


**THE ROLE OF THE 'STRATEGOI' IN ATHENS IN THE 4TH  
CENTURY B.C.**

**Scott Peake**

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD  
at the  
University of St. Andrews**



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# **The Role of the *Strategoi* in Athens in the C4th.B.C.**

A thesis submitted to the  
University of St. Andrews  
for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
by  
**S. Peake.**

March 1990.



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## Abstract

The role of the Athenian generals in the Fourth Century B.C. has remained one viewed in simplistic dismissal as mercenaries and lawless *condottieri*. Such ideas, based upon the political rhetoric of the Athenian *ecclesia*, led historians to remove the generals to the periphery of Athenian history in the Fourth Century. Though misguided, there has been neither a basic reinterpretation nor an in-depth re-examination of this idea.

This thesis examines the role of the Athenian *strategoi* from several different angles but with one central argument, that the specialist Athenian generals demonstrated throughout the C4th. a remarkably strong sense of loyalty and patriotism towards their *polis*. Through such an argument the generals may be brought back from the cloudy edges of legality and action they have been seen as occupying, and given a central role in the affairs of Athens in the Fourth Century.

This role will be reinforced on the military front by an examination of the Athenian command network and the evolution of warfare. I hope to show that the developments in the art of war that were occurring in this period merely exacerbated the sociopolitical tensions that were present in Athens and offered the generals further opportunity for the development of their office. By concentrating upon the relatively few specialist *strategoi* that emerged in the Fourth Century I hope to demonstrate that this development of the *strategia* was one of gradual evolution, continuing from Conon at the dawn of the century till the emergence of Leosthenes as virtually a popular dictator by the time of the Lamian War.

Loyalty to "state" did not bring direct political power to the specialist *strategoi*. Through the influence of public support, reliant upon a continued distancing from the squabblings of the rhetors, the *strategoi* might not have dominated Athenian political life but by 323 they were certainly in a position to threaten the complete sovereignty of the *ecclesia* itself.

The Role of the *Strategoi*  
in Athens in the C4th.B.C.

*For my parents, and for Graham,  
with admiration and affection.*

" διὸ ἐν στρατηγίαι μὲν εἰς τὴν ἔμπειρίαν μᾶλλον  
τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔλαττον γὰρ στρατηγίας μετέχουσι,  
τῆς δ' ἐπεικίας πλεῖον..."

Aristotle, *Politics* 1309b3.

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# Abbreviations

## 1. Ancient Authors:

Abbreviations of ancient authors mainly follow those laid down in *LSJ*<sup>9</sup>, but, as I have used a slightly different spelling system I offer the following list. Authors not found here are given in full:

Ael (ian):

*Tact (ics ).*

*V (aria ) H (istoria ).*

Aen (eos) *Tact (icos).*

Aesch (ines).

Aes (chylos).

Andoc (ides).

Ar (istophanes):

*Ach (arnenses ).*

*Av (es ).*

*Ecc (lesiazusae ).*

*Eq (uites ).*

*Nub (es ).*

*Plout (os ).*

Arist (otle):

*Ath (enaion ) Pol (iteia ).*

*Lac (edaimonion ) Pol (iteia ).*

*Pol (itics ).*

*Rhet (oric ).*

Arr (ian):

*Anab (asis ).*

*Tact (ica ).*

Ascl (epiodotos).

Athen (aeos).

Cic (ero).

Ctes (ias).

D (emades).

Dein (archos).

Dem (osthenes).

Diod (oros Siculos).

Diog (enes Laertius).

Dion (ysios of Halicarnassos).

Front (inus).

Harp (ocration).

Hell (enica Oxyrhynchia).

Herod (otos).

Hyp (ereides).

Isoc (rates).

Just (in).

Lyc (ourgos).

Lys (ias).

Man (etho).

(Cornelius) Nep (os):

IX *Con* (*on* ).

XI *Iphic* (*rates* ).

XII *Chab* (*rias* ).

XIII *Tim* (*otheos* ).

Paus (anias).

Phot (ios).



Plato:

*Laws.*

*Rep (ublic )*

Plut (arch): 1. Lives:

*Ages (ileos )* of Sparta.

*Alex (ander )* the Great.

*Art (axerxes ).*

*Dem (osthenes ).*

*Pel (opidas ).*

*Phoc (ion ).*

2. *Mor (alia ).*

Polyaen (os).

Polyb (ios).

Speus (ippos).

Theop (ompos).

Thuc (ydides).

Xen (ophon):

*Anab (asis ).*

*Ath (aenaion ) Pol (iteia ).*

*Cyr (opaedia ).*

*Hipp (archos ).*

*Lac (edaimonion ) Pol (iteia ).*

*Mem (orabilia ).*

## 2. Standard Modern Works:

The most frequently used works have been abbreviated thus:

*APF* J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* 600-300B.C.  
(Oxford 1971).

*CAH* *Cambridge Ancient History*, 12 vols.

- FGrH F. Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin and Leiden 1922- ).
- Develin R. Develin, *Athenian Officials 684-321B.C.* (Cambridge 1989).
- GG<sup>2</sup> K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*<sup>2</sup>, 8 vols. (2nd ed. Strasburg, Berlin and Leipzig 1912-23).
- IG *Inscriptiones Graecorum* (Berlin 1893- ).
- Kock T. Kock, *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta*, 3 vols. (Leipzig 1880-1883).
- LSJ<sup>9</sup> H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *An English - Greek Lexicon* (9th. ed. Oxford 1940).
- ML R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford 1967).
- PA J. Kirchner, *Prosopographica Attica*, 2 vols. (Berlin 1901/1903).
- Pritchett W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* , vol.II (Berkeley 1974).
- RE A. Pauly, G. Wissowa and W. Kroll, *Real-Encyclopädie der Klassischen Altertums-wissenschaft* (Stuttgart 1894).
- SEG *Supplementum Epigraphicum, Graecum* (1923- ).
- SIG<sup>3</sup> W. Dittenburger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecorum*, 4 vols. (3rd. ed. Leipzig 1915-1924).

Tod	M. N. Tod, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> , vol.2 (Oxford 1948).
Vitae	C. Rehdantz, <i>Vitae Iphicratis Chabriae Timothei Atheniensium</i> (Berlin 1845).

### 3. Journals and Periodicals:

Any abbreviations of journals and periodicals that I have inadvertently omitted to include here will be easily identifiable with the aid of such lists of abbreviations as the *LSJ*<sup>9</sup> I, p.xli-xlvi, *OCD*<sup>2</sup> p.ix-xxii, *CAH* V p.487-488, or any recent number of *L'année philologique*:

AC	<i>Acta Classica.</i>
AI	<i>Annali del Istituto di Corrispondenza Archaeologica.</i>
AJA	<i>American Journal of Archaeology.</i>
AJAH	<i>American Journal of Ancient History.</i>
AJP	<i>American Journal of Philology.</i>
AW	<i>Ancient World.</i>
BCH	<i>Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.</i>
BICS	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies.</i>
BSA	<i>Annual of the British School at Athens.</i>
CA	<i>Classical Antiquity.</i>
CJ	<i>Classical Journal.</i>
C&M	<i>Classica et Mediaevalia.</i>
CP	<i>Classical Philology.</i>
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly.</i>
CR	<i>Classical Review.</i>
CRAI	<i>Comptes rendus de l'académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres.</i>
CW	<i>Classical Weekly.</i>

<i>G&amp;R</i>	<i>Greece and Rome.</i>
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies.</i>
<i>HSCP</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies.</i>
<i>JRS</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Studies.</i>
<i>LCM</i>	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly.</i>
<i>MDAI (A)</i>	<i>Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung.</i>
<i>P&amp;P</i>	<i>Past and Present.</i>
<i>PP</i>	<i>La Parola del Passato.</i>
<i>PRIA</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy.</i>
<i>REA</i>	<i>Revue des études anciennes.</i>
<i>REG</i>	<i>Revue des études grecques.</i>
<i>RH</i>	<i>Revue historique.</i>
<i>RhM</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie.</i>
<i>RPh</i>	<i>Revue de philologie.</i>
<i>SO</i>	<i>Symbolae Osloenses.</i>
<i>TAPA</i>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association.</i>
<i>YCS</i>	<i>Yale Classical Studies.</i>
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik.</i>

The role of the general in the modern democratic state is to implement and enforce the policy decisions of the government which he serves through the use of the armed forces of that state which are under his control. The general is but one part (albeit a major part) of the executive branch of government, enacting the wishes of the legislative branch of the government, in which the general himself plays no part. It is a basic prerequisite of representative democratic government that these functions (along with the judiciary) remain strictly divided and independent of each other. The combination of the executive and legislative functions of government into one must effectively mean the transformation of democratic government into some form of totalitarian or authoritarian regime, be it oligarchy, junta, dictatorship or monarchy.<sup>1</sup>

In the direct democracy of classical Athens however, the divisions between the various functions of government were not so clearly defined. Being composed of the citizens themselves, with offices being drawn by lot or elected from the citizen body as a whole, the different branches of government tended to be composed of the same men. Magistrates were also citizens, and all citizens had the right to attend, speak and propose in the assembly. The lack of a distinct executive was heightened still further by the non-existence of any organised civil service. The nearest equivalent to such

a body was the board of the ten generals (*strategoi*), chosen annually by popular vote.<sup>2</sup>

In the C5th. it had been a regular practice for the most prominent of the speakers in the assembly to hold the *strategia* also. Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles and Alcibiades are all major examples of this trend. These men used the office as much as a means of increasing their own personal political influence within the assembly as they did for the actual duties of military command.

However, after the restoration of the democracy in 403 there was a trend towards the separation of these two aspects of political power. Policy making within the assembly gradually became the work of specialist orators (*rhetoires*), who were no longer elected as *strategoi*, whilst the *strategia* began to be dominated by individuals who tended to keep away from the *bema* on the Pnyx. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1305a7-15) put this trend down to the development of the art of rhetoric. But it was much more likely that it was advances in warfare: the advent of light-armed troops and cavalry as integral parts of the Greek city-states armed forces and technical advances (such as siege tactics and weaponry) that made it essential that military specialists should hold the active commands within the *strategia*.<sup>3</sup>

But this process was gradual in its development. The trend was most apparent after 355, but even then generals attended the assembly and spoke, proposed motions and used the processes of impeachment. Also, there were still some who clung to the traditional "dual role". Phocion was the most

noticeable example.<sup>4</sup>

Yet it is this continuing overlap between *strategoi* and *rhetoires* that made the subject of this thesis more easy to define to some degree. The idea of military specialist must not be overemphasised, but it was clearly the case that from 403 onwards it became a fact of Athenian political life that certain individuals became renowned as *strategoi* and not as *rhetoires* in the assembly. These figures tended to dominate the active military commands during the C4th. and thus took a central role in Athenian foreign affairs throughout the period of this thesis.

Yet this specialisation has brought with it a similar division of study in C4th. Athenian politics and history. Writers have tended to concentrate on the workings of the assembly and the personalities of the orators at the expense of those who dominated the *strategia* throughout these years. The specialist generals were pushed to the periphery of Athenian political study. A glance at two modern authors reveals the reason why. " Furthermore, a glance at the names of those listed above (ie. Euboulos, Lycourgos, Demosthenes, Demades and Hypereides as opposed to Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheos, Chares and Charidemios) shows that the *rhetoires* dominated the *strategoi*. Today, the C4th. Athenian generals are only known by specialists, whereas Demosthenes and Lycourgos are historical characters on a par with Pericles or Alcibiades of the preceding century."<sup>5</sup> So wrote Hansen in his book on the Athenian Assembly. Sinclair was to take a similar line. " The tendency for a separation of military and political functions, the growing "professionalisation" of warfare and of political

activity in the fourth century, and the crucial importance of finance and financial advisers seriously diminished the political significance of the *strategia* and encouraged a narrowing of its responsibilities,...real political influence in all periods rested on the ability to carry the assembly."<sup>6</sup>

In his important study *The Greek State at War* (Part II), W. K. Pritchett studied the evidence of Greek generals in the C4th. acting as lawless *condottieri*. His conclusion was that there was, in fact, remarkably little in the way of hard evidence to back up the traditional view. Pritchett concluded that the the generals of the C4th. were not lawless mercenaries but, rather, little more than civil-servants held in check by the legal strictures imposed upon them by the central authorities of their home countries.

It is one of the major contentions of this thesis that these lines of argument form the very trap that the orators wished the Athenian public themselves to fall into. Although Pritchett did much to recast the image of Greek generals in the C4th., it is my contention that, in the case of the Athenian *strategoi* at least, he too followed the wrong line of argument in assessing their independence and importance within the political framework of the Athenian democracy.

The development of specialised *strategoi* brought about (to some extent) the separation of the executive from the legislature, but in the direct democracy this did not necessarily mean that there was a consequent loss of political power nor some form of lawless conduct. As I hope to show, the



social tensions within Athens in the same period in fact brought about a degree of power in the *strategia* that the office had never had in its own right before, a power based upon loyalty and devotion to the mother city.

But as I have already said, this power was to be only in the hands of a certain few individuals who were to hold the *strategia* in the 4th.. So few were they that it is possible to name them. Conon, Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheos, Chares, Diopeithes, Charidemus, Leosthenes and Antiphrilos. All were *strategoi* first and foremost, and were recognised by the Athenian public as such. These nine figures dominated the generalship from 403 until 322.<sup>7</sup> These are the central subjects of this thesis. There were others. Menestheos, Leosthenes the Elder and Cephisodotos are all examples. But these men, for one reason or another were not to attain the political high ground that their more distinguished colleagues were to enjoy. The only other major *strategos*, Phocion, remains the enigma, and I justify his exclusion because he was not recognised as a general as such by his own kinsfolk, and was seen rather as a sort of "political general".<sup>8</sup>

As to the remainder of those who held the *strategia* from 403 till 322 we either know nothing or they are but names and nothing else. Though in the majority, these were the "silent holders" of that office, the links between the active, specialist *strategoi* and the political orators of the assembly. It is for this reason that I have deliberately attempted to avoid the use of the term "the *strategoi* " or "the generals", and use rather the term "the specialist *strategoi* ".<sup>9</sup> If I have erred from this rule in the course of this thesis then I apologise, and hope that the context of the passage in

which it is placed makes clear the grouping that I imply. Similarly, with the term "specialist *strategoi* " which has been used throughout as a convenient collective term. What it does not imply is that there was any conscious recognition of such a group amongst the generals themselves throughout this period. As I shall discuss, there were occasions when mutual self-interest pushed the specialist *strategoi* together, but they remained, in the main, rival individuals whose only mutual interest was that they held the office of *strategos*.

The order of this thesis has been a completely arbitrary choice on my own part. The four sections could have easily been reversed. However, it is my belief that their present order does form the most logical and readable progression in the understanding of the central arguments concerning the development of the *strategia* in my period.

The whole of this thesis is based on one presumption, but it is one that I make no apology for. The identity and integrity of not only the Greek city-states, but all nation states were built upon, and rested upon, the basic patriotism of its citizens. Perhaps in these days of international cooperation and attempts at multinational federalism patriotism is a slightly outmoded concept but it is, in my belief, the most basic political concept. Even multinationalism must, ultimately, be based on the concepts of national identity and the feelings of belonging to one nation that is felt by the citizens of any one country. It is my belief that within the Athenian *polis* of the 4th. the idea of Athenian identity, and a pride in that identity, was as strong as it had ever been. Without that feeling it must be asked just why

did the Athenians take the field at Chaeronea and Crannon, and all the other conflicts of the C4th.. The truth is that without patriotism the continued existence of any nation is impossible.

A brief word must be said concerning that unsolvable problem for the writer on Greek history, spelling. I am afraid that, like so many of my far-academically superior predecessors I have been consistent only in being inconsistent. Generally, names have been transliterated from the Greek as far as seemed consistent with easy recognition. I have tended, however, to use "c" rather than "k" (as in Pericles) and "ch" rather than "kh" (as in Chares), "ei" rather than "e" and "e" rather than "i" (as Hypereides and Aeschines). Similarly I have used the ending "os" rather than the now more common "us". This was simply a matter of preference on my part. Other spelling I hope will not pose too much trouble. Occasionally I have used the anglicised forms of familiar places or people (such as Athens and Alexander), but, as much as possible, I have stuck with the transliterated Greek versions. Ancient authors are always particularly difficult. I have tended to use the forms most commonly found in English, even if this has involved the loss of or modification of the original ending (such as Aristotle). Thus I hope to justify the inconsistency of Thucydides to Aeschines and Plato to Deinarchos.<sup>10</sup>

As to references, I hope that my method will be self-explanatory. I have chosen to use the author-date system, with the full titles being found in the bibliography. However, with some works on modern history and other works consulted for only a single reference I have tended to give the whole

As to references, I hope that my method will be self-explanatory. I have chosen to use the author-date system, with the full titles being found in the bibliography. However, with some works on modern history and other works consulted for only a single reference I have tended to give the whole title at that point and omitted them from the bibliography.

It is a pleasure to be able to express my indebtedness to many people. To everyone at Bedford College, London (now sadly no more), both friends and teachers (they were as one), whose friendship and encouragement I shall never forget. Especially I would like to thank Susan Sherwin-White, who offered this poor undergraduate some glimpse of her vast knowledge and inspired me to explore the world of fourth century Athens.

Equally I would like to thank everyone at the University of St. Andrews who assisted with this thesis. To Geoffrey Rickman, Michael Whitby and Jill Harries, who made me so welcome and gave me such help throughout my time in their department. However, I must express my particular gratitude to my supervisor Michel Austin, whose patience and common sense suggestions offered me so much of value in the way of advice and new insights into my topic and made my work such a pleasure.

I must also express my gratitude to all those whose friendship and advice I valued so highly. In the department, Jennifer, Tig and Lynne, three of the best secretaries one could ever wish to know and who would surely grace any department.

Finally however, thanks to my parents, Gordon and Vera, who bore with such extreme patience the trauma of having a son with academic pretensions. And to Graham, my big brother, who kept me sane more often than I can care to remember. It is to them that I readily dedicate this work, with all the love in my heart.

*University of St. Andrews*

Scott Peake

*March 1990*

Part I:

**The Generals and Athenian  
Foreign Policy, 404-323.**

## **2 Recovery and Resurgence 404-359**

### **i: Conon, Thrasyboulos and the Corinthian War**

From the year 404 till 397 the Athenians were unable to pursue anything resembling an independent foreign policy. Although the city could think itself fortunate to have been allowed to survive, defeat in the Peloponnesian War left Athens as virtually a defenceless satellite of the Spartans. The long walls and the arsenals of the city were pulled down, the fleet was reduced to twelve triremes, a Spartan Harmost stood guard over the city and the Athenian nation was itself brought to the brink of ruin by the agreement to repay the 100T. loaned by the Spartans to the Athenian oligarchs.<sup>1</sup> In addition to the ravages of the war there were the material and human losses of the recent civil bloodshed to contend with. Until 401 Attica was effectively to remain two distinct states, the main democratic part at Athens itself, and the oligarchic rump left in Eleusis. In short, the Athenians had no practical course left open other than to follow the foreign policies adopted by the Peloponnesian Confederacy.

Yet within eight years the Athenians were to be once again at war with their old enemies. Although it is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss this topic in itself, I have considered it necessary to begin my study at this point due to the apparently predominant roles of two figures who

were generals in this period, Conon and Thrasybulos, in the events surrounding the resurgence of Athenian imperialism. In discussing the activities of these two men I also hope to set out the basic paths of enquiry that I intend to follow in this, and the following two chapters.

In 398/397 Conon was appointed as vice-admiral (and effective commander in chief) of a Persian fleet under the satrap Pharnabazos for service in the Aegean.<sup>2</sup> Having sailed to Rhodes in the summer of 396 and successfully initiated the defection of that island from the Spartan alliance, Conon then decisively defeated the Spartan fleet at Cnidos. At sometime between these two events the Athenians had brought themselves into alliance with the Boeotians and, in so doing, into an immediate state of war with the Spartan Confederacy.<sup>3</sup>

After Cnidos, Conon and Pharnabazos had embarked upon an expedition around the Aegean, ostensibly "liberating" many islands and coastal city-states from Spartan control. Eventually they arrived at Athens whereupon Conon set the sailors of the fleet to work rebuilding the long walls. But Conon was not to enjoy his triumph for any length of time. In 392 he fell victim to the machinations of the Persian court. He was arrested by the satrap Tiribazos and although he escaped, he was to die in Cyprus without returning to Athens.

Short though Conon's career was, his influence was portrayed by the Athenians as all important to the rebirth of Athenian nationalism. To the Athenians after the event Conon was regarded as a national hero, *sotêr* of



the city and liberator of their "allies" from Spartan rule. Conon became the first Athenian since the tyrannicides to be awarded a statue in the Agora in his own lifetime.<sup>4</sup> Conon was viewed as an Athenian hero and Cnidos as an Athenian victory. Isocrates declared that from the first Conon's aims had been to do good for the Athenians and the Greeks.<sup>5</sup> The role of the Persians in Athenian sources was minimised to the point of virtual non-existence. Isocrates felt perfectly at ease in talking of Conon's victories without making any reference to the Persian contribution.<sup>6</sup>

The pedestal upon which stood the statue of Conon bore the following inscription: " Conon freed the allies of Athens."<sup>7</sup> But was this how Conon was seen at the time of his naval campaigns ? The question is an important one. If Conon was recognised as an Athenian "admiral" from the time of his appointment, then the general can be held to have influenced directly Athenian foreign policy in this period. In fact though, the evidence suggests otherwise, at least until the victory at Cnidos. Although many Athenians clearly took an interest in the activities of Conon, there was no official support or recognition for the admiral. Individuals sent privately sponsored missions of arms and sailors to Conon,<sup>8</sup> and Pausanias relates how the appointment of Conon emboldened the Athenians to refuse the request of king Agesilaos for troops for his campaigns in Asia,<sup>9</sup> but when a certain Demaenetus sailed from Athens to join the admiral, the assembly was quick to disown him and requested the Spartan Harmost of Aegina to intercept him.<sup>10</sup> Conon was not an elected Athenian *strategos*, and thus the Athenians could distance themselves from his activities. This was borne out by the fact that the Athenians received no embassies bringing complaints or

threats of retaliation from the Spartans as would be the case with the Athenian generals later in the century.<sup>11</sup> In short, Conon was regarded as a representative of official Athenian foreign policy neither by his own native state nor by Athens' neighbours.

The revolt of Rhodes in the summer of 396 has long been seen as the turning point in Athenian attitudes to Sparta and Conon. As Perlman has written: "...it can safely be said that the defection of Rhodes kindled both Boeotian and Athenian hopes of war."<sup>12</sup> But this was not a case of the direct initiation of foreign policy by a general but rather the indirect intervention of a third party in the relationships of the two city-states (Athens and Sparta). The Athenians might have encouraged, and been encouraged by, Conon, but they would not endorse him as any sort of vehicle of Athenian foreign policy as such, nor did his activities have any great bearing on that policy.

Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that at this time Conon was the subject of some abuse from amongst his own countrymen concerning his Medism. Lysias X (384/383) does not name Conon, and Cnidos was portrayed as a Persian, not an Athenian, triumph. Such ideas reflect the fundamental contradiction of Conon's position with regards to his native city-state. Conon was not elected *strategos* (in the C4th.) until 394/393,<sup>13</sup> when Athens was already fully engaged in open warfare with Sparta and could openly endorse his activities in a whole-hearted display of patriotic zeal. Yet until that point, his only official rank was that of admiral in the Persian navy, directly and solely responsible to Artaxerxes. It is a

contradiction amply reflected in the sources.<sup>14</sup> The Great King had selected Conon, an Athenian, for one purpose alone, and that was to make his operations in the Aegean appear as those of a Greek, rather than a Persian, fleet. His aim was to curtail the involvement of Agesilaos in Asia by stirring up as much trouble in the Aegean as possible without the risk of uniting the Greeks through fear of a Persian invasion. He had no long term interest in the Aegean, merely wishing for the city-states to remain divided and squabbling amongst themselves. Despite the latitude allowed to Conon by the Great King the Persians were only successful in part. As I have shown, Conon was not automatically linked to Athens, or recognised as an Athenian general, until after Cnidos. It was not he who brought Athens into conflict with Sparta.

The news of the voyage of Demaenetos was greeted with uproar amongst the Athenians. The assembly was hastily convened to decide upon the official course of action. Clearly there were many who viewed open support for the expedition to be the best available course. Epicrates and Cephalos, the leaders of "the many", were no doubt amongst this group; after all, had they not been "encouraged" to seek such a policy with the aid of 50T. of Persian silver?<sup>15</sup> Yet it was the group who wished to disavow Demaenetos and thus avoid confrontation with the Spartans that won the day, thanks largely to the advice of Thrasyboulos of Steiria.

Thrasyboulos was no friend of the Spartans, yet he did not wish to see the Athenians undertake a major conflict with that state over the Demaenetos affair. When however, less than a year later, the Theban

ambassadors came in search of an alliance with the Athenians, an alliance that would automatically bring the Athenians into war with Sparta, Thrasyboulos supported the move.<sup>16</sup> Quite clearly then it was his, not Conon's, which was the greater influence on Athenian policy at this time. Despite arguments to the contrary, it was highly unlikely that the Athenians, and Thrasyboulos in particular, had such a change of heart on account of the defection of Rhodes from the Spartan alliance, as many argue,<sup>17</sup> since this event took place before the embarkation of Demaenetus.<sup>18</sup> Thrasyboulos' change of opinion was probably due to two factors that had nothing to do with Conon. Firstly, the alliance with the Boeotian League<sup>19</sup> was more favourable both to him personally,<sup>20</sup> and to the Athenians as a whole, than one involving the Persians.<sup>21</sup> Secondly, the successes of Agesilaos in Asia since the Demaenetus incident made the halting of Spartan expansion a necessity. In effect, the activities of Conon were but minor influences on the minds of the Athenians as they attempted to ease themselves away from the Spartan orbit. In such a light it was hardly surprising that Thrasyboulos would view a protective alliance with a close Greek neighbour in far more favourable a light than one based on the distant illusions of a (largely) foreign fleet. Whilst many within the city might have wondered at the efforts of Conon, and speculated that there might be some possibility of assistance from that quarter, that was all it was, mere speculation. At best Conon's activities after Cnidos were but additional incentives for a city which had already determined to go to war through the agencies of Thrasyboulos and the Boeotians. The preparations for the war and the defence of the city from attack had begun long before the arrival of Conon at Athens and even before Cnidos. The contracts for the rebuilding of the long

walls make it clear that the work was already well in hand by 394 when the sailors of the Persian fleet were set to work on that task.<sup>22</sup> In short, Conon can be rejected as a direct influence on Athenian foreign policy up until the outbreak of the Corinthian War. He was but a catalyst in an already ongoing process.

Although Thrasyboulos was indeed experienced in warfare that is not to say that he was any kind of military specialist as Conon apparently was. Thrasyboulos was a regular and prominent speaker in the assembly. Though he had held the generalship in 411/410 his record was a long one of public service based mainly in the field of domestic politics. When he was reelected *strategos* in 395/394,<sup>23</sup> it seems likely that this was more in recognition of his domestic political skills and service for the democracy than for his military talents.

Thus the events leading up to Athenian participation in the Corinthian War were not directly attributable to Conon. Nor therefore was Athenian foreign policy itself. That was being directed by events at a much more local level, and by local figures - the political orators of the assembly. Conon merely arrived at an Athens already embarked on its own course into which he could conveniently fit as a timely morale-booster for an already war-wearied population.<sup>24</sup> To suggest that he even played a significant part in the determination and direction of Athenian foreign policy in the years up till the war is to fall into precisely the trap set by the Athenian propagandists of the 370's and 360's. Until his arrival in the city in 394 Conon was indeed a hope, but that was all.

**ii: The settlement of Greece and the Athenian reemergence**

Field Marshal Haig declared that "politicians have no role in wartime, it is only the generals who can carry through the foreign policies of the state."<sup>25</sup> As it was, for Athens, the generals were unable to bring about a successful conclusion to the war. By 390 the Athenians were once again on the verge of bankruptcy, their armies had been decisively defeated and both Thrasyboulos and Conon were dead. In the event however, the peace of 387, commonly known as the peace of Antalcidas, or the King's Peace, which finally ended the war, was not to leave Athens in as parlous a condition as many would have expected. Although the Asiatic Greeks were given up and the Athenians could no longer benefit from the 5% tax on shipping coming through the Bosphoros, Athens retained her walls, kept her rebuilt fleet and, above all, was allowed to retain Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros the guardians of the corn-supply routes. The consequence of such a settlement was that although they had once more been defeated, the Athenians had made some significant recovery since the nadir of the immediate post-Peloponnesian War era. The ensuing period of their history showed that the Athenians were still ready to pursue a policy of expansionism given the slightest leeway to do so. In considering the roles of the generals in this period it was this fact that must always be borne in mind.

**a: The period of diplomacy**

The King's peace contained two clauses of great significance for the Athenians and for the Athenian generals.<sup>26</sup> Firstly, the autonomy clause which recognised the right of all the city-states to govern themselves. Although breaking up the fledgling hegemony of Thrasyboulos and Conon it nevertheless offered the Athenians possibilities for the future, since her former allies Thebes and Argos had to give up their hegemonies of Boeotia and Corinth respectively. Secondly, although the Greek commentators portrayed the peace as a victory for the Persians, the reality was very different. The surrendering of the Ionian Greeks to the rule of the Great King was matched by the far more meaningful surrender by Artaxerxes of all the gains of Pharnabazos and Conon. If the King had realised that the results of this would be to leave his empire free of Greek interference for the next fifty years, then his diplomacy was indeed far-sighted. The truth, one suspects, was somewhat different, and he merely sought the freedom to deal with his troubles in the Levant. Like Augustus almost four hundred years later, Artaxerxes gave up what he could have gained as a result of war in order to attempt to maintain the strength of what he already held. Though individual satraps were to become involved, the Great King himself was to play no major part in Greek affairs from that point onwards.<sup>27</sup>

The defeats of the previous twenty years seemingly left unimpaired the Athenian popular desire for imperialist expansion. G. T. Griffith wrote that "...certainly Athens had changed little...the memory of her *archê* remained a subject of pride rather than shame."<sup>28</sup> At this time it must also be remembered that the greater part of the Athenian citizen body had come of age when Athens was a central power and enjoying all the economic and

material benefits of that position. In such a light it was hardly surprising that many looked with fond nostalgia on those days and sought a rapid recovery of that position. Such a desire could only have been heightened by the successes of Conon. Now the Athenians could see the opportunities to fill the power vacuum created in the Aegean by the Great King.

Yet the Athenians did not follow up the opportunities which presented themselves at the close of the Corinthian War. The appeal by Mantinea for Athenian assistance against the Spartans was met with inaction by the Athenians and the city was broken up.<sup>29</sup> Even Spartan aggression against Olynthos, a city in the very process of allying itself with Athens, went without any retaliation by the Athenians.

The two events above clearly demonstrated the contrast between Athenian ambitions abroad and Athenian actions. Despite the popular desire for a return to the days of empire the Athenians were simply unable to embark on such a course. This was due in part to economic considerations, but in part it must have also been down to the basic attitudes of those controlling Athenian policies at this time.

The whole tone of Athenian foreign policy from 386 till 380 was one of defensive and diplomatic activity rather than aggressive military action. A treaty made with Chios in 384/383 makes this policy apparent. The treaty was purely defensive in nature and it is openly stated that the treaty is not in contravention of the King's Peace.<sup>30</sup> Ober has also recently argued that it was in this period that the Athenians began a road and fortress



network around Attica "...clear sign of the new mentality and the new defence strategy adopted by Athens in the first half of the C4th.."31

This defensive approach to foreign policy suggests that the generals, or at least the specialist ones amongst that group, had little say in Athenian foreign policy. But that is of no great surprise. As I argued in the previous section there was no trend to suggest otherwise in the years since 403. The influence of Conon in the directing of Athenian foreign affairs was minimal, and the only other significant figure, Thrasyboulos, was certainly no *strategos* of the specialist variety. His death at Aspendos in 390/389 marks not a break in the new era of specialist generals, but rather the fading out of the old type of domestic political figure who would turn to the *strategia* as circumstances or short-term political opportunity demanded. In short, what we have in the period between 386 and 380 is the political domination of Athenian foreign policy by the political personalities of the assembly, and a period of quiescence on the part of the emerging specialist *strategoï* within the Athenian political system.

At this stage, despite being dependent upon military activity for their employment, the generals probably realised the economic straits that faced their country and knew that, for the present, such a defensive policy was relatively wise for the long term welfare of the state. It was when some signs of economic recovery became apparent that military activity and the readoption of an expansionist policy raised the public profile of the *strategoï* and began to advance their position within the Athenian political system.

Whereas the works of the historians, notably Diodoros, were Atheno-centric in nature, during these years the Athenians were hardly mentioned in connection with the major affairs of the Greek world. That is not to say that the Athenians were completely inactive, as the treaty with Chios made clear. Yet it was not until the 370's that the Athenians began to utilise the strength of their military machine.

**b: Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheos and the Athenian miracle ?**

From 380 the deeds of the Athenians were once more considered worthy of record by the Greek historians. For it was from this time onwards that the Athens resumed a militarily active role in Greek affairs. The reason for this apparently radical shift in policy can be attributed to three main factors.

Firstly, the leniency of the King's peace had given the Athenians the opportunity to rebuild and recuperate after the Corinthian War much quicker than had been the case after the Peloponnesian War.

Secondly, the slow economic recovery which had occurred after the ravages of the Peloponnesian War, had been severely set back by the Athenian involvement in the Corinthian War. By 387 the city was once more on the verge of economic ruin. But the six years of respite after 386 must have given the city a fair time to recover, especially since, as was mentioned above, she had escaped so lightly as a result of the peace. Sinclair has convincingly shown that Athenian naval activity markedly

increased between the 380's and the 370's. Such a growth was a clear signal of a marked improvement in the economic situation.<sup>32</sup>

Thirdly, and most importantly, there was a significant upsurge in public confidence in the capabilities of the Athenian military. Although the economic recovery could have gone some way to account for this, surely only a renewed confidence in the military leaders of the state could have caused such a shift in policy, and persuaded the Athenians once more to take up arms. This was especially true of direct democracies where the citizens who voted for military action at any moment also had to do the fighting themselves. Thus a high level of confidence in the military leadership was demanded. Following their defeat at Pavia in 1525 the Swiss refused to vote for the continuation of the war until their generals were replaced.<sup>33</sup> By the 370's, the Athenians considered that they had generals in whom they could entrust not only the future military affairs of the city-state, but also their own lives. By 380, two specialist *strategoi*, Iphicrates and Chabrias, had emerged to serve their city in the field. They were to do so, in a position of virtually unchallenged dominance (with the notable exception of Timotheos) until the late 360's.

Iphicrates of Rhamnous had first come to prominence in the Corinthian War. It was, in fact, this early part of his career that established his reputation as a military thinker and innovator as well as a fine field commander. His command of a force of peltasts on the Isthmus was particularly notable, and his successes, even though not at that time a *strategos*,<sup>34</sup> gained him great fame.<sup>35</sup> When, in 390, he destroyed a Spartan

*mora* with his peltasts, he assured himself a place in the Athenian hall of fame, even though he was still under thirty years of age.

After the ending of the war he entered the service of an unknown Thracian king,<sup>36</sup> although it is unlikely that this was in any official capacity as an Athenian magistrate, given the circumstances the Athenians found themselves in after the war.<sup>37</sup> In whatever capacity he served, Iphicrates was ultimately successful in the employ of Cotys, for the king gave the commander the hand of his daughter in marriage as a token of his gratitude for his services (circa 384). Iphicrates was to spend much of his time in the region from that point onwards.

In 380/379 however, Iphicrates left the service of the Thracian and returned to Athens. Although the reasons for his departure are not known, the theories put forward do assist our understanding of the specialist *strategoi*. Perhaps the renewed vigour of Athenian foreign policy after 380 drew him back. Yet this seems unlikely. The first genuine sign of this Athenian activity was the despatch of Iphicrates to Persia with the rank of *strategos*, so the evidence points to the return of the general acting more as a cause, than a response to, the Athenian shift in policy.<sup>38</sup> Pritchett (1974 p.66-67) argued that Iphicrates departed from Thrace after his refusal to serve in the naval battle referred to in Demosthenes XXIII.132, and although the date of this battle may have been much later, it was a good indication of the loyalty of this *strategos* to his home state.

Like his contemporary, Chabrias of Aexone was elected to his first

commands in the Corinthian War. He is first mentioned as the successor to Iphicrates as the Athenian commander in the Isthmus.<sup>39</sup> Although Chabrias did not gain the fame of his colleague, it can be assumed that he did well enough, for, having served Evagoras, the king of Salamis,<sup>40</sup> he was sent for by Acoris, the king of Egypt, to command his forces against the Persians. Unfortunately Diodoros, our only source for this campaign, badly misplaced it into the year 377/376. This was clearly incorrect, even though many have been misled. Hall in the Cambridge Ancient History agreed with the date,<sup>41</sup> but Nectenebôs had succeeded Acoris in 378,<sup>42</sup> making such a late date highly improbable. Parke settled for a date between 386 and 380, whilst Olmstead put the campaign in the period 385-383.<sup>43</sup> This campaign then, falls neatly into that period of relative lassitude of Athenian foreign policy described above. Like Iphicrates, Chabrias had gained enough of a reputation from the early part of his career to be sought after by foreign rulers seeking quality commanders. Indeed, Pharnabazos had specifically asked for Iphicrates as general in 379.<sup>44</sup> It is plain then, that even as early as the 380's, the Athenians had two generals of great worth, fame and reputation. They were figures of great pride. Their return from foreign employment to Athens in 380/379 must have brought a renewed hope of Athenian glory. These figures were but one part of the regeneration of the Athenian national spirit, but they were a very important part at that.

The service of Chabrias in Egypt also brings out another theme of this study. The state the Athenian went to serve was, at that time, engaged in a war against the Persians, who had only recently allied themselves with Athens. Chabrias did not seek the permission of the *demos*, but travelled in

the capacity of a private citizen.<sup>45</sup> He sought to distance himself from the Athenian central authorities and avoid any repetition of the Demaenetos affair which had so nearly brought the Athenians to war with the Spartans in 397. Such consideration for the interests of his home country was not only a constant trait of Chabrias' behaviour, but that of all the specialist *strategoi*.

For Chabrias, the moral dilemma which could, and did, arise from the taking up of offers of lucrative employment elsewhere, did not take too long to become a reality. The satrap Pharnabazos sent emissaries to Athens denouncing the general, and the Athenians had no course other than to send messengers to Chabrias seeking his return to the city.<sup>46</sup> Chabrias duly complied, returning to the city and taking up the duties required of him by his country.

The years 380 to 371 were to be highly successful ones for the Athenians in the area of foreign affairs. This was despite the inauspicious events of 379 when a Spartan army under Cleombrotos passed through, or near to, Attica on its way to Boeotia. Chabrias, despatched to the area with an Athenian force to intercept the Spartans, did nothing.<sup>47</sup> Yet Chabrias had not acted against the orders given to him. The road he was to guard (that which passed through Eleutherai) in fact ran into Attic territory. The Spartans however, took the other route to the north.<sup>48</sup> Chabrias acted in the best interest of his country and avoided the risk of war with Sparta by not engaging in a pointless conflict. Although there is evidence of a growth in anti-Spartan feeling in this period, Chabrias as much as any other thinking Athenian could see that the city-state was in no way capable, at that point in

time, of engaging in a major conflict with the Spartans.<sup>49</sup> As it was, the conciliatory nature of Cleombrotos' expedition drove the Athenians into an immediate alliance with the Thebans, fearing, as they did, the possibility of a Theban/Spartan reconciliation, with all the implications that would have had for the Athenians.<sup>50</sup> Thus, without any activity on his part, Chabrias once more found himself facing the military might of Sparta.

Yet this period was seemingly one of great confidence for the Athenians. The raid of Sphodrias, and his subsequent acquittal in the Spartan courts, brought anti-Spartan feeling to renewed heights of intensity, and this was reflected in the more "aggressive" approach the Athenians adopted in their foreign affairs from that point. The year 377/376 witnessed the election of not only Iphicrates and Chabrias to the *strategia*, but also a certain Timotheos, the son of Conon.<sup>51</sup> The same period witnessed the decree of Aristoteles, by which the Athenians formally recorded on a marble *stèle* the existence of a new confederacy which they had been gathering together since the last years of the Corinthian War.<sup>52</sup> In itself this move was not of great significance since the alliances upon which the Confederacy was based had all been made previously. But the psychological meaning of the decree was of great importance. The Athenians were back at the head of a major league. As such they were openly declaring their intent to resume their role as a major power in Greek power politics. In so doing, the Athenians were announcing their own confidence in the generals who would have to lead the city and its allies in the pursuit of these aims.

Chabrias was to lead the way in putting this renewed self-belief onto

a more permanent footing. In 378/377 he commanded an Athenian and Theban force that deterred Agesilaos from giving battle by use of a novel stratagem.<sup>53</sup> That the Spartans, and in particular, the warrior king Agesilaos had been deterred from giving battle by an Athenian *strategos* was hailed as a great victory by the allies, and prevented the loss of morale that was a common complaint of Athenian war efforts against the Spartans.

But in the following year Chabrias was to achieve the victory which would place him on an equal footing with the greatest generals of Athens. In a great naval battle off the island of Naxos in the year 376, the Athenian fleet under Chabrias gained a decisive victory over the Spartans.<sup>54</sup> Spartan naval ambitions were finally laid to rest by this action. Within the space of two years Chabrias had saved the Thebans,<sup>55</sup> reduced Sparta to a land-power, and regained Athenian supremacy of the seas. But such victories did not merely announce to their rivals that the Athenians were back in the forefront of Hellenic affairs. They also confirmed the Athenians in their renewed hopes of some form of greater Athens, and Chabrias was duly honoured as the man who had brought this about.<sup>56</sup>

At the same time Chabrias had convinced the lesser Greek states of the strength of the Athenian military. The new confederacy led by the Athenians specifically promised to avoid features of the C5th. empire that might rekindle fears of *archê* amongst the new allies. At this time there was no reason to suspect any imminent danger of such an occurrence. All Naxos did was to demonstrate the strength of the Athenian navy and to add credence to the Athenian claim to be able to protect the shipping of those



states that joined the confederacy. Or so it seemed to the allies of the Athenians. The truth of the situation was somewhat different. The cost of fitting out the fleets required for such a task was prohibitive, and it seems that the Athenians were already struggling to pay for the renewal of their power. This period was one of financial reform in Athens, reforms clearly aimed at attempting to relieve the crippling burden of the *trierarchy* and make the growth in naval strength more financially possible. A heavy new property tax was levied at home,<sup>57</sup> and the system of *symmories* to spread the burden of the liturgies was organised.<sup>58</sup> As it was, the Athenian fleet at Naxos only numbered eighty triremes, a considerable fleet in itself, but one which the Athenians were unable to reinforce to any great extent.<sup>59</sup>

Although a peace treaty was concluded in 375,<sup>60</sup> Naxos and the subsequent victory of Timotheos at Leucas in 376/375 were to put the Athenians on a policy of expansion until the Social War. That this aim was expressed through the gathering of new members for the confederacy was, for most Athenians, irrelevant. The city was once again on the way to an empire, however the politicians might seek to term it. For the lesser Greek states the victories of Chabrias and Timotheos made up the minds of many of their leaders to place themselves under what they could only see as a powerful protective wing. In short, the specialist generals played major, if not decisive, roles in the setting of Athenian foreign policy down till the Social War.

The task of recruiting new members to the confederacy was also left to the generals. The peace of 375 opened up the possibilities for voyages of

recruitment around the Aegean without the fear of hostile action, and Chabrias took full advantage of the opportunities on offer. In 373 he undertook a voyage conceived both to awe and reassure potential allies at the same time. The numerous treaties that have come down from this time reflect the success of Chabrias' mission.<sup>61</sup> Not surprisingly, this expedition has been compared to that of Conon in 394,<sup>62</sup> and indeed, the analogy is not ill-considered. Conon had already become a heroic figure to the generation that Chabrias was a part of, and thus allusions in such a vein could only further raise the prestige of the general. "Not only was he seen as the successor of Conon by the commentators, he was casting himself in that role as well."<sup>63</sup> In so doing the *strategos* was gathering the support and loyalty of the Athenian people to the degree where, ultimately, the general would begin to cast a shadow over the *demos* itself. But, for the meantime, the Athenians watched as the new confederacy reaped in the harvest of new members through the agency of their most valuable asset, Chabrias.

The forces which generals such as Chabrias took with them on these voyages were not great. Nor were they designed to enforce attachment to the confederacy. After 375 the Athenians tried to act out the role of protectors of the peace of that year and utilised the autonomy clause, enshrined in the King's Peace but now reaffirmed in the 375 treaty, to don the mantle of liberators from Spartan rule. Again, the parallel with Conon was conspicuous. The role of the general on such missions was neither that of military enforcer nor that of the diplomat, but as the actual symbol of Athenian power itself. As minor rulers were to recall of the "diplomatic voyages of goodwill" undertaken by the British navy in the late C19th., it

was not the strength of the fleets that overawed them but the face of the famous admiral Lord Fisher.<sup>64</sup> The renewed strength of Athens was to be seen in her generals, not her rather sorry attempts to rebuild the massive fleets which were her main strength in the C5th.. In making these voyages, the specialist generals also became personally involved with those states they came in contact with, and this personal role can be seen by the special cordiality shown to Chabrias by the allies thenceforward.<sup>65</sup> Chabrias' position could only have been heightened still further by his successful repulse of the Triballians attacking Abdera in 376/375, and in his successful operations with Callistratos and Iphicrates off Corcyra in 372.<sup>66</sup>

For the specialist general, keeping ahead of the competition was soon understood to mean not only the opportunity to make fortunes through service with foreign employers, but also to acquire the influence amongst the demos to protect themselves from attack through the Athenian legal system, both from rival *strategoi* acting through their associates in the assembly, and later from the orators themselves as they became aware of the growth of popular support for these men.<sup>67</sup> Thus the later 370's saw the first signs of rivalry amongst the specialist *strategoi*. The willingness of Timotheos to undertake the commission to relieve Corcyra in 373 without adequate funding from the Athenian authorities must partly have been due to the general's desire to match the deeds of Chabrias as much as it was merely the act of the patriotic servant of the assembly.

Rivalry became an important factor not only in the relations between the various generals but, as a consequence, this competitiveness might have

played a part in the overall direction and application of Athenian foreign policy. From 373 onwards the nature of this policy became noticeably more forceful in its approach, and there is reason to consider that in their efforts to outdo each other the major *strategoi* stepped up the pace of their military activity. For his efforts in trying to put his command into effect by sailing around the Aegean gathering the necessary funds, Timotheos was deposed from his command and recalled to Athens where he was prosecuted by Callistratos, a close associate of Iphicrates.<sup>68</sup> Yet when the command was reassigned it was to none other than Iphicrates himself. That is not necessarily to say that the *strategos* deliberately planned the demise of his colleague so that he might fill the breach, so to speak, but it was possible that he desired to keep the popularity of his rivals in check. The other side of the rivalry game was the trend, in the late 370's and the 360's, in the generals having to undertake these underfunded, and therefore risky, commands, leaving themselves not only open to the possibilities of military failure but also legal attack for that failure.

Iphicrates had spent the years 376-374/373 in Persia, commanding the forces of the old satrap Pharnabazos against the rebellious Egyptians. Although he had served in this campaign without any Athenian rank, it was clearly a diplomatic move by the Athenians to send him to the serve the satrap. By this means Persian fears at the reconstitution of the naval confederacy could be allayed. Iphicrates was a free man yet he undertook the commission willingly. There remains a strong sense of patriotic devotion in this episode, despite the further inducement of Persian gold. Iphicrates, whatever his official role might be at any one time, was

automatically linked to the "government" of his home *polis* by the rulers of Athens' neighbours. Both Iphicrates and the Athenian authorities realised this, and both accepted the role that such a recognition meant in terms of Athenian diplomacy and international relations. A mark of the more forceful approach to foreign relations apparent amongst the Athenians in the latter 370's was their response to the return of this figure in 374. The collapse of the Egyptian campaign saw relations between Iphicrates and Pharnabazos rapidly deteriorate to the point where the Athenian slipped away back to the city, suspicious of the satrap's intentions. Persian complaints followed, but the Athenian reaction was to appoint Iphicrates as commander of the fleet and to despatch him to Corcyra to replace the unfortunate Timotheos.<sup>69</sup>

### **c: Realisation and the drift towards war**

The Athenian answer to the Theban victory at Leuctra in 371 was to call together all the states of Greece to discuss a common peace. Although the Theban non-participation made the reality of the resolved treaty farcical, for the Athenians it was nothing less than a triumph. As the inspiration and protector of the peace, to many, the Athenians were once again at the head of Greek affairs. It was to mark the high tide of Athenian fortunes in the C4th..<sup>70</sup> Now it was they who were sought as allies by the Spartans, and addressed as protector of the peace.<sup>71</sup> Athens was forced from the role of that of "third party" between Sparta and Thebes to assist the weakening power. Such an apparent resurgence caused Marshall to interpret this treaty in the sense of an Athenian expansion of the confederacy to include the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, and concluded that at this time Athenian

confidence was such that they could break up the Peloponnesian League and take it over themselves.<sup>72</sup>

But all was not rosy for the Athenians, although as they basked in their renewed power and influence the dangers were to go unnoticed, or, at any rate, unheeded. For although the city stood at the head of a confederacy of over seventy cities and island allies,<sup>73</sup> Athens was already beginning to sow the seeds of discontent. The campaigns of the Athenian generals around Corcyra were to be responsible for making visible two flaws in the apparent Athenian strength.

Firstly, the campaigns to Corcyra were to mark the beginning of an Athenian foreign policy based upon a greater use of the military than had been the case previously. The voyages of Timotheos and Iphicrates to that island for the purpose of forcing it into the confederacy may have been based on a sound strategy, for the island was one vital for the protection of allied shipping moving into the Adriatic, but Athenian pride and self-delusion at their own strength brought about a lack of regard for the sensibilities of their own allies that was naive in the extreme. The basis of the Second Athenian Confederacy was a free alliance of equal allies, its clearly acknowledged intention being to avoid the more unpopular aspects of the old Delian League whilst all might benefit from the collective security of such a grouping. Out went the hated cleruchies, it now being illegal for Athenian citizens to possess property abroad (in allied states), and the most obvious symbol of Athenian domination, the tax (*phoros*) paid by the allies to Athens was hidden away under the name of *syntaxis*.<sup>74</sup> Athenian foreign

policy was dominated by the twin ideas of outwardly avoiding a repetition of the "mistakes" of the old empire whilst encouraging new members to the confederacy on the grounds of collective security. This notion was based around the (apparent) strength of the Athenian naval forces.

However, the events of the 370's shifted the axis around which the confederacy was intended to operate. The decline of Sparta left the confederacy with relatively little purpose, other than for the continuing menace of the pirates. But the Spartan decline was matched by the rise in Athenian fortunes, of which the Corcyra campaigns were the first ostensible signs. They marked a new era of Athenian action taken for her own benefit with little regard for the allies. Thus it was that the members brought into the confederacy from this point were seemingly more the objects of Athenian aggression or threat than willing signatories.

This phase of Athenian foreign policy has been consistently linked to one *strategos* in particular, Timotheos of Anaphlystos, and thus I can examine his career in some detail.

The achievements of Timotheos were considerable. His victory over the Spartans at Leucas (Alyzia) in 375 sealed the fate of the latter's naval ambitions, already dealt a great blow at Naxos the year before. Such was Timotheos' victory that the peace the Spartans were constrained to accept in 375/374 was directly associated with the general.<sup>75</sup> From that point onward Timotheos was to be the most significant *strategos* of the period. In 373 however, he was ordered to take command of the expedition

to Corcyra, yet he received no funds for the undertaking. Timotheos was forced to embark on a fund raising expedition around the Aegean. In so doing he laid himself open to attack by his rivals and enemies. Callistratos had the *strategos* deposed for treason for betraying Athens' allies.

There is no doubt that at this stage the specialist *strategoi* regarded each other as rivals to a greater, or lesser degree. That is not to say of course that this was anything new in the *strategia*, or in any other public office for that matter. The rivalries between such men as Pericles and Cimon and Nicias and Alcibiades are well known. But with the trend towards military specialisation these rivalries became more pronounced, at least until the mid-360's. Particularly prior to the later 370's, such was the lack of Athenian enterprise abroad that work for the military specialists was severely limited and the generals could, and did, resort to the courts to remove those who might appear as threats to their own position. Clearly, in 374/373, Iphicrates regarded Timotheos as a rising challenge to his own position, particularly because his long absence from the city had made him lose public support, or at least that was how it must have seemed to him. As it was, he did gain the command from the disgraced general and did succeed in undertaking the commission, though not without considerable difficulty.<sup>76</sup>

Rivalry between the specialist *strategoi* seemingly played a considerable role in the shaping of foreign policy in this period. Although the Athenians were beginning to embark on a more dynamic course from 374 onwards, the generals must have perceived the limitations of Athenian



military strength. Corcyra must have made clear to them that much as the Athenians could attempt to "replay" her previous glory days her economic and thus, military resources simply were unable to sustain the bluster. Thus they were compelled to attempt to out-manoeuvre each other to gain the commands which would enable them to maintain their positions within Athens. The efforts of the specialist generals in this trial of strength might well have had the effect of merely creating a vicious circle. Timotheos, for example, may well have become excessively zealous in his commands from this time in his efforts to regain, and then retain, a strong position in Athenian affairs. It has even been suggested that his Aegean "cruise" of 373 was not so much an attempt to gain the funds for the Corcyra campaign as an effort to repeat the *periplous* of his father, and to match the prestige attached to Chabrias through his own cruise to recruit new league members and allies in 376/375. In the respect of gaining new recruits the voyage of Timotheos was indeed successful. Isocrates and Deinarchos both talk of twenty four cities won over,<sup>77</sup> a figure rather more likely than the seventy five quoted in Aeschines.<sup>78</sup> Yet clearly that was not enough. Any act which was interpreted by the *demos* as a flagrant breach of the general aims of any expedition was still liable to be punished in the courts. The efforts to gain individual glory had to be tempered with the necessity to follow the overall aims of any campaign commissioned by the assembly. This division between individual action and the wishes of the central authorities is a continuous theme throughout this thesis.

The renewed confidence of Athens became more pronounced after 371. In 370/369 Callistratos successfully proposed aid for the Spartans,

then threatened with invasion by Athens' own erstwhile ally, Thebes. Such a move was merely the active response to her generally recognised claim as protector of the peace of 371, yet the sloth of Iphicrates in acting against the Thebans severely embarrassed the city. Iphicrates was replaced and the commander returned to service in Thrace and Macedon until the Social War. But his campaign against the Thebans helps to reveal the reality which neither the enemies nor the allies nor the Athenians themselves had apparently grasped. Iphicrates made no effort to prevent Epaminondas from passing through Attica on his return from the Peloponnese, not because he was inept in his management of the campaign, but because he was unable to challenge the Thebans with what he had. Xenophon criticised the general for his handling of the campaign, but Iphicrates was too experienced a commander to be so negligent. The obvious reason for his inactivity at this point can only have come about from his knowledge that the Athenian forces he had under his command simply could not challenge the Thebans. The criticism of the sources only strengthens the idea that the Athenians were engaged in a massive confidence trick at this time, in which the specialist generals played the central roles. But just as they might gain the glory from acting out this deception, so they had to face the consequences when they were unable to carry it through. Thus Iphicrates paid the price for his own honest judgement. Nothing that might make apparent their real condition could be tolerated by the Athenians. It was something they themselves believed in. Iphicrates, by declining to give battle to the Thebans merely prolonged the myth.<sup>79</sup>

For Timotheos, the 360's were to be the years of significant

success. Although he was despatched to Egypt to aid Ariobarzanes, with the strict instructions not to violate the King's peace, the *strategos* (for he retained the title) skilfully captured the island of Samos from Cyprothemis, a Greek in Persian service. The ten month siege of Samos itself was a superlative piece not only of military, but also economic, planning, for the general had to act on his own initiative to gain the *misthos* and provisions for his troops.<sup>80</sup> Then, when presented with the towns of Crithote and Sestos by the grateful satrap, Timotheos turned them over to the Athenian people.

But such actions must have sown the seeds of further doubt in the minds of the allies. Athenian acquisitions by right of conquest might not have directly affected their position or status, but it was just becoming apparent that the Athenians were once more on an expansionist course. This "hawkish" type policy was made all the worse for the allies because Athens had suddenly emerged from the 370's as the premier power on the Greek mainland, whereas before she had appeared as a secondary power seeking safety amongst her allies. Now they witnessed an Athenian foreign policy dominated by the imperialist general Timotheos. The siege and capture of Samos was a watershed in the history of the confederacy. When Samos fell Timotheos evicted the inhabitants and installed an Athenian cleruchy.<sup>81</sup> The orator Cydias warned the assembly what the consequences of such an action might be, not because the matter was illegal, for the island was not a member of the confederacy and was therefore exempt from the guarantees offered by the Athenians to the confederates on this issue, but rather because it reawakened the old fears of the allies.<sup>82</sup> Several member states of

the confederacy expressed their disquiet by welcoming the Samian exiles.

The activities of Timotheos had taken Athens away from the part of the old "third party" between Sparta and Thebes and committed the city to a policy of direct confrontation with the Thebans and their allies. The Athenians seemingly took it for granted that the allies would not only agree with their own actions, but would allow the resources of the confederacy to be used for such a purpose. When Timotheos captured the cities of Pydna, Methone and Potidaea it was not only a statement of Athenian intent aimed at the Thebans, but also, perhaps without realising, it was a statement that the *synhedrion* of the allies was gradually becoming, once again, the second tier of government for the confederacy behind the Athenian assembly itself.

There is no doubt that the activities of Timotheos brought about a clash between Athens and Thebes. His aggressive approach to the rebuilding of the confederacy and the increasing of the Athenian sphere of influence brought a response from the Thebans to attempt to arrest this growth. The close relationship between Timotheos and the increasingly influential Tagos of Thessaly, Jason of Pherae, could also be interpreted in an anti-Theban light.<sup>83</sup> Fearing being cut off from the Aegean the Thebans laid down the keels for one hundred triremes.<sup>84</sup> In 364 a Theban naval expedition, according to Diodoros, "won over Athens' allies Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium," and Justin mentions an appeal to Epaminondas from Heracleia on the Black Sea.<sup>85</sup> Yet neither Rhodes nor Chios seceded from the confederacy.

The successes of Timotheos the previous year probably made them fear the Athenian strength, or rather, what they perceived as strength.

The illusion of strength that characterised Athenian policies in the late 360's reached its natural conclusion in the efforts of the city to regain its old colony of Amphipolis in Macedonia. The Athenians had successfully pressed their claims over the city in the treaty of alliance signed with the Spartans in 369/368,<sup>86</sup> and the despatch of the *strategos* Iphicrates to the north in 368 clearly demonstrated that the Athenians firmly held the belief that they could recapture the city they had not claimed since 421/420. Athenian aggressiveness had reached its zenith. Iphicrates' failure to achieve anything of worth brought Timotheos to the area, sailing on from his successful effort against Samos.<sup>87</sup>

The Amphipolis campaigns marked the first signs of opposition to Athenian policies within the confederacy itself. The allies refused to aid the Athenians in the campaigns. Their lack of assistance reveals the contradiction in their own position. On the one hand they needed a strong Athens to protect their shipping, and themselves in time of war. But they also feared the Athenians lest they returned to the *archê* of the C5th.. The grab for Amphipolis, led by Timotheos, could only represent an Athens moving down that road.

Yet the refusal of the allies to render assistance for the Amphipolis expeditions also revealed that, in part at least, some were coming to question the reality of the strength the Athenians professed in their policies

but had not yet demonstrated. Even as early as the Corcyra campaigns in 374/373 the Athenians had not been able to finance a fleet, and it had been the efforts of the specialist *strategoi* that had allowed any expedition to take place at all. In 369 Iphicrates had decided not to confront the Thebans as it had seemed unlikely that he could have stopped them. Yet the general had lost his command for making apparent a truth the Athenians themselves clearly could not acknowledge. Even the Theban naval expedition, a direct challenge to Athenian naval supremacy, had been met with no active response from the Athenians. They had continued to demonstrate their strength through the capture and subjugation of lesser states. Even the Samos campaign had only continued through the efforts of Timotheos. The Amphipolis campaigns however, pulled away the shroud that had obscured the truth since the early 380's. The Athenians had managed to convince themselves that they really were embarking on the collection of a new empire. When things went wrong they summoned their champion to the scene, but even Timotheos could not save the campaign. Amphipolis repelled the Athenian attacks with ease, and even the capture of a few cities in the Chersonese and from the Chalcidian League could not maintain the illusion further.<sup>88</sup>

From 366 onwards there was, seemingly, a reconciliation between the specialist *strategoi*, a move that had important political consequences within Athens.<sup>89</sup> The result was an unprecedented spate of impeachments of the leading generals, led by the orator Apollodoros.<sup>90</sup> With Iphicrates in virtual retirement, Chabrias serving Tachos of Egypt, and Callistratos convicted for speaking against the best interests of the *demos*, the trial of

Timotheos in 360 removed the last of the famous *strategoi* from the centre stage of Athenian affairs.<sup>91</sup> With these figures gone, the direction and will went out of the Athenian foreign policy. The late 360's witnessed the attack of Alexander of Pherae upon Peparethos and Tenos.<sup>92</sup> Clearly the Athenians were not a great fear for the Tagos. Likewise it must have been apparent to the allies also that Athens simply had not the strength to protect them from such a menace, and thus presumably, they had not the strength to prevent the secession of any states who might wish it. Without the generals who had gathered most of the confederacy together, Athenian strength became virtually non-existent.

The generals Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos dominated Athenian foreign policy from the late 380's till the early 350's. No other figure, either military or political, was to rival their standing, not just within Athens itself but in the Hellenic world as a whole. The generals came not only to be recognised as fine soldiers, but also as the very essence of Athenian foreign policy itself. The efforts of the Athenians to regain some position of importance within Greece rested almost exclusively on these three men. It was their skill and reputations which were the basis for the Athenian recovery, and likewise it was their demise which left Athens with no clear path to follow.

But such reliance upon individuals, particularly military figures, as the basis for a country's foreign policy was not confined to just Athens. Sparta offers something of a similarity. There the efforts of the Spartan imperialists in realising their dreams of a Spartan-based empire were to be almost

entirely based around the person of the king, Agesilaos. But such a comparison runs the risk of over-simplification. At his death in 360, Sparta had already witnessed the failure of this policy and was engaged on the fight for her very existence. As a hereditary king, Agesilaos had had to become detached from 'his' policy as Sparta's own fortunes declined and he was forced to leave those dreams behind. In Sparta's case, circumstances forced the detachment of one policy from the king, whereas in Athens it was the removal of the generals which changed the circumstances. Yet there is another contemporary example comparable to that of Athens, where the foreign policy of the state rested so heavily on one individual that he was to personify that policy. That man was the Theban Epaminondas. As Boeotarch from 371 onwards, Epaminondas virtually alone (with the exception of Pelopidas) dictated the aggrandisement of Thebes after the liberation of the Cadmea in 378. It was he who refused to allow the Boeotian cities to sign the peace of 371 separately, thus reemphasising the Theban claim to Boeotian hegemony which was the cornerstone of Epaminondas' policy from that date onward. Likewise it was Epaminondas who directed the dismantling of the Spartan empire, culminating in the invasions of the Eurotas valley in 370/369, 369/368 and 366. It was fitting that his life was to end on the field of Mantinea, fighting his lifelong foes.

Yet Mantinea was to prove a pyrrhic victory for the Thebans. The death of their great leader marked the end of the Theban expansion, and the gradual decline of the Boeotian confederacy. Without this single figure, Thebes lost not only the central figure of her foreign policy, but also, seemingly, the very will to continue with that policy. Neither the Athenians,



nor indeed the Spartans were to be threatened by Boeotian aggression again. As Grote wrote, "...nothing except the fatal spear wound at Mantinea prevented him (Epaminondas) from reaping the fruits of a series of admirable engagements, and becoming arbiter of the Peloponnesus, including Sparta itself."<sup>93</sup>

Thus it was that in other nations too, the implementation of foreign policies was coming to rest on individuals to a far greater degree than had been the case (with notable exceptions) before. The demands of warfare in the C4th. were making the old citizen soldiery rely to a far greater extent on the men who led them, and thus the relationship of general to soldier was increasingly strong as the century progressed. The general was becoming the single most important factor to many men serving on campaign. He provided the pay, the booty, the provisions and even the employment itself (for the mercenaries) upon which they were dependent.<sup>94</sup> Thus it was not surprising that the generals became figures of increasing importance in their own right. Service with the specialist generals, most notably Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos meant (in the most basic terms) not only the greater likelihood of gaining the necessities of life, but greater opportunities for returning alive from the campaign. For the generals, this reliance on them, and the expectation of both victuals and booty must have been a factor in their readiness to undertake commands they themselves, as specialist commanders, must have considered highly risky. Particularly in the 360's the *strategoi* were compelled to retain the links with the citizens which offered them the protection they needed from the increasingly virulent attacks of rival politicians which characterise the latter part of that decade. In

short, the embodiment of the foreign policy of Athens into these few figures was as much forced upon the generals as it was their own desire. The nature of Athenian political society created the situation which led to the Social War. By removing the three figures upon which the hopes of most Athenians were pinned, the Athenians not only lost their own will to maintain the charade which was their "new empire", but in so doing revealed that charade to those who could benefit by the overthrow of the Athenian hegemony. As Athens entered the 350's, as rosy as the outward appearance of fortune might be, the clouds were already gathering for an almighty storm.

### **3 Defeat and Decline, 359-336**

The period from 359-322 has, quite correctly, been recognised as one of struggle for the Athenians, firstly in the efforts to retain the confederacy they had gathered around them and later in the struggle for their very survival as an independent sovereign nation against the rising power of the Macedonian kingdom to the north.

This chapter has, as its central topic, the activities of the generals in this period in the area of Athenian foreign policy, in an examination of the degree to which the generals themselves not only executed the policies adopted by their own legislative authorities but indeed, created and initiated those policies on their own behalf and through their own persons. As such, this chapter is a continuation of the first. Yet the emphasis was altered on account of the changed circumstances of Athens and the Greek world obtained in this period. It was for this reason that I have divided this section into two distinct chronological parts. It is hoped that this somewhat arbitrary division may justify itself in practice.

#### **a: The Social War**

In the history of 4th. Athens the Social War has long been

considered a turning point in her fortunes, a disastrous conclusion to the foreign policies pursued by the city in the previous twenty years.

In 358 several members of the confederacy declared their secession from the league.<sup>1</sup> In the four year struggle that ensued the Athenians were to prove unable to crush the challenge to their authority and when, finally, they were brought to the negotiating table on the threat of Persian intervention, the secession of Chios, Rhodes, Selymbria and Perinthos (and possibly Cos) was accepted, to be followed by Methymna, Mytilene and, if not before, Corcyra. The independence of Byzantium was also recognised.<sup>2</sup>

Although the confederacy had not suffered greatly in purely numerical terms (eight or nine states lost, if Corcyra is included) the reality was very different. The league had lost its most powerful members after Athens herself, its bases in the south-eastern Aegean, and the islands were laid open to Persian, or more precisely, Hecatomnid, influence.<sup>3</sup> In short, although continuing as a functioning organisation after the war, the league ceased to be a body of any considerable influence. No wonder that Demosthenes, twenty years after the event, could bemoan the Social War for leaving Athens and its resources "...consisting of island allies, and not all of them, but the weakest, Chios, Rhodes and Byzantium being absent."<sup>4</sup>

Thus the Social War can be seen as giving considerable impetus to the decline of Athenian power which had, in reality, been stagnating since the early 360's. Historians, both ancient and modern, therefore sought to find those responsible for this war in order to apportion the blame for the

later fortunes of Athens. Many found their victims in the specialist generals who had dominated Athenian foreign policy in the 370's and 360's. The activities of these men (along with the younger Chares) have been popular reasons for the outbreak of the war and their ineptitude the source of defeat. The individual acts of supposed lawlessness of the generals around which this argument is based will be discussed in the following part. My aim here is to demonstrate that, in the case of the Social War, the specialist generals acted not as incitements to rebellion, but rather the contrary, that their presence prolonged the Athenian hegemony for longer than might otherwise have been the case. In order to do this I must attempt to answer the question as to just why did the Social War break out when it did.

In my previous chapter I linked the persons of the leading generals of the Athenian nation to the foreign policies of that country. The activities of the leading generals, Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos, came to personify Athenian foreign policy. At least that was how foreign powers viewed Athenian policy in the 380-365 period. Without the dominating presence of these figures the standing of the Athenians in the eyes of their neighbours seemingly decreased. There was something of a similar loss of confidence from within the *polis* itself. Only the young general Chares came forward to attempt to push Athenian foreign policy onwards with anything like the vigour and dominance of the older generals. This change in circumstances was to be of great importance in different ways to three distinct groups.

Firstly, for the Athenians themselves, though they perhaps did not realise it, the removal of the specialist generals from their central role in

Athenian foreign affairs meant that they had surrendered the initiative to their opponents. Mantinea had opened up opportunities for expansion and an increase in influence which they could not take. The shortages of money and resources which had dogged the Athenians throughout this period could no longer be overlooked and hidden as had been possible when the three men had been dominant, for the specialist generals had successfully worked with the very little given to them by the demos in the way of resources. The Athenians were simply unable to afford the price of their own desire for hegemony.

Secondly, for the enemies of Athens the later 360's were ones where the reality of the city's strength became apparent. The Theban naval expedition of 364 is an example of this gradual realisation. That the Thebans had dared to challenge Athenian naval power at all shows that the assessments of the strength of the Athenians had diminished in this period. Such thoughts could only have been reinforced by the lack of any Athenian action against this challenge. The sorties of the Thessalian Tagos Alexander of Pherae in this period clearly reflected the growing understanding of the realities of the Athenian position by her enemies.

Thirdly, for the allies the Athenian weakness brought contradictory feelings. Clearly the activities of the Athenians in their dealings with states outside the confederacy, such as Samos in 365 and Chios in 362, had increased the sensitivities of the confederated nations as to the long term aims of the Athenians for the confederacy. By the middle 360's it was apparent that these sensitivities were changing into genuine fears. The

confederacy refused to take part in the campaigns to recapture Amphipolis.<sup>5</sup> The expedition to recapture the city, in the eyes of the allies, not only represented an expensive outlay in terms of men and equipment for a small return for themselves but, more importantly, the city represented a renewal of Athenian interest in the north, an interest not seen since the days of the old Delian league. The allies could only be reminded of, what was to them, the bad old days of Athenian domination. The Athenian intent to retake the former colony was a sign that Athens was once again becoming a major power in her own right and that, in such circumstances, the position of the allies as equals to the Athenians could only come under question.

Yet the fears of the allies with regard to the apparent increase in Athenian strength had, prior to the mid 360's, been balanced by the advantages offered by membership of the league. The league was primarily a confederacy of naval powers whose interests could best be served by a mutual protection of their shipping. The Athenians had patently made a great point of this in their initial recruiting for the league. Piracy was a major threat to shipping in the 4th., and the problem was especially bad in the Aegean. Yet there does seem to have been some improvement after 377. Several naval cruises were specifically organised and sent out to deal with the pirates.<sup>6</sup> Thus there was some reason for paying the *syntaxis*. But Athenian naval strength was more illusion than reality. It was the generals who successfully used the meagre resources to both deter and indeed defeat the pirates. Once these figures had become less prominent in Athens in the latter 360's the activities of the pirates once more increased.<sup>7</sup> Although Demosthenes regarded the guardianship of the seas as an Athenian right, not

to be usurped by anyone (Philip II), the evidence suggests that, in the later 360's at least the Athenians had lost that right because they could not protect allied shipping.<sup>8</sup> The sorties of Alexander of Pherae must have made plain this fact.<sup>9</sup> Once this fact had become apparent then membership of the league was largely useless. It was not too surprising to find that one of the most energetic of the rebels was Peparethos, one of the states ravaged by Alexander. On the other hand, without the likes of Chabrias, Iphicrates and Timotheos to command the Athenian forces the potential rebels could only consider their chances for successful secession from the league to be greatly enhanced.

In short then, the specialist Athenian generals were preventative factors in the outbreak of the Social war. This argument can be strengthened by finding evidence to suggest that the timing of the war came about as a corollary of this fact and the decline in the parts played by Chabrias, Iphicrates and Timotheos were significant in the timing of the conflict.

However, the discovery of the causes of the Social war has, in itself, proved to be an exercise of great contention for scholars. Certainly Athenian activities had brought about discontent and fear amongst the allies as to Athenian aims, but, as I shall discuss later, this was only a contributory factor towards the war. G.L.Cawkwell, arguing that the long term weakness of the Athenian economy throughout the 4th. brought an 'imperialist group' to the fore, whose policies offered the prospects of renewed wealth by a return to the glorious and profitable past, exemplifies the school of thought which sought to place the blame for the war firmly on



the Athenians, and in particular, the *strategoi* who had dominated the foreign policies of Athens down till the Social war itself.<sup>10</sup> But this is to overstate the case of Athenian excesses against the allies to the point of the exclusion of all other arguments. On the other hand, I do not follow the argument of J.L.Cargill in accepting the claims of Athenian innocence. His argument was that "...the Social war as a whole can reasonably be seen less as a struggle of Athens against its discontented allies than as the struggle of Athens and the loyal league members against Thebes, the Persians, Philip II and a very small number of rebellious allied nations and former allies...".<sup>11</sup> For Cargill, the activities of the Athenian generals (other than those of Chares) played no significant role in causing the Social war. Outside influences were to blame for the war and the outbreak itself came like a bolt from the blue.<sup>12</sup> Yet Thebes at this time was in decline. Her naval expeditions had failed to convert her into a naval power and the death of Epaminondas in 362 had marked the end of the self-confidence which had been the hallmark of Theban foreign policy in his time. From 360 Thebes was too engaged in maintaining her own dominance within Boeotia to stir up trouble for Athens, and the Theban failure to gain Euboea in 358 only emphasises this trend.<sup>13</sup> As for Philip, it seems too early a date to see the Macedonian king's agents playing any significant role in causing the war, since he must have still been pre-occupied in securing his own kingdom.<sup>14</sup> However, the role of the Persians, or rather, Mausolos, the satrap of Caria is far more controversial. Demosthenes wrote that it was Mausolos who was the prime mover and instigator of the war,<sup>15</sup> and from Diodoros we hear of his direct assistance for the rebels.<sup>16</sup> This contemporary

characterisation of Mausolos as the main cause of the war has generally been dismissed by modern writers.<sup>17</sup> But the evidence suggests otherwise. The Hecatomnids seem, for some considerable time, to have pursued an aggressively expansionist foreign policy consistent in its independence from that of the Great King. Although this could verge on open rebellion from the central monarchy,<sup>18</sup> by 360 Mausolos was pledged in his loyalty to the Great King.

The ascension to the throne, in 359, of Artaxerxes III Ochus, an energetic and aggressive new monarch, finally put paid to any thoughts Mausolos might have had of expansion within the empire itself and he was forced to turn westward. Despite the royal command for the satraps to disband all their mercenary forces it seems likely that Mausolos' fleet of one hundred ships was either exempted or else the satrap simply refused to comply.<sup>19</sup>

Thus Mausolos had both the desire, the opportunities and the means to play a direct and significant role in the affairs of the Greek states in this period. Although the potential rebels had realised that the strength of the Athenian forces was not anything like that they had imagined it to be, clearly Athens was still a force to be reckoned with. An inscription dating from the Social war credits her with 283 triremes, a massive fleet in ancient terms. Though many of these ships were to prove either completely unseaworthy or incomplete, to the rebels such numbers could only deter them from undertaking the war. Without direct substantial assistance from the satrap it seems unlikely that the rebels would have undertaken the final step against

the Athenians, just as they had not done so in 364. The role of Mausolos then, was one of central importance in the causes of the Social war. Yet even his actions were influenced, indirectly, by the Athenian generals. For Mausolos would have felt too weak to confront the Athens which appeared vigorous and strong under the direction of its famous generals. Once again, it was the decline of the dominance of the three major Athenian generals in this period which revealed to the satrap the weakness of the Athenians and the genuine opportunities which such weakness presented to him.

The lack of strength apparent in Athenian foreign policy in this period not only aroused the interest of the satrap in the possibilities of moving into the power vacuum now revealed. The rejection of the Social War as a conflict largely brought about by the revival of old style Athenian imperialism on the scale of the old Delian league offers the opportunity to see the war as the struggle between two powers. By the 360's Rhodes had already become an advanced naval power, and a rival to Athenian naval domination in the Aegean. C.Garton has argued that a comic fragment, preserved in Latin by Lucius Lanuvius, mentioning "*..Athenienses bellum cum Rhodiensibus*," is a record of an historical event, and since this piece is dated from the mid 4th. the only suitable conflict in the period is the Social War.<sup>20</sup> Thus we have a valuable insight into the Athenian view of the war. Rhodes was rapidly growing in strength in this period, and her system of trierarchies attests to the commitment to the growth of her navy.<sup>21</sup> Diodoros, in his account of the siege of 305/304, could record that the Rhodians had a very powerful fleet.<sup>22</sup>

The problem for the Rhodians was similar to that of the Confederate states of America in the mid C19th. By the mid 1850's, the thirteen states who were to become the Confederacy were exasperated by the repressive nature of the central government and considered that their own future lay more profitably outside of the Union. In basic terms, the south had outgrown its advantages in retaining membership of the larger group and was to be forced to go to war in order to secure the right to secede. The complaints of the C.S.A. were based upon the restriction of trade that membership of the Union brought.

Commercial considerations might also be valid in the case of Rhodes. An island of approximately only 420 square miles, Rhodian prosperity was dependent upon the carrying of trade, especially corn. However, there is some evidence to suggest that the Athenians operated restrictive trade practices within the Confederacy. An inscription of the mid-C4th. describes the renewal of an Athenian monopoly of Cean ruddle. Ruddle was a commodity greatly prized in the Greek World, used mainly for painting ships hulls. If Athens had monopolised this trade for herself, even though Ceos had rejoined the Athenian Confederacy prior to 362, then it is not too hard to fathom Rhodian antagonism, especially once it became obvious that the Athenians could not protect the shipping of the allies.<sup>23</sup>

The final, and most important cause of the Social war for the purposes of my subject was the Athenian diversion in Euboea. When, in the

summer of 358 the Athenians became involved in the internal disputes between the pro-Theban and pro-Athenian groups on Euboea the rebels took the opportunity to undertake their secession.<sup>24</sup> This dating is very important to my analysis of the role of the *strategoi* in the area of Athenian foreign policy, and thus I must discuss this in some depth.

Diodoros recorded the conclusion of the war in the archonship of Elpines (356/355) after "a four year war."<sup>25</sup> But Dionysios (De Lysia Iudicium 12, p.480) placed the war in the period 357/356 to 356/355. Around these datings there has indeed been heated debate. Beloch proposed the date 357/356 as the beginning of the war,<sup>26</sup> a date supported by G.L.Cawkwell.<sup>27</sup> The champion of the earlier, Diodoran date was Schweigert, whose arguments were based upon manuscript readings of the Archon lists.<sup>28</sup> His arguments were accepted by others, notably D.E.M.Lewis and R.Sealey.<sup>29</sup>

My own solution is as follows. The inscription of the Athenian alliance with Euboea has had the name of Chabrias (partially) removed, thus making it clear that he was not *strategos* when the treaty was signed. This was probably due to his death at Chios, rather than due to his removal from command for his failure in the Hellespont.<sup>30</sup> Hence the revolt was underway before the end of, or just after, the Euboean campaign, around the summer or autumn of 357. Diodoros then tells us that "...the Athenians chose Chares and Chabrias as generals and despatched them with an army".<sup>31</sup> The statement implies that the rebellion had begun before the elections for the new year (that of Agathocles in 357/356) and the two

generals were chosen in response to the revolt. Therefore, the Euboean campaign can be placed to the end of the archonship of Cephisodotos, the date given by Diodoros. If the war did begin in the last few days of 358/357, in calendar terms, the war did last for four years, though the re-deployment of the Athenian forces after the Euboean campaign would have taken a short while, especially as the new *strategoi*, Chares, Diocles and Chabrias had to take over their posts. The statement of Diodoros above suggests haste, and the assumption must be that Chares and Chabrias, having rapidly gathered their forces, set off straightaway to Chios where they met their defeat in the late summer/early autumn of the year 357.

Thus the Athenian campaign on Euboea was the precipitating cause of the Social war, but not for the reasons that most have argued. Busolt, for example, contended that Euboea was the last straw for the allies, who, disgusted by the increasingly harsh imperialism of the Athenians, panicked at the coercive action taken by the Athenian military on that island and rebelled to preempt anything of a similar nature against themselves.<sup>32</sup> But this is to see the Euboean campaign in political, rather than military, terms. If one group plans to rebel from the domination of another military dictum argues that it is foolhardy to await the outcome of any other struggle or conflict that the dominant power may be engaged in, but to use that opportunity to strike whilst the attentions of the enemy are diverted.<sup>33</sup> Basic military premises brought about the timing of the Social war. The allies sought to move against the Athenians when they were at their most vulnerable. In any event, if my timing of the Social war is accepted, then Busolt's theory must be incorrect. The rebel allies could not have known the

result of the campaign on Euboea because the conflict was still in progress when they rebelled and thus they could not have been panicked by the repressive military actions taken by the Athenian military at the end of that war.

What then of the role of the generals in this affair ? By discussing the real causes of the Social war I have sought to remove from the Athenian generals, at least in part, the blame often apportioned to them for this conflict. The activities of these men were clearly not responsible, in the short term, for causing the Social war. Such was the internal political situation within Athens itself at this time that the generals of note were coming under increasing political attack and, as a result, their role diminished in terms of directly influencing Athenian foreign policy itself. The roles of these men were, in fact, as those of negating, rather than precipitating, influences. As I have already proven, it was the absence of these men (Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos) which revealed to the allies the weakness of the Athenian position, and the pointlessness of their continued membership of the league. Hence my lengthy discussion of the timing of the outbreak of the war. If my dating of this war is accepted then we can see the election of Chabrias (along with Chares) to the *strategia* of 357/356 as a responsive rather than inflammatory act on the part of the Athenians. Clearly, the election of the old *strategos* was designed as a psychological countermove against the rebels, to regain the initiative by the reintroduction of such a distinguished figure to the game. In any event, the Athenian calculations went badly awry. The death of Chabrias at Chios in 357 swung the psychological advantage back onto the side of the rebels.

The Athenian response to this turn of events can only reinforce this idea. Another fleet was fitted out and dispatched to Chares under the generals Timotheos, Iphicrates and Menestheos.<sup>34</sup> It was their defeat at Embata in the year 355/354 which effectively ended Athenian hopes in the war and finished the careers of the generals who had for so long been the bulwark of Athenian foreign policy.<sup>35</sup> It was ironically fitting that the end of the active careers of these two men should end along with the dreams of the renewed Athenian hegemony that they had come to embody. The conclusion of peace in 354 left the confederacy in tatters and the Athenian economy on the verge of ruin.

#### **b: The Generals and the rise of Macedon, 354-336**

From the end of the Social war onwards the major Athenian concern was to become the increasing menace of the Macedonian kingdom to the north, under the aggressive Philip II.

Until 360/359 the history of Macedonia had followed a path generally removed from that of central and southern Greece. To most Athenians the Macedonians were a backward, near barbaric race.<sup>36</sup> The kingdom had a long history of internal power struggles and foreign invasions,<sup>37</sup> and thus the Athenians considered that there was little danger from such a nation. Indeed, such was the vitality of Athenian confidence in the 360's that the city-state was prepared to involve itself in the struggle for the throne which ensued upon the death of Perdiccas III by backing one of the claimants. The Athenians clearly had their sights set on the recovery



of their old colonial areas in the northern Aegean and involvement in Macedon was to be one of the ways they were prepared to demonstrate their interest. What the Athenians could not have foreseen was the emergence of Philip II. By 359 Philip had secured the kingdom as his own and the Athenians had withdrawn.<sup>38</sup> It was their first defeat at the hands of the purposeful monarch.

In 357 Philip took advantage of the turmoil of the Social War to march east and capture Amphipolis. By taking that city Philip had not only secured his own kingdom, but had opened up the whole of the north coast of the Aegean to Macedonian expansionism.<sup>39</sup> Within three years all the Athenian bases in the north were in the hands of the Macedonian. The loss of Pydna, Potidaea and Methone marked the end of Athenian interest in this area. Yet the demise of Athenian hopes in this region seemingly marked the end of an era in the foreign policy of the city.

Defeat in the Social war and the loss of all hopes in the north brought a major change in the roles of the Athenian generals through the changed circumstances that they had to operate in. Whereas before 358 the specialist generals, in the course of pursuing the expansionist policies of the city-state, could be seen as the embodiment of the aggressive self-confidence clearly felt amongst the majority of Athenian citizens, the loss of so much of the gains of the prewar period left these officials in something of a problematical position. In short, the Athenians had lost their sense of direction. There was no longer any grand strategy, any ultimate goal for the city to aim for. Yet such a policy contravened the basic

principles of the generalship held by specialist military commanders. Without any foreign policy as such, the Athenians were basically removing the generals from any active role within the state, and thus threatened their own position of power and prestige within the city. Clearly some refused to accept that the grand designs of empire and glory were at an end. Isocrates makes plain the fact that there remained within Athens a strong group who retained the belief in the Athenian ability to secure her own future as a major power through the use of the military. This belief went as far as to press for the continuation of the Social war even after the recall of Chares from Asia in 354.<sup>40</sup> In reality the Athenian war effort was exhausted, and the pamphlets of Isocrates and Xenophon reflect the general desire for peace felt amongst the Athenian citizen body at this time.<sup>41</sup>

The collapse of the Athenian war effort against the rebels and the end of the period of renewed imperialism brought to the forefront of the political scene the advocates of peace. A certain Euboulos was the most notable of these figures, who, in the role of Treasurer of the Theorikon, was to control Athenian policy, both internal and external, for eleven years.<sup>42</sup> His general aims, to secure the economic recovery and growth of the Athenian nation, were to have serious implications for the *strategoi*. Military action was to be limited to the most vital projects, in effect making the Athenian forces "responsive" bodies, virtually unable to act in an offensive capacity. Now, for the first time in generations the military were not to be the primary weapons in the implementation of foreign policy. Indeed, without a strong military there could be no effective foreign policy at all. In such circumstances, not only would the standing of the generals be

diminished by the loss of power such policies would entail, but the whole long term defence of the nation could be put at risk. To the likes of Chares such policy dictats must have seemed both illogical and dangerous. The generals, in their role as the commanders of the military forces of the city-state had always been in the forefront of Athenian foreign policy. This period represents the breakdown of the synchronisation between the specialist generals and the central bodies of Athenian government.<sup>43</sup>

Certainly there had been differences in the past between *demos* and general over specific actions and campaigns, as the numerous trials of disobedient generals bore witness, but, almost uniquely, the years 354-340 witnessed a major polarisation of the generals and the dominant politicians within Athens into two opposing groups regarding the long term foreign policy aims of the Athenian *polis* in the Greek world as a whole. Chares, and the other specialist soldiers in the *strategia*, clearly felt that Athenian security lay in an immediate return to the expansionist policies of the pre-Social war period. The majority of the politicians dominant at the time thought otherwise. Demosthenes could still tell the assembly as late as 341, that "...you are not well designed by nature to seek aggrandisement and secure empire, but you are clever at thwarting another's designs and wresting from him his gains...".<sup>44</sup> It was the idea of Athens as a champion of liberty that Isocrates had preached way back in 355/354.<sup>45</sup>

The Social war had proven that the two ideas were irreconcilable. The result of such contrasting views was the run down of the Athenian forces as the threat from Macedonia became ever more ominous, whilst the

specialist generals were to become increasingly removed from the workings of the *ecclesia*. The generals, to a far greater degree than in previous times, were to have to act in situations of emergency with little or no funding for forces usually insufficient for the task. Thus the latter 350's and the 340's present a story of Athenian ineffectiveness in their efforts (as well as those of the other city-states) to counter Macedonian expansionism, with the continuing theme of too little, too late. Athenian aid to her ally Phocis during the period of the Third Sacred War offers an illuminating example of this weakness of foreign policy. Despite the alliance between the two states and the coalition of states ranged against the Phocians,<sup>46</sup> there is little evidence of any Athenian support, and what there was was limited in the extreme. Apart from the fleet commanded by Chares which picked up the Phocian survivors after the battle of the Crocus Field in 352,<sup>47</sup> the only evidence of Athenian military action is one alluded to in a fragment of Theopompos in which Chares defeated the mercenary commander Adaeos, nicknamed the cock, who was serving Philip at the time.<sup>48</sup> The Athenians had missed the most likely opportunity to defeat Philip by the inadequacy of their own foreign policy. The Phocians had proven to be stout warriors and their generals capable of defeating any in Greece. With the full backing and support of the Athenians the position of the king might well have been made untenable, especially after the Macedonians' two defeats at the hands of the Phocian general Onomarchos in 353/352. As it was, Philip was able to withdraw back into Macedon to reinvade later the same year and defeat the Phocians at the Crocus Field.<sup>49</sup> Only then do we hear of a *strategos* in the field with an Athenian force to aid their allies. It was only the march of Philip towards Thermopylae that brought the Athenian *demos* to act.

Nausicles was dispatched to the pass with 5,000 men and Philip withdrew. The Athenian policy was clearly one based upon defensive action. In such a policy the *strategos*, whether a military specialist or not, was nothing other than an instrument of policy implementation rather than a director or initiator of that policy as a whole.

As Chares was the only consistently reelected specialist *strategos* during this period his career after the Social War provides the most complete evidence of the alteration in role. Although there is evidence of Chares holding nine *strategiai* between the years 354 and 339,<sup>50</sup> the *strategos* was to play little direct part in the period of Philip's rise in power. Only in the year 353 is there any sign of the Chares as so often portrayed by the ancient writers, capturing Sestos on the Hellespont, slaying all the adult populace and enslaving the rest.<sup>51</sup> This episode represents the only example of Athenian aggression not initiated as a responsive action in these years.

All the other military ventures undertaken in this period merely demonstrated the weakness of this foreign policy, and the increasing weakness of the Athenians as a whole. On closer inspection, even the Athenian expeditions to save the vital city of Olynthos from the Macedonian expansion in 349/348 appear as weak-willed efforts by a declining nation. Although Philochoros records three separate expeditions to the stricken city,<sup>52</sup> the numbers of the three forces were such that, even combined, they could hardly have matched those of the king. The same lacklustre approach caused the only sizeable force, the last, to arrive too late to save the city, although the official line was that the expedition was delayed by bad

weather.<sup>53</sup>

This period represents the role of the specialist general at its lowest ebb. The office of general had simply to be one of much less significance in an Athenian policy based upon the economic usage of the military. The concentration of the speeches of the orators on the civil branches of the Athenian authorities clearly reflects the reduced importance of the military. The activities of those representatives of the Athenian assembly elected as the diplomatic envoys of the state were to be the causes of the major events of Athenian foreign affairs in the 340's. The most notable example of this was the peace of Philocrates in the year 346. This peace was initiated, developed and delivered for the approval of the assembly without any referral to the generals. Men of the likes of Aeschines and Demosthenes could argue with great regularity on the intentions of Philip and on the merits of the peace he offered and the *demos* would act as it saw fit, but the knowledge of the military situation and the reality of the Athenian position could not be fully grasped without the assistance of the specialist *strategoi*. The likes of Iphicrates, Timotheos and Chabrias had regularly performed the task of diplomatic envoys within the normal range of duties that the generals were expected to undertake, but the generals of the post Social-War era had no such function. There is no evidence of the generals acting on embassies of this period.<sup>54</sup> The Athenians were still arguing amongst themselves as Philip made his move through the pass of Thermopylae and set about the destruction of Phocis. The peace of Philocrates was to alter the situation. The humiliation of a peace which acknowledged the control of Philip of so much which had been Athenian in the past discredited the

followers of Euboulos. From 346 the *ecclesia* became more antagonistic to the Macedonians and more ready to use military action.

But the role of the generals in this period (346-338) only gradually regained some of its former prominence. From 346 till 341, at least, the centre of Athenian foreign policy remained in the decision-making bodies of the democratic system and not with the generals themselves. The growing anti-Macedonian feeling apparent in the political speeches of the time also makes it clear that the arguments as to the foreign policy of Athens centred around differing groups within the assembly, and not between the specialist *strategoi* and the politicians. However, the rise of the more aggressive anti-Macedonians such as Demosthenes and Hegesippos could only foretell a role of increasing importance for the generals in the following years. Indeed, from 344 the drift was inexorably towards outright war with the Macedonians. The olive branches held out by Philip to the Athenians of custody of the temple of Delian Apollo and the offer to renegotiate the peace of 346 were not met with any conciliatory gestures on the part of the Athenians. The appointment of Hegesippos to lead the mission soon resulted in the collapse of the renegotiation talks.<sup>55</sup> In the same period the Athenians negotiated alliances with Achaëa, Argos, Messene and most of the Arcadian cities.<sup>56</sup> There was also a considerable increase in naval spending.<sup>57</sup> The character of Athenian foreign policy had undergone considerable change. The Athenians had once again found a role and a general goal to aim for. Once again they could don the mantle of champions of Hellenic liberty in a role reminiscent of the Persian wars some 150 years before.

By 342 the names of specialist *strategoi* once again begin to appear as central figures in the relations between the Athenians and the Macedonians. A certain Diopeithes of Sunium, the Athenian *strategos* in the Chersonese, raised a body of mercenaries through acts of extortion and piracy, threatened Philip's ally Cardia, seized the Macedonian ambassador Amphilochos and then raided Macedonian territory by attacking Thrace.<sup>58</sup> This represents the first act of foreign policy initiation by an Athenian *strategos* since the Social War. Diopeithes had acted on his own initiative to secure the funds he needed for his troops<sup>59</sup> and in so doing he had deliberately pushed Athenian foreign policy past the official line adopted in the assembly. The Athenian central authorities, hostile as they were to Philip, were not yet ready to adopt a policy of open warfare with the Macedonians. Demosthenes could later claim that Diopeithes had acted legally because Philip had himself broken the peace by aiding the Cardians (Athens having claimed the place in 343[Dem.VII.41]) but this cannot hide the fact that Diopeithes had clearly not been authorised to attack Macedonia itself. The Athenians did not declare war until the autumn of the year 340,<sup>60</sup> but Diopeithes almost brought them to that point two years beforehand. Demosthenes was, in all probability, seeking to justify the actions of the *strategos* in the full knowledge that the *strategos* had acted on his own initiative.<sup>61</sup>

Later, when Diopeithes was attacked by the proponents of a more conciliatory policy towards Macedon and Demosthenes asserted openly that his actions were those customary for an Athenian *strategos*,<sup>62</sup> the *demos*



apparently agreed since Diopeithes was neither recalled nor was he ordered to stop his harassment of the Macedonians.<sup>63</sup> But this was not to say that Diopeithes was acting in the same role as the leading generals of the 370's and 360's. The decision of the *demos* that he was acting within the legal bounds of his office did not necessarily mean, however, that Diopeithes had matched those men, but that he had not gone beyond them. Diopeithes did not match the likes of Timotheos, Iphicrates and Chabrias because in the eyes of foreign nations he was merely an individual acting on his own behalf and not the official policy of Athens. This can be seen in the fact that Philip sent his emissary to the general and not to the Athenian authorities themselves.<sup>64</sup> The actions of the Persians also point towards this conclusion.

Although Demosthenes had argued in favour of seeking assistance from the Great King against Philip,<sup>65</sup> it seems unlikely that the Athenians were yet ready to entertain the idea of any such a policy. There is no evidence to suggest an Athenian embassy to the Great King at this early a date, and the content of the fourth Philippic suggests that it was considered necessary to reinforce the arguments for the dispatch of such an embassy.

It must be concluded then that the Athenians did not have any formal agreement with the Persians at this point in time. Yet the evidence shows Artaxerxes III sent first money to Diopeithes and then troops to the city of Byzantium, to assist in the campaign against the Macedonians.<sup>66</sup> If so, then we can only assume that the Great King dealt directly with Diopeithes without the approval of, and without reference to, the Athenian authorities.

For the general in the field of course, any such financial or material assistance would be welcomed, from whatever source it might come, even if in so doing the *strategos* would be acting contrary to the official policies of the assembly. The *strategos* probably could not realise that such acts of apparent generosity, much as they might seem to be acknowledgements by foreign rulers of the importance of the individual, in fact demonstrated that the generals had lost their role as the personifications of Athenian foreign policy in the eyes of Athens' neighbours. The activities of *strategos* (in a few cases) and state were no longer one and the same, although the shifting attitudes within the Athenian political system meant that influence and standing were gradually returning to the specialist *strategos* as the Athenians drifted towards war.

In order to gain some sort of overview of this development in role and function I now turn my attention on to two specific figures whose dominance of the active *strategia* throughout this period provides the richest sources for this development.

### c: The Careers of Chares and Charidemus

From the Social war till the accession of Alexander III of Macedon two men stood out as the major figures in the Athenian military, the generals Chares and Charidemus.

Chares of Angele has long been a controversial figure in Athenian history. From the first the evidence apportioning the blame for the

misfortunes of the Athenians in the period 358-322 was centred upon and around the career of this figure. Although the activities of this *strategos* in the years 367/366 till 356/355 gained him, what can euphemistically be called "a bad press" very early on, as one of the major causes for the outbreak of the Social war, it is not my intention to discuss this section of his career at this point. My attention is drawn to the Athens of the post-Social war period, and the role of the generals, specifically Chares, in the foreign policy of his country after that disastrous conflict.

Chares had come to prominence in the Social War, when, from the outset, he was elected as *strategos*, along with the veteran Chabrias, to command against the rebels. Throughout the course of the war Chares was to "enjoy" the command of the Athenian forces either with, or, ultimately without colleagues.<sup>67</sup> Such was the desultory nature of this conflict that Chares had the time to involve himself in the internal affairs of Thrace.<sup>68</sup> It was the involvement of Chares with the rebel satrap Artabazos, and the subsequent letter of denunciation which the Athenian *demos* received from Artaxerxes which effectively finished the war in the rebels' favour.

The career of Chares after his recall from Asia in 354 has remained obscure,<sup>69</sup> mainly through the concentration of the sources on the internal political activities of the Athenians rather than the military ones. There can be no better evidence for the loss of prestige suffered by the generals in this period. Other than the recapture of Sestos and the Olynthos expedition Chares remained aloof from the centre of Athenian affairs.

The appointment of Chares to the Chersonese and Thrace in the year 341 marked the final end of this period in the evolution of the specialist *strategoi* in Athens. The dispatch of Chares to these areas represented the commitment of the Athenians finally to confront Philip and to attempt to prevent any further Macedonian expansion. In mid 340 Philip moved into the Hellespont to attack Perinthos and, later, Byzantium,<sup>70</sup> thus effectively calling the Athenians' bluff once again since they had still not declared war on him.<sup>71</sup> It was the degree of hostility shown towards him by Chares that convinced the king that a full-scale war with Athens was at last upon him.<sup>72</sup> Later that year the king made a direct attack upon Athenian shipping, seizing 180 (or 230) Athenian grain transports being assembled at Hieron, thus bringing the increasing tensions of the previous five years to a head.<sup>73</sup>

Philip pressed on to Byzantium, only to find his siege of the city beaten back by the joint defence offered by the Byzantines and their Athenian allies, along with the aid sent by the Persians.<sup>74</sup> In these events Chares played no part, he had returned to Athens soon after the capture of the grain transports.<sup>75</sup> However, the Byzantine campaign demonstrated to all, including the Athenians themselves, that they were still capable of successful defence. Philip was, at least for the time being, halted and Athens had won some respite before the now inevitable conflict in Greece proper. The commanding *strategoi* in the campaign, Phocion and Cephisophon, were regarded as heroes. Athenian morale had been restored and with it the will to fight on. The drift towards war which had been the hallmark of Athenian foreign policy from 346 onward seemed a policy more based upon resigned despair than deliberate and active decision, but the

success of the Byzantine campaign galvanised public opinion into a determination and renewed confidence not witnessed for many years. The generals, by their success, had not only justified the arguments for actively opposing Philip wherever it was possible to do so, but in so doing, had justified their own position within the Athenian system. Ironically, it was Phocion, one of those who had generally argued for a policy of appeasement and non-violent opposition to the Macedonian, who had ensured that Athens would be committed to a full-scale war with Philip.

Werner Jaeger admirably described the renewed sense of purpose, national unity and justified confidence apparent in the Athenians from 340 on.<sup>76</sup> That confidence ultimately had to rest on the generals who would decide the fate of Athens, and in the final analysis, of Greece also. Although Demosthenes, now ascendant in the assembly, argued that the military decision should be allowed to come about,<sup>77</sup> whilst he himself valiantly struggled to manoeuvre as many of the Greek city-states into alliance as possible,<sup>78</sup> it was the activities of the generals which were in reality the guiding lights of Athenian policy by this time. When Philip seized upon the opportunity presented by the Delphic Amphictyony to march into central Greece,<sup>79</sup> the Athenian *strategoi* persuaded the *demos* to settle the issue and the Athenian citizenry marched out to war.

The period of history from 354 until Chaeronea has always been one difficult to follow in terms of Athenian history. Although probably better documented than any other portion of the fourth century the mass of oratorical works has clouded over the roles of those who did not work in

the assembly or *boule*. Politicians tended to minimise the roles of any other than themselves, and given that it is this evidence which has survived, it is easy to underestimate the power of the generals in this period. It is also true, of course, that in treating all oratorical material with excess scepticism the reverse idea can come about, that the generals of this period can be seen to be equal in the direction and control of Athenian foreign policy as was the case with the specialists of the pre-Social War era.

However, there was no single figure in the history of Athens in the fourth century whose role was of the individual importance of Chares in terms of the development of the role of the *strategos*. My reasoning lies in three main arguments. Although many might argue that it was Demosthenes who had worthy claim to that distinction in the Athenian democratic system it was inevitably the general who was, in the final analysis, the arbiter of the foreign policy of that nation. In general terms Demosthenes himself acknowledged the limitations of the role of the political orator. A passage from the speech *On the Crown* reveals his own opinion on the subject. Whilst defending his own actions in the period prior to Chaeronea Demosthenes could plead that he had done as much, if not more than any man could do in his attempts to place Athens in as strong a position as possible, he was unable to control the final outcome of such political manoeuvrings; for he was as a shipowner, who, having prepared as best as possible for a prosperous voyage, loses his ship in a storm, so he too could not control the destiny of his own nation since he was not a general and it was they who controlled the ultimate course of the nation's fortunes.<sup>80</sup> Thus in the words of the leading politician of the period can be seen the

reality of the Athenian governmental structure. The nature of the democracy in the C4th. was such that the politicians could only take foreign policy determination so far, within the bounds of the decision making bodies of the Athenian central authorities. In the period from 346 onwards the imminence of war with Macedonia and the increasing recourse of the Athenians to military action brought the generals to a position of increasing power in the execution of Athenian foreign policy.

But the role of Chares was somewhat different to that of his illustrious predecessors. In the years from 354 till 338 Chares stood virtually unchallenged in the role of the leading *strategos* of the Athenians. The three leading *strategoi* of the pre Social War period, Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos were limited in the extent of their own power by the presence of the others which limited the numbers of commands each could receive. Power shared is power dispersed, this was the whole idea of the board of *strategoi* in the democratic city-state. Specialisation in the art of soldiering in the C4th. had, in reality if not in theory, limited the power of the *strategia* to the few specialists who took the active military commands, but Chares was not to have any serious rivals for his position. Only Diopeithes and Charidemus were to present themselves as any kind of rivals to the *strategos* up till, and beyond, Chaeronea. Even these figures failed to represent any serious challenge. Diopeithes died too soon, in 340, to establish his own credentials for the post, whilst Charidemus was dogged both by his own nationality (for he was not an Athenian by birth) and the times he lived in.<sup>81</sup> Chares himself was also quick to oppose any who might rival his position of dominance within the *strategia*. His impeachment

of his colleagues Iphicrates, Timotheos and Menestheos in 355/354 must have been inspired, in part at least, by the opportunity such a move brought to remove his elderly 'superiors' from active service, and at the same time, put paid to the ambitions of the rising Menestheos to follow in the footsteps of his illustrious father.<sup>82</sup> It was ruthlessness which seemingly characterised the whole career of Chares.

But Chares, although so dominant in the *strategia* of Athenian foreign affairs after the Social War, was never to equal the standing of his famous predecessors. Such was the condition of the Athenian nation after the Social War that Chares was, for long periods, lost in the inactivity of the city as it sought to find some renewed aim. Defeat in the Social War made wide use of the military an expensive drain on the economic resources of the state. This ran alongside the general loss of will amongst the Athenians to engage in such activities. In such circumstances the general simply could not maintain the position of prominence that had been the case before the Social War. This alteration in position was exaggerated by the changed nature of warfare which increased the use of mercenaries at the expense of the old citizen militias, causing the erosion of the traditional ties of general and citizen-soldier which was the bedrock of the influence and standing the generals enjoyed.<sup>83</sup>

In short, from the career of Chares, it can be seen that the role of the general up till Chaeronea was one of lessening influence in the area of foreign policy in an Athens where foreign policy itself had become much less important after the Social War. As the use of the military became less,



so too did the ability of the generals to directly initiate foreign policy either at home or in the field. Chares was unable to direct the foreign policy of the state because he had neither the standing within the state to dominate the *ecclesia*, nor did he have the opportunities to become the embodiment of Athenian foreign policy through his exploits in the field. Only as the threat from Macedon steadily grew and military activity once again became a regular feature of Athenian policy did the specialist generals begin to regain the influence of their illustrious predecessors. But this trend must not be over-stressed. Within the confines of this new role Chares gained as much respect and distinction as was possible through his patriotic zeal and undivided loyalties. The campaign of Chaeronea offered Chares the chance to gain a position of eminence and influence not seen since Conon. That opportunity was lost on the field of battle.

The defeat at Chaeronea left the Athenians in a state of panic for the safety of the city itself. Of the Athenian generals who had commanded at the battle, Lysicles and Chares, the former was either dead or was removed from command and the latter had fled.<sup>84</sup> Plutarch records how one Charidemos of Oreos was made *strategos* in command and the Athenians prepared for the defence of the city until the Council of the Areopagos intervened and replaced Charidemos with Phocion.<sup>85</sup> Charidemos clearly represented as fierce an anti-Macedonian ideology as Chares had done. The Council had acted because it considered that the Athenians should make peace, yet that was considered an impossible option whilst Charidemos stood at the helm of the city. Phocion on the other hand was a well known member of the moderate faction and thus considered a suitably conciliatory

commander to present to Philip. From this episode it can clearly be seen that although the generals remained the servants of the Athenian central authorities, the strength of personality displayed by certain of the specialist commanders was enough to ensure that their appointment could be interpreted as a policy undertaking by the city-state. Charidemos and Chares represented those who wanted the strongest action possible against the Macedonians and, as the threat grew worse, so this link between generals and this specific policy became more acute. As the Macedonian growth continued and the Athenians became increasingly more alarmed and belligerent then so did the influence of the specialist generals on Athenian foreign policy become stronger. The clearest proof of this was the continued relationship between the central authorities and these two men after Chaeronea and the acceptance of peace with Philip. Both Charidemos and Chares left the city to take up service with those who were continuing the fight against the Macedonian yet both seemingly remained in contact with the Athenians. Upon the death of Philip in 336 it was Charidemos who brought word of the assassination to Athens.<sup>86</sup> But Athens would not rise and Charidemos once again removed himself from the city. He was to spend his remaining years serving any who would challenge the Macedonian growth. The last heard of him was his execution by his new master, the Great King, who was angered by the Athenian's disrespect.<sup>87</sup>

The importance of these figures in the influencing of Athenian foreign policy can best be seen however by the actions of those they opposed, the Macedonians. The accession of Alexander III to the Macedonian throne and the rebellion of Thebes which this event provoked, brought the young king

into central Greece seeking those he considered the greatest threat to the stability of his empire. To the Athenians was presented a list demanding the surrender of the ten men considered the most dangerous anti-Macedonians. Amongst them was the name of Charidemus.<sup>88</sup> Clearly the king considered Charidemus to be both influential, and dangerous on account of that influence to the extent that he sought his removal from the city into his own custody.

With such evidence the revival of the influence of the specialist *strategoi* on Athenian foreign policy in the 346-338 period cannot be denied. The inevitability of war with Macedonia had guaranteed for the specialist generals a renewed role of great influence in the direction of Athenian foreign policy.

## 4

## Athens and the Macedonian

### Hegemony, 336-322

The fifteen years which are the topic of this chapter enclose a distinct enough division of the role of the generals in the area of Athenian foreign policy both to justify the separation of this segment from the other two chapters making up this review and the division of this section itself into a further two parts. The first section covers the period from the destruction of Thebes in 336 down till the exiles decree and the death of Alexander in 323, and the second covering the remaining one and a half years till the imposition of the tyranny of Demetrios of Phalerum by the victorious Macedonians in 322. Within the first part, due to the peculiar circumstances facing Athens from 336 onward I have found it necessary to make a further sub-division between those generals who operated within, and those who operated without, the actual political framework of the Athenian governmental system; in other words, those in possession of the title *strategos* as elected by the vote of the *demos*, and those whose careers, although now outside that office, were unavoidably linked to Athenian foreign policy.

**a: The Athenian Dusk, 336-324.**

The relatively smooth transfer of the Macedonian monarchy from Philip II to his son Alexander was both surprising and alarming to many of the Greek city-states who had awaited the death of the king in the hope that Macedonia might once again fall back into internecine conflict and thus offer the opportunity for they themselves to regain their sovereignty. As it was, only Thebes rose up to challenge the Macedonian hegemony and the other nations of Greece could only stand aghast at the swift crushing of the revolt by the new king. In 349 Demosthenes had written of Macedon that "...as an appendage, it is of no mean value...but by itself it is weak and full of defects".<sup>1</sup> By 336 the opposite was true, that the Greek city-states were but an appendage of the Macedonian kingdom. From the time of the destruction of Thebes and the acknowledgement by the *demos* of Macedonian suzerainty, Athens had, to all intents and purposes, ceased to exist as a sovereign nation in terms of its' foreign policy.

Can a nation realistically remain in being without an independent foreign policy ? Clausewitz considered that it could not, that without the freedom of choice to pursue such policy decisions the nation is but an illusion, a fleeting shadow of a past existence following the beck and call of the dominant state. But such conditions might, in the long term, assist in maintaining the integrity of the dominated nation and the belief in a future free of foreign interference. In this Clausewitz also agreed.<sup>2</sup> Is there an example of a similar situation which can prove that this may be the case? I believe that there may be a sufficient similarity of conditions between Athens and the other members of the league of Corinth and the Confederacy

of the Rhine as formed in the years 1806-1814 for there to be some worth in discussing the two groups.

Under the control of Napoleon I the nation-states of Germany were collected together into a confederacy under French suzerainty. During the years 1806-1814 these thirty-six states existed only as auxiliaries to the French Emperor (who had declared himself Holy Roman Emperor in order to legalise his control). To Napoleon this group of nations was but a well of manpower to be tapped for the expansionist policies of France. In return for their servitude, the rulers of these countries received little except rises in title and status, the meaningless titles of puppet government.<sup>3</sup> The loyalty of these nations was in fact that which was impressed upon them by the weight of arms. By 1814 the French simply had not the power to maintain this hold, and much as the Emperor might have talked of treachery, his words held little weight. The German states, under repression, had come both to view their own sovereign status and the independence of the German peoples as a whole as something which was essential for themselves. To the Germanic peoples the wars of 1813-1814 were regarded as wars of "liberation".

The League of Corinth can be seen in something of a similar light. The League, as established by Philip II, was an enforced collective of the Greek city-states which acted only as a reflexive body to the Macedonian monarch. As such, the individual nations forming the League were satellite allies, providing a large proportion of the materials and men needed by both Philip and Alexander for the continued expansion of the Macedonian

empire.<sup>4</sup> Alexander, as the head of the League, had the nominal title to legitimise his effective control of the foreign policy of the member states.<sup>5</sup> The city-states were nothing more than appendages of Macedonia, shackled to the future of that country by military strength and unable, or unwilling,<sup>6</sup> to coordinate any rising against the hegemon or his regent in Macedon, Antipater.

In such a context it can be seen that the role of Athens was but minor in the first instance, and diminished further as the years went on and the Macedonian empire grew. The events beyond Greece itself made the city-state an ever shrinking minnow in an ever growing pond. This is the context into which I place my discussion.

**i. The role of the elected Athenian *strategoi*, 336-324.**

The role of the official generals in this period can best be examined by considering the evidence we lack rather than what information we do possess. In this period the classical historians became less and less concerned with the affairs of Greece proper. This was hardly surprising. The classical tradition of the writing of history was based around the narrative of wars to form a chronological framework. The absence of wars from Greece after 336 meant that, in simple terms, there was little value for them in recording areas at peace. This idea could be extended further. Within the Achaemenid Persian empire, Greece, and the city-states within it, had almost always been of little interest, concerning only the western-most

satrapies of the vast nation. As the Macedonian empire gradually overcame the Persian and Alexander moved eastwards, the centre of events moved eastward as well. After 330, Greece and the world of the tiny city-states was as distant to the Macedonian king and the historians who moved with him as they had been to the Great King. The historians deliberately concentrated their work on the campaigns of Alexander whilst all else was relegated to the periphery. In so doing, the historians merely reflected the reality of the Greek situation and its declining significance in the ancient world.

Thus in one sense at least, the role of the Athenian boards of generals was altered by the world around them. The declining importance of Athens in relation to the world around the city meant that the generals had suffered a parallel decline. Whereas the actions of a general like Conon or Thrasyboulos could hold the central position in the events of the day only some sixty to seventy years before, in the "world" of the historians of the 330's and 320's the activities of the Athenian *strategoi* were of only auxiliary interest to the events in Asia. It may be a little simplistic to argue that the Athenian generals of the previous seventy years were responsible for the status of Athens, but with a little more success in the military field then Athens would perhaps have held a position of far greater importance in the 330's and 320's.

As it was, for the first few years of the reign of Alexander the Athenians remained very quiet in their own foreign policy, choosing to follow the ideology of a certain Lycourgos of Boutadae, who had come to



dominate the financial administration of the city after Chaeronea.<sup>7</sup> This ideology seemingly propounded the theory of a strong Athens through the rebuilding of the shattered Athenian economy. This entailed the avoidance of all but the most essential military activity. Resistance to the Macedonians was limited to assertions of Athenian autonomy whilst stopping short of any provocative acts that could justify Macedonian military intervention. Rearmament was a slow process since the revenues of the state were directed into internal projects designed to restore pride in the city and reaffirm the integrity of the city-state. The large amount of municipal building which occurred at this point is a good example of this.<sup>8</sup> However, it would be wrong to accuse Lycourgos of pro-Macedonian sympathies in the light of the city walls, shipsheds and new naval arsenal that were constructed during the course of his administration. But the most important evidence from this period that proves the full commitment of Lycourgos to the Athenian military was the reform of the *ephebate*, obliging all eighteen year olds to enroll for two years military training and service for the city-state. Attica was protected from surprise attack and the citizen militia was guaranteed a core of (reasonably) well trained infantry.<sup>9</sup> However, it has also been argued that this form of national service made active hostilities less likely rather than having the opposite effect, since "experience had shown that ad hoc mobilisations of the citizen army created existential situations with unintended political outcomes".<sup>10</sup>

The consequence of this, the "Lycourgan Reformprogramm"<sup>11</sup> was that the actions of the elected *strategoi* were very limited and remain, for the most part, unrecorded for posterity and the benefit of this study. But from

the evidence there is I believe that there was, in this period, a new form of generalship based around the changing ethics of Athenian society and, through this general change, there was an alteration in the role of these figures in the specific area of Athenian foreign policy.

The idea of a clear cut division in Athenian politics at this time, into "pro-" and "anti-" Macedonian groupings<sup>12</sup> has been modified, due to the efforts of such writers as Sealey and Badian,<sup>13</sup> in favour of the idea that "the Athenians were essentially as one in looking for the dissolution of the Macedonian empire".<sup>14</sup> However, it can justifiably be said that despite the general desire for revenge if the opportunity arose, after 338 and 336 there was a common awareness amongst the Athenians of the danger of provoking war with Macedon. The Athenians now realised that their military capabilities were not equal to that task. Indeed, the speech on the subject of the treaty with Alexander (333) is regarded as the last spasm of anti-Macedonian agitation. Subsequently there was agreement, or at least acquiescence, that the Macedonian supremacy could not be challenged.<sup>15</sup> The majority of Athenians no longer expected the generals to give them the success they had seemingly come to expect from those in command during the 380's and 370's. Thus Athens complied with the demand of Alexander to exile Charidemus from the city<sup>16</sup> and, despite the remonstrations of Demosthenes to do otherwise, sent only equipment to the Thebans in 336,<sup>17</sup> then offered congratulations to Alexander for his safe return from that campaign, thus escaping the fate that overcame that city.<sup>18</sup> Such was the general tone of foreign policy with regards to Macedonia. Not until the

Harpalos affair in 324 would the Athenians open a clear breach with the Macedonians, when Antipater was busy in the north, when Alexander himself was but a distant memory in the minds of the veterans and Athenian (and Hellenic) discontent had reached unprecedented levels.

For the *strategia*, such a state of affairs was to have great significance, not only in altering the roles of the generals of that period itself but also in highlighting the dramatic impact of the events of 324 onwards and, in particular, the role of the *strategos* Leosthenes. The events described above had stripped the Athenians of almost all of their leading generals. Chares had fled the city after Chaeronea; Diopeithes, Lysicles and Stratocles were all dead; Charidemus had been exiled and Ephialtes had probably departed at the same time to take up service with the Great King.<sup>19</sup> Of those who held the *strategia* with regularity only Phocion remained, and his role was one more to do with internal politics rather than external affairs.<sup>20</sup> It is of no coincidence that this "pacific" policy towards Macedon ran concurrently with the worst dearth of competent generals the Athenians had faced in the 4th. Alexander's demand for the exile of Charidemus from the city in return for the dropping of the demand for the eight leading anti-Macedonians amongst the Athenians clearly shows the importance attached to leading generals by foreign rulers, and the influence they considered these figures to hold over Athenian foreign policy. In short, whilst Alexander could come round to the idea of allowing the leading politicians of the Athenians who had vehemently opposed him to remain in Athens, he considered it too dangerous to permit the same for Charidemus. The demand also demonstrates that, by the later part of the fourth century

(ie. the 340's and 330's ), the idea of active military professionalism and patriotic duty had become synonymous for the specialist Athenian *strategoi*. In the aftermath of Chaeronea, it was preferable to these men to serve Persia than to accept the Macedonian suzerainty. "Lycourgan" Athens was no place for men as specialised in war as those mentioned above, whilst for the Athenians who remained, the loss of such leading lights could only weaken still further the fiercely anti-Macedonian group in the city and strengthen the desire to maintain the peace.

For the period from 336 till 324 there are extant the names of but twelve *strategoi*. Even of these most are but single names in epigraphical sources and thus it is impossible to say anything of their roles.<sup>21</sup> But as their careers were influenced by the policies adopted by the *demos* so did they themselves have a negative effect on those policies. By the very lack of record in history, it can be deduced that these men were not specialist generals in the mould of Chares or Charidemus, but men acting rather as the "stop-gap" holders of the *strategia* until circumstances might change, and the genuine soldiers could return with worthwhile purpose. But it was not only in terms of direct military skill and experience that these *strategoi* were very different to the leading Athenian generals of the recent past. Social pressures and ideologies were also influential in the make up of these boards, with significant consequential effects upon the Athenian polis and its foreign policy.

J.E. Atkinson argued that one of the major features of Athenian political oratory in the period 338-323 was the consistent appeals for

patriotism and loyalty. The aim was to redirect the social pressures building up within the polis at this time outwards against the common enemy.<sup>22</sup>

A.Fuks connected the works of Isocrates and Plato to the realities of the socio-political problems facing much of Greece in the mid-fourth century, problems still clearly present in Athenian society in the period of Lycourgan influence. After Chaeronea there was present in Athens a class tension not seen for many years in the city, a renewed divide between the rich and poor which upset the social order and caused the abuse of political power.<sup>23</sup> The speeches of the period and the Lycourgan programme of reforms had the dual aim of pressing for the avoidance of military activities and easing the tensions within Athenian society. For example, the speech of Lycourgos *Contra Leocratem*, dated around 330, seems to be the work of a man attempting both to calm the fears of the poorer classes and direct their efforts towards a united front of Athenian patriotism.<sup>24</sup> By prosecuting the wealthy merchant Leocrates over his alleged abandonment of the city at a time of crisis, Lycourgos could attempt to reunite the classes of Athenian society by demonstrating the patriotic nature of his own, aristocratic class in dealing with traitors. Leocrates had deserted the polis in time of dire necessity, and the integrity and safety of the polis was of supreme importance, thus traitors, be they rich or poor had to be hunted down and made to pay the penalty, even after so long a period (eight years). The law of Eucrates (336) too, was intended to play upon the fears of the poor, reinforcing earlier laws against those who might overthrow the democracy with new warnings for the Areopagites, the council of ex-archons whose powers were seemingly increasing, causing further anxieties to the poorer classes.<sup>25</sup> Evidently, these fears came from the poorer classes and were directed towards the

wealthier class who just might consider an oligarchic regime compliant with Macedon more appealing than the rather more aggressive democracy.

In such times the loss of the specialist generals brought about a significant alteration in the relationship between the *demos* and those who held the *strategia* and, in so doing, altered the role of these men in terms of their influence on Athenian foreign policy. For without the specialists, the boards of generals became, once again, the sole preserve of the wealthier and more aristocratic classes, often the sons or grandsons of famous generals of the past; Conon, son of Timotheos and grandson of Conon; Menestheos, son of Iphicrates; Thrasyboulos, son of Thrason and Leosthenes, son of Leosthenes are all examples of the growing importance attached at this time to a military background. From this can be deduced a new trend in the *strategia* of the period, since the loss of the specialist generals could only aggravate this tendency towards a form of hereditary generalship. In a nation which has lost its way in terms of foreign policy and military greatness such a trend is common enough, as it forms both a tangible link with the past and the hope for a brighter future. Thus mid-C19th. France sought to recapture the glory of the first empire by placing the descendants of the great figures of that era in the positions of power in the third empire, the repetition of names being disconcertingly familiar to Napoleonic historians.<sup>26</sup> But whilst such a subconscious trend may recapture the images of the past, more often than not these descendants were no more than mediocre shadows of their famous forebears.

But for the generals in the Athens of this period there were further

complications and hindrances to attaining the influence and power which (some of) their predecessors enjoyed. Even for those who were the relations of famous *strategoi* of the past, popularity amongst the *demos* was not an automatic privilege. By definition the families of those generals who were famous and successful were wealthy. The *strategoi* themselves were drawn from the wealthier classes of Athenian society as a prerequisite for holding an unpaid, elected post for a year.<sup>27</sup> Thus, in this period of internal discord the usual strength of the generals, the relationship enjoyed by them with the *demos*, was disrupted, and the mass of the people began to view the generals with the same suspicion that marked the relations between the two classes as a whole. The boards of *strategoi* were made up of, in the main, unproven and non-specialists drawn from the old aristocracy or the new rich whose loyalties were all too dubious. Just as numerous *rhetoires* were accused of being in the pay of the Macedonians, many *strategoi* also must have fallen under the suspicion of collaboration. The erection of the statue of Democratia by the *Boule* in 333/332 must have served as due warning to the generals as much as to the politicians of the assembly.<sup>28</sup> To the poorer Athenian who knew nothing other than loyal service to his country, the accusations so freely bandied about by the politicians casting doubts over any in positions of power within the state could only lead to a general decline in the respect felt for those in those positions. The "professional" general of known and proven loyalty must have seemed far more preferable than those he found in a position of unchallenged dominance in the 330's and 320's. It was not too surprising to find the generals forced to make public sacrifice to Democratia in 331, and again in 330,<sup>29</sup> at a time when the non-committal policy adopted by most politicians towards the revolt of

Sparta by Agis III against the Macedonians most conflicted with the wishes of the poorer classes.<sup>30</sup> It must have appeared to many ordinary Athenians that the best interests of the state were not being served by those either in the pay of the Macedonians or those fearful of their own personal expense in wartime.<sup>31</sup> This had never been a trait of the prominent generals of the past.<sup>32</sup> Thus there was a major inconsistency in the policies adopted by the *ecclesia* in regards towards foreign affairs.

As I have pointed out, it was the poorer classes, the traditionally more aggressive strata of Athenian society, which favoured a renewal of the conflict with the Macedonians in contrast to the more cautious approach of the wealthier, liturgical classes, yet we possess neither evidence of any official military expedition nor any unofficial activity by a lone *strategos* from 336 until the Lamian War.<sup>33</sup>

Why was war deferred for so long ? The Athenians perhaps considered themselves ready to fight a war, even in 336, just two years after Chaeronea (as did Charidemus), for they were prepared to undertake just such a war until the swift arrival of Alexander and the destruction of Thebes.<sup>34</sup> Again, in terms of military preparation, the city was ready to join in the revolt of Agis, and in 335/334 Diotimos was honoured for a major naval campaign against the pirates.<sup>35</sup> Clearly then, war with the Macedonians was avoided by the choice of the assembly enforced on the Athenians through a lack of the capability to fight such a war, since the economy was in a poor condition at this time. However, the *ecclesia* may also have been significantly influenced by the make up of the boards of



*strategoi*. The boards of generals in this period were, as I have argued, poor in quality, experience and the skills of command, but, perhaps more significantly, were of doubtful loyalty as well (to the poor). The generals could attempt to alleviate the persistent fears of oligarchy and a directly pro-Macedonian puppet government by the making of sacrifices to *Democratia*, but the people were not prepared to entrust large amounts of money, equipment and, above all, men, to those who were deemed to be directly opposed to their interests. On the part of the generals, their role in Athenian foreign policy in this period can be seen in two ways. Either the generals agreed with the majority of the politicians that war should be avoided for as long as possible, if not for good, and thus added the weight of their influence to the arguments of the politicians, or, if they did not agree, and sought to bring about the renewal of the conflict, then their influence was insufficient to bring about such a policy. However, the latter option must be considered doubtful as all the evidence points to the boards of the *strategoi* at this time being nothing other than full of men there more to carry out the traditional ceremonial and religious duties than to undertake any active role encompassed within that office.

Hence the Athenians remained in an uneasy peace for twelve years and the people awaited some figure in whom they might place their hopes and their trust. That figure would come, but he too would be of a traditional military family. Yet his skill and military prowess, and his clearly demonstrated hatred of the Macedonians would ensure for him the commitment of the Athenian people to serve under him and renew the struggle against Macedon.

In the intervening years, as the Athenian assembly would not risk confrontation with the Macedonians the official *strategoi* did little. No Athenian *strategos* served on campaign with Alexander.<sup>36</sup> This demonstrated the deterioration in quality and the lack of specialists within the official *strategia* of this era. But this also showed the continuing Macedonian distrust of the Athenians. The Greeks in the service of the young king tended to be from the lesser states of the Greek world (eg. Eumenes and Hieronymos of Cardia, and Memnon and Mentor of Rhodes) and not from the (ex) leading Greek cities. Alexander rightly had grounds to distrust the Athenians. Most of the leading generals of that state were in Persian service opposing him. Circumstances had removed them from the polis and the actual offices of Athenian military command, yet it was they who were, in effect, the real instruments of Athenian foreign policy throughout this period. It is to a consideration of this role that I now turn my attention.

## **ii. The Generals in foreign service, 336-324.**

For the specialist Greek generals the defeat at Chaeronea and the successful accession to the throne of Macedon by Alexander were not disastrous events in purely financial terms. The "professional" commanders of the time, having found themselves exiled from their home states, or having fled on the grounds of expediency in the fear of a Macedonian purge of trouble-makers, were to find a ready home in the

employ of the Persians who were themselves confronting the Macedonians. Amongst the Athenians Chares had fled from the city straight after the defeat at Chaeronea, Charidemus had found himself banished by his own people as the sole demand of Alexander,<sup>37</sup> and Ephialtes too had found it expedient to depart from Athens for the East. These three men exemplify the new role of the "professional" general after 336. Service under Macedonian suzerainty was inconceivable and so they sought employment elsewhere. For their own city as much as for themselves they sought employment with Persia, as the only viable option in the continued efforts to bring down the Macedonian hegemony. In this action the Athenians were not alone. The Athenians joined both commanders and ordinary men from other nations who had been displaced by the Macedonian growth, as well as other Greeks seeking the rich rewards of mercenary service. Nor was Athenian service in Persian ranks something novel. Athenodoros was a prime example of this,<sup>38</sup> but his service had been based on a very different motivation than that of the Athenian commanders after 336. Athenodoros had never held an Athenian magistracy and had proved his purely financial motivation by his own attacks upon his own countrymen in the 360's and 350's. Only hatred of the Macedonians linked these two, distinct types of general in Persian service, the mercenary and the patriot. For some, the decision to take up such service was a seemingly difficult choice. Chares, for instance, had probably retired to Sigeum after Chaeronea<sup>39</sup> where, in 334 he is found paying homage to Alexander on behalf of that place. Only then did he take up service with the Persians, and he is attested as commanding 2,000 men against the Macedonian king at Mytilene.<sup>40</sup>

Charidemos too, having been driven into exile upon the order of Alexander, came into Persian service, where, having been taken into the Kings' council his outspokenness cost him his life, an execution said to have been much regretted by Darius afterwards.<sup>41</sup> Ephialtes on the other hand, who had already served as an Athenian ambassador to Persia<sup>42</sup> and as a Persian agent in Athens, had been on the list of those demanded as hostages by Alexander in 335, and although this demand had been dropped in favour of the sole demand for the exile of Charidemos, he had taken himself off to the Persian court. In 334 he was commander of 2,000 mercenaries at Halicarnassos.<sup>43</sup>

The activities of Athenians who had undertaken service in the employ of Persia was inevitably a source of friction between the Macedonians and the Athenian authorities. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Alexander ever demanded that these generals should be recalled back to Athens as Chares had been recalled on demand in 355/354. It was probably an unspoken source of mutual hostility as both sides recognised that the Athenian generals in the service of Persia were, in effect, merely pursuing the long term aims of Athenian foreign policy, ie. the destruction of the Macedonian empire, from outside the official structure of the Athenian polis. Yet neither side could afford to recognise the fact officially. Alexander, in the early years of his reign, could not afford to acknowledge that a state allied to him was supporting the war effort of the enemy, either in a direct or indirect capacity, since the Athenian forces were an important part of his forces (along with the other Greeks). Whilst in later years, with the decline of the importance of the Greeks within the king's army, such an

order became increasingly irrelevant as well as impractical to implement by the simple matter of the vast distances that were by then separating the central power (Alexander) from the Greek city-states. Also such an action would reverse the policy Alexander had followed previously. The king had sought to remove the generals from Athens so as to minimise the influence he must have considered these men to hold over Athenian foreign policy. By successfully separating the generals from their home nation he was reducing their influence to that of distant hopes, like Conon had been to the Athenians in 397/396, far removed from their country, whom the Athenians might support in their minds, yet who were too far away to back in any practical manner. Just as in that post-Peloponnesian war period the recognition of the activities of these men by the central authorities was far too dangerous to be considered. Such a course of action would risk bringing down the wrath of Alexander and the army of the regent upon them. The Athenians had to distance themselves from those who had taken up such service.

There is evidence of only one general who, having entered Persian service, was elected to the *strategia* during the lifetime of Alexander. Thrasyboulos of Collytos, who might have been amongst those demanded by Alexander in 335, had fled the city at that time to join his compatriots at the Persian court.<sup>44</sup> After assisting Memnon of Rhodes at Halicarnassos in 334,<sup>45</sup> he was found as an Athenian *strategos* in 326/325 making a dedication at Eleusis.<sup>46</sup> But this recognition comes very late in the reign of Alexander when the Greek states were beginning to consider some form of joint action against the Macedonians since the main army and the dreaded

king was far away, deep into the interior of Asia. The Athenians were, by this action, testing just how far they could push before stirring Antipater into action.

Other than in this instance, the ties between these men, "the generals in exile", and the Athenian central authorities could only be in secret and at a minor level. Amongst the Greeks captured by the victorious Macedonians after the battle of Issos was a secret Athenian envoy, a certain Iphicrates.<sup>47</sup> As the son of the famous *strategos* and mercenary commander, the Athenians could successfully distance themselves from him in just such a circumstance by portraying his presence amongst the Persians as a mission by mercenary commanders rather than any act of official Athenian foreign policy. Similarly, the Greek envoys to Darius' court captured after the battle of Gaugamela were but minor figures the Athenians and the other compromised Greek states could, from necessity, disown.<sup>48</sup>

As it was, the Athenian attempts to obscure the reality of the support of the polis for the generals engaged in the long term cause of Greek liberty through service with the Great King were gradually to fall away in the light of the events of the latter 320's. For, as I have already described above, the latent hostility of the *demos* to the Macedonians became increasingly clear as the years of Macedonian regency went by. Such actions as the seizure by the Macedonian fleet of corn transports bound for Athens<sup>49</sup> and the Macedonian demand to use Athenian shipyards could do nothing to ease anti-Macedonian sentiment.<sup>50</sup> Such antagonisms ran concurrently with an Athenian military build up which, by the late 320's made the resumption of

hostilities inevitable. But a rapid sequence of consecutive occurrences outmanoeuvred the Athenian politicians and strategists seeking to follow a precise timetable to war and brought virtually the whole of Greece into open conflict. Yet, not too surprisingly, the inspiration and motivation behind the Athenian struggle came not from within Athens itself, but from those returning from the wars in the east.

#### **b: The Final Flowering of Athenian Nationalism.**

##### **The Lamian War, 323-322**

"If Alexander were dead the stench of the corpse would fill the world".<sup>51</sup> So said the orator Demades in disbelief at the news of the death of Alexander at Babylon in June 323. Such a statement expressed the momentous impact of the news all over the "Greek" world, and indeed, beyond it. But for the majority of Athenians, the impact of the death of the king could only be seen in one light, as the opportunity to break free from the Macedonian domination and champion the Hellenic cause for liberty.<sup>52</sup> Within a short space of time the Athenians would, along with a large number of the other Greek city-states, be at war with the Macedonians. But I must first examine the causes for the outbreak of the war and those influences which brought Athens to see no alternative other than to bring about a renewal of the conflict with Macedonia. Throughout, it shall be my contention that, despite the presence of many other factors, the overriding elements in that combination which brought the Athenians to this point in their history, were the generals who appeared in this period and whose

ascendancy would allow them to "dictate" the conduct of the polis in its foreign affairs. That is not to say that the Athenians would not have gone to war at this time if the new popular "heroes" had not appeared, but the actions of men of the likes of Chares and Leosthenes came at a time of such responsiveness on the part of the Athenians that the role of Leosthenes would resemble that of a second Pericles, a role the Athenians had long awaited to be filled, and lead them in their last great quest as a genuinely independent nation.

### **Athens and the outbreak of the Lamian War, 325-323**

As I discussed above, the 320's were a period of increasing hostility between the Athenians and Macedonia, culminating in the outbreak of the Lamian War in the summer of 323. What must be closely examined in this section is the part played by Athenian generals in the influencing of Athenian foreign policy which brought Athens back into open conflict, paying due regard to possible motives for such a policy and their success in the attainment of those aims.

But if I am to analyse fully the role of the generals in this chapter of history, I must seek to discard the oft-recorded interpretation of events which portrays the Lamian War as being directly instigated by the fugitive Harpalos, who arrived off the Attic coast in the summer of 324. The ex-treasurer of Alexander had fled from Asia with a reported 5,000T.<sup>53</sup> and had come to Athens seeking a refuge from the agents of the king. But the



only direct piece of evidence that it was Harpalos who was the instigator of an attempted revolt by a large number of the Greek city-states is a fragment contained within Bekker's *Anecdota Graeca*,<sup>54</sup> the value of which was vehemently attacked in the Teubner edition of the *Anabasis* of Arrian.<sup>55</sup> On the contrary, the mass of the evidence leads to the conclusion that Harpalos was not in Athens to lead a revolt of his own initiation and financed by his own money. Despite the connections of Harpalos with the Athenians<sup>56</sup> it was highly unlikely that he would have come to such a city unless there were hostile preparations already afoot in Athens, a fact made clear in the speech of Hypereides *Contra Demosthenem*.<sup>57</sup> Such hostility is further attested by the fact that Alexander had ordered a fleet prepared to ravage Attica if the Athenians supported Harpalos,<sup>58</sup> for which there is evidence of pledges of support by otherwise unknown men in connection with the polis.<sup>59</sup> Clearly then, it can be said that the Athenians had resolved to oppose Alexander in the summer of 324, before the arrival of Harpalos. The argument that the rebellion of the Athenians was stirred up by him can be finally laid to rest.<sup>60</sup> But it can also be said that by their reaction to Harpalos, the Athenians were also not yet prepared to openly defy the Macedonian king. The Athenians needed both a further provocation and a focus of inspiration to be brought to that point, and therefore I must look elsewhere for the genuine causes of the Lamian War and the part played in that episode by one of the last great Athenian *strategoi*.

In the early part of the year 324 Alexander had determined to force the Greeks to accept back within their states those each had exiled. Although

primarily aimed at those *poleis* which had expelled pro-Macedonian sympathisers, for nations such as Athens the effect would have a far more detrimental nature. For the Athenians the practical effect of this decree meant the loss of Samos as an Athenian cleruchy. Aetolia too would have suffered in a similar fashion through the loss of Oeniadae.<sup>61</sup> Even before the official announcement of this, the exiles decree, at the Olympic festival in the second half of that year,<sup>62</sup> both the Athenians and the Aetolians had decided to reject the order. Curtius supports the idea that this was what brought the Greeks to the point of war.<sup>63</sup> Thus the Athenians had the cause for the war. But from where did they draw the necessary personal inspiration? Now, at this time of reckoning the orators and rhetors could not fill that role for the Athenians. Demosthenes was in exile, Lycourgos was dead and Hypereides was too old (around sixty-seven in 324/323). But it was from the east that the man came who could fill this role, and lead the Athenians to war.

Of Leosthenes little is known, and what there is tends to be speculation written long after his death. Since the discovery of the Oropos inscription it has become generally recognised that he was the son of the *strategos* of the same name tried for misconduct in 361/360, who had fled the polis and become a fugitive leader of mercenaries. Hence Leosthenes the younger gained a military grounding and a deep knowledge of the mercenary mentality from a very early age. There is no knowledge of his holding any *strategia*, or any other magistracy for that matter, in Athens until 324/323.<sup>64</sup> Yet his military reputation was faultless. It is not too hard to guess that this experience was gained in the wars in Asia.<sup>65</sup> At any rate, such was his reputation that when, in 324 he found himself amongst the

large numbers of mercenaries at Cape Taenarum in Laconia, he was elected by the soldiers as their commander-in-chief.<sup>66</sup>

From this point onwards the chronological sequence of events becomes even harder to follow, all coming within a short space of time, but all the sources are agreed that it was Leosthenes who was the driving force which connected the Athenians with the Taenarum mercenaries, who organised the alliances with the other Greek city-states and who drove into the Athenians the conviction to fight for their freedom. But what was the role of Leosthenes upon Athenian foreign policy itself? Was he a mere figurehead for the Athenians to follow? It seems doubtful that Leosthenes maintained a position of such low influence. There is evidence of secret negotiations between Leosthenes and the leading Athenians, both as individuals and bodies, concerning the preparations for war with the Macedonians in Alexander's lifetime.<sup>67</sup> That discussions took place between the general and individuals such as Hypereides is not too surprising. Men such as he must have awaited the appearance of such a commander for a long time; but that such citizen bodies as the *boule*, mentioned in Diodoros, should have been involved shows the renewed commitment on the part of the majority of Athenians to the idea of the renewal of the war. But there would be no hasty moves which could provoke an anticipatory stroke from the regent. The Athenians could not be seen to recognise the young general or have any communication with him, since he was a recognised enemy of the Macedonian-cum-Persian King.<sup>68</sup> Although the Athenians took the provocative step of electing Leosthenes as *strategos* for the year 324/323,<sup>69</sup> it was clear that the leading men of Athens

were desperately trying to prevent the people from rushing headlong into war in a premature gesture of belligerence. Leosthenes was kept at a distance, both physically and diplomatically.

Yet, in reality, it was the general alone who was dictating the timing of the Athenian drift to war. But the general was not just guided by the sole, if primary, belief in the justification of his cause and the patriotism he felt for his own country. Leosthenes, upon his return from Asia, was in a position where he had no option other than to attempt to raise a general rebellion of the Greek states. He was both the commander of 8,000 unemployed mercenaries and a fugitive from Alexander. As the elected general of these men he was, in effect the commander of a private army looking to him both for pay and provisions. Looking at the strategic situation the time was ripe for action. Alexander was far away in deepest Asia, yet there were reports that he was beginning to make the long march homeward. He himself and the men under his command were likely to be the object of some action by the king's men in the near future. Clearly he had arrived back in Greece at a time when anti-Macedonian feelings were running at a particularly high level. Leosthenes could channel such hostility into a general Greek revolt based around the nucleus of the mercenaries under his command. But the Athenians were still reluctant to commit themselves to open warfare with the Macedonians until there were more mercenaries and more allies. Thus Leosthenes was given 50T and sufficient arms and left to organise the war.<sup>70</sup> "Leosthenes sent off an embassy to the Aetolians.....and otherwise made every preparation for the war".<sup>71</sup> E. Lepore has convincingly shown that the military and diplomatic preparations

for the Lamian War took place outside the political framework of the polis.<sup>72</sup> Thus, in short, it was the personage of Leosthenes himself who steered the Athenians back on to the road to war.

To later Athenians Leosthenes was portrayed as a later Conon, the hero who had returned from abroad in order to serve his city, who was the *sotêr* of the polis. But was this the case? Leosthenes, it is true, returned to Greece in 324, but his action in doing so was based, in the first instance, on necessity rather than desire, since he was both an unemployed mercenary and a fugitive from Alexander. Cape Taenarum was the natural place for him to go. Here, at the southern tip of the Peloponnese, still relatively free of Macedonian interference and in a convenient place for any employer to find them, had gathered for several years the mercenaries who had returned from the wars in Persia (and elsewhere).<sup>73</sup> Like some citizen assembly of a democratic polis the mercenaries at Taenarum elected their leaders, and to the Greek city-states this post was one of some considerable strength in its own right. If Leosthenes is not the same man as the one elected to the *strategia* in 324/323<sup>74</sup> then what we have is a general holding an office given him by a group of mercenaries directing the policy of the Athenian nation in which he held no magistracy. In 325/324 Chares had held the post, and clearly there was some connection between this fact and the standing of Leosthenes. A fragment of a speech of Hypereides, recorded in Plutarch, can be interpreted as evidence that Leosthenes was a commander of little influence before 324/323. "Hypereides spoke in opposition to Alexander concerning the generals whose surrender he demanded....he also advised against disbanding the mercenary force at Taenarum under the

command of Chares, since he (Hypereides) was well disposed towards the general".<sup>75</sup> If the text is not defective (as some consider, cf. G.T.Griffith, *Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* p.35) then Leosthenes can perhaps be seen as a mixture of brilliant individual and 'state' moulded hero. Before the death of Chares<sup>76</sup> and his election to the command of the Taenarum mercenaries Leosthenes, it must be said, had little individual role in the events going on around him. But if that is the case, then his use of the position of commander of that force and his role in Athenian foreign policy is one of even greater dominance, coming as it did, in so short a space of time.

When the news broke of the death of Alexander Leosthenes came to the assembly and persuaded the Athenians to fight for their liberty.<sup>77</sup> Although the Athenians were later to portray themselves as the leading nation of the allies and the instigators of the war, the reality of the situation was somewhat different. The Athenian leadership of the allies was only that embodied through the leadership of one man, Leosthenes. The Athenians themselves did not provide any leadership as such to the rebellion, it was the sole efforts of Leosthenes as the leader of the mercenaries at Taenarum which provided that leadership. It was this mercenary army which both provided the nucleus for the allied armies for the war, and began the conflict itself by the move northwards from Taenarum to Thermopylae. The Athenians had to follow Leosthenes because they were, in effect, presented with a *fait accompli*. When Leosthenes delivered his speech to the Athenians urging them to war, even if his mercenaries were not already on the march, Greece was to all intents and purposes already at war since Leosthenes had

deemed it so.

W. Will has contended that after the destruction of Thebes in 335, the Athenians had acquiesced in the idea of Macedonian suzerainty, and had rejected any form of conflict as a viable foreign policy option right down till the outbreak of the Lamian War itself.<sup>78</sup> If this is so, then the personal role of Leosthenes becomes even more important than before. If the Athenians were so utterly compliant to Macedon then the Lamian War becomes something of a bolt from the blue into which they were thrown solely due to the efforts of Leosthenes. Not only had the general become completely dominant in the dictation of Athenian foreign policy, but he had done so as primarily a leader of mercenaries. This was a great change from the earlier history of Athens. Even if the arguments of Will are modified (which I have argued they can be) and there was a significant conservative anti-Macedonian group who had long argued, with growing success for the resumption of the war, the direction of Athenian foreign policy by Leosthenes can still be seen as total, but met with more ready ears in Athens itself. The efforts of this single figure had not only brought the Athenians, but most of the other Greek states to war. Not only did the supporters of Leosthenes, such as Hypereides, acknowledge the fact. Even Plutarch, finding Leosthenes (like Chares) capable of being portrayed as a suitable foil for his character of Phocion, wrote "...when Leosthenes had involved the Athenians in the Lamian War...", and "many people admired the force which Leosthenes had mobilised...".<sup>79</sup> The Athenians led their allies to war behind the image of this single figure, Leosthenes having been elected to the supreme command of the allied forces.<sup>80</sup> It was the closest the Athenians,

indeed, the Greeks as a whole, had come to a voluntary monarchy. Perhaps such idolisation was the Greek answer to the imagery of Alexander and that unfathomable quality which is the loyalty felt by many to one's king. But loyalty to one man, as advantageous as it might be in some circumstances can be very different in others. Alexander had, sometimes miraculously, escaped from his campaigns at least alive, if not unscathed, but for a man a little less fortunate such a style of leadership could be very risky for himself and for his army disastrous. As it was, Leosthenes was killed in the course of the war, yet, remarkably, another able general, Antipholos came forward to take over the command. Like Leosthenes his control of the Athenian (and allied) war effort was total until defeat at the battle of Crannon broke up the allied resistance.<sup>81</sup>

But in the summer/autumn of the year 323 as the Greeks marched off to war, it seemed that the gods were at last favourable and as their leader they had an inspirational figure. Leosthenes had dictated Athenian foreign policy in its movement towards war, now he was to have control of the policy of that state in the area of traditional control for the generals, on the field of battle.

Defeat in the Lamian War was to cost the Athenians dear. Antipater, unlike the kings he had served, had no high moral regard for the ancient city-state. In the peace which ensued from the war, the Athenians lost not only the last vestiges of their once formidable power and the independence they had so briefly regained in the course of the war, but also the democracy which was the bedrock of the Athenian state.<sup>82</sup> But even in defeat the



influence of Leosthenes, and Antiphilos was to be felt. These men had restored to the Athenians the pride in themselves which was to prove unending. Such men represented the best traditions and the continuing strength of the polis ideal. Perhaps, in reality, that always had been the role of the Athenian *strategoi*. If so then the *strategoi* had continually proved themselves worthy of that role. As it was, such an ideal was to prove the basis for the overthrow of the tyranny of Demetrios of Phalerum in 306 and the restoration of the democracy.

Part II:

## **Accountability and Control.**

## 5 Loyal Patriots or Lawless Mercenaries?

The development of the Athenian general as an increasingly specialised entity somewhat removed from the political manoeuvrings of the assembly and *boule* merely paralleled, and was something of a response to, the evolution of warfare throughout the western ancient world in the C4th. This development, discussed in depth in the following chapter, had far reaching consequences. Not least of these was the growth in the opportunities for employment of those specialised in the art of war in the service of countries other than the home states of the commanders concerned. Greeks, in particular, were highly prized as mercenary commanders, and the Athenian generals proved no different than those from the other city-states in readily seizing such opportunities.<sup>1</sup>

However, such a development was considered by many historians, both in ancient and more modern times, to have had far reaching repercussions for the character of generalship in the C4th. Within the Athenian framework, the generals became objects of attack and the scapegoats for the declining power of Athens. Linked to this ideology, and, in part at least, caused by it, the specialist generals came to be commonly portrayed as unpatriotic brigands more interested in the acquiring the material gains of lucrative mercenary service than in serving the best interests of their home nation, be they in the employ of the Athenians or not.

This divorce of mutual interests led to the generals acting as they wished, with disastrous results for the fortunes of the polis itself.

In this chapter I hope to examine the evidence which has brought about this popular belief. In so doing I hope to argue that the validity of this theory has been based upon an unsound concept of the interaction between mercenary service and legality with patriotic duty. In order to do so I have divided the chapter into two sections considering each of these ideas in turn. Therefore I turn my attention, in the first instance, to mercenary service.

**a: Mercenary Service by the Athenian *Strategoi*, 404-322**

The taking up of commands in the service of others than the Athenians themselves became a feature in the careers of the *strategoi* from very early on in the C4th. Indeed, such was the extent of the ultra-national activities of these men that historians, from very early on began to use the titles of *condottieri* and *banditti* in referring to these figures (as well as the generals of other city-states).<sup>2</sup> But what are the meanings of such terms and do they describe the mercenary activities of the Athenian *strategoi* correctly?

The term *condottiere* was used as the collective noun for the bands of mercenary soldiers which became the common basis for the armies of the city-states in mediaeval, and early renaissance, Italy. The term implied that the mercenaries "...had broken the ties which bound them to their native cities: they were under no control, and had nothing to hope and fear for

from their fellow-citizens: their sole object was to secure their independence and to establish themselves in opulence and power elsewhere."<sup>3</sup> Thus such terminology implied that the Athenian *strategoi* possessed no overriding loyalty to their country and would take up service in the pay of any master without consideration of the desires or needs of their fellow citizens.

In 397 Conon was commissioned as an admiral in the service of the Persians.<sup>4</sup> The campaigns which he conducted in the Aegean from 396 onwards were not the activities of an Athenian, but a Persian admiral, conducted in the name of the Great King.<sup>5</sup> Conon was the first Greek to hold such a commission from the Achaemenid monarch.<sup>6</sup> However, such was the political situation surrounding the Athenians at the time, being, as they were, under the domination of the Spartans and the Peloponnesian League, that the activities of the admiral were not perceived to be directly conflicting with Athenian interests at the time but were instead propagated as those of an Athenian patriot acting in the best interests of the home-state. At least, that was how Conon was portrayed, and probably recognised as, by Athenians from the time of Cnidos onwards (if not before).<sup>7</sup> In fact, the actions of Conon-the deliberate destruction of the Spartan fleet, the cruise of 'liberation' embarked upon by the victorious commander after the battle of Cnidos and the arrival of the fleet at Peiraios in 394 whereupon the sailors were put to work on the rebuilding of the long-walls do point to a clever manipulation by Conon of the Persian fleet. He simultaneously served both the interests of his employer and his home country at the same time. Both the Persians and the Athenians desired to arrest the growth of Spartan

power which had come about as a result of victory in the Peloponnesian War. As it happened, Conon had realised that the Athenians were completely incapable of achieving this objective by their own efforts and thus linked the two mutual interests. Conon had, by this example, proven that mercenary service did not necessarily go against the interests of the Athenian nation. Indeed, in this instance, it was the city-state itself which was the most significant beneficiary of Conon's activities. The Athenians regained the control over their own foreign policy which they had lost in 404 and were simultaneously offered the opportunity to fill the power vacuum left in the Aegean as a result of the destruction of the Spartan fleet at Cnidos.<sup>8</sup>

Whilst the service of Conon as a Persian admiral can clearly be seen as the efforts of a commander working in the interests of his own country as well as those of his employer, such mutuality of foreign policy aims was a rarity. Conon was to be declared *sotêr* of the Athenians because of the chance of circumstances. Yet even some contemporary commentators accused him of Medism and disloyal conduct.<sup>9</sup> Once Athenian military specialists began to take up employment with those whose foreign policy ambitions ran differently to, or even directly opposed, those of the Athenian nation, then the charges that these men came to serve their own personal interests rather than those of their home nation became much harder to disprove.

The careers of the leading Athenian *strategoi*, namely Iphicrates, Chabrias and, to a lesser extent, Timotheos offer several examples of

mercenary service, particularly in the period 386-360, when Athenian foreign policy was at its most aggressive in the C4th. . Thus it might be expected that this period would provide the best evidence of a clashing of interests between the Athenian city-state and the service of the generals.

The mercenary service of Iphicrates in Thrace in the period immediately after the King's peace offers an interesting insight on Athenian mercenary practices. Firstly, it must be noted that Iphicrates entered the service of the Thracian king when he was no longer required by his city-state to command in the Corinthian War.<sup>10</sup> This has been seen by those who support the idea of the *condottieri* as a sign that the general was in Thrace in an official capacity,<sup>11</sup> but this is to read too much into this small event. Although the *condottieri* did occasionally desert the masters they were currently serving in mid-campaign on the offer a more lucrative contract from another source, such a level of disloyal activity was unusual even for them.<sup>12</sup> Within the context of the Greek city-states such activity was less likely. Ultimately, however, it is a matter of choice whether one sees the timing of Iphicrates' employment in Thrace as an indication of a man considerate of the interests of his home country or not.

Iphicrates must have brought considerable success to his ultimate employer in this period, Cotys. After 384 there is no further mention of any rivals to the king and the general was given the hand of the king's daughter. Even though the comic poet Anaxandridas could comment that it was the Thracian way for the kings to give their daughters in marriage to any

southern Greeks who served them, the argument that Iphicrates was successful cannot be denied.<sup>13</sup> But Iphicrates was not the first to receive such an offer. Xenophon for instance had the same offer from Seuthes.<sup>14</sup> So although Iphicrates' actions were mercenary in character, they did not fall beyond the bounds of anything which had gone before. He was not the first of the *condottieri*, but rather a continuation of a line of Athenians who had served with distinction in the north.

Iphicrates served Cotys loyally during his seven years in Thrace but his return to Athens, in 379, came at a time when the city-state was coming round to a more aggressive foreign policy. It is perhaps too much to suggest that this was the sole reason for the return of the *strategos*, since there is evidence of some estrangement between the Thracian monarch and Iphicrates,<sup>15</sup> but surely the true mercenary would merely have gone off in search of another employer who would pay the general handsomely for his services rather than return to the vagaries of the Athenian political system. Such a consideration of the character of Iphicrates can only be strengthened if it is accepted (as Pritchett argued) that the reason for the disagreement between the general and his employer was the refusal by Iphicrates to serve in a naval battle against the Athenians referred to in Demosthenes.<sup>16</sup> Such qualms were hardly the hallmarks of the ruthless *condottiere*. As Kallett put it, " Iphicrates went to Thrace, not as a deserter who had fallen out of favour in Athens, but with the express purpose of pursuing Athenian interests in the Chersonese in cooperation with Timotheos."<sup>17</sup> Iphicrates did indeed serve the interests of both his temporary employer and those of his



home country. The good relations fostered by the general removed the Thracian threat to Athenian interests in the region and only strengthened the reawakening desire for the recovery of Amphipolis.

Contemporaneous with Iphicrates' service in Thrace was that of the general Chabrias in Egypt. Chabrias, we are told, was sent for by Acoris, king of Egypt, to command against the Persians.<sup>18</sup> Thus this service was conducted in the same period of Athenian quiescence which Iphicrates had taken advantage of to take employment in Thrace. For the general without direct political aspirations, as Chabrias seems to have been, the military life, not to mention the material rewards of mercenary service, were powerful influences in taking up such employment. His home country had no need for him and the general did not have the political strength to influence the state back towards a more dynamic foreign policy. In such circumstances the general was a free being and his actions were in no way alien to the interests of his city, even if, as it happened, Chabrias served against an ally of the Athenians.<sup>19</sup> However, in order to avoid compromising his country he went as a private citizen and without consulting the *demos*.<sup>20</sup> Chabrias, in taking this action, was making a deliberate attempt to distance himself from the official policy of the Athenians. As it happened Pharnabazos could not appreciate that this general was no longer acting in any official Athenian capacity and sent emissaries to Athens to denounce him.<sup>21</sup> Chabrias was recalled and the general returned to Athens immediately.

That their best generals were ready to take up employment in the

service of foreign nations must have been both a source of pride and some concern amongst the Athenians. Pride because such employment was a mark of the high regard the Athenian generals, and the Athenian military as a whole, were held in. It seemingly became a source of some concern in the 370's.

The request by Pharnabazos for Iphicrates (in person) to command the Persian forces engaged in the campaign against the rebellious Egyptians came at the time of renewed Athenian vigour in terms of foreign policy. That Iphicrates took up this offer in this period does show that perhaps there was some weakening of the bond of loyalty felt for Athens by the specialist generals.

Yet it would be to say too much to argue that it was in this period that the active Athenian *strategoi* began in earnest to match their portrayal at the hands of those many historians who dubbed them as *condottieri*. The evidence, on the contrary, points rather to a continued devotion to Athens and the Athenians on the parts of these individuals often far beyond what the actions of the home-state merited. An examination of the other examples of foreign service by Athenian generals in the period from 372 till 361 might provide clarity. In fact there is little evidence of extended service abroad from 372. The only known examples are Timotheos' Persian service in 372 and that of Chabrias in Egypt in 362. However, in themselves they provide enough information for a reappraisal of the motives of those who undertook such employment.

The case of Timotheos is of especial interest. The precise details of the campaign do not concern us here. What is of interest is the motivation behind the likes of Timotheos in undertaking such service.. The timing of this service, in the year 372, is of great significance. There is evidence to prove that Timotheos was an official *strategos* in that year.<sup>22</sup> Whilst on face value such information can be seen as evidence of the declining pull, both legally and morally, that the office of *strategos* exerted over its specialist holders, such a diagnosis is incorrect. The Athenians were, at this time, in alliance with the Persians and it is around this point in time that ambassadors from the Great King had been received. It is not too hard then to suppose that the mission of Timotheos was one undertaken with official sanction from the Athenian home authorities.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, on the past record of Timotheos, in all probability it was the desire of the *demos* rather than the general himself which found him in this employment.

Timotheos and his role within the C4th. situation has always been problematical for historians who attempted to follow the "mercenary" perceptions of the specialist Athenian *strategoi* in the C4th.. Timotheos simply could not be bracketed as a *condottiere*. His career was one of enduring service in the name of his home state and this episode provides the only example of his undertaking employment in the service of a foreign ruler. Yet Timotheos has often been portrayed as an enigma within an alien period. " He (Timotheos), was rather a C5th. Nicias stranded in the C4th. world of mercenary generals, from whom he was naturally estranged."<sup>24</sup> But was this really the case ? The estrangement between the generals that

Parke isolated stemmed from socio-political affiliations rather than from supposed differences between the moral duties and loyalties felt by Timotheos on the one hand and the "mercenary generals" (Iphicrates and Chabrias) on the other. This was clearly recognised by the ancient writers. Nepos (drawing on Theopompos) collected the three generals together in his series of biographical sketches. The difference which the writer recognised that separated Timotheos from his two rivals was his noble bearing and the resulting political differences, not some superior notion of patriotic duty for the state. The political alliance of the three generals perceived after 362 makes this clear.<sup>25</sup>

The arguments of those like Parke simply do not stand up to close examination of the history of this period. We must return to the original discussion as to just what is a mercenary or a *condottiere*. If Timotheos was never identified as such what then earned the likes of Iphicrates and Chabrias the title ? Even in basic numerical terms the careers of these two men hardly followed the pattern of true mercenary captains. Indeed their records encompassed only four examples of foreign employment between them. As three of these episodes have been discussed already it is only proper to discuss the final piece of evidence, in order to be able to complete my arguments.

As I have already mentioned, if the *demos* failed to follow policies which provided specialist commanders with employment it was only natural that such men might turn their attentions elsewhere in the search for work. This, of course, was not unique to Athens. Even in the context of the

Spartan situation, where the military was all important, it was not unknown for her generals to take up such service. The great warrior-king Agesilaos died on his way home from mercenary service in Egypt.<sup>26</sup> All this then implies that it was not considered unpatriotic or disloyal, as it would in the modern era, to take up such work when the home country had none to offer. Such were the conditions surrounding Chabrias in 362. Although he had been elected *strategos* in 363/362,<sup>27</sup> it was apparent from the lack of any record that he had had little of any consequence to do. Of course any lack of employment for these men, and the desire or willingness to go elsewhere to find it, was heightened in times of political estrangement and alienation. This was certainly a factor for Chabrias in the later 360's, as there is evidence of him on trial in 366.<sup>28</sup> However, given that Chabrias was becoming estranged from the *demos*, his actions still follow those of one who was all too aware of his own duties with regard to his home city. Diodoros makes clear that Chabrias went to take up this command in a private capacity, and thus as *strategos* in the year before he could not have arrived in Egypt until the late summer of the year 362 at the earliest, thus losing that year's campaigning season.<sup>29</sup> Such was the connection made by foreign nations between the actions of the specialist *strategoi* and the foreign policy of the Athenians that Chabrias had to make a specific effort to distance himself from recognition as an official representative of his home state. That he was prepared to do just that makes clear that his loyalty to his country remained of paramount importance. In offering continued proof of this allegiance he was no different from his two famous colleagues.

From the 360's onward the notion of the Athenian mercenary general became increasingly centred upon one figure, Chares, active as a specialist general from 367 till his death in 324/323. " He is generally regarded as the *condottiere par excellence*," wrote Pritchett as an introduction to his own discussion of the career of this character.<sup>30</sup> In fact, prior to 336, when the unusual circumstances of the Athenian position made the notion of mercenary service different from the one I have discussed, the career of Chares offers ample evidence of the misrepresentation of the specialist *strategoi*. If Chares was the ruthless mercenary he was portrayed to be in the sources it would have been in this period that one could have expected to find him taking up regular service with foreign employers. This was the period of the greatest domination of the *strategia* by Chares, when he was the most, if not often the only, employable Athenian commander. It must also be remembered that the 360-338 period was one of overall quiescence in terms of aggressive Athenian foreign policy and thus the temptations to take up lucrative employment abroad would have been all the more tempting. Yet, despite all this, like his forebears Iphicrates and Chabrias, the instances of Chares serving masters other than the Athenians themselves are strikingly few in number. Three in all to be precise. I shall now examine these episodes in turn in an effort to reveal the nature of Chares' loyalties and his relationship with his native city.

Chares' service in Thrace in the year 358/357 provides an interesting source of information.<sup>31</sup> In accepting this commission he was merely following on in the footsteps of many Athenians before him, Iphicrates being the most notable. However, the information we possess

about this involvement is insufficient to determine the precise reasons for Chares' appearance. All that can be said is that Chares was *strategos* in this year (perhaps autokrator) and that, as this expedition followed on from the battle of Chios, it could be argued that the general was acting in an official capacity.<sup>32</sup> Chares was, in all probability, merely acting to reaffirm Athenian interests in the area and to reinforce the cordial relations that had formed between the two countries through the efforts of Athenian *strategoi* in the last quarter century.

However, it was the activities of Chares during the last year of the Social War which laid the foundation for his interpretation by later writers. In the year 354 Chares suddenly departed from the theatre of operations against the rebel allies and took up service with the rebel Persian satrap Artabazos. The subsequent letter of denunciation from King Artaxerxes effectively compelled the Athenians to accept their own defeat. Thus it was Chares who was blamed by later commentators for the disasters of the Social War, "...and, as no money was forthcoming, he entered the service of the satrap Artabazos; by this means, at all events, the general and his soldiers enriched themselves."<sup>33</sup>

On face value the evidence does indeed suggest that Chares neglected his duties and took up the offer of lucrative employment and deserted at the time when the Athenian war effort was verging on collapse. Yet a closer examination of the facts reveals a very different picture of this episode.

Chronologically, the Artabazos expedition occurred very late on in

the Social War. The Athenians had been defeated at Embata and, following on the trials of Iphicrates, Timotheos and Menestheos which ensued from that conflict, Chares was left as the sole Athenian commander to maintain the war effort. Diodoros then tells us that "...Chares, eager to relieve the Athenians of the expense of the fleet, undertook a hazardous operation..."<sup>34</sup> This refers to the taking up of service by Chares and the Athenian forces under his command with Artabazos. By then it must have been clear to many in the Athenian group that the city-state simply could not afford to continue the war effort any longer. The size of the Greek city-state and its economic infrastructure compared with the ever increasing burden of warfare, particularly naval warfare, meant that in reality, by 355/354 the Athenians were on the verge of economic ruin.<sup>35</sup> Chares realised and understood this, and the tone of Diodoros' description along with the allusion to the episode found in Demosthenes imply that the decision to take foreign service was Chares' own, taken by the commander in the field without reference to the home authorities.<sup>36</sup> Clearly, Chares' own plan was based on the use of mercenary service in the short term to permit the continuation of the Athenian war effort against the rebels. Indeed, his victory over the Persian forces of Tithraustes earned Chares the *ὀψώνιον* he required to maintain his mercenaries. As it was, the Persian ultimatum put paid to any renewed hopes amongst the Athenians of success against the rebels. Chares was recalled and peace made with the rebels.<sup>37</sup>

That this course of action was pursued by Chares in the best interests of his country and not for the benefit of his own reputation and pocket is



underlined by three further pieces of information.

Firstly, during the expedition Chares gained a victory loudly proclaimed (by himself I might add) as a second Marathon. Chares dutifully informed the Athenians back home and sought his instructions. He was told to hire more mercenaries and continue the war.<sup>38</sup>

Secondly, a Scholion recounts that Chares, having sacked the cities of Lampsakos and Sigeum in the course of this campaign sent the booty to the impoverished Athenians back home.<sup>39</sup> Such an action might have gained the official approval of the Athenians for the expedition, but surely this was not Chares' motivation. If the general really was the ruthless mercenary then such official sanction would have made no difference one way or another, certainly not worth the risks entailed by denying booty to the mercenaries making up the greater part of his forces.<sup>40</sup> The general's motivation could only have realistically come from a deep seated loyalty to his country and his impoverished compatriots back in the city.

Thirdly, it must be considered how Chares' plan of action came to grief. It was the letter of denunciation by Artaxerxes Ochus that brought about its failure. Yet this letter was not even sent to Chares direct, but to Athens. The first Chares must have heard of it was the embassy which arrived from the city, forbidding him from making war on the royal satraps and recalling him to Athens.<sup>41</sup> That Chares saw fit to obey this notice of recall by the Athenian home authorities must provide the final proof as to the loyalties of the commander. That the Great King had denounced the

*strategos* to the assembly not only hints at the official backing for Chares' campaign, but also at the fact that the person of the specialist Athenian commander, whether in or out of actual office, retained the image of the personification of Athenian foreign policy.<sup>42</sup> If the generals had become mere mercenary captains it seems highly unlikely that this recognition would have continued.

So much of Chares' reputation has been based upon the Artabazos episode that it is worthwhile, I think, to briefly consider one further point surrounding the campaign and the motivations of the general.

The taking up of mercenary employment in the service of Artabazos did not only provide a timely source of revenue for Chares' mercenaries. The military situation of the Social War also permitted such a course of action. Chares was able to maintain his own, and therefore the Athenian, presence in the region of the straits, the vitally important area for the Athenian corn transports. However, there is another, more controversial, theory as to Chares' military considerations. Chares may have seen the offer of employment in Asia as the perfect opportunity to weaken the contribution of Mausolos to the war effort of the allies. The revolt of a satrap would, at the very least, cause a diversion of the military resources of the loyal satraps in the surrounding areas, either to crush the rebellious governor or else to protect their own satrapies from rebel incursions. The defeat of Tithraustes must have brought an even greater diversion of resources, resources which the satrap could have been sending to Athens' rebellious allies. It is probably too much to argue that Chares

may have been planning a direct assault into Mausolos' Carian satrapy, yet Chares' generalship was outstanding in its use of surprise moves and near impetuous strategies. Chares' recall arrived as he was engaged in the ravaging of Phrygia, just north of Hecatomnid Caria.<sup>43</sup>

However, the one consistent feature of this whole episode was that every action of Chares was only taken with due consideration as to the best interests of Athens and the Athenians. The aims: to relieve the Athenian state of the cost of maintaining the war fleet and mercenaries, to provide the monetary and material resources in order to enable the Athenian war effort against the rebels to continue, to maintain some guardian presence over the straits and to reduce the assistance for the rebels provided by Mausolos through either indirect or, possibly, direct military activity, were all in the Athenian interest and centred around her economic and military requirements.

The third case of Chares serving in a mercenary capacity remains, like his involvement in Thrace, somewhat difficult to assess due to the weakness of our source material. All that can be stated with any certainty is that sometime in the midst of the Olynthos crisis (349/348), when Chares was supposedly acting to relieve that city from the Macedonian threat, he appears in the service of Orontes, the satrap of Mysia.<sup>44</sup> Was this an instance of Chares accepting a lucrative contract of employment with the added incentive of conveniently removing him from what was an extremely difficult military task ? Once again, I think not. If Chares had acted alone then, I think, there could have been a stronger case to answer, for then we

would have the only case in the fourth century of an Athenian *strategos* departing for new employment in the very midst of his duties. However, the presence of the *strategoï* Charidemos and, in particular, Phocion (as was Chares), can only suggest that this operation was an official Athenian delegation, perhaps seeking provisions for their forces.<sup>45</sup> At any rate, Chares was soon back in Chalcidice and his election for the following year makes any "condottierial" action on his part in the previous year most unlikely.<sup>46</sup>

Chares' colleagues in the *strategia* during the 360-338 period offer further evidence of the bonds of loyalty that existed between the specialist *strategoï* and Athens.

Diopieithes, in the course of his short active career was to take no mercenary service abroad; his main activities were the continual harassment of the Macedonians and their allies and the belief in acting in the best interests of his home country. In these two objectives he was unbending, even if his own personal methods could run in an independent manner to those of the Athenian home authorities themselves.<sup>47</sup>

However, it is perhaps the case of Charidemos which offers the most conclusive proof of the loyalty of the Athenian *strategoï*. Charidemos was not an Athenian by birth, and prior to 358/357, he had spent his life as a mercenary commander under various masters, service which had seen him involved in operations against the Athenians.<sup>48</sup> His later appearances as an Athenian *strategos* brought further comment on the nature of the Athenian

*strategia* and provided additional "evidence" on the dubious loyalties of these figures. Yet from the time of his first *strategia*, Charidemos was to serve none other than the Athenian *demos*. Indeed, it cannot even be said that the commander was given citizenship for the purpose of making him a *strategos*. Despite the efforts of the politicians to bemoan the decline in the standing of the office, the generalship remained one of the utmost importance within the Athenian system, too important for "a foreigner" to hold. The citizenship was awarded to Charidemos on account of the favourable treaty signed between the Athenians and the Thracians in 357,<sup>49</sup> as a means of honouring a foreign dignitary, especially in times like the Social War.<sup>50</sup> Charidemos neither gained the *strategia* immediately, nor did he even "use" his citizenship until the occupation of his native Thrace by Philip in 352. In fact, it was on the recommendation of the Thracian king, Cersobleptes, that Charidemos found himself proposed as *strategos* by Aristocrates, only for Euthycles to attack the idea in the lawcourts.<sup>51</sup> Other than the political rivalries which formed the background to this case, clearly there was some concern amongst the Athenians themselves about electing a figure of the reputation of Charidemos to the *strategia*. Such concerns can only mean that the (specialist) *strategoï* were otherwise considered as men loyal to the Athenian cause. However, Euthycles failed to discredit his rival and Charidemos was elected to the *strategia* of 351/350.<sup>52</sup> From that time on he was to serve the Athenian cause with loyalty sufficient for him to be included in the list of prominent Athenians Alexander demanded to be handed over to him in 336.<sup>53</sup> Although the Macedonian was persuaded not to enforce this demand, the king saw fit to order the exile of one man,

Charidemos.<sup>54</sup> Charidemos' service for his adopted country had been of sufficient loyalty that he had come to be regarded as too dangerous to be allowed to remain in the city. In 338, Charidemos, in the aftermath of Chaeronea, had been appointed to direct the defence of the city, until the Council of the Areopagos intervened and replaced the commander with Phocion.<sup>55</sup> That Charidemos was appointed to the highest command at that time is sure attestation of his position within Athens, proof enough of his loyalty and the recognition of that loyalty by the Athenians themselves. Charidemos' loyalty was duly rewarded with his being honoured by the assembly for his services to his fellow citizens.<sup>56</sup> Such is the evidence concerning the "mercenary" Charidemos.

The case of Charidemos brings me neatly to the final section of mercenary service by the Athenian *strategoi*. After 338, and especially after 336 the Macedonian ascendancy in Athens, and Greece as a whole (except Sparta), caused many of the specialist generals from the city states to take up employment elsewhere. Some were to serve with Alexander and the Macedonian invasion forces in their campaigns in Asia, but the vast majority entered into service with the Persians. On the face of it this was mercenary service of a most blatant nature, serving the Great King in his efforts to thwart the age-old Greek dream of destroying the Persian empire. For some of course the motivations were money and power. It must be remembered that many of the Greek generals within the Persian armies had held no positions within their own home countries and thus did choose (or were forced) to make their careers in the service of other masters.<sup>57</sup> However, for

many, especially the generals from Athens, service with Persia was a necessary evil brought about by the circumstances of the times. That the likes of Charidemus, Chares and Ephialtes, the only remaining military specialists (other than Phocion) within Athens were forced to flee the city or were expelled is in itself, sufficient evidence of the loyalties of these citizens.<sup>58</sup> Chares and Charidemus both patently remained in contact with the Athenian authorities. In 336, for instance, it was Charidemus who sent word to Athens concerning the death of Philip.<sup>59</sup> If these men had been the ruthless mercenaries they have been portrayed to be then surely the Macedonians would have had no need to displace them from the defeated city nor would these figures have felt any compulsion to remain in contact with Athens. After all, what hope would there have been for employment in an Athens virtually devoid of any independent foreign policy ? Clearly the Macedonians realised the capabilities of these men and recognised the necessity to break the bonds between them and their home country. For all the successes of the ensuing years, in this task the Macedonians were to prove unsuccessful.<sup>60</sup>

To conclude: the instances of mercenary service by Athenian generals who were recognised as such, i.e. those generals whose regular holding of the *strategia* caused them both to be recognised as specialist soldiers and Athenians, were not remarkably prolific during the 4th. In fact the instances of such service are most notable by their absence given the general assessment of these figures by many historians of the period. Between the years 386 and 338, the period of activity by the three most

"notorious *condottieri* ", Iphicrates, Chabrias and Chares mustered a mere seven episodes of mercenary service between them.<sup>61</sup> This compares favourably with many other specialist commanders of the C4th. Agesilaos, for instance, took up four different offers of mercenary employment during his reign.<sup>62</sup>

Secondly, mercenary service *per se* was neither disloyal nor necessarily even disadvantageous to the home nation. The cases that I have discussed above reveal that the Athenian generals took up service in the employ of other countries or rulers for varying reasons. Disaffection with the Athenian *demos*, political alienation or particular military opportunities were the most obvious. Of course, that is not to say that the lure of rich rewards, both in terms of finance and reputation, were not often important factors in the decision to take up such service, but a keen regard for the effects such employment would have on Athens itself is a constant feature in the timing of these ventures or the efforts of the generals to distance themselves from official Athenian policy. On occasion, most notably the case of Chares in 355/354, the aim behind the whole venture was intentionally to benefit Athens. Such an occurrence, admittedly, was rare, but does illustrate the nature of the relationship between the specialist *strategoi* and the Athenians themselves.

Finally, the common notion of the Athenian *strategos* of the C4th. as some sort of ruthless, cold-blooded soldier, owing allegiance to none but the highest bidder can be seen as an evidently false reading of the information we have at our disposal. Athenian generals were specialist



soldiers, that is true, but that does not mean that the idea of state and homeland had receded to the point of meaninglessness. The generals were becoming professional, that is also true, but not in the sense of purely financial acquisition. Professionalism was a manifestation of the evolving art of war, but whilst the *strategoi* were forced to follow this line of development in their office in terms of military command and power (as against political power), the nature of the social relationships that were resultant from the democratic processes of Athenian government resulted in the retention by these men of the notion of nationality and a loyalty to their own kinsmen and compatriots. It was, after all, upon their support that they relied for their own power. In short, the specialist *strategoi* retained the identity of being Athenians as well as specialist generals. Whilst it was true that, by and large, by the middle of the 4th. the specialist Athenian *strategoi* were commanders of mercenaries, in no way can it realistically be said that they were "mercenary commanders".

#### **b: Acts of Lawlessness and Illegality.**

Some preliminary definitions are necessary. Acts of "lawlessness" and "brigandage" fall into many different categories given the historical context in which they occur. Going by the evidence of the sources the acts of lawlessness and brigandage which I shall discuss, were those activities carried out by the Athenian *strategoi* usually, though not always, when holding office, which, whilst being generally regarded as against the international laws and/or conventions of the time, did not result in these men being called to account before the Athenian courts.

The available information on such activities centres in and around the middle of the century, particularly in the period prior to the Social War when the sources, both historical and oratorical, concentrated, for reasons I shall discuss later, on this aspect of Athenian generalship. By so doing, the sources highlighted the link between this type of activity by military commanders in the C4th. and the increasing use of mercenaries which developed in the course of the century. The linking of these two, quite separate, trends have been the basis for many of the conclusions drawn by both ancient and modern commentators on the nature of the *strategia* in the C4th. as a whole. My aim here is to take a new look at just what evidence there is and to question whether some of those basic premises need to be reconsidered.

Demosthenes, in his speech *For the liberty of the Rhodians* of 351 remarked that "...we (the Athenians) were charged with plotting against them by the Chians, Byzantines and Rhodians, and that is why they concerted the last war (the Social War) on us." <sup>63</sup> Many historians assumed this to be a reference to the policies of the Athenian government towards those states allied to her, mainly as members of the Second Athenian Confederacy. Much emphasis has been placed on the activities of the generals in their personal dealings with these states as evidence that, in particular, from the early 360's, the Athenian authorities had neither the ability nor the desire to prevent the generals from doing as they pleased. In particular, the cases of Samos (365), Corcyra (362/361/360) and Euboea (358/357) have been singled out as proven examples of this development. It

was alleged that the hated archê of the old Delian league was repeated in the C4th. confederacy through a policy of increasingly high-handed imperialism as enacted by Athens' generals.<sup>64</sup>

The conduct of the *strategos* Timotheos during the course of the expeditions to Corcyra in 373 has been singled out as the first clear example of this lawlessness.<sup>65</sup> Entrusted with the task of bringing the island under Athenian influence Timotheos had been despatched from Athens with a fleet. However, the *strategos* chose rather to venture on a περίπλους around the Aegean, extorting money and provisions from cities and islands whether they were allied to Athens or not. But Timotheos' actions were based upon financial necessity, not some desire for pillage. The expedition of 373 was, in fact a repeat of one in 376, when the general was given a fleet and only 13T., less than a month's upkeep for the fifty triremes.<sup>66</sup> His success in raising funds and gaining allies in that year was an obvious inducement to send him out again with little, or no money.<sup>67</sup> It was the inability of the *strategos* to secure these funds, and the delay brought about by this failure, rather than any qualms by the Athenians as to the morals of his efforts that led to Timotheos' deposition.<sup>68</sup> Yet, the evidence also shows that Timotheos was not pursuing a policy of rampant imperialism. Xenophon singles out the good behaviour of the general on Corcyra (in 376/375), neither changing the constitution nor enslaving the populace.<sup>69</sup>

Although it is a matter of some controversy as to whether Corcyra became a league member in 375, 373, or at any other time, the point is that the island was successfully brought under Athenian control without the use

of excessive force. Corcyra was neither pillaged nor even treated harshly as a conquered island, and so the episode provides no evidence of lawlessness amongst the Athenian generals.

Timotheos' conduct in the year 366 has also been cited as evidence of lawless conduct by a *strategos*. Sent out to aid Ariobarzanes, and ordered not to violate the King's peace he sailed instead to the island of Samos and captured it for Athens from one Cyprothemis, a Greek in Persian service.<sup>70</sup> Although Timotheos handled the ten month siege with great skill, especially considering his lack of funds,<sup>71</sup> his conduct after the fall of the island led to accusations of lawless and ruthless behaviour. Timotheos evicted the inhabitants and established an Athenian cleruchy.<sup>72</sup> This was contrary to one of the conditions as set down in the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy and was one of the most fundamental safeguards against any return to the ways of the Delian League. Clearly the alarm bells began to sound around the allied states. Several members of the Confederacy welcomed the Samian exiles as a sign of protest to Athens.<sup>73</sup> The Athenian orator Cydias warned the assembly of the effect Timotheos' activities would have on Greek opinion.<sup>74</sup> Yet, given that Samos was not a member of the confederacy,<sup>75</sup> Timotheos' actions, even if they did violate the spirit of the charter, were, in fact, legally permissible.

However, it was the activities of the *strategos* Chares which were most linked to those of the *banditti*, even to the point of singling him out as virtually the sole perpetrator of such acts. G. Norlin wrote that it was Chares "...who had no mind for moral scruples, bullied the allies and

treated them as subject states."<sup>76</sup> Even in the terms of the standards of behaviour set by the three older generals (Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos) Chares was seen as particularly ruthless and vindictive, outside the control of the Athenian authorities. Such was the common portrayal of him.<sup>77</sup>

In his recent book on the Second Athenian League, Jack Cargill expressed this view thus, "...whereas the ancient tradition of the greatness of the three old generals, Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos has been largely disregarded by scholars depicting the supposed growth of Athenian imperialism and misconduct, the generalisations of scholarship have had the effect of improving the reputation of Chares. For most commentators he was just another imperialist Athenian general, no worse, or not much worse than the others. In the judgement of his contemporaries and of later authors however, he was uniquely brutal and lawless amongst the generals of his time."<sup>78</sup>

Cargill's aim was to reassess and revalue the careers of Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos in the context of his basic argument that the second Athenian confederacy did not become increasingly imperialistic through the middle part of the 4th.. In this he was quite correct. The evidence, what there is of it, simply does not back up such a theory. However, Cargill also sought to retain as his main cause of the Social War the fear amongst the confederates of Athenian intent towards them. In order to do this the four major *strategoi* of the period were split up into two groups, the three older generals and Chares. The latter was the arch-criminal, the scapegoat upon whom rested the sole responsibility for the Social War and all the disastrous

repercussions that defeat had for the Athenians. By doing so, Cargill failed to apply in Chares' case the same rules that he had used for Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos.

Chares, in point of fact, only held three *strategiai* prior to the Social War, in 367/366, 366/365 and 361/360.<sup>79</sup> Of these, only one held any implication of misbehaviour towards nations allied to Athens, that being the expedition to Corcyra in 361/360. Thus it was upon virtually this one piece of evidence that his guilt was based.

Diodoros recounted how Chares "...sailed to Corcyra and stirred up great civil strife, with the result that the Athenian democracy was discredited in the eyes of the allies."<sup>80</sup> But why was the Athenian democracy discredited by this action ? One reason put forward was that "...Chares assisted in the rebellion of the oligarchic faction against the rule of the people."<sup>81</sup> But this does not reflect the reality of the political situation. Although Athens by inclination obviously found more common ground with other democracies, there is no evidence to suggest that it did not tolerate, even support, both oligarchies and tyrannies within the confederacy. Examples include the oligarchy at Mytilene (after 367), and the tyrannies of Jason of Pherae and Cleomis of Methymna. That Chares was supporting an oligarchic faction would not therefore have been a major cause for disaffection amongst the allies in its own right. However, the interfering by the *strategos* with the internal politics of an allied state was another proposed reason for discontent. However, Kiechle has argued that at this point in time, Corcyra, far from being an allied island was in fact,

disaffected and lost to the confederacy.<sup>82</sup> Demosthenes talks of Corcyran hostility towards the Athenians at this point in time.<sup>83</sup> In such a light the actions were not those of a brutal general treating an allied nation as he saw fit, but those of a commander trying to deter the Corcyrans from further aggression and to bring the island back within the confederacy.

With the deletion of the Corcyran campaign from the evidence against Chares, then the case against him, that he was little more than a brutal and uncontrollable thug and the major cause of the Social War collapses, making other assertions based around this expedition flimsy in the extreme.

G. L. Cawkwell wrote that "...the dispatch of Chares in 361 and his seeming immunity, despite loud complaints, gave the allies grounds for fear. What he had done on Corcyra he could do elsewhere in the confederacy, and when, in the summer of 357, he was sent out to conduct the war for the Chersonese, the allies had only to fear for themselves..."<sup>84</sup> Cawkwell's underlying argument, that Chares' election to the *strategia* in 357 was, in itself, a precipitating cause of the Social War, cannot be accepted.<sup>85</sup> Nor, too, can the hypothesis of F. H. Marshall, who accepted as literal a sentence from Isocrates' *On the Peace* that Chares actually began the war by attacking the Chians and other allies.<sup>86</sup> Such theories have come from the prejudices of the sources and the mis-dating of the Social War discussed in a previous chapter. Diodoros placed the outbreak of the Social War at sometime around mid-357, when the Athenians were entangled in the revolt on Euboea. If this date is accepted, as I believe it should be, then

Chares could not have been directly responsible for the revolt because he was simply not in office at the time when it began. The truth was that the election of Chabrias and, to a lesser extent, Chares, was the Athenian response to the revolt, and not that the revolt was a response to the election of the generals.

I do not contend that Chares did not worry the allies, but this concern stemmed from reasons very different from the common interpretation of Chares' behaviour. Chares had clearly gone off on his own initiative to Corcyra, leaving behind him an Aegean far from safe for the shipping of the confederacy. It must be remembered that the Confederacy was primarily a naval league, and that one of its' major aims was the mutual protection of shipping from the attacks of the pirates who were very common in this period, as the tales of Demosthenes and Isocrates testify.<sup>87</sup> The Athenian pledges upon the founding of the league to combat this threat must have appeared very weak to the allies of the Athenians in 361 as Chares sailed off to Corcyra rather than deal with the increasingly daring raids against league shipping of Alexander of Pherae, the Thessalian Tagos. Without the fleet of Chares to protect them the league members must have wondered, with good reason, just what was the purpose of paying the syntaxis. As it was, these fears merely added to the concerns over the ability of the Athenian military to protect them, fears which the successful expedition to Corcyra could have done little to allay.

Such was the extent of Chares' lawless career prior to the Social War. In the post-war period there was one further episode which was used



to back up the argument of Chares' free-booting image.

In 340 Chares arrived with a force to relieve Byzantium, then under siege by Philip. He was refused entry, even though the city was an ally of Athens. However, the evidence of this episode, found in Plutarch, must be considered dubious.<sup>88</sup> The reason for the Byzantines' refusal was portrayed as their distrust of Chares himself, such was his reputation. When Phocion took over the Athenians were suddenly welcomed with open arms, Philip withdrew and the city was saved.

It is true that the Byzantines could well have distrusted Chares, remembering his defeats at their hands during the Social War. Perhaps too, this fear was intensified by Chares' actions on Sestos after his recapture of the island in 353.<sup>89</sup> But the Byzantines and the Athenians had entered into alliance because both had desperate need for allies at the time. With Philip on hand it was hardly credible that the Byzantines would have been in any position to refuse any aid. Military necessity would surely have overcome any such qualms.

However, the basic idea that Chares was an object of mistrust must also be questioned. An inscription from the same year (340) records the cordiality of relations between the Chersonesetai and the Athenians. What is more surprising is that it is obvious that Chares was regarded as their protector.<sup>90</sup> Clearly then, this inscription makes a nonsense of the story of Byzantine qualms over this general. In fact there is some evidence that Chares suffered the loss of his wife in 340, perhaps accounting for his

substitution in mid-campaign by Phocion and Cephisophon.<sup>91</sup> The welcome the two Athenian commanders received from the Byzantines was probably due to the worsening situation of the city under the press of the siege rather than any change of general. The Byzantines were probably somewhat suspicious of all aid from the Athenian generals whosoever they might be, but military necessity forced them to choose between the risk of Athenian revenge or the probability of defeat by Philip and all the consequences that might entail.<sup>92</sup> The Byzantines feared the actions of all Athenian generals whilst carrying out the commands of the polis, they did not fear Chares on account of his past record with regard to Athens' allies.

Other than these rather tenuous episodes, the known career of Chares held no other evidence of misbehaviour. Nor are the stories of similar activities by other Athenian *strategoi* any more numerous. Indeed all we have is a single piece of information, mentioned in passing by Demosthenes.

The *strategos* Diopeithes of Sunium, Athenian commander in the Chersonese, raised a body of mercenaries through acts of extortion and piracy in order to attack Philip's territory.<sup>93</sup> Yet we are told that the general was deprived of funds.<sup>94</sup> Clearly he was expected to act in just such a way in order to threaten the Macedonian king. Nor are we told just who it was Diopeithes extorted these funds from. It is too much to automatically assume that the general was attacking Athenian allies. The general was outside the control of the Athenian *demos* in as much as Diopeithes was acting as he saw fit in order to mount some form of opposition to the

Macedonians, but this in itself proves only the loyalty of the generals with regard to the home polis. Diopeithes continued to act, independently of control by the home authorities, in the best interests of Athens, even if that did entail some activities which might be interpreted as illegal.

What, then, is it possible to infer from the evidence I have drawn together above ?

Firstly, questions of legality and illegality are, in themselves, concepts which are very difficult to define clearly in relation to the activities of the generals. Athenian law did provide a system of accountability with which generals breaking the law could be brought to book.<sup>95</sup> But this system was itself dependent upon what the Athenians themselves perceived as illegal actions, and this, as has been shown, could take a very different line from what foreign countries might accept as legal, or illegal, activity. The Athenian perception of legality was often conveniently modified according to whether a general's actions were successful or not. Chares' employment in the service of Artabazos, for instance, was illegal by Athenian law, since it had not been authorised by the *demos*, but the success of the general made this irrelevant. Only rarely was legality brought to the fore in the case of successful generals. The trial of the victorious *strategoi* after the battle of Arginousai is the most famous example. On the other hand, generals failing to achieve success often found themselves accused of illegal activity, whether they had done so or not. Lysicles paid for the defeat of Chaeronea with his life, simply because he had failed to win the battle. Clearly then, it is impossible to gauge the degree of illegal

activities by the generals by the standards set by the Athenian notions of legality.

Similarly, however, it is impossible to assess the lawlessness or otherwise, of the Athenian *strategoi* by modern perceptions of legal activity. Contemporary ideas regarding international standards of behaviour are reliant upon similarly modern concepts of morality, which were as alien to the Greeks as Greek standards of morality were in relation to the modern world. I would contend that it was this inability to comprehend this difference of legal concepts which caused many historians to highlight the mercenary activities of the generals and the illegal actions as they perceived them.

However, in order to do this, historians did use the sources which recount these activities in detail, and do themselves offer up those images of lawless "banditti" which later writers were to stress as the overriding features of the C4th. *strategia*. In order to question this conception then, I must examine why it was that the sources, many themselves Athenian, portrayed the specialist commanders in such a light.

In order to understand the hostility of the sources, it is necessary to appreciate the separation of powers that was a tendency in the Athenian system in the C4th.. The roles of general and political orator, which had often been simultaneously held by the most powerful figures in the C5th. (e.g. Pericles), now came to be increasingly held by specialists who did not venture, to any great extent, into the other field. Although there was no arbitrary division, and some did maintain a dual role (such as Phocion), it

was this separation which was a root cause of the divisions between the generals, the political orators and the Athenian people. As I shall discuss this question in a following chapter, I think it enough to say that the source material from this time reflects the necessity of the politicians to decry the achievements of the generals and to place on them the blame for the ills which had befallen the Athenians.

Chares however, was a special case. The intensity of the hostility shown towards him in the sources requires a close examination since his position was one of unique dominance in the *strategia*, and his enemies were numerous. Virtually all the sources for Chares' career are hostile towards him, or are coloured by these hostile sources.

Aeschines has provided much of the contemporary information regarding Chares' behaviour and record,<sup>96</sup> but his evidence must be treated with caution. Not only were the two at opposite poles in their conception of the direction of Athenian foreign policy, but such differences naturally drove the general towards Demosthenes (and Hypereides), and there is evidence that some cooperation did indeed occur between the three.<sup>97</sup> Aeschines' much used claim that "...in the course of the Social War our general succeeded in losing seventy-five allied cities...",<sup>98</sup> a thinly veiled attack upon Chares, must be regarded with extreme scepticism. There were hardly more than seventy plus allied states within the confederacy as a whole, and in no way were all lost as a result of the war. Even if taken in the more subtle sense, to imply that the general caused the demise of the confederacy as a whole through his causation of the war, such statements

were clearly most important in influencing the image of Chares whilst having little basis in fact.

Demosthenes, on the other hand, made little mention of Chares, with five single sentences being the sum total of Chares' appearances in his corpus. Two of these have no direct relevance to Chares,<sup>99</sup> but the remaining three provide us with some interesting information as to his relationship with the Athenian people. Although Demosthenes once rebuked the assembly for blaming all the evils facing Athens on Chares (and Diopeithes and Aristophon), it was clear that the orator had little need to defend his "ally".<sup>100</sup> Hence the lack of references to the general. Plutarch claimed that Chares needed Demosthenes, but the *strategos* was clearly aware of the need for him to keep in with the assembly, and this he was able to do without reliance upon the skills of his political allies.<sup>101</sup> Although little is heard of Chares as a political orator, the general was shrewd enough in his dealings with the Athenian citizen body that Demosthenes could call him "a friend of the people".<sup>102</sup> Chares in fact, had mastered the art of maintaining the support of the people without having to resort to the risky business of exchanging political rhetoric in the assembly where the specialist politicians might attack him most effectively. Actions taken by the general, such as the dispatch of the booty from his successful Asian campaign of 355/354 back to the Athenians at home, were as much public statements of the general's concern for the welfare of his fellow Athenians as they were symbols of genuine patriotism. Athenaeos records how Chares used 60T. he had gained from a certain Lysander, to feast the Athenians.<sup>103</sup> Such actions were those of a man who could maintain his influence without

recourse to the politicians. Chares relied on the ordinary people for his position of power within the *strategia* and Athenian politics, and not the specialist orators. Their only response was to attempt to discredit him through speeches and pamphlets.

Isocrates, in particular, attacked the record of the *strategos*. Chares has long been recognised as the un-named subject of his work *On the Peace* (VIII). The whole piece is a condemnation of the Athenian *strategoí* as a whole, and Chares in particular. But the pamphlet reflects more the coloured ideas of an idealistic thinker than the objective views of the political pamphleteer. Chares represented to Isocrates all that was wrong in the Athenian system, the general outside the control of the specialist orators and rhetors. This hatred was exacerbated by the background of the general. Chares appears to have had no training other than in the art of war. There is no record of any philosophical training for the *strategos* as Timotheos had undergone under Isocrates himself. Hence the allusions to Chares' crudeness and the clash of Timotheos with Chares in private insults.<sup>104</sup> Isocrates had used his *Antidosis* (XV) to defend his protégé, and this must provide us with ample reasoning for his condemnation of Chares. Timotheos was one of the three generals prosecuted by Chares after Embata. Isocrates used his rhetoric to gain popular support for Timotheos during, or near to his trial. Timotheos and Chares had never been on good terms, but the trial of the former must have polarised support for both still further. It is in this context that the condemnation of Chares by Isocrates must be placed.

The writings of the Greek historian Theopompos have only survived in a few scattered fragments. However, the essence of his work is generally considered to have been recaptured in the work of Cornelius Nepos, a series of biographies on the lives of the great generals of antiquity. Chares is not amongst them. In fact, his position is made clear by one single statement by Nepos: "The era of Athenian generals came to an end with Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos, and after the death of these eminent men no general in that city was worthy of notice." <sup>105</sup>

Plutarch's evidence also paints a picture of Chares as an incompetent bandit disparaged by his colleagues. Yet he too, had reasons which must bring the validity of his information into doubt. The majority of his references to Chares occur in his "life" of Phocion, a man whose whole ideology was far removed from that of Chares. Phocion was portrayed, like his Roman "counterpart" Cato the Younger, as the anachronistic symbol of his nation's virtuous and glorious past. Phocion is gentle and kind, although he is of sullen and forbidding countenance. He represents the living symbol of the ancient Athenian. In contrast Chares, the leading general of the day, was portrayed as arrogant, rash and useless, the cruel and piratical exemplification of a decaying society. Thus Chares was to mock Phocion's appearance only to be put down in one sentence by the older statesman.<sup>106</sup> The contrast is heightened so that in military affairs too, can be seen the older general's superiority. The story of Chares and the Byzantines in 340, discussed above, provides a perfect example of this. Later too, Phocion is not made general for the Chaeronea campaign because he is absent with the fleet, and of course, upon his return, he can urge in



vain against the war with the Macedonians.

Clearly the biography was a piece of fabrication and distortion of the historical events upon which the piece was loosely based. Chares was to be the foil to Phocion both in terms of personality and career. Such was the framework of the typical ancient biography, especially those by Plutarch. The virtue of one character, usually the subject, was strengthened at the expense of another's personality or deeds. Such literary devices could fit within the loose framework of historical fact, but the emphasis was more on the character than on the history. Plutarch skilfully used the character portrayal of Chares as offered in the contemporary sources as the basis for his Chares, compounding the bias of those earlier works. Plutarch produced an interesting piece of historical biography in his life of Phocion, but one from which pieces of historical evidence can only be drawn with caution.

Thus the sources for the career of Chares, both from his own time and after, combined to produce the picture of Chares as a lawless, yet talentless, mercenary commander, out of the control of the Athenian authorities, who steered the Athenians down a dangerous and ultimately disastrous course. Chares was the victim of the fact that the generals were the prisoners, for their portrayal to future generations, of writers who, for various reasons, had reasons to picture them as they did. Against them the generals had no recourse. The reputation that the general (apparently) had amongst the allies was based upon rumour and very little else. Although this must have been a considerable force in itself, it must not be overestimated. Rumour, and the extent of fear of Chares, are also things that have only come down to us through the sources hostile to the general. An examination

of the historical evidence has conclusively shown that the lawless image of the specialist *strategoi* was largely a myth, put across for reasons of political gain, so is there any reason to think that this idea of a fear of what Chares might do was also the work of the sources. In reality, the activities of these generals remained, in the main, well within the bounds of the accepted standards of military behaviour. The specialist generals were neither disloyal to their home-country, nor like banditti in serving her. Through these qualities it was they who were to retain the trust of the Athenian people whilst the politicians sought desperately to prove otherwise and there is no reason to believe that the allies thought radically otherwise.

## 6

## Accountability at Home

The previous chapter of this section discussed the conduct of the Athenian *strategoi* as mercenaries, and sought to answer the criticisms levelled at these figures that they were, by the middle of the C4th. nothing other than lawless *condottieri*, acting as they saw fit for personal profit and quite beyond the control of the Athenian authorities whom they were supposed to be serving. I think that I provided enough evidence to prove that this idea was fallacious and that the generals were, in fact, constant in their loyalty and idea of obligations towards their home country.

However, it has also been asserted (by those who sought to refute the *condottierial* image) that the generals remained in the service of their home state because of the system of judicial accountability which existed in the Athenian democracy for just that purpose. The argument is that the generals were forced to obey their orders because they feared the consequences that disobedience would bring. It is for this chapter to question to what degree this idea reflected the true situation in the C4th.

Strategic accountability is the conception and enactment of immediate or retrospective opinion either through the courts or through other means of expression. In the Athenian system for instance, expressions of thanks could be enacted through the awarding of honours to victorious generals

(amongst others). These were indicative of a positive accountability.<sup>1</sup> But, in the main, Athenian accountability usually took the form of negative actions against the officials who served their country.<sup>2</sup> For the generals in particular, popular opinion could reflect many degrees of anger and discontent, ranging from fines or removal from office to summary justice meted out to both unsuccessful, or indeed, successful generals.<sup>3</sup> Fortunately, the Athenians had developed a system of criminal justice into which popular indignation could be channelled without the need for direct actions by the mob, even if, given the nature of the direct democracy, the shield offered by the system of accountability could appear a little thin at times.

The Athenian democracy was based upon the theoretical participation of all (male) citizens in the legislative and judicial functions of government, without the use of any representative or administrative intermediate bodies such as a parliament and the judges/magistrates systems found, for instance, in Great Britain. As a consequence of this, the administration of justice tended to be highly flexible and responsive to fluctuations in the consensus of public opinion. This tendency was heightened further by the fact that the "state" possessed no machinery in itself for the prosecution of wrong-doers,<sup>4</sup> leaving legal proceedings to be undertaken by individuals who initiated the process in the assembly and which, if successful, would then be transferred to the courts (*dikasteria*).<sup>5</sup> This led to the trial, in the Athenian system, being used not only as a means of defining and punishing illegality, but also as an arena for arguing over and settling factional

disputes from the assembly and determining questions of Athenian policy. Thus was it that the generals were the political footballs of the great orators of the assembly, being kicked around the Athenian courts for purposes of political gain whilst they themselves remained in the constant fear of conviction and fine, deposition, exile, or even death ? Such a viewpoint has become rather popular amongst historians, and it is not hard to see the arguments for this line of thought. In the C4th. there is only one case of generals being tried for the taking of illegal actions in the purest sense.

In 379/378 two (unnamed) *strategoi*, guarding the Attic border with Boeotia were asked for assistance by a group of Theban exiles seeking to liberate their country from the controlling Spartans. The generals acceded to the request and went to aid the Thebans. The Spartan garrison was forced to withdraw from the Cadmeia. The Athenians condemned both generals; one was executed and the other, who had presumably realised the danger, opted for exile.<sup>6</sup> Despite arguments to the contrary, it was most unlikely that the actions of these two *strategoi* were ever sanctioned by the *demos* ; to have done so would have given advance notice of the plot, one of the major hopes for success being the element of surprise.<sup>7</sup> However, it was also true that Athenian public opinion was, generally, in support of the Theban "liberators". But that support did not extend as far as sanctioning the actions of the two generals (amid Spartan condemnation in the form of an embassy to Athens) which could have brought war. The actions of the generals were clearly illegal and, despite private support, this allowed the Athenians to back away from a confrontation they were, at that time, unable to undertake.

In this instance, true illegality of action had been used in the necessity of self-preservation. It was the only clear case of such an occurrence in the period of this thesis. Only the case of Timomarchos in 361/360 might also come into this class of trial, but the paucity of the information makes any in-depth discussion of this episode of little value.<sup>8</sup> In any case, the case of the two generals of 379/378 is sufficient to make my point, namely that the machinery did exist within the Athenian system for a general to be held accountable in law for illegal activities free from political factionalism.

Other than the two trials above, accountability was usually exercised over the generals by individuals in the assembly seeking more than a nation's punishment of unsuccessful or illegal activities. Such trials, though usually based in the context of a failed military mission, were testing grounds for either policy determination or for the personal support of individuals within the assembly. Of the former, the trial of Timotheos in 373 provides an outstanding example.

In the summer of that year Timotheos, *strategos* in command of an expedition to relieve Corcyra was deposed by ἀποχειροτονία, and he and his treasurer (ταμίης) Antimachos were tried by εἰσαγγελία on an unknown charge. Though the general was acquitted, Antimachos was convicted and executed.<sup>9</sup> Yet although it might appear that Timotheos was a victim of his own failure in raising the troops and monies for the campaign, it seems almost certain that his trial was more concerned with the foreign policies he advocated than any specific illegal action on his part. When the

Athenians had appointed Timotheos to the command it was in full knowledge that he had neither the funds nor the equipment necessary to accomplish the task. Timotheos was forced to undertake a preliminary expedition to raise men, money and supplies. He was up to this task and when, in mid-summer, he finally set out for Corcyra, he had not only gathered together considerable amounts of both men and money, but had also brought a considerable number of valuable allies into the Athenian camp.<sup>10</sup> But Timotheos' achievement was little-recognised, for he had already been deposed at the instigation of the orator Callistratos in the early summer, and he dutifully returned to the city.<sup>11</sup>

Quite clearly, Timotheos had not acted with undue sloth in his eventual departure for Corcyra; he had been placed in the very dangerous position he found himself in by the Athenians themselves and had acted in the best interests of the "state" and of his men. Although the account books of the expedition were clearly very badly kept, a path used to attack Timotheos at his trial, it is also clear that there was no hint of embezzlement on the part of the *strategos* himself. Hence the acquittal of Timotheos in the courts.<sup>12</sup> To appreciate the inconsistent behaviour of the Athenians in their dealings with Timotheos over this matter, it is necessary to understand the policy disputes which centred upon and around this general. Timotheos was a leading member of the "pro-Theban party" at Athens,<sup>13</sup> whereas his political rival Callistratos can successfully be linked to the group which favoured closer links with the Spartans.<sup>14</sup> In 374 the Athenians had concluded a peace with the Spartans which was then put at risk by

Timotheos, who had landed some exiles from Zacynthos back on their native island, an action which provoked a complaint by the Zacynthian government to the Spartans to redress.<sup>15</sup> The actions of Timotheos appeared to have brought war, rather than peace, between Athens and Sparta, and to have wrecked the work of Callistratos, the architect of the treaty. Thus, when the opportunity arose, the orator used the pretext of the Corcyra expedition to attack Timotheos in the courts. The impeachment was a trial of strength between the proponents of alliance with the Thebans on the one hand, and those who advocated closer ties with the Spartans on the other. In such circumstances the question of technical guilt was of very minor consequence.

As for cases which hinged upon the personal popularity of individual *strategoi*, the case of Chares and the trial of Timotheos, Iphicrates and Menestheos in around 354 provides a prime example. The defeat of the Athenians at the hands of their own former allies at Embata was always likely to bring about a number of recriminatory impeachments in order to find suitable scapegoats, and to determine the direction of foreign policy to be taken from there. However, there occurred the unusual spectacle of Chares, the Athenian commander-in-chief, charging his own colleagues of treason, for failing to support him in the battle.<sup>16</sup> Chares might well have taken this course of action in order to head off any charges being brought against his own conduct. He was as guilty in the eyes of the Athenian public as the three generals he had himself impeached. Chares had lost the battle, and as commander-in-chief he must have been prepared to take the ultimate



responsibility. Equally, his three colleagues were guilty of not giving the general the support he had needed in the battle. Since, presumably, all four men were in favour of the war, there was seemingly no clash of policy as a factor in this case, so guilt or innocence was determined by personal popularity. As it happened, Iphicrates and Menestheos were acquitted, the former retiring into private life, whilst Timotheos was convicted and fined 100T.<sup>17</sup> Chares had avoided action against himself, had had his vigorous pursuit of the war vindicated, and had cleared his path of rivals as the leading *strategos* of the Athenians. Chares had effectively utilised his own popularity for his own ends. In so doing, he had tested that popularity and, at the end, had greatly strengthened it, much to the alarm of the politicians in the assembly. The conclusions then, that can be drawn from the trials exemplified by the cases above ? Clearly the Athenians had constructed a framework of accountability in which the general was open to attack, not only over matters of military competence or failure in the field, but also for reasons of political aggrandisement or dissension. Athenian accountability in both theory and practice allowed arguments which were completely alien to modern legal systems to be settled in the courts. The Athenians not only allowed legal proceedings to occur against their generals on numerous grounds, but had devised the machinery within the constitution which allowed such trials to proceed quite easily, making the generals very accessible to legal attack.

Indeed, so manifold were the opportunities for bringing Athenian

officials to book that some observers have defined the legal system as being one based upon persecution rather than accountability. P. Vinogradoff, for instance, in his study of the jurisprudence of the Greek city-state wrote that "the first thing that strikes one in the study of Greek criminal law is the extraordinary development of repressive actions against officials."<sup>18</sup> It is easy to form such a view of the Athenian system from an examination of the highly developed method of registering discontent with officials in office. At the main assembly (κυρία ἐκκλησία) of each *prytany*, all Athenian officials had to submit reports and a vote of confidence would be taken. If an official failed to gain enough votes (probably a simple majority), he was deposed from office though he did not stand convicted of any charge,<sup>19</sup> although he might do so afterwards.<sup>20</sup> At the same κυρία ἐκκλησία, any citizen might accuse another of an act compromising the welfare of the "state" by bringing an εἰσαγγελία against him. This method of accusation was often used against the *strategoi*, and it seems that for some offences (attempting to overthrow the "state", the betrayal of military forces and the taking of bribes), the seriousness of the charges made the use of εἰσαγγελίαι mandatory. At any rate, the εἰσαγγελία was another major hazard facing the *strategos* in pursuit of a long career.<sup>21</sup> Even when an official's term of office was over, his conduct was liable for scrutiny and legal attack. Within thirty days of laying down office, every official had to produce his records to be submitted for inspection and audit, over which he could be liable for prosecution. These scrutinies, known as the εὔθυναι, were used on several occasions to attack *strategoi*, most notably Timotheos in 373.<sup>22</sup>

Throughout the term of office of any Athenian magistrate, the opportunities were present to enable any citizen (theoretically) to challenge his conduct and record, with final recourse to the law-courts if necessary. Even before the magistrate took up office, the law allowed a vote by a *dicastery* on whether he was suitable to do so. Although this scrutiny rarely deposed magistrates-elect,<sup>23</sup> it completes the all-round picture of the Athenian structure of legal accountability for all their magistrates (not just the generals). At every stage of an official's term the machinery was present to bring him to book, if the citizenry wished it.

Thus it can be seen that not only did the Athenians write it into their "constitution" that all their officials were highly accountable to the major democratic "organs of government", but also that the machinery of control was still in full working order in the C4th., and still being used to humble various *strategoi* in the courts. This was, however, more often than not, carried out for reasons of political, factional or personal aims rather than through any notion of national wellbeing. As a consequence of this fact, even without having to consider the individual conduct of the generals in the C4th., it is possible to question the notion of the generals as the C4th. *condottieri*. Not only did the laws exist which placed great emphasis upon the loyal conduct of the generals when on campaign, but those laws had not fallen into disuse in the C4th. and were still being utilised. If the opportunities arose, the generals were still likely to become the "political footballs" of the specialist orators. It is hardly surprising that with such evidence R. A. Knox dismissed the arguments of those who suggested that

the Athenian people treated their officials fairly, tolerantly, sensibly and justly, and more like the "mischievous beaste" as Plutarch described them.<sup>24</sup>

Knox based his arguments upon a survey of the casualty rates amongst Athenian politicians in the C5th. and C4th.B. C.. His conclusions were based around the fact that he found that less than 50% of the selected politicians he had chosen for his survey suffered no catastrophic disaster in the courts.<sup>25</sup> By taking the machinery of accountability as I have described above, and adding the utilisation of that machinery as I have also noted above, it is possible to see where Vinogradoff and, more recently, Knox, found the basis for this theory that the Greek city-state acted repressively against its' own generals. Others too have followed this line of argument. E. Cavaignac, for instance, portrayed the Athenian generals of the C4th. as living under a reign of terror, their policy decisions boxed in on all sides and paralysed by the crushing weight of the responsibilities of their posts.<sup>26</sup> Glotz concurred, stating that "their natural anxiety about popular disapproval, brought about by the frequency of impeachments, deprived the Athenian generals of the spirit of initiative and the security indispensable for the proper discharge of their functions."<sup>27</sup>

But does this reflect the reality of the situation in C4th. Athens ? Were the generals really persecuted and hounded by their own countrymen ? Such theories can only work if the trials of Athenian generals in the C4th. were both numerous and frequent. Thus, I must return to the trials of those

generals that are known in the course of the period of this thesis to argue that, far from showing a quite exceptional trial rate, the evidence that exists hints rather at the opposite. Few generals were successfully tried throughout this period, and as the century progressed, the generals became less and less susceptible to the risk of serious attack through the use of the Athenian legal system.

Taking together the trials of *strategoi* brought about by the procedures of the ἀποχειροτονία, ἐισαγγελία, δοκιμασία and γραφή,<sup>28</sup> there are twenty-two known trials of *strategoi* in the period from Pamphilos in 389/388 to Lysicles in 338/337.<sup>29</sup> Although, of course, any theory on this topic must have the proviso that it lies at the mercy of the source material, I do think that from what extant evidence there is, some reasonable arguments might be put forward.

Whilst the figure of twenty-two trials might, at first glance, seem a very high figure, such a total does, in fact, compare favourably with the C5th., for which there is evidence of no less than thirty-seven.<sup>30</sup> Given the fact that the period covered by my investigation spans *circa* twenty years less than the complete century, it still seems illogical even in these basic comparative terms, to see the C4th. as a period of repression on the generals. Nor can I agree that the number of trials in the C4th. in itself, demonstrates the strict control of the *demos* over the *strategoi*.. If we take the period covered in this thesis (404-322) and then consider just how many generalships are being considered, then the figure twenty-two rapidly

declines in importance, since such a figure, in relation to eight hundred and twenty generalships does not amount to a great proportion (approx. 2.7%). Such a percentage can, of course, be argued either way, for in a modern parliamentary type system the figure would still be considered excessive. But such a figure again compares favourably with the Athenian mode of conduct in the C5th. (3.7%). In comparison to some more modern examples of citizen armies this figure also appears creditable. Between 1917 and 1921, it has been calculated that the Soviet Russians executed, imprisoned or exiled 6% of their own generals. In France under the Directory the use of summary justice was even more pronounced. Between 1792 and November 1799 no less than 994 general officers of the 1, 378 who held commands in that period were removed from their commands and tried on various counts. Eighty one were condemned to death.<sup>31</sup> Whilst these governments were "revolutionary" or "radical", the same was said of the Athenian democracy, so such comparisons are of some value in assessing the city-states' degree of accountability. Indeed, when one considers that the Federal government in America dismissed or impeached more generals (in percentage terms) during the course of the Civil War of 1861-1865, then the argument that the Athenian system was excessively harsh on its officials, even in ancient terms, becomes one based upon an over-simplistic appraisal of the facts.<sup>32</sup>

There were, or rather, are known to us, simply not enough trials of *strategoí* in the C4th. to convincingly argue the theory of a harsh and repressive regime. That is not to say however, that the Athenians were not

harsh upon their officials by present day standards, particularly for a democracy, but this is to seriously misconceive the Athenian democracy. As Sir Kenneth Dover wrote, "...we tend nowadays to associate democracy with tolerance, and to imagine that democracies are, by nature, lenient and reluctant to take the lives of their own citizens. If we have made this assumption the conduct of the classical Athenian democracy will sometimes surprise us."<sup>33</sup> What must inevitably be concluded is that whilst the Athenian democracy of my period offered wide opportunity within its own structure for the calling to account of its officials, presenting the appearance of an intolerant and persecuting society, our own knowledge of the workings of the direct democracy (as opposed to the now, more favoured system of parliamentary democracy) is limited to the point where conclusions based upon modern ethics must be made only with extreme caution. Indeed, in the case of the Athenian *strategoi* in the C4th., it is possible to argue the opposite case and portray the democracy as, if not lenient, at least restrained, in its use of its own legal powers. After all, there is no evidence to suggest that there was ever any shortage of would-be leaders, either political or military, in C4th. Athens. Clearly the rewards and benefits on offer still outweighed any potential risks from the law-courts.

R. K. Sinclair, in his study of the Athenian democracy, wrote that "the Athenians however, expected more of their *strategoi* than compliance with the assembly's instructions. They also expected success."<sup>34</sup> In taking such a view Sinclair was not alone. Inevitably, the military character of the *strategia* affected the nature of impeachment trials, at least in a *prima facie*

sense. As W. K. Pritchett has pointed out, " the overwhelming majority of trials against generals were in connection with military failure."<sup>35</sup> In effect, the trials of *strategoi* often took the form of court-martials. Indeed, it is fair to argue that military failure was often a cause for an impeachment of a general; out of the forty-eight known impeachments between 490 and 322, three quarters were brought about in the context of military failure of some kind: twenty-two in the Peloponnesian War, five in the Corinthian War and eight in the period from 362-359, during the Athenian struggles for control in the Hellespont. Yet if this argument is valid for the C4th., would it not also be true that military success was the prerequisite for any general in command of active forces who wished to avoid court action against himself ? But in the C4th. this does not appear to have been the case. Between the years 395 and 359, the period of Athenian revival and not inconsiderable military success we find record of no less than seventeen of the twenty-two known trials in my period, whilst the remaining thirty-seven years, other than the Iphicrates, Timotheos and Menestheos trial of 354/353, there were only two other trials, those of Hegisileos and Lysicles.<sup>36</sup> This, it must be remembered, was the period of near-continual decline after the deprivations of the Social War, a period of very little in the way of military success. This then, poses a problem. Why, if the Athenians managed to keep a tight check on the generals appointed to command their military forces, do we find such little action taken against them in the latter half of the C4th.? Chares for instance, the leading Athenian *strategos* from the Social War till his death in 323 (?) managed never to win any major action on Greek soil yet he still avoided any conviction in the courts. How



did he manage this ? Although it is not the place here to discuss the loyalty of the Athenian generals of the C4th. in relationship to their dealings with the Athenian *demos*,<sup>37</sup> it is my contention that *strategoi* such as Chares retained a sense of duty to the *polis* which held them within the legal framework of the city-state and did not, as some have argued, spend their careers roaming around as lawless mercenaries. Thus, the generals in this period did not avoid legal actions through some self-implemented break with the central authorities, and so an answer must be sought from elsewhere.

The idea of the trials of *strategoi* as being, in the main, contests over questions of military success or failure must be modified. However, it cannot be that from the 350's the generals simply avoided trial in the courts by some means. Chapter 5 has shown that the specialist generals remained linked to the *polis* and respected its laws and orders. As I have already described, the legal procedures which enforced the accountability of the generals in the C5th. were still in operation after the Peloponnesian War, especially down till the end of the 360's. But is it possible that other factors<sup>38</sup> enacted the break down of the operation of these legal procedures after that date ? I think not. For although there is no direct literary evidence to support me, there is enough in the way of secondary evidence to make it fairly certain that in the latter half of my period (358-322), *strategoi* did continue to be tried, although the lack of cases in this period of still very active Athenian policy must raise other questions. Demosthenes, in the speech *On Organisation* made clear that *eisangeliai* were still practical

instruments in attacking the generals, "ὑπὸν στρατηγὸν κρίνεται, καὶ περίεσθ' ὑμῖν ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων ὅς δαίνο καὶ εἴηκε τὸν δαῖν εἰσήγγελειν," ἄλλοι δ' ἔτι ἐξέειπεν."<sup>40</sup> The date of the speech is some time after 351.<sup>40</sup> Demosthenes, again in circa 331, 331 clearly criticised the system of accountability as practiced by the Athenians, "It is scandalous is our present practice that every general is tried two or three times for his life in the courts, but not one of them dreads to risk death in a battle against the enemy."<sup>41</sup> Interestingly, Demosthenes was complaining of the fact that whilst the generals may face trial in their own law courts, their fear of this occurrence was obviously not great enough to stir them into significant activity. The generals seemingly felt more at ease in defending themselves in the courts than they did about laying themselves open to the vagaries of the fortunes of battle. At any rate, Demosthenes made clear that generals were still regularly finding themselves in the dock in the late 350s, even if his rhetoric may have exaggerated the practice to some degree. Although there is no other evidence, Demosthenes' speech *De Falsa Legatione* (343 ?) reports that the general Chares was often brought to trial (and acquitted).<sup>42</sup> Finally, from the end of the period of this thesis comes a piece of Hypereides which reveals that the impeachment of generals was still occurring in the 320's: "καίτοι σε ἐχρῆν...πάν ῥητόρων εἴαν τις ἀδικῇ τοῦτον κρίνειν, στρατηγὸς εἴαν τις μὴ τὰ δίκαια πράττει, τοῦτον εἰσαγγέλειν."<sup>43</sup>

It is clear from the evidence that I have presented in this chapter that although the general remained a common figure for legal attack throughout

the period covered by this work, after the veritable reign of trials and convictions between 383 and 380, the whole system of accountability for the generals, as created by the law-courts, became increasingly less worthy of regard, and even worthy of scorn.<sup>45</sup> Such a situation could have only come about in one way, the trials were becoming increasingly routine and unlikely to produce anything worthy of record; i.e. a verdict of guilty on the accused or, at least, a *doxa* *pro* inquisition. While Hansen's argument that 'the strangalia' was the sword of Damocles for the Athenian generals<sup>46</sup> may have been true enough in the years prior to 383, all the evidence points to the fact that, from that date onwards, trials became, for the specialist strategoi, if not trivialities by any means, hindrances which held gradually lessening fear. From the 380's onwards, it must have appeared to many, that the central authorities at Athens had indeed lost control of their own commanders who could no longer be effectively brought to justice. But such an appearance was only partially true. The generals had not broken away from the legal control of the *polis*, they were not lawless mercenaries. What they had done was effectively to protect themselves, either consciously or not, from destruction in the courts. It was not the ordinary Athenian who could bitterly attack the men elected to command the Athenian military forces,<sup>46</sup> but the specialist orators and rhetors who realised that their own power was decreasing as that of the generals increased in proportion. But that is not for this chapter to prove, since that is worthy of a chapter in its own right.<sup>47</sup>

Though the apparatus existed within the Athenian legal system for the

procedure of prosecution to be undertaken against the *strategoi*, it is clear from the evidence in our possession that this legal procedure, although hard on convicted wrong-doers was never seen as a repressive apparatus either by the generals or (for the most part) the Athenians themselves. Indeed, although it is clearly apparent that the prosecutions of generals continued with great frequency throughout the whole of the period of discussion, in the latter part (from 358 onwards) the lack of convictions in the courts points to a significant shifting in the voting patterns of juries in the trials of generals and, as a result, a significant increase in the powers of the Athenian generals.

As the century progressed, the specialist *strategoi* came to realise that they were able to act as they wished on campaign, not because they had successfully broken away from the system of accountability, but rather because that system accurately reflected popular opinion amongst the Athenian citizenry. The generals managed to master the legal system because they could play upon the one emotion that is above all found in the lower classes, base nationalism. By consistent loyal service to their *polis*, the generals were to become the channels of expressions of popular patriotism, and it was this service which found popular voice in the courts and defended them from the attacks of their political rivals in the *ecclesia*.

Part III:

## **The Athenian Generals at War.**

## 6 Command and the Athenian Generals

Winsor Churchill wrote that "without the effective backup of a competent staff and command structure the role of the general becomes little more than as a figurehead, unable to control or even guide the course of either battle or campaign except within the limited range of his own person."<sup>1</sup> Churchill might have been referring to warfare within the environs of his own predecessor's age in 18th. Europe, but the same point was as equally valid in the Greek armies of the 5th. for any other period for that matter. Thus, such an observation provides a good starting point for this discussion of the structure of the Athenian military and the efficiency of the generals within that framework. By closely examining the command structures of the Athenian military it might be possible to discover the part played by the Athenian strategoi in the significant military events of the period. If my investigation reveals an under-developed command framework then it must be concluded that the importance of the general and his influence on these events was much less than is generally considered. However, if the Athenian military had, in practice, a system of command somewhat akin to those of the other leading military states of the age, then by its very nature the role of the Athenian commander was indeed truly vital to the course of battle, campaign, war and, ultimately, the course of Athenian history.

This chapter is divided into two distinct sections; firstly, the role of

the general within the tactical command framework, and secondly, his role within the wider area of the strategic command system. The first part focuses on the general in the context of campaign and battle (a command in the field). The second, the general within the network of strategic efficiency and accountability, his independence, or dependence, upon the Athenian authorities back home and the effects this relationship caused in the conduct of Athenian military operations. Whilst an efficient tactical command structure was, and certainly, an essential requirement for effective tactical leadership, the opposite can be true in the case of strategic command. The use of an effective strategic (or 'grand-strategic') command system may inhibit initiative and cause a stagnation in innovative generalship. It is for this chapter to find out if that was true of the Athenian armed forces.

## **a: The Tactical Command Structure.**

### **i: The infantry:**

What is a "tactical command structure?" Although the word tactics, or tactical, is often used synonymously with strategy, the two words are independent in meaning. Whilst the latter can be defined (by the Oxford English Dictionary) as "the art of warfare and command therein," the former is "the art of handling troops or ships on campaign or in battle." In short, this part of my discussion deals with the mechanics of Athenian command in the lower levels of the military campaign, the relationship between general and troops in the field.

The term "vertical command structure" refers to the system of staff, aides and junior officers, signals and messengers which seek to put into practice the commands of the commander as effectively, and as quickly as possible. Within this structure it was the general who communicated directly, who was the central figure and upon whom the system revolved. Even in practice, the mechanics of translating orders into actions made the structure itself as important as the talent and skill of the commanding officer.

Unfortunately, as with so many of our insights into fifth-century Athens, our sources of information on the structure and workings of the Athenian military are very patchy. Our knowledge is limited to the "scraps" of information found in works relating to other subjects. Thus I can only ask forgiveness if I have inadvertently missed some pieces of information in the midst of the mass of ancient Greek source material.

The major source for our knowledge of Athenian command lies within the *Constitution of Athens*, a work attributed to Aristotle.<sup>2</sup> Having discussed the allotted tasks of the Athenian generals,<sup>3</sup> Aristotle wrote thus:

" Χειροτονοῦνται δὲ καὶ ταξιάρχους δέκα, ἓνα τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης· οὗτος δ' ἡγεῖται τῶν φυλετῶν καὶ λοχαγοὺς καθίστησιν." (61.3).

Here then, is a major piece of evidence for the existence of an organised command structure. The *taxiarchs* were the commanders of the individual tribal "regiments" which formed the basic infantry unit within the Athenian army, and therefore provided the first link between the general(s)



and the rank and file. That these men were elected must suggest that they too played an important part in both the conduct and actions of the individual regiments and the army as a whole. Indeed, in Thucydides, the *taxiarchs* are found in council of war with the generals.<sup>4</sup> Clearly the office of *taxiarch* was no tribal figurehead appointment instituted to fill the gap left by the gradual abandonment of the election of tribal generals,<sup>5</sup> but a much older office,<sup>6</sup> requiring a significant amount of military expertise. It can be surmised that as the C4th. progressed, and the art of generalship became ever more complex, the role of the *taxiarchs* became much more focused upon acting as the intermediate officers between the generals and the men. Prior to the Persian Wars the functions of both generals and *taxiarchs* must have been very closely linked. Clearly, however, by the C4th. the generals were figures relatively removed, by and large, from the ordinary troops within the army (see section c). Where before it had been part of the duties of the general to personally lead and motivate the hoplites under his command, the necessities of war in the C4th. placed this burden upon the *taxiarchs*. The requirements of command in the Greek world necessitated an officer, preferably one maintaining the old traditions of tribal election, who might lead by the example of personal bravery. There is no evidence of the *taxiarchoi* acting as commanders in their own right, but that is to be expected. Only in the heat of battle could they assume the (old) role of the generals. The *taxiarchs*, even by the time of the Aristotelian *Ath. Pol.* were still emphatically tribal appointments. That is the key to their position and function within the Athenian chain of command. They were the successors to the generals in the socio-military aspects of hoplite generalship. In that way alone did they fill the role the generals.<sup>7</sup> Important as the *taxiarchs*

were, they were not lesser *strategoi*. Their primary task was to enact the orders of the generals, and as such, they could only emphasise the importance of that central authority.

Of the *λοχαγοί* there is but little information. Indeed, it is only in the single reference above that there exists any specific mention of such officers in the Athenian army.<sup>8</sup> All that is clear is that they were subordinate to the *taxiarchoi* and seemingly represented the lowest officers in the army, probably commanding units about the size of *enomotiai* in the Spartan army (ie. around forty men).<sup>9</sup> Thus, the known basic chain of command in the Athenian infantry comprised only three known levels of officer. There is no evidence of any other officers within the phalanx. The Athenian phalanx was an unwieldy instrument with little ability to respond to all but the most basic commands.

However, I think it worthwhile to compare the Athenian command chain to those of her military rivals. Otherwise it might be assumed that military evolution had not taken place at all, and that efforts had not been made to overcome the communication problems inherent in hoplite (phalanx) warfare. By examining the tactical command structures of her military rivals it might be possible to deduce whether the Athenian method of infantry command was efficient. Effective command was still hindered by other factors, such as, for instance, the lack of integration between the various arms. But such an examination might make it possible to deduce whether that command structure was maintaining its development on

is put with those leading states. Therefore, I shall compare the Athenian system both with the Spartan and the Macedonian models. Unfortunately, the lack of information possessed on the subject makes any similar comparison with the Persian army impossible. As it happens, the periods of greatest strength for the Spartans and the Macedonians came at either end of one period of study, so still might provide enough comparative material for a valuable study.

In comparison to the Athenian army, there is a relatively large amount of information concerning the Spartan army. Thucydides provides numerous pieces of information within his history, as does Xenophon. And although much of this evidence relates more to the C3th. than the C4th., it is sufficiently near, chronologically, to provide useful material. Although the source material is often conflicting, the work of Lazenby in particular has ironed out most of the problems concerning the Spartan army and thus offers a useful model of comparison.

At its head, the army was led by both, but later only one, of the Spartan kings. Below these came the heads of the Spartan regiments (μόροι), apparently six in number.<sup>10</sup> The commanders of the regiments (πολεμαρχοί)<sup>11</sup> often commanded independently of the supreme commanders.<sup>12</sup> Next in the chain came the πεντηκοντάρχες<sup>13</sup> and below these came the smallest unit within the army, the ἐνωμοτιά, each commanded by an ἐνωμοτάρχης.<sup>14</sup> However, the last book of the *Hellenica* also contains three references to λόχοι, which may imply the existence of

commanders called *λοχαγοί*,<sup>15</sup> units half the size of the *μόρα*. Despite complicated arguments about the exact relationship of these command levels, it is quite clear that the Athenian command structure was indeed inferior to the Spartan model of the late C5th. and early-mid C4th. One reason for the military superiority of the Spartans during this period was the relatively advanced command structure and the strategic and tactical flexibility which resulted.<sup>16</sup>

In comparison with the Macedonian army as moulded by Philip II and Alexander III, even the Spartan command was rather crude. The army of Philip and Alexander (in the early part of his reign) contained no less than ten different levels of command below the person of the king himself. Such a system highlighted the role of the commander in a very different way to that of the Athenian. The ability of the Macedonian ruler in command was maximised and the general discipline of the troops was improved by the ability of officers to give orders down the chain. To what extent this worked in the practice of the battle situation it is hard to imagine.

The Athenian command system was then (for the infantry at least), a rather undeveloped organ for military command, at least in comparison with the preeminent military powers of the the C4th. The lack of flexibility was a notable feature of the Athenian forces during the Corinthian War. Hoplite warfare had not developed the means for effective control after the initial clash of the armies. In short, the generals had very little role after the initial placements of the troops. Only as the century progressed, and the use of mercenaries, especially trained in warfare, came to be an increasingly

important factor in these wars, was the Athenian *strategoi* to be able to fully utilise their own abilities in generalship. As the century advanced, the role of the Athenian general as elected military commanders was to become of fundamental importance to the outcome of Athenian military ventures. Yet one of the significant features of the information concerning the Athenian army is precisely just how little there is. The Athenian general, even within the distant armies of the early part of the C4th., was the epicentre of the army; it was he who received the attention from the soldiers and it was he who bore the responsibility for their actions. This in itself must provide some sort of clue to the Athenian chain of command. Crude as it might be, it was the general who was the commander, however difficult he might find it to transmit orders to his own troops.

#### i: The cavalry:

The Athenian cavalry was regarded as a special part of the army, a common feature of the city-states. Such was the structure of command within the hoplite system that the cavalry, in the case of Athens at least, could, and indeed did, act as a virtually separate entity to the infantry. Once again, the principal source is Xenophon, through the *Hellenica* and the *Hipparchikos*, a pamphlet on cavalry command possibly written in c. 357. However, I shall begin with Aristotle. The *Ath. Pol.* relates that two cavalry commanders were elected annually ἐξ πάντων, whose powers were the same as the generals in relation to the cavalry.<sup>17</sup> The implication of such a statement could be very significant in understanding the Athenian military. Taken at face value, the picture that Aristotle put across was that of an army

virtually divided into two entirely separate arms, the infantry, under the command of the generals and the cavalry, usually divided up on the wings of the army (hence two commanders), under the *hipparchoi*. Clearly the command of the cavalry was a special task requiring specifically trained and experienced officers, but were they really equal in rank to the generals? If so, then it would virtually be said that there were not ten, but twelve generals. B. J. Broderick argued that "the parallel between the generals and the *hipparchoi* is not so close as the *Ath. Pol.* might suggest, that the generals were the commanders-in-chief of the whole Athenian forces—cavalry, infantry and navy whilst the *hipparchoi* were the commanders of the cavalry alone."<sup>18</sup> However, the evidence does suggest some kind of individual control by the *hipparchoi* of the cavalry distinct from the command network of the infantry.

The similarity between the cavalry and infantry command structures was marked. Aristotle reveals that the *hipparchoi* each had half of the cavalry under him, made up of five tribes each. This was presumably to fit in with the standard role of the cavalry during hoplite battle of guarding both flanks of the phalanx. But the tribal divisions were then, in turn, commanded by ten *φύλαρχοι*, squadron commanders.<sup>19</sup> This similarity between the infantry and cavalry arms was not lost on the author of the *Ath. Pol.*<sup>20</sup> If the phylarchs played the same role in the cavalry command as the *taxiarchs* in the infantry, then it could logically be argued that the *hipparchoi* were the *strategoi* of the cavalry. Xenophon offers some further evidence.

"Cavalry commanders act independently of the infantry forces and under

his initiative.<sup>21</sup> The cavalry commanders were important enough to act under their own initiative. The *hipparch* was to watch the enemy from some point and take notice of any opportunities which might be of tactical gain.<sup>22</sup> Xenophon was implying that the cavalry commanders were not controlled, on the battlefield at least, by the *strategoi*. Whilst the practicalities of command in the midst of classical Greek battle might explain this level of independence, it is harder to account for the surprisingly high level of autonomy enjoyed by the *hipparchs* in a strategic sense. If Xenophon's account is accepted, and there is no reason to do otherwise,<sup>23</sup> not only was it in the power of the *hipparch* to invade another country's territory,<sup>24</sup> but even to control such matters as the enlistment of spies.<sup>25</sup> Many orators and writers considered it perfectly acceptable to mention the *strategoi* and *hipparchoi* together.<sup>26</sup>

However, I think that it is incorrect to take the evidence given above at face value. Plato in the *Laws* wrote that "...the commanders must be selected next, and as subordinates to them, for the purposes of war, *hipparchs*, *phylarchs* and the officers to marshal the ranks of foot *phylae*..."<sup>27</sup> Plato was very familiar with the workings of the Athenian legal system and the infrastructures of the organs of the government. Quite clearly, the *hipparchs* were no equals of the generals, but merely subordinate officers. It must be remembered that in Classical Greek warfare, the role of the cavalry arm was one of far less importance than that of the infantry. Greek generals fought on foot, in the phalanx, at the most important point in the battle. Although the *Hipparchicos* dates, in all

predominant from the early 350's,<sup>28</sup> Xenophon's cavalry commander is probably an anachronistic picture from the times of the author's own active service as a *hipparch*. The cavalry in the early part of the century were far more independent in relation to the infantry due to the very lack of efficient command procedures. This independence could only be further highlighted in the conditions faced during such campaigns as the Cyrus expedition.

The class divisions apparent within Athenian society in the early fifth century must also have led to some form of estrangement between the infantry and cavalry arms. For Xenophon then, the rank of *hipparch* matched that of the *strategos*. Simply because, in his time, the *hipparch* really was the effective commander of the cavalry. By the time of the *Hipparchicos* the Athenian armies were beginning to follow common military evolution and integrate the various troop types within the army. By the time of Leosthenes, although the Athenian cavalry themselves were to retain a clear division from the remainder of the army, based upon social status, the rank of cavalry commander, which had once been the near equal of that of general, was but one level of the general's command structure.

There are indeed, no instances of *hipparchs* acting as commanders of Athenian armies in their entirety. In point of fact, such a move would indeed be surprising in the light of military history. Cavalry commanders have rarely commanded integrated armies made up from all arms. Certainly, those that did do so generally gained but little success. The most famous generals of cavalry have gained renown through a cavalier approach, a gallantry verging upon rashness which has best suited the nature of the



cross and the horseman. The character of men like Eumen, Prince Rupert, or Sir John Mordaunt brilliantly captured the spirit of cavalry warfare and the unifying loyalty of their men. Yet all were in some degree at commanding an elite arm. Others such as Field Marshal Haig could only envision the "alien arm" as a means of providing suitable opportunities for the cavalry to operate with maximum effectiveness. In short, cavalry commanders have always tended to be individualists who were rarely entrusted with the highest commands.<sup>29</sup>

It is not difficult to surmise that the cavalry commander was never equal in purely military terms to the general, even if his class and social status might have exerted some equalising influence. Very few individual hipparchs have come down to us, Demarces of Phaleron being the most obvious example.<sup>30</sup> But even this record has only survived because of his later role. It was the strategoi who were honoured, and condemned, by the Athenian *demoi* and whose names and deeds were recorded by historians. There can be no clearer proof of where the genuine power lay.

Unlike the comparisons I made between the command structures of the Athenian infantry and its Macedonian and Spartan counterparts, the Athenian cavalry compares relatively favourably. Within the Spartan system the cavalry was the weakest arm, and the command structure reflects its general lack of discipline and training.<sup>31</sup> Xenophon provides the only information on the subject; that the cavalry was divided, like the Spartan infantry, into six *morai*, each under a *hipparmostes* (ἵππαρμοστὴς).<sup>32</sup> This was probably the smallest tactical unit. Xenophon records that the Spartans

cared little for the cavalry and there were few Spartiates in that arm.<sup>33</sup>

The Macedonian cavalry however, offers a great contrast to the Spartan model. The cavalry of Philip and, to an even greater extent, Alexander, was designed to act as a fully integrated part of the army as a whole in which its' role was to be a decisive one, waiting for gaps in the enemy's phalanx which might be exploited. Such a role required great discipline and flexibility which only a highly developed command structure could give (along with thorough training). It is from the rather turgid, but invaluable, handbook-cum-lecture notes which is attributed to Asclepiodotos that most of our information on this topic is gleaned.

The entire cavalry, the equivalent to the phalanx (ἐπίταγμα) was basically divided into two parts or complements, for each wing of the army (the normal station of the cavalry). Each part (τελῶς) was divided into two divisions (ἐφιππαρχίαι), these into two brigades (ἱππαρχίαι) and these again into two (Tarentine) regiments (Ταραντιναρχίαι). The regiments were further sub-divided into two battalions (ἐπιλαρχίαι) which were made up of two ἵλαι (squadrons), the basic tactical unit. Yet even within this unit (theoretically 128 men) there existed a further three tiers of command. Each ἵλη, commanded by its' own commander (ἱλαρχος), usually operated (in battle situations) in a "rhomboid" formation, with a rear-commander (οὔραγος) and two flank-guard commanders (πλαγιοφύλακες).<sup>34</sup> It must be assumed that this unit structure had officers to match, even though there are references for them at only two levels of the higher structure.<sup>35</sup> The

remains was the highly effective long, which the Macedonian kings were to use with great effect in numerous battles.

In comparison to the Macedonian model, the Athenian cavalry was weak and ineffective. But in comparison to the Spartan cavalry, the Athenians did, seemingly possess a more advanced system of command and a body of greater tactical flexibility. Two further pieces of evidence back up this argument. Firstly, given the composition of the Athenian cavalry, its superior training and discipline must be accepted.<sup>36</sup> Secondly, because the Athenian cavalry was divided into small divisions, its cohesiveness and working practices must only have been improved. Kinship ties and fought together, and retained their tribal distinctiveness by operating in these smaller units. In the final analysis, all that can be said of the Athenian cavalry was that at the first and second Mantinea and later, at Crannon, it was to acquit itself creditably where it played its part as a fully integrated part of the Athenian and allied forces.

### c: The navy:

Despite its great, if not superior, importance to the land forces, the Athenian navy and its command structure has remained largely unstudied by both historians and military theorists. Such neglect is all the more surprising when it is considered that it was through the use of naval forces that the Athenians regained their liberty in the C4th., reasserted their strength in the Aegean and, ultimately, lost that independence again.<sup>37</sup> But once again, by piecing together the various scattered references, it is possible to form some

idea of the various elements which made up the command network within the Athenian navy.

It was the *strategoi* who were the commanders of Athenian naval forces.<sup>38</sup> There was neither an office of admiral, nor any specialisation within the *strategia* of designated naval commanders.<sup>39</sup> The generals had to be equally at home either on land or at sea. Even as the fourth century progressed and advances in warfare brought about increased specialisation within the *strategoi*, there was no specialisation in naval command, merely naval organisation.<sup>40</sup> Only upon the defeat of the Athenians in the Lamian War and the abolition of the classical trierarchy by Demetrios of Phalerum did the creation of the post of a general specifically in charge of the navy come about.<sup>41</sup> Before then, the titles used in literature which refer to the naval *strategoi* were more explanatory inserts than actual titles of office.<sup>42</sup> In short, the command of Athenian fleets lay in the hands of the *strategoi* alone and none of these was subordinate to any specifically designated member of their own college.<sup>43</sup> This lack of any specialisation must have impinged upon the effectiveness and competent usage of the navy.

Below the most senior ranks in the navy, the command chain becomes one rather difficult to follow. But what can be said is that the navy was far in advance of its counterpart on land in the development of command structure and organisation. Despite arguments to the contrary the trierarchs, the acting "captains" of the triremes had, by the C4th., a highly organised and functional command structure designed to operate with

ment more rapid and efficient. The insight into the extent of this development in the Athenian naval command structure can be gleaned from a comparison between it and the Venetian and French navies of the Renaissance, the most highly organized modern navies of the period. The ships comprised within these vessels' naval fixed establishments with the Athenian model included all the ranks.<sup>14</sup> In short, the Athenian navy, even in the economically hard times of the 13th, represented "the state of the art" in terms of tactical command. Indeed, this was to be hardly bettered until the abandonment of the "galley warfare" in the 17th. The Athenian navy was to remain at the forefront of classical naval warfare until the rise of the Macedonians and the seizure of the Persian fleet by Alexander.

Despite efforts to redress the balance between the army and the navy, the Athenians remained first and foremost a naval power throughout the period of this thesis. Only the gradual increase in the use of mercenaries and the rapid military developments which came about as a result brought the Athenian land forces anywhere near up to par with the navy.

Unfortunately, as the 14th progressed, fewer and fewer officers came through who specialised in naval warfare and could use the navy to its full potential. Moreover, the same flexibility which was the navy's strength in the hands of competent "Admirals" could also expose the weaknesses of those of insufficient knowledge or talent in naval warfare. Vessels as responsive and flexible to command required specialists to command them, and this was not forthcoming. Without them the navy was but a pliable tool in the hands of clumsy workmen. After Leucas (Alyzia) in 375, the unfortunate truth was that the Athenians failed to gain a significant naval

victory. This, of course, does not detract from the importance of the role of the generals. The command of the general within an army or navy efficient in command response was as important in defeat as well as victory.

However, whilst the role of the Athenian general at sea was to remain at a consistently high level throughout my period, reflecting the highly evolved nature of Athenian naval command structures throughout this time, the personal role of the general on land was to become one of increasing power as the century progressed. Command structures and their development within the tactical sector were to place an increasingly heavy burden upon the central figure in the command framework and not only offered to the talented unprecedented opportunities for military manoeuvre and tactics upon the battlefield, but also exposure to those whose incompetence might have remained hidden in the past due to the inabilities of the army to reflect the ignorant or plain stupid decisions of bad generalship.

### **b: The Strategic Command Structure**

Unlike command at the tactical level, "strategic control" recognises no differences between the varying arms of an army (except in the broadest sense), but rather one entity acting outside the internal machinery of government. However, encompassed within this one idea are two distinct facets of the same thing, that is firstly, the idea of a strategic control over the actual operations of the Athenian military, and secondly, the idea of a

control of the armed forces and its' commanders by the home authorities through the means of strategic accountability. Although partly as one, I considered it both advantageous and profitable to consider these two distinct concepts in different parts of this thesis. The decision to do so was a completely arbitrary one on my own part, and I hope that the reasons for doing so will become apparent. Therefore, as chapter 6 has already considered the question of accountability I now consider the question of strategic control in the field.

#### **Accountability and control in the field:**

" At his (Marshal Jourdan's) headquarters, as at every other army headquarters, were the Representatives of "the People", armed with plenary powers. Their task was to assure themselves of the loyalty of the commander-in-chief...they were also instructed to bring before the revolutionary tribunals anyone whom they considered to have "engineered the disorganisation of the army". It was not unnatural that losing a battle was counted as disorganising the army but, in the opinion of some of the Representatives, failing to take their advice was equally culpable... ."45

Thus did the government of one nation seek to restrict the activities of the military whilst in the field. But although the quote refers directly to the French armies of the Directory, the Athenian authorities apparently also used non-military officials with significant, if undefined, powers in order to retain control over their own military forces. As these figures form the most tangible evidence of strategic control in the field, it is of these that I shall

speech first.

During the 4th. century 'warfare', the Athenians had made frequent use of public officials (*archontes* and *epistates*) who were sent out to their 'allies' in a supervisory capacity.<sup>46</sup> In the context of 4th. Athens however, the most possible existence of any supervisory officials sent out by the Athenian central authorities was the *nomotai*. Because these officials accompanied the Athenian generals in all major military operations it has been argued that these acted as the equivalent to the generals as the *archontes* and *epistates* were to the allied states of the old empire. But the evidence suggests otherwise. These figures were financial officials who, along with the clerks (*δρυνοῦν*) assisted the generals in the financial aspects of campaigns.<sup>47</sup> Even in this context their powers were limited. Demosthenes' speech *Against Polycles* makes it clear that it was not they, but the generals themselves, who looked after the monies allocated to them for each campaign.<sup>48</sup> Any further thoughts about the powers of these officials must finally be minimised by the knowledge that these men were but public slaves (ex-prisoners of war) whose role could surely be only bureaucratic in character. The roles of these officials must have been diminished still further by the condemnation, and subsequent execution of one Antimachos, on a charge of misuse of state funds whilst serving as the *ταμίης* to Timotheos in 373.<sup>49</sup>

The only other officials sent out by the Athenian central authorities to commanders in the field of which there is any evidence were the



πολεμικά, the ἐπιπορωλαί and, in the latter half of my period, monetary boards, whose task it was "...to investigate the numbers of money (sent to the Athenian commanders) so that the appropriate amount of pay might be sent to them, because the generals used to lie and exaggerate their numbers."<sup>50</sup> Although not a great deal is known about either the ἐπιπορωλαί or the ἐξετασταί, it can safely be said that these figures played no part in the military conduct of campaigns. The only limiting effect these officials could have was in their estimation of the amounts of monetary provision to be paid to each general. Cases such as that of Timotheos' Bosporan expeditions bear witness to the effect underfunding might have on the conduct of a campaign. In short however, these figures were, like the ταμίαι, financial officials of the state, and their only interference in the handling of any campaign was that indirectly caused by the restrictions in funding.

Direct control by central government has been written as having nothing other than a purely detrimental effect upon the efficient conduct of military campaigns by both political and military analysts. As was the case with the aforementioned armies of the First French Republic, the use of non-military "representatives" by the central authorities in the affairs of the armed forces had no effect other than to curtail individual initiative within the ranks of the generals of France. The twin dangers of defeat and excessively popular victory were thus avoided through the dangers faced by the military commanders, not in the heat of battle but in the mock-courts of justice in Paris. In part it can justifiably be said that this, the crudest attempt

as political control of the armed forces was responsible for the defeat of the 1890s and the overthrow of the Directory. The government was eventually overthrown by such strategic period rather than generated by the generals fearing the wrath of the suburbanised back home, and continually interposed within the running of their own affairs might well eventually conclude to better to strike first. Thus, in this way at least, the degree of freedom permitted to the Athenian generals by the central authorities strengthened the Athenian democracy rather than put it at increased risk. The Athenian General Augustus Pritchett blamed the interference of the democratic government in the affairs of the army as the reason for his being dethroned in 1873: "...blame (President) Allende," he said, "for it was he who would not leave the generals alone." Such statements could have echoed down from ancient times.<sup>51</sup>

But in what, less obvious ways, did the general in the field come under the control of the Athenians back home? W. K. Pritchett identified two areas which, in his opinion, clearly demonstrated that the home authorities of the Greek city-states exercised a high level of control over the activities of their *hegemones*. These were, firstly, the instructions given to generals on their departure on expeditions and campaigns, and the communications between the commanders whilst in the field and their respective "governments".<sup>52</sup>

The issuing of orders is a clear measure of some form of attempt at control, so what examples can be found that are within the scope of this study? I shall begin with Pritchett, who conveniently collated the testimonia

for the issue of orders to departing *hegemones* in both the C5th. and C4th.. Unfortunately, Pritchett, in the pursuit of his overall argument separated the information concerning "citizen" and "mercenary" armies into two chapters, thus undercutting one of his own major contentions (that there was no such clear cut division between the two). The specialist Athenian general was considered to be a representative of the Athenian government and therefore a personification of the official policies of the Athenian nation whether in, or out, of office, even when the general had made specific efforts not to be so. It can thus be assumed that the Athenians would treat these figures the same, when in command of official expeditions, if their forces were made up of all citizens, all mercenaries (highly unlikely) or a mixture of both. Pritchett found three examples of Athenian commanders being issued some sort of orders upon departure in the C5th.<sup>53</sup> However, in regard to the C4th. there were no examples at all of orders being issued which filled the criteria Pritchett had set himself.

Thus I have extended the search in the C4th. by closely examining the active careers of the seven truly specialist Athenian *strategoï* of the period, Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheos, Chares, Diopeithes, Charidemos and Leosthenes (the younger).<sup>54</sup> These men who between them held seventy known *strategiai* and were all described as *condottieri*, and thus it would be in their careers that evidence of control by the Athenian authorities would most stand out.

So, what evidence is there of the issuing of orders upon departure ?  
How often were detailed instructions issued to Athenian generals ? The

known much less rarely, and the names of those generals listed above have winners in this. I shall, in the process of the following review, also examine how the sources describe the dispatching of the *strategoi* from Athens.

Firstly, to Iphicrates, the most senior of the specialists *strategoi*.<sup>58</sup> His known "official" career began in 389 when, having been elected to the magistracy, he was sent out to the Hellespont.<sup>59</sup> In 378/377 Iphicrates was dispatched to Illyria.<sup>60</sup> There was no mention of orders of any kind, rather surprising given the fact that he was replacing a disgraced general (Timotheos).

In 369 Iphicrates was made *strategos* in command against the feared Thracian invasion. Again there was no mention of orders.<sup>61</sup> Aeschines reports that in the following year Iphicrates was elected as general by the Athenians: "...to go against Amphipolis."<sup>62</sup> Finally, during the Social War, Iphicrates, along with Timotheos and Menzatheos, was sent out "...to continue the war against the allies, who had revolted."<sup>63</sup> Thus there are seven instances of departure from Athens on Iphicrates' part, yet not once did he go with any recorded specific orders. Only in 377/376 was Iphicrates seemingly issued a specific command "...τὸν Ἰφικράτην στρατηγὸν ἐξαπέστειλαν συμμαχεσόντα τοῖς Πέρσαις,"<sup>64</sup> but this might rather be the author's method of emphasising Atheno-Persian co-operation than a genuine order. Given the nature of Athenian generalship as discussed in the Chapter 5, it would appear highly unlikely that the Athenian *demos* would have deemed it necessary to issue such an order. Iphicrates was a loyal

difficult, not even mentioning general of dubious reliability.

But Diodorus offers no hint of five cases of departure from Athens on official expeditions. In 351 Diodorus was sent to Corinth to replace Iphikrates.<sup>63</sup> Four years later, after his recall from mercenary service in Egypt, Diodorus was elected as a *strategos* and sent to make war on the Spartans.<sup>64</sup> In the following year (probably 348/377) he won victories in the Mytilene and Euboea, having been sent forth from Athens with an army.<sup>65</sup> In 339 Chabrias was dispatched with an army to confront the Thracians passing into the Peloponnese.<sup>66</sup> Finally, upon the outbreak of the Social War, Diodorus recounts that "...the Athenians chose Chares and Chabrias as generals and dispatched them with an army."<sup>66</sup> In each of the five cases there is no mention of any orders in the specific sense, and only in 339 is there any statement of the intended general line of conduct by the *strategos*: "Chabrias was sent to make war upon the Spartans."<sup>67</sup> Such terminology was so loose as to be virtually worthless. If the Athenians really did send out generals with orders as unspecific as Diodoros would have us to believe then it would not have been too surprising to find anything other than the most loyal commanders merely acting as they wished in the vague pursuit of such vague commands. In short, it is highly unlikely that the Athenians would have bothered to send out their generals with orders such as these. Such statements were more likely to have been helpful inserts by historians to help make their narratives clearer.

The distinguished general Timotheos has only a single episode in his career relevant to the topic of this discussion, the intended expedition to

Corcyra in 374/373. Xenophon records that Timotheos was chosen to command sixty ships but, because he was unable to find crews for them he went off around the islands.<sup>68</sup> Diodoros however, wrote that "Timotheos had, some time previously, been despatched with with sixty ships to aid Corcyra. He however, before intervening in their favour, had sailed to the region of Thrace...at this point, because he was too late to assist Corcyra, he was at first deprived of his command as a result of his loss of popularity."<sup>69</sup> At first glance it might appear that Diodoros is suggesting that it was Timotheos' failure to carry out orders that led to the loss of his command, but there is another interpretation of the evidence that is equally valid. The important idea is that Timotheos lost his command on account of his loss of popularity. There is in fact no specific mention of a contradiction of any specifically issued orders, merely that he was too slow in assisting Corcyra. Once again there is the vague notion of some form of overall end, but no allusion to any specific instructions. The final remark of Diodoros, that Timotheos lost his command, " τοῦ δήμου χαλεπῶς πρὸς αὐτὸν διατεθέντος,"<sup>70</sup> is indeed revealing, reflecting the fickleness of the *demos* rather than their anger at insubordination by a *strategos*. A return to Xenophon provides the real reason for the dismissal of Timotheos. Because the general was sailing around the islands (recruiting), "...the Athenians could not forgive him for, what they considered, was letting slip the best time of the year for the voyage and so they deprived him of his command."<sup>71</sup> Timotheos was clearly attempting to enact the general will of the people but had incurred their wrath by his own sloth (as they saw it) rather than for disobeying any specific orders on departure.

Chares was the leading Athenian strategist from 338 till his death around 333. Given his reputation as the candidate's par excellence,<sup>74</sup> we might expect to find in his career numerous examples of detailed orders upon departure. Yet in the four instances of departure from Athens there is no evidence of his leaving of any orders to the strategos. In 365, Chares appeared with a force of interest in the conflict between Philas and Argos. Xenophon offers no information concerning the departure of Chares from Athens, but Coudane states: 'And to the Philazians, upon whom the Argives were making war, Chares brought assistance, having been sent with an army under his command by the Athenians.'<sup>75</sup> When, in 361, Lysimachus was condemned for his conduct on Peperathos '...Chares, chosen as general, was sent out with a fleet.'<sup>76</sup> Again, there is no mention of any orders upon departure despite the fact that Chares was to take over from a *strategos* who had just been condemned. Chares promptly sailed to Concya.<sup>77</sup> Again, in 362, when Chares was sent out to the Chersonese as '*strategos autokrator*' there were no orders.<sup>78</sup> Finally, in 353/352, upon the onset of the Social War, '...the Athenians chose Chares and Chabrias as their generals and despatched them with an army.'<sup>79</sup> In short then, Chares, despite his (supposed) reputation, did not seem to receive any specific instructions from the Athenians upon his departures from the city.

Concerning Charidemus of Oreos, only one piece of information is of interest here. In the year 352/351 Philip was besieging the fortress of Heraeum in Thrace. The Athenians voted to despatch a fleet of forty ships to its aid, but due to their economic straits no fleet could be gathered until

Boëdromion of the following Attic year. Only then was a small force under Charidemos sent out.<sup>78</sup> Though Demosthenes' object in discussing this matter was to highlight the financial plight of the country at this time, and the opportunity lost by the abandonment of this expedition (in order to save money), it is also noteworthy that Charidemos was (apparently) sent out with no orders other than, presumably, to sail to Thrace. What is of especial interest here is that Charidemos had only recently taken up the citizenship with which he had been honoured by the Athenian demos in the late 360's/early 350's. He was still essentially a foreigner, if not in legal terms, and with his previous record of mercenary service it would be expected that he would be issued strict instructions upon departure. It was simply expected that a *strategos* would follow the basic intentions of foreign policy, in whatever manner he saw fit.

Finally, I come to Leosthenes. As I discussed earlier, this figure, perhaps the last hero of classical Athens, represented both the culmination of the evolution of the "specialist *strategos* " in the 4th., and an almost anachronistic holder of both political and military power. It is with due regard to the influence of Leosthenes' own personality, and the new rules which applied to the interplay between the home authorities and this general, that the following testimonia should be considered.

The emergence of this, the new hero to champion the Athenian, and Greek, cause threatened a continuation, and furtherance, of the role of Chares, in which the personal appeal of the *strategos* caused a relative weakening in the powers of the specialist *rhetoires* . In 323, amid the



planning for the rebellion against Macedonian rule. Diodorus tells us that '...the Athenians, therefore, gave exact instructions to Leosthenes, ordering him to send them (the negotiators at Thebes) as if acting upon his own responsibility, without the authority of the city.'<sup>78</sup> Later on, Leosthenes was sent part of the notice of Marsias and the Athenians told him not to act in some way longer.<sup>79</sup> Although perhaps these were not 'orders on departure' I have included these two pieces of evidence because they do represent a beginning of a campaign, instead a war, although the commanding *strategos* was not seen in Athens. However, a study of the precise role of Leosthenes in this affair (discussed in Chapter 4) reveals that the momentum, inspiration, and initiative for the rebellion all came from the person of the general himself. The Athenian authorities were, in effect, faced with the *de facto* reality of a rebellion whether they liked it or not. The orders issued to Leosthenes came with the funds sent to him once the council had determined to support him, but those orders must have been more to maintain the illusion of control by the central authorities over the *strategos* than any genuine orders. However, even in these rather forceful messages to the *strategos* there was no intention of controlling the actual operations of the campaign. The general was left to follow the general lines of Athenian policy as he himself saw fit.

In conclusion then, despite arguments to the contrary, the evidence simply does not support the theory that the Athenians exerted control over their generals through the issue of specific orders upon departure. Furthermore, the despatch of any orders at all was, seemingly, a rare occurrence. The argument that such orders were necessary instruments in

the maintenance of control over the *strategoi* by the home authorities contains, in itself, two basic flaws. To assume that the issue of detailed orders was a method of control is a misconception based upon the idea that the generals were, in themselves, "lawless", and needed such control. Secondly, it assumes that these generals would obey any orders given to them, despite being out of control to the degree where they acted as they, alone, saw fit. It is my belief that the lack of evidence concerning the issue of specific orders clearly reveals that the demos considered it unnecessary to do so because it was understood that the generals would act in a manner both consistent with the general aims of the campaign, and within that overall goal, would continue to act in the best interests of the Athenian "state". In general, orders were clearly unnecessary. Commanders knew who the enemy were, the general circumstances of war and the overall aims of any particular campaign without having to be told. The tactical considerations were left up to them.<sup>81</sup> Only in unusual circumstances would the issue of orders be noted by the sources (or created for their own purposes). One such instance was the replacement of the general Leothenes (the elder) by Chares in 361. Instead of succeeding his predecessor's command on Peparethos, Chares was sent to Corcyra instead, with all the repercussions that ensued for the Athenians.<sup>82</sup> Likewise, the despatch of Iphicrates to aid the Persians might well be mentioned by Diodoros because, even at that point in time, such an act was looked upon with some disdain.<sup>83</sup> Events viewed by the sources to be unusual or of great importance warranted extra information which could be provided by the idea of some form of orders to the departing general. Such orders were, in reality, of no value and were not issued.

Pericles' control over him for the activities around by the Greek king-zans was the use of communications between generals in the field and the home authorities. These communications could take numerous forms, particularly amongst the Athenians who never adopted any set method of exchanging communications: as, *e.g.*, did the Spartans with their *Agelai*.<sup>85</sup> However, this does not mean to say that the Athenian generals did not communicate with the authorities at home. For such communication does not prove strategic control either.

Communications seem to have followed two distinct patterns. Firstly, there was the request, usually made by a *proxenos* when in need of reinforcements or money, but sometimes advice on a particular matter. Xenophon offers a prime example of this form of communication: '...Timotheos kept on sending to Athens for money. He needed a lot since he had a lot of ships.'<sup>85</sup> In 373 Iphicrates captured several triremes from Dionysios of Syracuse carrying sacred statues to Delphi and Olympia, and wrote to the Athenians to ask what to do with them.<sup>86</sup> However, examples of this type of communication are scarce in the C4th. compared with the C5th., which must make any theory rather speculative.<sup>87</sup> But from what evidence there is, it can be seen that such communications simply do not fulfil the criteria of implying control by the central authorities.

I have found only two examples of what might be interpreted as orders initiated by the home authorities being sent to generals in mid-campaign. In 371, the Athenians wrote to Iphicrates, ordering him to

bring the fleet home and to restore any captures made after the oath-swearing of the general peace in that year.<sup>88</sup> Again, in 354/353, Chares was forbidden to make war on the royal satraps and ordered home by the Athenians through the means of a letter and an embassy.<sup>89</sup> It must be noted however, that this order only came about after the satrap Tithraustes had put pressure on the Athenians to do so (through the Great King), and that prior to this, the Athenians had looked upon this act of initiative by the *strategos* with favour.<sup>90</sup>

There are several occurrences of the other form of communication, the letter or despatch to the home authorities by campaigning generals, relevant to this discussion. Most notable must be the evidence found in the speech of Demosthenes *Against Aristocrates*, in which the speaker calls for several "letters" from the generals Iphicrates, Timotheos and Chares to be read out to the assembly.<sup>91</sup> Unfortunately, it was not seen fit to include such documents in the text. But at least there is the evidence of such despatches. Such occurrences also take place in Aeschines II.70 and Demosthenes VII.33, both being a despatch from Chares to the demos. Isocrates VII.81 refers to the reports of the strategoi to the demos attesting to the hatred for the Athenians felt amongst the Hellenes. Demosthenes in letter VI mentions "...ἦλθεν ἐπιστολὴ παρ' Ἀντιφίλου πρὸς τοὺς τῶν συμμάχων συνέδρους.." <sup>92</sup> Finally there are four examples of inscriptions which attest to the receipt of messages from campaigning generals.<sup>93</sup> Therefore, it does seem possible to argue that the generals did communicate with the assembly when on campaign, keeping the *demos*

influence of the character of their home-state. However, to suggest that such communication was a sign of control is not excluding.

Firstly, it is possible to argue, however, that there is simply not enough evidence to argue that either depositions, or other communications by generals were regular features of Athenian military campaigns during the period covered by this thesis. Indeed, the scarcity of the references that do exist might rather point more to the opposite conclusion, that such correspondence was a rarity, the exception and not the rule. However, that might well be to go too far. For what can be seen from the evidence is that there did not seem to be any code of conduct, any imperative, which made the *strategos* glib in such dialogue. That which the general undertook was usually done on his own initiative, often for personal motives. A letter of complaint about hostile 'allies', for instance, might well lessen the bitterness of defeat for an expectant people back home. On the other hand of course, victory was always something to write home about.

In short, the majority of communications between the Athenians and their serving generals were voluntary acts, initiated by the generals themselves and usually borne out of either necessity or victory. Only in very exceptional circumstances did correspondence come from the home authorities; when political circumstances had occurred which might have bypassed the general in the field and left him pursuing a policy out of synchronisation with the central authorities of his home state. This was the only occasion when the home authorities would intervene in a campaign (other than recall and depositions etc.) to bring a general into line. In the

main it was left to the individual *strategos* to determine the level of communication between himself and the Athenian "government". Nor was any idea of compunction or of interference on the part of those authorities to be implied through such correspondence. Chares was eager enough to write to the Athenians of his "second Marathon", yet clearly he had not seen fit to correspond at all before then, since the embassy was despatched to go and find him.<sup>94</sup> Again, in 353/352, one Antiochos was sent out to find Chares in the midst of a national emergency as the Athenians had no idea where he was.<sup>95</sup>

Communication was not necessarily a form of control exercised by the Athenian central authorities over serving generals. Nor was it a sign of effective control through other means. The Athenian generals enjoyed a virtually unrestrained freedom in the conducting of their campaigns and this freedom was only inhibited by their loyalty to the country that they served.

Thus, Pritchett's theory on the effective control of commanders in the field by the Athenian authorities can be modified. Although the machinery was present to do so, the Athenians did not impose strict controls upon their specialist commanders because they had no need to do so. The activities of the specialist *strategoi* throughout the period of this thesis has revealed that such control was not necessary. Such was the loyalty of these generals that they were in fact self-regulating in what they did. The increasing use of the term *autokrator* in the 4th. (as discussed in the following chapter) not only demonstrated the evolution of Athenian military command in relation to the developments in generalship and warfare in the

C4th., but also the evolution of the generalship in its relations with the Athenian people. The generals were, of necessity, given increasingly blank cheques to carry out their operations. The orators and rhetors of the assembly were to find that the specialist generals could not be attacked through judicial means because, in the main, they acted according to the wishes of the majority of the Athenian people and in the best interests of the Athenian nation.

## The Generals and the Evolution of Warfare

As I described in the previous chapter, the Athenian command structure was, in the early part of the century at least, a relatively crude and unresponsive instrument for the effective transmission and enactment of orders. But why was this structure so crude, and what effect did it have on the role of the general as a military commander ?

In terms of warfare, Heath noted that command structures within the armies of the later middle ages reflected the training and proficiency of the troops which made up the army.<sup>1</sup> A highly developed command network would have little effect upon the troops if they were not sufficiently trained to be able to respond to those orders issued through the chain. The Athenian army of the latter part of the C5th. and the early C4th. does seem to support this idea. Pericles in the funeral speech contrasted the natural courage of the Athenians with the laborious training of the Spartans.<sup>2</sup> Unlike their Spartan rivals, Athenian citizen soldiers of the early part of the C4th. would only be soldiers part of the year, for the two to three months of the campaigning season at most, and, for the rest of the time would carry on their normal jobs in civilian life. Nor was it the Athenians who were exceptional. Plutarch records a story in his life of Agesilaos in which the allies of Sparta began to complain about the lack of soldiers the Spartans



were contributing to the allied armies, whereupon Agesilaos bade the whole army sit down and thereupon asked the troops to stand up profession by profession. Eventually only the Spartans, the only true soldiers, remained seated.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the Athenians resembled the majority of *poleis* in that their system offered armies which were but part-time citizen militias little able to effect other than the most basic of commands.<sup>4</sup>

It is of little wonder then, that Adcock wrote that the Greek general could do little more than "...dispose his troops as well as he could, encourage them to fight well, and fight well himself, as one hoplite amongst the rest."<sup>5</sup> In fact, such an idea not only reflects the weaknesses in military development within the Greek *polis* system, but also reflect the social strengths of that same system. This was especially true of the democratic city-state, of which Athens was the most notable example. The general within the Athenian system was to be, above all else, a citizen of the *polis* and a commander second. Such was the cornerstone of the relationship between the *strategos* and the troops who served under him. The jobs of the *strategos* were clear. Firstly, prior to combat he was to provide the inspiration for the troops by means of the pre-battle address. Then, once battle was underway he was to act as a personal rallying point and inspiration for his troops. He was not supposed to be some distant figure directing operations from afar. There did also seem to be some compulsion amongst the generals to fight and to die (if necessary) alongside their men.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, it seems to have been the commander who stood apart from his men who was criticised for not being "one" of them.<sup>7</sup> Within the context of hoplite warfare, it was the duty of the general to act out his command in a

directly active role. In so doing he was demonstrating the strength of his own convictions with regard to his dispositions, his trust in his men, and his own position as one amongst equals.

In Athenian terms, this tendency was highlighted to a greater degree. The generals acted mostly in groups. Rarely did individuals command large forces. Generals were expected to remember their place as mere citizens above all else. Hence the famous trial and conviction of the victorious generals for leaving behind the stragglers after the naval victory at Arginousai.<sup>8</sup> The basis for respect and obedience of the generals by the citizen phalanx was the idea of ultimate equality, and a shared experience of commonality and mutual belonging. This notion of common experience and shared fortune found its clearest expression in the uniquely Athenian institution of the Funeral Oration. Delivered after the loss of many men in battle, the orations that survive prior to 323/322 ( Pericles [Thuc. II.35-46], Dem. LX and Lysias II) recall the glories of the Athenian nation and its people. The stress is on a collective self praise of all Athenians. There are few mentions of individuals.

As a final ingredient in this ideology there is no evidence of any training in either tactics or strategy for Athenian generals, simply because in the next year, the general could, and often did, find himself fighting in the ranks of the army as a mere hoplite.<sup>9</sup>

During the course of the 4th. the relationship between the Athenian generals, the men whom they commanded, and the citizens of the

city, was altered by the development of warfare into an art form.

The tactical innovations of the Spartans and their specialisation in warfare had inevitable consequences for the other Greek city-states. During the course of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans had begun to adapt the basic clash of opposing hoplite phalanxes which made up classical hoplite battles to their own ends. At the first battle of Mantinea in 418 the Spartans took advantage of the natural drift of phalanxes to move to their right to successfully outflank their enemies in battle.<sup>10</sup> During the C4th. this development became more advanced. At the Nemea in 394, such was the Spartan skill that the troops were able to manoeuvre in mid-battle, through means of a ninety degree wheel, into a position to "roll up the allied line." At the Second Coronea in the same year, the Spartans again demonstrated a superiority in training and discipline that stood them apart from the hoplites of any other Greek city-state.<sup>11</sup> Though the opportunities for major tactical innovation in hoplite warfare were relatively limited, warfare as practised by the city-states becoming increasingly refined as the C4th. progressed.<sup>12</sup>

From the early fourth century onwards there began to appear treatises on war and generalship.<sup>13</sup> In these it was stressed the necessity of the general to actually command, and in order to do this he was required to stay out of the front line. Xenophon stressed the need for the general not to be too rash.<sup>14</sup> Onasander too suggested "...let the general fight with caution rather than with daring, or even let him stay out of the hand-to-hand fighting entirely."<sup>15</sup>

In his recent book on Greek infantry battle, V. D. Hanson argued that the old relationship of the general to his "fellow" men, as reflected by his actual fighting in the front rank of the phalanx continued into, and throughout the C4th.<sup>16</sup> Hanson argued that in a hoplite battle the commander of a defeated army would rarely survive the death of so many of his fellow citizens: "most later writers did not appreciate what the sacrifice of hoplite generals was, nor did they realise that such casualties were not always responsible for an army's collapse but, rather, were symptomatic of a leader's close ties with his men once the battle had, for other reasons, been lost."<sup>17</sup> Hanson contended that such an end was the inevitable and constant result of defeat (and sometimes even victory) in hoplite battle, not just for the militarily advanced nations of the C4th., but for all Greek city-states. "The Athenians, to their credit, followed the same tradition well into the C4th. In the aftermath of Chaeronea, they condemned Lysicles, the surviving general to death."<sup>18</sup>

If Hanson's argument is correct then Athenian military practices must have remained at the rather crude levels which I discussed above. The generals would have been restricted to the roles they had always had, only being able to influence the course of events within the range of their own personal command. Nor would many of Athens' generals have survived. Chares, in particular, was basically, a remarkably unsuccessful general during his long career, yet he died peacefully, or at least, not in battle. Indeed, at Chaeronea, where he was one of the leading *strategoi*, he was neither killed nor condemned after the battle. Antiphilos too, seemingly survived the crushing defeat at Crannon.

It is simply impossible to press the argument of this continuing active role by the generals to any great extent during the C4th.. From very early on in the century, generals began to realise the necessity of remaining in a position where they could affect the course of battle in terms of generalship. Hanson claimed that "...even the commanders of mercenary armies in the C4th.-Iphicrates and Chabrias continued to fight alongside their troops once battle had commenced despite the fact that they led forces that were quite different in nature from the purely citizen militias of the prior two centuries."<sup>19</sup> Although it does seem that Chabrias did still fight amongst his troops in battle, such an activity seems contrary to what is known of Iphicrates. An allusion recalls that Iphicrates, seeing another *strategos* exhibiting his wounds to some admirers, rebuked his colleague that such things were not the marks of the general.<sup>20</sup> The general was evolving from an amateur leading his fellow citizens into a much more remote figure, both militarily and socially. For Iphicrates, the army was a body in which the phalanx was the chest, the *psiloi* the arms, the cavalry the feet and the general the head.<sup>21</sup>

In support of this idea must be the increasing use of mercenaries during the century. Although some have argued that this century saw the city-states become the slaves of the mercenary forces which they had to hire to form their military forces, there can be no doubt that mercenaries did come to be increasingly important elements within Athenian armies.

Mercenaries had long been a feature of Greek armies. Most often

their use was confined to that of certain ethnic speciality troops, such as Cretan archers, recorded in Spartan armies of the First Messenian War of the late C8th..<sup>22</sup> They had also formed the backbone of the military support that maintained many of the tyrants of the C7th. and C6th.. Later, in the C4th., Iphicrates' successful command of a large independent force of lightly armed mercenaries in the Isthmus during the Corinthian War<sup>23</sup> guaranteed the employment of increased numbers of mercenaries to fill the roles of certain specialists which citizen militias were unable to provide.<sup>24</sup> But it was not until the end of the Peloponnesian War that social and economic conditions brought about a rapid advance in the use of mercenaries as substantial portions of the hoplite phalanx within Greek city-state armies. From the time of the Cyrus expedition and the Corinthian War onwards, mercenaries were available in sufficient quantity (as a proportion of all soldiers) to exercise an appreciable influence on the Athenian (and Greek city-state) mode of warfare and, by extension, its social organisation. This has been called the age of the "mercenariat".<sup>25</sup> Though not as dominating in their presence in C4th. Greek armies as some complained they were (e.g. Isocrates), nevertheless, their role in the development of the Athenian *strategia* was to be significant.

The refinement of tactical command in hoplite warfare, the decline in the old style leadership in battle, and the partial replacement of citizen militia with professional mercenaries would suggest that the relationship between the Athenian generals and the ordinary citizens of Athens would have suffered a decline. However, it is my contention that the opposite was the case, for the following reasons.

Mercenaries often showed a highly developed sense of professionalism and *esprit de corps* greater, in some ways, than those of militia armies. This was the result of the greater training and drill that was necessary in order for the troops to be employable. Then there is evidence of a closer relationship between mercenaries and their commanders. The commanders of mercenaries often had to provide much more than just a daily wage for their men. The *Anabasis* of Xenophon suggests that the organisation of mercenary service was already fairly advanced by 400, with the provision of both military pay and provisioning.<sup>26</sup> In the *Laches*, Socrates has to tell his young friend who wants to be a *strategos* that there was more to generalship than just strategy and tactics. "A general must be fully prepared to furnish all the equipment necessary for war. He must be ready with all the supplies for his troops."<sup>27</sup> Thus the reliance between the troops and the commander was even greater than those between the citizen militias and their leaders. The men came to follow their leaders wheresoever they took them. The mercenaries Chares took to Asia in 354 and those Leosthenes brought back from Asia and then employed in the Lamian War are just two examples of this loyalty.<sup>28</sup>

The feelings of loyalty and necessity that bound both citizen soldiery and mercenaries alike to their leaders during the 4th. were intensified further because there were simply so few competent (in this instance, specialist) commanders in the Greek world. As I have already identified, there were arguably only about eight or, at most, ten Athenian *strategoi* throughout the period of this thesis who can be determined to have been

specialists in warfare.<sup>29</sup> It is to these figures that the soldiers offered loyalty and affiliation. As the C4th. progressed the role of these specialists became increasingly important in relation to the other, unspecialised, generals who were supposed to be their equals. From Conon and his successful naval campaigns in the Aegean in 395/394 onwards, the tendency was towards individual generals (as opposed to bands of generals) in command of expeditions and campaigns, even of large forces.<sup>30</sup> Even if such a development did go against all the best ideals of the democratic *polis*, military necessity required it in the changing world of the C4th. Nor was this idea simply a C4th. innovation. The speech of Hermocrates to his fellow commanders during the siege of Syracuse makes clear that this basic flaw in the Athenian democratic command was recognised during the C5th: " Much mischief had also been caused by the large numbers of the generals (on the Athenian side) and the division of command - for they had fifteen generals... ." <sup>31</sup> This compared to the Spartan custom of the individual kings commanding the armies. Thus Hermocrates himself went on to offer the solution to the problem (for the Syracusans): " The generals then, whom they should elect, ought to be few in number and clothed with full powers and they should give them their oath that they would in all truth allow them to command according to their judgment. " <sup>32</sup>

Perhaps it was in answer to this trend that the C4th. also witnessed the increasing use of the term *αὐτοκράτωρ* as a title given to generals with absolute authority.<sup>33</sup> I believe that although this term had been used in the C5th., its use in the C4th. was the response of the democratic



processes of government to the military developments occurring around them over which they had no control. Command was gradually being removed from the limitations of collective generalship as had been imposed by the Athenian system. Yet C4th. warfare was becoming too complicated for such "democratic" decision making in war. There were simply not enough specialists in the military field for this form of command to continue. However, the Athenian processes of government could be seen to entertain the rise of such individuals within the system and so began to use the term of *autokrator* with increasing regularity. I find it hard to believe that this term actually meant anything other than to put into official terms what was, in effect, a *fait accompli*. For instance, I doubt if Leosthenes would have acted any differently in his preparations for the Lamian war if he had not been made *autokrator* (or *strategos* for that matter) by the Athenian authorities.<sup>34</sup> Similarly Chares could not have acted with any greater authority if he had been made *autokrator* in the Social War.<sup>35</sup>

But what then, were the consequences of these developments on the Athenian method of warfare ? Firstly, the lack of restrictive control from the central authorities of state and from devolved (i.e. to political controllers) or shared (i.e. collective generalship) powers allowed the Athenian military specialists to act as they saw fit both on campaign and in battle. The military innovations of Iphicrates and Chabrias reflect this freedom of action to improve the Athenian military machinery.<sup>36</sup> This can also be seen in the demands of these men for the Athenian citizen-soldiery to become better trained for the demands of C4th. warfare. Iphicrates refused to lead into battle a force of men because, although he had the numerical superiority

over the enemy, they were so badly trained that they were unable to carry out the most basic of commands.<sup>37</sup> Thus, from early on in the century the specialist generals began to impose upon the Athenians the need for competently trained men, be they citizens or mercenaries, in order for they themselves to command efficiently. The raising and training of the *epheboi* was, in part at least, an answer to this requirement.<sup>38</sup> And certainly the results did show. The performances of the infantry phalanxes at both Chaeronea and during the Lamian War reflected the greater training, and thus, the improved tactical flexibility, of the Athenian citizen-soldiery, particularly when compared to the performances of their predecessors during the Corinthian War.<sup>39</sup>

In conclusion, the generals played a uniquely significant role in the military history of the Athenian nation in the C4th.B.C.. Although in the early part of the century the effective command and control of the armies were limited both by the weaknesses inherent within the Athenian military in terms of tactical command structure and training deficiencies, the C4th. witnessed military change which enabled Athenian military specialists to command with a far greater degree of efficiency than had been the case previously. The rise of mercenaries, the gradual integration of the various arms of Greek city-state armies, and the general improvements in training all played a part in this, but there became apparent a much greater degree of loyalty and an acceptance of orders amongst citizens and mercenaries alike. The more basic loyalties felt by troops for their equals, the keystone of the relationship between the hoplite general and his fellow citizens making up his force, was replaced (to a certain degree) by a higher form of respect, that

felt by those who think they are being led by someone superior to themselves (in the art of war).

That the whole nature of generalship was changing was apparent in the Athenian attitudes to their specialist commanders. In the C5th. the Athenians were keen to show victories as those of the Athenian people and not those of individuals. Aeschines recalled the inscription on the third of the Hermae that celebrated victory in the Trojan War: "Is the name of the general anywhere here? Nowhere; only the name of the people."<sup>40</sup> In contrast, the victories of the great generals of the C4th., Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos were attributed to them, and lavish civic honours duly came their way.<sup>41</sup> The Funeral Oration of Hypereides, the final example of the *genre* offers us a clue to the new relationship between the Athenian people and their generals at the end of the period of this thesis. Delivered mid-way through the Lamian War, the oration uniquely concentrates upon the achievements of Leosthenes (recently killed) as the architect of the war, commander of the Athenians and the (somewhat premature) saviour of the *polis*. Such an oration would have been inconceivable in the C5th. By the later C4th. it was the generals who won victories, or at least, who took the credit for them. Cleitus' Euripidean jibe at Alexander, that the victories that he claimed as his own were really those of his men, was of sufficient insult for the king to despatch him with a spear.<sup>42</sup>

This altered relationship between *strategos* and his men brought a far greater readiness to follow the general not just in the tactical sense, but in

the long term as well. The effects upon the sociopolitical relationships were enormous, and are discussed in the following chapter. What the consequences were for the role of the Athenian generals at war were to be similarly important.

It was the generals who were seen as responsible for the victories which brought Athens back to some form of greatness in the C4th., and it was the generals who were likewise seen as responsible for the defeats which robbed her of it. Although events, circumstances (i.e. the rise of the "superpower" [Macedon]) and basic economics made the achievement of military success more difficult for Athenian generals in the C4th., Leosthenes proved that the Athenian army, in the right hands, was capable of equalling, and indeed, defeating even the greatest military nations.

Thus, military success and failure on the part of the Athenians was due, primarily, to the basic military competence, or incompetence, of the Athenian generals themselves. Indeed, the death of Leosthenes can be said to have been one of the few genuine instances of bad luck playing a great part on the final outcome of a war. But the Athenians had failed to gain the victories in the fifty years prior to that campaign to justify success on that one occasion.

The role of the generals in the military sphere cannot be overestimated. They were the arbiters of the ultimate destruction of Athenian liberty on account of their own incompetence on the battlefield. As Field Marshal Foch wrote: "Great results in war are due to the commander.

History is therefore correct in making generals responsible for victories, in which case they are glorified, and for defeats, in which they are disgraced."<sup>43</sup> One of the most notable features of the Athenian political system in the C4th. was that the generals were only rarely called to account concerning failure in battle. There can be no more significant a sign of their power beyond the purely military sphere.

The ordinary people and the soldiers of Athens, and the mercenaries who fought alongside them in all the major campaigns of the C4th. sought to exalt the leading generals in order to compare with, and perhaps to capture, some of the success of, the great dynasts of autocratic rule in Thessaly (Alexander and Jason of Pherae), in Syracuse (Dion and Dionysios) and, most notably, in Macedon (Philip II and Alexander III). In the final analysis, the men who came forward were simply not up to the expectations put on them.

Part IV:

## **The Generals and Politics.**

## The Generals and Athenian Politics, 404-323

Democracies both ancient and modern, are delicate things. That great French constitutionalist of the C19th. Abbé Sieyès likened democracy to a finely tuned balance which could only require the slightest knock to shift out of position. The "radical" democracy of C5th. Athens was to be no exception. The traumatic events of the Peloponnesian War brought about similar traumas in Athens itself. In 411 and 404 the ancient constitution was overthrown and the democracy replaced by oligarchies, "the Four Hundred" and "the Thirty" respectively. However, the democracy was perhaps stronger than the oligarchs had imagined and in the following year (403), the oligarchs were themselves overthrown and a moderate democracy was restored. Thus Athens opened the new era of her history with the governmental system which had flourished in the years of her greatest power. In defeat, it was to be the one thing that would be regarded as fundamental to Athenian political life.<sup>1</sup>

It is precisely because of this fact that I have introduced this chapter with mention of the two oligarchic "revolutions" of the late C5th.. For whatever else they achieved, the failure of both regimes was to see the virtual elimination of the old oligarch/democrat division which had been such a feature of Athenian politics in the previous century. Indeed, the

victory of the democrats was such that it put paid to any (openly expressed) thoughts concerning constitutional change for two generations. The old "oligarchic" class turned instead to more outward expressions of intent. Democracy became the universal motto of all strata in Athenian society. Democratia became a virtual cult during the C4th.<sup>2</sup> Such was the new political framework in which the generals had to work. By accident and by design, they were to find a path which not only was to maintain their position of significant influence in the new conditions of C4th. Athens, but one which even found them in roles of increasing power and influence without upsetting the balance of the democratic system.

#### **a: The People in the Athenian Political System, 404-323:**

In terms of democratic government, what is meant by the term "the people" ? In the modern democracy, "the people" is usually the term applied to the electorate that votes for its representatives to the legislature at a specified time or within a specified period. In this manner, although the representatives to the legislature are "of the people", they are a group quite distinct from the mass of the population. In the Athenian democracy, however, there was no representative assembly in its own right and no government. The democracy was direct, and all citizens could attend, propose, speak and vote in the legislature, the *ecclesia* . In short, the *ecclesia* was the people and all decisions taken in the assembly were popular.<sup>3</sup>

As I have already noted, the leading politicians of all the



factions of Athenian politics were, customarily, men of wealth and property. This had always been so since Athenian politics, traditionally split on oligarchic and democratic lines, had regularly been dominated by men from the old aristocratic families, such as Theramenes and Pericles, to give two examples.<sup>4</sup> Yet in the C4th. there seems to have been a general trend amongst the older families to keep out of public affairs. Plato himself was a prime example. Whilst his own involvement (and those of several others) must have been influenced by the participation of his relatives Critias and Charmides as leading members of "the Thirty", other factors seem to have made this trend more widespread. In part it was perhaps due to the emergence in the last decades of the C5th. of men like Cleon and Cleophon who successfully challenged the political leadership of the old aristocratic families. Perhaps also, the unpleasant face of "radical popular democracy" which was revealed after the battle of Arginousae in 406, made many from the old families realise that they were alienated from such a system and liable to become the victims of the *demos*. They therefore withdrew from active public life or did not enter it at all.<sup>5</sup> In short then, the early C4th. witnessed in Athens a continuation of the trends which had become noticeable in the C5th. as to those who held most sway in the assembly and *boule*. The older wealthy figures and families made way for newer figures to fill the vacuum. By the time of Demosthenes hardly any political leader was of noble descent, and distinguished birth was no longer considered of any consequence.<sup>6</sup>

Although good birth was no longer a prerequisite for ambitious men entering the political field, was Pericles correct in asserting that poverty was

not a bar ? Surely the answer must be that he was not. A fair measure of wealth was essential for the aspiring rhetor, if only because they could not otherwise afford to spend their time in the numerous meetings of the assembly. These men formed a distinct third group in the Athenian sociopolitical spectrum, coherent enough for some to have seen them as a distinct "middle class" in their own right.<sup>7</sup>

This class was based upon wealth either recently acquired, or inherited from a recently enriched family. Wealth was the sole basis for their position, both in the assembly and in Athenian society as a whole. That is not to say that all the leading politicians of the 4th. were of this group. Timotheos for instance, the son of Conon, was proud of his aristocratic origin and his family's long involvement in Athenian politics. But the trend was certainly a significant one. By the 360's, Timotheos was seen as something of an anachronism.<sup>8</sup>

Athenian society was divided into social strata based upon perceptions of wealth. The term "the people" in ancient times could also carry with it implications of social class. "The people" were as the counterparts to "the few", the aristocratic class, and later, "the wealthy". Take, for instance, a well-known passage in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, in which the author describes post-war Athens as being divided into two parties, "the populist many" (*hoi polloi kai demotikoi*), and "the men of breeding and property" (*hoi epieikeis kai tas ousias echontes*).<sup>9</sup>

It was this division that was commonly represented as the basis

for having certain attitudes and supporting certain policies. "The people" or "the masses" were seen and recognised as a distinct social grouping removed from that of "the few" and, as such, followed certain different political attitudes, the most divisive being the issue of war. The men of wealth were depicted as being disposed to favour peace (to avoid the economic burdens of the trierarchy and eisphora), whilst the poor favoured war.<sup>10</sup>

Greek comedy utilised this idea to paint a picture of the 4th-century democracy as being wracked with internal social conflict between the rich and poor. Wealth was portrayed as something to be regarded in an unfavourable light, and this feeling was most strongly expressed against the *nouveaux riches*, for want of a better term, becoming increasingly dominant in the *ecclesia* and the *boule* and the connection was made between wealth and politics. All politicians, even those who sought the support of and "leadership" of "the many" were regularly portrayed in Greek Comedy as villains, even criminals.. This group was portrayed as having made their wealth by unsavoury methods. " ὅσοι δ' ἐπλούτουν οὐσίαν τ' εἶχον συχνὴν οὐκ ἐκ δικαίου τὸν βίον κεκτημένοι... ," says the slave Cario in the *Ploutos*,<sup>11</sup> but the idea is an oft-repeated one.<sup>12</sup> "They place no limit on their evil ways," says Ploutos, "every single one of them is bad."<sup>13</sup> Again, "as soon as they (the orators) have enriched themselves at public expense, they become criminals; they intrigue to defeat the popular cause, and make war on the people itself."<sup>14</sup>

However, it is doubtful if Greek comedy accurately reflects the

political situation in C4th. Athens. Aristophanes might have sought to play upon what he perceived as being social tension and division, but there is very little evidence to indicate if he accurately reflected the attitudes of the Athenian poor.<sup>15</sup> As I have already discussed the nature of the direct democracy did not allow for unpopular politicians to remain at the forefront of Athenian affairs. They would either be ignored or, if extremely unfavourable to the *demos*, they ran the risk of impeachment. Wealth could not be the sole basis for political support. Active politics was a rich mans game and even "the leaders of the people", those whose line the people generally followed in the assembly, were men of wealth. Though there was probably some basic dislike of all politicians, that was because they were politicians and not because they were men of wealth. In any event, the popular attitudes of the Athenian masses to those active in Athenian politics are only of moderate significance, since the politicians of the C4th. were vying for political influence against each other, not against the people. The first half of the C4th. was a period where political influence became based much more upon the power to harness short-term popular support than one based upon the long term implications of wealth.

Clearly the Athenian democracy after 403 was secure. There was no *stasis* in the C4th., nor a hint of any (in itself quite remarkable in the C4th. city states). Yet after the Social War, the introduction of a new factor into Athenian politics altered the situation somewhat and did bring about some friction between those dominant in the *ecclesia* and the majority of ordinary Athenian citizens.

A common theme in the works of Isocrates was anger at the growing use of mercenaries in Athenian armies at the expense of the traditional citizen-soldier.<sup>16</sup> Even if, as seems likely, such an idea was greatly exaggerated in order to emphasise the writer's point, that point still retains considerable validity in the context of this discussion.<sup>17</sup> The decline of the citizen militia, in the eyes of Isocrates, was to be linked to a decline in the patriotism felt by the average Athenian for his *polis* and, ultimately, would lead to the break up of the city-state itself.<sup>18</sup> Yet it was, after all, the masses who clamoured for war and wished for the Athenians to be once again dominant in the Aegean. What Isocrates denounced in the Athenian citizen as a loss of patriotism can, in fact, be interpreted in the opposite light. The Athenian masses were remarkably resolute in their patriotism throughout the period of this thesis. Such patriotism was seen in the resolve of the *ecclesia* to go to war in 396, so soon after the Peloponnesian War; in the near-continuous wars fought after that date down till Chaeronea in 338; and most conclusively rounded off by the massive effort of the Lamian War which falls at the very end of the period.

It was after the Social War that the question of patriotism gradually became much more important in Athenian politics. The rise of Macedon posed questions for all Athenians, but it was amongst those who dominated the internal organs of Athenian political life that this question posed the most serious problems. A. H. Chroust, in his article on "Treason and Patriotism in Ancient Greece" convincingly portrayed another, less honourable side, to Athenian city-life. "Few indeed," he writes, "were those men in ancient Athens whose political conduct was consistent with our notion of patriotism

and patriotic devotion to one's country; and few men, in a position to do so, would have hesitated to collaborate with a foreign power, whenever such action promised domination over the city and the utter defeat of a political opponent."<sup>19</sup> Yet what must be emphasised was that Chroust's examination was one largely dealing with the more directly powerful in the Athenian, and Greek in general, context. The most important part of the above quote is "...few men, in a position to do so... ." Patriotism in our sense of the word was still a very strong emotion amongst the vast majority of Athenian citizens in the C4th.; where it was presented as being at its weakest was in the area of the greatest importance, in the central decision-making bodies amongst the politically-dominant specialist orators. Obviously, not all *rhetoires* were collaborators with the Macedonians. On the other hand, there were times when the Athenian masses seemingly took a pro-Macedonian stance (as is suggested by the embassy of the whole crew of the *Paralos* to Alexander in 331/330). But clearly the receipt by politicians of bribes from foreign powers in order to promote their own interests did play (or was portrayed as playing) a role in C4th. Athenian politics. Its popularity as an accusation by opposing orators supports the view that such accusations found ready ears amongst the common citizenry.<sup>20</sup> The genuine extent of bribe-taking is of no real concern for us here. What does matter is that the average loyal, patriotic Athenian perceived many who held sway in the assembly and *boule* as to be mainly unscrupulous, devious individuals, who might betray their own country for personal gain, be it for monetary gain or power.<sup>21</sup>

A loss of confidence in " the governing classes " by a majority of

people, based upon an idea of collaboration with foreign powers (whether true or not) is, potentially, a dangerous condition. However, again this idea must not be pushed too far. In the Athenian system such feelings were, to some extent, apparently diluted by the nature of democracy. The political leaders relied ultimately upon popular support. If the *demos* accepted that any political figure was acting against the best interests of the state then he would lose influence by the wish of the *demos*. The *oratores* in the assembly attacked each other with accusations of bribery and treason for the sake of short-term political capital and even the most vehement anti-Macedonians could suffer as a result of the taint (e.g. Demosthenes in 324), only to be returned to favour again at the expense of another. In short, as the Macedonian Kingdom became an increasingly dominant question in Athenian affairs, the Athenian *demos* did begin to perceive its leading orators as being prone to foreign influences and increasingly considered that the city might be as much at risk from within itself as from without. As the Austro-Hungarian Field Marshal and military theorist von Hötendorff wrote "...the poor man has nothing but the love of his country. If he is betrayed, or believes himself to have been betrayed, by those in power then, and only then, will he wonder just what it is he serves..."<sup>22</sup>

Civilian politicians are rarely regarded with respect by the ordinary citizen. Such is the usual lot of the man involved in politics. But when those politicians (in the modern sense) are considered to be behaving in a treasonable way, then credibility is lost and the people may look elsewhere for those to lead them and their country. The second half of the C4th. was one in which social harmony was somewhat upset by the

growing shadow of Macedon and the damage this caused to the credibility of the specialist orators in the assembly.

To assess just how these new conditions affected the *strategia*, and to show what new, or altered, roles it filled in this period, I consider it necessary to determine how the workings of the democracy, notably the *ecclesia*, developed in the face of this altered situation, and to show how the politicians attempted to mould the roles of that office to suit their own needs in the face of the *demos* and this new set of conditions. In order to aid my analysis I have divided the group I termed as "the politicians" in the introduction to this chapter, into two distinct parts.

Firstly, there is the group of those men who, by their regular appearances and speech-making in the assembly, can be styled as *oratores* or *rhetores*.<sup>23</sup> Secondly, there are the generals. In the Athenian system these were as much part of that group which can be described as "politicians" as the orators but, as I have explained in the Introduction to this thesis, I have found it possible to justify my division between those who were specialists in that magistracy and the remainder. This broader group itself encompassed virtually the whole spectrum of active Athenian politicians, from those who sought to specialise in the field of military command (like Chabrias, Iphicrates and Timotheos etc.) and who, for a variety of reasons, never attained equal status as their distinguished colleagues right across to those who were but amateur generals seeking to utilise the political bonus such a title held but without the skill to take up any major active command. Thus, in this discussion, although the terms might



appear to be used quite haphazardly, I have attempted to utilise my arbitrary definition of the loose groupings within Athenian society to differentiate as clearly as possible between the various groups which I am discussing. In a similar vein, it can be seen how I can justify use of the term "the people" to mean everyone I have not bracketed within the term "the politicians", although the emphasis will often be only the poor rather than the alienated aristocratic families. Such differences of meaning will, I hope, be made clear in the context the terms are found.

To sum up then, the political context of this chapter was one based around the favour of the Athenian *demos*. Those who took part in, and dominated, active politics in Athens, the *rhetoires kai strategoi*, were figures who, in order to maintain any position of prominence, were forced continually to curry favour with the *demos* (in the *ecclesia*). This might well explain the introduction of pay (μισθος) by the orator Agyrrhios for those attending the assembly.<sup>24</sup> Such a move was almost certainly a demagogic means of gaining popularity and political influence. Two pieces of evidence seem to back up this theory. Firstly, Praxagora in the *Ecclesiastousai* states that "...we never bothered with Assemblies at that time; Everyone knew that Agyrrhios was crooked."<sup>25</sup> If this statement truly reflects popular opinion concerning Agyrrhios then it can be seen that any politician might attempt to gain favour through measures which would naturally appeal to the populace, whatever they might have thought of that politician. Such is the case in all democracies, particularly when election time comes around. But in the Athenian direct democracy the tactic assumed a much greater significance. Hence within a short space of time after the

introduction of pay at one *obol* a day, the level of the *misthos* was raised to two, then three *obols* per day,<sup>26</sup> the first being introduced by Heracleides of Clazomenae,<sup>27</sup> the second by Agyrrhios again. *Misthos* became a political football of the demagogues as they sought power through the only means they could achieve it, by popular support. By 327, pay was at the levels of six *obols* per meeting and nine *obols* at the principal meeting (*ecclesia kyria*) of each *prytany*.<sup>28</sup> It was as such a weapon that the generalship and the specialist generals were used in the first half of the 4th., as a means of gaining and maintaining support in the assembly. Only from the time of the Social War onward did the generalship begin to exert an influence in its own right. As the Macedonian threat caused increasing political division between the orators of the *ecclesia* and the *demos* itself, the specialist generals became popular political forces within the democracy in their own right.

### The Generals - The Popular Oligarchs ?:

Firstly, I shall ask (rhetorically), what is a general ? The dictionary offers the barest insight into a definition: " the military commander of an army or group of armed men " (*OSD* ). But such a definition is completely inadequate for the generals in classical Athens. Given the nature of the Athenian democratic system - without parties, governing groups or any "head of state", the nearest equivalent to the "executive branch" of modern government was the board of *strategoï* , elected annually from amongst the citizen population. Thus, in the Athenian model, the generals took on a role

with much closer links to the decision-making bodies, in a manner very alien to the strict separation of governmental branches found in the modern Western-style democracy. Indeed, in the 5th., this relationship was very apparent through the tendency of leading politicians also to hold the *strategia*. Pericles and Cleon are notable examples, as are Themistocles and Cimon from earlier in the century. Clearly, not only did the *strategia* offer "real" power to politicians, in the form of military command, but the office brought with it a respect and honour which reflected on those who held it, and thus could also increase their political influence in the directly democratic organs of "government" (the *ecclesia* and the *boule*). Quite simply, the generalship was a very useful extra string in the bow of the prominent Athenian. The same might be said of more modern ideas on generalship. The general appeals to the baser instinct of the citizen; war and patriotism are, in a campaign, as one, and it is the general who guides the citizen through it, without regard to political gain or power. So it is the general, the military commander, who is held in the respect and honour of his countrymen in a manner that is but all too rarely matched by that felt for the civilian political leader. "Which is it that history remembers," wrote the Finnish soldier-statesman Count Mannerheim, "the commander or the politician? The answer is clear enough, for who remembers those men of politics and who forgets those men of war."<sup>29</sup> The military commander, historically, possessed the ability, if he had sufficient talent and personality, to form a relationship, a kind of bond, with the ordinary people which could bypass the civilian politicians and give the general a power which, although unconstitutional, could be not only dangerous to the power of the individual civilian politician but indeed, could ultimately threaten the government as a

whole. " I was not made by the army..., " wrote Napoleon upon the overthrow of the Directory and his establishment as First Consul, "...I was made by the people."<sup>30</sup>

But how much of all this can be applied to C4th. Athens ? In order to attempt to answer that question I have decided to discuss the evolution of the *strategoi*, and the *strategia* , not only in political and military terms, but in the area of the social background of the C4th. For it is in this area, I think, that the real answers to this question can be found. In order to facilitate this process I shall discuss each of the major specialist *strategoi* in chronological sequence. Thus, I turn to the first great *strategos* of the period, Conon.

#### i: Conon:

Conon, the son of Timotheos, provides a perfect beginning to this section of my discussion. Here in this figure we possess a C5th. *strategos* in the context of the C4th.. He had commanded, as *strategos*, the fleet at Aegospotamoi in 405,<sup>31</sup> and had escaped to the court of Evagoras, King of Salamis, in order both to rebuild a force to continue the war and to escape the wrath of the Athenians.<sup>32</sup> From there he moved to Persia whence, in 394, he returned to Athens, destroying the Spartan fleet on the way.<sup>33</sup>

Conon was a national hero. At least, that is how he was portrayed to a war-weary Athenian public. In the late 390's the Athenians were still recovering from the Peloponnesian War, still trying to mend the scars of the

civil war, and they were embarking upon another draining conflict (the Corinthian war). Many orators attacked Conon, and advised the Athenians to avoid being connected to him. When, in 396, Demaenetos sailed a trireme to Conon from Athens, we are told that "they (the political opponents of Conon) were saying that Demaenetos and his associates would destroy the city by starting a war against the Lacedaemonians."<sup>34</sup> It has been asserted that the political orators were divided into two groups over this issue; the pro-war, anti-Spartan faction of Epicrates and Cephalos, and the anti-war, pro-Spartan group of Thrasyboulos, Aesimos and Anytos, and that whatever group a man belonged to determined his opinion of Conon. I believe that the whole issue was one much less clear cut. There was no group in Athens, at least not one headed by Thrasyboulos, which was "pro-Spartan". Given that Athens was still in the "recovery phase" after the defeat of the Peloponnesian War, such a stance would have been politically suicidal in the assembly. Nor indeed, do Thrasyboulos' activities back up this argument. True, he did "lead the opposition" against the voyage of Demaenetos, and he did stand against the sending of weapons to Conon,<sup>35</sup> but that was because he thought it would be dangerous to provoke Sparta too soon. His activities after 395 can only strengthen the argument that his disagreement with his political colleagues was based on the timing and method of further anti-Spartan moves rather than on the principle of that course of action in itself.<sup>36</sup> Thrasyboulos' efforts to delay war must have been important considerations in his impeachment of Aristophanes and Nicophemos, friends of Conon, at about this time.<sup>37</sup> In any event, Thrasyboulos failed. Athens was dragged into the Corinthian war and the victory of Conon at Cnidos made him the leading general of Athens and a

national hero.

Here then, I think we have a transitory figure between the C5th. political situation and that of the later C4th.. Conon was the first of the specialist generals of my period, yet at the same time, he was part of a C5th. legacy (eg. Phormio ). He was clearly a man of wealth, an aristocrat,<sup>38</sup> but that is not surprising in a *strategos* who had begun his career in the Peloponnesian War.<sup>39</sup> What is surprising is the importance of Conon as seen by the Athenians themselves. Nepos, probably following Theopompos, credits the "admiral" as being the commander of the Athenian forces at the close of the Peloponnesian War,<sup>40</sup> a highly unlikely event given Conon's relative inexperience at that time.<sup>41</sup> This statement however, then forced Nepos (following Theopompos) into finding the excuse necessary to explain away his subject's role in the defeat. He was absent; though, of course, no one doubted that had he been present, the Athenians would not have suffered that disaster.<sup>42</sup> Cnidos too, offered the opportunity to "blow up" the status of the *strategos* . To those Nepos used as his sources,<sup>43</sup> Cnidos was the victory which restored freedom to the Athenians and threw off the Spartan yoke.<sup>44</sup> Cnidos marked the end of the Spartan hegemony over the islands and the Greek cities of Asia. What the evidence reveals is, in fact, a classic case of "hero-building" by later writers attempting to raise the figure of Conon from that of victorious *strategos* into that of some sort of super-hero. Their motives in this will be discussed later, but at present it is enough to add more evidence to my claim.

Nepos probably based his account of Conon's life largely on the work of Theopompos (through that of Antigonos of Carystos and Satyros [C3rdB.C.] ) whom we know was largely active in the 370's and 360's B.C., and it is on his writing that this "enhanced" portrait of the admiral is based. If this version of Conon's life is compared to those writers more contemporary with these events, then there is found in the latter, a far less idealised figure. The *Bibliotheca* of Photios (after Ctesias, *Persica* ) portrays Conon in a most dead-pan manner, far removed from the eulogising of Theopompos. Likewise is the work of the Oxyrhynchos historian, in a manner followed, to a lesser extent, by Didymos.<sup>45</sup> What is vital is the fifteen to twenty years that elapsed between the works of the early C4th. writers and Theopompos. In the 370's and 360's the need for a national hero was such that Conon's importance was magnified (as well as providing a paternal hero figure for Timotheos). Conon gained statues in his honour in his lifetime in many of the states he had "liberated" from the Spartans during his Aegean "cruise" of 394/393,<sup>46</sup> but interestingly, though he became the first man to be honoured with a statue in the Athenian Agora since the tyrannicides Harmodios and Aristogeiton,<sup>47</sup> this was not to be till many years after his death in 392 (?), probably the early 370's, around the same time as his "image build-up" by Theopompos.

What conclusions is it possible to draw from all of this with regards to Conon and Athenian politics ? I think it must be said that it is difficult to deduce anything definite about this man. As an aristocrat he followed the best traditions of the Athenian political system, yet he was, first and foremost, a military man, a "specialist general" in the manner of the later

C4th..<sup>48</sup> Unfortunately, it is impossible to say if he would have combined this with a career in domestic politics since his death came so early.

This contrasts with Thrasyboulos of Steiria, who represented the older type of public figure. Again, aristocratic and wealthy, his career was one based in domestic politics, but who was elected *strategos* as a means of increasing his influence. Clearly, he considered Conon a political threat, hence his opposition to any support for this man.<sup>49</sup> But Thrasyboulos was also, and probably above all, a patriot. Thus, once Athens was at war again, Thrasyboulos played his part to the full. Conon was obviously popular, the people needed a patriotic hero, but this popularity was not excessive. It was the general desire for any figure who might restore Athenian pride, even initiate steps of revenge on the Spartans, and perhaps, even begin to rebuild the empire. But that was all. Conon was an aristocrat, and I have already discussed the implications of belonging to that class to a political career. It is questionable if the short-term popularity of Conon the general would have been translated into long term support for Conon as a leading political figure in the *ecclesia*. But that is mere *hypothesis*. What can be said is that Conon was an extraneous figure whose growing popularity suited the needs of the "popular leaders", and upset the plans of Thrasyboulos and his faction. For Epicrates and Cephelos, the presence of Conon was a factor to be seized upon. Epicrates and Cephelos, and the "popular group", attempted to link themselves, and their policies, to those of the *strategos* as a weapon in their struggle for popular support with the grouping led by Thrasyboulos. Even at this stage, the general, as a general, was assuming political significance within the domestic political scene. The retaliatory move of the



Thrasyboulos group, the impeachment of Nicophemos and Aristophanes demonstrated how alert they were to the dangers posed by such a figure. Though the move seemed to do little to weaken the eminent position of Conon, the tactic must have offered some hope of success. The impeachment of Adeimantos by Conon in 393/392 may have been a preemptive strike to deflect attacks on him through the courts.<sup>50</sup> But, in any case, it is likely that the conflict between Conon and Thrasyboulos was one based upon two contradictory ideas of general policy, and not on any political move to stem the power of the generalship. Struggles such as this were commonplace amongst the leading political figures in Athens. Conon's position as a figure outside the democratic structure (before his election to the generalship) added an extra dimension to the conflict, but from his return to Athens, he was but one other politician seeking the favour of the *demos* and using his military record to commend him to the people.

## ii: Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos:

I have placed Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos together under one heading because they form a chronological grouping, not because they should, or even can be, classed together for any other reason. As has already become obvious in this thesis, great importance must be placed on the importance of the individual personalities of the specialist generals. Individual personality was to play the greatest part in the development of the office of the *strategia* as a whole.

Hence, although the period of active command by these three generals overlapped that of Conon, such was the development of the office of *strategos* by these figures that they have been separated from him. Similarly, although the three *strategoi* are now classed together as one, that is not to say that each did not play a very different part in the evolution of the *strategia* within the Athenian system.

Defeat in the Corinthian War left Athens once again militarily vulnerable and economically weak. Yet the popular ideas of ἀρχή or some form of expansionism soon reasserted themselves. As Isocrates' *Panegyricos* makes clear, it was not simply the masses who wanted such a policy. But the political realists knew Athens no longer had the strength, either economically or physically to be able to reassert herself in this manner and, for a short time, the Athenian *ecclesia* followed this line. The years after the King's Peace were ones of little in the way of large scale military activity, reflecting a political approach to the Athenian situation as one based upon relative inactivity and defence. Although Ober went too far in attempting to show how the new physical defence works around Attica, begun in the later 380's, revealed a mentally defensive approach adopted by the Athenians,<sup>51</sup> from 386-380 there were no recorded military actions by Athenian forces. Whilst, in the decade following the Athenians were once more to pursue policies aimed at "imperial" expansion and the level of military activity increased to a degree, both to satiate nationalistic pressures and to ease economic tensions, the decade still represents one of relative quiet in terms of Athenian foreign policy.

Thus, in the 380's (after the Corinthian War) and, to a lesser extent, the 370's, the foreign policy of the Athenians as influenced by the orators of the assembly was radically different from the traditional policies of the *ecclesia*.

One example might provide some explanation for such a change. When the two generals aided the Thebans in liberating the Cadmeia from the Spartans in 378, the Athenians took swift vengeance upon them, executing one and banishing the other *in absentia*.<sup>52</sup> Yet the majority of citizens seemingly supported their actions (at the time).<sup>53</sup> Anti-Spartan feelings were running high in Athens at that time, and clearly the two generals had thought that their actions would be condoned in the *ecclesia*. The condemnation of these men not only demonstrates the fluidity of Athenian public sentiments, but also that highly proficient political orators (along with, in this instance, Spartan pressure) had the ability to persuade the majority to follow what were usually the most unpopular of policies.<sup>54</sup>

It was in this context that the figures of Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos came to prominence, or perhaps eminence, amongst the Athenians. The Corinthian War had seen the deaths of Conon and Thrasyboulos, the two leading generals of the immediate post-Peloponnesian War period. Yet the gap was to be filled immediately by two figures who had cut their teeth in that same war, Iphicrates of Rhamnous and Chabrias of Aexone. They, along with Timotheos of Acharnae, dominated the generalship until the Social War. Yet, in so doing,

they were to alter significantly the nature of the generalship.

As I mentioned above, a common feature in many societies, both ancient and modern, is a mistrust of political figures (in the modern sense), and yet with a higher level of respect for generals and other military commanders. Such was certainly true in 4th. Athens, particularly in the case of victorious generals. By the late 380's Iphicrates and Chabrias were already heroes of the Athenian people; Iphicrates for his annihilation of a Spartan *mora* at Lechaeum and Chabrias for his service in the Corinthian War and, later, for his famous "success" against Agesilaos in 378 and the naval victory at Naxos in 376. All were victories over the Spartans, and were thus "doubly" popular to the Athenians. But in the interval between the King's Peace and the resumption of some sort of foreign policy in 380, the Athenians must have heard of the exploits of Chabrias in Egypt. Likewise, Iphicrates' service in Thrace did not alienate him from the Athenian people. Chapter 5 has described how service by the specialist generals in the employ of foreign rulers was not carried out merely for the sake of economic gain. Their actions were always dictated by a consideration of the effects such service would have on their own country. Thus within the political structure these individuals came to be highly respected as loyal Athenians. The role of the distinguished specialist general offered them an increasingly independent claim on public support than the orators of the assembly.

I do not believe however, that the specialist generals in this period actively sought popular support beyond that of the other politicians. The definition was not as clear-cut so as to be able to define two opposing

groups. Chabrias, Iphicrates and Timotheos were specialist generals and they recognised themselves as such, but they did not recognise themselves as being in any sort of separate group removed from the other politicians (at least not until the end of their careers). They were but different sorts of the same species. Clearly, as the conviction of the two generals in 378 showed, the assembly was the sovereign body within the Athenian system, and the leading orators the major influences in the policy-making decisions of state. The specialist generals still played active, if decreasingly prominent roles, in the *ecclesia* and *boule*.<sup>55</sup> But, as the 370's progressed it became increasingly apparent that the leading generals were becoming detached from the workings of the *ecclesia* and the generals began to undertake alliances with orators who might look after their interests in the *ecclesia*. It was with Iphicrates and Chabrias that the first real signs of this changing *strategia* appeared.

Apart from the basic requirement of popularity for a *strategos*, that of success in battle, the changing face of warfare as described in Chapter 8 brought with it socio-political consequences of a high order. The mercenary explosion not only bonded mercenaries to their commanders to an unprecedented level, it bonded Athenians to their commanders to unprecedented levels as well. It must be remembered that, given the economic conditions prevailing in the early C4th., many Athenian-citizens must have found themselves work as mercenaries. Thus Athenians, both as citizen militia, and, perhaps more importantly, as mercenaries under their leaders, served for long periods under their generals. It is not too difficult to judge the level of loyalty that built up between the men and their

commanders. Iphicrates and Chabrias were, of course, notable figures in this line of work, and the position they held in Athenian society and in Athenian politics must have rested to no small extent upon these bonds of loyalty. No wonder that it was written of Iphicrates that "...vixit ad senectutem, placatis in se suorum civium animis."<sup>56</sup>

But it was not only through the ties of military service that the specialist *strategoi* gained unprecedented levels of popularity, loyalty and influence. The specialisation of soldiering, and the need for skilled generals witnessed a gradual change in the social character of the *strategoi*. Chabrias for instance, though wealthy enough to undertake the trierarchy,<sup>57</sup> was but a crude and boastful soldier.<sup>58</sup> Iphicrates too, was no aristocrat. He was (perhaps) the son of a shoemaker, and most conscious of the fact.<sup>59</sup> Clearly such humble origins were still very exceptional for high magistrates in the first half of the 4th.. But the result of this increased the popularity of these generals still further. Iphicrates, in particular, seems to have had a devoted following amongst his old soldiers and the general masses alike. When impeached (for the only time) after the events at the battle of Embata, Polyaeus records that Iphicrates drew his sword in court.<sup>60</sup> Grote has argued that if Iphicrates was trying to intimidate the jury by this means (if it occurred at all), it would probably have done him more harm than good.<sup>61</sup> Grote, I fear, missed the point completely. The jury must have been made up of many who were presently of military age, or who had fought under Iphicrates in the past, either as citizen militia or as mercenaries. In order to defend their old commander from political attack (even if the proceedings were initiated by Chares) then to the Pnyx they flocked. Iphicrates was

acquitted.

Militarily, both Iphicrates and Chabrias were renowned as great innovators in military technique, equipment and training, renown that probably gained them a higher prestige than was, in reality, due.<sup>62</sup> But Iphicrates and Chabrias were unlike any of their predecessors in the *strategia* because they were, to quote that oft-used Demosthenic *cliché*, "men of the people". The generals, to the ordinary Athenian citizen, were someone to relate to, men of their own kind, men who would neither betray their country, nor the hopes and expectations of their countrymen. The 370's, the period of greatest activity by these two figures, proved to be a period which only strengthened that belief. The Second Athenian Confederacy came into being and was gradually expanded through the efforts of these *strategoi* with minimal military effort, providing maximum glory for themselves without the drain on manpower and resources which always rapidly changed the people's eagerness for war and expansion. But the decade was also to witness the last great victories of the Athenian forces over Greek opponents. Chabrias' "success" over Agesilaos in 378, the defeat of the Spartans at Naxos in 376, and the victory of Timotheos at Leucas (Alyzia) in 375 brought the specialist generals a standing and honour not witnessed since Conon, if then.

Yet in the process of forging these links beyond the regular spheres of relations between politicians and the Athenian masses Iphicrates and Chabrias were accelerating the processes of change affecting the *strategia* within the older area of political involvement, the *ecclesia*. Iphicrates and

Chabrias avoided taking active roles in the *ecclesia* where they could lay themselves open to attack from the "professional" orators. However, these men needed some support within the assembly. Thus *rhetoires* and the successful commanders began to forge alliances. These offered benefits to both sides. The generals had those in the assembly who made their proposals for them and defended them from attack as much as possible, whilst the orators enjoyed the increased influence that connection with the popular generals brought. The value of such mutual support was clearly demonstrated in the cooperation of Chabrias and Iphicrates with Callistratos.<sup>63</sup>

But what of Timotheos ? Where does he fit into this picture ? The answer is that, to a large extent, he does not. The career of Timotheos however, does highlight the novelty of the new type of *strategoi* exemplified by Iphicrates and Chabrias.

Timotheos came to prominence with his victory at Leucas in 375, and followed this in the next few years with successful voyages of acquisition for the confederacy. Such was his success in this period that Aeschines could talk in the 340's of the "seventy-five cities won by Timotheos."<sup>64</sup> Timotheos served his *polis* honourably and well, never taking unofficial employment elsewhere. He showed a forcefulness of character that was reflected in his pursuit of new gains for the Confederacy. In every respect, he was the model *strategos* . He should have been a great hero of the Athenian nation and people, yet he was not. His career was to end in the bitterness of impeachment, conviction and voluntary exile.



Although Timotheos had all the military talents required to make him a fine *strategos*, he was never to rival the standing of his two contemporaries over any great period of time. For Timotheos was the son of Conon, and therefore, like his father before him, a representative of the old, aristocratic class. Isocrates offers a clue to the effect that this had on Timotheos, for at his trial in 354, the general was convicted largely on account of his aristocratic bearing, which would not permit him to entreat the people's favour.<sup>65</sup> Nepos offers the idea that "...he was skilled in the art of war and equally so in statesmanship."<sup>66</sup> Timotheos was a general in his father's mould, who served his country for its sake and not for any popular political influence in the assembly; his demise showed that whilst the Athenians could still honour and respect a patriotic *strategos*, the nature of the *strategia* had moved on from Conon's day. The assembly was becoming ever more dominated by men highly trained in the art of rhetoric in which the specialist generals, men largely untrained in oratory and even more often absent from Athens would find it increasingly difficult to operate effectively.<sup>67</sup> As I have described above the answer for Chabrias and Iphicrates was to be the forming of mutually beneficial alliances with orators. Timotheos on the other hand adopted a very different approach, preferring to participate as an active orator himself. He was not able to continue successfully in this dual role. He was attacked by the orators (who could not use him for their own ends) and hence he was pushed to the periphery of the political scene. His career was to continue as almost a counter to his two rivals, coming only into favour at the times when they fell from the grace of the *demos*.

For those like Isocrates, Timotheos represented the ideal of the *strategos* ; but then the general had been his pupil and did represent the same class. For the majority of people Timotheos, although a loyal, patriotic and successful servant of the *polis*, had been superseded by the "popular heroes", the "new" soldiers of Athens, somewhat removed from the constant squabbles of the politicians of the assembly.

Timotheos was perhaps a victim, at the last, of the economic strains in Athens which had afflicted the city-state since the Peloponnesian War. By the end of the Social War it was quite clear that the Athenians were basically bankrupt, and despite the sabre-rattling of Chares it was obvious that the war could not be continued.<sup>68</sup> Once again the Athenian social structure must have been put under great strain on economic grounds. Even though Timotheos was of the old aristocratic order rather than the "middle classes" dominating the assembly (in terms of influence), he was still a wealthy man. The fine imposed on Timotheos seemed to mock his wealth, since 100T. was one impossible even for the wealthiest Athenian to pay.<sup>69</sup> It was a vindictive sentence, laid down to express the *demos'* anger both at defeat in the war and, perhaps, the economic struggles of the masses after the Social War.

Yet given Timotheos' aversion to entreating the support of the masses was position of prominence not surprising in the 370's and 360's ? Perhaps not, if we look back to his father's period of prominence and at the activities of the politicians in reaction to this external pillager of popular support. However, in tackling this single question I shall widen the

discussion to cover the whole area of the relationships that were developing between these specialist military men and the orators in this period.

As I have pointed out already, the later 380's and the early part of the 370's were periods of relative inactivity for the Athenians in foreign affairs. But the specialist *strategoi* had not been idle. The Athenians witnessed the skilful generalship of Iphicrates in Thrace and Chabrias in Egypt. The reaction of the *demos* was decisive. Iphicrates and Chabrias were both honoured to a degree which, in truth, far outweighed their actual military accomplishments. Chabrias, the victor of Naxos gained a decree honouring him with a gold crown, his exemption from liturgies and, above all, a statue in the Agora.<sup>70</sup> Iphicrates was, in 371, honoured with free meals in the Prytaneum, various lesser honours, and the coveted statue in the Agora.<sup>71</sup>

All such awards had to be voted on in the *ecclesia*.<sup>72</sup> Clearly many of the specialist rhetors saw the generals as a short-term means of securing popular backing for themselves. The proposing of these honours was but one face of the relationships between the orators and these military men (that I discussed above). Just as Epicrates and Cephalos had sought to link themselves with Conon, so too do we find the name of the orator Callistratos linked to that of Chabrias; another demagogue seeking credibility under the military stars.<sup>73</sup> It is not too surprising that many historians have taken the proposer of the decree in honour of Chabrias and Callistratos to be one and the same man. The use of honours had other effects. By building up these prominent public figures into national heroes on an unprecedented scale, the lack of genuine military strength might be

hidden behind them. Chabrias in 378, and Iphicrates in 371, both were ideal candidates for such image-building, and both decrees came at ideal times to ease or, at least, to attempt to ease, worries that might have been growing concerning Athenian military strength and preparedness. Such political devices are common enough in unpopular "governments" or in times of national crisis. "The people want heroes," wrote the Russian General Brusilov in 1918, "...the government needs them. In that way both are happy, even in the face of catastrophe."<sup>74</sup> For men like Callistratos, Iphicrates and Chabrias were valuable tools and in honouring them, he not only gained the glory of proposing such measures, he enhanced the value of the generals as political weapons and obscured the reality of the "renewed" city.

In 375 Timotheos too, was honoured with a statue in the agora and, perhaps, a festival of peace.<sup>75</sup> As has been shown, Timotheos was, in social, economic and, to some extent, political terms, the odd one out of the three major specialist generals of this period. His old family ties, his wealth and his active participation in the assembly marked him out, in domestic political terms, as a somewhat anachronistic figure whose power was based on military success alone. It was in this period that the rapid build-up of the image of Conon occurred. The victory of his son at Leucas, though a fine victory, hardly ranked with the Athenian victories at Cnidos and Naxos. Yet suddenly Timotheos was put on a par with, in terms of honours, both his own father and Chabrias. The parallel with the use of Miltiades by Cimon to boost his own position is striking.<sup>76</sup> By building up the image of Conon, Timotheos was able to be raised as another hero, both for his own gain and

that of his political allies.

Timotheos was active in the *ecclesia*, but he was no demagogue. He was a specialist general, but he was of the old guard. By promoting Timotheos through the use of honours, the rivals of Callistratos might divide public support for the generals between him, and Chabrias and Iphicrates (even though he had not even gained his honours at this time).

Yet Timotheos was something different. Although popular for his military exploits, because of his class and bearing this was rather more limited than that enjoyed by his more humble colleagues. In short, Timotheos' "supporters" in the assembly found in him a figure of far more fleeting popularity. Whilst being able to "feed off" the popularity of the *strategos* by their being linked to him to a degree, he was never in a position to challenge them in the assembly. In 375 it was impossible to know whether Timotheos recognised the position of his two colleagues or his own. Only in the late 360's, when we hear of the marriage alliance between Timotheos and his old rival Iphicrates, did it become apparent that he saw the potential that lay in the *strategia* as an office of political influence in its own right.

But how far did the development of the *strategia* into an independent internal political influence reach in this period? R. Sealey recognised the specialist *strategoi* as political entities, but more as rivals against each other rather than as a collective group in themselves.<sup>77</sup> Around these men the rhetors worked, making alliances with those whose views matched their

own, or whose popularity could increase their own standing.

Although I agree with Sealey's analysis, I do not believe that this is the whole story. There has been a tendency to link these three *strategoi* with differing policies in foreign affairs. There is some truth to this, but I think that such connections have been over-emphasised, being based on a misinterpretation of the role of the specialist generals as discussed in Chapter 2. The 370's was indeed a period of rivalry between the *strategoi*, but this has been interpreted to too great an extent as a rivalry of differing policies. I see this rivalry more in the terms of a desire to be the premier general amongst the Athenians. Athenian politics, until the rise of Macedon, was far too fluid to associate men with particular policies for any long periods of time. Perhaps, given the "balancing act" Athens was performing between the Theban and Spartan camps in this decade, it did occur that the generals did differ in opinions as to the optimum foreign policy for Athens to pursue, but it is certain that the generals shared a common goal, and, as time progressed and the Athenian position within Greece became clearer, the three specialist generals would gradually come together into a form of unified grouping in themselves.

Yet whilst the supporters of the generals strove to use them as a political weapon, those politicians that either did not, or could not, link themselves to one of the major *strategoi* did not stand idly by. As early as 376 there were signs from some of the politicians of the assembly of an effort to stem the popularity of the major *strategoi*. In that year Chabrias received his decree of honour from the *ecclesia*, but the award did not go

unopposed. The unknown proposer of the decree was challenged by γραφή παρανόμων by one Leodamas.<sup>78</sup> In the next year, the decree in honour of Timotheos was likewise challenged, again by Leodamas. In 371/370, the proposer of the decree in honour of Iphicrates was challenged, by one Harmodios.<sup>79</sup> It seems highly unlikely that these accusations were brought by men opposed to the principle of honorific decrees. Leodamas, for instance, was never exactly regarded as a figure of high morals, particularly in the field of politics; but he was seen as a fine statesman and a formidable opponent in the *ecclesia*. Although some have tried to view the actions of Leodamas as those of the pro-Theban faction I do not think this to be correct.<sup>80</sup> If the generals were divided on the lines of foreign policy direction then the prosecution of the proposers for the honorary decrees for both Chabrias and Timotheos by the same, highly ranked political orator becomes a little difficult to explain. The prosecutions cannot simply fall into the category of factional policy disputes. In Leodamas' and Harmodios' use of the *graphai* was, I believe, the realisation and response to the shifting of popular support that was caused by these specialist generals, and the implications that meant for the balance of power within the Athenian domestic political system. As it was, all three impeachments against the generals brought by Leodamas and Harmodios failed. The generals gained their unprecedented honours, the generals became even more respected and honoured by their fellow citizens and their allies in the assembly rode on the coat-tails of their popularity.

From the 360's onwards, however, I believe that there was some realisation amongst the specialist generals of a developing role as entities in

their own right and just where this trend might be leading in the Athenian political system. The 360's, or at least, the earlier part of the 360's, was a period of lackadaisical campaigns by the *strategoi*. Iphicrates (370/369), Chabrias (369/368), Timomachos (367) and Chares (366) all undertook expeditions which achieved virtually nothing.<sup>81</sup> Yet no challenge to these generals appeared. Iphicrates in particular seemed to do little to carry out the policies of the assembly, either against Epaminondas or in Thrace, yet he was not attacked in the courts. Even his failure to capture Amphipolis in 364 went without judicial attack. This might in part be explained by his association with the influential orator Callistratos, who probably deflected criticism of the general in the assembly. But can this be the whole answer? <sup>82</sup> Iphicrates could not control Athenian foreign policy from its source in the *boule* and *ecclesia*, he simply did not have the power to do so. But such was his popularity that he was not attacked through the courts either.

From 366 the specialist generals seemingly closed ranks, their conduct gradually adopted a more consistent line with regards to each other. By 366, although Timotheos was still somewhat "out of step" from the other specialists, even he was moving closer to being identified as part of a group. The marriage alliance between Menestheos and the daughter of Timotheos marks an important stage in the development of the *strategia*. The term "alliance" itself implies the formation of a grouping for mutual protection against a common enemy. The alliance would have had little value if these generals did not recognise themselves as such, and realised that together they might have some degree of influence in their own right,



even if this meant merely having more clout in their relations with the orators. Although this must not be overstressed, the three specialist generals were becoming a discernibly distinct group from the rest of the Athenian politicians.

To Parke "...the desultory campaigns of the early 360's showed clearly the friction felt between the *polis* and the professional generals, whose conduct rarely merged with the interests of their state."<sup>83</sup> But this is only valid if one views that the interests of these "professional" generals was somewhat different to those of the Athenian "state". If one follows my argument, then the two ran hand in hand; the interests of the *polis* and those pursued by the specialist generals were, by and large, the same (with some notable exceptions). At least, that was how the Athenian masses saw it. The friction Parke saw in those years not only demonstrates the generals' commitment to policies they believed to be right (ie. the continuation of the "middle man" role between Thebes and Sparta), which, if necessary, they would defend in the courts, but also their knowledge of, and confidence in, their own mass support in the assembly.

By 366 many more rhetors must have realised the folly of the 370's. The over-use of honours had begun to reveal its consequences. It had been right to honour and aggrandise the *strategos* Conon. But it had not been realised that Conon had not personally gained much from his honours politically, because he had never returned to Athens to take advantage of the position made for him in Athenian society. But by the mid-360's things seemed very different. The generals had become very powerful tools in the

hands of a few orators.

In 365 however, came a major opportunity to attempt to halt the development of the *strategia*. The sluggish campaigns of the early 360's, as I have pointed out above, were unpopular to the Athenian masses who, at that time, were seeking a more active "anti-Theban" policy. Such a gap between the specialist generals and the bedrock of their position, their popularity amongst the Athenian masses, had to be exploited if the political influence of the *strategoi* was to be curtailed.

The seizure of Oropos by pro-Theban exiles, and the banishment of the leading pro-Athenian partisans in 366 became the incident which was used by some of the orators as the test of their strength against the specialist *strategoi* and their supporters in the assembly.<sup>84</sup> Chabrias had been put in command of an expedition to recapture the town, but upon his arrival he found that the town had been delivered into the hands of the Thebans. As I have already said, at this time, anti-Theban sentiment was running high amongst the Athenians. The Greek embassy to the Great King in 367 had returned with a rescript decidedly in favour of Thebes and against the Athenians, seemingly recognising a Theban hegemony in Greece.<sup>85</sup> Thus Chabrias' failure made him vulnerable, and this was increased by his association with Epaminondas and Pelopidas.<sup>86</sup> Chabrias was impeached on a charge of *prodosia*, and Callistratos joined him. The accuser was none other than Leodamas. This, in itself, must be most significant. Leodamas was also known as being prominent amongst the pro-Theban group in Athens at this time.<sup>87</sup> But Chabrias too was linked, however tenuously,

with this group. Thus the factional argument must be partially incorrect, because in prosecuting Chabrias, Leodamas would, in effect, have been attacking a member of his own faction.<sup>88</sup> Nor does it seem likely that Leodamas would have selected such an incident to bring to court if he had been acting on factional policy grounds, since in order to bring about a successful prosecution he would have had to stir up anti-Theban feeling, the very thing he did not wish to do. Leodamas had not acted over this matter for reasons of personal gain through the advancement of his own policies but through the reduction of the influence of the *strategia*.

That it was this matter that he chose to take to court must hint at the level of concern that there was amongst those of the specialist orators who could see the implications of the trends affecting the *strategia* at this time. Leodamas was clearly aware that he must strike at the groupings of specialist generals and orators, and that the Oropos incident, despite the policy contradictions which might occur, was an opportunity that could not be passed up. In attacking Chabrias, he might weaken "the servant" Callistratos, thus giving himself some position of increased prominence, or else he might bring down the orator and leave the *strategos* open to his own influence (if Chabrias was not convicted).<sup>89</sup> Indeed, perhaps the vital issue was the successful prosecution of Chabrias; to begin to reverse the shifting balance of public popularity, to reaffirm the influence of the orators over that of the specialist generals, to reaffirm the necessity of support by those same orators for the generals and, in part at least, begin to break up the clique of populist generals and their image in the eyes of the Athenian masses. It is not surprising then, that Plutarch recalled that "...the lawsuit

was eagerly awaited...and because of the importance of the issue, which was at the forefront of everyone's minds."<sup>90</sup> But the hopes of Leodamos were to be dashed. At the last, the people rallied to their popular hero, and both he and Callistratos (whose oratorical skills in this case won great renown ) were acquitted.<sup>91</sup>

The trial of Chabrias and Callistratos, and their subsequent acquittal must have been a bitter blow to Leodamos and his supporters in the assembly. In the years between 375 and 366 there were signs that could be interpreted as deliberate attempts to set up one of the specialist generals for impeachment. One of the noticeable features of the military campaigns undertaken in this period was the lack of adequate finance provided by the *demos* to commanding generals. In 373, lack of sufficient funding forced Timotheos' Corcyran expedition to be delayed as he went on a fund-raising "cruise" around the Aegean. The *strategos* was recalled and prosecuted, and although he was merely deposed from office, his treasurer Antimachos was condemned and executed.<sup>92</sup> His successor Iphicrates, was similarly despatched without any funding.<sup>93</sup> In 366 Timotheos again was forced to undertake a commission (to Samos) without public funds.<sup>94</sup> Even though financial considerations were clearly the most obvious cause of such monetary limitations, it could just be that failure by these generals would not have been too great a disappointment for those orators who did not have one of the leading *strategoí* as a supporting figure. Even Timotheos was acted against. In 373 he was probably not considered of sufficient influence to a warrant full-fledged attack in the courts, his political course still being unclear at that point in time. But by 366 circumstances had changed. Only a

remarkable success on Samos saved Timotheos from further court action. Perhaps his marriage alliance with Iphicrates was Timotheos' answer to this threat. As it was, his victory at Samos made him once again one of the most influential politicians in Athens.

However, the failure of Leodamas' prosecution in 366 did not deter the enemies of Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos, but stirred them into different, but more radical, action. Between 363/362 and the Social War no less than eleven prosecutions of *strategoi* were recorded, a very high proportion of those that have come down to us.<sup>95</sup> Yet none were of the three leading generals. Two reasons might account for this.

Firstly, it might well be that the enemies of the three generals (and their allies), led by the zealous prosecutor Apollodoros, had deliberately altered their tactics in order to isolate the three main generals. Their aim was to cut away at the support for these men. The support amongst the Athenian masses would, presumably, be weakened by successful prosecution. Amongst the orators themselves it was a different story. Hence Callistratos was once again impeached, this time successfully, in 361 (?).<sup>96</sup> By removing their supporters it could be that the generals would be forced to seek new allies in the assembly, thus compromising their own position.

Secondly, though in part it leads on from the first argument, was the fact that it might well have been reasoned that Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos were all coming to the end of their careers. The first two were hardly active in the later 360's. Timotheos returned to Athens after a

triumphant voyage in 362, and there is some evidence to suggest that he was attacked in the courts in 360.<sup>97</sup> But in this year he must have been at least sixty. What the enemies of the specialist *strategoi* sought to do was to avoid the rise of new figures to join this group. The use, or rather, non-use of decrees of honour after 371 bears out this line of argument. The orators opposed to the idea of an influential *strategia* (or at least a *strategia* not controlled by them) had to avoid the rise of individuals into some sort of cult figures amongst the Athenian masses. Thus it was the younger generals who found themselves under legal attack, before they had the foundation of public support with which to protect themselves. The promising *strategoi* Callisthenes (362),<sup>98</sup> Timomachos (361),<sup>99</sup> Theotimos (361),<sup>100</sup> Cephisodotos<sup>101</sup> and Leosthenes (both 360)<sup>102</sup> all met their ends in the courts during this period. There were numerous politicians who were determined that support for the specialist *strategoi* would not come from others who specialised in that office, nor would these be allowed to join this group. Quite what the Athenians were supposed to do in the event of a major war seems not to have been considered, or considered secondary to the necessity of reducing the influence of the *strategia*.

On the other hand, there was also the motive of personal ambition to consider as an additional factor. That the prosecutions of many of these *strategoi* were led by the orator Apollodoros is significant. Apollodoros was one of those orators who also aspired to military command.<sup>103</sup> It is possible to see the spate of prosecutions in this period (by this man at least) as the efforts of one man to gain favour with the *demos* (who were infuriated by the lack of military success in the late 360's) by prosecuting

those deemed responsible, whilst at the same time clearing the way for his own military career (much as Chares was to do in the 350's). Clearly by the later 360's the generalship was something which was very worthwhile possessing in terms of domestic politics, but only if the politician was capable of succeeding in that office and thus build up the following of popular support to be a valuable commodity in the assembly. The 360's and the 350's witnessed the conflicting consequences of these trends. The *strategia* was very highly sought after as a means of political advancement and recommendation to the Athenian masses because its influence as a channel of popular support had grown. But that growth was based in only the few figures I have discussed at depth. Others sought to emulate the success of Iphicrates and Chabrias from within the *ecclesia*, but none were to succeed (unless Timotheos is considered as such). Those amongst the orators that neither had the skills to attempt to build a military reputation, nor the chance to ally themselves with leading strategoi could do little else but to attempt to weaken that office in times of public disquiet at Athenian foreign policies.

Demosthenes could later wonder with amazement at the actions of his predecessors "...Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos - those whom you lavish extravagant favours upon."<sup>104</sup> But then he was speaking at a time when the full implications of such actions were still being felt. The lavish use of honours built up the specialist commanders to such levels that the people began to no longer see them as military saviours, but as something rather more, even some sort of ideal of the political Athenian. Of course, various orators adopted different responses to this growth of

"power" amongst the generals. Some wanted to distribute more honours, in an attempt to "ride on the back" of the specialist general's popularity. Others sought to directly challenge this "power" and to attempt to regain the old balance of power. The courts were their favourite weapon. A third group seems to have sought an independent "slice" of this popularity for the generals by means of becoming *strategoi* themselves. Callistratos and Apollodoros himself were notable members of this group.<sup>105</sup>

But whilst the realisation of the political ramifications of what was occurring was clearly apparent to many amongst the political orators, it is a lot harder to detect any such realisation amongst the specialist generals themselves. Only at the very end of the 360's did a deliberate act of policy initiation stem from the *strategoi*. Cephisodotos, on campaign in Thrace, made a treaty of his own accord with the then mercenary leader Charidemus of Oreos. But the treaty was repudiated by the *demos*, Cephisodotos was deposed and he only escaped death by three votes.<sup>106</sup> In 359, Chabrias again acting alone, made a treaty with Thracian Kings which was then repudiated by the assembly. The three points raised by these two incidents can form the general conclusions to this section.

Firstly, public support for the specialist general was, at this point in time, limited to those who were famed in military command and were, preferably, heroes from their own social order. Thus (in part) did Timotheos' popularity tend to be of a far more transient nature than that of either Iphicrates or Chabrias. For relatively unknown generals the perils could be far greater. Cephisodotos' action in 360 sought to use the popular



support given to his famed colleagues, but that was for them alone. They had not violated the sovereignty of the *ecclesia*. Cephisodotos had attempted to push the *strategia* into a position of policy initiation outside the democratic processes of Athenian government and was duly punished.

Chabrias had clearly expected that his influence and popular support would have been enough for this treaty to be ratified. That it was not shows that, at this stage, the popular support enjoyed by the specialist general had not yet been transformed into any sense of an independent political body. The orators in the assembly were still the major influences in the political decision-making processes of the "state". Chabrias was aware of his position with regard to the people but his support had only developed into a form of political pressure to give the specialist *strategoi* what they sought in terms of policy and command through their associates in the assembly.

Thirdly, the political development and influence of the specialist *strategoi* was, as yet, mainly of a defensive nature. Whereas Cephisodotos had only narrowly escaped with his life for his initiation of the treaty of 360, for Chabrias there was not even a court case. In 358 he was back as the *strategos* in charge of the Athenian forces at Chios.<sup>107</sup> In short then, the careers of the three generals who formed the central subjects of this section, were to cover and witness the evolution of certain individual Athenian *strategoi* as entities independent of the politicians of the *ecclesia*. Whilst they remained within the sphere of the democratic processes, such had been their success in tapping into public support that they became very influential in the area of domestic politics. The specialist

*strategoi* on the level of Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos had, by 358, ceased to fear legal attack for the orators of the assembly.

### iii: Chares, Charidemos and Diopieithes.

The outbreak of the Social War was to prove a milestone not only in the external history of the Athenian nation, but also in the internal political development of the city-state. In the sudden massive increase in the use of Athenian military forces to meet the rebellion, the requirement for specialist generals became acute. Thus, the legal attacks which had come to be such a feature in the careers of promising *strategoi* during the late 360's came to an end. Yet the effects from that policy were to have major repercussions both on the war and the central Athenian figure in it, Chares of Angele.

Chares was to become the leading *strategos* amongst the Athenians even though his military record was one credited with but a single major victory to his name, that of his "second Marathon" in 355/354. That being so, it is interesting to consider just how he came to hold such a dominance of the *strategia* during, and after, the Social War.

When the Social War broke out, Chares, by chance, was seemingly the only *strategos* considered capable of holding the command by the *demos* who was young enough to fill the "post of apprentice" to the three older generals. Thus, he was despatched by the *demos* with Chabrias to Chios. The death of the older general left Chares as commander-in-chief of the Athenian forces operating against the rebels. The position that Chares

had gained was not to be challenged till the arrival of Iphicrates, Timotheos and Menestheos late on in the war.

Two points emerge here. Firstly, the length of time before Timotheos and Iphicrates were employed, despite the emergency of the situation, reveals the reluctance of the orators to offer these figures the opportunity to gain even more prestige and political influence. Only when the situation became critical, with the rebels attacking Athenian bases around the Aegean, did national interest seemingly override domestic political considerations. Secondly, despite the lack of success of Chares in operating against the rebels, he was apparently neither recalled nor accused. Indeed, in the case of Chares, it is possible to see the result of the practices of the late 360's. The over-zealous use of *eisangeliai* to prevent the rise of younger men to positions in the *strategia* which might become politically dangerous produced just what the prosecutors had sought to avoid. Chares was the only qualified figure left at the outbreak of the War, and was to remain so.

But what could not be foreseen however, was that Chares was to effectively utilise other factors in his favour to win the public support he needed for a long career, without the need for a record of military glory and victory. Only when this became clear did the folly of the 360's become apparent. Instead of a relatively competent college of youngish specialist generals who could be played off against each other, the Athenians were left with a singularly unsuccessful *strategos* continually reelected to the *strategia*. Chares brought about further significant political development to

that office largely on account of his isolation in that magistracy.

In the early part of his career it could be said that Chares' biggest asset was, what can kindly be described as, his moderate generalship. Such might well have been a reason for his survival in the late 360's, although his liberal use of money and his friendship with Aristophon were the major reasons.<sup>108</sup> Chares, at least in the early stages of the war, was not yet at the point where he could effectively operate with little risk of successful prosecution. The Social War was to alter his position. The defeat of Embata brought about such anger amongst the Athenians that an impeachment was inevitable. As I have already discussed, the accusations made by Chares against his colleagues in the battle, and the result of the trial, was probably a good thing for the military development of Athens, but the trial also clearly demonstrates the position Chares was aspiring to within the *strategia*. Although the impeachments of Iphicrates, Timotheos and Menestheos were something of a preemptive strike, Chares must also have considered himself in enough of a position of popularity to prosecute both Iphicrates and Timotheos simultaneously with the hope of success. Chares, it seems, had, by the end of the War, not only realised the position that he had gained and the means to retain that position, but also the possibilities which could occur by simply following the same rules which his predecessors had worked by. Clearly, by 355/354 Chares considered himself in a very strong position with regard to the Athenian masses and within the political structure.

From the trial of the three *strategoi* onwards Chares was the leading *strategos* amongst the Athenians. Due in part to the limited opportunities for

active military command after the Social War and in part, I suspect, on account of Chares himself, no other specialist *strategoi* were to appear who challenged Chares' position. Without such colleagues, Chares possessed an unparalleled monopoly of the major military commands between 355 and 338. As the rise of Macedon and the Athenian response to it became the all-overshadowing factor in the field of foreign affairs the influence and importance of Chares grew with it until finally the long-term foreign policy aspirations of the Athenians came to be embodied in him.

In Chares, the various elements of the office of *strategos* that had been developing throughout the 4th.c. were gathered together. The security of his position was unprecedented. Despite a singular lack of military achievement only once, in the expedition to Byzantium in 340, was there any record of any form of deposition, but even this incident is highly contentious.<sup>109</sup> Demosthenes related that Chares had often been brought to trial and always acquitted.<sup>110</sup> This was not only due to the loyalty of service of Chares which, although undoubted,<sup>111</sup> was simply not enough to stave off legal attack by his enemies in the assembly. Demosthenes offers the real clue to Chares' strength: "Chares was a friend of the people."<sup>112</sup> The general not only played upon his own record of service for the polis to secure his popular support, but also used his office to forge direct links with the Athenian citizenry beyond the usual call for support at the annual elections. The support given to Iphicrates, and the popularity ensured for him by his own social class was something Chares clearly recognised. He too, was "one of the people". There is no record of his father, Theochares, in the liturgical lists, and Chares himself did not appear till 349,<sup>113</sup> when

his wealth can be assumed to have come from his military service. But Chares, unlike his predecessor, sought to maintain and play upon those links with the lower classes. Chares was the master of public relations. The sending home of the booty from the cities of Lampsacos and Sigeum during the Social War,<sup>114</sup> and the feasting of the Athenians with the 60T. given to the general by one Lysander<sup>115</sup> were stunts clearly aimed at strengthening Chares' relationship with the ordinary Athenian citizen. This went hand in hand with Chares' political alliances with prominent *rhetoires* who might look after his interests whilst he was absent from Athens. It was often said that the *strategos* bought this support.<sup>116</sup> He must have been well satisfied with the later results. Although Plutarch stated that "...it was well known that Chares relied on Demosthenes for his survival,"<sup>117</sup> from 354 onwards Chares had to rely decreasingly on the support of influential orators. Chares simply remained the most potent symbol of Athenian hostility to Macedon. Whilst orators and rival *strategoï* regularly attacked Chares in both the *ecclesia* and the *dicasteria* they were unable to stop him being reelected or acquitted.

In my discussion of Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos as political figures I mentioned the relationship between Callistratos and Chabrias and, to a lesser extent, Iphicrates. Commentators have continued to follow this argument of the reliance of the specialist generals on the rhetors in the assembly. Certainly such relationships were essential to the survival of the generals. However, as the century progressed the necessity for these contacts became less vital. For example, Callistratos was convicted of speaking against the best interests of the *demos* in 362, yet his

"associate" Chabrias continued "in power" until his death in the Social War. Similarly, Chares was able to continue his career as Aristophon, Demosthenes and Hypereides, the orators customarily linked to the *strategos*, all rose and fell from influence in the assembly.<sup>118</sup> Factional links inside the assembly were certainly of very great importance to Chares (and other specialist *strategoi*), but to accept that these relationships were essential for their survival is to fall into the trap of taking as literal truth the words of the orators themselves without examining the facts.

Contacts between generals and orators offered the opportunity for the generals to exert more influence in the assembly in the area of policy initiation. Despite occasional signs in the later 360's that the specialist *strategoi* were beginning to utilise their position of strength to initiate policy from their own persons, before the Social War it was certainly true, and after 355 still considerably so, that the use of oratorical associates within the assembly was a far easier, and far less risky, method for attempting some form of policy control. The basis for the popularity of the generals, especially after 355, was that they stood above the dubious loyalties of many of the specialist orators. It was during the absence of Chares from Athens in the later 330's and early 320's that there was renewed anxiety for the democracy, making the generals themselves sacrifice to Democratia in the years 331 and 330.<sup>119</sup>

In 355 Chares took up service with Artabazos. The account of that episode as given in Diodoros makes it clear that the *strategos* had acted on his own initiative in undertaking this operation.<sup>120</sup> Chares then, by 355,

considered himself to be in a position of sufficient prominence to act in a way which, to all intents and purposes, would be recognised as a piece of Athenian foreign policy, without any decree coming from the Athenian assembly. Chares had as his intention, beyond the desperate need for funds, a campaign of significant enough success to head off the inevitable complaints and probable prosecutions that would arise from his course of action. The approval of the people was what he needed to justify his activities and make them official policy, hence his readiness to send the booty back to the Athenian people. Having thus gained popular approval,<sup>121</sup> Chares was safe from attack by the rhetors. Even after the King's note and his subsequent recall to the city, there is no mention of any prosecution and, if it did take place, Chares must have been acquitted.

In 353 Chares seized Sestos, slaying the adult population and enslaving the remainder.<sup>122</sup> This episode was one initiated by Chares alone. His efforts in provisioning his men through service with Artabazos had been in an attempt to permit a continuation of the Social War. Now he took this action to attempt to stir his compatriots to further efforts. Chares considered that the war against the rebels was not yet over, and that he could initiate its renewal. The *strategos* had secured the services of his men and had further strengthened his own position by the removal of the "old guard", Iphicrates and Timotheos. Sestos marked an important stage in the development of the specialist *strategos* as a powerful political figure.

But the Sestos episode was the prelude to the rise of another challenge to the growing political power of the specialist *strategos*. Sestos



failed to rekindle the War because the general feelings of the Athenian masses had altered by 354, and with them the power relationships between Chares, the orators and the people themselves.

Although Chares was in an unprecedented position for a *strategos* by 354, his record from that date until 340 is one of relative obscurity rather than political dominance. Two factors account for this sudden abatement of the growth in the general's power. Firstly, the King's note had brought the Social War to an end despite the efforts of Chares and supporters, and with this came an equally abrupt end to Athenian imperialism. The Athenians were exhausted both in terms of morale and resources. Economically, the state was verging on bankruptcy. The call from the masses was for peace. But the general, by definition, cannot thrive in times of peace. His rallying call must always be, ultimately, for war. Chares attempted to regain the political initiative by swinging Athenian public opinion back in favour of the war. Hence perhaps, one reason for the Sestos episode. But war-weariness thwarted his efforts.

The second reason for this abatement of power was tied to the loss of the War and the general desire for peace. The economic crisis facing the Athenians at the end of the War allowed Euboulos, acting initially as a commissioner of the Theoric Fund, to assume control of the whole of the Athenian finances. Though Euboulos was only to hold any actual office at all for a few years, he gained, then held, public support in a manner not dissimilar to that of the specialist *strategoi* themselves. The strength of Euboulos' role was that he was a specialist, an economic specialist,

masterminding the economic recovery of the city. He stood above the political squabbles of the *ecclesia*. Like the specialist generals, Euboulos stood for the loftier ideal of the national good above the short-term political gains and losses that marked political life within the assembly. At least, that was how the Athenian masses saw it. But like the generals as well, Euboulos based his support on one immovable doctrine, and, in his case, it proved an ultimately self-destructive one. The economic recovery that Euboulos brought about in Athens once more renewed thoughts amongst the Athenian poor of a more active foreign policy. By 342, Athenian opinion had shifted back to its more typical aggressive stance, and with it Euboulos lost influence. War was becoming ever likelier for an Athens whose sphere of influence was being increasingly impinged upon by the Macedonians.

Thus the opportunity re-arose for Chares to regain something of the position of political influence he had attained by the end of the Social War. But the years of Euboulos had had a permanent effect upon the domestic political role of the specialist *strategoi*. Even after 342, the specialist *strategoi* (Chares, Charidemus and Diomeithes) were unable to simply pick up the political development of the *strategoi* where it had been left off at the end of the Social War. Although Chares had scored a notable military success with his "Second Marathon" in 354, he had been deprived of the lifeblood that was the basis of his support for eleven years, significant military command. Without this, the role of the general would inevitably be weakened, to the extent where it would effect the career of both Chares and the role of the *strategoi* as a whole.

Mention of Charidemos and Diopeithes enables me to briefly discuss their contribution to the role of the *strategoi* as political beings. Both were important as being the only serious rivals to Chares in this period. Yet neither was to reach the position whereby they could become politically active. Chares himself might well have been a factor in this. Chares was quick to restrict the growth of any who might challenge his dominance of the *strategia*. The trials of Iphicrates, Timotheos and Menestheos in 354, and of Lysicles in 338 bear witness to this strong sense of self-preservation.<sup>123</sup> As it was however, both Charidemos and Diopeithes were restricted in their influence by other factors. Charidemos was only an honorary citizen, and his role in the *strategia* must always have been overshadowed by this fact. Although Charidemos was to serve Athens with the utmost loyalty it was not surprising that he was never to earn the popularity and public support which some of his less talented and less deserving colleagues gained.<sup>124</sup> His case clearly shows that despite the growth in the position of the specialist *strategos* the line between being able to utilise popular support or not was indeed a fine one which could be tipped one way or another by virtually any factor.

Diopeithes' case was very different. His career was one marked by important political acts that came through the use of his position as *strategos*. Diopeithes' attack on Cardia and seizure of the Macedonian ambassador in 342 was the most notable example of this.<sup>125</sup> Diopeithes had acted on his own initiative and had brought the Athenians to the verge of war. Clearly, his enemies in the assembly were shocked, the "moderates"

by the action itself, and the more "radicals" by the timing of such an act. Both groups must have been alarmed by their own lack of power to direct or prevent such a move. Yet even the like of Diopeithes, relatively inexperienced and held in only moderate regard by the *demos*, did not find himself in the law-courts, nor even recalled. He had successfully tapped into Athenian public opinion, bypassed the assembly, and made a direct political act designed to bring the Athenians to war and was ready to take his chances in the courts (as the generals of 379/378 had done). Even Philip sent his ambassador not to the *ecclesia*, but to Diopeithes himself. The masterful speeches of Demosthenes in this period, notably the Third Philippic, are but the extant sources of an assembly merely attempting to catch up and justify the actions of its own generals in relation to itself. Reinforcements were sent to Diopeithes, and Chares was despatched to the Chersonese,<sup>126</sup> but such actions merely responded to what was effectively, a *fait accompli* as presented to the assembly. Demosthenes' justification and defence of Diopeithes in his *Περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ* strikes one as a (domestic) political reasoning and explanation of those events as much as the defence of a *strategos* by one orator against another. Unfortunately, for my study, the career of Diopeithes was cut short. Nothing contemporaneous was heard of the *strategos* after the spring of 341,<sup>127</sup> and Aristotle alludes to his death in the Hellespont.<sup>128</sup> Diopeithes had shown the signs of pushing ahead the political development of the specialist generals in the full realisation of his activities both in regards to the effect this might have had on Athenian foreign policy and to the power relationship between the *strategos* and the assembly.

Chaeronea once again altered the context of the inter-relationships between the specialist *strategoi* and the orators. Despite the talk of continuing the war and defending the city, the fight seemingly evaporated from the Athenians. A reason for this might well have been the flight of Chares after the battle. Although Charidemus, appointed commander of the defence of the city, was a highly respected general, as I have discussed above, he did not possess the standing with the Athenian people that Chares did, that gave the *strategos*, in certain times and circumstances, the political power to direct, and not follow, foreign policy decisions. Without Chares, Athenian popular opinion swung round, once again, to peace. The "war party" was discredited and the balance of political power swung back to the politicians of the moderate groups within the assembly.

The period 338-326 was one dominated in terms of Athenian political history by the figure of Lycourgos, an Eteoboutad aristocrat.<sup>129</sup> Lycourgos, like Euboulos before him, gained control of the finances of the city-state and through them exercised a dominating influence over almost every aspect of Athenian policy. Though fiercely anti-Macedonian in his thinking, the period of Lycourgan influence was one of peace and economic recovery.<sup>130</sup>

Yet this period was also one of social tension. The decree of Eucrates, which laid down severe penalties against those who might overthrow the democracy, is a clear example of the fears of many Athenians for their constitution.<sup>131</sup> Undoubtedly, many suspected the motivations of many politicians. These fears were compounded by orators playing upon them for the sake of making political capital out of the subject.

The evidence is found in the numerous speeches dating from this time. *Against Cephisodotos* and *Against Aristogeiton* are prime examples of this genre, with a continual emphasising of the importance placed by Demosthenes on the pro-Macedonian sympathies of his opponents. These pro-Macedonian sympathies were viewed by the masses in an increasingly wary and hostile light. Wealth and the wealthy were once again looked upon as the qualities of those of dubious loyalties, particularly amongst the wealthier political classes, there being few of the old aristocratic families left involved in politics by the latter half of the 4th.<sup>132</sup>

Lycourgos was an exception to this trend, coming from an old priestly family, but he too was forced to distance himself from the politics of the *bema* in order to gain his base of public support. Hence his position as *tamias epi ten dioikesin*, a totally new office around which to build his position of influence.<sup>133</sup> In order to strengthen his own position Lycourgos followed policies which stressed his personal patriotic commitment to the city. *Contra Leocratem* not only stresses Lycourgos' patriotism, but underlines his anti-Macedonian sympathies. Likewise Lycourgos' decrees on public works, such as the resumption of work on the Olympeion, and a new Telesterion (amongst others), along with a restoration of various temple furnishings, most notably "the Victories", are all symbolic of Lycourgos' efforts to promote his patriotism.<sup>134</sup> However, in pursuing such a political line, Lycourgos inevitably further increased public unease with the regular magistrates. In such a light do we find the erection of the statue of Democratia in the *boule* (333/332) and the sacrifices by the generals to the same cult (331 and 330).<sup>135</sup> In short, whilst Lycourgos

successfully distanced himself from the *ecclesia* in order to gain and retain his extraordinary level of influence, this same position further heightened public fears for the democracy amid a decreasing regard for the leading political figures in Athenian society.

For the specialist generals, these years were to be very different to those under Euboulos. Firstly, although peace was the cornerstone of Lycourgan financial planning, this peace was seemingly understood by him to be only part of the build-up to another attempt to defeat the Macedonians. The navy was reequipped and modernised, there were new stocks of arms built up and the institution of the *epheboi* showed a commitment to a well-trained citizen militia.<sup>136</sup> The Athenians were being prepared for the time when they would cease to believe in the anti-Persian propaganda of the Macedonians and make another effort to "free themselves". In such circumstances, although the Athenians were wise enough not to pursue an active foreign policy themselves, the leading "professional" generals were still looked upon with respect. Though they had fled from the city, the Athenian specialists retained their links with the *polis* and their activities against the Macedonians helped maintain Athenian pride.<sup>137</sup>

Secondly, the social tensions of the period were increased without the presence of the specialist commanders. The board of the *strategia* without the specialists was simply a group of politicians attempting to appear as generals.<sup>138</sup> In such a light it was inconceivable that the Athenians would risk confrontation with the Macedonians. As indignation with Macedonian suzerainty grew throughout the 320's, the Athenians

became increasingly restless. By the mid 320's the Athenians were looking to the East, where the Athenian generals were still campaigning against Alexander, for the figure to lead them. The orators of the assembly might press for war or for peace, but they were but minor figures compared to the events in Asia, the people and the Athenian generals. Some sort of contact between the Athenians and Chares seems likely after 326,<sup>139</sup> and with that came the increasing likelihood of a triumphant return of a *strategos* to Athens from the East who would completely dominate the political life of the city.

#### **iv: Leosthenes and Antiphilos:**

The Harpalos affair in the summer of 324 produced two major consequences. Firstly, Athenian indignation at the domineering attitude taken by the Macedonians in their demands for the surrender of the fugitive treasurer must have brought anti-Macedonian feelings to new levels. Secondly, the scandals and subsequent trials concerning the vast amount of money brought by Harpalos into the city must have eroded still further public confidence in their political leaders. Even Demosthenes became tainted in the scandal.<sup>140</sup> Taken together, Athenian opinion was clearly heading towards favouring a resumption of the conflict with the Macedonian Empire. This meant that at least one specialist Athenian general had to be restored into the social and political fabric of the city. Although by 325 it must have been becoming obvious to even the most fervent supporter of a policy of cooperation that war was becoming increasingly likely, the election of Leosthenes of Cephale to the *strategia* of 324/323, was a signal



of popular intent far in advance of the previous official line taken by the assembly.<sup>141</sup> Leosthenes was a known enemy of the Macedonian king, having opposed him for a considerable time in Asia, and thus such a step was an obvious provocation on the part of the Athenian people, and one probably not looked on with much favour amongst the orators with the exception of those who had proposed the general to the *strategia*.<sup>142</sup> Though Hypereides, it has been said, was the natural choice for leader in the coming war his support, in turn, for the election of Leosthenes was both an implicit acceptance of the Athenian desire for a military, not a civilian, leader, and of the inevitability of such a move in the popular climate of the time.

The news of the death of Alexander brought the matter to a head. Popular support for war was overwhelming. Phocion, Demades and "the moderates" were overwhelmed in the clamour for vengeance. The appearance of Leosthenes was all important, stirring the Athenians into action with the call for Greek freedom.<sup>143</sup> Leosthenes was placed in command of all operations. But if the evidence is studied again there is a different interpretation of events. As already stated, the election of Leosthenes was a clear provocation to the Macedonians as to Athenian intentions. Leosthenes had returned to Greece early in 324 where he had set about organising the mercenaries who had gathered on Cape Taenarum. Simultaneously we are told that Leosthenes was, as his predecessor Chares, involved in communication with individuals at Athens concerning preparations for a war. I find it unlikely that the *boule* was involved at this stage since this would have risked the preparations becoming common knowledge.<sup>144</sup> The political organs of Athenian government were thus

knowledge.<sup>144</sup> The political organs of Athenian government were thus bypassed in order to link directly and secretly with those who supported war. The election of Leosthenes undoubtedly wrong-footed the orators and brought the general great confidence with such a backing of public support. Without doubt it was he himself who initiated such communications between the general and his supporters within the city. It was he who sent off the embassies to the Aetolians and other Greek states seeking alliances for war, in which he was successful. When the debate occurred in the assembly on the matter of war with Macedon, in effect the *ecclesia* was faced with a *fait accompli*. Leosthenes not only had the full support of the Athenian masses and the fiercely anti-Macedonian orators to back him up, but also a series of alliances, constructed by him, committing the Athenians to war. Leosthenes had, in all probability, returned to Greece with the sole intention of leading an Athenian, if not a Greek, rebellion. He was able, on the basis of a full understanding (and skillful calculation) of the power-structure of the Athenian political system, both to utilise public opinion in order to effectively disengage his political opponents in the assembly. His gamble had been to make alliance, on behalf of the Athenians, on his own accord. As it happened, his timing was (by accident) perfect. The exiles decree<sup>145</sup> and the death of Alexander both angered and excited the Athenians to the degree where Leosthenes in reality found few to oppose him, even in the assembly. Patriotism was the order of the day, and that meant, in the late summer of 323, giving full support for the cause of Athenian (and Hellenic) freedom. No thought was given to the constitutional position Leosthenes found himself in at the outbreak of the war. Though he was wreathed in the titles of democratic office, στρατηγός

and στρατηγός αὐτοκρατῶρ, his power was, in reality, something far beyond. His command over every aspect of the war was one of near-unlimited political, as well as purely military command. Leosthenes was a hero of the Athenian people, and a hero in such a position was a very powerful figure. Although Leosthenes still talked in the assembly and worked through the regular organs of the democracy, his will and desire were all-powerful. In effect, in the short period of time from mid-324 till his death at the siege of Lamia in the winter of 323/322, Leosthenes was, to all intents and purposes, a popular dictator, still within the boundaries of the legal constitution in name, but in reality, acting far beyond the bounds of his own, theoretical position or that of any specialist general before him.

Of Antiphilos, his successor, little can be said. His career as the last specialist strategos in an independent Athens (in the period of this thesis) was too short for any definite conclusions to be drawn. All that can be seen in the evidence was that he was described as "...ἀνὴρ συνέσει στρατηγικῇ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ διαφέρων."<sup>146</sup> Certainly it seems that Antiphilos was at least some sort of replacement for Leosthenes. It was a mark of the general's standing that the allied Greek army did not disintegrate more than it did upon the death of Leosthenes. It can only be assumed that Antiphilos followed the same political path as his predecessor. After Crannon it was Antiphilos (along with the Thessalian cavalry commander Menon) who decided to open negotiations. This must have reflected Antiphilos' position as the supreme authority amongst the Athenians, a position strengthened by his appointment as the supreme commander of the combined Greek army. Given the circumstances, it must be assumed that Antiphilos assumed all the

between the two men was the charisma of the former, the charisma which kept the allied army together and which, in all probability, let him get away with far more than he might have been able to do.

As it was, military defeat on this occasion cost the Athenians dear. The peace terms imposed by Antipater overturned the democracy and replaced it with a widely-based oligarchy. Without the democracy and without freedom, the *strategia* was unable to develop further. The power that had been gradually accruing to that office became part of the historical myth of the classical democracy.

## Epilogue

Yet, even without the democracy and the base of mass public support, there were signs, reminders of the political prestige and (ultimately) genuine power that the rank of *strategos* had acquired in the late classical democracy. After Crannon the leading authority in Athens was Phocion. Although he was a fine orator, it was seemingly through the rank of *strategos* that he held control over the city.<sup>147</sup> However, this might well have been more through chance than any deliberate use of the rank. Phocion came to prominence at that point in time as part of the "pro-Macedonian" faction, in order to gain peace on the mildest terms possible, with his *strategia* being but an incidental left-over from the Lamian War. It was only

*strategia* being but an incidental left-over from the Lamian War. It was only after the peace terms had been set and the harshness of them made apparent that there was a hint of the political use of the office. Given Athenian reaction to the peace terms Phocion would not have been a popular figure. Yet he remained the major political figure from 322-319. Though his authority was probably based on the Macedonian garrison placed at Munychia, Phocion retained the title of *strategos*, though it had only ceremonial duties attached to it. The use of the title of *strategos* was not the base of Phocion's power, but it did ease the bitterness of the pill the Athenians were having to swallow by at least some effort at clothing the new situation in some vestige of the old constitution.

The brief restoration of the democracy in 318 culminated in the imposition of a "tyranny" under the philosopher Demetrios of Phalerum. Backed by the garrison he was in complete control of the city from 318 till 306. Yet he too sought a title by which to justify his externally imposed, and maintained, power in the city. This title has been a matter of considerable conjecture, as the sources are divided on the issue. Both Strabo and Diodoros described him as *epistates*,<sup>148</sup> whilst Diodoros on another occasion uses the term *epimeletes*.<sup>149</sup> Polybios terms him as *prostates*, protector of the city.<sup>150</sup> But these seem more colloquial terms than genuine offices within "the constitution". But an important inscription reveals that from 315/314 Demetrios was acting as *strategos* for the fourth time.<sup>151</sup> Thus Demetrios based his power within Athens on this title. Although his power was, in reality, based upon the support of Antipater's son Cassander, Demetrios had clearly sought some sought of recognition

amongst his own people, and in his native political system, through the use of this office. By the 320's and 310's then, it can be said that far from being an office with relatively little power as against the influence of the political orators, the office of *strategos* had, in fact, become regarded as the supreme office in the Athenian system, both in terms of prestige and genuine political influence. The office which had been regarded by the Athenian people as being that which was the surest protection and safeguard of the democracy was, ironically, ultimately used as the justification for the overthrow of that same democracy and the legality of tyrannical rule.

Before beginning any summary of the findings of this thesis, I feel that I must first make a point concerning the relation of this work to the history of classical Athens as a whole. Although I singled out a specific period as a convenient timespan for study, this division of the eras of Athenian history merely follows modern conventions. Though there is an argument that the years covered by this thesis do fit into a relatively neat compartment in terms of time, from the recovery of Athenian freedom and the democracy to the dissolution of that same system at the hands of Antipater in 322, such notions cannot be applied to the history of the Athenian *strategia*. This thesis does not claim to present a revolution of dramatic speed to the generalship, although circumstances did indeed hasten certain trends within the office. Instead, it considers the last eighty (effective) years of that magistracy as part of a process that had been occurring since the institution of the *strategia* itself. In short then, this thesis, is a story of evolution and gradual development as much as intermittent alteration.

Chapters Two, Three and Four of this thesis offered, what I considered to be a necessary overview of the role of the specialist *strategoi* in the area of Athenian foreign policy from 404 till 322. The trends that I pointed out as being significant were as follows.

Firstly, from the time of the restoration of the democracy onwards, the influence exerted by the *strategoi*, or rather, a certain few specialists within that office, began to affect Athenian foreign policy to an increasing degree. This was, in part, due to the specialisation of offices that I described in the Introduction, that brought a greater percentage of important military commands onto those few specialist individuals, and partly due to socio-political factors that I shall mention below. Yet this trend was strongest only when the *demos* itself pursued a policy of expansion, and thus offered the necessary conditions for these figures to be employed on regular military missions, and thus remaining constantly in the public eye. The period from 386 till 362 represents this trend at its peak. The military abilities of the three *strategoi* Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos brought Athens military victories and a renewed Confederacy, bringing some restoration in her position in the Greek world. As a consequence, the generals were treated as heroes. The unprecedented level of honours given to them by a grateful *demos* clearly reflects the esteem that they were held in by their fellow citizens, especially amongst the poorer classes.

The influence of these figures on Athenian foreign policy was such that Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos came to personify Athenian foreign policy itself. This in itself expresses the degree of influence and dominance that the specialist *strategoi* gained, and then maintained over foreign policy in this period.

However, the generals were never themselves able to exert



sufficient control that they were able to initiate foreign policy *per se*. This was probably because the specialist *strategoï* failed to realise the strength of their own position, and the consequences of their degree of popularity within the *ecclesia* and dominance of the *strategia*. Later, there is evidence that certain individual generals did begin to attempt to initiate foreign policy (i.e. Chabrias in Thrace), but not until Diopeithes in the 340's was there seen a clear example of a successful case of policy initiation by a *strategos*. Even Chares, dominant in the *strategia* for so long, could not exert sufficient influence to push the Athenians back towards war after 354 or during the 340's. The *demos* remained, in the final analysis, the controlling body of Athenian policies. Only the special circumstances of the death of Alexander and the Lamian War enabled Leosthenes to direct every aspect of Athenian policy from 323 till 322. It is impossible to say whether he would have retained this degree of control if he had lived (and the War had been won).

Part Two (Chapters Five and Six) discussed the important issue of the nature of service by the specialist commanders and the degree of accountability exerted upon them by the "state". What I discovered and made clear was that the military service undertaken by the Athenian generals in the C4th. did not follow the pattern of lawless *condottieri*. The generals showed instead a remarkably high level of loyalty towards Athens and regularly acted with the interests of the Athenians at heart. Military service was usually undertaken only when the specialist generals were not needed by their home state, and even then, if that service was contrary to the policies of the Athenian *demos*, then the generals often took steps to

deliberately distance themselves from that policy and from the Athenian "state" itself.

However, this loyalty of service was not brought about through the strictures of close control by the Athenian central authorities. The argument of Pritchett as put forward in *The Greek State at War* (Pt. II) portrayed the generals as magistrates closely tied down in their actions by a highly developed system of accountability that kept the specialist generals shackled to the state. That is not to say that the system of accountability was not in place in the C4th., or that the system had withered away through non-use. The use of impeachments against numerous generals in the mid-century makes that clear. It was simply that such was the degree of loyalty shown in the actions of these specialist generals whilst on military service that it became increasingly difficult for a successful action to be brought against them. Eventually, even for the specialist orators of the assembly, impeachment of established *strategoi* became a formidable task in the face of public opinion.

In the military field the C4th. witnessed a rapid development of war and the art of war. The development of the specialists within the *strategia* was the Athenian response to this. Begun in the latter part of the C5th. and developed by Conon, the C4th. was to witness the rise of a few individuals who were to spend their lives dedicated to war. The speed of change in the field of warfare brought with it a rapid growth in the development of the *strategia* as an entity separate (to an increasing degree) from the politicians of the assembly, leading to the political development of the specialist

*strategia* being dangerously independent (according to some of the orators of the *ecclesia* ).

The development of certain generals as specialists in the art of war was also influenced by the events in the Greek world around Athens. The C4th. witnessed the rise of military rulers as the successful leaders. An era that began with the Spartans victorious in the Peloponnesian War and king Agesilaos the arbiter of the fortunes of virtually the whole of Greece was to finish with the ultimate victory of monarchy in the form of the Macedonian conquest of the Persian Empire. In between time, Greece witnessed the successes of Jason and Alexander of Pherae and Dion and Dionysius in Syracuse. Isocrates saw the ideal ruler in Jason of Pherae, as did Plato.<sup>1</sup> Even in democracies there was a trend towards the rise to power of generals, albeit within the confines of the democratic system. Epaminondas and Pelopidas were completely dominant in the Boeotian Confederacy during the 370's and 360's. The development of the specialist *strategoi* , though in no way as dramatic as the examples given above, was the Athenian democratic answer to this trend. Gradually, the idea of the board of ten, active *strategoi* was replaced, in practice if not in theory, by the few specialists who dominated the office and whose political significance as figures of power grew along with the "professionalisation" of arms.

Although at first this trend was unconscious, Chares successfully secured complete domination of the *strategia* by eliminating all who might pose a threat to him. Leosthenes was to be the culmination of this trend. Although the death of Alexander, the long absence of any specialist generals

and the longstanding resentment of the Macedonians highlighted his position, Leosthenes still gained a position of extraordinary power within Athens. That the people looked to him rather than one of the orators of the assembly clearly demonstrated that the need for a hero and a national liberator had brought the specialist general to the control of the city and the virtual domination of the democratic organs of Athenian government.

However, despite their growth in power the generals were not a threat to the democracy. The increasing strength of the specialist generals lay in their ability to tap into the support offered to them by the masses of the Athenian poorer classes. This support was founded on the ideology of patriotism and loyalty to the "state". In Athenian terms this meant a belief in the democracy and the integrity of the democracy. The specialist *strategoi* never offered an alternative to the democracy, but acted rather as guarantors of its security.

De Ste. Croix convincingly unravelled the pro-Macedonian sympathies of some of the Athenian upper classes in the latter half of the C4th.<sup>2</sup> This was translated into a feeling of disenchantment and distrust on the part of the masses with their leading citizens. Hence the revival of some form of class friction from 336 onwards. Yet to the masses the specialist *strategoi* offered a reassuring influence in the higher echelons of political life. The undisguised hostility to Macedon of Chares, Charidemus, Diopeithes and Leosthenes (and perhaps Antiphilos) contrasted sharply with the political squabbles in the assembly where the accusations and counter-accusations of Macedonian bribery and sympathies were

commonplace.<sup>3</sup> Although it would be difficult to assess to what extent these allegations were based in truth, the fact was that the majority of the Athenian poor believed it to be so.<sup>4</sup> It was no coincidence that the absence from Athens of any specialist *strategos* in the period from 336 till 325 was one marked by a revival of fears for the democracy. This fear found its most public expressions in the growth in the cult of Democritia, the law of Eucrates and the enforced making of sacrifices to Democracy by the *strategoi*.

However, the specialist *strategoi* were never all powerful. The growth in the political influence that was developed through the support of the Athenian masses was limited by several factors.

Firstly, as a corollary to the conclusions I have drawn above, the generals could only grow in power as much as the democratic system allowed them to. Although certain individual *strategoi* occasionally broke away from the strictures of the Athenian system of accountability, they still had to confine their activities to those which fell in with the general wishes of the Athenian people, otherwise they would find themselves deposed or answering to the system that could still be brought to bear with a severe rapidity.

One of the fundamental reasons for the rise in the influence of the specialist *strategoi* was the social links between them and the people. This was most obviously demonstrated in the case of Timotheos. Though as

successful and, at times, as influential, as his colleagues Iphicrates and Chabrias, he was never able to hold down his position with regards to the people due to his aristocratic background. His ultimate demise in the law-courts not only bore witness to the vulnerability of his own position but that of the remainder of the *strategoi* as well. The line between being "one of the people" and one of the political élite was a fine one which was sometimes blurred in the eyes of the Athenian public. Hence Chares was always ready to be seen as an ordinary Athenian helping his kinsfolk in every way possible.<sup>5</sup>

The power of individual *strategoi* was also limited by the fact that they were only part of a board of ten. Such, of course, was partly the intention at the institution of the *strategia*. As the C4th. progressed however, military specialisation put paid the idea of an active board of ten, and the effective power of the *strategia* became concentrated on a few individuals. Initially this trend was itself watered down by the emergence of several military specialists of about equal talents (ie. Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos). This enabled rival orators, and the generals themselves, to weaken their growing influence by playing them off against each other. The emergence of Chares effectively brought this to an end. His keen sense of self-survival enabled him to completely dominate the *strategia* for some thirty years, disposing of all who threatened his own position. Leosthenes completed the process. His position of dominance within the office was complete. He was the commander-in-chief of the Athenian forces on his own. Though other *strategoi* were elected,<sup>6</sup> they effectively held subordinate rank to Leosthenes himself.

Ultimately however, the weakness and fatal flaw in the *strategia* , and the use of the office to obtain direct political power, was the fact that at its most basic level, the sole criterion of power was military success, and, in the case of the Athenian generals, success was something noticeably absent, particularly in the latter part of the period. Conon, Iphicrates, Chabrias and especially Timotheos all relied upon military victories to bring them to the attention of the Athenian public and used the emotive force of those victories to maintain their position. Chares was unable to match the successes of his predecessors and thus had to rely to a greater extent on the other factors that offered the generals popular support. Although he was to advance the political influence of the *strategia*, ultimately his development of the office was restricted and curtailed by this. The contrast with Leosthenes was striking. " For the last generation Athens had produced several excellent orators, but none of her citizens in this age, before Leosthenes, had displayed military genius along with Pan-Hellenic purpose."<sup>7</sup>

To what extent military failure was the fault of the generals themselves was considered in Chapters seven and eight. Although the Athenian military (on land) never matched those of her major rivals amongst the Greek states, I have shown that neither was Athenian command hampered by any form of political control, nor was the Athenian generalship inhibited to an excessive degree by the crudity of the Athenian command structure. Indeed, as the century progressed, the use of mercenaries, and the reorganisation of the *ephebeia* made the role of the general and his talent at generalship increasingly important. In the final analysis, it was somewhat

ironic that the increases in military competence that occurred in the Athenian army ran concurrent with a decline in the degree of military competence on the part of the nation's generals.

Finally, the role of the Athenian generals was ultimately restricted by the position of Athens itself in the C4th.. The influence and position of the city was always undermined by her defeat in the Peloponnesian War. Economically Athens was simply unable to mount large scale military operations for any considerable length of time. Whilst these shortcomings had successfully been hidden through the strength of the personalities of Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheos in the 380's, 370's and 360's, defeat in the Social War exposed the reality of the Athenian position not only to the world at large, but also to the Athenians themselves. From that time onwards, the notion of Athenian military strength became a thing of the past which the Athenian generals were unable to counter.

This weakness in the Athenian system merely intensified and accelerated the decline of Athens as a major power. The rise Rhodes in the Aegean and the further expansion of Syracuse in the West are both examples of once states that increasingly challenged the supremacy of the cities of mainland Greece in the course of the C4th.. The Athenian answer was the ill-fated attempt to restore the Confederacy. The failure of the Social War left her without any opportunities to maintain a preeminent role in Greek affairs. Ultimately, by the end of my period, Athens was but a small member of a Greek World completely dominated by the Macedonian Empire of Alexander against which it could do virtually nothing alone. Such was



the strength of the city-states that by 323 all the cities involved in the Hellenic alliance together could not match the size of the Macedonian armies. It was in this overall context that the role of the Athenian generals must be considered.

A. Vagts, in his *History of Militarism Civilian and Military* considered that one of the major features of militarism was that the military ideal dominated the civilian one in social life. With the appearance of specialised generals and soldiers at the end of the C5th. and the beginning of the C4th. the conditions came about in the Greek World where the role of military men developed as an important social phenomenon.<sup>8</sup> The C4th. was to witness the rise to power of generals such as Jason of Pherae and Timoleon who simply could not fit into the narrow confines of the structure of the *polis*.<sup>9</sup> The role of the specialist *strategoi* in the C4th. was to reflect the attempts of the Athenians to place this development within their own democratic framework.

# Notes

## 1

### Introduction

1. On the divisions of functions in modern democratic government see for instance, P. Dunleavy and B. O' Leary, *Theories of State* (London 1988) ch.2; H. R. G. Greaves, *The British Constitution* (London 1956 ) p.21.
2. See Roberts (1982) p.173 on the generals as the effective executive.
3. See Isoc. VIII.54-55; Plut. *Phoc.* 7.3. Cf. Gilbert (1877) p.1-93; Beloch (1884) p.16-17; Mossé (1962) p.269-273; Perlman (1963); Roberts (1982) p.171; Hansen (1983a) p.49-50, (1988) p.50-53; Sinclair (1988) p.45-48.
4. Plut. *Phoc.* 7.5.
5. Hansen (1988) p.52.
6. Sinclair (1988) p.48.
7. The nine *strategoi* listed held 76 out of the 195 known *strategiai* .
8. Tritle (1988) p.xiv.
9. See however the term "the *strategoi* " used as a collective term as opposed to "the politicians " in Jones (1957) p.128; Perlman (1963) p.347; Nippel (1980) p.106-108 and Davies (1981) p.124-127.
10. Note that the abbreviations of ancient authors follow the rules of my spelling; eg. Dein. for Deinarchos, Aesch. for Aeschines etc; see the list of abbreviations p.ix-xiv).

## 2 Recovery and Resurgence, 404-359

1. Xen. *Hell.* II.2.20; Hell. Oxy. I.3; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 40.3-4; Dem. XX.12; Isoc. VII.68.
2. Photios *Bibliotheca* 44b37-38.
3. Tod 101.
4. Tod 128.
5. Isoc. IX.52, 55.
6. Isoc. V.63, IX.56, 58; Dein. I.14, III.17
7. Dem. XX.69; Cf. Diod. XIV.39.3; Nep. IX *Con.* 2.1, 5.1 and Julian VI.4.
8. Hell. Oxy. VI.1.27-30.
9. Paus. III.9.2.
10. Hell. Oxy. VI.1-VII.5.
11. Compare, for instance, with the Persian reaction to Chabrias in Egypt in 379.
12. S. Perlman (1958) p.79.
13. *PA* 8707; Hansen, (1983b) p.271; Harp. s.v. ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίθῳ. Conon, of course, had been *strategos* several times in the C5th..
14. Before Cnidos: Ctes. 688F30; Hell. Oxy. XX (15) 5; Diod. XV.39.2, 79.5, 7, 81.4; Nep. IX *Con.* 4.3. After Cnidos: Xen. *Hell.* IV.3.11, 8.2, 6; Dem. XX.68; Diod. XIV.85.2.
15. Hell. Oxy. II.2; Paus. III.9.8.
16. The vote was unanimous (Xen. *Hell.* III.5.16). Aristophanes (*Ecc.* 193-196) records how the Athenians were persuaded into the alliance by those people who said that the city would be ruined if Athens did not join: "...but upon making the alliance the people soon realised the dangers, and the politicians who had persuaded them to it took to their heels." If Aristophanes was correctly reflecting Athenian opinion at this point, and the evidence is there to suggest that he did (see Perlman [1958] p.79), then the person who was the politician was indeed a major, direct influence on Athenian foreign policy. Whilst that figure cannot be Conon, it could well be Thrasybulos.
17. Perlman (1958) p.64-81.

18. R. Seager (1955) p.74-81.
19. It is worth noting that the alliance was made specifically with the Boeotian Confederacy as a whole and not Thebes alone, but this is a minor point. Thebes in practice assumed it spoke for the Confederacy, and in this period the two were interchangeable. In Xenophon the Thebans come to Athens seeking an alliance; the actual text of the alliance shows that it was made with "the Boeotians".
20. Thrasyboulos had personal ties with Boeotia. See Strauss (1986) p.103-104.
21. Anti-Medism was still a considerable influence in the formation of policy, or so it appeared. Canon himself did not escape censure for working with the old enemy (see Lys. X).
22. See Barbieri (1955) p.162, 167-170.
23. Davies *APF* 240f, *PA* 7310; Election in 411/410: Thuc. I. 100; In 395/394: Paus. III.5.4; Plut. *Lys.* 29.1; Dem. LVII.42.
24. Ar. *Ecc.* 194-196; Lys. XVI.13; Xen. *Hell.* IV.2.23; Dem. XX.52.
25. Taken from Correlli Barnett, *Swordbearers, A Study in Supreme Command in the First World War* (London 1966).
26. On the King's Peace see Xen. *Hell.* V.1.31; Diod. XIV.110.3; Justin VI.6.1-3; Ael. Arist. *Panath.* 172.10; cf. Bengtson (1975) p.188-192, nos.241-242, and Ryder (1965) p.34-36, 122-123.
27. On the Persian view of the peace see Cook (1983) p.218. Compare this to the famous remark of Xenophon (*Hell.* V.1.36) that "In the fighting the Spartans had just about held their own, but now, as a result of what is known as the peace of Antalcidas, they appeared in a much more distinguished light."
28. Griffith (1978) p.128.
29. Mantinea was dissolved as a *polis* : Diod. XV.5.12; Xen. *Hell.* V.2.7; Strabo VIII.3.2; Isoc. IV.126, VIII.100; Polyb.IV.27.6; Paus. VIII.8.6-9; Ephoros FGrH 70F79.
30. IGII<sup>2</sup> 34; Tod 118; Diod. XIV.94.4.
31. J. Ober (1985) p.208.
32. On peace and economic recovery see Xenophon *Poroi* or *Vectigalia* and commentary by Gauthier (1976) which reflects the new and changed mood in Athens at the end of the Social War.

33. On Pavia and its' aftermath see T. Brady, *Turning Swiss, Cities and Empire* (Cambridge 1985) p.146, 184.
34. Pritchett (1974) p.62-63.
35. See the discussion on Iphicrates as a general in Ch. 8.
36. Nepos claimed that this king was Seuthes (XI Iphic. 2.1); Dem. XXIII.129 claimed the king was Cotys. Beloch *GG*<sup>2</sup> vol.3, 2.87 reconciled the two by having Seuthes as Cotys' son. Thus, Iphicrates served only one dynasty.
37. Swoboda, *RE*. Seuthes 2, 2021 argued that he served on his own initiative, but C. Rehdantz, *Vitae* p.24-25 argued that he served in an official capacity. This theory was supported by A. Hock (1891) p.76-117 and 353-462. Their argument was that Iphicrates was acting in the role of an Athenian *strategos*, and backed up this argument with an inscription (Tod 117) which mentions ships that could only have come from the Athenian squadron lying off Thrace. But Dem. XXIII.130-132 records that Iphicrates was prepared to fight the Athenian fleet itself. However, given Iphicrates' later conduct, it seems that the statement of Demosthenes must be incorrect.
38. For Iphicrates in Persia see Diod. XV.29.4, 41.1-2.
39. Diod. XIV.94.2. He was under thirty years of age at the time. This is the argument used to demonstrate that Iphicrates was not *strategos* in the Corinthian War.
40. Xen. *Hell.* V.1.10; Nep. XII *Chab.* 2.2: "...sed publice ab Atheniensibus Euagorae adiutor datus."
41. *CAH* VI, p.148.
42. *ibid.*
43. Parke (1933) p.59-62; Olmstead (1948) p.379.
44. Diod XV.29.3: " ..παρακαλῶν δὲ στρατηγὸν Ἰφικράτην αὐτῷ δοῦναι." Nep. XI *Iphic.* 2.4 has his renown at an even greater level, the request coming from the person of the Great King himself: "...Artaxerxes Iphicratem ab Atheniensibus ducem petivit...".
45. Nep. XII *Chab.* 2.1: "...in Aegypto sua sponte gessit."; Diod. XV.29.2.
46. Diod. XV.29.3.
47. Xen. *Hell.* V.4.14.

48. See Ober (1985) p.211.
49. On anti-Spartan feelings amongst the Athenians at this time see Sinclair (1978) p.42.
50. Thebes sent emissaries to Sparta immediately after the liberation of the Cadmea. Cf. Cawkwell (1976a) p.62-84.
51. Diod. XV.29.4; (Iphicrates) XV.29.4.
52. Decree of Aristoteles: Tod 123, and see Cargill (1981) ch.1 for a full discussion.
53. Xen. *Hell.* V.4.54; Diod. XV.32; Polyae. II.1.2.
54. Naxos: Diod. XV.35; Dem. XX.77.
55. Diod. XV.33.4.
56. Honours for Chabrias: Dem. XX.75-77; Diod. XV.32.5, 33.4; Nep. XII *Chab.* 1.
57. Property tax (*eisphora*) see Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.1; Polyb. II.62.7; Harpocration sv. *eisphora* (cf. Philochoros FGrH 328F46) and Dem. XIV.19.
58. Harpocration sv. *symmoria* (cf. Philochoros FGrH 328F41); Photios *Lexicon* sv. *Naukraria*; Cleidemos FGrH 323F8; Dem. XIV.17. Cf. Jones (1957) p.83-86; Thompsen (1964) p.24-37, 45-104, 194-249; Ruschenbusch (1978a) p.275-284.
59. Xen. *Hell.* V.4.61.
60. Chabrias captured or disabled forty-nine triremes of the Spartan fleet. Presumably the captured vessels were incorporated into the Athenian fleet.
61. Peace of 375: Ryder (1965) ch.4. The Athenians regarded the peace as a triumph of arms: Isoc. XV.109-110, XIV.41, VII.12; Philochoros apud Did. VII.68.
62. See IGII<sup>2</sup>96 (Tod 126), IGII<sup>2</sup>97 (Tod 127) and IGII<sup>2</sup>102 (Tod 129).
63. J. K. Davies (1969) p.323 n.85.
64. Taken from J. Morris, "Portrait of a Hero.", *The Times* (August 12th. 1989) as an extract from the book by the same author, *Pleasures of a Tangled Life, The life of Admiral Jackie Fisher* (London 1989).
65. Plut. Phoc. 7.1ff; Dem. XX.76-78, 81, XXIV.180.
66. Abdera: Diod. XV.36.4. Corcyra: Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.39.
67. See the discussion in chapter 9.

**Missing pages are unavailable**

- "...though Mausolos' intrigues and intervention deserve a prominent place in the accounts of the Social War, the origins lie deeper and further back than is suggested in the accounts of the two main sources, Diodoros and Demosthenes."
18. For example, Mausolos had openly assisted Evagoras in his rebellion from the Achaemenids; cf. Hornblower (1982) p.209.
  19. Schol to Dem. IV.19.
  20. C. Garton (1971) p.17-37.
  21. Arist. *Pol.* 1304b27 talks of the Rhodian trierarchies (the sign of a strong naval organisation in the Greek city-state), even though Arr. *Anab.* II.20.2 talks of the small size of the Rhodian fleet in the 360's.
  22. See G. L. Cawkwell, (1981) p.41; R. M. Berthold (1980) p.32-49; *ibid.*, (London 1984), and R.A.Knox (1985) p.132-161. Note however, that the passage of Diodoros might be anachronistic.
  23. Monopoly on Cean Ruddle: Tod II 162; IGII<sup>2</sup> 1128. Ceos in Confederacy: Tod 142; Bengtson (1975) p.289.
  24. Diod. XVI.7.2 places this war in the archonship of Cephisodotos (358/357), but Aesch. III.85 dates it to the archonship of Agathocles (357/356). It is known that Diocles was general at some point in the campaign, and his known *strategia* was in the year 357/356 (Dem. XXI.174; his *strategia* : Syll.190.23.). The peace was also dated under Agathocles' archonship. For the campaign proper see Dem. VIII.74-75, XXI.174, XXII.14 and Aesch. III.85; On the Athenian victory see Tod II.153.
  25. Diod. XVI.22.2.
  26. *GG* <sup>2</sup> III, p.260-262.
  27. G. L. Cawkwell (1967) p.34-50.
  28. E. Schweigert (1939) p.14.
  29. D. E. M. Lewis (1954) p.44 and R. Sealey, "Dionysios of Halicarnassos and some Demosthenic dates.", *REG* LXVIII (1955) p.112.
  30. Death of Chabrias: Diod. XVI.7.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 6.1; Nep. XII *Chab.* 4; Dem. XX.80.
  31. Diod. XVI.7.3.



32. G. Busolt (Leipzig 1874) p.822. Following on this argument are P. Brunt (1969) p.247f. and G. L. Cawkwell (1978) p.45; cf. Dem. VIII.74; Aesch. III.85.
33. Historical parallels are always dangerous, but provide useful points for discussion. In 1809 for instance, the empire of Austria planned its entire strategy of war with France around the fact that the French were already fully committed to the war in Spain and Portugal. Cf. D. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (London 1966), and F. H. von Stutterheim, *Der Krieg 1809 zwischen Österreich und Frankreich*, (Vienna 1811) as major works on this subject.
34. Diod. XVI. 21.1; Nepos XIII.Tim. 3.
35. This battle is problematical. Embata means only "accessible place". The account of Diodoros (XVI.21.3-4) places this battle in the Hellespont, but Nepos XIII.Tim.3 and Theopompos FGrH 115F14 make clear that the battle took place near Erythrae. Cf. Polyaeos III.9.29 and Stephanos of Byzantium s.v. Ἐμβάτον.
36. As is implied in the speeches of Demosthenes. If the Macedonians were well known to the Athenians, then the accusations by the orator of Macedonian "barbarity" would have held no credence at all with the listening audience.
37. The history of Macedon was marked by the double dangers posed by enemies from without the country and rival claimants for the throne within it. Macedonia's geographical position was weak, the country being divided into two physically distinct regions, Upper and Lower Macedon, and surrounded by barbarian tribes. The Illyrians to the north-west, the Triballians and Paeonians to the north and the Thracians to the east all posed a continual threat to the security of Macedonia. The C4th. in particular revealed the weaknesses of the Macedonian monarchy. Philip II was the ninth recognised ruler of the country since 400, besides the numerous other claimants and pretenders. See N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia.*, (Oxford 1978). G. L. Cawkwell (London 1978) ch.2, p.20-28, discusses the problem of pretenders to the throne which arose from the polygamous traditions within the Argead royal house.
38. Diod. XVI.2-3, 6; Justin *Philippica* 7.6.

39. Possession of Amphipolis also brought considerable material benefit, the territory being rich in terms of timber (suitable for ship-building) and deposits of silver (Thuc. IV.108.1; Herod. V.23).
40. Isoc. VIII.5-6, 51.
41. Isoc. VIII *On the Peace* and Xen. *Poroi*.
42. The exact role of Euboulos and his position within the Athenian political system has been the subject of considerable debate amongst scholars. Most accept the reference in Aeschines (III.25) which linked the power of Euboulos to his holding of the office of Treasurer of the Theoricon in those years. This fund was clearly used as a device to avoid what some considered to be extravagant military expenditure and hence the connection with a defensive cum pacific policy. On the theoricon see schol. to Dem. I.1 and Harpocration, Lexicon s.v. Εὐβούλος. Cf. A. Andreades (1933); J. J. Buchanan (New York 1962). On Euboulos see H. Wankel (Heidelberg 1976) p.223-225 and 834-836; K. J. Beloch (Leipzig 1884) p.173; H. J. Gehrke (Munich 1976) p.24-36, and G. L. Cawkwell (1963) p.47-67.
43. Probably the period 335-324 is the only other area discernible as following a similar pattern, but, in this later period, much further removed in time from the "years of glory", the contradictory forces of the two elements were much less forceful.
44. Dem. VIII.42.
45. Isoc. VIII.23, 136-145.
46. Phocis had been fined by the Amphictyonic Council for cultivating the Crissaeian plain. In retaliation the Phocians had seized Delphi, and had repelled the efforts of the Amphictyonic allies, Thessaly, Locris and Boeotia. Philip II was then "invited" by the allies to intervene in order to break the Phocians. Cf. Diod. XVI.35.1, and P. Cloché (Paris 1915) and N. G. L. Hammond, "Diodoros' narrative of the Sacred War.", *JHS* LVII (1937) p.44f.
47. Diod. XVI.35.5.
48. Theopompos FGrH 115F247-249. Most scholars follow A. Schaefer, (Leipzig 1887) p.443 n.3 in assigning this incident to the year 353.
49. Diod. XVI.35.2.
50. See M. H. Hansen (1983b) p.179.

51. Diod. XVI.34.3.
52. Philochoros FGrH 328F49-51.
53. 17 triremes, 2,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry. G. L. Cawkwell (1962) p.122-140, and (1978) p.74, 81 and 86, has argued that the bad weather mentioned was, in reality, the Etesian winds which commonly prevented, or severely delayed navigation in a south to north direction in the Aegean during the mid-June to mid-September period each year. These winds must have been well known to the Athenian mariners. Cf. "Suidas" s.v. Κάρονος. Of course, Philip might well have timed his attack on Olynthos taking this into account.
54. Except for the suggestion that Nausicles acted as one of the ambassadors to Philip in 346. (M. H. Hansen [1983c] p.151-180). If so then he was the only known *strategos* on this embassy (*strategos* 353/352: Dem. XVIII.115; Diod. XVI.37.3.).
55. Hegesippos had demanded that the treaty of 346 should be amended from "...both parties should have what each possesses (at that time)", to read "...each should have its own possessions", intending through such language to implicitly call for the return of every city the Athenians had ever claimed and subsequently lost. Not surprisingly, Philip rejected this proposal (Dem. VII.18, 26, 30.).
56. Aesch. III.83, and schol.; cf. IGII<sup>2</sup> 225.
57. IGII<sup>2</sup> 1627, b.352: a new naval arsenal at Zea. By 343 Demosthenes (XIX.89) proudly talked of a fleet of 300 triremes with stores and money, "...οὐ τριήρεις τριακόσαι καὶ σκευὴ ταύταις καὶ χρήμαθ' ὑμῖν περίεστι..."
58. See Dem. VIII and Libanios' *hypothesis* on that speech. cf. Dem. IX.15.
59. Dem. XVIII.76. cf. A. W. Pickard-Cambridge (London 1914) p.349-350 and *infra*.
60. Diopieithes, at the time, was seriously lacking in funds: Dem. VIII.21 "...οὔτε τὰς συντάξεις Διοπέθει δίδομεν." On the seizure of Amphilocho see Dem. XII.3-4. Amphilocho was eventually released on the payment of a ransom of 9T.
61. Demosthenes' defence of Diopieithes that he, at least, had done something for the Athenian cause, smacks of a man attempting to justify

the actions of another knowing them full well to be illegal. cf. Pritchett (1974) p.93.

62. Dem. VIII.24.

63. Demosthenes, a few weeks after the previous debate on the Chersonese, used the opportunity of another debate on the subject (stimulated by the requests for supplies by the forces in that area) to deliver the masterly Third Philippic, in which he demanded that the Athenians take the field against the Macedonian king as the champions of the Hellenes. Reinforcements were sent to Diopeithes, and, within a month or so, Chares too was in the Chersonese (IGII<sup>2</sup> 228), and there is evidence of Athenian forces garrisoning threatened areas (eg. Tenedos and Proconnesos: Dem. XVIII.302).

64. Compare with the action taken by the Great King against Chares in 354.

65. See Demosthenes, *Third Philippic*.

66. Money: Arist. *Rhet.* II.8.1386a13; Troops (to Perinthos): Paus. I.89.7; Diod. XVI.75.2.

67. I.e. after the impeachment of Iphicrates, Timotheos and Menestheos.

68. In 357. Whether this was before or after Chios is dependent upon one's dating of the Social War. In my chronological framework, with Chios so early in 357/356, Chares' activities in Thrace must have occurred after the battle.

69. See Davies *APF*, Kirchner *PA* 15292; Chares held seven *strategiai* in the period 354/353 to 341/340 yet his activities in these years remain, to a large extent, a mystery.

70. Diod. XVI.74.2-76.4; Paus. I.29.7; Philochoros FGrH 328F53-56; cf. Arr. *Anab.* II.14.5 and Dion.Hal. *To Ammaeos* I.11.740.

71. Athens was still negotiating allies when Chares was dispatched. Demosthenes and Hypereides, now ascendent in the assembly, successfully gained alliances with Byzantium, Abydos and some unknown Thracian princes (Dem. XVIII.89, 302 and 244) and with Rhodes and Chios in all probability (Dem. *Vit. X. Orat.* 850a). These came about after the outbreak of hostilities. Spring 340 also witnessed an anti-Macedonian conference at Athens (Plut. *Phoc.* 15, Dem.17; Diod. XVI.74.1; IGII<sup>2</sup> 230; Charax FGrH 103F19; Philochoros FGrH 328F159-160; Dem. XVIII.89; Schol. to Aesch. III.85, 103).

72. Philip's ships met with such a violent response from Chares that the king was forced to move the fleet alongside the army on the way into the Hellespont.
73. 180 ships according to Theopompos (FGrH 115F292), and 230 according to Philochoros (FGrH 328F162) and Didymos (Dem. col.X.34-XI.5).
74. Persian aid (for Perinthos) is attested in Dem. XI.5; Arr. *Anab.* II.14.5; Paus. I.29.10. It seems unlikely that Byzantium would have received no aid from the Persians, even though the city had withstood a famous lengthy siege by the Persians in the late C6th. (Herod. VI.1.).
75. Plut. Phoc.14, Mor.188B.8; Diod. XVI.77.1-3. cf. Dem. *Vit.X.Orat.* 848f, 851a; GHI 175 and IGII<sup>2</sup> 232-235.
76. W. Jaeger, *Demosthenes: The Origins and Growth of his Policy* (California 1938) p.184-185.
77. Dem. IX.47-52.
78. Demosthenes had gained the alliance of the Thebans.
79. Diod. XVI.80; Plut. *Phoc.* 15-16.
80. Dem. XVIII.160-187, 211-251 for the general argument. The ship owner allusion is found in §194.
81. The lack of Athenian vigour in terms of the pursual of foreign policy in the 351-340 period meant in effect, that there was simply little for an ambitious young *strategos* wishing to specialise in a military career to do.
82. Menestheos was a very young man at the time of Embata. He could scarcely have reached the thirty year minimum age requirement for the *strategia* (cf. Davies, *APF* ; *PA* 7737), but he held only one known *strategia* after his impeachment, in 333/332 (Dem. XVIII.26).
83. See the chapter 7 on Athenian Command Structures for a full discussion of this relationship.
84. On Lysicles: see Diod. XVI.81.1-2; Lyc. F10.tit.1.
85. Plut. *Phoc.* 16.
86. Aesch. III.77.
87. Diod. XVII.30.2-6; Q. Curtius Rufus III.2.10-19.
88. See, for instance, the arguments in M. B. Sakelariou (1981) p.126 onward.

#### 4 Athens and the Macedonian hegemony, 336-322

1. Dem. II.14.
2. C. von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* (Berlin 1808), book I, rule 9.3
3. Napoleon attempted to buy the loyalty of the of these confederated states by the bribing of their rulers in an age of title and prestige. Thus the two major nations of the confederacy, Bavaria and Württemberg were raised from the status of electorates to that of kingdoms in their own right. Most of the rulers of the other, smaller nations received a similar rise in titular rank or the gift of territory taken from another, leaving the actual area covered by the countries of the federation virtually unchanged from that of the old Holy Roman Empire. Thus, in reality, for all their efforts, the states of the confederacy made very little in the way of actual physical gain; it was, in effect, a classic example of the divide and rule policy on a long(ish) term basis.
4. As was provided for the expeditionary forces to Asia Minor; If the figures of Diodoros are followed there were 30,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry, of which 12,000 of the infantry and 2,100 of the cavalry were from the southern Greek city-states. If it is further considered that almost all of the mercenaries in Alexander's force were Greek as well, then the contribution of the Greeks to the army was clearly very great indeed (Diod. XVII.17). Plutarch (*Fort. Al. M.* p.327) states that both Ptolemy and Aristoboulos gave the figures as to the size of Alexander's army as also 30,000 infantry, but with 5,000 and 4,000 cavalry respectively. Arrian (*Anab.* I.11.4) conjectured the army at "...not much more than 30,000 infantry, but with over 5,000 cavalry". Justin gives 32,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry. Anaximenes claimed 43,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry and Callisthenes (ap. Polyb. XII.19) gave 40,000 with 4,500 cavalry. Cf. A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander I* (Oxford 1980), I. I.2.4.

5. Alexander continued to use the title of "Hegemon of the League of Corinth" as adopted by Philip II in 338.
6. Some city-states however were keen supporters of the Macedonian settlement. The enemies of Thebes for instance, outwardly at least, saw Alexander as a liberating, rather than enslaving presence. Cities such as Megalopolis too benefited from Alexander's campaigns. Polybios (XVIII.14) reveals the extent of the collaboration by leading figures in the city-states with Philip and Alexander, although these men, according to Polybios were not traitors to the Hellenic cause, but merely seeking the same thing as Demosthenes through other means.
7. On Lycourgos see Plut.*Vit. X. Orat.* 841B-C. Modern discussions: F. W. Mitchel (Cincinnati, Ohio 1970); S. C. Humphreys (Lanham 1985) p.199-252; E. M. Burke (1985) p.251-264; A. B. Bosworth (1988) p.204-215. Cf. C. J. Schwenk (Chicago 1985); B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia* XXIX (1960) p.2-4; M. Markianos, "A note on the administration of Lycourgos.", *GRBS* X (1969) p.325-331.
8. On the Lycourgan municipal building programme see Syll.<sup>3</sup> 326 (IGII<sup>2</sup>457): Decree of Stratocles in honour of Lycourgos (307/306).
9. See O. W. Reinmuth, *The Ephebic Inscriptions* (Leiden 1981), and E. Ruschenbusch (1979) p.173-176. Cf. D. E. M. Lewis *CR* (1973) p.254-256.
10. J. E. Atkinson (1981) p.43.
11. W. Will (Munich 1985), p.48-77, 78-100. Cf. A. B. Bosworth, rev. of W. Will (1985), *Gnomon* LVII.5 (1985) p.432.
12. See for example W. W. Tarn in *CAH* vol.7, A. Schaefer (Leipzig 1887), H. B. Dunkel (1938) p.291-305 and C. Mossé (London 1970) p.83-85.
13. R. Sealey, (1956) p.178-205 and E. Badian (1961) p.16-43.
14. F. W. Mitchel (1970) p.165.
15. A. B. Bosworth (1985) p.432.
16. Arr. *Anab.* I.10.4-6; Plut. *Dem.* 23.4.
17. Diod. XVII.8.5-6; Plut. *Dem.* 23.1.
18. Arr. *Anab.* I.10.3.
19. Q. Curtius Rufus III.2.10f. (cf. J. E. Atkinson [Amsterdam: Gieben 1980]); Diod. XVII.25.6, 30.2-6.

20. The career of Phocion, belonging more to the internal history of Athens, will be discussed in the chapter on the generals and Athenian Politics.
21. For ease of reference the *strategoí* are:  
 Δικαιογένης Μενεξένου Κυδαθηναίεύς; Διότιμος Διοπέιθους  
 Εὐωνυμεύς; Θρασύβουλος Θράσωνος Ἐρχιεύς; Κόνων Τιμοθέου  
 Ἀναφλύστιος; Λεωσθένης Λεωσθένους Κεφαλῆθεν; Ναυσικλῆς  
 Κλεάρχου Ὀῆθεν; Σώφιλος Φλυεύς; Φαῖδρος Καλλίου Σφήττιος;  
 Φερέκλειδης Φερέκλου; Φιλόμονιδης; Φιλοκλῆς Φορμίωνος  
 Ἐροιάδης; Φίλων; Φωκίων καί Χάρης.
22. J. E. Atkinson (1981) p.46.
23. A. Fuks (1972) p.17-44., VIII (1977) p.49-83, X (1979) p.33-78. E. Ruschenbusch (Bamburg 1978) argued, however, that class strife was not a feature in C4th. Athens. Cf. D. M. Lewis, *CR* XXX (1980) p.77-78 and W. Lotze, *Gnomon* LII (1980) p.381-382 for two reviews of Ruschenbusch. See also H. J. Gerhke (1985) and G. E. M. de Ste. Croix (London 1981) p.298-300 on the pro-Macedonian leanings of the Athenian upper classes.
24. Leocrates, a prosperous Athenian businessman had fled Athens in 338, shortly after the defeat of Chaeronea and had headed for Rhodes where he spread the false report of the capture of the city. Later on he moved to Megara, but in 333/330 he returned to Athens and was immediately impeached for treason. Although we hear of emergency defence procedures being taken by the city in the wake of the battle, and the execution of one Autolycos, an Areopagite, for breaking them, it seems doubtful that these measures were in force at the time of Leocrates' departure. A point revealed perhaps by the lack of emphasis put on them by Lycourgos (Emergency measures: *Lyc. Leoc.* 16,17; Autolycos: *ibid.* 53 and F9). As it was, Aeschines (III.252) reveals that Leocrates escaped conviction by only one vote.
25. Eucrates' law: *Hesperia* XXI (1952) p.355-356.
26. Students of the Napoleonic era will find such names as MacDonald, Mortier, Soult, Sebastiani, Gourgaud, St.Cyr and even Jerome Bonaparte as relevant to the history of the French Third Empire as they were to the First.
27. See *Arist. Ath. Pol.* 61 with the commentary by P. J. Rhodes (Oxford



- 1981).
28. Statue of Democratia: A. E. Raubitschek, "Democratia", *Hesperia* XXXI (1962) p.268.
  29. Sacrifice: IG II<sup>2</sup> 1496.131-132.
  30. On the revolt of Agis III see Paus. III.10.5; Q. Curtius Rufus VI.1.21; Diod. XVII.62.6-63.5; Badian (1967) p.170-192.
  31. J. K. Davies in his introduction to *APF* argued that the liability for the liturgia could be taken as the criterion for membership of the 'upper classes' (cf. Plato 1291a.33-34.), and although perhaps a little simplistic (eg. the impoverished old aristocratic families which no longer filled the economic qualification.) such a definition can be a workable qualification as a clear indication of relative wealth; contra: P. J. Rhodes, *AJAH* VII.1 (1982) p.1-19.
  32. See the relevant career studies of Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheos and Chares in previous chapters.
  33. On the traditional bellicosity of the Athenian poorer classes see Ar. *Ecc.* 192, 197-198, *Ach.* 205-236 and the Old Oligarch (Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 2.14; cf. E. David (1980); Strauss (1986) p.59-63 and Mossé (1973) ch.2, especially p.30.
  34. See Diod. XVII.3.4-4.6; Plut. *Dem.* 23.
  35. Diotimos and the pirates: IG II<sup>2</sup> 1623.276-285, and his honours: Plut. *Mor.* 844a; IG II<sup>2</sup> 414a; E. Schweigert (1940) p.340-341.
  36. Such is an indication of the considered quality of the Athenian generals in this period. Alexander preferred to hire mercenary commanders rather than use the official generals of the city-states. Clearly he considered that he had successfully purged Athens of her best commanders and had no use for the semi-competent generals on his staff. Such an occurrence is not unique in the armies of hegemons. The Grande Armée of 1812 included in its ranks contingents from Napoleon's recently defeated enemies Prussia and Austria. Napoleon demanded the finest generals from those nations to lead these corps. Of course, the situation had not arisen whereby these generals had already fled their nations to continue the struggle elsewhere, but when the generals requested did not appear, those who were sent in their place played little part in the campaign and were, indeed, sent home after a short space of time. Alexander likewise

considered the Greek generals who were commanding the allied contingents to be of insufficient quality to play any major part in his campaigns.

37. Charidemos was, of course, an Athenian citizen by this time, having been naturalised in 357/356 (Davies *APF* p.571).
38. Athenodoros has the dubious distinction of being the first known Athenian to fight against official Athenian forces whilst in the service of a third party (Polyaenos V.21). In the pay of the Persians during the 350's he became involved in the Thracian problem where he continued to act as a mercenary commander until the annexation of Thrace by Philip II (Dem. XXIII.10), whereupon he returned to Persian service fiercely anti-Macedonian. Later on he is recorded as a prisoner in Sardis until released by Alexander on the appeal of Phocion (Plut. *Phoc.* XVIII; Ael. V. H. I.25.). An Athenian general he may have been but a general of the Athenians he most certainly was not, thus precluding him from in-depth study in this work (cf. Kirchner *PA* 280; Davies *APF* ; Berve [1926] no. 27).
39. See H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* (Munich 1926) no.819. Homage for Sigeum: Arr. *Anab.* I.12.1.
40. Plut. *Vit.* X. *Orat.* 848E.
41. Arr. *Anab.* II.2.1; Q. Curtius Rufus III.3.1; Diod. XVII.30.1f.
42. Dinarchos (I.33) records that Ephialtes had ferried money into Athens from Persia for "anti-Macedonian activities". Although described as 'a demagogue' Ephialtes was a proven *strategos*, as his later conduct proved (Plut. *Mor.* 847F).
43. Diod. XVII.26.1 seq..
44. One source has his name upon the list of those demanded (Suda A 2704; Compare with Plut. *Dem.* 23 and Arrian *Anab.* X; cf. Schaefer, III p.137 n.2.
45. Diod. 25.6.
46. *Strategia* : IG II<sup>2</sup> 1628.40; dedication: IG II<sup>2</sup> 2969.
47. Arr. *Anab.* II.15.2, 4.
48. Arr. *Anab.* III.24.4. Cf. Atkinson (1981) p.39.
49. Dem. XVII.20. It was a measure of renewed Athenian readiness that a fleet of 100 triremes was prepared in order to force this issue (ibid. 21).

50. Dem. XVII.23-25.
51. Plut. *Phoc.* 22.
52. See, for example, the ref. above (n.51) for the Athenian reaction to the death of Alexander.
53. Diod. XVII.108.6. Of course, by the time Harpalos reached Attica this sum must have been considerably reduced, and Diodoros himself states that after his initial refusal of entry to Athens (XVII.108.7) Harpalos only kept part of the money with him. Upon landing at Piraeos he is said to have had only 700T. with him (Hyp. *Dem.* cols.9 and 10; Plut. *Vit. X. Orat.* 846b and Plut. *Phoc.* 21).
54. I. Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca* (Berlin 1900) p.45: "ἐκπολεμῶ· ἐχθρὸν ποιῶ, αἰτιατικῇ. σαυτὸς δὲ ἐς Ἀθήνας ἐλθὼν, ὡς ἐκπολεμώσον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον."
55. See the Teubner *Anabasis* of Arrian (Leipzig 1967) p.359 in reference to Arrian *Anab.* I.5..
56. Harpalos was closely connected with Phocion and his son-in-law Charicles (Plut. *Phoc.* 21-22), and had been honoured with Athenian citizenship for his donations of grain to the *polis* (Athenaeos 586-596 a-b).
57. Hyp. *Dem.* col.19.
58. Q. Curtius Rufus X.2.2.
59. Athenaeos 538b quotes Ephippos of Olynthos as his source for the following public offer made to Alexander at Ecbatana in the autumn of 324, making it clear that an expedition against the Athenians was considered as a certainty by some members of Alexander's entourage: "Γόργος ὁ ὀπλοφύλαξ Ἀλεξάνδρον Ἀμμωνος υἱὸν στεφανοῖ χρυσοῖς τρισχιλίοις, καὶ ὅταν Ἀθήνας πολιορκῇ, μυρίαίς πανοπλίαις καὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καταπέλταις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις βέλεσιν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανοῖς." The speaker, one Gorgios is not to be confused with Gorgos of Iasos, the representative of the Samians at the court of the Macedonian king. It is incorrect to consider the issue of Samos as the cause for such an expedition as the one proposed, as some have suggested. Eg. Jacoby FGrH from A. Korte, *Neue Jahrbücher* I (1924) p.220.
60. The "Harpalos Theory" has a long tradition in the works of the

historians, particularly because of the sparsity of the sources on this subject, since both Arrian and Curtius suffer from lacunae at this point in their narratives. Examples of those who have followed this line of thought include Grote, vol. XII p.400-401; A. Holm, *Griechische Geschichte* vol.III (Berlin 1981) p.415-416; J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch: Alexander* (Oxford 1969) p.21; Bury and Meiggs (1975). But see N. G. Ashton, "The Lamian War-A False Start?", *Antichthon* XVII (1983) p.47-64; S. Jaschinski (Bonn 1981) and I. Worthington, "The chronology of the Harpalos affair.", *SO* LXI (1986) p.63-76.

61. For the Athenians on Samos see C. Habicht, "Samische Volksbeschlüsse der hellenistischen Zeit.", *MDAI* (A) LXXII (1957) no.1 (A) p.152ff; R. M. Errington, "Samos and the Lamian War.", *Chiron* (1975) p.51-58.
62. Diod. XVIII.8.
63. Q. Curtius Rufus X.2.7; Demosthenes apparently bought time on the issue for the matter was still a question for Antipater in 322 (Diod. XVIII.18.6).
64. His father, Leosthenes, was sentenced to death in an *eisangelia* (Hyp. III.1-2); cf. Kirchner *PA* and Davies *APF*; For Leosthenes' *strategia* see O. W. Reinmuth no.15b.4-6 and see n.69 below; cf. Worthington (1987) p.489-491.
65. W. W. Tarn, *CAH* VI p.455.
66. The sources do not agree as to the role of Leosthenes in regard to the Greek mercenaries. Diodoros reports that the mercenaries, having drifted to Taenarum, thereupon elected Leosthenes as their leader (XVII.111.2-3). Pausanias however places much more emphasis on the conduct of Leosthenes himself: "Alexander had wished to deport to Persia all the Greeks that were serving as mercenaries in the armies of Darios and his Satraps, but Leosthenes was too quick for him, and brought them by sea to Europe." (Paus. *Attica* XXV.5).
67. Many historians have argued that Leosthenes must have had some political connection with the polis from an early stage. See, for example, G. T. Griffith (Cambridge 1935) p.35; C. Mossé (1973) p.98 and F. W. Mitchel *Phoenix* XVIII (1964) p.16ff. Only Diodoros however, specifically mentions any negotiations between the Athenians and

- Leosthenes himself (Diod. XVII.111.4) and the opposite viewpoint, that the Athenians did not open negotiations with Leosthenes in the king's lifetime has been argued by, amongst others, W. Will (Munich 1983) p.129 and S. Jaschinski (Bonn 1981) p.53.
68. Pausanias I.25.5 describes the direct and active opposition of Leosthenes to the plan of Alexander to "replant" the Greek mercenaries in Persia. If true then Leosthenes was clearly an enemy of the king. Yet even if this story is incorrect Leosthenes was still in charge of a group (the Taenarum mercenaries) making a direct challenge to Macedonian control. Diodoros too, notes that Leosthenes was thoroughly opposed to Alexander (Diod. XVIII.3.3) and so clearly, any connection between the Athenians and Leosthenes would not be regarded in a favourable light by the Macedonians.
  69. W. Will considered that the Leosthenes in the Oropos inscription described as *strategos* to be the same as the mercenary general, but this has been rejected by S. Jaschinski (Bonn 1981) p.435 and A. B. Bosworth (1985) p.435.
  70. Diod. XVII.111.3.
  71. Diod. *ibid*.
  72. E. Lepore (1955) p.161ff.
  73. Agis III had gathered his mercenaries from Cape Taenarum for the revolt of 330 (Arr. Anab. II.13.6.) and attempted to stir up a pro-Persian revolt there at the same time (Diod. XVII.48; Q. Curtius Rufus IV.1.39). On the Cape as the source of mercenaries see J. F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster 1985) p.170.
  74. See A. B. Bosworth (1988) Appendix 1.
  75. Plut. *Mor.* 848E, *Vit. X. Orat.* 18.
  76. Dem. *Ep.* III.31.
  77. See A. W. Pickard-Cambridge *CAH* VI, ch.XIV p.455.
  78. W. Will (Munich 1983) p.48.
  79. Plut. *Phoc.* 23 and *ibid*.
  80. Paus. I.25.5.
  81. On Antiphilos see Diod. XVIII.13.6, 15.7, 17.6.
  82. The Athenians had to accept a Macedonian garrison and the imposition

of a restricted franchise (12,000 citizens lost their voting rights). They were also forced to accept the loss of their allies, the forfeiture of Samos and the surrender of the leading anti-Macedonians (ie. Demosthenes, Hypereides, Aristonicos of Marathon and Himeraeos of Phalerum [Plut. *Dem.* 28]). See further Diod. XVIII.18; Plut. *Phoc.* 28.

## 5 Lawless Mercenaries or Loyal Patriots ?

1. Herodotos (VII.9.2) hints at the value of Greek soldiers as against their Asian counterparts, in that the Persians suffered from that most dangerous tendency in war: a wish to kill but not to die in the process. The comments of the Persian Mardonios (Herod. *ibid* ) that "...these Greeks are accustomed to wage war amongst each other in a most senseless way, for as soon as they declare war on each other, they seek out the fairest and most level ground, and then go down there to do battle on it. Consequently, even the winners leave with extreme losses; I need not mention the conquered, since they are annihilated," seem to be more inspired by awe than contempt. " It is this Western desire for a single, magnificent collision of infantry, for a brutal killing with edged weapons on a battlefield between free men, that has baffled and terrified our adversaries from the non-Western world for more than 2,500 years." (V. D. Hanson, *The Western Way of War* [London 1989] p.9).
2. The titles *Condottieri* and *Banditti* were first used by F. Guicciardini in *Storia D'Italia* of the early C16th.
3. C. Thirwall, *History of Greece*, (London 1852) VIII. p.299 n.1. For the fullest discussion of the *Condottieri*, their activities and loyalties see M. Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters* (London 1974).
4. Photios, *Bibliotheca* 44b20-38 (Ctesias, *Persica*, FGrH 688F30).
5. See Seager *JHS* LXXV (1955) p.101.
6. On this commission see C. D. Hamilton (1979) p.175ff; G. Barbieri (1955) p.79-89 and Swoboda *RE* 1(1922) col.1323.
7. Isoc. IX. 52, 55; Dem. XX.69; Nep. *Con.* 2.1, 5.1, Just. VI.4 and

Diod. XIV.39.3.

8. See Ch.2. p.12-15.
9. Ctes. 688 F30; Hell. Oxy. 20(15).5; Diod. XIV.39.2, 79.5, 7, 81.4; Nep. *Con.* 4.3.
10. The king referred to has been a matter of some debate. Nepos ( XI. *Iphic.* 2.1) claimed the ruler was Seuthes. Demosthenes (XXIII.129) claimed it was Cotys. Beloch, *GG*<sup>2</sup>, reconciled the two sources by theorising that Seuthes was the father of Cotys. Hence Iphicrates loyally served one dynasty.
11. Swoboda, *RE* 2, Seuthes (1923) col.2021, argued that he acted on his own initiative, but A. Höck, *Hermes* XXVI (1896) p.76-117, 353-462, concluded that Iphicrates must have served in an official capacity. Rehdantz, *Vitae*, p.24-25 whose arguments were that Iphicrates did act as an official *strategos*, and indeed, the ships in Tod 117 did presumably belong to the Athenian squadron lying off Thrace. But Dem. XXIII.130-132, the main Attic source for this episode argued that Iphicrates had not been prepared to act against Athenian possessions, which can only suggest that the general was acting in an unofficial capacity.
12. See W. Block, " Die Condottieri : Studien über die sogenannten "unblutigen Schlachten.", *Historische Studien* CX (1913).
13. Kock, II p.151; Seneca (*Contr.* VI.5) alluded to Iphicrates' marriage, but his account is so garbled as to be worthless.
14. Xen. *Anab.* VII.2.38.
15. Pritchett (1974) p.66-67.
16. Dem. XXIII.132. This, however, is most dubious. The naval battle referred to was probably from a much later date (362?). Iphicrates' departure was more likely due to the ending of resistance to Cotys.
17. L. Kallett (1983) p.252. E. M. Harris, "Iphicrates at the Court of Cotys." *AJPH* CX (1989b) p.267, however, took a very different view. He considered that Iphicrates' refusal to fight against the Athenians, and his willingness to defend Cotys were merely two sides of a single policy aimed at protecting his own personal interests by the avoidance of giving offence to either Cotys or the Athenians.
18. Diod. XV.29. Diodoros clearly muddled his chronology here. The entire Egyptian campaign has been compressed into the year 377/376.

Hall *CAH* VI. p.148 agreed with the 377 date. But Nectenebô had become king in succession to Acoris in 378 (ibid). Parke (1933) p.59-62 determined the dates of the campaign as 386-380. A. T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948) p.339 asserts 385-383. In conclusion, the 380's seem much more likely than the 370's from both the Greek and Persian angle. Cf. J. D. Ray (1987) p.82-83 and Kienitz (1953).

19. Athens had recently made an alliance with the Persian Empire.
20. Diod. XV.29.2; Nep. XII. *Chab.* 2.1 "...in Aegypto sua sponte gessit."
21. Diod. XV.29.3 "...Φαρνάβαζος ἐξέπεμψε δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πρέσβεις, κατηγορῶν μὲν Χαβρίου..."
22. See Hansen (1983b) p.151-180.
23. Demosthenes (XLIX.24) argued that the general was trying to leave Athens before the time of his *euthynai* (scrutiny of his accounts). However, given that the speech was a deliberate attack upon the name of Timotheos' family such evidence must be treated with scepticism.
24. Parke (1933) p.75.
25. See Ch.5 p.42-43, 261.
26. Nepos XVII. *Ages.* 8.6.
27. IG II<sup>2</sup> 111.18.
28. Dem. XXI.64.
29. Diod. XV.92.2.
30. Pritchett (1974) p.72.
31. G. L. Cawkwell (1981) p.52 and n.49 on his service in Thrace.
32. Dem. XXIII.177; Nep. XIII. *Tim.* 3.1; Diod. XVI.7.3; Hyp. Isoc. VIII.
33. Holm (1891) p.211-212.
34. Diod. XVI.22.1.
35. Isocrates' *On The Peace* (VIII) and Xenophon's *Ways and Means* provide the general ancient evidence on the economic situation in Athens during this period. Isoc. VII.9 indicates the intolerable burden the war placed upon Athenian finances. Cf. A. Andreades (Cambridge, Mass. 1933).
36. Diod. XVI.22; Dem. IV.24. However, the Scholion to Dem. IV.19 talks of a very different situation and pressure: "...saying if he did not



provide them with maintenance they would go away to one offering it, and he (Chares) was constrained to transport the army to Artabazos."

Such actions by mercenaries are not unknown (eg. The German *landschnechts* of the Earl of Lincoln prior to the battle of Stoke in 1487.).

37. Recall: FGrH 105F4; cf. Diod. XVI.22.2 on the decision of the Athenian *ecclesia*.
38. Scholion to Dem. IV.19.
39. Scholion to Dem. III.31.
40. Schol. to Dem. III.31. The denial by a general of booty and loot to a victorious army not only caused a drop in morale amongst the troops but risked serious discontent. Thus, in 338, the Roman army under Cincinnatus was allowed to retain the booty it had taken at Contenebra, even though it had been planned for this to go to the state (Livy VI. 4.7-11). Such were the risks when the army in question was composed of citizen-soldiers. Chares' action must be viewed in this light.
41. FGrH 105.4.
42. As there is no evidence, it cannot definitely be said that he was elected *strategos* for the year 355/354. The argument need not be affected here in any case.
43. FGrH. 105.4.
44. On Olynthos: G. L. Cawkwell (1962) p.122-140; Orontes: IG II<sup>2</sup> 207.
45. Charidemos: Philochoros FGrH 328F50; cf. Theopompos FGrH 115F143 and Davies *APF* 570 and Kirchner *PA* 15380. Phocion: Dem. XXI.164; Aesch. II.169-172; Plut. *Phoc.* 12; Polyaeos V.21; Chares: Philochoros FGrH 328F49; Schol. Ael. Arist. *Pan.* 179.8.9; Suda sv. Κάρανος.
46. The rapidity of the entire operation caused Osborne to question the dating of this episode. He placed it in the late 360's (*ABSA* LXI [1971] p.297-321 and *Naturalisation II* [1987] p.61ff.). But cf. M. H. Hansen (1984) p.134 n.31; R. A. Moysey, *ZPE* LXIX (1987) p.93-100; R. Develin, *ZPE* LXXIII (1988) p.75-8 and J. M. Carter, *Historia* XX (1971).
47. See Ch. 3 p.68-69 on the activities of Diopeithes.
48. The career of Charidemos of Oreos can be pieced together from various sources, but essentially Demosthenes' *Against Aristocrates* (XXIII) and

Diodoros provide the evidence. It is clear that his early career was indeed that of a "mercenary captain", serving various masters for financial reward. For accounts and references to Charidemus see Kirchner *PA* 15380; Davies *APF* 570; Parke (1933) p.125-132; Pritchett (1974) p.85-89; Osborne, *Naturalisation III/IV* (1983) p.56-58.

49. The dating of Charidemus' grant of citizenship by the Athenian demos depends upon one Ὁ Χαρίδημος mentioned in IG II<sup>2</sup> 118. H. W. Parke dissociated this man from Charidemus of Oreos (*PRIA* XLIII [1936] sect.C12,375), thus removing the theory that Charidemus was awarded the citizenship prior to 361/360. Osborne (1983) p. 56-58 however, has recently renewed this earlier date.
50. Although by no means common, awards of citizenship became an increasing feature of Athenian diplomatic honours for very important foreign individuals during the course of the 4th., particularly in the 360's and 350's. See Osborne, *Naturalisation II* (1980) p.77f. T.39-42. As a mercenary commander, Charidemus had taken service with Cotys in 364 (Dem. XXIII.130) and again in 359 (Dem. XXIII.158) from when he served first Cotys, and then Cersebleptes, as a loyal commander. The award of Athenian citizenship was made to Charidemus as a Thracian "grandee" rather than as a mercenary officer. Cf. Dem. XXIII.165-175; IG II<sup>2</sup> 126; P. Cloché *RPh.* (1922) p.5-13.
51. Using the oration of Demosthenes. W. Jaeger (1938) p.100ff. paints the whole picture of the political rivalries which formed the background of this case.
52. See Develin (1989); Davies *APF* ; Kirchner *PA*.
53. The list is given in both Plutarch (*Dem.* 23) and in Arrian (*Anab.* 10), both having nine names, although some authors mention ten-twelve names. Most were well-known orators or generals, but some are otherwise unknown. Some names appear on one list but not the other. Charidemus' name was on both.
54. Arr. I.10.6; Suda sv. Αντίπατρος.
55. Plut. *Phoc.* 16.
56. Dem. XVIII.114 records that Charidemus was crowned for his donation of shields to the public armoury. We also possess the epigraphic evidence that Charidemus was awarded three gold crowns (at

- least) by the *demos* for services "to the state", possibly as trierarch (as argued by Davies, *APF* 571). See also IGII<sup>2</sup> 1496.28, 32 and 36.
57. Men such as Athenodoros (See *PA* 6882; *APF* p.221) and Apollodoros of Lampra (*PA* 10904; *APF* p.43; Paus. I.29.10).
58. See Ch.4 p.86-88.
59. Aesch. III.77.
60. See Ch. III part 1.b on the generals "in exile".
61. Iphicrates in Thrace (386), Egypt (380/379) and Thrace (365); Chabrias in Egypt with Akoris (376) and with Tachôs (363/362); Timotheos in Egypt (373) and Chares in the service of Artabazos in 354.
62. 336-365: Agesilaos served with Ariobarzanes; 361/360: Employed by Tachôs of Egypt; 360: Deserted Tachôs for Nectanebô II. Cf. Cartledge, Agesilaos (London 1986). But also see J. D. Ray (1987) p.82-83.
63. Dem. XV.3.
64. So reasoned F. H. Marshall (1905) ch.V; cf. S. Hornblower (London 1983) ch.17 p.242, Mossé (1973) chs.2 and 3 and also H. Montgomery (Oslo 1983) p.9.
65. eg. G. L. Cawkwell in the *OCD*, sv. Timotheos.
66. Isoc. XV.109; Xen. *Hell.* V.4.63.
67. Aeschines (II.70) claimed that Timotheos had gained seventy-five cities for the Athenians at this time. Isocrates (XV.113) and Deinarchos (I.14 and III.17) both offer the more realistic figure of 24 new allies.
68. Dem. XLIX.6ff; Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.12.
69. Xen. *Hell.* V.4.64.
70. Dem. XV.9.
71. Polyaeos III.10.9; Arist. *Oecon.* 2; Isoc. XV.3 and Nep. XIII. *Tim.* 1.2, "...Samum cepit; in quo oppugnando superiore bello Athenienses mille et ducenta talenta consumpserunt, id illud sine ulla publice impensa populo restituit."
72. Diod. XVIII.18.
73. The welcoming of exiles was a common expression of displeasure by one state against the actions of another. For example, the Athenians took in Theban exiles after the Spartan seizure of the Cadmea in 382 (Xen. *Hell.* V.2.28-30; exiles at Athens, *ibid* V.2.31). Evidence of countries

- absorbing the Samian exiles of 365: eg. Cardia, *Misc. Acad. Berol.* II.2 (1950) p.27; Erythrae, Miletos and Rhodes, see Hornblower (1982) ch.V; Phaselis, *SEG* I.352.
74. Arist. *Rhet.* 1384b.32.
75. Tod 123.
76. G. Norlin, introduction to the LCL edition of Isocrates VIII.
77. To list all the works by writers who have taken up this viewpoint would be excessive, but some of the major works are Beloch, *GG* ; J. B. Bury (ed.) *CAH* VI, Marshall (1905), Grote, *History of Greece* XI (London 1888), Mossé (1962) and Glotz (1925-). R. Sealey exemplifies the less moralistic approach of some more modern writers.
78. Cargill (1981) p.179; cf. S.Sherwin-White, rev. of Cargill in *JHS* CIV (1984) p.270-271.
79. 367/366 (Xen. *Hell.* VII.2.18f; Diod. XV.75.3), 366/365 (Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.1,5) and 361/360 (Diod. XV.95.3; Aen. Tact. XI.13f). Cf. Davies *APF* 568; Kirchner *PA* 15292; Develin (1989).
80. Diod. XV.95.3.
81. Aen. Tact. XI.13.
82. Kiechle, *Der Kleine Pauly* I (1964) p.113.
83. Dem. XVIII.234 , XXIV.202.
84. Cawkwell *JHS* CI (1981) p.46.
85. *ibid.*
86. Marshall (1905) p.110; Isoc. VIII. "...ἐπεχείρησε Χίοις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς συμμάχοις."
87. Dem. XXIII.148; Isoc. IV.115.
88. Plut. *Phoc.* 14; *Mor.* 188.B.8.
89. Diod. XVI.34.3: "...Σηστὸν πόλιν ἐλὼν τοὺς μὲν ἡβῶντας ἀπέσφαζεν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐξηνδραποδίσσατο." But Sestos was an enemy of the Athenians and Byzantium, their new ally. The harshness of treatment shown to captured nations did not reach new levels through this incident. For instance, contrast with the Athenian treatment of Mytilene, recaptured in 428 (Thuc. III.2-6, 8-16, 18, 25-50).
90. IG II<sup>2</sup> 228.
91. See A. Schaefer II (1886) p.508-509. Schaefer also states that Chares continued to operate against Philip, thus dispelling the arguments that

the general was recalled in disgrace.

92. Philip was extremely harsh on those cities who opposed him. The fate of Olynthos provides a good example.
93. On Diopeithes: Demosthenes VIII and Libanios' hypothesis on that speech.
94. Dem. VIII.21: "...οὔτε τὰς συντάξεις Διοπεΐθει δίδομεν."
95. See ch.V.
96. Aesch. II.70,90-92.
97. Political cooperation with Demosthenes: Plut. *Cic. and Dem.* 3.1, *Mor.* 486D; with Hypereides: Plut. *Mor.* 848E.
98. Aesch. II.70.
99. Dem. XXIII.173,175.
- 100.Dem. VIII.30; The year was 341.
- 101.Plut. *Cic. and Dem.* 3.1.
- 102.We have some evidence of a single public oration by Chares, part of an *eisangelia* against one Pheidiades, somewhere in the 336-324 period (see Dein. F XXIV.Con.). Chares, "the friend of the people," see Dem. *Ep.* III.31.
- 103.Athenaeos, *The Deipnosophists* XII.532.a-c.
- 104.Crudeness of Chares: Athenaeos, *The Deipnosophists* XII.532.a-c; Plut. *Pel.* 2, *Mor.* 187C.3 and 788D. and E.
- 105.Nep. XIII. *Tim.* 4.4.
- 106.Plut. *Phoc.* 5.

## 6

## Accountability

1. See Chapter 9 on the Generals and Athenian politics.
2. This statement is not necessarily true, but the implementation of negative accountability remains the greater part of the recorded evidence. Those officials who were the victims of the wrath of the Athenians were, seemingly, far more worthy of note for historians than those (the

vast majority) who had served competently, if not outstandingly.

3. Such outward statements of discontent were not necessarily found solely, or at all, in classical Athens. The summary "justice" of the people exercised on its generals was avoided in classical Athens. Even in times of the greatest indignation, the Athenians never became the lynch-mobs found in some periods of history such as revolutionary France or Civil War China.
4. As in the case of Great Britain, where there exists an Attorney General (England and Wales), a Procurator Fiscal (Scotland) and, from 1986, a Crown Prosecution Service who undertake legal proceedings against other parties on behalf of the Crown (the State). The equivalent exists in most modern countries.
5. Before 360-355 impeachments could, indeed, be heard in the assembly.
6. See Diod. XV.25.1-26.4; Xen. *Hell.* V.4.9-12; Dein. I.38.
7. Such arguments have been used in order to reconcile the conflicting accounts of Xenophon and Diodoros, welding together the ideas of an officially sanctioned expedition, and the subsequent trial and condemnation, providing a rich argument for the "shameful conduct" of the Athenians towards their generals. Such writers have included W. Judeich (1922) p.171-197 and C. Rehdantz, *Vitae* 44; Cf. E. Fabricius (1893) p.448-473; For more recent discussions see Buckler (Cambridge, Mass. 1980) and R. M. Kallet-Marx (1985) p.127-151.
8. The information for the case comes from scattered references in Dem. XIX.180, XXIII. 115, L.17; Aesch. I.56; Hyp. IV.1, and has been discussed by several writers, most notably R. J. Bonner (Chicago 1927) p.130-131, and recently by J.T. Roberts (Wisconsin 1982a) p.111-112.
9. Dem. XLIX; Diod. XV.47.3-4; Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.13.
10. Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.11-13; Diod. XV.47.2-3.
11. Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.39; Dem. XLIX.13-17.
12. Dem. XLIX. *passim* ; The trial was an εἰσαγγελία since we are told that it took place before the assembly.(XLIX.9).
13. Plut. *De genio Socr.* 575e.
14. Callistratos was a leading negotiator in the Atheno-Spartan treaty of 375/374 (Diod. XV.38.2-4).
15. Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.2-3; Diod. XV.45.

16. Diod. XV.95.1-3; Isoc. XV.129; Dein. I.14; Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 12.
17. Dem. LI.8-9; Nepos XII.*Tim.* 3.
18. Outline of Historical Jurisprudence: II: The Jurisprudence of the Greek City State (London 1922) p.167.
19. On ἀποχειροτονία see *Ath. Pol.* 43.4 and 61.1.
20. *Ath. Pol.* 61.2.
21. On the ἐισαγγελία see Harp. sv.; Hyp. IV.1-10; Pollux VIII.51-53; *Ath. Pol.* 8.4, 29.4, 43.4, 59.2. The main secondary sources are Busolt-Swoboda, *GS* (Munich 1920-1926) p.1006-1008; M. H. Hansen (Odense 1975) *passim*; D. MacDowell (London 1978) p.183-186; P. J. Rhodes (1972) p.162-171; T. Thalheim, "Zur *Eisangelia* in Athen", *Hermes* XXXVII (1902) p.339-352, and *RE* V.2138-2141; Cf. J. T. Roberts (1982) *passim*, but especially p.15-17 and 21-24; R. K. Sinclair (Cambridge 1988) p.71, 147-148, 157-158, 183-184, amongst others.
22. The εὔθυναί are mentioned most notably in Pollux VIII.54; Harp. sv. λογισταί and Lex. Cantabr. 664; Cf. Busolt-Swoboda, *GS* 1033, 1060-1061, 1069-1070 and 1074-1088; Glotz, *Greek City* p.225-228; M. Piérart (1971) p.526-573; U. Willamowitz-Möllerndorff (Berlin 1893) II. p.243-251; Sinclair (1988) p.78-79, 160, 174-175 and 220.
23. This scrutiny was called the δοκιμασία; See J. Lipsius, *Das Attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren* (Leipzig 1915) p.269-285 and Kock, "Δοκιμασία", *RE* V. p.1268-1273.
24. R. A. Knox (1985) p. 132-161.
25. R. A. Knox, (1985) p.138-143.
26. E. Cavaignac, *Histoire de l'antiquité*, vol. II: Athens (Paris 1913) p.195-200 (synopsis).
27. G. Glotz (London 1929) p.231.
28. The use of the εὔθυναί as an avenue of attack against the generals does not seem to have been used in the C4th..
29. In chronological order the twenty-two are: Pamphilos (389/388); Ergocles (388); Thrasyboulos of Collytos, Dionysios, Agyrrhios (387/386); The two generals of 379/378; Timotheos (373); Chabrias (366); Callisthenes, Ergophilos (362); Autocles, Leosthenes, Menon, Timomachos (?) and Theotimos (361); Cephisodotos (360/359 ?);

- Iphicrates, Timotheos and Menestheos (354/353); Hegisileos (?) and finally, Lysicles (338/337).
30. For convenience, I shall list them, once again in chronological order: Miltiades (493); Cimon (463); Pericles (430); Xenophon, Hestiodoros and Phanomachos (429); Phormio (428); Paches (427); Laches (426); Pythodoros, Eurymedon and Sophocles (424); Thucydides (424); Phrynichos and Scironides (411); Aristarchos (409); Anytos (409); Alcibiades (408), and the victors of Arginousai (Pericles the Younger, Aristocrates, Lysias, Aristogenes, Protomachos, Thrasyllus, Diomedon and Erasinides).
  31. Figure for Russia quoted from General Y. Denikin, *Ocherki russky smuty* (Paris-Berlin 1921-1926) I. p.189; The French figures come from G. Six, *Les Généraux de la Revolution et l'Empire* (Paris 1947) p.236, n.1.
  32. R. Egger, *The President of the United States* (Boston 1966) p.90-91.
  33. K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle*. (Los Angeles 1974) p.289.
  34. R. K. Sinclair (1988) p.146.
  35. W. K. Pritchett (1974) p.24.
  36. See note 29.
  37. See chapter 5.
  38. eg. changes in the character of the *strategia* into an office enacted in the age of the professional mercenary. Sinclair (1988) p.146 wrote that "...an analysis of the relations between the *demos* and the commanders reveals that the assembly sought, and largely managed, to exercise supervision of the *strategoï* and, to a lesser extent, of the mercenary commanders in its employ." But the *strategoï* were not mercenaries, but citizen-soldiers who, in the overwhelming majority of instances, acted purely in the best interests of the Athenians themselves. The whole concept of "the age of the mercenary commander" is a serious fallacy in the case of Athens. It is the idea of the "age of the mercenary soldier" that has some validity.
  39. Dem. XIII.5.
  40. As ascertained from the mention of the overthrow of the Rhodian democracy in §8, which occurred in that year.
  41. Dem. IV.47.



42. Dem. XIX.332.
43. Hyp. IV *For Euxenippos* 27.
44. As Demosthenes in note 41.
45. M. H. Hansen, *Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the 4th.B.C.* (Odense 1975).
46. For instance, see Isoc. VIII.55: "...the men whose counsels we follow in matters of the greatest importance-these we do not see fit to elect as our generals...but men whose counsel no one would seek, either on his own business or that of the state-these we send into the field with unlimited authority."
47. See chapter 9.

## 7 Command and the Athenian Generals

1. Quote from C. Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (London 1987) p.12.
2. See P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on Aristotle: The Athenian Constitution* (Oxford 1981) for a full discussion. For convenience I shall henceforth use the abbreviation "*Ath. Pol.* "
3. *Ath. Pol.* 61.1-2.
4. Thuc. VII.60.1.
5. See discussion below.
6. Tod 204, "The Oath of Plataea", if the reading is correct, provides the evidence for the existence of ταξίαρχοι at the time of the Persian Wars. (cf. G. Daux, *RA*<sup>6</sup> XVII (1941) p.177-178.). But U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen*. II.88, 108, noting Herodotos' untechnical use of the word, argued that in the Persian Wars the generals were in fact the regimental commanders and the *taxiarchoi* did not exist. I do not agree with Rhodes (Oxford 1981) p.684-685, that the *taxiarchs* were instituted at the time of the institution of the *strategia* in 501/500 as commanders of the whole army, but consider some date

around the 440's/430's to be more likely, when the tribal election system was beginning to break down on a regular basis. The emphatic idea of the *taxiarch* was as a "tribal commander", and it is this idea which probably determines the date of their institution. The *taxiarchs* were considered of sufficient military importance for them to be elected rather than chosen by lot, but if their role had been one primarily based on individual action and initiative, surely they would have followed the *strategoi* and *hipparchoi* in becoming officials elected by the whole citizen body.

7. The emphasis on tribal duties as part of their role caused the *taxiarchs* to accompany the generals in religious ceremonies (IG II<sup>2</sup> 334, 13-14), processions (Dem. IV.26) and in the swearing of oaths (e.g. Tod 144.38), duties stressing the "polity" of the city and the tribal traditions of the citizen body.
8. Λοχαγοί are mentioned in Xen. *Mem.* III.1.5, VI.1, Isaeos IX.14 and Isoc. XV.116 in armies not Athenian. λοχοί are found in Xen. *Hell.* I.2.3.
9. See P. Connolly (Aylesbury 1977) p.28-30.
10. Xen. *Hell.* II.4.31, VI.1.11, 4.17.
11. Xen. *Hell.* IV.4.7, V.4.46.
12. Such as at Lachaeon in 390 (Xen. *Hell.* IV.5.3-17).
13. Xen. *Hell.* III.5.22, IV.5.7.
14. Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.12.
15. Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.30, 4.20 and 5.10. λοχαγοί: Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 11.4, 13.4.
16. Sparta was recognised as the greatest military city-state from the time of the Persian Wars until the battle of Leuctra in 371. (Persian Wars: Herod. I.56.1-2. See also Thuc. I.18.1, III.34.1, V.72.4; Xen. *Hell.* IV.2.18, VII.1.31; Lys. XVI.17.).
17. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 61.4: "...Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἱπάρχους δύο ἐξ ἁπάντων· οὗτοι δ' ἡγούντο τῶν ἱππέων διελόμενοι τὰς φυλὰς εἰς ἑκάτερος· κύριοι δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσιν ὥσπερ οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατὰ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν."
18. P. J. Rhodes (Oxford 1981) p.685.
19. *Ath. Pol.* 61.5; Xen. *Hipp.* III.2.

20. *Ath. Pol.* 61.5: "...τὸν ἡγησόμενον τῶν ἱππέων ὥσπερ οἱ ταξίαρχοι τῶν ὀπλιτῶν."
21. *Xen. Hipp.* IV.3-6.
22. *Xen. Hipp.* IV.16.
23. Xenophon himself had been a commander of cavalry.
24. *Xen. Hipp.* VII.2: "κἂν μὲν εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν ἐμβάλλειν ἐπιχειρῇ ἄνευ τῆς ἄλλης πολεως, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους τούτους μόνοις ἂν τοῖς ἱππεῦσι διακινδυνεύοι."
25. *Xen. Hipp.* IV.7.
26. See, for example, *Dem.* IV.26; *Lys.* XVI.8.
27. *Plato Leg.* 755C: "δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα στρατηγούς αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ τούτοις εἰς τὸν πόλεμον διόν τινας ὑπηρεσίας ἱππάρχους καὶ φυλάρχους καὶ τῶν πεδῶν φυλῶν κοσμετὰς τῶν τάξεων..."
28. Giuseppe Giangrande in the *OCD* sv.Xenophon.
29. The cavalry corps was traditionally the arm made up of the wealthy and aristocratic citizens. See *Xen. Mem.* III.3.8f, 5.16-21, *Hipp.* I.7. They were often linked to oligarchic sympathies: *Xen Hell.* II.4.2, 8, 10, 24, III.1.4.
30. *Syll*<sup>3</sup> 319.
31. Even Xenophon has little to say on the Spartan cavalry, except to record its' poor quality at Leuctra (*Xen. Hell.* VI.4.10-11, IV.5.16).
32. *Xen. Hell.* IV.5.12.
33. *Xen. Hell.* VI.4.10-11, IV.5.16.
34. *Ascl.* VII.2, 11. Also *ταραντιναρχίαι* at *Ael.Tat.* XX.2 and *Arr. Tact.* XVIII.3; and for *ἐπίταγμα* see *Arr.Tact.* XVIII.4 and *Suidas* sv. *ἐφιππων*.
35. *ἐπιλάρχης*, *P. Petr.* III.p.21; *ἵππαρχος* (*Polyb.* XVIII.22.2).
36. ie. Because it was generally made up from the higher classes of citizen who had the time for more training.
37. ie. *Cnidos* (394/393): *C. Nepos IX.Con.* IV.4: "Qua victoria non solum Athenae, sed etiam cuncta Graecia quae sub Lacedaemoniorum fuerat imperio liberata est;" (though, of course, this was not purely an Athenian victory), *Naxos* (377/376): *Diod.* XV.35.2: "μετὰ γὰρ τὸν Πελοποννησιακὸν πόλεμον Ἀθηναῖοι ταύτην πρώτην ναυμαχίαν

- ἐνίκησαν...," and the defeats at Abydos and Amorgos in the Lamian War (323/322) (Marmor Parium §9. FGrH 239B; Diod. XVIII.15.9.).
38. See IG II<sup>2</sup> 98.18 and B.Jordan (1972) pt.II. p.117.
39. As there was, for example, in the Spartan navy, where the term nauarch was a specifically designated office completely separate from the commanders of the land forces.
40. See W. H.Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, (London 1911); cf. Ferguson, "Researches in Athenian Documents, II: The Athenian Generals," *Klio* IX (1909) p.314-323; Jordan (1975) p.117-119.
41. "στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν"; IG II<sup>2</sup> 682.4-7.(321 B.C.)
42. e.g. "στρατηγὸς τὸν νεὸν," (IG II<sup>2</sup> 98.18).
43. In the C4th. however, there is some evidence of subordination of *strategoi* to others in the college. Generals like Conon, a specialist in naval warfare must have held charge of of any Athenian naval action in which he played a part, whether he had "colleagues" or not. However, this subordination was a natural consequence of the growth of the military specialists within the Athenian *strategia*, and was an unofficial code of practice within the magistracy.
44. The navy of the Venetian Republic in this period has been described as "the supreme weapon of galley warfare" (See J. R. Hale, *Renaissance War Studies* [London 1983] chs.4, 5.).

The table below offers the comparison of the Athenian command structure to those found on Venetian and French war-galleys:

Navy:	C4th. Athenian.	C15th. Venetian.	C16th. French.
Rank:			
Captain.	<i>Trierarchos.</i>	<i>Capitano.</i>	<i>Capitane.</i>
Helmsman/1st. Officer.	<i>Cybernetes.</i>	<i>Senior nobile de poppa.</i>	<i>Leutenant.</i>
2nd.Officer.	<i>Celeustes.</i>	<i>Comito.</i>	<i>Comite.</i>
Clerk/Treasurer.	- *	<i>Scrivano.</i>	<i>Écrivain.</i>
Supply/	<i>Pentecontarchos.</i>	<i>Sottocomito.</i>	<i>Sous-comite.</i>
Disbursement Officer.			
Under-Helmsman.	<i>Prorates.</i>	<i>Junior nobile de poppa.</i>	<i>Sous-Lt.</i>

\* The equivalent officer whilst not (yet) found in the C4th. Athenian model has been located in Rhodian fleets of the late C4th/early C3rd. (*grammateos* : IG XII. Supp. p.139 no.317.).

I think it necessary to point out that whilst the Athenian naval command structure compared very favourably with the Venetian and French models in terms of ranks, the later navies, by necessity, possessed more of each officer (except, of course, for the captain and first officer) on each ship. This was due to increases in ship-size which brought with it parallel increases in the numbers making up a full ship's complement. Whilst the typical C4th. Athenian trireme possessed a full crew of around 189 (excl. officers), 170 rowers, 10 marines and four archers (J. S. Morrison and R. T. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships* [London 1968] p.264, 266 and IG II<sup>2</sup> 1951), a typical French galley of the C16th. would have 202 rowers, 29 deckhands, 6 cabinboys and eight guards-245 in all (excl. marines etc.). Cf. Amit (1965) Ch.2: The Crew of the Trireme; Casson (1971) p.300-321; Morrison and Coates (1986) p.111-113.

45. M. Glover, "The True Patriot: Marshal Jourdan.", in D. Chandler ed., *Napoleon's Marshals*. (London 1986) p.159-160. Other references and comments on these officials are made at pp.299, 433 and 159.
46. On *archontes* and *episcopoi* see Liddell and Scott, *An English - Greek Lexicon* (9th. ed.) sv. ἀρχόντες, ἐπισκόποι. On the ἀρχόντες see Thuc. I.115.5; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 24.3; Antiphon V.47; ML 45, 46.6, 7, 69.42-43, 89.54; On the ἐπίσκοποι see ML 40.13, 50; Ar. *Av.* 1035-1052, Meiggs (1972) p.212-213. Cf. J. Balcer, "Imperial Magistrates in the Athenian Empire.", *Historia* XXV (1976) p.257-282.
47. Aesch. I.56; Dem. IX.10. On the slaves see Dem. II.19, VIII.47 and X.22. Cf. O. Jacob, "Les esclaves publics à Athènes," *Bibliothèque de la faculté de la philosophie et lettres de l'Université de Liège* XXXV (1928), and for a modern discussion Y. Garlan, *Slaves in the Ancient World* (Cornell 1978) p.165-167.
48. Dem. L.

50. On the λαφυροπωλαί see Xen. *Hell.* IV.1.26, *Lac. Pol.* 13.11; cf. Pritchett pt.1. p.90-92. On the ἐξετασταί see B. D. Merritt, "Greek Inscriptions," *Hesperia XII* (1942) p.278; W. B. Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens* (Cambridge, Mass. 1931) p.64; I. Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca* I. (Berlin 1814) p.252; the quote from H. W. Parke (1933) p.149.
51. "Augusto Pinochet," *The Guardian Profile*, January 31st. 1990.
52. Pritchett (1974) p.35.
53. Diod. XIII.2.6 (repeated at XIII.30.3); Xen. *Hell.* I.6.5-6, II.1.31-32.
54. Canon is excluded from this list because his career, covering as it did, the early part of the C4th., was not strictly part of "the mercenary age", and was thus fully discussed in Pritchett's examination.
55. In terms of the commencement of his *strategiai*.
56. Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.34.
57. Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.14.
58. Xen. *Hell.* VI.5.49; Diod. XV.63.2; Paus. IX.14.3.
59. Aesch. II.28; Nep. XI. *Iphic.* 3.2.
60. Diod. XVI.21.1.
61. Diod. XV.29.4.
62. Diod. XIV.92.1.
63. Xen. *Hell.* V.4.14; Diod. XV.29; Dem. XX.76.
64. Diod. XV.30.5.
65. Diod. XV.68.1-4.
66. Diod. XVI.7.3-4.
67. Diod. XV.29.
68. Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.11.
69. Diod. XV.47.2-3.
70. Diod. XV.47.2-3.
71. Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.13.
72. See Pritchett (1974) p.64; cf. Cargill (1981) p.181: "In the judgement of his contemporaries and of later ancient authors however he (Chares) was uniquely brutal and lawless among the generals of his time." (cf. Nep. XII. *Chab.* 3.4, XIII. *Tim.* 4.4.).
73. Xen. *Hell.* IV.2.18; Aesch. II.168; Diod. XV.75.3.
74. Diod. XV.95.3: "ἐλομενοι δὲ στρατηγὸν Χάρητα καὶ ναυτικὴν δύναμιν δόντες ἐξέπεμψαν."

75. Chares on Corcyra: Aen. Tact. XI.13f (cf. Dem. XXIV.202).
76. Dem. XXIII.173.
77. Diod. XVI.7.3.
78. Dem. III.5: "...τούτου τοῦ μηνὸς μόγεις μετὰ τὰ μυστήρια δέκα ναῦς ἀπεστέιλαι· ἔχοντα κενὰς Χαρίδημον καὶ πέντε τάλαντ' ἀργυρίου."
79. Diod. XVIII.9.2.
80. Diod. XVIII.9.4.
81. As already discussed in the survey of tactical command structures.
82. Diod. XV.95.3.
83. Diod. XV.29.2-4.
84. Plut. *Lys.* 19; Thuc. I.131; Nep. III *Paus.* 3.4.
85. Xen. *Hell.* V.4.66: " χρήματα μέντοι μετεπέμπετο Ἀθήνηθεν."
86. Diod. XVI.57.2.
87. Prichett (1974) ch.4, collected fifteen examples from the C5th., five of which relate to Athenians (Thuc. II.70.4, IV.46, 47, 52.2, VII.48.2), and seven after 395 (Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.25-30 [*Lys.* XXVIII]; Diod. XV.43.6; Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.1; Diod. XVI.22.2 and Dem. XXIII.167 as well as the two notes above [nn.92,93]).
88. Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.1-2.
89. FGrH 105F4.
90. See Diod. XVI.22.1-2, 34.1; Dem. IV.24; Plut. *Aratos* 16; But especially Schol. to Dem. IV.19 and III.31.
91. Dem. XXIII.151, 183.
92. Dem. *Epist.* VI.
93. IGII<sup>2</sup> 110 (362), 187 (353), 213 (346) and 408 (330 ?).
94. Schol. to Dem. III.31.
95. Aesch. II.72-73.

1. I. Heath, *Armies of late Mediaeval Europe* (Goring 1980) Introduction.
2. Pericles' Funeral Oration in Thuc. II.39.1.
3. Plut. *Ages.* 26.3-5.
4. On Athenian discipline in the field see Ath. Pol. 61.2; On the unpopularity of strictness see Herod. VI.12.2. Cf. J. F. Lazenby, "Hoplite Warfare" p.79, in Gen. Sir John Hackett ed., *Warfare in the Ancient World* (London 1989).
5. F. E. Adcock (1957) p.6-7.
6. Such as Leonidas at Thermopylae and the Spartan Anaxibos in the C4th: "...men, it is a fine thing to die right here." (Xen. *Hell.* IV.7.38, VI.4.13).
7. Ar. *Ach.* 1071-1234, *Peace* 1171.
8. On Arginousai see Xen. *Hell.* I.7; Diod. XIII.99.101 and cf. Diod. XV.35.1.
9. See Lazenby (1989) p.80, V. D. Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (Bury St. Edmunds 1989) p.110.
10. Mantinea: Thuc. V.71.
11. Spartan tactical innovations at Nemea: Xen. *Hell.* IV.2.9-27; Anderson (1970) p.141-150; Lazenby (1985) p.135-143; Cartledge (1986) p.220-221. Coronea: Anderson (1970) p.151-153; Lazenby (1985) p.143-148; Cartledge (1986) p.219-222.
12. Refinement of hoplite warfare: Delbrück (1920) ch.4; Warry (1980) p.55-61; Lazenby (1988) p.69-71.
13. Xenophon *Cyropaedia*, *On Horsemanship* and *On Cavalry Command* and the work of Aeneas Tacticos *On Siegewarfare*. Possibly the author was the same man as the Stymphalian general mentioned in Xen. *Hell.* VII.3.1; Cf. Lazenby (1989) p.80 and I. Ferrill, *The Origins of War* (London 1985) p.113.
14. Xen. *Mem.* V.1.
15. Onasander 33.1.
16. Hanson (1989) p.111-114.
17. Hanson (1989) p.112.
18. Hanson (1989) p.113; See Diod. XVI.88.2.
19. Hanson (1989) p.114.
20. Plut. *Mor.* 187B2.



21. Polyenos III.9.29.
22. Cretan archers were employed by the Spartans in the First Messenian War of the late C8th. (Paus. IV.8.3, 12, 10.1). The Bible mentions "Kerethike" mercenaries employed by King David in the C10th. (II. Sam. 20.23; I Kings I.38).
23. The troop was originally raised by Conon: FGrH 324F48; FGrH 328F150; Dem. IV.24; Led by Iphicrates: Xen. *Hell.* IV.4.9; Diod. XIV.86.3; Andoc. III.13 and Polyenos III.9.45.
24. On the mercenary "explosion", see Parke (1933) p.143-144; Ferrill (1985) p.157-162; Also Dem. IV.24; Isoc. VIII.48; *contra* Pritchett (1974) p.102-109.
25. "Mercenariat": Aymard (1967) p.487-498; Garlan (1972) p.67-74; Cartledge (1986) p.315.
26. Pritchett, vol.I (1974) p.3-54, MacKechnie (1988) p.80-88.
27. Xen. *Mem.* III.1-4.
28. Leosthenes: Paus. I.25.5; VIII.52.5; Chares: Schol. to Dem. IV.19 and Diod. XVI.102.
29. See Introduction.
30. Eg. Chabrias at Naxos: Xen. *Hell.* V.4.60-61; Plut. *Phoc.* 6; Diod. XV.34.3-35.2: XV.34.4: "μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Χαβρίας μὲν ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναύαρχος μετὰ τοῦ στόλου παντὸς πλεύσας ἐπὶ τὴν Νάξον..."
31. Thuc. VI.72.4: "μέγα δὲ βλάβαι καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τὴν πολυαρχίαν (ἦσαν γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα οἱ στρατηγοὶ αὐτοῖς), τῶν τε πολλῶν τὴν ἀξύντακτου ἀναρχίαν."
32. Thuc. VI.72.5: "τούς τε στρατηγοὺς καὶ ὀλίγους καὶ αὐτοκράτορας χρῆναι ἐλέσθαι καὶ ὁμόσαι αὐτοῖς τὸ ὄρκιον ἢ μὴν ἑάσειν ἄρχειν ὅπῃ ἂν ἐπίστωνται..."
33. On *autokrator* see M. Scheele, *Strategos Autokrator* (Leipzig 1932), and reviews by Lenschau, *Philologische Wochenschrift* LIII (1933) p.1050 and Nesselhauf, *Gnomon* X (1934) p.210-211; Cf. C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford 1952) p.244-251.
34. Leosthenes as *autokrator* must be inferred from his election to the supreme command of the allied forces and from the language in Diod. XVII.111.3.

35. There is no evidence in the sources of Chares as αὐτοκράτωρ (cf. Diod. XV.35 etc.).
36. Military innovations by Iphicrates: Nep. XI. *Iphic.* 1.2-4; Diod. XV.44; Polyaeus III.29 *passim*. Chabrias: Nep. XII. *Chab.* 1.
37. Ferrill (1985) p.162.
38. On the *ephebeia* see Arist. Ath. Pol. 42.6; Dein. III.15; Reinmuth (1971); Tod 204; Bosworth (1988) p. 206-207; Humphreys (1985) p.206-209; Lewis (1973) p.254-256; Garland (1975) p.174ff.
39. On Chaeronea see Diod. XVI.86.2. Cf. J. T. Roberts, "Chares, Lysicles and the Battle of Chaeronea," *Klio* LXIV (1982) p.368. On the Athenian performance in the Lamian War see Diod. XVIII.9-18; Hyp. *Fun. Orat.*
40. Aesch. III.185.
41. Dem. XXIII.198; Aesch. III.178.
42. On Alexander and Cleitus see Q. Curtius Rufus VIII.19.51; Plut. Alex. 50-52; Arr. Anab. IV.8.1-9; Justin XII.6.1.
43. Foch quote from The Principles of War. Precepts and Judgements. (New York 1920) p.288.

## 9 The Generals and Politics

1. The democracy was more moderate than before. Whilst on the one hand the Athenians rejected the proposal of Phormisios that full citizen rights should be restricted to the owners of landed property, on the other hand, the powers of the *ecclesia* itself were somewhat reduced. See Hansen (1988) p.94-95; On the proposal of Phormisios see Lys. XXXIV.(Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 525-534).
2. IG II<sup>2</sup> 1604.24 (377/376) records a trireme of the name *Democratia*. It is the first of numerous listings of this and other so-named triremes. IG II<sup>2</sup> 2791 actually relates to such a cult. O. Palagia, *Hesperia* LI (1982) p. 99-113 discusses a huge statue set up in 333/332 of *Democratia*; cf. A. E. Raubitscheck, *Hesperia* XXXI (1962) p.238-243.

3. On the *ecclesia* see, for example, Hignett (1952), Sinclair (1988) and Hansen (1988) and who all provide excellent discussions on the nature of the direct democracy and the sovereignty of the people.
4. *Ath. Pol.* 28.5.
5. See W. R. Connor, *CJ* LXX (1974) p.175-194; Sir M. I. Finley, (London 1968) p.73-88; Carter, *The Quiet Athenian* (1986). Cf. Plato *Ep.* VII.324b-326b.
6. See Hansen (1988) p.64-65.
7. S. Perlman, *Athenaeum* XLI (1963) p.327-355. On class divisions and terminology see also de Ste Croix (1981) p.69-72.
8. See Isoc. XV.129-130.
9. Hell. Oxy. I.3.
10. Hell. Oxy. I.2.
11. Ar. *Plout.* 754-755.
12. For instance see Ar. *Plout.* 502, esp. 335-390; Lys. XXII.15, 20, XXVII.10-11; Isoc. *Antid.* 159-160. Cf. J. K. Davies (1981) and K. J. Dover (1974).
13. Ar. *Plout.* 108, 110.
14. Ar. *Plout.* 569-570: ".πλουτήσαντες δ' ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν παραχρήμ ᾗδικοι γεγέννηνται, ἐπιβουλεύουσί τε τῷ πλήθει καὶ τῷ δήμῳ πολемоῦσιν." See also the aristocratic Plato's views that the politicians are amongst the greatest criminals ( Plato *Gorg.* 525D-526B), and the men of wealth were enemies of the people and the democracy (Rep. 556C); On this aspect of Plato see A. Fuks, (1977) and (1979).
15. See however, David (1984) and Sommerstein (1985); cf. de Ste. Croix (1972) esp. p.70-76.
16. Isoc. *Paneg.* 168, *Archid.* 76, *Peace* 24, 46-48.
17. See W. K. Pritchett (1974) p.104 and nn.242, 243.
18. See E. David, (Leiden 1984) p.35.
19. A. H. Chroust (1954) p.280-288.
20. Accusations of bribe-taking and collaboration with foreign powers are common features of C4th. political rhetoric and oratory. See, for instance, Dem. VI. 30-34, 54-63, VII.5, VIII.66, X.70, XVIII.35, 131-132, XIX.8, 28, 110, 145, 220-225; cf. Aesch. III.103, 113, 126, 129, 156, 240; Dein. I.10, 28, 43; Hyp. F 4-6; Polyaen. I.48.3. Cf. D

- Harvey in *CRUX* (1985) p.76-117, esp.89-102.
21. On the *demos'* view of members of the "elite" as "traitors" see G. Herman, (1986): " The upper classes in the Greek city were involved in a network of alliances across community lines; the lower classes were confined within their laterally insulated communities; and the upper classes did display more solidarity with those of their kind outside their communities than they did with the lower classes inside them. The portrayal of the "foremost of citizens" as traitors was thus central to an ideology that was propagated by the *demos* (or on their behalf) to protect themselves - and the community as a whole - from external, upper class coalitions." (p.160).
  22. Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorff, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit* , vol.3 (Vienna 1923) p.248.
  23. Dem. XXII.37 complains how the "orators" and the "talkers" (*rhetores*, *hoi legentes* ) dominate both the council and the assembly. On the term rhetor see M. H. Hansen, *GRBS* XXIV (1983a).
  24. *Ath. Pol.* 41.3.
  25. *Ar. Eccl.* 183-185.
  26. *Ath. Pol.* 41.3.
  27. Heracleides is only known otherwise by a reference in Plato's *Ion*. (541D).
  28. *Ath. Pol.* 62.2.
  29. Field Marshal President Count Mannerheim, *Memoirs* , p.122.
  30. Napoleon I, *Maxims*.
  31. Diod. XIII.106; cf. Nep. IX. *Con.* 1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.
  32. Photios *Bibliotheca* 44b20-38; Ctesias *Persica* FGrH 688F30; Diod. XIV.39.
  33. Didymos *Dem.* col. 7.28ff; Diod. XIV.83.4-7.
  34. On Damaenetos see Hell. Oxy. VI.1-2, and Davies *APF* 3276.
  35. Hell. Oxy. VI.2.
  36. On Thrasyboulos' activities in the Corinthian War see Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.25-30; Lys. XXVIII and XXIX, and IGII<sup>2</sup> 24.
  37. Lys. XIX.7.
  38. Davies *APF* 506-510, 118-135.
  39. Nep. IX. *Con.* 1: "...Conon Athenienis Peloponnesio bello accessit ad

rem publicam... ."

40. Nep. IX. *Con.* 2. However, on Nepos' use of his sources see C. Dionisotti *JRS* LXXVIII (1988) p.35-49.
41. Conon's first generalship was only in 414/413, so he would only have been around forty years of age in 404/403; cf. Davies *APF* 13700, p.507.
42. Nep. IX. *Con.* 3.
43. Nepos mentions, as the sources for the *Lives of the Famous Generals*, Dinon, Timaeos, Silenos, Sosylos, Theopompos, Hermippos, Antigonos of Carystos and Satyros. But there were undoubtedly others.
44. See Diod. IV.8.1-9; Nep. IX. *Con.* 4.
45. Photios *Bibliotheca* 44b20-38; Hell. Oxy. IX.2-3, XV.1-3, XIX.1-3 (col. 15.32-col. 16.29).
46. Erythrae honours Conon: SIG 126.15-16 (Tod 106); Statues at Ephesos and Samos (Paus. VI. 3.16).
47. Dem. XX.70; Nep. XIII. *Tim.* 2.3; Dein. I.14; Isoc. V.64, VII.12, 65, IX.68.
48. That Conon's career did begin in the Peloponnesian War, in conjunction with those of the orators such as Cleon and Cleophon, who had little background in military affairs, marks out the fact that, despite many historians' arbitrary distinction between the military and domestic political trends in leadership between the C5th. and C4th.'s, this in itself is too clear cut a boundary, emphasised by the imposition of modern dating. The whole evolutionary process of these figures and their offices was one of gradual and undramatic change.
49. The rivalry between Thrasyboulos and Conon might have been caused by two reasons. Firstly, the ideological conflict between the traditional anti-Persian attitudes of the Athenians and supporting Conon, a Persian admiral, might have been too great to bear for Thrasyboulos. Secondly, and more directly relevant, Thrasyboulos' position might well have been threatened, then undermined by the appearance of Conon, and this might well have brought about hostility between the two. See Ar. *Eccl.* 202-203: "...Thrasyboulos is angry because he is no longer called upon." Conon himself is credited as calling Thrasyboulos a man of rash counsel (*thrasus boulei*) (Arist. *Rhet.* 1400b.20). See further Strauss,

"Thrasyboulos and Conon: A Rivalry in Athenian Politics in the 390's B.C.", *AJP* CV (1984) p.37-48.

50. Dem. XIX.191.

51. J. Ober (Leiden 1985). See the convincing counter arguments found in the review of Ober by P. Harding in *Phoenix* XLII.1 (1988) p.61-71, but note Ober again in *Phoenix* XLIII.3 (1989).

52. Xen. *Hell.* V.4.19; Plut. *Pelop.* 14.1.

53. This incident has provided a source of great debate amongst scholars. The problem is that the sources are hopelessly divided on the issue. Diodoros (XV. 25.4) asserted that the support for the Thebans was official, but Xenophon's account contains no idea of any official sanction for the actions of the two generals. Many scholars have argued that the actions by the generals must have been "unofficial" (See Grote X. p.88-102 esp.90n.2; Cargill [1977] p.56; Roberts [1982] p.81-83; Ober [1985] p.210-211). But numerous others have accepted the opposite: e.g. Fabricius, *RhM* XLVIII (1893) p.448-473; Judeich, *RhM* LXXVI (1922) p.171-197 and Rehdantz, *Vitae* 44; Busolt (1873-1875) p.681-683; Cawkwell (1973) p.56-60; Hornblower (1983) p.209. Cf. Kallet-Marx (1985) p.140-147 for a full discussion of all the evidence.

54. *Ibid* p.81-83.

55. Iphicrates is attested as a reasonable orator in Arist. *Rhet.* 2.23 (1397b).

56. Nep. XII. *Iphic.* 3.

57. IGII<sup>2</sup> 1609.95. Davies APF 560-561 shows that Chabrias was not, however, one of the *nouveaux riches*, since his father too, had undertaken the trierarchy.

58. Courage: Dem. XX.82; Nep. XII *Chab.* 4; Plut. *Phoc.* 11; Diod. XVI.7.3. Vulgaritas (luxury): Nep. XII *Chab.* 3.3; Hyp. F137 (Blass).

59. Plut. *Mor.* 186f; Theopomp. *De. Elig. Mag. Vat. Gr.* 2306F.B.18-26 makes the statement that Chabrias and Iphicrates were examples of true leaders who would have been prevented from becoming *strategoi* by a property qualification. Though Iphicrates was descended from the Eupraxergidai (*Hesperia* VII [1938] p.92-93; Davies (1971) p.248), note Iphicrates' own statement that his family history begins with him

- (Lys. fr.43). (See W. R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth Century Athens* [New York 1975] on Themistocles, a strikingly similar case from the C5th.)
60. Polyaen. III.9.29. This whole incident, however, might be a piece of historical fabrication. It seems very unlikely that a general even of the standing of Iphicrates would have been allowed to carry a sword, as the accused, into court.
  61. Grote VII. p.659.
  62. On the military innovations of Iphicrates see Nep. XI *Iphic.* 1.3-4; Polyaen. III.9.*passim* ; Diod. XV.44.
  63. See Sealey (1956) p.178-205.
  64. Aesch. II.70.
  65. Isoc. XV.130-134.
  66. Nep. XIII. *Tim.* 1.
  67. See Hansen (1988) p.58-61 on the increasing domination of the assembly by specially trained orators.
  68. See Chapter 3.
  69. Timotheos of course, could not pay the fine and withdrew to Chalcis in Euboea. He died soon after, and his son Conon, was allowed to discharge the debt on remittance of one tenth of the full fine, even then a huge fortune in Athenian terms. See Dein. I.14, III.17; Isoc. XV.21.4; Nep. XI. *Iphic.* 3., XIII. *Tim.* 3.
  70. Aesch. III.243; Nep. XII. *Chab.* 1.
  71. Dem. XXIII.130; Aesch. III.243; Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 12.
  72. On the necessary attendance levels required in the assembly for the granting of honours see Andoc. I.87; Dem. LIX.89-90, XXIV.45-46; Plut. *Arist.* 7.6. Cf. P. J. Rhodes, (1972) p.196-198; R. K. Sinclair, (1988) p.115.
  73. Callistratos was the nephew of Agyrrhios (see Sinclair [1988] p.163).
  74. Brusilov was made Marshal of the Russian Empire for his offensive on the Galician Front in the Summer of 1916. He lost 200,000 men. His book on offensive tactics was still the standard text in Russian military academies in 1940. On the increasing honours for generals in the C4th. honours for generals see the important discussions in Y. Garlan (1989) p.150-153 and A. Aymard (1967) p.51-72.

75. Honours for Timotheos: *Tod* 128; *SEG* 16.55, 22.88; Isoc. XV. 109-110.
76. In the 470's and 460's Cimon had built up and exploited the reputation of his father Miltiades, the victor of Marathon, with public buildings at Athens. (cf. Connor, *New Politicians* p.16, 43-46).
77. R. Sealey (California 1976) p.431.
78. Dem.XX.146; Aesch. III.243.
79. Dem. XX.246; Aesch. III.243; Hyp. F. B.22.
80. eg. J. T. Roberts (1982) p.72.
81. Half-heartedness: Xen. *Hell.* VI.5.49; Paus. IX.16.6.
82. Diod. XV.38.3 describes Callistratos as the servant of Iphicrates.
83. H. W. Parke, (1933) p.83.
84. Isoc. XIV.22-40; G. Grote VII.p.251.
85. Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.33-36; Dem. XIX.137.
86. Rehdantz, *Vitae* p.112; cf. A. Schaefer (1856-1858) I.p.95.
87. Aesch. III.138-139.
88. As Rehdantz contended (n.95).
89. Diod. XV.38.3.
90. Plut. *Dem.* 5.1.
91. For this trial see Dem. XXI.64; Arist. *Rhet.* I.7.13; Plut. *Mor.* 187d; Diog. Laert. III.23-24.
92. Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.13; Dem. XLIX.9-10.
93. Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.14.
94. Isoc. XV.111; Arist. *Oic.* 2.1350b4-15; Polyaen. III.10.5.
95. For the list of *strategoi* impeached during the 404-322 period, see Hansen (1975) p.87-111, 116-120; Sinclair (1988) p.148-152.
96. Lyc.*Leoc.* 93.
97. Dem. L.6.
98. Aesch. II.20.
99. Dem. XIX.180; Schol. Aesch. I.56.
100. Hyp. IV.1.
101. Dem. XXIII.153, 167; Aesch. III.52 and Schol.
102. Diod. XV.95.3; Aesch. II.124; Polyaen. VI.1.
103. Apollodoros as *strategos* see Davies *APF* and Kirchner *PA*. Also Hansen (1983b) p.151-180.



- 104.Dem. XXIII.198.  
105.See M. H. Hansen (1983) p.158-183.  
106.See n.109.  
107.For the activities of Chabrias in this period see Chapter 3.  
108.On Chares' relationship with Aristophon see Diod. XV.95.1; Dem. LI.8-9.  
109.See my detailed discussion in Chapter 3.  
110.Dem. XIX.332.  
111.See the relevant discussion in Chapter 5.  
112.Dem. *Ep.* III.31.  
113.Davies *APF* and Kirchner *PA* 15292.  
114.Schol. to Dem. III.31.  
115.Theopomp. F205.  
116.On buying support see Dem. XXIII.146-147, 185-189; Theopomp. FGrH 115F213.  
117.Plut. *Dem.* 3.  
118.For Aristophon see Diod. XV.95.1-3; Dem. LI.8-9. On Demosthenes and Hypereides see Plut. *Cic. & Dem.* 3.1, *Mor.* 848E.  
119.IGII<sup>2</sup> 1496.131-132, 140-141.  
120.Diod. XVI.22; Dem. IV.24.  
121.Diod. XVI.22.2  
122.Diod. XVI.34.3.  
123.See J. T. Roberts, *Klio* LXIV (1982) p.370-371.  
124.eg. Chares.  
125.Dem. XII.3, VIII.20, 22.  
126.IGII<sup>2</sup> 228.  
127.Dem. VIII.  
128.Arist. *Rhet.* II.1383.13.  
129.Plut. *Mor.* 841B.  
130.See the decree of Stratocles in honour of Lycourgos: IGII<sup>2</sup> 457 (Syll.<sup>3</sup> 326).  
131.B. Merritt, *Hesperia* XXI (1952) p.355-359; cf. C. Mossé, *Eirene* VIII (1970) p.71-78.  
132.On the pro-Macedonian sympathies of the Athenian upper classes see de Ste Croix (1981) p.298-300.

- 133.Plut. *Mor.* 841b-c; Diod. XVI.88.1; Mitchel (1962) p.213-229.
- 134.Temple refurbishments: IGII<sup>2</sup> 333, 334, 739-741. Construction works: IGII<sup>2</sup> 457.
- 135.Statue: Raubitscheck, *Hesperia* XXXI (1962) p.268; Sacrifice: IGII<sup>2</sup> 1496.
- 136.See Reinmuth (1971); Tod 204; Humphreys (1983) p.206-209; Bosworth (1988) p.209-210.
- 137.Contact: Lepore (1955) p.161-170; Bosworth (1988) p.209-210.
- 138.See Chapter 4, pt.1, a.
- 139.E. Lepore, *Parola del Passato* XL (1955).
- 140.See E. Badian, JHS LXXXI (1961) p.16-43. On Demosthenes' involvement in the scandal see Hypereides' *Contra Demosthenem* . Cf. G. Colin, *REG* XXXVIII (1925) p.306-349, *REG* XXXIX (1926) p.31-89 and *Annales de l'Est* , Mémoires IV. (1934).
- 141.Bosworth (1988) Appendix B, p.293-294.
- 142.On Leosthenes' early career see Diod. XVII.111; XVIII.9.1; Paus. I.25.5. Cf. C. Mossé, (1973) ch.4; Matthieu, *Rev. de Philol.* III (1929) p.159-185; I. Worthington, *Historia* XXVI (1987) p.489-491.
- 143.See A. W. Pickard-Cambridge *CAH* VI. p.455.
- 144.As Diod. XVIII.9.
- 145.Diod. XVIII.3.6.
- 146.Diod. XVIII.17.6.
- 147.Diod. XVIII.65.6; Plut. *Phoc.* 27-28. Cf. Gehrke, (1976) p.102; Cloché, *Revue Historique* CXLIV (1923) p.173; Contra L. Tritle, (1988) p.137-140.
- 148.Strabo IX.98.; Diod. XX.45.5.
- 149.Diod. XVIII.74.3, XX.45.2.
- 150.Polyb. XII.13.9.
- 151.Syll<sup>3</sup> 319.9-11.

1. Isoc. *Panegyricos* ; cf. Matthieu (1925) p.6-69. Plato, *Ep.* VIII.
2. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix (London 1981) p.298-299.
3. Accusations and counter-accusations of Macedonian sympathies: see de Ste Croix (1981) p.298-300; F. D. Harvey in *CRUX* (1985) p.89-102.
4. On bribery see M. Markle III (Exeter 1985) p.265-297.
5. See the discussion in Chapter 9.
6. The known colleagues of Leosthenes in the *strategia* of 323/322 were Demetrios, Dikaiogenes, Phaidros, Phocion and Antiphilos; cf. Develin (1949) p.408.
7. Grote (1888), vol. XII, p.236.
8. A. Vagts, *A History of Militarism Civilian and Military* (New York 1971) p.14-15.
9. See W. Lengauer (1979) p.126-127.

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