely restated powers that the Colonel General supposedly already held. Under the terms of the *traité* of 1605, Épernon was declared responsible for the appointment of 'sergens, & aides de Sergens Majors, Prevôts, [et] Marêchaux des Logis'.[98] Indeed, Pontis recounted an incident from 1621, where the aide-major of *Picardie* had refused to obey his orders during the defence of Montech, despite Pontis having been given temporary command of the regiment. The aide-major stated that he was an 'officier de M. d'Épernon, colonel de l'infanterie' and that in this quality he could not obey Pontis, as he was merely the 'lieutenant de la Mestre de camp, de laquelle M. d'Épernon en la personne de ses officiers ne vouloit point recevoir d'ordre'. In the aftermath of the successful defence of the town, the aide-major accused Pontis of trying to undermine Épernon's *charge*, and a serious dispute between Pontis and Épernon was only narrowly avoided through the intercession of other officers.[99]

The incident thus displayed how Épernon's power over regimental disciplinary officers had possibly come into question by the early 1620s, with figures such as the *mestres de camp* attempting to contest this authority. The regulation of 1624 was thus

[97] 'Pouvoir', BnF Cangé 21, ff. 274r-v.
[98] Girard, *Espernon*, II, p. 251.
[99] Indeed, the subsequent homage that Pontis paid to Épernon through the ceremony of the *hausse-col* was probably a means by which Pontis attempted to ensure that no ill-feeling continued to exist between them. Pontis, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 320-332, quote on p. 320.

a powerful sign that the monarchy wished to maintain the eminence of the Colonel General over discipline within the infantry, in the face of encroachment by other regimental figures. The utility of the Colonel General being able to make appointments of disciplinary officers, and thus the utility of the position *per se*, was far from negligible. As the episode at Montech displayed, it allowed Épernon to maintain clients at a regimental level who would pursue his interests wherever possible.

An incident described by Pontis also demonstrated how the Colonel General's disciplinary authority worked in practice by the late 1620s, and, particularly, how it was used to end disputes between the noblemen who inhabited the regimental officer corps. In 1628, Pontis had become involved in a dispute with the sieur de Canaples, who had effectively been made *mestre de camp* of the *Gardes* in 1621.[100] Canaples had reneged on a promise to allow Pontis to command the *enfants perdus* in a proposed attack on the English.[101] The disagreement between the two became sufficiently heated for Pontis to draw his sword, and for Canaples subsequently to accuse Pontis of trying to assassinate him. The affair was adjudicated by Épernon. He stated that he saw the position of Colonel General as essential to preventing the 'désordre' that existed among overly ambitious infantry officers, who were attempting to assume powers above their station. The good favour that Pontis enjoyed with Épernon by 1628, born in no small part from acts of deference such as that involving the *hausse-col*, was critical to Pontis' acquittal; although it is notable that the king told Épernon to take the advice of the *maréchaux* and other 'principaux officiers de l'armée' before a definitive decision was reached. Pontis' description of Épernon as the 'premier juge' of the infantry by the late 1620s may well, therefore, have been true.[102]

In some respects, the authority of the Colonel General was a function of the level of royal favour in which Épernon was held. The lofty influence of the office during the 1580s can thus be explained as a temporary anomaly, springing largely from the privileged position enjoyed by Épernon under Henri III. As he descended from his towering position as a royal *mignon* and lost favour under Henri IV, his ability to

[100] Créquy would technically continue to hold the position until 1633. Susane, *Ancienne*, II, pp. 1, 44-5
[101] The *enfants perdus* were essentially a small detachment of advanced forces which would lead forces into battle.
[102] Moreover, Canaples' own father, Créquy, declared himself in favour of Pontis in the matter. Pontis, *Mémoires*, pp. 24-38, quotes on pp. 34, 37.

make regimental nominations was restricted, for the new Bourbon ruler wished to significantly diminish the clout that Épernon held within the infantry. Accordingly, he never again enjoyed the level of dominance that he had possessed under Henri III. Yet, the new-found stability of the regiments helped ensured that at least some of the men Épernon had been able to appoint to officerships in the 1580s remained in their posts by the 1610s. Moreover, Épernon's ability to influence appointments was never fully eradicated after 1589, and he succeeded in placing a certain number of clients in the regiments. A wider number of regimental officers may have recognised that they owed some part of their careers to him, even if to describe them as Épernon's 'clients' would be an exaggeration. Overall, the vagaries of royal favour are thus insufficient to explain fully the changing nature of the Colonel General's power during the period of this thesis.

Instead, Épernon's authority as Colonel General was more clearly affected by the transformation of a number of royal regiments into the core of a new standing army during the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century; a transformation which reconfigured the relationship between the higher and lower echelons of the nobility within the royal army. Already, in the 1600s and 1610s, Épernon's ability to nominate clients to company positions was challenged, even within the *compagnies colonelles*, by the growing idea that the permanent regiments constituted a 'career army' in which long-term service should be rewarded by progressive promotion of existing officers through the company ranks. Yet, the effects of the emergence of the standing army can be seen most clearly during the revolts of 1619 and 1620. In both years, Épernon was only able to convince around 10% of regimental officers, at most, to defect and join the rebel forces. Moreover, the officers who defected were often long-term followers of Épernon, or were operating in geographical areas in which he held sway, and thus provide stronger evidence for Épernon's provincial power than a general authority he held over the infantry by virtue of his office of Colonel General. Overall, the vast majority of infantry units and officers remained loyal to the king in both rebellions.

Given the potential consequences of rebellion, for 10% of the army to defect was still a notable amount. That this figure was not higher nevertheless attests to the fact that the overwhelming majority of regimental officers did not wish to imperil the social advantages they had gained via service in the standing army by following a *grand* into rebellion. The clear dynastic benefits of relatively direct service to the crown within the royal regiments had thus fragmented and weakened the bonds

between, on the one hand, *grands* who held positions of supra-regimental authority and, on the other, officers from the *petite noblesse* and *noblesse seconde*. Links of affinity and 'amitié' continued to exist between the higher and lower echelons of the nobility who held royal military office, yet the emergence of the standing army meant the monarchy had a body of force at its disposal which was fundamentally more loyal to the crown than its previous armies. One could thus argue that the monarchy had made progress towards achieving a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within France by the late 1620s. As long as service within the standing army continued to satisfy the family ambitions of the nobles who formed the regimental officer corps, not even a *grand* such as Épernon would be able to take the majority of the royal army with them into rebellion. Indeed, the standing army meant the monarchy could be less beholden to the whims of the *grands* during its military operations.

Further consequences for the *grands* of this shift towards a more monarchy-centred army can be seen in Épernon's experiences in the 1620s. In many respects, the Colonel General remained an influential figure within the royal army. He was able to acquire his own army groups; infantry officers were theoretically meant to pay homage to him during their accession to office; and the Colonel remained a leading figure in military discipline – in this case, the Colonel General was clearly an asset to the crown in its overweening struggle to impose order on an extremely unruly society, including the army. Indeed, Épernon himself seems to have increasingly moved towards basing his status and honour on the military service he performed for the monarchy in his role as Colonel General, instead of his capacity for military action outside of the aegis of royal military structures. Thus, the standing army encouraged not only the lower nobility holding office within the regiments, but *grands* holding positions of supra-regimental authority, to place themselves much more firmly within the king's military service than before. Such a position, however, was by no means irreversible by 1635.

Conclusion

The Army, the Nobility and the Monarchy.

French infantry forces did not appear from nowhere in 1598. The *bandes* and temporary regiments levied before the 1590s displayed similarities to later methods of infantry administration. The more continuous nature of the conflicts that the royal army had engaged in from the mid sixteenth century helped to create a segment of noble society which viewed themselves, and the male members of their families, as career soldiers. The changes described in this thesis could not have occurred without such earlier developments. Yet, it was not until the aftermath of the Peace of Vervins in 1598 that certain royal regiments were given the stability required for a true change in the nature of the French infantry, and hence military system, to occur: in short, this was the rise of the standing army. This army was based on certain premises, the most fundamental of which was that regimental office could be securely held in the long-term, usually until the death or resignation of its incumbent, rather than being created and then disbanded before and after periods of warfare.

It is important to note again that the primary purpose of such a force was to achieve certain aspirations of the Bourbon dynasty, and hence the French monarchy. The decision to permanently maintain a core of infantry units in royal service after the Peace of Vervins may well have been influenced by the crown's desire to ensure that it was not caught unawares by the outbreak of conflict, as the Valois had been in the early 1560s. Thus, after 1598, the permanent regiments formed the nucleus around which temporary units, often organised by loyal *grands*, coalesced when the monarchy undertook periods of military campaigning. Yet, notwithstanding the crown's centrality in the creation of new military offices, this thesis has argued that the rise of the standing army was only possible because long-term service within the royal regiments had sufficient appeal for the dynastic ambitions of at least certain French noble families.

During the early seventeenth century, around 300 permanent military offices became available at a company level within the *vieux* regiments, and as the *petits-vieux* joined the standing army, hundreds more such positions arose. As has been shown, these *charges* were rapidly monopolised by certain noble families, who primarily emanated from the *petite noblesse* and *noblesse seconde*. Families desired these offices due to the tangible benefits regimental service could bring. As many noble officers came from relatively humble backgrounds, the wages and allowances they received could constitute a significant increase in their income, perhaps even

saving them from destitution. Yet even for those nobles who only gained a marginal financial advantage through their service, or none at all in net cash-flow balance, the social and longer-term economic benefits of acquiring regimental office were potentially considerable. Even though military service, as opposed to merely managing the estate, might require significantly greater financial outlays, officers had the satisfaction of no longer festering in provincial backwaters with low-grade social interaction. The career nature of the new standing army meant service could lead to progressive promotion to higher military and even non-military *charges*. Nobles could enjoy the general improvement of social stature and honour that was achieved by being seen as close to, and often recognised by, the king. Such proximity to royal power notably improved the patronage opportunities wielded by regimental officers, and also brought them into contact with exalted patrons. Indeed, the influence that captains themselves held over appointing officers to their companies meant that they could confuse the lines between a 'patron', 'broker' and 'client', as described by Sharon Kettering, and enhance their own standing.[1] Moreover, being an officer within the standing army allowed a nobleman to raise himself and his family into a new social milieu. Families of similar social standing entered into horizontal alliances with each other, transcending narrow provincialism, and better marriage prospects brought opportunities for capital and asset acquisition on a higher level than before, which was not an unimportant matter for officers who needed to subsidise their own service or even subsidise their units.[2] Regimental service thus allowed men to enter a world where they could more easily pursue their overall family strategy of social ascension. Indeed, this thesis has argued that the rise of venality within the regiments was not merely a reflection of the practical costs of military service, but of the widespread recognition that these offices held considerable social value, which allowed nobles to sell them for a premium.

Holding regimental office also appealed to the cultural instincts of the nobility, and especially the continuing importance that many nobles ascribed to military service for their self-definition and self-worth. That the monarchy attempted to play to these instincts can be seen in the *Code Michau* of 1629. This document stated that the crown wanted both its permanent infantry and cavalry companies to be 'remplies des enfans

[1] Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients*, pp. 3-11.
[2] For example, Fabien de Biran, an officer in the *Gardes*, received a dowry of 3,000 *livres* when he married Françoise de Briqueville in 1617. BnF Cabinet 46, f. 16r.

de nostre noblesse, & qu'en chacune Compagnie il y en ait *au moins la quatriesme partie*'.[3] The monarchy thus proposed that the nobility were not only to command the standing army, but that they were also to fill a proportion of the body – in the rank-and-file – that far exceeded the percentage of wider society that it represented.[4] Based on the strength of contemporary ideas which linked warfare to noble status, the monarchy even toyed with the idea, in 1626, of ennobling the families of common soldiers who had undertaken lengthy periods of military service.[5] Admittedly, this measure was not enacted, and participation in warfare was never a precondition of noble status during the early seventeenth century. Yet, evidently, it was widely felt that holding office within the standing army could help to prove, consolidate or even improve the perception of a family's status within the nobility, due to the 'moral and physical qualities' that were required in warfare and military command.[6] That the crown desired its armed forces to be dominated by the nobility also demonstrated the privileged position that this estate held with respect to acquiring royal offices.

Thus, members of the *petite noblesse* and *noblesse seconde* were enticed into joining the standing army's officer corps due to the financial, social and cultural benefits that such service could bring to themselves and their families. Had these rewards not existed, the monarchy would not have been able to find the body of men who became its regimental officer corps. Indeed, as the first three chapters of this thesis have demonstrated, families attempted to hold regimental *charges* for as long as possible once they had acquired them, in order to accrue as many dynastic advantages from their positions as they could, unless in the meantime they acquired higher office. If anything, prior to 1635, a major problem with the standing army was that it did not provide *enough* opportunities for long-term service. The expansion of the standing army to incorporate the *petits-vieux* was possible, at least in part, because more nobles wanted to acquire regimental offices than were available in the *vieux*. Given the further expansion of the army after 1635, and the rush of nobles in the mid-1630s to take up freshly-created positions in new units, it can be postulated with reasonable

[3] Code Michau, art. 200, my emphasis.
[4] As with so much of the *Code Michau*, it is unclear whether this measure was enacted, given the reluctance of much of the French nobility to serve in the infantry ranks, a problem that had been apparent since at least the 1580s. Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 55-56.
[5] An unenforced 'reglement' from 1626 proposed that the children of any soldier who died after twenty years of military service, or who was killed in action after ten years, would receive noble status: 'Projet de Reglement de Guerre', January 1626, BnF Cangé 22, f. 46r.
[6] Parrott, 'Military Enterprise', p. 78.

certainty that the standing army during the early seventeenth century never fully met the demands of the nobility for military office. Indeed, the participation of Frenchmen within foreign armies during this period might partly be explained by the lack of opportunities which were available in a relatively small number of native permanent regiments.[7]

Continuing a process which had begun with the Habsburg-Valois wars of the first half of the sixteenth century, the civil wars of the second half of the century had thus shaped and stimulated, mainly from the 1580s and beyond 1598, new and more reliable frameworks for royal military patronage through which the nobility could be more firmly drawn into crown service. These 'opportunités de la Guerre' helped to create an 'interdependence' between a section of the nobility and the monarchy.[8] Certain nobles were increasingly reliant on new royal offices within the standing army for the status of their family within French society, whilst the monarchy became dependent on these men to form the core of its armed forces. The process of early modern military change, that at least in some respects went hand-in-hand with the emergence of the monarchical or 'absolute' state, was not inherently threatening to the nobility and, indeed, the co-operation of this estate was necessary for military evolution to occur.

However, it is possible to argue that the creation of a force based on a more direct relationship between the monarchy and a section of the *petite noblesse* and *noblesse seconde* did negatively affect another part of the nobility, the *grands*. Clearly, the high nobility remained important, if not vital, to the operation of royal forces, particularly during periods when it was necessary to rapidly levy large numbers of temporary units to add to the core of permanent forces. Yet, the authority of the *grands* over royal military structures diminished as the body became a standing army. Certain prestigious supra-regimental offices, such as that of Constable, afforded their incumbents few definite powers over the new force. The influence of such positions

[7] The service of French soldiers, whether commoners or nobles, in foreign forces during the sixteenth and early seventeenth century is a topic which has received insufficient attention, especially due to its importance in matters such as military education, and the construction of cross-border dynastic and confessional networks. Works which have addressed, but in a short way, the issue include: Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 29-32; D. J. B. Trim, 'Huguenot Soldiering, c. 1560-1685, The Origins of a Tradition', in M. Glozier and D. Onnekink (eds.), *War, Religion and Service: Huguenot Soldiering, 1685-1715*, (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 9-30; Dewald, *Aristocratic Experience*, pp. 48-49; Finkel, 'French Mercenaries', pp. 451-471. For contemporary examples of such service, see, for example, Bassompierre's participation in the Imperial armies in 1603-1604, or Pontis' various escapades during the1600s: Bassompierre, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 98-154; Pontis, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 228-242.

[8] Bourquin, *Noblesse seconde*, pp.37-57; Potter, *War and the Provinces*, p.114.

could thus be marginalised by other nobles who now held offices that could more explicitly affect how the regiments operated, including ostensibly non-military *charges* such as the *Surintendant des finances*. The patronage opportunities of offices such as the Colonel General were also considerably reduced after the reign of Henri III, particularly in matters such as appointment. On the other hand, such positions still had their uses. They were still considered prestigious rewards and affirmations of a grandee's power, and could be of real practical assistance in subsidising, administering and controlling a still-fractious officer corps and ill-disciplined troops. However, and perhaps more importantly, the informal influence that the *grands* wielded over the lower nobility was weakened by the new offices within the standing army. Few nobles within the regiments now wished to jeopardise the advantages that they gained for their families through regimental service.

Consequently, whilst links continued to exist between the higher and lower nobility within the standing army, many of the latter were increasingly unwilling to champion the interests of a *grand* before those of the crown. This can be most clearly seen in the revolts of 1619-1620, when only a small minority of regimental officers followed Épernon into rebellion. Indeed, there may well have been a rising sense of military professionalism amongst regimental officers by the late 1620s, due to the career nature of the army, which encouraged a sense of pride and duty in their service to the monarchy. This bears out Rowlands' argument that the standing army helped to dissolve the 'rather static, fixed province-orientated bonds between *grands* and the lesser nobility'. Inter-regimental promotion and long-term service ensured that officers might serve under several *mestres de camp*, whilst the social advancement that could be achieved through long-term service in the standing army meant the ambitions of the lower nobility were more closely tied to the monarch than any individual *grand*.[9] But, it has been a contention of this thesis that in smaller but still significant ways this process was already in motion well before the second half of the seventeenth century, the era in which this development is more often placed.

Thus, the standing army was a far more monarchy-centred body of force than had previously existed in France, and the crown was significantly closer to achieving a monopoly over the use of armed force by 1635 than in 1598, especially after the Peace of Alais in 1629, the real end of the Wars of Religion. This had only occurred as the

[9] Rowlands, 'Monopolisation', p. 159. See also, Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, pp. 349-361, especially p. 360.

new standing army responded to the ambitions of French noble families in a number of ways. Despite the peace treaties of 1598, the nobility had clearly lost little of its proclivity for warfare or, perhaps, violence more generally. The beginnings of a professional officer corps through the regimental system allowed, to quote Stuart Carroll, the 'more systematic redeployment of those whose profession was arms, [and] who claimed the right to violence' into the monarchy's service.[10] They did so as the monarchy increasingly monopolised 'le don de charges, d'honneurs et d'argent' in the military domain, and thus made itself 'celui qu'il était le plus avantageux de servir'.[11] As part of the lower nobility recognised this new state of affairs, it engaged itself more directly in royal service than before. Moreover, many of the *grands* also began to assert their status more according to the royal offices they held than the weight of their autonomous military entourages, as their ability to influence the military lower nobility was proportionally reduced.

Overall, by the early 1630s, the mutation in the nature of royal armed forces had led to two fundamental changes in the nature of the relationship between the monarchy and the nobility. Firstly, the nobility, even up to the level of the *grands*, had begun to define itself more openly in terms of being a royal 'military service élite'[12] in return for 'les bienfaits du roi'. Secondly, and closely linked to the first change, the standing army was helping to construct a situation where, as Ronald Asch has put it, 'the authority and status of noblemen was defined more in terms of privileges granted by the state and less in terms of autonomous power than in the past'.[13] However, neither of these trends was immutable, and the potential for the *grands* to re-empower their position within royal forces after 1635 was there, and would be realised.

Given these developments, it is perhaps worth contemplating at this juncture whether changes in the nature of the royal army during the early seventeenth century were reflective of the emergence of a new type of overall political organisation in France. Indeed, the first half of seventeenth century has often been seen as giving birth

[10] It should be noted that Carroll argued that this process began with the 'creation of a standing army in the fifteenth century' and culminated with the 'militarization of the nobility under Louis XIV into a professional officer corps'. I would instead stress the importance of the new standing army based on infantry regiments, rather than the older body of the *gendarmerie*, to this process, and that a professional officer corps was created before Louis XIV's reign. Carroll, *Blood and Violence*, pp. 332-333.

[11] Jouanna, *Devoir*, p. 84.

[12] To reiterate the point made by Scott and Storrs, 'Introduction', p. 46.

[13] Asch, *Nobilities*, p. 154. Jouanna makes similar points specifically about the French nobility, Jouanna, *Devoir*, pp. 111-116.

to a new form of government in France: absolutism. Whilst the exact meaning of this term has been contested by historians, Bonney has plausibly stated that the 'simplest definition' of 'absolute power' is a form of government in which the monarch enjoyed '"freedom [...] in practice from institutional checks on his power".[14] To achieve this state of affairs, an absolute monarch was a ruler who attempted to monopolise all contemporary marques of sovereignty. These included matters such as the right to conduct foreign policy, to make law, to enforce taxes, and, critically for this discussion, the sole privilege to authorise the use of military force.[15] The prince was thus the unique source of legitimacy for all public power, and for all the privileges that certain members of society enjoyed. However, an absolute monarch did not wield unlimited power, and 'he had to operate within bounds fixed by society as a whole.'[16]

The findings of this thesis would suggest that between the 1590s and the early 1630s, the rise of the early standing army meant that the crown was moving noticeably towards a monopoly over the legitimate use of armed force in France, and hence made significant movement towards the construction of absolute monarchy. The emergence of new royal offices within the regiments bolstered the impression that only positions within the royal army possessed 'legitimate military authority'.[17] Elements of the nobility accepted the emphasis on the 'absolute' nature of the monarchy's military power, as it underlined the legitimacy and prestige of the royal offices that they held themselves. The consequent reduction in the power of the *grands* within the standing army, as demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, is further evidence that the monarchy was moving towards a situation in which the standing army both positively and negatively helped the crown achieve a monopoly of the use of legitimate force.

Indeed, the rise of the standing army was only part of the monarchy's attempts to enforce its sole right to possess and employ armed force during the early seventeenth century. Articles within the *Code Michau* stated that the crown wanted to restrict the possession of artillery to royal arsenals. Since the 1600s, there had also been a relatively successful effort to dismantle France's internal fortresses, which had

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[14] Bonney, 'Absolutism', p. 94.

[15] Hodson, 'Sovereigns and Subjects', pp.29-30; Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs and H. M. Scott, 'Introduction', in Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs and H. M. Scott (eds.), *Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 1-5; Guy Rowlands 'Response to Jim Collins' review of Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State* [...]' *H-France Review*, 5 (2005). <http://www.h-france.net/vol5reviews/rowlands.html> [8 November, 2010].

[16] Collins, *The State*, pp.xix. My emphasis.

[17] To use the phrase employed by Rowlands, 'Monopolisation', p. 139.

multiplied during the civil wars.[18] The campaigns against the Huguenots during the 1620s also put an end to a significant domestic challenge to the monarchy's military power. Perhaps the most naked sign of the crown's intentions was article 216 of the *Code Michau*, which declared that no person could arm themselves without letters patent from a Secretary of State, enclosed by the crown's 'grand sceau'.[19] The crown was thus clearly confident enough by 1629 to pass measures which stressed its unique privilege to levy and possess armed force within the French kingdom; a situation which was further reflected by the formal interdiction of military venality. The existence of a standing army, staffed by the nobility, and in which even members of the *grands* had begun to redefine their status more overtly as based on their service to the monarchy, can only have encouraged the crown further in making such claims of 'absolute power'.

Yet, for the monarchy to achieve a real monopoly over legitimate military authority in France, there had to be a much greater 'political and ideological' acceptance of this fact on the part of the French nobility than existed by the early 1630s. Arguably, it required the Frondes and the firm grip of a monarch ruling as well as reigning after 1661 for this to transpire.[20] Moreover, whether one wishes to label the monarchy as 'absolute' or not by 1635, one has to recognise the sheer extent of the concessions that the crown was required to make to elements of the nobility in order for them to join its officer corps, as evidenced in this thesis.[21] The new French polity, which the standing army had helped produce, was thus a complex amalgam by the early 1630s. The royal government enjoyed a higher level of undivided theoretical sovereignty and stronger practical power due to the emergence of new structures of monarchical offices. However, such a state could only arise if these offices satisfied the ambitions of at least a certain number of French noble families. Were the interests of noble office-holders not respected, both the theoretical and actual limits of royal sovereignty and power could potentially be reduced.

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[18] *Code Michau*, arts. 213, 214; Rowlands, 'Monopolisation', p. 147.

[19] The 'attache' of the *gouverneur* of the province in which the armament was occurring was also required. This measure was probably included in order that *gouverneurs* could more easily determine whether provincial nobles had made authorised or unauthorised levies, as all nobles had to receive authorisation from the *gouverneur* at some stage for a levy to be considered legitimate.

[20] Rowlands, 'Monopolisation', p. 160.

[21] Indeed, James Collins has recently argued against the continuing use of absolutism as an explanatory tool for the early modern French monarchy, as it frequently misleads non-specialists into the belief that the crown wielded despotic power. He instead prefers to use the term 'monarchical state' to describe the form of government seen in France during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Collins, *The State*, pp. ix-xxv.

Thus, the situation described hitherto would appear to give credence to Wood's contention that 'developing government institutions' in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 'might have been forced to accommodate themselves to the prevailing aristocratic society as much as the nobility was forced to conform to the political regime.'[22] This was not least the case with regard to the army, because much of the military evolution that occurred during the early seventeenth century had not been explicitly planned or ordered by the monarchy. Even the decision to maintain permanently a certain number of regiments in 1598 should be seen as a largely pragmatic manoeuvre which eventually had far reaching changes, rather than a purposefully revolutionary moment in French military history. Indeed, the fact that no substantial sets of military *ordonnances* appear after 1598 until the mid-1620s demonstrates that the royal government was largely *reacting* to changes in the nature of French infantry forces by this later date, rather than driving the process forward itself. The transformation of royal forces into a standing army was largely an organic affair. And, if anything, by the 1620s the crown had begun to display a certain degree of uneasiness with the manner in which royal forces had evolved over the previous twenty years.

Such disquiet can be seen in the 'projet de reglement de guerre' of 1626. Whilst the document does not appear to have been enacted, it gives a fascinating glimpse into the monarchy's fears regarding the emergence of the standing army. The text begins by stating its displeasure at the 'commandement trop continu' that many had enjoyed in 'places fortes' but also 'dans nos troupes de gens de guerre'. This had reached a point in the past where some commanders had been able to use their positions against royal authority. As, however, the text also noted that others had joined past rebellions due to the lack of opportunities for royal military service, the regulation attempted to strike a balance between forging a military establishment with prospects for service, whilst rigorously asserting the complete authority of the monarchy over all military *charges*.

Accordingly, the draft 'reglement' proposed that a permanent infantry force of 30,000 men should be maintained, but explicitly stated that the king alone would hold the right to nominate *all* regimental positions above that of ensign. The king's prefence in making such appointments would be to choose the 'plus anciens et

[22] Wood, *Nobility*, p. 170.

valeureux' who were already enrolled in the army. Aside from the *Gardes* retaining its predominance, all other regiments were to be held in equal stature. All regiments were also to be named after a royal province, rather than a *mestre de camp*, again emphasising that the units belonged to the monarchy and were thus, aside from one elite unit, inherently equal. Crucially, within the regiments, the monarchy moved to ensure that no captain could wield untrammelled power over the 'compagnie qu'il commandera pour notre service'. Captains and subalterns were not even to be written on the roll of any particular company 'pourcequ'ils ne doivent point estre particulierement attachés a aucune compagnie', and would hence change the company that they commanded from year to year. [23]

Whilst the crown had thus evidently accepted the benefits of maintaining a standing army, which if anything it wished to increase in size in order to improve the nobility's prospects for service, it was also clearly worried about the level of authority that certain regimental officers held over their companies. This was despite the fact that only a small minority of officers appear to have defected to rebel forces during the late 1610s and 1620s. Consequently, the draft regulation seriously contemplated measures which would break the bond between nobles and ordinary soldiers, by forcing officers to take up new company commands on a yearly basis. Whilst this would diminish regimental *esprit des corps*, it would also lessen any likelihood that officers could persuade their companies to follow them into rebellion, were this eventuality to arise. The measures relating to appointment displayed that the monarchy was ostensibly willing to respect some of the customs that had organically emerged in the early standing army, namely that progressive promotion through the regimental grades would occur in return for long-term service. However, the insistence that the monarch was responsible for the nominations to all regimental posts signalled that the crown wished to make its power over appointment more explicit, perhaps in an attempt to counter the belief amongst some regimental captains that they now effectively held the right to name company subalterns, and to designate the successor to their company command.

The proposed regulation thus more aggressively foreshadowed the *Code Michau* of 1629, as both texts sought to place definite limits on the level of sovereignty that the crown was prepared to devolve to its military officers. As shown

[23] 'Projet de Reglement de Guerre', January 1626, Bnf Cangé 22, ff.30r-46r, quotes from ff., 30r, 35v.

in Chapter Three of this thesis, the *Code Michau* again demonstrated that the monarchy was prepared to offer progressive promotion, and hence social advancement, in return for regimental service. However, the document also explicitly outlawed the purchase and sale of royal military offices, emphasising that regimental officers did not own their *charge* and could technically be removed from their position at any time by the crown.

The regulation of 1626 was not enacted, and many of the measures contained within the *Code Michau*, such as the interdiction of venality, were only spasmodically enforced when convenient. Nonetheless, the documents of 1626 and 1629 are extremely revealing of the monarchy's somewhat troubled mindset by the early 1630s with regard to its armed forces that had been evolving rather too organically for comfort. The royal government had recognised many of the advantages of having a standing army, both in relation to the increased military power of the crown, but also in terms of improving its relationship with the nobility. Indeed, the crown clearly wanted its standing army to be dominated by the nobility, and to openly reward the men who served within it. Yet, the monarchy also wanted to prevent the emergence of any force which would potentially confuse the distinction between royal and private military property. Given the previous seventy years of intermittent civil warfare, such a concern was perhaps understandable. But, it meant that one of the most important foundations upon which the standing army had been forged was beginning to be brought under question: the ability of the nobility to hold military office securely in the long-term, during which period the dynastic benefits of service could be accrued.

The timing for such a development could not have been worse, as it almost perfectly coincided with the beginning of a major war against Spain in 1635, and France's much wider involvement in the Thirty Years' War. Because certain officers *had* achieved their dynastic aspirations through service in the permanent regiments, other members of the French nobility flocked to the infantry officer corps once it began to notably expand in the 1630s. Due to the paucity of positions within the *vieux* and *petits-vieux*, noblemen began to take positions within newly formed units, which may have appeared to have been an expansion of the existing standing army. Yet, due to the continuing official prohibition against regimental venality after 1629, the monarchy was able to disband, reduce or reorganise these units at will. Indeed, Parrott has shown that the threat of enacting such measures was systematically used by the crown in order to 'persuade commanders to support the upkeep of their units with their

own funds'.[24] Nobles who refused to advance their credit, particularly within the newer regiments, risked losing their office with no compensation in return.

Ultimately, such a system was counter-productive. Captains were loath to maintain their units at anything *but* the minimum number of troops required, due to the fear that they could lose their commissions at any moment. The bulk of the French army after 1635 was consequently witness to low-unit strengths, appallingly high levels of unit turnover and wastage, and a force mainly comprised of inexperienced officers who frequently deserted due to the financial pressures of service. As both the monarchy and its officers struggled to meet the army's financial requirements, military payment structures collapsed. Consequently, desperate soldiers began to prey more and more on civilians, threatening the kingdom's wider societal stability. By the 1640s, France began to edge towards the abyss of breakdown.[25]

Much of Richelieu's ability to field a larger royal army after 1635 was thus achieved through his exploitation of the good will that had emerged between elements of the nobility and the monarchy due to the early standing army. Ambitious newcomers wanted to join this force in order to achieve similar social advancement to the existing officer corps; instead, they were essentially forced into becoming a subsidiary, transient part of the royal army, where they formed little more than temporary bodies of muscle and credit for the monarchy to exploit. Richelieu was able to manipulate the new officers in this manner as no official guarantees of the permanency or ownership of regimental office were given by the monarchy – a situation which reflected the *official*, but not *actual* manner in which the standing army had operated prior to 1630. Indeed, newcomers were essentially being asked to join something closer to the pre-1598 infantry, which had mainly consisted of frequently reformed and reorganised regiments, rather than the considerably more secure post-1598 system witnessed in the *vieux* and *petits-vieux*. Consequently, as the relationship between the monarchy and many of its noble office-holders in the army broke down after 1635, so did the effectiveness of its armed forces, which contributed to the kingdom's wider social instability by the 1640s. Such a sequence of events says much about both the nature of the relationship between the monarchy and the nobility, and also the nascent 'absolute' state, during the early seventeenth century.

[24] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 329.
[25] Ibid., pp.328-364, 543-546.

Thus, rather than being presented as a transitional force, the army of the early seventeenth century studied in this dissertation should perhaps be seen as representative of a particular, *sui generis* era of military development. The specific political, social, and cultural circumstances of the early seventeenth century permitted the creation of a small standing army in a manner which had not previously been possible, and which differed sufficiently to the forces which would precede and succeed it for it to be considered unique. Indeed, at least within the seventeenth century, French military development appears to have occurred in at least three largely self-contained periods of time, rather than in a consistent movement towards progressively improved forces.[26] Particular conditions conspired to produce the early standing army between c.1598 and 1635, the near collapse of this body from c.1635 to 1660, and the reconstruction and expansion of this force from c.1660 to the 1690s. There might even be the potential for further sub-divisions within these eras, to reflect other relatively unique periods of military change. In each of these phases, while the varying needs of domestic and international politics shaped the size, or projected size, of the army, the fundamental determinant of the real strength and character of the royal army was the monarchy's relationship with the nobility. Only by understanding the development of the royal army in these terms, as a constantly mutating body which reflected specific historical conditions, will a fuller understanding of French military development be achieved.

[26] Parrott has made a similar argument when he stated: 'the personal rule of Louis XIV may better be seen as a reaction against, rather than a building upon, the regime of the cardinal ministers.': Ibid, p. 556.

Appendix One

Companies and Captains of the *vieux* Regiments.

Appendix One is comprised of two tables.

The first table will note the number of companies within the *vieux* at certain dates between 1588 and 1623. The dates for this table have been chosen on the basis of remaining *états*, as these are the only documents which consistently record the total number of companies within a regiment at a given moment in time during the period of this thesis.

The second table contains the name of every captain and *mestre de camp* within the *vieux* regiments found on the *revues* and *états* analysed for this thesis, which cover most of the period between 1588 and 1629 (see above, p. 15). Additionally, instead of listing the duc d'Épernon as a captain, the various *lieutenant colonels* have instead been included, due to their role as the *de facto* captain of the *compagnie colonelle*. Cases where a person was a *lieutenant colonel*, a *mestre de camp* or a 'captain "retenuz"', rather than an ordinary captain, have been noted.

Captains who appear on multiple occasions within the *revues* and *états* have been grouped together in the same entry. Where it has not been possible to *categorically* confirm that the repeated appearance of a similar name on a *revue* or *état* relates to the same individual, entries have been left separate. Possible connections between an identified individual and unidentified namesakes have been noted.

Finally, and unlike in the rest of the dissertation, *Normandie* has been included as part of the *vieux* in both appendices, in order to give a fuller picture of the workings which underlie this thesis.

Abbreviations:

N/S: Not-stated.

P/C: Possible connection to another entry.

I – the Number of Companies per vieux *Regiment, 1588-1623*

	1588	**1597**	**1610**	**1620**	**1623**
Gardes	12	20	18	20	-
Picardie	17	46	15	23	20
Piémont	-	20	18	23	-
Champagne	14	27	19	27	20
Navarre	-	25	20	19	-
Normandie	-	-	-	19	20

A dash indicates that either no *état* exists, or that none has been located, for the regiment for the date in question.

As previously stated, each company contained a captain, lieutenant and ensign, together with a varying amount of lower officers such as sergeants and corporals. The total number of soldiers per company varied (see Chapter One, Section III).

II – the Captains of the vieux *Regiments, 1588-1629*

Surname	First Name		Seignurie(s)	Place(s)	Regiment(s)	Date(s)	Source(s)	Notes
Acarie	Jean	d'	sieur du Bourdet	Bordeaux	*Gardes*	27/11/1615, 21/09/1620	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/151; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, 160v	
Achart				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 163v	Captain 'retenuz'
Albert	Leon	d'	sieur de Brante	Paris	*Gardes*	13/03/1618; 25/05/1618; 20/10/1618	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845/207, 216, 230	
Albert	Honoré	d'	sieur de Cadenet and duc de Chaulnes.	Poitiers; Montpellier.	*Normandie*	03/09/1620; 26/02/1623.	*État*,Ms.Fr. 16718 f. 266v; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.244v.	*Mestre de camp*
Angest				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 163v	Captain 'retenuz'
Anthon	Baron d'		baron d'Anthon	Meurier	*Champagne*	20/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.186r	
Antist	Paul	d'	sieur de Mansan	Angers (near); Paris; Saint-Germaine-en-Laye; N/S; Paris; Paris; Bordeaux.	*Gardes*	04/04/1598; 11/09/1601; 27/07/1605; 1610; 06/01/1618; 10/02/1618; 21/09/1620.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1446; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1708; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1947; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845/204, 206; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, 160r.	P/C:‘Mansan’; ‘Mansan, Paul de’.
Applaincourt	Charles	d'		Bordeaux; Montereau; Paris; Paris.	*Gardes*	21/09/1620; 10/05/1621; 25/05/1627; 29/06/1627.	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, 162r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/275; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25848/479, 481.	
Apremont				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.269v	
Arques				Champagne (as advised by Nevers)	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Arques				Provence	*Piémont*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 141v.	
Arques	Bernard	d'		Aubenton;	*Piémont*	08/10/1598;	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1510;	P/C: ‘Arques’.

				Antibes.		10/06/1602.	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16701,f. 43v.	
Aubourg	Charles	d'	sieur de Porcheux	Corbie; Havre de Grace; Havre de Grace; Havre de Grace; Havre de Grace; N/S; Havre de Grace; Poitiers; Saumur; Paris.	*Navarre*; *Gardes* (1627 only).	01/1597; 27/03/1601; 19/02/1605; 14/06/1605; 27/07/1606; 1610; 10/12/1611; 03/09/1620; 19/03/1622; 06/02/1627.	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1667; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25837/1899; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838 no. 1936; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/2006; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, 134r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25843/85; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.222r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/295; *Revue*, PO 126 (2579) p.10.	
Auise	Jean-Jacques	d'	sieur de Periac	Saint-Dezise (Champagne); Bourg-en-Bresse; Toul.	*Piémont*	19/10/1598; 12/02/1601; 16/02/1609.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1512; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1651; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2168.	
Bachos	Jean	De		Metz; Saint-Quentin; Saint-Quentin; Saint-Quentin; Berru (Champagne).	*Piémont*	01/1597; 27/05/1599; 17/01/1600; 07/06/1605; 15/04/1606.	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1544; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1615; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1924; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/1997.	
Baradat	Lizander	de	vicomte de Verneuil	Péronne; Montreuil; Montreuil; Montreuil; N/S; Poitiers.	*Navarre*	01/1597; 19/07/1599; 23/11/1600; 10/02/1601; 1610.	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1558; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1635; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1649; *État*, N.A.Fr. 24842, 134r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.222r.	
Baradat	Jean	de	sieur de Cahusac	La Fère; N/S	*Picardie*	01/1597; 1610	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, 163v	Captain 'retenuz' in 1610.
Baron	Pierre	de	sieur de Cachedat	Boulogne	*Picardie*	25/03/1601	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1663	
Baron				N/S	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	

Barrière	Thomas	de		Bourg-en-Bresse (citadel); Bourg; Bourg.	*Champagne*	12/02/1601; 18/04/1602; 11/04/1611.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1652; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16701, f. 37v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25842/54.	P/C: 'Thomas'
Bastide				Metz	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Bastier				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.237v	
Baure	Jean	de		Guise	*Piémont*	11/09/1623	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25847/339	
Beaudez				Rue	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Beault	Ruben			Toulon	*Navarre*	04/06/1602	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16701,f. 37r	
Beaumanoir				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f. 238r	
Beaumanoir				Charroux	*Champagne*	05/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 ,f.265r	
Beaupuy	Jacques	de	sieur de Brignemont	La Haye (Tourraine)	*Piémont*	04/02/1616	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/159	
Bellefonds				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.246v	
Bellocq Ramefort				Provence	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4 , 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Bellot				Montreuil	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Belloy	Theseus	de	sieur de Saint-Martin	Louan (Burgundy); Toulon; Toulon; Provence; Poitiers	*Navarre*	11/08/1599; 04/06/1602; 16/11/1605; 1610; 03/09/1620	*Revue*,Ms.Fr. 25833/1567; *État*,Ms.Fr. 16701, f.36v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1964; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.141r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.222v.	
Berault				Beaune	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	

Berault				Provence.	*Navarre*	1610.	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 141r.	
Bernet				Provence	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Bernet	François	de	sieur de Bernet	Metz	*Picardie*	01/1597; 03/04/1598; 19/10/1598; 06/04/1601	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1443; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1513; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1674.	P/C: 'Bernet'.
Beron				Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.207v	
Berton	Louis	de	sieur de Crillon	N/S; N/S; Paris.	*Gardes*	12/08/1588; 01/1597; 22/11/1601.	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.; *État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1717.	*Mestre de camp*
Bidache				Corbie	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Bidache				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.163r	Captain 'retenuz'
Biennes				Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.206r	
Biran	Barthélemy-Scipion	de	sieur de Casteljaloux	Calais; Paris; Paris; N/S; Paris; Bordeaux; St Martin de Ré (citadel).	*Gardes*	06/07/1598; 04/08/1601; 11/09/1601; 1610; 14/08/1613; 21/09/1620; 24/02/1629 .	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/ 1487; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1698, 1707; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25843/110; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f. 159v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25849 /537.	P/C: 'Casteljaloux'.
Biran	Jean-Bernard	de	sieur de Gohas	Paris; Bordeaux	*Gardes*	02/07/1618; 21/09/1620	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845/224; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, 161r.	
Blaignac				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.241r	
Blaignac				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.238r	

Blanchefort	Charles	de	marquis de Créquy	Melun; N/S; Melun; Bordeaux.	*Gardes*	15/04/1609; 1610; 18/10/1613; 25/09/1620.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2183; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 131r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25843/116; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.157r.	*Mestre de camp*
Blasan				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.163v	Captain 'retenuz'
Blécourt	Claude	de	sieur de Betancourt	Clermont	*Maréchal d'Ancre*	20/02/1616	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/172	
Blere				Poitou	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Boisverdin				Poitiers	*Navarre*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.223r	
Bonnault				Bresse	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r	
Bonnault				Provence	*Champagne*	18/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.195r	
Bonnault				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.251v	
Bonnault				Sanneterre	*Champagne*	26/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.264r	
Bonnault	Balthasar			Vaulx	*Champagne*	16/04/1602	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16701,p.40v	P/C: ‘Bonnault’
Bonne Foy				Metz	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Bonne Foy				N/S	*Piémont*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v	
Bonnefins	René	de	sieur de Fioux	Calais	*Picardie*	08/08/1598	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1492	
Bonneuil				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r	
Bonneuil				Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.206v	
Bonnevault				Poitiers	*Navarre*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.223r	
Bonnouvrier	Pepin	de		N/S; N/S; Angers; Meaux; Melun; Paris; N/S; Bordeaux.	*Gardes*	12/08/1588; 01/1597; 18/04/1598; 30/06/1603; 15/04/1609;	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.; *État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 15832/1451; *Revue*, PO	

						30/12/1609; 1610; 27/11/1615	413 (9211) p.4; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2186; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2237; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 131r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/152.	
Borderes				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.237v	
Borderes				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.240v	
Bossonniere				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.296r	
Boulaye				Picquigny	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Bouleuze				Rocroi	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Bouleuze				Provence	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.141v	
Bouleuze				Provence	*Champagne*	18/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.195r	
Boullays				Poitiers	*Navarre*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.221v	
Boulogne	Jules	de		Poitiers; Oléron; La Rochelle (near Fort Louis); Fort Louis (La Rochelle).	*Champagne*	03/09/1620; 23/01/1621; 21/12/1622; 04/04/1623.	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f. 252r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.264v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/314; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f. 294v.	
Bourrouillan				Anaille	*Piémont*	23/12/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.242r	*Lieutenant colonel*
Bourrouillan				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.236r	*Lieutenant colonel*
Bouvault				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.294r	
Brasse				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 163v	Captain 'retenuz'

Brasse	Louis	de		La Fère	*Picardie*	01/1597; 24/07/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597; *Revue*,Ms.Fr.25831/1380.	P/C: 'Brasse'.
Briquemont				Angoulême	*Piémont*	20/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.187r	
Brisaille				Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.206v	
Brouiets				Champagne (as advised by Nevers)	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Broulz				N/S	*Piémont*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v	
Bruel	Martin		sieur des Boulletz	Montreuil	*Navarre*	03/10/1598	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1505	P/C: 'Des Boulletz'.
Brussailles				Saint-Quentin	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Brussailles				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 163r	Captain 'retenuz'
Brussailles				Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f. 207v	
Buons				Provence	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Burosse	Julien	de		Mouzon; Montigny (Château); Montigny (Château); Provence; Châlons (champagne); Paris	*Champagne*; *Gardes* (1613 only).	01/1597; 08/04/1605; 06/06/1605; 1610; 30/06/10; 14/08/1613.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1909,1923; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.141v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25842/7; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25843/112.	

Caillebot	Louis	de	sieur de La Salle	N/S;Paris; Paris; Paris; N/S; Paris; Bordeaux; Paris	*Gardes*	01/1597; 10/09/1598; 18/04/1599; 31/12/1605; 1610; 14/08/1613; 21/09/1620; 16/01/1621	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1500, 1538; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1975; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25843/113; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f. 158v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/271	
Calinet				Poitou	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Camp Remy				N/S	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Campagnol				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f. 244r	
Canonville	Alexandre	de	sieur de Raffetot	Querieu (Château)	*Maréchal d'Ancre*	22/03/1616	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/178	
Cassagnet	Bernard	de	sieur de Tilladet	N/S; Longpré (camp at); Fontainebleau; Metz; Metz; Paris; Bordeaux; Bordeaux.	*Gardes*	01/1597; 19/06/1597; 20/12/1599; 03/05/1607; 1610; 30/11/1613; 17/10/1615; 08/09/1620.	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr.25831/1376; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1592; *Revue*, PO 609 (14320) p.4; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25843/118; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/149; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.157v.	
Casteljaloux				Boulogne	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Castelnau	Mathurin	de	sieur de Rouvre	N/S; Paris; Paris; N/S; Paris; Paris; Bordeaux	*Gardes*	01/1597; 03/07/1598; 24/11/1605; 30/12/1609; 1610; 14/08/1613; 21/09/1620	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1485; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1966; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2233; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25843/111; *État*,	

							Ms.Fr. 16718, f.159r	
Castelz				Poitou	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Casteras				Beaune	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Casteras				N/S	*Navarre*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134r	
Casteras				Poitiers	*Navarre*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f. 222v	
Caulaincourt	Robert	de		Clermont	*Maréchal d'Ancre*	24/03/1616; 10/05/1616	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/168; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/180	
Cersin				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, 163r	Captain 'retenuz'
Chabot	Jacques	de	marquis de Myrebeau	Mouzon	*Champagne*	07/06/1601; 14/06/1605.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1685; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1937.	
Chabot de Mirabeau	Jacques	de	comte de Charny	Maubert-Fontaine	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	*Mestre de camp*
Chanthouin	François	de	sieur de La Mothe	Amiens (town); Herpy (plaine de, near the Château Portian); Amiens (town).	*Picardie*	21/03/1601; 17/04/1606; 03/08/1606/	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/ 1657; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/2000, 2007.	P/C: 'La Mothe Chantouin'.
Chastillon				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.237v	
Chastillon				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.240r	
Châteaulandon				Poitiers	*Navarre*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.223v	
Chaumejean	Blaise	de	marquis de Fourilles	Poitou; N/S; Longpré (camp at);Paris; Angers (near); Rennes;	*Picardie* (1588 only); *Gardes*.	12/08/1588; 01/1597; 19/06/1597; 07/01/1598	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.; *État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*,	

				Paris; Paris; Montereau-Fault-Yonne; Paris; Paris; Paris; Paris; N/S; Bordeaux		04/04/1598; 13/05/1598; 03/07/1598; 29/06/1605; 01/07/1609; 05/08/1609; 12/09/1609; 19/10/1609; 30/12/1609; 1610; 21/09/1620	Ms.Fr.25831/1377; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1413, 1444, 1460; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1484; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1941; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2198, 2206, 2213, 2225, 2234; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f. 163r	
Chesne				Maubert-Fontaine	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Chesnel	Charles	de	sieur de Meux	N/S; Paris; Paris; Paris; Paris; Melun; Paris; Paris; Paris; N/S; Bordeaux; Paris.	*Gardes*	01/1597; 06/08/1601; 06/08/1605; 07/09/1605; 16/03/1609; 15/04/1609; 05/08/1609; 24/11/1609; 30/12/1609; 1610; 21/09/1620; 13/03/1621.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1700; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1948; *Revue*, PO 739 (16878), p.2; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2236, 2184, 2209, 2230, 2232; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f. 159v; *Revue*,Ms.Fr. 25846/273.	
Chisse				N/S	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.164v	Captain 'retenuz'
Cochart				Metz	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X14, B.d.R Cangé, 12 August 1588	
Cochefilet	Andre	de	comte de Vaucellas	N/S; Berru (Champagne).	*Piémont*	1610; 14/04/1610.	*État*,Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2254.	*Mestre de camp*
Colombat				Poitou	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Colombiers				Poitou	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	

Comminge	Charles		sieur de Comminge	Lyon	*Gardes*	25/07/1629	*Reevue*, Ms.Fr. 25849/544	
Concini	Concino		marquis d'Ancre	Clermont	*Maréchal d'Ancre*	24/03/1616	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/176	
Conflans	Jacob	de	baron de Vezilly et Boulleuze	St Menehould; St Tropez.	*Champagne*	03/04/1601; 17/03/1602.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1671; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.42r.	
Conflans	Baron	de	baron de Conflans	Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.251v	
Cosseins				N/S	*Gardes*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Courtault				Mascon	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Crecy				Rue	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Damon	Hector			Péronne; Saint-Quentin; N/S; La Haye (Tourraine).	*Piémont*	18/08/1598; 26/07/1601; 1610; 04/02/1616.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1496; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1693; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/163.	
Daquin	Arnaud			Boulogne; Saint-Quentin; Saint-Quentin; N/S.	*Piémont*	21/03/1598; 13/11/1599; 11/10/1605; 1610.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1430; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1585; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1959; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134v.	*Lieutenant colonel*
Des Boulletz				N/S	*Navarre*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134r	
Des Chappelles				Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f. 208r	
Des Chappelles				Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f. 205r	

Des Combes				Pont Dormy	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Des Estangs				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.296r	
Desguyets				Montreuil	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Desmarets				St Quentin	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Du Bellay	Pierre		sieur de La Courbe	N/S; Longpré (camp at); Paris; Paris; Paris; Paris; Paris; Fontainebleau; Montereau-Fault-Yonne; Paris; Paris; Paris; Paris; N/S	*Gardes*	01/1597; 19/06/1597; 12/08/1597; 27/01/1598; 03/07/1598; 25/01/1599; 12/03/1605; 07/09/1605; 14/04/1609; 26/05/1609; 12/09/1609; 19/10/1609; 24/11/1609; 30/12/1609; 1610.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25831/1375, 1381; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1415; *Revue*, MS.Fr. 25833/1482, 1530; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25837/1901; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1951; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2182, 2189, 2214, 2224, 2229, 2235; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f. 131r.	
Du Boulle				N/S	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.164v	Captain 'retenuz'
Du Breuil				Angoulême	*Piémont*	20/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.186v-187r	
Du Breuil				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.236v	
Du Breuil				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.240r	
Du Breuil	Henry			St Quentin; N/S; La Haye (Tourraine).	*Piémont*	27/05/1599; 1610; 04/02/1616.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1545; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/164	P/C: ‘Du Breuil’.

Du Caylar de Saint-Bonnet	Jean		marquis de Toiras	Blaye (Guyenne)	*Gardes*	21/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, 163r	
Du Corel	François		sieur Dancourt	Doullens	*Navarre*	05/11/1623	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25847/353	
Du Four				Provence	*Piémont*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.141v	
Du Four	Jean			Antibes; Saint-Paul-de-Vence (Provence).	*Piémont*	10/06/1602; 13/08/1605.	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.44r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1910.	PC: 'Du Four'.
Du Fresne				Picquigny	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Du Jar				Donchery	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Du Metz	Simon		sieur de Mauduy	Vitry-le-François (citadel); Maubert; Maubert; Villefranche	*Champagne*	18/11/1599; 12/04/1601; 13/08/1601; 17/04/1605	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1587; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1675, 1701; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1915	P/C: 'Mauduy'.
Du Mons				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.244r	
Du Plessis de Liancourt	Roger		duc de La Rocheguyon	Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.203v	*Mestre de camp*
Du Pont				Maubert-Fontaine	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Du Praet				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268v	
Du Praet				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.244r	
Du Raynier	Elie				*Gardes*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	

Du Raynier	Isaac		sieur de Droué	Paris; Paris; Paris; Montereau-Fault-Yonne; Paris; N/S; Bordeaux	*Gardes*	21/09/1601; 05/02/1605; 31/12/1605; 01/07/1609; 05/08/1609; 1610; 21/09/1620.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1710; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25837/1896; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1976; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2199, 2208; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f. 158r.	
Du Terte				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.296v	
Du Val				Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.206v	
Du Val	François		marquis de Fontenay-Mareuil	Poitiers; Charron.	*Piémont*	03/09/1620; 13/11/1620.	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.236r, 239v.	*Mestre de camp*
Du Vernet				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.240v	
Dupre				Metz	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Duquez				Provence	*Piémont*	17/05/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.194v	
Durban	David		sieur de St Jullien	Calais	*Picardie*	11/06/1605; 09/08/1606.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1932; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/2009.	
Durbois				Mouzon	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Durbois					*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.164v	Captain 'retenuz'
Egumont				Rue	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X^1 4, January 1597, n.p.	
Esclanvillier				Rue	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Esclassan	Gabriel	d'	sieur d'Esclassan	Boulogne	*Picardie*	30/05/1598	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1467.	

Esclasson				Metz	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Escodeca	Pierre	d'	baron de Boisse-Pardaillan	Picquigny; N/S	*Navarre*	01/1597; 1610	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r.	*Mestre de camp*
Escurac				Champagne (as advised by Nevers)	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Escurac				N/S	*Piémont*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v	
Escurac				Angoulême	*Piémont*	20/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.186v	
Escurac				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.237r	
Escurac				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*,Ms.Fr. 16718, f.240r	
Escurac	Pierre	d’		Verdun	*Piémont*	17/04/1605; 11/06/1605.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1916, 1933.	P/C: ‘Escurac’.
Esparbez	Antoine	d'	sieur de Coignac	Boulogne; Ardres.	*Picardie*	01/1597; 22/07/1599.	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1563.	
Fau	Jean-Jacques	de	sieur de Bigarré	Boulogne; Péronne; N/S; La Haye (Tourraine).	*Piémont*	01/1597; 28/12/1606; 1610; 04/02/1616.	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/2019; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/158.	
Faudoas	Jean-François	de	sieur de L'Isle Sérillac	Montauban; Montpellier; Clermont (camp near).	*Picardie*	25/09/1621; 23/03/1623; 15/10/1628.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/285; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.205v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25849/518.	
Faudoas	Pierre	de	sieur de La Mothe-Sérillac	Han; N/S; Poitiers; Montpellier.	*Picardie*	21/01/1600; 1610; 03/09/1620; 23/03/1623.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1620; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.207r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.204r.	
Faure	François	de	sieur de La Roderie	Blaye (Guyenne); Paris.	*Gardes*	22/09/1620; 29/01/1627	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.162v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25848/459.	

Fertin				Rue	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Fioux				Montreuil	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Folleville				N/S	*Gardes*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Fos				Dauphiné	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Foucaudiere				Péronne	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Foucault	Charles	de	sieur de Lorme (& de Regnac)	Ardres	*Navarre*	12/06/1605; 10/08/1609.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1935; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2211.	P/C: ‘Lorme’.
Frelandiere				Mouzon	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Gacheda				Boulogne	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Gallois				Pont Dormy	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Gallois				N/S	*Navarre*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r	
Gamardes	Jacques	de		Pontoise	*Picardie*	31/10/1589	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25817/30	
Gariez				La Fère	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, August 1588, n.p.	
Garrané	Bertrand	de	sieur de Pépieux	Boulogne	*Picardie*	30/05/1598; 25/03/1601	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1468; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1664.	P/C: ‘Pepieux’.
Gas				N/S	*Gardes*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	

Gastault	Jules César	de		La Rochelle (near Fort Louis); Fort Louis (La Rochelle).	*Champagne*	04/02/1623; 04/04/1623.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/319; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.295v.	
Gavarret				Champagne (as advised by Nevers)	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Gavarret				N/S	*Piémont*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134v	
Gavarret	Charles	de		Bourg-en-Bresse (citadel); Toul.	*Piémont*	12/02/1601; 05/06/1601.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1653; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1684.	P/C: 'Gavarret'.
Gentil	Erye		sieur de Pugeolle	Saint-Tropez	*Champagne*	07/06/1602	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.41v	
Genton	Claude	de	sieur de Coudron	Verdun (ville); Han.	*Piémont*	20/11/1623; 16/03/1625.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25847/ 360, 398	
Germaincourt	Daniel	de	sieur de Buffé	N/S; Paris.	*Gardes*	01/1597; 29/10/1598.	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 15833/1515.	
Gontaut	Jean	de	baron de Saint-Blancard et Biron	Montreuil; Calais; Herpy (plaine de, pres de Château Portian); N/S.	*Picardie*	01/1597; 27/03/1601; 17/04/1606; 1610.	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1669; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/2001; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r.	*Mestre de camp*
Grand Maison				Mascon	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Grandmont				N/S	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Grillet	Albert	de	sieur de Brissac	Bordeaux; Compiègne	*Gardes*	21/09/1620; 12/11/1621; 06/02/1627	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.162r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1716; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25848/460.	
Guerre				N/S	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	

Guigneaudeau	Pierre	de	sieur de Montigny	Paris; Paris; Bordeaux; Montelimar (Château); Paris.	*Gardes*	02/07/1618; 04/11/1618; 21/09/1620; 12/02/1621; 17/04/1627	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845/225, 234; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.160v; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.186r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25848/ 476	
Guytault				Bresse	*Champagne*	13/04/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.197v	
Guytault				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.252r	
Guytault				Sanneterre	*Champagne*	26/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.264v	
Guytault				Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.206r	
Guytault				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.294v	
Hames	Paul	de	sieur de Fresnoy	Montreuil; Longpré (camp at); Amiens; Amiens; Corbie; N/S; Rue; Poitiers; Montpellier.	*Picardie*	01/1597; 19/06/1597; 16/03/1598; 28/09/1598; 14/01/1600; 1610; 19/08/1611; 03/09/1620; 23/03/1623.	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr.25831/1378; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1427; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1502; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1612; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25842/72; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.206v; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.204r	
Hamond				Metz	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Harman	Camille		sieur de Bonneuil	Doullens; Ardres	*Picardie*	12/03/1601; 21/10/1606.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1660; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/ 2015.	P/C: ‘Bonneuil’.
Haulterive				Rocroi	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Hons				Provence	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	

Houillez				Dauphiné	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	*Mestre de camp*
Jarmon				N/S	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Joffre	sieur	de	sieur de Joffre	Beaune; Montrenet; N/S; Lyndel.	*Navarre*	01/1597; 07/08/1598; 1610; 13/12/1620.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1491; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.231v.	*Lieutenant colonel* (1620 only).
Jussac d'Ambleville	François	de	sieur de Saint-Preuil	Lyon	*Gardes*	25/07/1629	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25849/543	
La Bastye				Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.205v	
La Baume	Claude-François	de	comte de Montrevel	Bresse; Poitiers; Oléron	*Champagne*	02/04/1620; 03/09/1620; 23/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.197r, 250r, 262r	*Mestre de camp*
La Besne	Abraham	de		Bordeaux	*Gardes*	21/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.161v	
La Borye				Montreuil	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
La Borye				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.163r	Captain 'retenuz'
La Brande				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.163v	Captain 'retenuz'
La Burthe				Boulogne	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
La Burthe				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.163v	Captain 'retenuz'
La Chapelle				Metz	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
La Chapelle				Provence	*Piémont*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.141v	

La Chapelle				Provence	*Piémont*	17/05/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.194v	
La Chapelle				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.237r	
La Chapelle				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.240r	
La Chapelle	Hector	de	sieur d'Escuvas	St Vallery; Antibes; Antibes.	*Piémont*	24/05/1599; 10/06/1602; 24/04/1605	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1542; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16701,f.43r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1908.	P/C: 'La Chapelle'.
La Cledye				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.296v	
La Condamine				Provence	*Champagne*	29/04/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.195v	
La Condamine				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.252r	
La Condamine				Cuiray	*Champagne*	05/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.265r	
La Condamine				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.297r	
La Coste				Metz	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
La Coudrelle				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.246r	

La Courtain				Montreuil	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
La Fay				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, 163v	Captain 'retenuz'
La Ferriere				N/S	*Navarre*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, 134r	
La Ferriere				Poitiers	*Navarre*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.221v	
La Fontaine				N/S	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
La Fontan				N/S	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
La Gauchapt				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.295v	
La Grange	Charles-Etienne	de	sieur de Villedonné	La Haye (Tourraine)	*Piémont*	04/02/1616	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/161	
La Grange de Montigny	Antoine	de	sieur d'Arquien	N/S; Sancerre; Angers (near); Paris; N/S.	*Gardes*	12/08/1588; 08/04/1593; 04/04/1598; 03/07/1598; 04/08/1601; 1610.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25825/807; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1445; *Revue*, MS.Fr. 25833/1483; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1699; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.131r.	*Lieutenant colonel*: 1598, 1601, 1610.
La Guesle	Alexandre	de	marquis d'O	N/S	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.135v	*Mestre de camp*
La Haye				Boulogne	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
La Hilliere				Donchery	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
La Hilliere					*Piémont*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134v	

La Hilliere	Gilles	de	sieur de Garousset	St Quentin	*Piémont*	01/12/1610	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25842/36	P/C: 'La Hilliere'.
La Magdelaine				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.247v	
La Mairie	Robert	de		Amiens (citadel)	*Maréchal d'Ancre*	22/02/1616	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/175	
La Marque				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.238r	
La Marque				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.241r	
La Marque	Isaac			Beaumont (Argonne)	*Piémont*	18/02/1625	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25847/393	P/C: 'La Marque'.
La Morelie				Rocroi	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
La Morelie				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.293v	
La Morelie	Isaac	de		Maubert-Fontaine; Beaumont (Argonne); N/S; Poitiers; Cuiray; La Rochelle (near Fort Louis)	*Champagne*	02/12/1599; 18/04/1605; 1610; 03/09/1620; 05/01/1621; 21/12/1622	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1590; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1917; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.135v; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.251r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.263v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/312	P/C: 'La Morelie'.
La Mothe					*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r	
La Mothe	Pierre	de	Sieur d'Arnaud	Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, 16726, f.293r	*Mestre de camp*

La Mothe Chantouin				Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.206v	
La Motheallard				Maubert-Fontaine	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
La Passe	Durand	de		Montpellier; Montpellier; Clermont (camp near)	*Picardie*	15/12/1622; 23/03/1623; 15/10/1628	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/311; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.205v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25849/520	
La Roche Irlandois				Corbie	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
La Roche Menardiere				Corbie	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
La Rocheallart				Picquigny	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
La Rocheallart				N/S	*Navarre*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r	
La Salle				Montreuil	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
La Saludie				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.269r	
La Saludie				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.246r	
La Serre				Boulogne	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	

La Serre				Monteuillin	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
La Serre				Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.206r	
La Serre				Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.203v	
La Serre	Antoine	de		Ardres; Calais (ville); N/S; Abbeville.	*Picardie*	12/06/1605; 20/02/1609; 1610; 18/08/1611.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1934; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2171; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25842/74.	
La Taillade				Angoulême	*Picardie*	20/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.185v	
La Taillade				Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.207v	
La Taillade				Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.204v	
La Taillade	Charles	de		Montpellier	*Picardie*	10/02/1623	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/320	P/C: ‘La Tailade’.
La Tallauresse				Villefranche	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
La Tallauresse				Bresse	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r	
La Tallauresse				Bresse	*Champagne*	05/04/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.198r	
La Tallauresse				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.251r	

La Tallauresse				Sanneterre	*Champagne*	26/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.263r	
La Tallauresse				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.297r	
La Tallauresse	Jean	de		Bellay	*Champagne*	20/04/1602	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.40r	P/C: 'La Tallauresse'.
La Toucheperre				Corbie	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597	
La Toucheperre					*Navarre*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, 134r	
La Tour	Guy	de	sieur de Lioux	Donchery; Aubenton; Toul	*Piémont*	01/1597; 08/10/1598; 05/04/1601	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr.25833/1509; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1672	*Mestre de camp*
La Vallee				Villefranche	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
La Vergne				Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.205r	
La Veronniere				Bresse	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r	
Lambert				Picquigny	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Lambert				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.238r	
Lambert				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.241r	

Lambert	Jean		sieur des Escuyers	Péronne (ville)	*Piémont*	15/11/1623	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25847/355	P/C: 'Lambert'.
Lamet	Charles	de	sieur de Beaurepaire	Montreuil; La Flèche; Poitiers; Montpellier.	*Picardie*	20/08/1601; 05/08/1620; 03/09/1620; 23/03/1623.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1703; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845/260; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.207v; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.204v.	
Lannoy	Claude	de	sieur de Seraud	Seuilly	*Navarre*	15/03/1622	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/293	
Lartigue				Donchery	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Lartigue	François	de		Antibes; Provence; Provence; La Flèche; Poitiers; Charron.	*Piémont*	10/06/1602; 1610; 03/05/1620; 05/08/1620; 03/09/1620; 13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16701,f. 43r; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 141v; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.194v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/266; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.237r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.240r.	
Launoy	Phillippe	de	sieur du Mesnil Serans	Montreuil	*Navarre*	18/11/1623	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25847/359	
Laur	Jacques	de		Puchevillers; Montreuil; Doullens; Doullens; Doullens; N/S; Doullens; Poitiers.	*Navarre*	28/09/1597; 11/11/1599; 21/07/1601; 03/04/1606; 01/08/1609; 1610; 23/12/1611; 03/09/1620.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 15832/1393; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1583; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1692; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/1991; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2204; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25843/86; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.222r.	
Laval				N/S	*Gardes*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	*Lieutenant colonel*
Laverdin				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.252v	
Laverdin				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.241r	
Lazenay				Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.207r	
Lazenay	Phillippe	de		Calais; N/S; Calais (ville).	*Picardie*	23/12/1606; 1610;	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/2018; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r	P/C: 'Lazenay'.

						23/08/1611.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25842/76.	
Le Bruette				Metz	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Le Courroy				N/S	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Le Tourneur	Jacques		sieur du Plessis	Boulogne; Boulogne; Boulogne; Boulogne; Boulogne; Herpy (plaine de, pres de Château Portian); Boulogne; N/S; Tallemont (Saintonge).	*Picardie*	01/1597; 05/10/1598; 18/01/1600; 25/03/1601; 07/04/1606; 17/04/1606; 03/08/1606; 1610; 31/03/1620.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr.25833/1507; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1616; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1662; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/1994, 1999, 2008; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.185v.	
Le Vernet				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.244v	
Le Vernet	Barthélemy	de		Bois de Vincennes (Château); Poitiers.	*Normandie*	07/01/1620; 03/09/1620.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845/247; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.267r.	
Lezines				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.252v	
Lezines				Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.208r	
Lezines				Charroux	*Champagne*	05/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.265v	
Lezines	Jean	de	sieur de Villebelin	Bresse; Villefranche; N/S; Maubert-Fontaine.	*Champagne*	01/1597; 04/06/1599; 1610; 11/08/1611.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1551; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.135v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25842/70.	P/C: ‘Lezines’
Lezines	Charles	de		La Flèche	*Champagne*	05/08/1620	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845/261	P/C: ‘Lezines’.

Lignerac	Gilles Robert	de	sieur de Bazanes	Péronne; Toulon; Toulon; Toulon; Toulon.	*Navarre*	01/1597; 04/06/1602; 17/06/1605; 16/11/1605; 27/11/1606.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.;*État*, Ms.Fr. 16701,f. 36r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1938, 1965;*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/2016.	
Limailles				Picquigny	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Lisle				N/S	*Gardes*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Lorme				Corbie	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Lorme				N/S	*Navarre*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r	
Maguers				Xaintes	*Picardie*	24/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.185r	
Mainville				La Fère	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Mainville				N/S	*Gardes*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r.	
Mainville	François	de		Picardy; Paris; Paris; Melun; Paris.	*Gardes*	27/09/1597; 18/04/1601; 27/12/1601; 24/04/1605; 29/06/1605.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 15832/1389; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1677, 1719; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1920, 1940.	P/C: ‘Mainville’.
Maleyssye	Henry	de		Montauban (camp)	*Gardes*	02/06/1629	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25849/540	
Mallevault				Mascon	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Manicau				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.247v	
Mansan				St Quentin	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	

Mansan	Paul	de		Pontoise	*Picardie*	31/08/1589; 30/11/1589.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25817/11, 40.	
Marcillac	Charles	de		Verdun (ville)	*Piémont*	16/03/1625	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25847/399	
Marossan				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268r	
Mauduy				Mouzon	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Mauduy				N/S	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.135v	
Mausieulx				N/S	*Piémont*	1610	*État*,Na.Fr. 24842 f.164v	Captain 'retenuz'
Mazelière	Betrand	de		Bourg-en-Bresse; Montreuil; N/S.	*Navarre*	12/03/1601; 08/06/1605; 1610.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1655; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1926; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r.	*Lieutenant colonel*
Meissonnier	Isaac	de	sieur du Pont	Bellay; Bresse; Bresse; Poitiers; Charroux; La Rochelle (near Fort Louis); Fort Louis (La Rochelle).	*Champagne*	20/04/1602; 1610; 03/04/1620; 03/09/1620; 05/01/1621; 21/12/1622; 04/04/1623.	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.40r; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.197v; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.250v; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.263r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846 no. 313; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.297r.	
Meressart				Rue	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Meslé	Baron de		baron de Meslé	Poitiers; Montpellier	*Normandie*	03/09/1620; 26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.245r	
Mesples				Dauphiné	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Miraumont				Maubert-Fontaine	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Miraumont				Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.208r	

Miraumont				Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.205r	
Miraumont le jeune				Poitou	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Monbeton				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.239v	*Lieutenant colonel*
Monchauvere				St Quentin	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Monmas	Bertrand			Metz (ville)	*Champagne*	15/02/1605	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25837/1898	
Mons				Boulogne	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Monson				Rocroi	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Montagu	Joachim	de	sieur de Frémigières	N/S; Melun; Metz.	*Gardes*	01/1597; 17/10/1601; 1610	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1713; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131v.	
Montagut de Nestes	Louis	de	sieur de Verdelin	Lory; Saint-Quentin.	*Piémont*	10/03/1623; 16/11/1623.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/323; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25847/358	
Montamel				Péronne	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Montamel	sr	de	sieur de Montamel	Picardy	*Navarre*	28/09/1597	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 15832/1391	
Montault	François	de		Pontoise	*Picardie*	31/10/1589; 1589	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25817/33, 59.	
Montduzer	Phillippe	de		Doullens	*Picardie*	22/03/1601	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1659	

Montesquiou	Jean-Jacques	de	sieur de Sainte-Colombe	N/S; N/S; Paris; Calais; Paris; N/S; Paris; Paris; Paris.	*Gardes*	12/08/1588; 01/1597; 27/01/1598; 06/07/1598; 29/06/1605; 1610; 06/02/1621; 17/04/1627; 04/11/1629.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.; *État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1417; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1486; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1943; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.131r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/272; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25848/477; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25849/532.	*Lieutenant colonel* : 1621, 1627, 1629 only.
Montferier				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268v	
Montferier				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.244r	
Montlezun	Barthélemy	de	sieur de Busca	Boulogne; Boulogne; Boulogne; N/S; Poitiers; Montpellier.	*Picardie*	01/1597; 25/03/1601; 11/10/1605; 1610; 03/09/1620; 23/03/1623.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1665; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1958; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.206r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.203v.	
Montmas				Metz	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Montmorency	Annibal	de		Péronne; Ardres; Toulon; Provence; Toulon; Vienne (Dauphine).	*Navarre*	01/1597; 09/10/1598; 04/06/1602; 1610; 24/09/1610; 22/02/1620.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.36v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr.25833/1511; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 141r; *Revue*,Ms.Fr. 25842/28; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.188r	
Montmorency	Josias	de	sieur de Bours	N/S; Rennes; Paris; N/S.	*Gardes*	01/1597; 13/05/1598; 12/03/1609; 1610.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1461; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2175; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r.	

Montz				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.267r	
Moreau				Champagne (as advised by Nevers)	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Moreau	Michel	de	sieur de Moreau	Blagny; Verdun	*Piémont*	01/06/1598; 06/04/1601	*Revue*, Ms.Fr.25832/1472; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1673	P/C: 'Moreau'.
Mouton				Metz	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Nantas				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.237v	
Nantas				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.240v	
Nargonne				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.250v	
Nargonne				Mouzon	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Nargonne				Provence	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.141v	
Nargonne				Provence	*Champagne*	18/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.195v	
Nargonne				Sanneterre	*Champagne*	26/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.262v	
Nargonne				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.294v	
Nargonne	Claude	de		Mazières; Metz; Gardanne	*Champagne*	28/08/1598; 03/08/1601; 30/05/1602	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1498; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1697; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.41r	P/C: 'Nargonne'.
Nogaret de La Valette	Jean Louis	de	chevalier de La Valette	Paris	*Gardes*	29/06/1627	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25848/480	

Octovio Vinge				Villefranche	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Orges	Claude	d'	sieur de Forfelière	Villefranche; Bourg; Bresse; Velye (champagne); Poitiers; Cuiray.	*Champagne*	01/1597; 18/04/1602; 1610; 10/05/1610; 03/09/1620; 05/01/1621.	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16701,f.38r; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2257; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.251r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.263r.	
Ormense	Denis		sieur de La Ferriere	Péronne; Havre de Grace	*Navarre*	01/1597; 14/08/1598	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1495.	P/C: 'La Ferriere'.
Pagan				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.269r	
Palais				N/S	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Palliez				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268r	
Patras	Michel			Boulogne; Bordeaux	*Picardie*	12/08/1588; 21/09/1620	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.162v.	
Patras	Bertrand		sieur de Campaigno	N/S; N/S; Rennes; Paris; Paris; Melun; N/S.	*Gardes*	12/08/1588; 01/1597; 13/05/1598; 18/04/1599; 31/12/1605; 15/04/1609; 1610 .	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.; *État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1463; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1539; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1974; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2185; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r.	
Pépieux				Boulogne	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Pépieux				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r	
Periac				Boulogne	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Periac				N/S	*Piémont*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134v	

Perigal				Poitiers	*Navarre*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.223r	
Petinnes				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.247r	
Pigeolet				Provence	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.141v	
Pigeolet				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.250r	*Lieutenant colonel*
Pigeolet	sr	de	sieur de Pigeolet	Villefranche	*Champagne*	23/06/1598	*Revue*, MS.Fr. 25833/1479	P/C: 'Pigeolet'.
Pilliers	Claude	de	sieur de La Coudrelle	Bois de Vincennes (Château); Poitiers.	*Normandie*	01/07/1620; 03/09/1620.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845/257; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.269r.	
Pineau				Boulogne	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Pioche	Marc		sieur de La Vergne	La Flèche; Poitiers.	*Picardie*	05/08/1620; 03/09/1620.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/264; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.208r.	
Plaisance				Bresse	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r	
Plaisance				Bresse	*Champagne*	10/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.197v	
Plaisance				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.251v	
Plaisance				Charroux	*Champagne*	06/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.264r	
Plaisance	Michel	de		Bourg	*Champagne*	18/04/1602	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.38v	P/C: 'Plaisance'.
Plantiers				Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.206r	
Pompierre				N/S	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Pons de Lauzières	Antoine		marquis de Thémines	Poitiers	*Navarre*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.221r	*Mestre de camp*
Poyminet				Poitou	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	

Pugnet				N/S	*Navarre*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Pugnet	Jean	de		Ardres; N/S; Poitiers; Bourg de Latellé (near Poitiers)	*Navarre*	11/04/1606; 1610; 03/09/1620; 16/01/1622	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/1995; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.222v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/290	P/C: 'Pugnet'.
Ragagnac				Poitiers	*Navarre*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.221v	
Ramel				Poitou	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Realz				Donchery	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Realz				Angoulême	*Piémont*	20/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.186r	
Realz				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.296r	
Realz	Cesar	de		Guise; Guise; N/S; Guise; Guise.	*Piémont*	28/05/1599; 04/08/1609; 1610; 28/05/1610; 12/06/1610.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1548; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2205; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25842/1, 2.	P/C: 'Realz'.
Repaire				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268r	
Repaire				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.247v	
Retiou	Benjamin	de	sieur de La Veronniere	Montreuil; Sessel.	*Picardie*	29/03/1598; 21/04/1602.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1436; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16701,f.39v.	
Ribon				Monunq	*Picardie*	12/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.212r	
Robert				Mouzon	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Robert				N/S	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.135v	
Robert				Provence	*Champagne*	18/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.195r	
Robert				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.250v	

Robert				Oléron	*Champagne*	23/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.262v	
Robert	Berthelemy	de		Rocroi	*Champagne*	31/05/1599; 10/02/1601; 20/04/1605	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1550; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1650; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1918	P/C: 'Robert'.
Robineau				Vienne (Dauphine)	*Navarre*	31/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.188v	
Rochechouart	Guy	de	sieur de Chastillon	La Flèche	*Piémont*	05/08/1620	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/265	P/C: 'Chastillon'.
Rocquart				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268r	
Rocquart	Jacques	de		Getz (near Geneva)	*Normandie*	27/03/1627	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25848/474	
Roger				Calais	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Roger				Poitou	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	*Lieutenant colonel*
Roquart				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.246v	
Saint-Aubin	Guillaume	de	sieur de Mornay et Dampierre	Sessel; Montigny; Montigny (Château); Montigny (Château); N/S; Veure; La Flèche; Poitiers; Cuiray.	*Champagne*	18/04/1602; 13/10/1605; 01/08/1609; 05/10/1609; 1610; 03/05/1619; 05/08/1620; 03/09/1620; 05/01/1621.	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16701,f. 38v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1961; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2203; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2219; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.135v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845/241; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/262; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.251v, 264r.	
Saint-Bonnet	Paul	de	sieur de Monferries	Bois de Vincennes (Château)	*Normandie*	18/04/1620	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845 no. 251	
Saint-Cricq	Gratian	de		Rue; Doullens; N/S; Lisle Bouchart; Poitiers; Bourg de	*Navarre*	15/01/1600; 03/04/1606; 1610; 06/02/1616;	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1613; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/1990; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/165;	

				Latellé (near Poitiers)		03/09/1620; 16/01/1622.	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.222v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/291.	
Saint-Denis				Montreuil	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Saint-Dizier				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.267v	
Saint-Dizier				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.245r	
Saint-Géry	Jean	de	sieur and baron de Magnas	Lauzerte; Montpellier.	*Picardie*	12/11/1620; 10/02/1623.	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.209v; *Revue*- Ms.Fr. 25846/321.	*Lieutenant colonel*
Saint-Julien				Boulogne	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Saint-Nazere				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.268v	
Saint-Nazere				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.245v	
Saint-Pierre				Provence	*Navarre*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.141r	
Saint-Pierre				Metz	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Saint-Pierre				N/S	*Piémont*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134v	
Saint-Pierre				Poitiers	*Piémont*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.236v	
Saint-Pierre				Charron	*Piémont*	13/11/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.239v	
Saint-Pierre	Camille	de		Saint-Quentin	*Piémont*	21/07/1599; 13/11/1599; 25/03/1601.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833 no. 1560; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1586; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1666.	

Saint-Quentin				Boulogne	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Saint-Quentin				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r	
Saint-Quentin	Antoine	de		La Fère; La Fère; Corbie; Ardres; Ardres	*Picardie*	04/10/1598; 20/01/1600; 05/06/1605; 11/04/1606; 08/10/1609	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1506; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25834/1619; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1922; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/1996; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2221.	
Salbeuf	Jean	de		N/S	*Gardes*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Salcède				N/S; Poitiers.	*Picardie*	1610; 03/09/1620.	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.205v.	*Lieutenant colonel*
Salerne				N/S	*Gardes*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Salerne				N/S	*Gardes*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Salerne	Gaillard	de		Paris; Paris.	*Gardes*	27/01/1598; 10/09/1598.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1416; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1501.	P/C: ‘Salerne’.
Sarred				N/S	*Gardes*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Sarrocque				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.267v	
Saubole				Metz	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Sausson				Rocroi	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Sereuil				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.163v	Captain 'retenuz'
Sers	Hercules	de	sieur de Casteras	Tourines (Burgundy); Montreuil;	*Navarre*	10/08/1599; 08/06/1605; 16/04/1606;	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1566; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25838/1927; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/1998;	P/C: ‘Casteras’.

				Brueres		06/08/1609	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25841/2210.	
Simianne	Gabriel	de	sieur de Saint-Nazere	Bois de Vincennes (Château)	*Normandie*	07/02/1620	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845/248	P/C: 'Saint-Nazere'.
Sociondo				Bresse	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r	
Sociondo	Johannes	de		Montreuil	*Champagne*	18/04/1602	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16701,f.39r	
Tajan				Poitou	*Picardie*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	*Mestre de camp*
Tassancour				Montreuil	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Terrault				Poitiers	*Normandie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.267v	
Terrault	Henry			Bois de Vincennes (Château)	*Normandie*	01/07/1620	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845/256	
Thianges	Jonathan	de	sieur de Roulet	N/S	*Gardes*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Thibault				Bresse	*Champagne*	02/04/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.198r	
Thibault				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.252r	
Thibault				Charroux	*Champagne*	05/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.265r	
Thibault				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.295r	
Thomas				Maubert-Fontaine	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Thomas				Bresse	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r	
Thomas				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.250v	
Thomas				Charroux	*Champagne*	05/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.262v	

Thomas				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.296v	
Tournier				Metz	*Piémont*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Tournier				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r	
Tournier				Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.207r	
Tournier	Joachim	de		Metz	*Picardie*	19/10/1606	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25839/2014	
Trion				Corbie	*Navarre*	1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Trion				Poitiers	*Navarre*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.221v	
Trion	François	de		Bourg de Latellé (near Poitiers)	*Navarre*	16/01/1622	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/292	P/C: 'Trion'.
Trion	Pierre	de	Sieur de Dancourt	Rue; Rue; N/S.	*Navarre*	18/07/1599; 23/03/1601; 1610.	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25835/1661; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25843/1557; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842, 134r.	P/C: 'Trion'.
Trumelet le Jeune				Villefranche	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Vaillac				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.246v	
Vaillant				N/S	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT [1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Valence				N/S	*Gardes*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT X[1]4, January 1597, n.p.	
Valence	Emmanuel	de		Paris; Paris; Paris; Paris; Paris; Paris; N/S; Bordeaux; Paris;	*Gardes*	07/02/1598; 12/08/1598; 29/10/1598; 06/12/1598;	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25832/1421; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 15833/1494,1514, 1520, 1534; *Revue*, Ms.Fr.	P/C: 'Valence'; 'Vallon'

				Paris.		07/03/1599; 29/06/1605; 1610; 21/09/1620; 02/01/1627; 23/09/1629.	25838/1942; *État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, 158v; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25848/458; *Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25849/547.	
Vallon				N/S	*Gardes*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Valpergue				Maubert-Fontaine	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Vassant				La Fère	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Vaucocour	Jean	de	chevalier et sieur de Repaire	Getz (near Geneva)	*Normandie*	27/03/1627	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25848/475.	
Vaudray				Rocroi	*Champagne*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^1$4, January 1597, n.p.	
Vaudray				Provence	*Champagne*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f.141v	
Vaudray				Cuiray	*Champagne*	16/01/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.263v	
Vaudray				Provence	*Champagne*	18/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.195v	
Vaudray				Poitiers	*Champagne*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.251r	
Vaudray				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.293v	
Vaudray	Zacarie	de		Vitry-le-François; St Tropez.	*Champagne*	21/06/1598; 06/05/1602.	*Revue*, MS.Fr. 25833/1478; *État*, Ms.Fr. 16701,f.41r.	P/C: ‘Vaudray’.
Verdelin				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r	
Verdelin				Angoulême	*Piémont*	20/03/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.186v	
Verdelin				Provence	*Picardie*	03/05/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.194r	
Verdelin	Jacques	de		Angoulême (ville)	*Piémont*	31/12/1616	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25844/188	P/C: ‘Verdelin’.

Verdelin La Jeune				N/S	*Piémont*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v	
Vernegue				Montpellier	*Normandie*	26/02/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.247r	
Vezilly				Fort Louis (La Rochelle)	*Champagne*	04/04/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.294r	
Vezilly	Baron de		baron de Vezilly	Oléron	*Champagne*	23/01/1621	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.263v	
Viaspre				St Quentin	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Ville	Charles	de	sieur de Saint-Béarn	La Flèche	*Picardie*	05/08/1620	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846/263	
Ville Ferme				Montreuil	*Picardie*	01/1597	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, January 1597, n.p.	
Villegaignon				N/S	*Picardie*	1610	*État*, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r	
Villegaignon				Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.206v	
Villegaignon				Montpellier	*Picardie*	23/03/1623	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.204r	
Villeluysant				Metz	*Champagne*	12/08/1588	*État*, SHDAT $X^{1}4$, 12 August 1588, n.p.	
Villemur	Roger	de	sieur de Pailles	Bois de Vincennes (Château)	*Normandie*	07/02/1620	*Revue*, Ms.Fr. 25845/249	
Zamet	Jean	de	baron de Murat	Poitiers	*Picardie*	03/09/1620	*État*, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.206r	*Mestre de camp*

Appendix Two

Biographical Details of *vieux* regiment Captains

The following appendix consists of brief biographical details of those captains within the *vieux* regiments who have been firmly identified. Captains have only been included within this appendix if source material in addition to *revues* and *états* has been found for their existence. The appendix contains the biographies of fifty-eight captains, out of the 531 captains listed in Appendix One.

All manuscript sources relate to the BnF, unless otherwise stated.

ACARIE, Jean d', sieur du Bourdet.

Son of Jacques Acarie and Catherine Goumard. Received *Gardes* captaincy in 1612. Client of Épernon and named as a rebel captain in 1619. Died at siege of Montauban, 1621, whilst fighting in royal forces. Married Catherine Belcier in 1581, daughter of René Belcier, baron de Cozes, and Catherine de Boulainvilliers. Notable children:

1) René d'Acarie, sieur de Crazannes. Captain in *Navarre*. Died at the siege of Montpellier in 1622. Married Angélique de La Rochefoucault in 1611, daughter of Louis de La Rochefoucault, sieur de Bayers and de La Bergerie, and Suzanne de Beaumont Bressurie.

2) Louis d'Acarie, sieur du Bourdet. Captain in the *Gardes*. Appointed *maréchal de camp* in 1649. Married Philippe or Catherine du Chemin, dame de Boisredon in 1608.

3) Charlotte-Margueritte d'Acarie. Married Charles Poussart de Linieres.

(Above, pp. 161-163; Sottas, 'État militaire', pp. 165-166; Anselme, *Histoire*, IV, p. 454; DB 2 (35).)

ALBERT, Leon d', sieur de Brantes, later duc de Luxembourg et de Piney.

Received a *Gardes* captaincy in 1617; resigned this commission prior to the *état* of 1620. *Chevalier des ordres du roi* in 1619. *Pair de France* in 1620. Appointed lieutenant in the *compagnie des chevaux-légers de la garde ordinaire du roi* in 1621. *Gouverneur* of Blaye. Died in 1630. Married Maguerite-Charlotte, duchesse de Luxembourg in 1620, oldest daughter of Henry de Luxembourg, duc de Piney and Medelene de Montmorency, dame de Thoré. Notable relatives: Brother of Charles d'Albert, duc de Luynes and Honoré d'Albert, sieur de Cadenet.

(Above, pp. 84, 108, Chapter Four, Section II; Anselme, *Histoire*, IV, p. 274; DB 8 (213).)

ALBERT, Honoré d', sieur de Cadenet, duc de Chaulnes,

Mestre de camp of *Normandie* between 1617 and 1627. Appointed *maréchal de France* in 1619. Given the *Gouvernement* of Picardy in 1633. Married Claire-Charlotte d'Ailly, daughter of Philibert-Emmanuel d'Ailly, sieur de Pequigny, and Louis d'Ognies, dame de Magny. Notable relatives: brother of Charles d'Albert, duc de Luynes and Leon d'Albert, sieur de Brantes.

(Above, p. 108, Chapter Four, Section II; Susane, *Ancienne*, III, p. 176; Anselme, *Histoire*, IV, p. 272; DB 8 (213).)

ANTIST, Paul d', sieur de Mansan.

Captain in the *Gardes* from 1598 and his death in 1631. Possibly a captain in *Picardie* prior to 1598. *Conseiller du roi*, and *gouverneur* of Gaston d'Orléans during the 1600s.

(Noeufville, *Abrégé Chronologique*, III, p. 203; DB 25 (569); Luppé, *Mémoires*, p. 214.)

AUBOURG, Charles d', sieur de Porcheux,

Son of Charles, sieur de Porcheux, *lieutenant du roi* at Chalon-sur-Saône, and Anne de Clery, daughter of Pierre de Clery, sieur de Freminville. Held a *Navarre* captaincy from an unknown date prior to 1597 until his promotion to a *Gardes* captaincy in 1626. Died in 1628. Married Judith de Chaumont d'Orneville, daughter of Gilles de Chaumont, sieur de Bellestre and Anne de Fouquesoler. Notable children:

1) Charles, sieur de Porcheux. Made a captain in *Navarre* in 1622, before buying Saint-Preuil's *Gardes* company in the 1630s. Married Genevieve Bontin, daughter of Pierre Bontin, sieur de Victor, *bailli* of Caen and Morant. Killed in action in 1643. Related to an unnamed nephew who inherited the captaincy of his *Gardes* company after his death in 1643.

2) Philippes, sieur de Clery. Died whilst holding an unspecified command in royal forces on the Isle-de-Rè in 1627.

3) Henry, sieur de Boissy. Captain in *Navarre*.

4) Louis, sieur de Saint-Eloy. Captain in *Navarre*.

(Above, pp. 64-5, 91-92, DB 37 (333); PO 126 (2579).)

BARADAT, Jean de, sieur de Cahusac.

Received the captaincy of a *Picardie* company at unknown date before 1597. Had been reduced to 'retenuz' status by 1610. Married to Marguerite de Copin, daughter of Mathieu, sieur de Cahusac.

Notable relatives:

1) Eldest brother: Guillaume, sieur de Damery, baron de Thou. Captain of Monceaux. Married Suzanne de Romain in 1593.

2) Younger brother: Lizander, vicomte de Verneuil, see below.

3) Nephew: François de Baradat, sieur de Damery. *Premier gentilhomme de la chambre du roi* in 1626. Favourite of Louis XIII. Captain of Saint-Germaine-en-Laye, *lieutenant général* of Champagne, *gouverneur* of *Châlons. Disgraced in 1627. Died in 1682. Married in 1632 in Brussels to Gabrielle de Coligny, daughter of Marc, sieur de Crecia, and Catherine de Blaigny.*

(Above, p. 64; DB 55 (1288).)

BARADAT, Lizander de, vicomte de Verneuil.

Captain in *Navarre* from an unspecified date before 1597. Still holding the captaincy in 1613. Captain and *gouverneur* of Château-Thierry. Married Anne des Essarts, relative of Charles des Essarts, *gouverneur* of the town and citadel of Montreuil. Notable children:

1) Gaspard de Baradat, vicomte de Verneuil. Captain of a company of *chevaux-légers*, and made *gouverneur* of Aumale in 1647. Married Marie-Angelique du Mesnil, daughter of Antoine, sieur de Chaumenil and Françoise de Saint-Simon.

Other Notable relatives: see under entry for Jean de Baradat, above.

(Above, pp. 54, 70; DB 55 (1288).)

BELLOY, Theseus de, sieur de Saint-Martin.

Appointed captain in *Navarre* at an unknown date between the 1597 *état* and a *revue* of August, 1599. *Gouverneur* of Crotoy, *chevalier de l'ordre du roi*,

gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi and a *maitre de l'hôtel du roi*. Died at the siege of Montpellier in 1622.

(Hozier, *L'impôt*, I, p. 174.)

BERTON, Louis de, sieur de Crillon.

Son of Gilles Berton, sieur de Crillon, and Philippe Grillet. Avignonnais heritage. *Mestre de Camp* of the *Gardes* from 1584 to 1605. *Chevalier de l'ordre du saint-esprit*. Chagniot has suggested that Crillon used his influence within the *Gardes* to acquire several positions for Avignoese allies, including Joachim de Montagu, sieur de Frémigières, and the initial entry into the regiment of future captain Albert de Grillet-Brissac as an ensign in Crillon's *mestre de camp* company. Did not marry.

(Above, pp. 42, 79, 89, 151-152; Chagniot, 'Gardes', pp. 111-112 Susane, *Ancienne*, II, p.1; Anselme, *Histoire*, IX, p.93.)

BIRAN, Barthélemy-Scipion, sieur de Casteljaloux.

Son of Blaise, sieur de Casteljaloux, and Marie de Malvin. Barthélemy-Scipion was appointed to a *Gardes* captaincy in 1597, which he retained until an unknown date between 1631 and 1640. Barthélemy-Scipion was the oldest of his eight siblings. Married Louise de Montagu. Notable children:

1) Jean. Ensign of Barthélemy-Scipion's company by 1631.

2) Agnès. Married, in 1623, Jean-Jacques de La Barthe, sieur de Giscaro, captain in the *Gardes*.

Other notable relatives:

1) Brother: Alexandre, sieur de Carbon. Appears as Barthélemy-Scipion's lieutenant in *revues* of 1613 and 1629. Appears to have succeeded Barthélemy-Scipion to the company captaincy during the 1630s. Resigned the post in 1640.

2) Brother: Fabien, sieur de Osseboc. Appears as Barthélemy-Scipion's *Gardes* ensign in *revues* of 1613 and 1629. *Gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi*. Married Françoise de Briqueville, dame de Osseboc, daughter of Issac de Briqueville, *gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi* and captain of fifty *hommes d'armes*, and Charlotte du Quesnel. Joachim de Montagu, sieur de Frémigières was present at the marriage.

3) Sister: Jeanne. Married the sieur de Vioues.

4) Sister: Susanne. Married Fabien de La Feitte, sieur de Vignardes.

The Biran de Casteljaloux and Biran de Gohas, below, were two branches of the same family which had split in the 1470s.

(Above, pp. 49, 68; O'Gilvy and Bourrousse de Laffore, *Nobiliaire*, I, p. 245; La Chesnaye, III, p. 235; Cabinet 46 (1135); DB 98 (2344).)

BIRAN, Jean-Bernard de, sieur de Gohas.

Son of Antoine de Biran de Gohas, *mestre de camp* of an infantry regiment in the 1560s, and captain of a *gendarme* company. Jean-Bernard was appointed to a *Gardes* captaincy in 1614. *Gouverneur* of Antibes. Client of Épernon. Married Margueritte de Narbonne in 1620. Notable children:

1) Susanne. Married Pierre de Faudoas, Baron de Sérillac, a nephew of the two Faudoas brothers who held captaincies in *Picardie*, (see below).

(Above pp. 67, 160; Cabinet 46 (1135); DB 98 (2344).)

BLANCHEFORT, Charles de, marquis de Créquy.

Son of Antoine, sieur de Saint-Javarin, and Chrètienne d'Auguerre. Appointed *mestre de camp* of the *Gardes* in 1605; held the position until 1633. Appointed *maréchal de France* in 1621. *Chevalier de l'ordre du saint-esprit*. Married Madeleine de Bonne in 1595, daughter of François de Bonne, duc de Lesdiguières, and Claudine de Bérenger. Played a leading role in the royal high command on during the 1620s and 1630s. Died in 1638. Notable children:

1) François, duc de Lesdiguières. Named as the designated heir of Lesdiguières in 1613.

2) Charles, sieur de Canaples. Apears to have been the *de facto mestre de camp* of the *Gardes* for most of the 1620s.

3) Françoise. Married in 1609 to Maximilien II de Bethune, marquis de Rosny (son of Sully).

4) Madeleine. Married in 1617 to Nicolas de Neufville, duc de Villeroy, *pair et maréchal de France, gouverneur* of Louis XIV.

(Above pp. 42, 79, 151-153; Susane, *Ancienne*, II, p. 1; Anselme, *Histoire*, IV, p. 191, VII, p. 462.)

BONNOUVRIER, Pepin de

Appointed to a *Champagne* captaincy in 1575, before being promoted to a *Gardes* captaincy in 1583, which he held until his death in 1617. Appointed *lieutenant du roi* in the citadel of Metz between 1610 and 1612. Client of Épernon. Married Charlotte de Garges, dame de Yèvre-le-Châtel, daughter of François de Garges, sieur de macquelines, *chevalier de l'ordre du roi*, and Gabrielle de La Grange. Notable relatives:

1) Philippe de Garge. Ensign found in Bonnouvrier's company in a *revue* of 1615. Exact relationship to Bonnouvrier unknown, but Philippe was probably the brother or nephew of Pepin's wife.

(Above, p. 51, 155; Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 111; DB 112 (2764); PO 413 (9211).)

BUROSSE, Julien de, sieur de Burosse.

Son of Jean, sieur de Burosse and Jeanne de Caubois. Julien was appointed captain in *Navrre* in 1585, then *Champagne* in 1596, and finally the *Gardes* in 1613. *Gouverneur* of the château of Monitgny in 1606. Married Hilaire de La Morre, daughter and heiress of Jean, sieur de La Barrère and Anne de La Roche. Notable children:

1) Jean de Burosse d'Uzenh. Captain in *Piémont* in 1630, captain of a company of *chevaux-légers* in 1649, and captain in the *Gardes* in 1650. Married, in 1638, Françoise de Bourouillon, dame d'Espas et de Labory, daughter of Louis de Bourouillan and Aymée de Forgues.

2) Brandelis de Burosse. Royal page.

3) Jean de Burosse, sieur de Mendoce. Captain in *Piémont*.

4) Françoise de Burosse. Married the sieur de Sonpets, who served in the *maison du roi*.

(Courcelles, *Dictionnaire Universel*, III, pp. 121-122.)

CAILLEBOT, Louis de, sieur de La Salle.

Eldest son of Robert de Caillebot and Jacqueline d'O, daughter of Etienne d'O, sieur de Fresnes, and Madeline Gerard. Louis received his *Gardes* captaincy in 1596, which he held until his death in 1624. *Maréchal de camp*. Married Léonore de Molitard, daughter of François de Molitard, *chevalier de l'ordre du roi*, *gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi*, and Catherine de Cambrai. Isaac du

Raynier (see below) was present at the wedding, as he was the brother-in-law of the bride's father. Notable children:

1) Louis, sieur de La Salle. Amongst other positions: appointed captain in the *Gardes* in 1640, *maréchal de camp* in 1649, inducted into the *ordre du saint-esprit* in 1651, *conseiller d'état* in 1652. Married Anne Madeleine Martel, daughter of Cahrles Martel, sieur de Monpinson and Alphontine de Balzac.

2) Jacques. Found as an ensign in his father's *Gardes* company in a *revue* of 1621.

Other Notable relatives:

1) Brother: Louis. Lieutenant in his brother's company on multiple *revues* between 1598 and 1621. Inherited his brother's captaincy in 1624; stripped of the position due to muster fraud in 1627/8.

(Above, p. 55, 67; Carrés 145; DB 148 (3722).)

CASSAGNET, Bernard de, sieur de Tilladet.

Received a *Gardes* captaincy in 1589, which he held until his death in 1622. *Gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi, gouverneur* of Bourg-sur-mer. Married Jeanne de Narbonne, daughter of Jean de Bezolles, sieur de Bezolles.

Notable children:

1) Paul-Anthoine, sieur de Tilladet. Inherited his father's *Gardes* company in 1622. *Maréchal de Camp* in 1637. Died 1664.

2) Gabriel, sieur de Tilladet. *Conseiller du roi, lieutenant général des armées du roi*. Married Madeleine Le Tellier, sister of Michel Le Tellier, Chancellor and Keeper of the Seals.

3) Roger. Lieutenant in his brother Paul-Anthoine's *Gardes* company by 1623. Received the *survivance* of his father's *gouvernement* of Bourg-sur-Mer.

(Above, pp. 52-53; DB 156 (4069); PO 609 (14320).)

CASTELNAU, Mathurin de, sieur du Rouvre en Touraine.

Younger son of Pierre de Castelnau, *premier maitre d'hôtel* of Francois, duc d'Anjou, and Marguerite de Sigonneau, daughter of Macé, sieur de Perdrilliere, and Jeanne d'Amours. Mathurin was a *Gardes* captain from 1596 until his death

in 1622, and a *gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi*. Married Marie Ianton, daughter of Durand, sieur de Milandres. Notable children:

1) Charles, sieur de Quincy. Married Gabrielle, daughter of Claude de Vieurre and Marguerite de l'Estang.

2) Louis, sieur de Rouvre. Bought his father's old *Gardes* company from the Chevalier de La Valette in 1633. Appointed *Maréchal de camp* after 1643. Married Marguerite de Pallvau, daughter of Denis, sieur de Pallvau, a *conseiller* in an unspecified *parlement*, and Magdelaine de Motholon.

3) Gabrielle. Married René de La Reteloire.

(Above, pp. 40, 55, 90; DB 157 (4109); Cabinet 79 (2066).)

CHAUMEJEAN, Blaise de, sieur then marquis de Fourilles.

Youngest of three children of Gilbert de Chaumejean and Genoise du Pont. Blaise was appointed captain in *Picardie* in 1587, before receiving a company in the *Gardes* in 1594. Made *maréchal de camp* in 1617, and resigned the command of his *Gardes* company in the same year. Died in 1621 at the siege of Montauban. Married Hippolite-Louise de Piovene, daughter of Scipion, comte de Castel-Gombert, *premier écuyer du roi*, and Claudine Robertet. Notable children:

1) René, marquis de Fourilles. 'Nourri enfant dhonneur' beside Louis XIII. Lieutenant in his father's *Gardes* company, before assuming the company's captaincy in 1617. *Conseiller d'état* in 1632, and *grand-maréchal de logis* in 1638.

2) Michel-Denis, marquis de Fourilles. Lieutenant in his brother René's *Gardes* company from 1617, before assuming the captaincy in 1632. *Lieutenant colonel* of the *Gardes* from 1655 to 1667. *Maréchal de camp* in 1649, *conseiller d'état* in 1656, and *lieutenant général des armées du roi* shortly after this latter date. Married 1) Genevieve Foulé in 1632, daughter of Jacques, *maître des requêtes*, and Marie Charon, 2) Anne de Croisille, daughter of Nicolas, *conseiller d'état* and Anne de Tufani.

Other notable relatives:

1) Sister: Antoinette. Married Jean-Jacques de Montesquiou, sieur de Sainte-Colombe in 1610, *lieutenant colonel* in the *Gardes* (see below).

(Above, pp. 35, 50, 53, 62, 67; La Chesnaye, IV, p. 389; DB 178 (4640).)

CHESNEL, Charles de, sieur de Meux.

Appointed to a *Gardes* captaincy in 1596, which he held until at least 1626. Married Suzanne de Gouy.

Notable children:

1) Anne de Chesnel. Possibly married Pierre de Giugneaudeau, sieur de Montigny, another *Gardes* captain (see below).

(Beauchet-Fillet, *Dictionnaire*, IV, pp. 601-602; Noeufville, *Abrégé Chronologique*, III, p. 261; PO 739 (16878).)

CONCINI, Concino, marquis d'Ancre.

Native of Florence, arrived in France in 1600 after marrying one of Marie de Médicis' ladies-in-waiting, Leonora Galigaï. Became a prominent favourite of Marie de Médicis during the early 1610s, and was a key figure in the factional disputes of this decade. Assassinated on Louis XIII's orders in 1617. Appointed *maréchal de France* in 1613.

(Above, Chapter Four, Section II.)

DU BELLAY, Pierre, sieur de La Courbe.

Son of Eustache, baron de Comequiers and Guyonne d'Orange, dame de La Feuillée et de La Courbe. Client of Épernon. *Gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi*. Appointed to a *Gardes* captaincy prior to 1596, which he held until his death in 1615. Married Barbe d'Aunieres, dame de Raguin, daughter of Bonaventure, sieur d'Aunieres and Françoise de Hatton, dame de Raguin. Notable children:

1) Guy du Bellay, sieur de La Courbe. Can be found as the ensign in Pierre's *Gardes* company in 1609. Fought a duel with *Gardes* captain Abraham de La Besne (see below for La Besne).

2) Barbe du Bellay. Married Jean de Loubes.

(Above, pp. 80-81, 161; Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, pp. 212; Cabinet 37 (873); DB 81 (1848).)

DU CAYLAR DE SAINT-BONNET, Jean, marquis de Toiras.

Son of Aymar, and Françoise de Claret de Saint-Félix. Named to a number of court positions by Louis XIII during the 1610s, including *capitaine de la volière*.

Purchased the *Gardes* company under the command of Joachim de Montagu (see below) in 1620. Appointed *mestre de camp* of *Champagne* in 1624. Subsequently appointed *maréchal de camp* in 1625 and *maréchal de France* in 1630. *Gouverneur* of Auvergne. Disgraced by Richelieu owing to the involvement of a number of Toiras' brothers in the rebellion of Henry II, duc de Montmorency in the early 1630s. Notable siblings:

1) Elder brother: Jacques, sieur de Resteinclères. *Gouverneur* of Lodéve, *sénéchal* of Montpellier.

2) Elder brother: Simon, sieur de La Forêt, *gouverneur* of the château de Foix. Briefly held the captaincy of the *Gardes* company after Paul (see below), but sold the company captaincy in 1628. *Conseiller du roi*.

3) Elder brother: Claude, *abbé* de Saint-Gilles, *évêque* de Nimes.

4) Younger brother: Paul. Named as the successor to Rolin's *Gardes* company (see below), but was killed at the Île de Ré before he could assume its command.

5) Younger brother: Rolin. Assumed command of Toiras' *Gardes* company in 1624 when he resigned its command. Died during the defence of the Île de Ré.

(Above, p. 62; Balincourt, 'Toiras', pp. 111-127; Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, pp. 240-1.)

DU RAYNIER, Elie

Eldest son of Jacques, sieur de Droué and Marie Madeleine de Saltun, daughter of Mathurin, sieur de La Ville aux Clercs, *maître d'hôtel* of the cardinal de Bourbon, and Madeleine de Villars. Appointed to a *Gardes* captaincy in 1591. Died in 1597. Notable siblings:

1) Younger brother: Isaac. (See below.)

2) Younger sister: Madeleine. Married Jean de Herce, sieur de Lignières, *gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi*. Died after 1649. Jean can be found as the lieutenant of Isaac du Raynier's *Gardes* company on multiple *revues* during the 1600s.

(Sources: see under Isaac du Raynier, below.)

DU RAYNIER, Isaac, sieur de Droué.

For parents and siblings: see Du Raynier, Elie, above. Captain in *Picardie* prior to acquiring a *Gardes* captaincy in 1597, which he held until 1629. Briefly reassumed command of this company between 1632 and 1634 after the death of the company's captain, Isaac's son, Valentin I. Appointed *gouverneur* of Royan in 1622, and *maréchal de camp* in 1640. *Conseiller du roi*, and a *gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi*. Present at the marriage of Louis de Caillebot, sieur de La Salle (see above). Married: 1) 1593, Madeleine de Molitard, daughter of François, *chevalier de l'ordre de Saint-Michel*, sieur de Molitard, and Andromaque du Plessis. Eleven children produced from this marriage. 2) 1644, Lucrèce de Fromentières, daughter of Joachim, sieur de Montigny. This marriage was childless. Notable children from his first marriage:

1) Charles, sieur de Boisseleau. Lieutenant in the *Gardes*. Died in 1622.

2) Marie. Married 1) Etienne de Vallée, sieur de Pescheray in 1618. 2) Charles d'Angennes, sieur de La Loupe in 1632. Marie's third daughter from her second marriage, Madeleine, married Henri de Senneterre, maréchal de La Ferté, in 1655.

3) Valentin I. Inherited the captaincy of his father's *Gardes* company. Died in 1632. Valentin de Coutances, ensign in Isaac's company during the 1600s, was his godfather.

4) Louis II, sieur de Droué and Montigny. Inherited his father's company, and was captain in the *Gardes* from 1634 to 1657.

5) Valentin II. *Abbé* of Madeleine de Chateaudun and Saint-Jean-d'Angély.

6) René, sieur de La Fontenelle. Captain in the *Gardes* from 1648 to 1655. Married Marguerie de Longueval. *Gouverneur* of Mirecourt and *bailli* of Vosges.

(Above, pp. 51-2, 71-2; Leger, *Droué*, pp. 42-67; Noeufville, *abrégé chronologique*, III, pp. 211, 225.)

DU VAL, François, marquis de Fontenay-Mareuil,

Mestre de camp of *Piémont* from 1616 to 1629. For more information see Fontenay-Mareuil, *Mémoires*.

ESCODECA, Pierre d', baron de Boisse-Pardaillan.

Son of Jean, sieur de Boisse, and Marguerite d'Aspremont. Pierre was the youngest of four brothers. Served firstly a captain in *Navarre* before being appointed *mestre de camp* of the regiment in 1594, a position he held until 1617. Appointed *Maréchal de camp* in 1619, and *gouverneur* of Monheurt and Sainte-Foy in the early 1620s. Assassinated in 1621 whilst serving in royal forces. Protestant. Married Marie de Ségur, heiress of Pardaillan. Notable children:

1) Armand, marquis de Mirambeau. Married Madelaine de Pons, daughter of Jacques de Pons and Marie de La Porte.

(Haag, *La France Protestante*, IV, pp. 543-545; Susane, *Ancienne*, III, p. 1.)

ESPARBEZ, Antoine d', sieur de Coignac,

Married Marguerite de Faudoas. Sister of Jean-François and Pierre Faudoas (see below). A possible relation, Bertrand d'Esparbez, was present as an ensign in Antoine's *Picardie* company in a *revue* of 1599.

(La Chesnaye, VI, p. 266; *revue*, Ms.Fr. 25833/1563.)

FAUDOAS, Jean-François, sieur de L'Isle-Sérrilac.

Son of Jean, sieur de Sérillac, *mestre de camp* of the regiment that would become *Picardie* between 1579 and 1585, and Brandelise de Bouzet, daughter of Pons de Bouzet, sieur de Roquepine and Marguerite de Madirac. Jean-François was appointed to a *Picardie* captaincy in 1621, and died in 1630 without having married. Notable siblings:

1) Elder brother: Pierre, sieur de La Mothe-Sérillac (see below).

2) Sister: Marguerite. Married Antoine d'Esparbez, sieur de Coignac, captain in *Picardie* (see above).

Other notable relatives:

1) Uncle: Jean-Gilles. Known as the 'capitaine de Sérillac'. Captain in the *Gardes*.

2) Uncle: Bernard. Known as 'capitaine de La Mothe'. Captain in the *Gardes*.

3) Aunt: Catherine. First marriage was to Carbon de Marrast, sieur de Mons, captain in the *Gardes*.

(La Chesnaye, VI, pp. 265-266.)

FAUDOAS, Pierre de, sieur de La Mothe-Sérillac

Captain and susbequently *lieutenant colonel* in *Picardie*. *Gouverneur* of the town and château of Sommieres. Died in 1628. For parents, siblings and relatives see under Jean-François de Faudoas, above.

(La Chesnaye, VI, pp. 265.)

FAURE, François de, sieur de La Roderie.

Appointed captain of the *Gardes* company previously commanded by Leon d'Albert (see above) at an unknown date between 1617 and 1620. Died in 1628 whilst still in command of the company. Married Jeanne Gyves.

(Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 110; Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 266.)

GERMAINCOURT, Daniel de, sieur de Buffé.

Captain of a *Gardes* company for an unknown period of time prior to his death in 1600.

(Above, p. 84; Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 105; *revue*, Ms.Fr. 25848/459.)

GONTAUT, Jean de, baron de Saint-Blancard et Biron.

Son of Armand, baron de Biron, *maréchal de France*, *lieutenant général* and *gouverneur* of La Rochelle, pays d'Aunis et Saintonge, and Jeanne, dame d'Ornezan and Saint-Blancard. Jean was *mestre de camp* of *Picardie* between 1597 and 1617. *Conseiller d'état* and *maréchal de camp*. Died in 1636. Married: 1) Jacqueline de Gontaut de Saint-Geniez, daughter of Helie de Gontaut, *sénéchal* of Béarn, and Jacqueline de Bethune; 2) Marthe-Françoise de Noailles, daughter of Henry, sieur de Noailles, comte d'Ayen, *gouverneur* and *lieutenant général* of Auvergne. Notable children (all from second marriage):

1) Henry-Charles, baron de Biron, *mestre de camp* of the *régiment de Perigord*.

2) François de Gontaut, marquis de Biron, baron de Saint-Blancard. *Mestre de camp* of the *régiment de Perigord*, *lieutenant général des armées du roi*. Married Elizabeth de Cossé, daughter of François de Cossé, duc de Brissac.

Notable siblings:

1) Elder brother: Charles de Gontaut, duc de Biron, *pair et maréchal de France, chevalier des ordres du roi, lieutenant général* in Burgundy and Bresse. Executed for high treason in 1602.

(Anselme, VII, pp. 305-306.)

GRILLET, Albert de, sieur de Brissac.

Son of Alexandre, baron de Brissac and Jeanne de Gerard. Albert was the ensign of Louis de Berton, sieur de Crillon's *Gardes* company by 1601, and had been promoted to lieutenant of the same company by 1609 (now commanded by Créquy). Appointed captain of the *Gardes* company previously commanded by Bonnouvrier in 1617. Spent his early life as a page of Henri III. Commander of the citadel of Nancy in 1635. Possible client of Crillon and/or Épernon. Married Catherine de Tardieu, a *fille d'honneur de la reine*, daughter of François Tardieu, *conseiller du roi* and *maître des requêtes de l'hôtel du roi*, and Anne-Martin de Maleyssie, *dame d'honneur de la reine*. Notable children:

1) François. Became a captain in the *régiment d'Orléans*. Married Elizabeth des Etangs.

2) Albert. Commanded the *régiment de cuirasseurs du roi*. Married Claire Marie Harnier in 1664.

3) Henry. Became 'premier capitaine' in *régiment de Le Cloque Caval*.

Other Notable relatives:

1) Elder brother: Gabriel, Baron de Brissac. Client of Épernon. *Mestre de camp* of a disbanded infantry regiment during the 1590s.

(Above, pp. 61-64, 79, 160; Cabinet 174 (4411); DB 333 (8474).)

GUIGNEAUDEAU, Pierre de, sieur de Montigny

Son of Pierre, sieur de Migronneau et Montigny, and Esther Moreau. Pierre can be found as the ensign of the *compagnie colonelle* of the *Gardes* in 1598 and 1610 before receiving a captaincy in the *Gardes* in 1610. One of his sons inherited the command of this company in 1642, and held the office until 1647. Married Anne de Chesnel in 1620, daughter of another *Gardes* captain, Charles de Chesnel. Notable children:

1) Eutrope, sieur de Burie, Montigny et Rochereau. Captain and Brigadier of the 'gardes du Corps'.

2) Pierre-Alexis, lieutenant in the *Gardes*.

3) Anne. Married Joseph-Roch Chasteigner, comte de Saint-Georges.

(Above, p. 67; Noeufvile, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 256; Beauchet-Filleau, *Dictionnaire*, IV, pp. 601-602.)

HAMES, Paul de, sieur du Fresnoy, vicomte d'Willy et Pargnan.

Son of Claude, sieur de Fresnoy and Barde de Cailleu, daughter of Nicolas, sieur de Forestel and Madelene Adenin. Held a *Picardie* captaincy between 1596 and 1624. Designated 'premier capitaine' of the regiment during this period. *Gouverneur* of Nerac. Married Ester Marie d'Hervilly in 1607, daughter of Jean, sieur de Hervilly and Sara de Flavigny. Notable children:

1) Charles de Hames, sieur de Merval, vicomte d'Willy et Pargnan. Married Marie d'Avanne, daughter of Cesar, sieur de Villeneuve, Bouresches et Suzanne de Radinguard.

Other notable relatives:

1) Younger brother: Abdias, sieur de Carempay. Lieutenant in Paul's company from at least 1611.

2) Sister: Marie. Married 1) Pierre de Mores, sieur de Jaudrais, *gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi*; 2) Jean de Chapuisa, sieur de La Fosse.

(Above, pp. 50, 80; DB 345 (8902); PO 1471 (33,351).)

JOFFRE, sieur de.

Served in *Navarre* from at least 1597 to at least 1622. By 1602, was designated 'premier capitaine' of *Navarre*, and was appointed *lieutenant colonel* of *Navarre* in 1617. His name was also occasionally recorded as 'Jeoffre Martin', and his ancestors styled the family name as 'Martin de Joffre' by the 1670s. Married to Catherine Edsein, daughter of Ollivier Esdein, sieur du Plessis-Gédon, *maréchal des logis ordinaire du roi*, and Symone de Roullin.

(Above, p. 78; Martellière, 'Généalogie', pp. 122-123; Bassompierre, *Mémoires*, II, p. 185.)

JUSSAC D'AMBLEVILLE, François, sieur du Saint-Preuil.

Appointed ensign of the *compagnie colonelle* of *Picardie* in 1622. Bought the captaincy of Gaspard de Coligny, sieur de Saligny's *Gardes* company in 1627. In 1629, Louis de Pontis (author of Pontis, *Mémoires*) was the lieutenant of Saint-Preuil's *Gardes* company. *Gouverneur* of Arras. *Maréchal de camp*. Disgraced by Richelieu and executed in 1641.

(Above, p. 42; Pontis, *Mémoires*, I, p. 347, II, pp. 16-23; Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp.493-494; *revue*, Ms.Fr. 25849 (543).)

LA BESNE, Abraham de.

After holding the positions of ensign and then lieutenant of Pierre du Bellay's *Gardes* company, Abraham assumed the captaincy of this company on Pierre's death in 1615. Married Isabelle Justiniani, *dame d'honneur* of Marie de Médicis. Died in 1631 at the siege of Montmélian.

(Above, pp. 80-81, 160; Cabinet 43 (1061); Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 212.)

LA GRANGE DE MONTIGNY, Antoine de, sieur d'Arquien.

Son of Charles de La Grange, sieur de Montigny, *chevalier de l'ordre du roi*, *gouverneur* of Charité-sur-Loire, and Louise de Rochechouart, dame de Boiteaux, daughter of Guillaume, sieur de Jars et de Breviande, and Louise d'Autry. Antoine was appointed to a *Gardes* captaincy in 1577, and was made *lieutenant colonel* of the regiment by 1597, a position he resigned in 1610. Appointed lieutenant of Metz's citadel in 1604. *Gouverneur* of Calais, Sancerre et de Gien. Not a client, and probably even an opponent, of Épernon. Married 1) Marie de Cambray, daughter of Jean, sieur de Villemenard and Genevieve le Maréchal; 2) Louis de La Châtre, daughter of Claude, maréchal de La Châtre, and Jeanne Chabot-Jarnac; 3) Anne d'Ancienville, dame de Prie, daughter of Louis d'Ancienville, baron de Reveillon and Françoise de La Platiere, dame des Bordes. Multiple children from marriages 1) and 2) (see Anselme, VII, pp. 427-429). Notable siblings:

1) Elder brother: François, sieur de Montigny, *maréchal de France*.

(Above, pp. 77-78, 157-159; Anselme, *Histoire*, VII, pp. 425-429; Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, pp. 59-60.)

LA MOTHE, Pierre de, sieur d'Arnaud

Mestre de camp of *Champagne* from 1622 to 1624.

(Susane, *Ancienne*, III, p. 92.)

LAUR, Jacques de.

Son of Gabriel de Laur and Isabeau de Gaschessans. Jacques was made a captain in *Navarre* between the *état* of 1597 and a *revue* of September 1597. *Gentilhomme de la chambre du roi*, *gouverneur* of Navarreux, captain of Parsan, and *maître de l'artillerie* of Béarn by 1614. Died whilst serving in royal forces at the siege of Montauban, 1621. Protestant. Married Magdeleine de Moreuil. Another *Navarre* captain, Gratian de Saint-Cricq, was present at the wedding. Notable children:

1) Jacques. Married Jeanne de Lons.

(Above, p. 33, 48, 67, 124; DB 386 (378); Batcave, 'La maison du roy', p. 54; correspondence, AN $G^7$113, ff. 102r-104v.)

LE TOURNEUR, Jacques

Son of Jean Le Tourneur, sieur de la Baussonnière et du Plessis, and Antoinette Le Bascle, his second wife. Jacques was still serving in the royal infantry in 1630. *Gouverneur* of Talmont. Possible client of Épernon. Appears to have died childless. Notable relatives:

1) Nephew: René Le Tourneur. 'Capitaine'.

2) Nephew: Jean Le Tourneur. Major in *Champagne*.

3) Sister: Perrine. Married Charles de Pernes.

(Sottas, 'État militaire', pp. 177-178.)

LE VERNET, Berthélemy de

Married Antoinette d'Albert in June 1605, sister of Charles d'Albert, duc de Luynes.

(La Chesnaye, I, p. 110; above, Chapter Four, Section II.)

MAZELIÈRE, Bertrand de

Captain in *Navarre* from an unknown date prior to 1593; promoted to the position of *lieutenant colonel* of *Navarre* by 1600. He continued to hold this position into the 1610s.

(Above, pp. 39, 78, 157; Le Roux, *Faveur*, p. 531.)

MONTAGU, Joachim de, sieur de Frémigières.

Appointed to a *Gardes* captaincy between 1588 and 1596. Client of Épernon, and possibly also Crillon. Named as a rebel captain in 1619. Sold his captaincy to Toiras in 1620. Present at the marriage of Fabien de Biran, son of the *Gardes* captain Barthélemy-Scipion de Biran (see above). *Ambassadeur de l'ordre de Malte* between 1617 and 1624.

(Above, pp. 37, 68, 90, 159, 162-164; Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 111; Petiet, *Le roi*, p. 604; Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, p. 240.)

MONTESQUIOU, Jean-Jacques de, sieur de Sainte-Colombe

Son of Antoine de Montesquiou, sieur de Sainte-Colombe, lieutenant of the duc d'Anjou's *gendarme* company, and Anne de Mondenard, daughter of François, sieur de Moncaup. Jean-Jacques was appointed as captain of a *Gardes* company in 1577, was recognised as the regiment's 'premier capitaine' by 1600, and was promoted to *lieutenant colonel* of the *Gardes* in 1610. He was still holding this latter position in 1629. Married Anne de Chaumejean in 1610, sister of the *Gardes* captain Blaise de Chaumejean (see above). Notable children:

1) Bernard, baron du Faget. *Maréchal de camp*.

2) Jean-Charles, baron de Londat. Married Miramonde Piger.

On *revues* of 1621, 1627 and 1629, a 'Bernard de Montesquiou' is named as the ensign of the *compagnie colonelle*. Given the date of Jean-Jacques' marriage, this may have been his first cousin once removed, Bernard-Antoine de Montesquiou (who married in 1618), rather than his son Bernard, who could only have been eleven years old by 1621. Alternatively, it could display the young age at which a person could enter into regimental office. Jean-Jacques was also a distant cousin of the Montesquiou de La Serre who captained a company in *Vaubecourt*.

(Above, pp. 67, 78, 114, 117; Noeufville, p. 256; La Chesnaye, X, pp. 338-339; DB 459)

MONTLEZUN, Barthélemy de, sieur de La Busca.

Son of Martin de Montlezun. Named as the lieutenant of Michel Patras' *Picardie* company in 1587. Received a *Picardie* captaincy in 1589, whcih he still maintained in 1632. 'Premier capitaine' of *Picardie* by 1610. Serving in the royal 'paneterie' in 1607. *Lieutenant du roi* in the Boulonnais. Married 1) Madeléne de Martines in 1587, daughter of Nicolas, *procureur* in the *généralité* of Calais and Antoinette de Bresse; 2) Marie de Blaizel, daughter of Guillaume, sieur de Florinetay and Antoinette du Amant. Notable children:

1) Jean, sieur de Saint-Léonard. Eldest son from his first wife. Named ensign in Barthélemy's *Picardie* company in 1622. Married Marie Frameri, daughter of Jean, sieur de Hambresent, *lieutenant civil et criminelle* of the *sénéchaussée* of the Boulonnais, and Jacqueline Morel. Two members of the Patras – Antoine, *sénéchal* of the Boulonnais and Pierre - were present at the wedding.

2) François de Montlezun, sieur de Lianne. Eldest son from his second wife. Named as ensign in Barthélemy's *Picardie* company in 1632. Married Marie de Tustal, daughter of Etienne de Tustal, sieur d'Andique.

(Above, pp. 40, 50, 63, 69-70, 83, 155; DB 466 (12, 440); Cabinet 246 (6504).)

MONTMORENCY, Hannibal de

Bastard son of Henri I de Montmorency-Damville, Constable of France. Appointed to a Navarre captaincy at an unknown date before 1597, which he held until an unknown date after 1620. Possible connection to the Laur (see above), as a David de Laur can be found as his lieutenant in *revues* of 1598 and 1610.

(Above, p. 134; Rohan, *Mémoires*, I, p. 382; Courcelles, *Histoire Généalogique et Héraldique*, II, Montmorency section, p. 10; *revue*, Ms.Fr 25833 (1511), Ms.Fr. 25842 (28).)

MONTMORENCY, Josias de, sieur de Bours.

One of fourteen children of Jean de Montmorency, sieur de Bours and Bernarde Gaillard. Josias was appointed to a *Gardes* captaincy during the 1590s, which he held until his death in 1616. A distant cousin of Henri de Montmorency-Damville.

Protestant. Married 1) Marie de Grouches, daughter of Henri, sieur de Griboval and Claude Girard; 2) Louise Hotman. Notable children:

1) Jean, sieur de Bours. Only son from first marriage. Served from the age of fourteen in his father's company. Appears as an ensign under Charles d'Applaincourt, who had assumed control of Josias' company on his death. Died in 1622.

(Above, pp. 81, 125 ; Haag, *La France protestante*, VII, pp. 492-493; Belleval, 'Les Montmorency', p. 253; *revue*, Ms.Fr. 25846 (275).)

NOGARET DE LA VALETTE, Jean Louis, chevalier de La Valette.

Bastard son of Épernon. Was appointed captain of the *Gardes* company previously commanded by Mathurin de Castelnau in 1622 after his death. Sold the captaincy of the company in 1633 to Louis de Castelnau, Mathurin's son and the lieutenant of La Valette's company. Subsequently entered into Venetian service, before returning to French service at an unspecified date between 1645 and his death in 1650. Appointed *lieutenant général des armées du roi* between 1645 and 1650. Married Gabriel Aymar in 1610, daughter of Honoré Aymar, sieur de Montsalier, *maître des requêtes* and subsequently *président* of the *parlement* of Provence, and Eleonore de Forbin Souliers. Notable children:

1)Felix de La Valette. *Lieutenant général des armées du roi* in 1688.

(Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 111; Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, pp. 119-120; DB 157 (4109) (Castelnau).)

PATRAS, Bertrand, sieur de Campaigno.

Captain in *Picardie* prior to his appointment as a *Gardes* captain in 1584. Client of Épernon. Appointed *sénéchal* of the Boulonnais, and made 'commandant' of a company in the Boulogne garrison, in 1597. Maintained close ties to Boulogne until his death in 1617. Notable relatives:

1) Brother: Michel Patras. (See below.)

2) Nephew: Antoine de Patras. Inhertied the position of *sénéchal* of the Boulonnais from Bertrand.

(Above, pp. 41, 69-70, 124, 155; Chagniot, 'Gardes', p. 110; Luppé, *Mémoires*, p. 200; Lefebvre, *Histoire*, II, p. 408; Cabinet 246 (6504) (Montlezun).)

PATRAS, Michel

Assumed the captaincy of his brother Bertrand's *Picardie* company in 1584, which Michel had resigned by the *état* of 1597. Barthélemy de Montlezun (see above) was the lieutenant of Michel's *Picardie* company in 1587. Subsequently assumed the captaincy of Bertrand's *Gardes* company at an unknown date between 1609 and Bertrand's death in 1617. Michel sold the company in 1622 to Gaspard de Coligny, sieur de Saligny. Notable relatives: see above: Patras, Bertrand.

(Sources: same as for Bertrand Patras.)

SAINT-AUBIN, Guillaume de

Son of Alexandre de Saint-Aubin and Marie-Anne de Bar. Married Huguette de Saubiez. Notable children:

1) Gabrielle. Married Jean du Val, sieur de Praslay, Mornay etc., lieutenant of the king's company of *chevaux-légers*.

(Nicolas Viton de Saint-Allais, *Nobiliaire universel de France [...]*, (21 Vols., Paris, 1814-1843), I, p. 343.)

SAINT-CRICQ, Gratian de

Present at the wedding of a *Navarre* captain, Jacques de Laur.

(DB 386 (378) (Laur).)

SALERNE, Gaillard de

Appointed to a *Gardes* captaincy prior to 1598, which he held until his death in 1601.

(Chagniot, *Gardes*, p. 105.)

THIANGES, Jonathan de, sieur de Roulet.

Appointed to a *Gardes* captaincy between 1588 and 1596. Died at the siege of Amiens in 1597.

(Noeufville, *Abrégé chronologique*, III, p. 203; Hozier, *L'impôt*, III, p. 326.)

TRION, Pierre de, sieur de Dancourt

Appointed to a *Navarre* captaincy before 1599, a position which he still held in 1617. By 1625 he was described as a former holder of a *Navarre* captaincy. Appointed *gouverneur* of the town and chateau of Roye at an unknown date after 1626. Listed in 1617 as *écuyer de la petite écurie du roi*. Married Louise de Roguée, widow of Louis de Caurel, *écuyer*, sieur de Dancourt. Notable children:

1) Charlotte. Married Charles de Séricourt, son of Antoine, sieur d'Esclainvilliers, royal lieutenant in the town and citadel of Rue, and lieutenant of the *Gardes de Monsieur frère du roi*, and Marie de Neufville.

Possible other relatives:

1) François de Trion. *Navarre* captain in 1622.

(Villefosse, 'Histoire', p. 157; Coët, *Histoire*, I, p. 137.)

ZAMET, Jean de, baron de Murat.

Son of Sebastien Zamet and Madeline de Clerc du Tremblay. Sebastien - who was originally from Lucca, Italy and who came to France within the entourage of Catherine de Médicis - became one of the foremost financiers within the French kingdom by the 1580s. Jean was appointed *mestre de camp* of *Picardie* in 1617, a position which he resigned in 1621/2. *Gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi*, *capitaine et surintendant des bâtiments* at Fontainebleu, *maréchal de camp*. Died at the siege of Montpellier in 1622. Married Jeanne de Goth, daughter of Jacques, baron de Rouillac and Hélène de Nogaret La Valette, daughter of Épernon.

(Anselme, *Histoire*, II, p. 236; Bergin, *Rise*, p. 41; Susane, *Ancienne*, II, p. 221; DB 634 (18, 224).)

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